Robert Floyd (CTBTO) on the vital role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in advancing the NPT's non-proliferation and disarmament objectives - Press Conference

Good morning, dear colleagues. My name is Charles. I'm senior liaison officer of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization here at the United Nations headquarters. And it's my pleasure to accompany Executive Secretary Dr. Floyd for his engagement with you this morning. As we mark 30 years since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty opened for signature, its relevance has never been clearer. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and the CTBT is a key component of this architecture. Ending nuclear test explosions is essential to limiting the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. This week, Executive Secretary Dr. Robert Floyd is in New York to participate in the 11th Review Conference of the NPT. On Monday, he delivered a statement to the conference, and a copy is available if you're interested. Today, he's joining you to chat some more with those of you in this room, as well as those online, and he'll be talking with you about the relevance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its contribution to international peace and security. Since taking office in 2021, Dr. Floyd has led our organization's efforts to strengthen the global norm against nuclear test explosions, to advance the treaty's universalization, and to further develop its unique verification regime. He brings extensive experience in international security and non-proliferation, including from his previous role as Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. Dr. Floyd will deliver opening remarks and thereafter he will take your questions. It's my honor to introduce the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Dr. Robert Floyd. Dr. Floyd, the floor is all yours, please.

Thank you so much, Charles. And thank you to each of you for making time for this briefing. To us, it's a very important issue, and I trust to you it would be also. The NPT review conference, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference here this week, but for the next four weeks, is an important review of the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The organization that I head is about implementing a treaty that sits within that architecture, and that is a treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. banning nuclear explosions of any size from the tiniest to the largest. That is an essential part of being able to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world from state to state, and also to limit the further development of nuclear weapons. This week, or these last few days here at the review conference, it's been a wonderful opportunity to meet with ministers, senior officials from across all regions of the world, and also to meet with the Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. And it's been very clear that as I speak with them, that they recognize the essentiality of a ban on testing to maintain non-proliferation and disarmament. for the good of this generation and all generations to come. The geopolitical context is certainly worrying. A lot of uncertainty. We see multilateralism under intense pressure, various elements of treaties that are important for international security under pressure, arms Control treaties, bilateral expiring, conflicts in various parts of the world, rhetoric about threats of nuclear testing, returning to testing, and even concerns about possible use. This is why the work of organizations such as the CTBTO to seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and the further development of them is so critically important. The CTBT has been amazingly successful. We're celebrating the 30th anniversary year of its opening for signature this year. But it's been amazingly successful in that time is that it's almost turned off the tap when it comes to nuclear weapon testing. Before 30 years ago, when the opening for signature of the treaty occurred, over 2,000 nuclear tests had taken place. In the last 30 years, less than a dozen. That is stunning. A treaty that is almost universally supported, a ban on nuclear testing of no matter what size. A verification system that gives nations confidence so that there is a powerful norm against testing. Now I stress norm because the treaty has not yet entered into force and therefore is not legally binding. But our international monitoring system will detect a nuclear weapon explosion of 500 tons of TNT or above anywhere across the face of the planet or underwater, underground. it will be detected. And that is a powerful benefit to all humanity because any state that thinks of developing a nuclear weapon would need to test one. And if they did, it will be known to all. The data that we collect from around the world in our international monitoring system is all beamed by satellite into Vienna. We put it all together and then we make it available to all of our state signatories. It's a very open, transparent and powerful verification system. Over 90% established, 307 facilities around the world are in place and operating. All of the six North Korean tests were detected, even the very first one, which was quite small. We find ourselves these days also needing to address disinformation when particularly in social media people get excited about a seismic event you know an earthquake type event that it's actually a nuclear test and we had one of those situations um you know back late 2024 was a couple of seismic events in Northern Iran Social media got very excited as people were claiming those seismic events to be nuclear tests. But the analysis done by my colleagues showed that those events were entirely consistent with natural seismic events, earthquakes in northern Iran. The countries of the world breathed a sigh of relief when we made that known, and I was glad that our analysis and statement was seen as authoritative, independent, impartial. And it had that positive effect. So, in the current situation, the CTBT and the ban on testing is a little bit more in front of mind than what it has been for a long time. Particularly when states are threatening to return to testing. and the likelihood that if one state tests, others would and even more would potentially then go into a spiral of expanded testing. That is a spiral that we do not want to see start because it may never be able to be stopped. We also have a situation where an allegation is made by one state against another state where they say that testing has taken place and strongly denied by the other state. And so that causes there to be real interest and questions about the ability of our verification system to detect even the smallest of nuclear explosions so that the states of the world would have confidence that they would know that no nuclear testing is taking place. So the CTBT has a range of different verification mechanisms that are to deal with the large and the small. And all of those, when put together, are a powerful set of verification measures. But we would need entry into force of the treaty to be able to use all of those measures. And we're still short on that. There are nine states that need to ratify the treaty, nine particular states. We have 187 states have signed, 178 have ratified, but there are nine specific ones that still need to ratify so the treaty could become legally binding. That is an important issue. But there are other ways that confidence can be built in a case where allegations are made and denials are issued. Back to the 30th anniversary and then over to your questions. The 30th anniversary of the signing or the opening for signature of the treaty is a significant milestone and an anniversary is a great time to reflect on how far we've come, what we've achieved. We do that with our own birthdays and other anniversaries in our lives. It's also a good time to look forward as to where we still need to go. The 30th anniversary of the CTBT is no different. So much has been achieved. So much has been contributed to international peace and security, but there still is so much more that we need to achieve. We will continue to work on establishing our verification system, work towards entry into force, and to contribute in a positive and a powerful way to peace and security for all. Thank you very much, and I welcome your questions.

Thank you very much, Dr. Floyd. Dr. Floyd will take a few questions before he moves on to his next engagements. I'll be grateful if journalists would kindly introduce themselves and the media they represent, and I'll start with the lady on the front row.

Thank you very much. Mr. Floyd, on behalf of the United Nations Correspondence Association for doing this briefing, my name is Edith Lettera from the Associated Press. As you said, the United States, you didn't name them, but the United States and Russia have both threatened to resume nuclear testing. Have you been in talks with both countries about the issue? And frankly, is there anything that can really be done to stop them? And I have another question, too. The same nine countries haven't ratified for many, many years. Do you see any movement at all that any one of them might be moving toward ratification? Okay.

Thank you. Edith, thank you for your continued interest in this treaty. I recall you being here on previous occasions. We engage with all states, whether they are signatories, ratifying states or not. It's very important because this whole ban on nuclear weapon testing is effective when all states are complying with that and with the global norm. In the case of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, yes, there has been statements there about circumstances for resumption of testing. We certainly do engage diplomatically. Even recently, I was in Moscow and I had a meeting with Sergei Lavrov and we talked about exactly these issues. And I certainly make the case that it is not in any state's interest to see an unconstrained return to testing. You know, the world used to have one nuclear test every week, every week. And now, in 30 years, less than a dozen. That is a much better world and we do not want to go back to the other one. So yes, I do raise that with representatives of both governments and all governments of the world. With your question regarding any movement on the nine states that are yet to ratify so the treaty can enter into force. I think it's fair to say that we need to see a way that the United States of America, the Russian Federation, People's Republic of China might be able to address the treaty and its ratification together. It is, I think, quite unlikely that any one of them would move on that without the others simultaneously moving together. And that certainly is something that I would encourage all of those states to consider. And that would certainly be a powerful step forward. I don't have good news to report to you on that matter at the moment.

Quick follow-up. You said you met with Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister. Have you met with any senior U.S. officials.

I have not had the opportunity to meet with the Secretary of State. I would greatly welcome that. I have met with officials from the State Department, certainly.

Thank you very much to AP and to Dr. Floyd for his response. I move to the second row, gentleman in the orange tie. Thank you.

Thank you for this briefing. This is Namo Abdullah with Rudaw Media Network. Given the current Iran tensions, how confident is your organization that any nuclear test can be verifiably detected and prevent escalation or misinformation? Thank you.

We are very confident that a nuclear test explosion or a nuclear explosion of a magnitude equivalent to 500 tons of TNT chemical explosives or higher would be detected and could be characterized and known characterized meaning is that seismic event an earthquake? Is it a chemical explosion? Is it a nuclear explosion? And so the threshold for our international monitoring system at the moment is 500 tons of TNT yield and above. To give you some idea, you know, how big is that? It's worth using the reference point of the size of the atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. So the Hiroshima bomb was 15,000 tons of TNT equivalent. So the threshold of our sensitivity is only two to 3% of the size of the Hiroshima bomb. So it is very, very small when it comes to a nuclear weapon. So we are very confident of that. We are way less confident below that threshold of 500 tons and down to anything which is yield producing, you know, zero plus. And that's the area where I think we need to do more work to build confidence in the international community that any test would be detected.

You and Pro Nico. Yes, please.

Mark Goldberg with Global Dispatches. Earlier, you referenced, without naming names, accusations between the United States and China around alleged China nuclear testing and said that the mechanisms to detect such a test are not available to you absent ratification or entry into force of the treaty. What would those mechanisms be if the treaty was entered into force?

Yeah. So the treaty has four different elements of its verification regime. One of those elements is the international monitoring system and the international data center, which then provides that data out to all states. And as I've mentioned, it can detect explosions from 500 tons plus. That's what it was designed for. Actually, the expectation was it would be 1000 tons threshold and above. It's actually now down half of that. And I think it will go even lower, be more sensitive. But the other three mechanisms in the treaty is a mechanism for consultation and clarification. The kind of situation that we see where a question is asked and then there is a mechanism and a requirement to provide answers. Another one, the third mechanism is confidence building measures, which is the sharing of information so that states can have confidence of what other states are doing or understanding what where seismic event might be, etc. The fourth and really critically is on-site inspection. So where there is a concern that there could be a nuclear test that has taken place somewhere, then a team of people working with predetermined equipment and methodologies, you know, could then go into that location and be able to do some testing and some sampling to determine whether there'd been a nuclear explosion. So as you can see, Mark, those three mechanisms can be used for very small the concern about a very small explosion that may have taken place and to be able to then clarify whether there is a concern there or not, a violation or not. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Do we have any questions online? I see none. You want one more question? Okay.

Sure. Is it your view that an outcome document at the NPT right now needs to include an explicit prohibition on testing?

The review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty always aims to agree an outcome document. The history is not being always successful in that regard, as that needs to be a consensus-based document. I think it is fair to say that in the current circumstances, there are many points that states are likely to have differing views. And so to find a pathway to consensus is going to be a challenging process, but I really appreciate the leadership of Ambassador Viet Do, who is leading to seek to achieve exactly that. Maybe there will be a possibility for an outcome document which is a bit shorter than normal, which might be more principles-based and go really to the heart of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a document could be quite restricted in its scope, but very powerful as a signal if all states were able to sign on. I would welcome that.

Like to thank you all for your participation in this engagement this afternoon. We are grateful for your continued support for our treaty and of course we are always happy to engage with you. That said, this is the end of this engagement and we are very grateful for your kind assistance. Dr. Floyd will move on to his next engagement. Thank you.