4295th Meeting, 146th Session, Human Rights Committee (CCPR)

Dear members, distinguished delegation, good morning. I hope you had a good rest. This is meeting number 4295. It is a public meeting and on webcast. This morning, we will continue the constructive dialogue with the delegation of Rwanda. As agreed yesterday at the end of the meeting, the delegation will have 10 minutes to respond to outstanding follow-up questions related to the first part of list of issues. Without further ado, I'd like to now give the floor to Dr. Emmanuel Ugirishibusa.

Thank you very much, dear Chairperson. of this committee, distinguished members of the committee. Uh there was some pending questions that we do hope that we'll be able to reply in the coming next 10 minutes. And I'll see the floor to my colleague Doctor Wichez Picard. Uh to respond to some of the questions then I will make some remarks on others.

And thank you honorable minister. Good morning distinguished members. I'd like to respond to one of the outstanding questions which was asked by Madam Basim with regards to the concerns that they may have about street vending by women and children and the treatment reserved to those that engage in this informal trading. Homelessness, begging, and informal trade street vending are not criminal offenses under the law and a person may not be arrested solely on those grounds. I'd like to make a distinction between the women that are found to be engaging in informal trading, street vending. Various cities will have various city ordinances and prohibitions about prohibited activities within a certain area of the city. Some of the cities prohibit street vending, and when a person is found to be engaging in such prohibited activity, they are usually asked to vacate the area or a fine is imposed, an administrative fine on them. However, we also recognize the precarity that drives women and children to engage in street vending. There are several social programs that are targeting informal vending to bring them into the formal trade by encouraging them to join cooperatives of vendors, by constructing multiple markets where they can join the markets and have a stall within the market and thereby moving from the informal to the formal trade. And it has been quite successful with thousands of women that have been able to now formalize their trade. There are also cases of street vendors being co-opted by criminals into selling drugs in addition to selling other wares. When they are found, some of them will obviously be investigated and prosecuted within the ambit of the law by the relevant authorities. However, when it is found that children are engaged in this street situation, they are mostly treated as in need of protection and reintegration, not as offenders merely because of their social condition. There are programs that are led by the National Rehabilitation Service and child protection institutions that prioritize family tracing, reintegration, family strengthening, education and vocational support. 8,072 children in street situations were reintegrated into families, and the National Child Development Agency also moved 3,571 children from institutions into family-based care. There are more than 80,000, 80,471 persons that have received preliminary rehabilitation services that include psychosocial support, group therapy, civic education, and medical care. The intent is to provide an all-around, all-inclusive rehabilitative care by looking at the entirety of the socioeconomic condition that has brought people into a situation where they would be engaged in informal trade or even having been co-opted by criminals into engaging in criminal activities such as selling drugs. Some of the programs that are provided to them, they receive psychosocial rehabilitation and vocational training skills, and graduates are then reintegrated into families and communities. Children are reunited with families, and there is a post-reintegration follow-up, and that was provided to 1,429 graduates from these programs at Iwawa Rehabilitation Center, and 97.4% were reported to have settled successfully. 41,797 graduates were reintegrated in their community. So I would say that is the support that is provided to informal traders, to homeless people, and to beggars, which sometimes are overlapping. These are the same people that would engage in all these various activities. So we all look at a holistic approach, addressing the root causes of the situation that has brought them into informal trade, into even being co-opted by these criminals. I thank you.

Thank you very much for your replies. And I'd like to move to the second round of questions this morning. And today, I will first, I'll give the floor to Mr. Sinanovic. You have the floor.

Good morning to delegation. Thank you for your answers during yesterday's dialogue. On issue 10, I thank the delegation for reaffirming Rwanda's commitment to protecting children from recruitment and use in armed conflict. Paragraphs 39 and 40 deny Rwanda Defence Force involvement in forced recruitment and deny military, logistical and other support to M23. We would appreciate a substantive response to the specific UN findings that differ from this account. In resolution 2773, adopted unanimously in February 2025, the Security Council called on the Rwanda Defence Force to cease support to M23 and withdraw from Congolese territory without preconditions. The UN Group of Experts in its 2025 report also described Rwandan military involvement and effective command and control over M23 operations. How does the delegation reconcile its categorical denial with these findings? Which specific findings does Rwanda dispute, and what evidence has it provided in response? Has an independent national authority examined the underlying allegations? I have three more specific questions. First, on recruitment. What investigations have been undertaken into allegations that persons, including children, were recruited in Rwanda or trained on Rwandan territory for deployment with M23? Second, on support and operational involvement. Have allegations concerning the provision of personnel, weapons, training, transport, or logistical assistance to M23 been examined? Have they included possible responsibility for summary executions, sexual violence, torture, and forced displacement, including responsibility arising from orders or a failure to prevent and punish violations? Please identify any ongoing or completed investigations, their scope and their outcomes. If none have been opened, please explain why the UN findings have not prompted an investigation. Third, on prevention and cooperation, what binding instructions prohibit Rwandan personnel from assisting recruitment or operation involving serious abuses? How is compliance verified? Will Rwanda facilitate access to relevant personnel, facilities, and records for competent UN mechanisms? I thank you very much.

Thank you very much. Now I will give the floor to Madame Bassim.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Good morning to the delegation and to all present here and online. I would like to thank you, madam, for the explanation you gave. It covers partly the issue I'm going to raise this morning, which is about the arbitrary detention of persons, including children, on the grounds of vagrancy. The committee continues to receive reports that, according to 2017 legislation, anyone exhibiting deviant behaviour, such as drug use, begging, vagrancy and informal street vending, can be held in a transit centre for up to two months. without any other further legal justification or oversight. In view of this broad interpretation of the term "deviant behavior," can the esteemed delegation clarify in practice how the term is applied to the persons living on the street, men and women, children and adults? Also, the reports on the situation of the detainees, particularly in Kigali Transit Center, which was known as Kitgondji Transit Center, they deplore, these reports deplore the very dire conditions in the center and other similar establishments particularly for children who are sometimes put together with adults, and they are subject to beatings from the responsible of the center or the other adult detainees, the bad nutrition, whether in quantity or quality, and the poor hygienic situation. On the other hand, others of these arrested persons are not led to the transit centers but taken to the local police stations, where they are held for periods ranging between a few hours and one week without charge and no regard to due process, neither access to family or guardians or legal assistance. What are the measures taken by the government to remedy to the deplorable situation of these detainees, especially the juvenile ones in the transit center, before their transfer to the rehabilitation establishments where they are supposed to receive psychosocial care, as you said, education, and vocational training to reintegrate them in the society and avoid their return to the streets. Has the Government considered to reduce, except in limited cases, the detention of children in conflict with the law and develop and implement non-custodial solutions such as counseling, training, non-custodial sentences, and community services? As far as the abusive treatment and misconduct by the police, such as arbitrary detention and use of violence with the detainees, what measures are taken to prosecute those responsible and hold them accountable and apply the appropriate penalties. I will now move to another related subject, which is the prison conditions. Despite the recognition of the significant progress achieved by the State Party as far as the crowding overrate of prisons occupancy the efforts, such as expanding facilities, implementing plea bargaining and using non-custodial sentences, have not fully alleviated the issue of overcrowding of the prisons, as it continues to persist, particularly for the pre-trial detainees. Can the esteemed delegation provide information about the most recent prison population rate and the impact of the measures already taken to tackle the overcrowding. Can you clarify what steps have been taken to remedy procedural delays and case backlogs that continue to affect the judicial system and lead to long pre-trial detentions delaying access to justice, ending by exacerbating the overcrowding of the detention facilities. How did the government ensure the effectiveness and accessibility independence of complaints mechanisms for detainees experiencing ill treatment or procedural violations? and the guarantees provided for a transparent, impartial handling of these complaints? Finally, what measures are put in place to protect juvenile detainees and ensure their separation from adults in detention facilities? Thank you for your cooperation, and I'm looking forward to the answers.

Thank you very much, Madame Bassim. Now I'll give the floor to Mr. Teraya.

Thank you, Chairperson. Good morning. I hope the delegation of Rwanda had a restful night. This morning, I will raise three issues, issue 14, 15, and 20. Issue 14 pertains to independence of the judiciary, fair trial, and the military courts. The Committee appreciated information provided in the State Party report and replies of list of issues. I have three follow-up points. First, while constitutional and statutory guarantee of judicial independence are important, the practical operation remains unclear. How are members of the High Council of the Judiciary selected? What involvement does the executive have in judicial appointments, promotions, disciplinary proceedings and removal, and what safeguards prevent undue influence? What mechanisms enable allegations of interference with judges to be investigated independently and have any complaints resulted in remedies or disciplinary action? In light of reported case backlogs and prolonged pre-trial detention, what measurable progress has been achieved under the National Strategy for Transformation 2024-2029? Second, the State Party confirms that the legal aid fund envisaged in the 2014 policy has not been established. What is the timetable for establishing it and how is adequate funding secured in the meantime? Who determines eligibility for legal aid, on what published criteria, and can refusal be challenged? One of the reliable sources reports that Access to Justice Bureau do not cover criminal matters within their mandate and identifies barriers in rural areas and for persons with disabilities, who therefore provides effective legal representation to indigent suspects during investigation and pretrial or detention, including in remote communities and for persons with disabilities. Third, the State Party acknowledges that civilian perpetrators and accomplices may be tried by a military court under Law No. 30/2018. Why is the exceptional jurisdiction necessary, rather than referring civilians to ordinary courts? How many civilians have been tried by military courts during the reported period, for which offenses, and with what outcomes and appeals? In view of allegations concerning non-public hearing, denial of access to counsel before trial, and inability to appeal, what specific measures ensure effective enjoyment of a fair trial guarantee under Article 14 of the Covenant? Let me move on to issue 15 regarding surveillance and interception of communications. The State Party has explained that interception requires prior written authorization from the Prosecutor General. However, Article 39 of the Law No. 27/2019 also permits urgent oral authorization. to be confirmed in writing within 24 hours and provides for an authorization lasting three months, renewable once. How often has the urgent procedure been used and what safeguard govern its use? Given that the authorization authority is the Prosecutor General, what independent judicial security is available before or during interception to assess its necessity and proportionality? The 2019 Criminal Procedure Law requires authorization by the Prosecutor General and limits interception to offenses concerning national security, corruption, and embezzlement of public property. However, the 2014 Prime Minister's Order provided for authorization by designated prosecutors and with a wider range of offenses, including murder and tax evasion. Could the State Party clarify whether 2014 Order remain applicable and, if so, how these apparent differences are reconciled, particularly regarding the competent authorizing authority and the scope of offenses subject to interception? With regard to law number 58, 2021, the state party has mentioned rights of access, rectification, and erasure, and compliance to the supervisory authority. Does these protections apply to cyber violence conducted by state security organs, including in national security cases, or are there statutory exemptions? Since individuals are generally unaware that their communications have been intercepted, are they notified afterwards when notification would no longer jeopardize a legitimate investigation, so that they can challenge unlawful measures? What authority does the National Cyber Security Authority have to independently inspect security agent practices, and could the state party provide figures on surveillance-related complaints, judicial challenges, findings of unlawfulness, and remedies? Finally, one of the sources raises allegation that mass surveillance is facilitated by law and Pegasus or similar spyware has been deployed against political opponents, human rights defenders and persons in the diaspora. Without prejudging these allegations, has the government commissioned or permitted an independent investigation and if so, what are its findings? Does one then allow bulk interception or oblige service providers to maintain technical interception capabilities? And if so, what legal limits and independent oversight apply? Please also provide, insofar as possible, disaggregated statistics on interception requests, authorization, refusal, and renewals, as well as any publicly available reports. The last issue is issue 20, which pertains to political participation. The State Party refers to constitutional protections but has not addressed specific allegations documented by one of the reliable sources. Why has FDU-Inkigi, Darfur Umulenge and Rwanda is a platform for democracy remained unregistered and what the judicial remedies are available against registration refusal or obstacles to organize the necessary meetings. In the context of the 2024 elections, why were six presidential candidacies rejected, including and why were Requests for legal rehabilitation by Victor Ingavire and Bernard Ntaganda denied, including where timely appeals were available. What investigations and remedies have followed the reported deaths of Anselm Mutu Amane and Sylvio Dusabumuremye? and the disappearance of Boniface Twagilimana and others. Beyond constitutional guarantees and observers' reports of orderly polling, what concrete institutional safeguards ensure the independence and impartiality of the National Electoral Commission? How are allegations of electoral irregularities investigated and adjudicated independently? What protections exist for complaints? And could the State Party provide statistics on complaints, decisions, and effective remedies? The State Party refers to national consultative forum and the participation by civil society. How can Unregistered opposition groups and independent political actors participate in public policy debate and peaceful political activities outside the forum without undue restriction or intimidation. One of the sources expressed a concern that a draft NGO law could restrict activity deemed political. Why is the current status of that registration and what safeguards protect independent advocacy and civil society organizations? These are questions I'd like to raise at this stage. I look forward to receiving your responses.

Thank you very much, Mr. Teraya. Now I will give the floor to Madam Donders.

Thank you very much, Chair. Today, I will deal with issues 16 and 21. On issue 16, on freedom of religion, the Committee is concerned about extensive requirements for registration in the law on faith-based associations, such as disclosure of sources of revenue, strict building, hygiene and noise requirements, and clergy with accredited theological qualifications. Regulation 1/2025 adds requirements such as extended theological training for all pastors and branch leaders, meetings in places of worship exclusively used for that purpose, 1,000 supporting signatures from local residents for each new place of worship, and a 2 million Rwandan franc registration fee. We were also informed of regulations that require all preaching to align with Rwandan values and that prohibit misleading or false prophecies. Could the State party please explain how it ensures that these requirements do not imply undue interference with freedom of religion, especially for smaller or newly established religious communities? and that the autonomy of religious communities as regards their finances, membership, and activities is fully respected. The Committee also received information about the closure of between 7,000 and 10,000 churches and 100 mosques for non-compliance with the law. Could the State party explain the main reasons for such a high number of closures? How were religious communities informed about this, and were there any remedies available? Have any of those places of worship reopened? What measures were taken to ensure that individuals remain able to worship collectively, including in private settings, without facing sanctions for engaging in unregistered religious activities? The committee was informed that people who do not want to perform armed community night patrols because of their religious beliefs have to pay a security fee, or else they may face arrest and detention. We also understand that in some districts, local officials are not aware of possible alternative services. How does the State Party ensure that all people who refuse to participate in night patrols or similar activities for religious reasons are offered alternatives and do not risk arbitrary detention or arrest? Moving to issue 21, which concerns the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, in particular the Batwa people. This was also recently discussed with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee appreciates that the Constitution of Rwanda is founded on national unity, equal citizenship and prohibition of ethnic discrimination. Rwanda accordingly does not qualify Rwandans into separate ethnic or indigenous legal categories and does not recognize a distinct group-specific right to self-determination. While the Committee appreciates the historical context of this approach, we would like to inquire how the State Party ensures full respect for covenant rights of minorities and indigenous peoples including their rights of self-determination and their cultural rights. We know that Rwanda uses the concept of historically marginalized peoples, covering various groups, including the Batwa. But how does the State Party ensure that this general qualification guarantees respect for their specific rights? For instance, we understand that freedom of association is not applicable to political organizations based on ethnic identity. How does the state party guarantee that the Batwa and other communities can freely form and join associations promoting their cultural identity or advocating for their interests, also in politics? As regards political representation, the constitution provides that eight senators are appointed by the president, taking into account representation of historically marginalized groups. Could the State Party inform the Committee how, in the last years, this provision has been applied in practice? Moving to land rights, we understand that the Organic Land Law Act gives the government final authority over land use. Which measures has the State Party taken to guarantee the rights of the Batwa to access and use their ancestral lands and natural resources, and to facilitate access to land titling procedures? How does it support communities affected by climate change, for instance, when they must relocate from their ancestral lands, including procedures for alternative housing or compensation? And to what extent does it provide accessible remedies for resolving disputes around land insecurity, unresolved compensation cases, and ensure access to legal assistance? The Committee has received reports indicating that the Batwa community has not been meaningfully consulted in processes around the conservation of their forest ecosystems, including their rights to benefit from income derived from activities of national parks and nature reserves. The State Party reports that it has not adopted a separate procedure for free, prior and informed consent. Could the State Party explain how it guarantees the right of indigenous peoples, including the Batwa, to systematically and meaningfully participate in all decision-making that affects them? Those are my questions for now, and I thank you for your attention.

Thank you very much. And now I will give the floor to Mr. Kurukelija.

Thank you, Chair. Good morning. Today, I will address issues 17 and 18 on the freedom of expression, and issue 19 on the freedom of assembly and association. The Committee welcomes the information received from the State parties that defamation, as well as insults against certain national and foreign authorities, primarily the criminal offence of humiliation of national authorities and persons in charge of public service and public defamation of religious rituals have been decriminalized. The information provided by the State Party on the progress in revising the 2011 media policy is appreciated as well. Nevertheless, various reports at the disposal of the Committee indicate a pattern of widespread use of provisions of the penal code and cybercrime law to disproportionately target human rights defenders, journalists, civil society organizations, and opposition political activists. Reports also point to the hostile environment for journalists and political activists, with numerous cases of harassment and intimidation for their critical reporting. The fears of which have led to widespread self-censorship. In the light of these issues, the Committee requests information on the following: a) Please provide a plausible date of the finalization of the adoption of the 2011 media policy; b) Please explain how the vaguely defined crimes of publication of rumors through digital platforms spreading false information or propaganda with intent to cause a hostile international opinion against the government of Rwanda, undermining the government, inciting unrest, and the laws on divisionism conform to the strict test of necessity and proportionality under the Covenant. Please indicate the measures taken to revise or repeal the respective legal provisions of the penal code and cybercrime law that enabled arbitrary restrictions of the freedom of expression. C. Please clarify how the introduction of licensing and registration requirements for online news outlets under the 2021 Media Law ensures free speech and independent journalists of independent journalism. Please inform the committee was as a state party would consider amending the relevant provisions. And D, please provide the details and the results of any effective investigation and judicial and other inquiry undertaken in relation to harassment, intimidation, torture, and ill treatment of journalists and human rights defenders. As to the issue 18 regarding digital surveillance and censorship of online content and investigations of such allegations, according to the information available to the Committee, concerns have been raised regarding the government's efforts to manage public opinion with censorship. As my colleague, Koji Teraya, noted, the use of Pegasus spyware to monitor journalists, interception of internet communications, allegations of personal intimidation for expressing views, and the lack of investigation thereof. The Committee would like to receive information on the above-mentioned issues. Moreover, the Committee would appreciate if the delegation provides information on the legal and practical safeguards from censorship in the digital sphere, including any inquiry into allegations and intimidation and reprisals. Issue 19, freedom of assembly and association. I will first focus on sub-issue A, on the status of non-governmental organizations. The Committee welcomes that the State Party's law that allows NGOs to enter into agreements and partnerships with other entities and the government conduct commercial activities, express opinions and views, participate in designing national policies and legislation, and advocate for the protection and promotion of human rights. It also welcomes the establishment of a single legal framework for both national and international NGOs. However, according to the sources available to the Committee, A number of gaps were identified in Rwanda's compliance with articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant. This concerns Law No. 58/2024, governing non-governmental organizations and the framework on public demonstrations. The Committee requests the delegation to provide the following information: a) Please identify the provisions of the law 58/2024 that allows an organization denied a certificate of legal personality or registration to appeal the refusal before an independent and impartial court, and provides a number of refusals issued by the Rwanda Governance Board since entry into force, and how many were appealed and overturned. B. Please specify the precise criteria underlying the refusal, termination, ground in Article 7 on jeopardizing security, public order, health and morals, and human rights, and explain how it meets the legality, proportionality, necessity requirements of Article 22 of ICCPR and is not overbroad. C, please indicate how many NGOs lost legal personality or the validity of their certificate under Article 47 of the Law 58/2024 after the 24-month transition period for aligning existing organizations with the law, and what remedies were available to them. And D, please inform the Committee to what extent NGOs were consulted in the preparation of the above-mentioned law. On sub-issue B, relating to the legal framework governing freedom of assembly, according to the information available to the Committee, a number of gaps were identified in the compatibility of Rwanda's framework on public demonstrations and public gatherings with Article 21 of the Covenant. These concern the prior notification and written approval requirements the absence of any exception for spontaneous demonstrations, the criminal penalties attached to unauthorized assemblies, and the rules governing police use of force. The Committee would appreciate the following information: a. Please clarify which instruments and notice period currently govern public demonstrations and explain how a 30-day period and written approval i.e. prior authorization requirements are necessary and proportionate under Article 21 of the ICCPR. B. Please explain how the absence of any exception for spontaneous demonstrations is compatible with the right of peaceful assembly. C. Please clarify how the use of force by Rwanda National Police during peaceful assemblies is regulated in practice and how Articles 50 and 51 of the Law 26/2023 of 17 May 2023, governing the Rwanda National Police, ensures that any use of force is necessary and proportionate, particularly when participants express disagreement with a public policy in accordance with the Covenant. As regards sub-issue B, the committee received information that there have been allegations that the police forcibly dispersed protests. Therefore, the committee requests the police to respond to allegations that the police have forcibly dispersed protests, including cases in which organizers had obtained official authorization, and to provide information on those incidents, any investigations conducted, and their outcomes. I thank you.

Thank you very much. So thank you all the members who posed the questions. I will suspend the meeting for 15 minutes so that the delegation can prepare the answers. Meeting is suspended. Okay, dear members, dear delegation, I will resume the meeting and I will give the delegation one hour to respond to our questions. And Honorable Dr. Emmanuel Ujirashi Buja, you have the floor now.

Thank you very much, Chairperson of the Commission and esteemed members of the Commission. Yeah, there are quite a number of questions that were asked and you were earlier saying that each and every subsection would require a seminar of its own, but we'll try as best as possible to cover as much as we can within the one hour that we have. There are quite a number of questions that were asked on recruitment of armed forces and whether children are recruited and whether there's a link between what is happening in Congo, recruitment of children to join certain armed groups. I would say that we still maintain what we replied in the list of issues, but also maintain that the Rwanda Defense Force is one of the most disciplined forces that does not engage in this. Actually, you all remember that there are different principles on protection of human beings, of humans during warfare and also recruitment of children. Some of those principles were adopted. They are called Kigali Principles, and we abide by them. So there is no recruitment, I can assure you of that. of any sort and more especially of children. So, and there was a question as to whether the weapons which have been supplied, the answer is still no. And we maintain what has been extensively covered in the written response. And if there's anything that we miss out, we'll be able to respond to it extensively. But let me cover, of course, again, the sources because you refer to sources before the Security Council. It is true that those sources point out to certain serious allegations. Whether they are questions of fact, that is an assessment that can be done on each and every individual report. Because it wouldn't be unheard of that experts have determined, made determination later on to be found to be wrong when faced with deeper facts and investigations. So we do believe that you cannot take the outcome of it on the face value that it will be. It is a determination. It's a report, but not a determination. And I would say that this if we take every report on the first value of who did it then we fall falling in a in the authority bias without going deep I I referred to a report some reports from what will be considered as a credible sources that later on courts found otherwise when tested before a court where it has to go through deeper fact finding mission and determine the existence of this. So in a nutshell, these are the response. But I do gather that the question was extracted from a meeting such as the Security Council meetings. There are responses which were given. So the commission can still extract the responses by the Republic of Rwanda. They won't differ much. from what I'm going to provide because the questions were answered adequately and the reports were dealt with in that particular forum. Then I will cede a bit of my time to my colleague to answer to some of the questions that were raised, especially on religious and faith-based organization, then I'll come back to some of the issues. that were mentioned here.

Thank you, distinguished members of the committee. I'd like to react to questions asked about freedom of religion and regulation of faith-based organizations, freedom of expression and media policy, and freedom of assembly as it pertains to the NGO law. As you may be aware, the Rwanda Governance Board is the public institution mandated to promote the media sector through capacity building and to register and regulate civil society organizations and faith-based organizations. As it pertains specifically to freedom of religion, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is expressly guaranteed by Article 37 of the constitutions. And this encompasses the freedom to hold religious belief, practice religion individually and collectively, and manifest those beliefs in accordance with the Constitution and applicable law. Religious freedom is recognized as a fundamental right. Equally, the state has a responsibility to protect life, health, safety, dignity, and fundamental rights of individuals participating in religious activities. The exercise of this responsibility is the impetus for the legal framework governing the operation of religious institutions and the premises used for public worship. Law number 72 of 2018 governing faith-based organizations establishes requirements concerning legal personality, institutional governance, accountability, and compliance with applicable legal standards. The requirements pursue legitimate public interests with applicable legal standard, public interest objectives. They are not intended to determine the theological legitimacy of religious beliefs or to privilege one denomination of belief over another. With regards to concerns about the closure of public, of prayer houses, it's important to distinguish between the temporary closure of physical premises on grounds of regulatory noncompliance and the suppression of the underlying religious belief or dissolution of the religious community. Measures directed at the safety and legality of premises cannot be equated with the prohibition of the religion. In July 2024, the government undertook nationwide inspections of all places of worship. following long-standing concerns relating to public safety, building standards, sanitation, legality, and harmful practices that were affecting worshippers. The inspections resulted in the temporary closures of approximately 8,000 prayer houses that did not satisfy applicable legal or safety requirements. These inspections were undertaken pursuant to generally applicable regulatory requirements, not on the determination of which religious beliefs or denominations were acceptable. The objective was to establish minimum conditions under which members of the public could safely participate in religious activities. The scale of the enforcement exercise must be understood in relation to the number of facilities inspected and the extent of deficiencies identified. Widespread noncompliance with public safety requirements does not remove the state's duty to protect worshippers merely because corrective enforcement actions may affect a large number of prayer facilities. This process was intended to secure compliance not to make non-compliance a permanent ground for excluding religious communities from public worship. Prayer houses that have fulfilled the required standards have applied for reopening and have been reopened. The process is still ongoing. Other organizations are undertaking compliance measures, including infrastructure improvements, leadership training, and other completion of registration requirements. And the number of facilities that have reopened should be understood alongside the fact that this is still an ongoing process. And the nature of deficiencies identified in prayer houses differ. Some involve documentary organizational matters. Some were required to just submit theological degrees, which they did and were reopened, but others required substantial physical improvement to premises, refurbishing of the premises, which take a longer time. Separate from this temporary closure of physical premises, 21 faith-based organizations had their legal personality revoked following findings of serious illegal or harmful practices. And in addition, 43 unregistered faith-based organizations that were operating 181 illegal prayer houses were permanently closed. And these are to be distinguished from the temporary closure of premises. It's about different legal circumstances, and they were undertaken under the FBO law. RGB's regulatory responsibilities include responding to serious unlawful organizational conduct while ensuring that decisions are grounded in the law and remain subject to the applicable review mechanisms. The position of the state is that Rwanda does not regulate religious doctrine, determine the validity of religious beliefs, or prescribe the faith that individuals may practice. The Rwanda Governance Board's regulatory mandate is about organizational legality, public safety, institutional accountability, and protection of the rights of worshippers and the wider community. The measures were applied through a general legal framework rather than any denomination-specific prohibition. While Article 18 of the Convention recognizes that the manifestation of religion may be subject to restrictions prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals, and the fundamental rights and freedom of others, Rwanda's regulatory framework is grounded in these recognized public interests responsibilities. Rwanda's approach is grounded in this fundamental distinction between freedom of religious belief, which the state fully protects, constitutionally protected right, and the conduct carried out under the guise of religion that may infringe upon the rights, dignity, and safety of others. There were questions about the RGB's guidelines number 001/2025 on preaching that aligns with Rwandan values. These are to be understood within this constitutional and legislative framework. The concepts of Randan values is not intended to impose religious conformity or prescribed theological doctrines. As reflected in articles three to five of these guidelines, the Randan values referred to include national unity, social cohesion, mutual respect, human dignity, and non-discrimination. And these are particularly important in the historical context of our country, where the manipulation of identity and dissemination of hatred contributed to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis. Second, the provisions concerning misleading teachings and false prophecies are directed at protecting individuals from harmful and exploitative conduct, including fraudulent financial practices, manipulation of vulnerable followers, and incitement to violence and practices that endanger health or safety. The State's legitimate concern is not whether a religious prophecy is theologically correct, but whether the identifiable conduct associated with it violates the law or infringes upon the rights of others. The guidelines expressly recognize respect for religious freedom as a core principle under Article 4. So their implementation is to be understood consistently with the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and the requirements of necessity and proportionality under Article 18 of the Covenant. The regulatory framework is intended to address objectively identifiable harmful conduct, not peaceful religious disagreement, doctrinal differences, or legitimate religious expression. Finally, Article 6 of these guidelines emphasizes training and capacity building, and Article 7 requires faith-based organizations to establish by themselves codes of conduct. These are measures to promote institutional accountability and responsible preaching within religious communities. Yesterday, we were asked questions about the role of religious leaders in the promotion on the prevention of violence, of gender-based violence. These are some of the guidelines that emphasize this accountability and responsible preaching. Rwanda maintains that freedom of religion and responsible regulation of religious institutions are not inherently contradictory. Public authorities have both an obligation to protect religious freedom and a responsibility to respond objectively to objectively established threats to public safety and the rights of others. We will continue to administer the framework through lawful regulatory processes, dialogue with religious leaders, and support for organizations seeking to meet the requirements for the lawful operation of places of worship. I would now like to responds to questions with regards to freedom of expression, especially as it pertains to media. Freedom of expression is, of course, of opinion, expression, and press are constitutionally recognized and protected. They're essential element of constitutional governance, public accountability, and informed citizen participation. Rwanda's approach to media governance has undergone significant reform. notably through the transition from direct state regulation of journalistic conduct towards a framework based on professional self-regulation, statutory protections, and independent media sector development. This constitutes an important institutional choice that reflects the principle that the professional and ethical conduct of journalists should be primarily assessed through media self-regulatory mechanisms rather than through direct governmental control over editorial activity. As for the legal and institutional framework, there is the 2013 Media Law that established the foundation for media self-regulation and distinguishes the regulation of journalistic conduct from technical regulation of the broadcasting and communication sector. The Rwanda Media Commission operates as the media self-regulatory institution with responsibilities including professional accreditation, complaints handling, media monitoring, and the promotion of journalistic ethics. The Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority retains responsibility relating to technical regulation of broadcasting and communication infrastructure. This coordination between the two institutions preserves the distinction between professional self-regulation and technical regulatory functions. The law relating to, there is also the access to information law, law number four, 2013, which establishes a legal framework through which the public and the journalists may obtain information held by public institutions and certain private bodies. This reinforces the role of the media in informing citizens, scrutinizing public affairs, and contributing to transparent governance. The media law also provides protection against censorship and safeguards concerning journalistic sources. These protections are to safeguard the ability of journalists to gather information, exercise editorial judgment, and undertake reporting on matters of public interest. In practice, the Rwanda Media Commission's activities provide concrete evidence of the operation of the self-regulatory models. The Commission indicates that during a specific reporting period, they received 118 complaints, of which 105 were handled. They also recorded 552 accredited journalists out of 800 journalists. This illustrates the practical functioning of professional accreditation and complaints mechanism rather than the mere formal existence of a self-regulatory institution. It also demonstrates the importance of strengthening institutional capacity, effective complaints handling, and accessibility of professional accountability mechanism. The Rwanda Governance Board also conducts evidence-based assessment of the media environment through the Rwanda Media Barometer. It's an instrument for identifying priorities for institutional and policy development. The Rwanda Media Barometer of 2024 recorded an overall performance score of 76.7% based on a framework examining the legal and policy environment, media pluralism, and the contribution of media to governance and democracy, professional capacity and access to information. The legal and policy framework achieved quite a high score of 90%, which shows the strength of the regulatory and institutional architecture. Media contribution scored, the contribution to governance and democracy scored 81.3%, whilst information transmission and access scored 79.1%. and media plurality and diversity score is 72.3%. Rwanda is also, as it pertains to the media policy and its modernization, Rwanda is undertaking a review of the 2011 media policy to align national framework with developments in digital journalism, economic sustainability of media organization, and evolving practices and changing communication environments. You are not without knowing that the media sector is facing rather an existential crisis globally with the event of social media, AI, and the rapid spread of misinformation, disinformation, and fake news. Any sort of review of the policy needs to be to catch up with the rapidly changing environment. We have found that many countries, as we were undertaking an exercise in benchmarking, many countries are struggling to catch up with this rapid evolution of the sector, whereby laws that are adopted today are irrelevant by the next month. As such, the review is an opportunity. We consider the review as an opportunity to address practical challenges and support journalism. over simply updating a policy document. It's practical, institutional, and legal improvements that are relevant to this rapidly evolving environment. The Rwanda's framework also recognizes that freedom of expression protects public debates, criticism, and dissemination of information, including on matters concerning public authorities. The continuing policy review, self-regulatory framework, access to information legislation, and regular evidence-based assessments of the media sector collectively demonstrate Rwanda's approach to strengthening the institutional conditions for a professional and independent journalism. We also received questions with regards to freedom of assembly, especially as it pertains to civil society and freedom of association and the law number 58 governing NGOs. Freedom of association is, of course, a constitutional guarantee, which is Article 39 of our Constitution, recognizes that the exercise of this fundamental freedom does not require prior authorization. Our legal framework, therefore, distinguishes between the constitutional freedom of individuals to associate and the formal legal recognition of organizations seeking to operate as legal entities. Law number 58 2024 of 20th June 2024 governing non-governmental organizations that I will hereby refer to as the NGO law, establishes the legal framework for the acquisition of legal personality and institutional operation of national and international NGOs. This registration is not meant to unduly restrict the freedom of association, but it serves an important function of legal certainty, institutional accountability, and the capacity of organizations to conclude agreements, employ personnel, administer resources, conduct income-generating activities, and exercise their rights and obligations as recognized legal entities. The 2024 law was an important reform in the Rwanda civil society regulatory framework. There were extensive consultations with national and international civil society organizations, and it sought to address the figures that were requested will be provided in written form. This reform sought to address limitations in the previous legislation, including fragmented administrative process inconsistent institutional accountability requirements, and challenges relating to governance and transparency. A central feature of the law is the recognition of the autonomy of NGOs. They can manage their own internal affairs, determine their leadership through competent organs, administer assets and resources, establish priorities, and participate in public affairs. The regulatory oversight is directed at ensuring legal compliance and institutional accountability. It is not intended to replace the lawful decision-making authority of an organization's own governance structures. The financial accountability provisions are to be understood in the same context of maintaining an effective framework against money laundering, terrorism financing, fraud, and misuse of organizational resources. These obligations are legitimate elements of institutional governance and are to protect beneficiaries, donors, organizations, and the wider public interest. And since the entry into force of the 2024 law, the Rwanda Governance Board has received hundreds of applications and that were the specificities of which will be submitted in written forms. Also, as of October 2026, no application has been formally refused registration. As such, there are no appeals against registration refusals that have been lodged during this period. This is because of RGB's administrative approach to application processing. The right to challenge administrative decisions should an NGO be in the future rejected from registration is still very much present. So it's an administrative decision that can be reviewed in the court. Any decisions taken under the NGO framework are subject to the applicable administrative and judicial review mechanisms under Rwandan law. As for the transition periods, we were asked to provide some of the figures. We received 1,134 compliance applications and of those, sorry, no, we received 975 for compliance and 536 still have pending requirements, 260 are still being processed, whereas 179 have been granted compliance certificates. There are 159 identified NGOs that have lost legal personality due to non-compliance. They have not even applied for compliance. Some of the reasons are that these NGOs no longer exist, or have no longer received funding due to the current funding crisis that has affected CSOs. But we can say that 86% of eligible NGOs that submitted applications, submitted application, and it was a demonstration of broad participation by the sector. and it reflects the importance that both RGB and civil society organizations accord to regulatory predictability, institutional governance, and accountability. We remain committed to administering the framework consistently, engaging with civil society stakeholders, and ensuring that regulatory functions are exercised within the limits established by the Constitution and applicable laws. Thank you.

Prison conditions. We mentioned earlier that now the number has gone to the acceptable occupancy rate that is allowed because it's at 98% from almost 142% at some point. And we think it will even be better in the coming years as we continue to implement the criminal justice policy as required. With regards to pretrial detention and the length that it takes, it's not as easy a concept to determine or make a simple answer here, unless you determine it on a case to case basis. There are certain cases where the the the detained because of course before you are it has to be subjected to the court and then the court maintains whether you you you your trial will be held in when you're in detention or not. But once that is done, there are many reasons as to why the before it goes to trial, it delays. Sometimes it's because the accused wants to change the the lawyer representing them. Of course, there are times because of the case backlog, which is reducing, but largely it's not the only cause. At times it's because there's a lot of change of advocates by the parties themselves. There are also instances where a procedural issue is being challenged, the constitutionality of it in the case before it goes to the trial of the substance of which someone is accused of. So it goes all the way to the Supreme Court. if it's a constitutional matter being challenged within that particular trial before the substantive case is heard. So that is a possibility as well. But when procedural issues are challenged before the trial is undertaken, of course, you can expect the case to delay. And as a result, the detention will be much more longer. Those are all the kinds of possibilities. as to why sometimes cases can delay before they go to trial. Then, of course, there are effective complaint mechanisms, including through the National Commission of Human Rights, the Ombudsman Office, and many other offices that deal with complaints of any possible breach of human rights. With regards to juvenile A lot of resources have been put into ensuring that the juvenile are detained separately. There's the Nyagatari detention for the juveniles, and it's also a correctional service where the juveniles serve when sentenced. where they have almost all the other rights that other children enjoy, including being taught and sitting for national examinations. And so there's a lot that has been done in this area. Recently, not too long ago, the Chief Justice also issued guidelines on how to handle juvenile cases. Right from the time when someone is detained, they are very detailed to the time when they appear before the court, how the cases should be treated because we know that the case setting is scary, not only for juvenile, but for everyone, but for the juvenile even more so, to the extent that the cases, there are guidelines by the Chief Justice. including how they should be handled so that they are not scary, in order to be able to take into consideration that someone is a child, including further that you don't even have to put on a gown. It's quite elaborate. If I had time, I'll go through it. It's a very recent development by the Chief Justice, guidelines on how to handle juvenile cases. in a broader sense, right from the time the juveniles are investigated, all the way to the time that the decisions are met. But I'm happy to share with the committee these new guidelines. Excellency, Tera, I think, asked quite a number of questions, including the independence of the judiciary, more so with the High Council. There was a reform in 2004 that reformed the justice system from 2004, we've had successive reforms. One of the reforms was actually to do with the independence of the judiciary. Before this, in the constitution of 1978, the head of the Judicial Service Commission was the president of the republic, deputized by the minister of justice, and it was appointed by the executive. But in 2004, actually it's 2003 constitution and then the reforms went further. Now the head of the Judicial Service Commission of the High Council of the Judiciary, as we refer to it, is headed by the Chief Justice, deputized by a judge elected by the judges. Most of the members that constitute the High Council of the Judiciary members elected by their peers judges, then there's the chair of the National Human Rights Commission is a member, the ombudsman is a member, and the Minister of Justice has has someone representing the minister of justice. Initially it was the minister of justice who was there. But now because we we do understand that there's a requirement that eh there's that there's of course the requirement that eh when it's policy issues there's a link from the ministry. But eh they don't even hold the leadership of the or or or any leadership in the judicial service commission. Then this judicial service, High Council of the Judiciary, and is, undertakes different roles, including interviewing and appointing judges up to the level of the High Court. So, they are appointed by the judicial, the High Council of the Judiciary. And then, the other judges from Court of Appeal onwards are appointed, of course, through the executive and then the leaderships of the court, all of it, the Chief Justice, the President of the court, the courts, even the President of the High Court, appointed by the President in consultation with the High Council and the Cabinet. And then they are, actually they are nominated and then the final appointment is done, is confirmed by the Senate. the Senate of the Republic of Rwanda, which is a parliamentary. So that is how the appointments take place. There were questions on the legal aid fund. It is true that the legal aid fund is provided for, has been debated, and we've been discussing this. But legal aid fund is a fund which requires sufficient money to put into it. But when you don't achieve it immediately, you just don't abandon that idea because it's a noble idea. You try to come up with principles that ensure that this legal aid, for example, there was an innovation of having the access to justice houses, which are found in all the 30 districts of the country, where we have three lawyers. who have-- and the head of it actually can represent people in court. They're vulnerable because they are members of the Bar Association. So any person can walk into these houses and show that they require the services, including advisory and representation, and then that will be done. Of course, a lot needs to be done to get the funds to do this. But we try to work closely and we have a budget also, which is allocated to the Bar Association, because they've informed us that they do a lot of pro bono cases, but sometimes pro bono is not totally pro bono, you need transportation to where you go to and all these other support. So the Bar Association, we give them this budget from the government every year so that it assists the lawyers who undertake pro bono cases in order to assist this. But where it comes to certain groups such as the vulnerable, of course, the juvenile, they have to have a lawyer funded for by the state. That is a requirement. And where you go to the appellate courts, especially the Court of Appeal, and onwards, it is a requirement that you have a lawyer funded for. You can't self-represent yourself. So that is a requirement under the lawyer is paid for through this. Of course, the ideal is to have a legal aid fund where it can be tapped into whenever there is a requirement. But when you cannot do that, you look for other innovative ways of ensuring that there is access to justice. through representation. So this is one of the things that is done. With regards to the civilians who are tried in the military courts, let me make a correction here. It's normally where there's a military person who has committed a crime, but there's an accomplice who is a civilian. Then for that particular purpose, there has to be a military person in that particular crime. It can't be someone independently, a civilian. being tried. And immediately once the case is in, because they have the up to the level of the High Court, you can appeal these cases to the Court of Appeal, which is the civilian court. So whatever is done, even for military or any accomplice who is a civilian, ultimately it goes to the civilian courts, which is the Court of Appeal, which has supervisory role over what happened. in the military courts, but there's no civilian who can be tried by military courts if they committed the crime independently without a military person being used, being part of it, and the civilian being an accomplice. I will give the numbers maybe of those who are accomplices in crimes committed by the military. When it comes to interception of information, I would say that it's done in a legitimate way according to the laws provided for. And we've never seen anyone, at least to the best of my knowledge, I've not seen anyone who has even challenged this process. In their own case, I've not seen anyone. As to whether the use of Pegasus to target anyone, we can confirm again here that Pegasus is not used by Rwanda. And there is no evidence to the effect that Rwanda has used Pegasus against anyone. But again, this is where we stand and we've mentioned this quite a number of times. There are some cases which have been referred to here, some of which are still ongoing. and to me it will be subjugated to try and go into details of these cases because they are ongoing cases. I don't want to fall into that trap. Uh but there are some which I can refer to which I I am comfortable discussing because they are not they've been decided. Uh there is a case that you raised of Victor Ingavid and Bernard on a rehabilitation. This was-- it's not a consideration by the executive. It's considered by the courts. And the courts, according to the evidence before them, come to a conclusion. And they concluded that they did not fulfill the requirements of rehabilitation. So it's a court judgment. It's not an order of the executive. There are some cases that were referred to on disappearance. Again, I will reiterate my answer yesterday. Whenever it's a case of disappearance, the file is not easily closed. It's open for any information that leads to further establishment of anyone who has been designated as having disappeared. And then there were questions as to the six presidential candidates. Of course, in each and every country, there are always conditions that have to be fulfilled before someone is ultimately allowed to campaign. So if you don't fulfill them, it's natural that if you don't fulfill the law, as provided for, then you will not pass that bar. So that is what happened. I don't know what I can explain beyond saying that there are requirements provided for by the law, which are followed by the electoral commission in order to ultimately clear those who will stand for presidential election. Or even other elections, it's not only presidential, it's different forms of elections. And in the elections, we even had an independent candidate standing because that is a possibility, because they were able to fulfill the conditions as required by the electoral law. There are quite a number of questions on, I think, freedom of religion. Doris, I think you explained that. The questions of the rights of the minority in the 17 minutes, again, but I think largely we've been discussing this for the last two days. But maybe let me be much more expressive and try to put it into the context of Rwanda and why we took this position of of ensuring that no one is left behind rather than categorizing people. This Batwa community fights across the border because of the colonial heritage that we had of the borders being subdivided. So you'll find Batwa in Uganda, in DRC, and also in Rwanda. So they speak the same language, but let me tell you why it's The ideas that are preferred sometimes on how we should handle this issue a bit don't conform to the context of Rwanda. In Rwanda, all of us speak the same language, Kinyarwanda. But for any other group, when you go to the north-south, east, west, we speak the same Kinyarwanda. There's no language called, designated for Batwa in Rwanda, in the context of Rwanda. When you cross over to the other borders, of course, that's another issue altogether, different context, and that's why it's different. We don't even have a region designated for Batwa, as it is in other regions where the Batwa are found. That's how the community has been, time and again, and we speak the same language. So trying to designate a group where the group has been part of the community and you don't have a place where they are designated, I don't know how you can begin to protect rights of where they are designated, yet we don't have a geographical designation of the Batwa. This is the context that we find ourselves in. Same language, largely same culture, almost the same culture for all Rwandan speaking people. And so this is the issue. But I don't dispute the fact that if they go to another part due to our boundaries, the context is different and maybe the treatment should be different. But for Rwanda, we don't think this treatment will answer to any challenges of any historically marginalized group in Rwanda. We think everyone, no one should be left behind. Then in the, with regards to the communities actually, and you referred to the Batwa again, that live close to the forest ecosystem, let me say that we have an elaborate system where anyone who lives, who has land near the forests, the communities that live there, and we don't again designate them, There's a fund, a percentage of the fund that comes out of tourism that is designated for that particular group that is around there. And that particular group of people are the ones who sit and decide which projects they want. It's not the central government that decides. The fund is there, and then you decide whether it's schools or hospitals. So it's an engagement undertaken by the Rwanda Development Board. which is entitled, which has the mandate to manage the forests and the proceeds of the forests. So that engagement of that particular proceed, where does it go to? Is it schools? Is it a market that you require? So the community itself decides which kind of and it's provided for which kind of project that they think is appropriate to them. So that is with regards to anyone who is close to them. Because there's a lot that takes place with communities that are close to some of these national parks. There's that part of proceeds, of course, that come out of it. And you also want to ensure that there's protection of wildlife and nature. And the people who can do it actually very appropriately will be the community around. So if they don't have benefits from proceeds of these natural resources, then they won't be part of it. So that is what-- it's a logical conclusion that they have to be involved. And furthermore, an insurance has been set aside because sometimes it's not only the issues of proceeds, it's the issues of those who have land that is in the proximity of national parks. Sometimes the animals wander outside of the parks and destroys people's property and especially plants. So recently there's a loan insurance that has increased the insurance for anyone whose property has been destroyed because their land is in proximity with the national parks. So it's a very recent law and we are happy to share with you that particular law. Then So there are questions as to the peaceful assembly and the spontaneous assembly and how it's carried out. Yes, it's true that you need to inform the police for security and I think this is quite normal. I think we can debate on the number of days. whether it's proportional, but we believed that it was proportional, the 30 days. It's debatable again, people can look into it, nothing is cast in stone. So I think that is something that can be looked into. With regards to spontaneous assembly, that where force has been used to dispel it, I think this is news to my ear, I have not seen one, but if you have an example, I'm like, I'm happy to look into the details of it and refer and respond to it. But I don't, to the best of my knowledge, I don't remember any of this, of, of, of, of any protest that has been forcefully dispelled that was spontaneous. Um, then, a number of questions, to do with the existing legal procedures. Let me point out that there is no law that is cast in stone. We have a very elaborate process where laws, civil society organizations can raise any queries or anyone else and laws are looked into. For example, I can give you an example that currently All the laws that fall under the subject of penal code are being reviewed up to December and everyone will be involved. This is an opportunity to give views on how to look into this. The reason why we are doing this is so that the laws conform to the 2022. criminal justice policy. So, laws will be discussed. It's a process and it's not always cast in stone. Uh whenever there's a need to amend the laws. Uh in order to capture new ideas. I think this this there's always that process. Uh but I mentioned earlier that there are certain cases and I I would wish this community or committee or any other treaty body mechanism and also the special reporter to really consider. It's the idea of respecting cases when they are still ongoing because It is against all the principles that we've learned or we believe in of commenting and actually even trying to influence the outcome of the case by specific pronouncements, including when the case is ongoing, including coming to a conclusive decision that the case is unfair and someone should be released. If you want me to give you an example of the consequences of this, and I have still have eight minutes I can and I I would want to show you why we need to really respect these institutions. Uh wait until they complete what they are supposed to do and then judge them on the basis of a completed process. Uh it's very important because first of all it helps ensure that the confidence that people have in these institutions is is maintained. Otherwise, why go through a process if there's an alternative process that can make a ruling and actually decide that a case that is ongoing is conclusive. I want to give an example of one of the cases. And it's a very famous case which has been misinterpreted, even sometimes stated in ways that it didn't even conclude and also even showed that the processes that were applied which before that were considered had been ruled to be unfair. Uh and now it came to a different case and surprise surprise this is the the the in Gabire case in the African court. I I wanted to really talk about it because I saw it not being referred to by the committee but by by some of the special rapporteur. This communication that was made by the special rapporteur on the promotion of the right of freedom of opinion and expression. And in the communication, and I want to cite it, it was a 2025 communication which was sent to our office. And in the communication, the special rapporteur stated that, and I want to quote, Without wishing to prejudge the accuracy of the above-mentioned allegations, it's to do with the ongoing case today. I express my serious concerns about the arrest, ongoing detention, and possible prosecution of Ms. Victoire Ingabire, who is a prominent political opposition leader in Rwanda, who was previously found by the African Court to have been wrongly imprisoned for five years. so this is a I'm just quoting verbatim what the special report said this and this is really far from the truth uh in the case before the African Court Miss Victoria's prayers were five the first one was that uh the laws the organic law relating to penal code should be repealed relating to the punishment of the crime of ideology of the genocide because it was not in conformity with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. There was an order to review a case, that is the case that went all the way to the African Court. And as the Special Rapporteur had asserted that Ms. Ingabire was found to have been wrongly imprisoned for five years and it was ordered by the African court I want to take the paragraph of the court that mentioned about whether whether she she whether she would uh be released because this is the implication in paragraph 168 of the African Court judgment the court stated that uh this court The court has established that such a measure of ordering that someone should be released could be directly ordered by the court in exceptional circumstances. And the court went further to state that in this instance, the applicant, Ms. Victoire Ngavire, has not provided proof of such circumstances. Consequently, the court does not grant the prayer to release her. This was what the court said in paragraph 168. of this particular judgment. And there are certain other issues that the court dealt with, and I wish I had enough time to go into this because this judgment has been mischaracterized. And even before The process was completed in Rwanda. And this I'm talking about that process, the first case of Ngavire, where a number of assertions had been made by certain bodies, including some of the treaty bodies. You can go back and see when the cases were ongoing. So on the right to the presumption of innocence, the African Court found that the applicant, Ms. Ngavire, has not adduced evidence to the effect that her right to presumption of innocence has been violated. It therefore dismisses this allegation. That is paragraph 85 of the African Court judgment. On the right to defense, the African Court generally found that the right had not been significantly violated, you can look from paragraph 88. to paragraph 99. Of course, there are certain issues that were raised by the court, but largely it concluded that this right was not violated. On the right to be tried by a neutral and impartial tribunal, I refer to you to the judgment in paragraphs 100 to 105. The African Court found that the evidence adduced by Ms. Victory Ngavire did not demonstrate that the tribunal was not neutral and impartial, and her allegation was dismissed by the Court. So the Court found that the tribunal that tried Ms. Ngavire was not-- Ms. Ngavire did not demonstrate that the tribunal was not neutral and impartial. And it was this allegation by Ms. Ingabiri was dismissed by the African court. But the reason why I'm going deep into this is because prior to this, when the first case was ongoing, there were a lot of allegations that the courts were not fair, the tribunal was impartial, and there was no presumption of innocence. But the African court judgment says, provides a different picture, which ultimately decided that. And sometimes it's mischaracterized to mean that she was released and then Rwanda did not. But that's not true. The court said they have the power in exceptional circumstances, and they refused. African court refused to exercise this power because the applicant did not provide enough evidence to move the court, the African Court of Human and People's Rights, to take this exceptional measure. Um so much as we deal with these issues. I implore that whenever matters before any institution that handled the case. The best approach is not to try and comment on the on on that particular ongoing case. Until the whole process is completed. Then you have a broad picture of what happened. And then you can effectively do that. Otherwise The unintended consequence of trying to comment on ongoing processes would be later on to be found not true and lead to conflict. And no one actually is held accountable for this. But even worse, it leads to erosion of confidence of institutions, which all of us should be working together to build. Because these are the only institutions which are constitutionally mandated. To handle disputes between ah disputes of ah between ah citizens. So I wanted to raise this as part of ah because it's a constructive dialogue. Or now we approach certain matters including cases that are ongoing. And I can see I have 22 seconds and I yield my 22 seconds.

Thank you very much. we will move to the follow-up questions. Now I will give the floor to Mr. Sinanovic.

Thank you, Chair. I thank very much to the delegation for their answers. Today, delegation mentioned the importance of credible sources to launch investigations. Yesterday, the delegation explained that Rwanda had not launched any investigation based on the UN Mapping Report because that report only reports on other reports. However, paragraph 8 of the Mapping Report explicitly states, and I quote, "Information on the identity of the alleged perpetrators of some of the crimes listed does not appear in this report but is held in the confidential project database submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. This database also contains underlying investigative materials, including information obtained by witnesses. The report specifies that access to the database is determined by the High Commissioner for Human Rights. My question is, has Rwanda ever requested access to relevant information in this database or sought OHCHR's cooperation in investigating the alleged crimes and identifying those responsible? If not, why?

Thank you very much. I will now give the floor to Madame Donders.

Thank you very much, Chair, and a warm thank you to the delegation for for engaging with us and answering some of our questions. First, on the freedom of religion, conscience and religions, as you rightly said, I indeed understand the legal recognition of freedom of conscience and religion, and I also appreciate that it's a fundamental right. However, what we said at the beginning, the Committee also wants to look into how law works out in practice, and I still remain concerned about the extent of the requirements in the law, but also how they are applied in practice. Because you're right, protection of safety, health, the rights of others are legitimate public interest concerns and they could fall within the legitimate aims under the covenant. But dissolving organizations, closing places of worship are severe interferences with the right to freedom of religion. And I'm still wondering how you ensure that these interferences are not arbitrary or lead to a de facto denial of the right to manifest religion, because individuals are actually prevented from worshipping collectively. And are there accessible remedies in place to challenge the decisions by the governance board? And how are people informed about these remedies? Then my second follow-up question is on the Batwa community. and again, I appreciate very much your explanations, but could you please respond to concrete information that the Batwa have been forcefully evicted from their ancestral lands following the development of the Volcanoes National Park, Nyungwe National Park, or the Kizwati-Mukura National Park without any consultation. Now, it's great to hear that the benefits of these parks are now increasingly shared with the Batwa, But it's of course much more difficult to replace land that these peoples use for, for instance, hunting, fishing, grazing, gathering food, medicinal plants, and where they practice spiritual ceremonies and bury their dead. So my question is, do you allow indeed the Batwa access to national parks established on their ancestral lands to enable them to carry out their spiritual practices collect their medicinal plants and access their cultural and burial sites. I thank you. This is it for now.

Thank you. Now I will give the floor to Mr. Korukelia.

Thank you, Chair, and I thank the delegation for answering a number of questions. The delegation has touched upon a number of issues on freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly and association. The Committee takes note that some of the information will be provided in written form. As to the freedom of expression, the delegation touched upon, among others, operation of Rwanda Media Commission and Rwanda Governance Board. However, there are few remaining issues, and the Committee would like to request information regarding the results of effective investigation and judicial or other inquiry undertaken in relation to harassment, intimidation, torture, and ill-treatment of journalists and human rights defenders. Regarding freedom of assembly and association in the context of Law 58/2024 governing NGOs, the Committee would like to request information on the precise criteria underlying the refusal or termination grounds in Article 7 of the law on jeopardizing security, public order, health, morals, and human rights, and explain how it meets the legality, necessity, and proportionality requirements under Article 22 of the ICCPR. Also, please inform the Committee to what extent NGOs were consulted in the preparation of the above-mentioned law. The Committee would also appreciate if the delegation clarifies which notice period currently governs public demonstrations and explain how a 30-day period and written approval requirement are necessary and proportionate under Article 21 of the ICCPR. And finally, could the delegation also explain how the absence of any exceptions for spontaneous demonstrations is compatible with the right to peaceful assembly? Thank you.

Thank you very much. Now I will give the floor to Mr. Teraya.

Thank you, Chair. Uh, first of all, I would like to thank the delegation, uh, for its responses, as right now, uh, to ask some, uh, follow up questions concerning the three issues I raised earlier. Thank you for your clarification regarding military courts. Your explanation was helpful. However, since the trial of civilians by military courts should remain exceptional, I would appreciate it if you would provide some statistics on the number of civilians tried before military courts in recent years. Of course, a written reply is sufficient. Let me turn to surveillance and interception communications. I would first like to emphasize that most of my questions are simply a request for clarification based on information already provided in the State Parties' report enterprise or on public available information. I have relied only on a limited extent on information from external sources. One of the question was, uh, that the, the, the, the relationship between the 2014 Prime Minister's order and 2019, uh, criminal procedure rule. More specifically, the question is whether the authority to authorize interception granted to designated prosecutors under the 2014 order remain in effect, or whether the 2019 law now reserve the authority exclusively to the prosecutor general. This is not just a technical or formal question. The question who has the authority and authorizing interception is directly relevant to the procedural safeguards necessary to prevent arbitrary surveillance. I would therefore appreciate some further explanation of how the authorization system currently operates in practice. Among the issues I raised, I consider political participation to be the most important. Regarding specific individuals and cases I mentioned, the delegation responded that the relevant decisions had been made by the courts or competent commission, or that individuals concerned have failed to meet the applicable legal requirements. I fully understand that these matters must be dealt with in accordance with law. However, could the delegation elaborate on precisely which legal requirements were not met in each case and on what grounds the relevant decisions are made. I recognize that political participation is a sensitive issue. Nevertheless, I would also like to emphasize that the concerns we are discussing are fundamental matters of human rights. They concern not only the right of political participation under Article 25 of the Covenant, but potentially other rights as well. Uh, political stability is, of course, important for every country, uh, as to the same time, the presence of, uh, opposition candidates in the election is healthy feature of democracy, and it allowing genuine political competition can strengthen the legitimacy and international… standard of the State Party. The rule of law the State Party legitimately proud of in the opening statement is essential, but it must be understood in some towns not only as formal compliance with democratic legal procedure. This is why the Committee has raised the above questions. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. Now I will give the floor to Mr. Carrazzo.

Thank you very much, Chairperson. And my warm thanks go to the delegation for what they have shared. I wanted to just flag two positive issues in the presentation. One is the presence of the National Human Rights Institution. both in the private meeting that was held with the representative on Monday as well as in this meeting over these two days. That's very positive, I think. And the second thing relates to the judicial delay. I have taken note of the South South Corporation mentioned by the Minister in the presentation given related to this context. And As you said, and I'm very glad to hear it, we are seeing products being exported as a result to Jamaica, which is another country, actually, as luck would have it, that we'll be reviewing in this session. And I think it's a very positive piece of progress. I wanted to refer to the political space in Rwanda as an indispensable space for civil and political rights and their protection in Rwanda. And I'd like to ask the delegation, and of course they can answer this subsequently in writing if they don't want to answer orally today, but what are the measures that you've adopted to ensure that the critical demonstrations against the government, which is now in power for some time, can go ahead without any fear of reprisals or any other consequences that the committee has been aware of on occasion? What are the requirements that are in place to register as an entity and to lobby or demonstrate against the president of the country? You mentioned something about that today. I wonder whether you could also provide information concerning investigations into complaints concerning any worries around acts of encroachment into that free space of political expression, any actions which have been undertaken by agents of the state or other agents to encroach upon that freedom? What measures have been taken to ensure the limitation of any encroachment by the state into that space of free expression? Thank you very much, and thank you very much to the members of the delegation as well.

Thank you very much, Mr. Carozzo. I think this is all of the follow-up questions. I see none from the floor. So we have now half an hour to go. So I can give you 20 minutes to reply, then we can go to the conclusion part. Yes, I'll give the floor.

Thank you for the follow-up questions. I would like to also quickly react to one of the questions that was not answered with regards to Jehovah's Witnesses and Neighborhood Watch. So just to clarify, Neighborhood Watch is a voluntary organization by the communities. The night patrols are voluntary. We all participate. So people who don't wish to participate simply do not. It's not compulsory. There is none that are obliged to participate in the night patrols. And for those that are, for lack of a better term, conscientious objectives to patrolling and ensuring the safety of their neighborhoods, it's not a criminal offense. You can just decline. As to the control fees. These are things that we all pay to contribute to the upkeep of this structure that keeps all of us safe. So we all pay these fees. They're monthly fees and they're subjected to, it depends on the neighborhood. Some neighborhoods determine that some fees that are a bit higher than other neighborhoods, it just depends on the needs of the community. We all pay them monthly. There is no such thing as a fine for not participating. It's entirely voluntary. There was a question that was asked by Madam Donders with regards to freedom of religion and how to ensure that affected religious communities were informed of the closures and that administrative and judicial remedies are available. The approach has always been grounded in prior communication and established legal framework and engagement with religious leaders and providing them with opportunities for corrective compliance and reviews. So the requirements that were relied upon for the temporary closures of prayer houses were not new and were not introduced without prior notice. The law governing FBOs established the applicable obligations and the requirements regarding legal personality, governance, and the operation of places of worship. there was a five-year transitional period, which is statutory grace period, for religious leaders to acquire required theological qualifications. And this expired in September 2023. So you can understand that for those prayer houses that were closed because of the lack of a theological degree of the legal representative of the particular denomination, they've had five years to comply. There was nothing new or without prior notice. There was also extensive consultations and sensitization activities before the 2024 inspections. Even in December 2023, RJB met with representatives of the Rwanda Interreligious Council from national to district levels to discuss compliance obligations. In May 2024, We formally wrote to umbrella organization, religious umbrella organizations, requesting information on their affiliated institutions and places of worship, and reiterating the need to comply with applicable legal requirements. Second, closure is not necessarily a permanent measure. Any religious community affected by closure of premises can address the identified deficiencies and submit requests for reopening to competent local authorities. We are constantly engaging with religious leaders, providing guidance and facilitating compliance process. There are also measures in place for the exemptions of some of the requirements for minority religions or upcoming faith-based organizations that are in place. Also, any administrative decisions that are affecting religious organization remain subject to remedies available under the law. which includes applicable administrative review, recourse to competent courts. So ultimately, the protection of religious freedom does not exempt institutions from generally applicable public safety and legal requirements. People are still able to congregate and worship publicly in those prayer houses that remain open. And Any regulatory decision remains grounded in the law and subject to all the appropriate safeguards. We want worshippers to be able to worship safely and peacefully in buildings that are up to code, up to standards. One of the other questions was about NGO law and the precise ground for refusal on the grounds of security, public order. and how it is applied consistently with requirements of legality and necessity and proportionality. Freedom of association and institutional accountability are complementary. So the grounds for refusal of registration, even though to just reiterate the point made earlier, as of now, under the 2024 law, no NGO has been rejected from registration. But the grounds for refusal of registration, they're expressly established by the law. They're not matters of unrestricted administrative discretion. So there are three circumstances that are identified by the law. for rejection under Article 7. So if you fail to satisfy the requirements of registration, if there is evidence indicating that an applicant organization is jeopardizing or intends to jeopardize security, peace, public health, national unity, public order, good morals, good conducts, and the rights and freedom of others. So there is a requirement of an evidentiary basis if risks to protected public interests are invoked. So just the fact that an organization engages in criticism or human rights advocacy or expresses views different from those of public authority, it does not in itself establish that ground. There's an evidentiary basis that is required by the law. And also, the law distinguishes registration from the termination of an organization's activities. And there's a graduated enforcement framework. So under articles 42 and 43, noncompliance with the law may result in a written warning. And if the violations are repeated, there's a temporary suspension for a period not exceeding three months. And during that period, there are extensive consultations with the organization to propose corrective measures. And Article 44 establishes the circumstances where definitive suspensions may be imposed. So if you fail to remedy the violations or there is established serious grounds relating to unlawful activities and the protected interest identified by law. And as with any regulatory decision, it must be grounded in the law and must be supported by relevant evidence. and justified in relation to public interest. So we intend to facilitate to the furthest extent as possible so that lawful civil society activities occurs and that organization operates transparently, respect the rights and legitimate interests of another. The regulatory oversight is not a mechanism for controlling opinions or activities of the civil societies. It's legally defined and very precise and based on evidence. Thank you.

Yes, so thank you very much. On the question of mapping report, I think we all know that it was released in Okay, first of all, it was completed in 2009, submitted to the High Commissioner, leaked in August 2010, and officially released in October 2010. So we are 16 years down the road. We will respond because it might have been either at the embassy, we have to look at whether there was that kind of request. on the basis of what you've said. But let me point out that Rwanda had a particular view on this report that was hugely based on even the methodology of the mapping report, to the extent that the conclusion was that it was so flawed, and that we are happy to give you the detailed review of Rwanda on the mapping report. It was so flawed to the extent that it could not have come up with very viable conclusions. And the mapping report itself points out that it is not a judicial investigation or a formal court judgment. So it's not a judicial, that's the, even with the mapping report itself, it says that and but rather factual mapping and inventory intended to lay a ground for transitional justice and combat immunity. So that was the objective of it. So we thought that the next step would have been to lay these processes which have not been laid in for the last 16 years. But again, it's not only the owners of Rwanda to seek for this information, I believe also under the mandate of the OSHR, they should be able to share information that they believe is important to the State Parties if it's within their custody. We would be happy if they shared it to us, but it's not always the mandate of the State Party to go seeking for some of this documentation that within the within the mandate of the OHSR because we are state parties. So anything that can help us in pursuit of justice, we are happy to receive it and pursue it. But I'll give you an answer whether that, because it was more of a procedure question rather than the content in a written form. There are quite a number of other questions that were posed and I think we'll probably give them in a written form and as I would say the 2019 law gives exclusive powers to the prosecutor general on authorizing on authorizing any interception and this particular other prime minister's order is is a prior law to the 2019 law. So if the powers are given by the prosecutor in 2019 law, then automatically the new law supersedes the older law. That's number one. But even in the hierarchy of norms, orders are not high in hierarchy than laws. So the laws take precedence. So I would confirm that it's the prosecutor general who does this under and and this is done with after a lot of considerations are done because it's it is in our infringing in someone's privacy. So it has to be legitimate and so the 2019 law prevails. Over any prior laws. Um then we look at we'll give a a reason as to why the the 30 days I think it has been repeated quite a number of times and we are happy to to make a written submission on this. There are quite a number of questions on political space, and I think the question is about the demonstrations and the protestations. And I don't have a live case to be able to demonstrate to you, but if it's the question of how the law works, because there are different members of the committee that posed this question, we will be happy to send it in a written form so that it informs the committee deeply on how the laws apply and the rationale behind the laws, the days that were established. we will be happy to to do that in terms of the number of civilians it's an exceptional as we all agree circumstance we'll share with you the numbers because the numbers can be found in uh uh in the isms and um and uh also assure you that still even for a military person ultimately the cases are supervised by the civilian courts because it goes to the court of appeal, all the way to the court of appeal in most instances. And so this is how it's handled. Ultimately, there's a say on the civilian cases, courts, especially after it has been determined at the high court. But we are happy to give you numbers, which I believe are not so many because it's not every day that you have civilians being accomplices to crimes committed by the military. But I don't have the numbers at my fingertips, but I know that they are not significant given the rationale for the court itself. I don't know whether this is the question that-- Maybe even though the questions on freedom of worship have been discussed, when we talk about churches, the only pointer that shows you that there's an infringement on this right is when a given denomination is closed. target a given denomination and you close it as a whole. So this never happened in Rwanda. All denominations still have their worship houses. Largely the questions were whether the worship houses were safe for prayers there, but of course, even other issues such as the theology that is taught, but I can confirm that there's no denomination that was closed completely. Largely it was worship houses. and now the rules also and the laws do capture what is required for a denomination to be registered. But I can confirm that there was no denomination which was targeted. It was the operation that we had of the 7,000, 10,000 were worship houses that did not fulfill the conditions that are required by the law. So I think I needed to, and maybe Doris can.

Thank you. I'd like to just quickly react to the questions about journalists facing harassment and intimidation and the measures that are in place. There are the relevant laws, of course, that govern any such behaviors, and individuals that are found to be involved are investigated and prosecuted in accordance with the law. And there is Rwanda understands that there is an MOU between the Legal Aid Forum and the Rwanda Media Commission for journalists to have access to legal representation when they're involved in legal proceedings. Between 2020 and 2026, the Legal Aid Forum recorded 45 matters involving journalists, media practitioners, digital content creators, and concerning at least 52 individuals. 32 criminal matters reached investigation and prosecution stage, And 22 matters, which include criminal, civil, labor, were brought to court. And some five of them were resolved through mediation and amicable settlement. So we can commit to providing further figures in written form. And yes, that's when it comes to complaints by journalists, I think that's pretty much it.

Okay, many thanks again to the delegation for the responses provided to the Committee. And now we move to the concluding part. Now I give the floor back to the head of delegation, Honorable Dr. Emmanuel Wirashibuja, for the closing remarks. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairperson of this committee, distinguished members of the committee. As we conclude this constructive dialogue, I wish on behalf of the government of Rwanda and the delegation that I'm heading to thank you, Mr. Chairperson, and the distinguished members of the committee for your thoughtful questions and substantive engagement. We also appreciate the cooperation extended by the Committee and its secretariat throughout the preparation for and the conduct of this review. The dialogue, I believe, has by and large provided a valuable opportunity to present Rwanda's progress since the previous review, to clarify the legal, policy and institutional measures taken to implement the Covenant, and reflect on areas requiring continued attention. The Committee's questions and observations will inform our efforts to strengthen the practical enjoyment of the civil and political rights in Rwanda. Where questions remain outstanding, as I earlier pointed out, or where additional information, clarification or statistics have been requested, Rwanda will provide written replies within the prescribed time. I know it's time-bound, but we respect the time that is prescribed. We do look forward to receiving the Committee's concluding observations, and once available, they will guide national efforts during the next phase of implementation of the Covenant. Rwanda welcomes the Committee's proposal to use the simplified reporting procedure for its next periodic report and looks forward to engaging with the Committee under that new procedure. Finally, we acknowledge and thank all stakeholders in Rwanda and abroad, including the National Commission for Human Rights, civil society organization, development partners who are always key in this journey that we undertake, and also the UN agencies for the important contribution to the implementation of the covenant and to its review. I conclude by thanking you, Mr. Chairperson, for your extraordinary leadership of this very tough session, and the distinguished members of the Committee and the Secretariat. And we do reaffirm Rwanda's commitment to constructive cooperation with the Committee and to the effective implementation of the Covenant. I also wish the committee and all the stakeholders continued meaningful commemoration of the Covenant's 60th anniversary. So we do hope that we will be able to commemorate this both nationally through activities that we've organized throughout up until December to commemorate the meaningful implementation of this Covenant. We thank you and we wish you all the best.

Thank you very much. On behalf of the Human Rights Committee, I would like to thank the Rwandan delegation for presenting its fifth periodic report and for the constructive dialogue held over the past two days. I appreciate the delegation's engagement and its efforts to address the Committee's questions. We acknowledge the State Party's post-conflict rebuilding efforts and the challenges it faces in implementing the Covenant in this context. We have been informed of the measures taken by the State Party, including efforts to reduce case backlog, and we note the high level of representation of women in Parliament. We also welcome the re-accreditation of the National Commission for Human Rights with A status and the increase in its budget. In the spirit of the dialogue, we note that some of the Committee's concerns have not yet been fully addressed. These include prolonged pre-trial detention and prison overcrowding, and the lack of independent investigations into deaths in custody and reported disappearances. We also remain concerned about gender-based violence and the stigma that deters victims from reporting, about accountability for past human rights violations, and about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. We further raised restrictions on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, and rights of Batwa and other groups classified as historically marginalized to participate in decisions affecting them, and need for investigations into UN findings concerning support to non-state armed group, including the recruitment of children. We would appreciate receiving additional information in writing from the delegation, including data, case outcomes, and information on practical measures, as requested by the members, which we trust will provide further clarity on the challenges at hand. We look forward to receiving your detailed written responses on the outstanding issues within two working days, i.e. by Monday, 26 October at 1 p.m. On behalf of the Committee, I once again thank you, Honorable Dr. Emmanuel Urashibuja and all members of the delegation for traveling to Geneva and for engaging with us so openly over the past two days. I also thank National Commission for Human Rights and Civil Society for their valuable contributions. My warm thanks goes as well to my colleagues and to those whose work made this dialogue possible, often unseen, the secretariat, the interpreters, and the technical team. We are grateful for your dedication and care. We look forward to continued cooperation I wish the delegation a safe and pleasant journey home and every success in the work that lies ahead. The meeting is now adjourned.