First Committee, 13th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 80th session

Good morning. The 30th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 80th session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, in accordance with its programme of work, the Committee will begin its consideration of the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction. Before I open the floor, I would like to remind all delegations to respect the time limit for statements during the thematic discussion. The first speaker on the list of speakers is the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. You have the floor.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I am honored to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Non-fulfillment of the commitments and obligations assumed under the relevant international legally binding instruments, especially on weapons of mass destruction, continues to pose threats to global peace and security. NAM State Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons note with satisfaction the effective operation of CWC as a comprehensive multilateral treaty banning an entire category of WMD, providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemical for peaceful purposes. Non-State Parties to the CWC invite all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible. The accession of the State of Palestine as a 193rd State Party in 2018 is a significant step towards achieving Convention's universality. Non-State Parties to the CWC reaffirm the importance of international cooperation in the field of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under CWC. The use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances, is reprehensible and completely contrary to international law, particularly the provisions of the Convention. Those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. International support to provide special care and assistance to all victims suffering from exposure to chemical weapons is an urgent humanitarian need. The State Parties to the Convention, as well as the OPCW, should pay attention to meeting those needs. Madam Chair, NAM State Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention consider that the Convention represents an important component of the international legal architecture related to WMD. They recognize that the lack of a verification system continues to pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the Convention, They continue to call for the resumption of multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory, legally binding protocol dealing with all articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner to sustainably strengthen the Convention, including through verification measures. They reiterated their call to promote international cooperation for peaceful purposes, including scientific-technical exchange. In the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and its subsequent resolutions, NAM underlines the need to ensure that any action by the Security Council do not undermine the UN Charter, existing multilateral treaties on WMD, and international organizations established in this regard, as well as the functions, power, and role of the General Assembly. NAM reaffirms the need to prevent the emergence of new types of WMD, as those weapons require a comprehensive ban and therefore supports the necessity of monitoring the situation and pursuing international action as required. In this regard, NAM welcomes the adoption of GA resolution entitled Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of WMD and New System of Such Weapon, report of the Conference on Disarmament. as well as the meeting held by Subsidiary Body 5 of the CD during this year on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new system of such weapons, radiological weapons. The full statement will be submitted to the Secretariat. I thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for her statement, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Oman.

Madam Chair, the Arab Group aligns itself with the statement by NAM. We reiterate our principled commitment to a world free of all weapons of mass destruction. We prioritize the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with relevant international resolutions. We would be remiss not to recall that SSOD 1 clearly and by consensus prioritized nuclear disarmament. However, we consider that the progress made in the disarmament and prohibition of chemical and biological weapons is yet to be matched with such progress and the disarmament of nuclear weapons. The Arab Group has played an important role in the total elimination of WMDs, and we have supported the CWC and BWC, and we've worked on achieving their noble objectives. We've condemned the use of WMDs by any party and under any circumstance as weapons that severely violate international humanitarian law. We partake in efforts made to implement the objectives of the CWC and BWC through review conferences and state party meetings, as well as in the framework of the working group on the strengthening of the BWC, whose sixth session was held in August. And we hope that the needed progress will materialize, especially on Article 10, on international cooperation. We stress the need for the OPCW to work with full respect to neutrality, non-politicization and impartiality, including in the consideration of reports of the use by Israel of prohibited chemical weapons in its warfare against the Gaza Strip. We stress that Israel’s joining of the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and the placement of its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards will contribute to confidence-building, the universality of the Treaty. and the strengthening of the credibility of the NPT, as well as the rectification of the current strategic and contractual imbalance in the region, in addition to the strengthening of international and regional peace and security. Israel is the sole party in the region which has not joined the three treaties on WMDs. With great and good political will and boldness, we have sought to widen the scope of arms control in the region to include WMDs, in addition to nuclear weapons, to dispel the pretext used by one party in the region to hold on to nuclear weapons as or for deterrence and intimidation. And we have taken pioneering steps in providing a proposal on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs, as is the case with other regional treaties. We call for concerted international efforts to establish a zone free of WMDs in the Middle East to achieve this noble and long-awaited objective. We welcome the convening of five sessions on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East. The last session was held in November under the chairmanship of Mauritania and encompassed in-depth discussions and valuable reports that paved the way for the resumption of negotiations on a legally binding instrument on the establishment of this free zone. We look forward to the convening of the sixth session under Moroccan chairmanship. Madam Chair, in conclusion, we reiterate our commitment to strengthening efforts to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring WMDs and their delivery systems, as this poses a threat to international peace and security. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Oman on behalf of the Arab Group. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation on behalf of the Group of States.

Distinguished Chair, I will read out a joint statement to support efforts to strengthen the UN Secretary General's mechanism for investigation of illegal use of chemical, biological, and weapons. We, the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Iran, Kyrgyz Republic, People's Republic of China, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Burundi, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Mali, Republic of Niger, Republic of Nicaragua, Republic of Tajikistan, the Russian Federation, the state of Eritrea, Reaffirm our dedication to protecting humanity from chemical and biological warfare, recognize the common interest of all humankind in excluding completely the possibility of the use of chemical, bacteriological, and toxin weapons. Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind, we are determined to condemn any use of toxic chemicals, biological agents, or toxins as weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time. and to hold accountable those responsible for any such use. We underline that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, that is the BWC, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, CWC, and the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisons and Other Gases and Bacteriological Weapons of Warfare, the Geneva Protocol, are essential for international peace and security. "We reaffirm that under all circumstances, the use, development, production and stockpiling of chemical, bacteriological and toxin weapons are prohibited under Article I of the BWC and under Article I of the CWC. We urge all States Parties to the BWC and CWC, as a priority, to fully comply with all their obligations pursuant to those Conventions and to abide by the understandings agreed by the Review Conferences of the States Parties to these Conventions." We note efforts by the UN Secretary General and UN Secretariat, as well as national initiatives to provide relevant training to experts that could support the Secretary General’s mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. At the same time, recognize that there have been developments in the field of science and technology related to the UNSGM, and that the situation related to the CWC, BWC, and Geneva Protocol regimes, including new challenges and threats such as chemical and biological terrorism, has changed since the establishment of the UNSGM in 1987 and the endorsement of its technical guidance and procedures in 1990. Therefore, we are convinced that there is a need to intensify efforts of the international community, with support of the UN Secretariat, to strengthen the expert and technical capabilities of the UNSGM. should pay particular attention to the UNSGM Guidelines and Procedures document, that is A/44/561, which have not been updated with the exception of their technical appendices. Few of their points were revised in 2007 since their endorsement by the UNGA in resolution A/45/57/C from December 4, 1990. We reiterate that according to section G of the above-mentioned UNSGM Guidelines and Procedures, the UNSG should periodically review the assistance of his appointed expert consultants bearing in mind modifications proposed by Member States, the guidelines and procedures contained in Annex I to the 1989 report of the SG, and revise them as necessary for submission to the GA upon its request. In light of the above, we call upon the UNSG to organize a review of the current UNSGM guidelines and procedures, the UNGA document A/44/561, in which they are set out, in accordance with paragraph 103 and.

I think the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the European Union.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member states. North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Monaco, and San Marino align themselves with this statement. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery remain a grave threat to international peace and security. Compliance with and enforcement of international obligations in this field remain a fundamental pillar of global efforts to uphold the international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture. The use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances is a violation of international law. The EU continues to support the OPCW politically, financially, and will uphold its integrity and credibility. We call upon those states not yet party to the CWC to join the Convention. The EU is seriously concerned by uses of riot control agents and choking agent by Russia as a method of warfare prohibited by the CWC. Russia must provide a credible response to these legitimate concerns. The EU welcomes the Syrian Transitional Authority’s cooperation with the OPCW and calls for implementation of the next steps to fully eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme. The EU supports it through a substantive voluntary financial contribution to the OPCW, including for identifying the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks committed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The EU supports the BWC, welcomes the recent accession of Comoros and Kiribati to the Convention, and calls on the remaining eight states outside the Convention to join at the earliest date. The EU is encouraged by the productive work undertaken by the BWC Working Group, which should complete its work preferably this year in order to establish both a science and technology and international cooperation and assistance mechanism. It should also endorse clear recommendations on further strengthening of the Convention. We support the creation of open-ended working group on verification and compliance. Deliberate use of disinformation, especially by Russia against Ukraine and its partners, undermines international peace and security, erodes trust, and obstructs cooperation and assistance. Russia's false claims about legitimate programs for biosafety and biosecurity are a striking example of politicizing technical forums and weakening collective efforts to uphold treaty obligations. The EU recognizes the UN Secretary-General mechanism as the only existing independent international instrument for investigating the alleged use of biological weapons. We will continue to provide funding for its operationalization. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We consider the 1995 NPT resolution valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East. The EU reaffirms the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and supports its implementation through its Council decision. The HCOC is a vital multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing confidence and transparency. The U.S. calls on all remaining states to subscribe to the code. Effective and transparent export controls are important for facilitating the fullest possible exchange on equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information. Multilateral export controls regimes, as well as national export control systems, are essential for the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. You are fully committed to defending and further developing export controls as universal, effective, and responsive non-proliferation tools. Thank you, Mr.

I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union, and now I give the floor to His Excellency Permanent Representative of Germany.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Germany aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. Madam Chair, this year marked the 50th anniversary of entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention and the 100th anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Both treaties remain very relevant to this day. In the past two and a half years, five states have joined the BWC and one the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Germany remains fully committed to the strengthening of the BWC. Rapid developments in science and biotechnology, often in convergence with AI, have lowered the threshold to develop and produce novel biological weapons. The BWC is not equipped to respond to these risks. In particular, a mechanism to review and assess scientific and technological developments and provide expertise to States Parties for subsequent decisions, but also verification tools, are urgently needed. Germany welcomes the important work undertaken so far by the BWC Working Group under Brazil’s stewardship. As a key contributor to training measures for experts and laboratories nominated by UN members to the UN Secretary-General Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Germany aims to support the operational readiness of this mechanism. It is important that the UNSGM remains independent. Madam Chair, The prohibition of chemical weapons has come under increasing pressure. Russia's uses of riot control agent and the forbidden, blatant violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention must stop immediately. Holding Russia accountable is crucial in order to uphold the global norm against the use of chemical weapons. Madam Chair, the fall of the Assad regime has opened up the opportunity to fully destroy all remnants of the former regime's chemical weapons. Germany commends the clear commitment of the new Syrian authorities to cooperating with the OPCW and fulfilling Syria's obligations on the Convention. We also highly appreciate the continued deployment of OPCW missions to Syria. Significant proliferation risks remain until all sites are secured and all CW-relevant chemicals, munitions, and equipment are destroyed. Germany, as a member of the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, stands ready to support this important effort. I thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank His Excellency the Permanent Representative of Germany for his statement. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. Egypt aligns itself with the non-aligned movement and the African and the Arab groups. Egypt categorically rejects and condemns the use of chemical and biological and other toxin weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. Recognize also the emerging chemical and biological risks and the importance of stepping up existing efforts to anticipate, prevent, and respond in a timely and effective manner. Similar to chemical and biological weapons, which are prohibited under respective conventions, namely CWC and BWC, nuclear weapons, being the most consequential of weapons of mass destruction, must be prohibited and totally and irreversibly eliminated under effective international control. To ensure political and moral consistency and lack of double standards, when some member states call on other nations to accede to the conventions on chemical and biological weapons, They also need to extend their attention to achieving the universality of the NPT and calling upon its non-state parties, including in the Middle East, to join the treaty as a matter of urgency, as well as calling upon nuclear weapons states to implement their obligations to dismantle their nuclear arsenals and sharing arrangements. Madam Chairperson, Egypt signed and ratified NPT in good faith and implemented all its respective obligations under the treaty, including adherence to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of the IAEA. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 Review and Extension Conference was made possible on the basis of the package which included the 1995 resolution on establishing the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which remains unimplemented until now. Egypt was a pioneer in proposing the establishment of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction, and not only nuclear weapons. Egypt calls for an immediate action to rectify the state of strategic imbalance in the Middle East due to the persistent obstruction of the efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction by one State, an alarming situation which hampers the realization of sustainable security and stability in the region and continues to further strain a region in great peril. Egypt also rejects and condemns any use or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors under any circumstances. In this regard, Egypt has consistently supported the implementation of international resolutions, especially Security Council Resolution 1540, to prevent acquisition by or diversion to non-state actors, including terrorist groups. Finally, while not being a State Party, we continue to follow with great interest the discussions in the context of BWC’s Working Group to Strengthen the Convention. We reiterate that efforts to respond to the use of chemical and biological weapons must not result in any undue restrictions, including through arbitrary and selective export control regimes, to the inherent right to benefit from the application of peaceful uses.

I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Qatar.

Mr.

Chairman, my delegation aligns itself with the statement made on behalf of the Arab Group and on behalf of NAM. The presence of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons threats, the peace and security of peoples and countries and violates fundamental human rights, including the right to life, a threat that is worsening with access by non-state actors to these weapons and their means of delivery. Nationally, Mr. Chairman, Qatar continues to develop and update its legislation in the field of weapons of mass destruction. This with a view to adapt them To our international commitments, we cooperate with the OPCW and we strengthen the role it plays in terms of implementing the convention. Qatar is currently hosting the 12th annual meeting of representatives of the chemical industry. national bodies of States Parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons. That is between the 21st and 24th of October in Doha. That meeting aims to bolster cooperation between the chemical industry and national authorities in order to fully and effectively implement the Convention on Chemical Weapons. We welcome the adoption by the Executive Council of the OPCW during its 110th session, the resolution entitled "The rapid destruction of all traces of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic". Republic that was adopted by consensus. The State of Qatar, as a state representing the interests of Syria, submitted a draft resolution to the Executive Council as part of our efforts to support the international community in eliminating all traces of chemical weapons and to strengthen cooperation between States Parties and the OPCW. That draft resolution was co-sponsored by more than 70 states. As part of our regional efforts, we have organized an Arab Forum for the Limitation of Arms, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation. That was between the 4th and 6th of June 2024. Chair, as part of our efforts to eliminate biological weapons and raise awareness of the threat they pose, we organized in Doha a workshop for national contact points on the implementation of the Convention on Biological Weapons, and that was in 2024. The goal was to bolster the implementation of that convention and to exchange information and good practices between national contact points in the region. By way of conclusion, Chair, we are ready to continue working in order to implement all conventions related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and we call upon all States to refrain from developing any weapons that would constitute

the microphone has been cut off.

I thank the distinguished representative of Qatar, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Thank you very much, Chair. The prohibition and total elimination of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a moral and legal obligation. My country reaffirms its commitment to the full implementation of international regimes which categorically prohibit their development, production and use. As regards chemical weapons, Mexico notes with concern reports regarding the possible use of chemical weapons in Sudan and on the use of riot control agents. control agents in the context of the war in Ukraine. These cases underscore the urgent need to strengthen mechanisms for investigation and accountability under the OPCW. At the same time, we recognize with optimism the new stage of cooperation that has opened between the Syrian authorities and the OPCW. We hope that this spirit of collaboration will manifest in tangible actions to resolve outstanding issues, this with a view to guaranteeing guaranteeing that these weapons will never again be used, and also in order to ensure that we take a crucial step towards truth, justice and redress for victims. Mexico welcomes the progress made with the destruction of obsolete and abandoned chemical weapons, particularly the joint efforts of Japan, China and Germany. In the sphere of biological weapons, Mexico recognizes that the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons has been fundamental to prevent the emergence of national programs in this field. However, the effectiveness of this work is being limited by the absence of a verification mechanism. It is for this reason that we must, without delay, equip it with a legally binding instrument to guarantee its full implementation and bolster mutual trust between States Parties. In the context of scientific development and technological development occurring at a breakneck speed, including developments in biotechnology and AI, we must guarantee that science is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. I conclude with a brief reference to Committee 1540 of the Security Council. The last comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 of 2022 identified the need to pay greater attention to controls over biological material. I appeal to Committee 1540 to consider the impacts of emerging technologies, particularly when artificial intelligence could be used to develop biological weapons. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the US.

Thank you, Chair. The world faces persistent and growing danger from chemical and biological weapons. The United States unilaterally renounced biological weapons in 1969 and was a founding member of the Biological Weapons Convention. President Trump’s statement at the General Assembly last month was a wake-up call on the threat of biological weapons. The United States is concerned that some countries and non-state actors are pursuing biological weapons. To protect Americans and the world, President Trump announced last month that the United States will spearhead efforts to strengthen the BWC by applying modern tools, especially AI, to tackle these growing and evolving threats. We urge all to join us in pioneering a suite of trustworthy 21st century tools to strengthen BWC enforcement, verification, and implementation. Chair, while paving new roads to address biological threats, we also recognize the promising chapter opened by the new Syrian Government to address chemical weapons. The United States calls on all nations to step up, share the burden, and seize this opportunity to support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Syrian Government in turning the page. We fully support Syria’s and the OPCW’s critical mission to identify, secure, and verifiably destroy remnants of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons. The new Syrian government’s efforts to work with the OPCW are a welcome shift from the former regime’s attempts to conceal and mislead. We cannot ignore the scourge of chemical weapons across the globe. Iran is developing pharmaceutical-based agents as part of a chemical weapons program, and in May, the United States determined the government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024. We remain committed to engaging Sudan on this issue. In Ukraine, the OPCW has issued three reports concluding munitions recovered from the front lines by Ukrainian forces contained riot control agents. These reports provide further evidence that these agents were used as a method of warfare against Ukrainian forces, a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States is not alone in assessing Russia repeatedly has used chloropicrin, a weapon not seen since World War I. Russia’s actions reflect its disregard for its international obligations and follow its 2018 and 2020 poisonings in violation of the CWC. Chair, we call on all nations to uphold the obligations established by these conventions and to strengthen the tools to support them. We reiterate our opposition to the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere. We ask all countries to join us and to hold any actor who uses such weapons accountable. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Madam Chair, this year marks the 50th anniversary of the BTWC and the centenary of the Geneva Protocol. It has now been 12 years since Syria acceded to the CWC, and we welcome Syria's commitment to meet its obligations under the Convention. We also reaffirm our commitment to Article I of the BTWC, to ensure that biological agents and toxins are used solely for peaceful purposes, to protect health, advance science, and strengthen global security. As the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs recently noted, in a time of rapid scientific advancement, the peaceful application of biology must be safeguarded through cooperation, transparency, and trust. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 opens the way for Syria to destroy its chemical weapons. We commend the Syrian Government’s engagement with the OPCW to find, secure, and destroy Assad’s chemical weapons, and we will continue to support the OPCW’s missions in Syria. We have committed 2.8 million pounds over the last year to support these efforts, and as such, we encourage all CWC State Parties to contribute funding, technical expertise, and support to Syria and the OPCW. Madam Chair, Russia continues to use chemical weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine. The OPCW has confirmed in three reports the presence of riot control agents in samples collected by Ukraine. In July, the UK sanctioned two individuals and a Russian entity under its chemical weapons sanctions regime. Rest assured that we will support Ukraine's pursuit of the perpetrators. The UK is also concerned by reports that the Sudanese armed forces have used chemical weapons. Let us be clear: any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. As a CWC State Party, Sudan must abide by its obligations under the Convention. Madam Chair, on a positive note, we welcome the OPCW’s Executive Council’s recommendation to appoint Ambassador Sabrina De La Fiore Matter as Director-General. A strong, confident, and properly funded OPCW is critical to achieving the CWC’s vision of a world free of chemical weapons. The UK also welcomes President Trump’s remarks to UNGA on the BTWC. The time is indeed ripe for an international effort to enforce the BTWC. We support strengthening the Convention to ensure that all State Parties use biological agents or toxins only for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. To conclude, we remain alert to non-state actors and terrorists' interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. For that reason, we urge all States to implement in full the obligations of UN Security Council resolution 1540 and to support the 1540 Committee’s efforts to provide advice and assistance to States to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. Now I give the floor to Her Excellency, Permanent Representative of France.

Thank you, madam Chair. France aligns itself with the statement of the EU and would like to make the following comments in its national capacity. Respect for the norms for non-proliferation of WMD and their vehicles by all states is crucial. We must collectively combat the threats posed by nuclear proliferation, as well as ballistic, chemical, and biological proliferation, and refuse the widespread use of these weapons, France reaffirms its support for the actions of the OPCW and the implementation of the CWC. Since 2023, all of the chemical weapon stocks we’ve declared have been destroyed, which is an important step in the fight against proliferation of WMD. And yet, The taboo against using chemical weapons has been broken several times over the past few years. We encourage cooperation of the Syrian transitional authorities with the OPCW to destroy stocks and production capacity of chemical weapons from the Assad era and identify perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks that occurred. Syria is not an isolated case. The use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. anyone under any circumstances. We are concerned by the use of chemical agents, including anti-riot agents, in the hostilities carried out in Ukraine in violation of the CWC. The OPCW allegations and legitimate questions must be addressed by Russia. Madam Chair, France is fully committed to the work of the BWC. As Vice President of the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC, France reaffirms its support for strengthening cooperation and interstate assistance and developing independent capacity for analysis of recent scientific and technological developments in the field to ensure respect for the Convention. Developments that violate Security Council resolutions of vehicles that can carry WMD Their sophistication and their proliferation continue to jeopardize global stability. We call on all states to join the Hague Code of Conduct against Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, HCOC, and accede to the regime of control over these missiles. support these mechanisms against proliferation, and we favour strengthening the role and expertise of the 1540 Committee. Thank you, Chair.

I thank Her Excellency Permanent Representative of France, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland.

Madame Chair, This year is the 100th anniversary of the Protocol of 1925 on the use of chemical and biological weapons. The protocol is a key instrument that laid the groundwork for international norms in this area, including the CWC and the BWC. Over the past few years, this crucial framework has been called into question by the acts of certain parties. It is our common duty to protect and to strengthen this normative framework, to guarantee that it lasts. We must investigate any credible allegations of the use of these weapons and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable. When it comes to the CWC, these considerations apply equally to all credible allegations and confirmed cases of use of these weapons, whether in Syria, the UK, or Ukraine. Use of chemical agents, riot agents, or other toxic agents is covered by this. When it comes to Syria, a historic occasion has arisen to clarify the extent of the chemical weapons program after a decade of limited cooperation and dishonesty, and to guarantee its long-term compliance with the Convention. Switzerland commends the measures taken by the transitional Syrian Government. Madam Chair. We commend the progress made under the BWC. Switzerland, Comoros and Kiribati for their recent accession to the Convention. This progress is encouraging, and we call on all States that have not yet done so to ratify this crucial instrument without delay. We are pleased that the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention has made progress on several key issues. welcome beginning discussions on its final report. In this context, we believe that the establishment of a review mechanism for scientific developments as well as a mechanism for international cooperation and assistance would be essential elements. Their establishment would be a first and important step toward filling in institutional gaps in the CWC. Its clearest shortcoming is the lack of a verification mechanism that is effective. Therefore, we believe that it is as or even more important, the final report of the group recommend the establishment of a working group dedicated to verification of this instrument. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Netherlands.

Thank you, Chair. In addition to the statement delivered by the EU, I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Chair, Excellencies, and Distinguished Delegates: One hundred years ago, in June 1925, the Geneva Protocol was signed. We mark the anniversary of this historic document, which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons in war and laid the groundwork for concluding the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, one of the original signatories of the Geneva Protocol and the host state of the OPCW, actively promotes the full and effective implementation of the global norms against the possession and use of chemical weapons, now more than ever. We are seriously concerned by the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare and the use of the choking agent chloropicrin by Russia in Ukraine. Both are explicitly prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Furthermore, we must address the urgent situation with regard to the chemical weapons programme in Syria under the Assad regime. We should eliminate the chemical weapons in Syria for good. The Netherlands commends the Syrian Transitional Authority’s cooperation with the OPCW and encourages it to ensure Syria’s return to full compliance with the Convention. Also in light of the need to counter any proliferation risk, this is in the interest of us all. More generally, the Netherlands emphasizes the importance of attribution. Holding perpetrators of chemical weapons use accountable is a priority of the Netherlands foreign policy. For this reason, we remain committed to supporting the UN Secretary General's mechanism. Chair, 2025 also marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention. While the convention has proven instrumental in preventing the spread of biological weapons in the past 50 years, it requires continuous work to ensure it remains up to this task.

Therefore, it is

crucial that the BWC working group accelerates its work as the end of its mandate in 2026 is approaching. We are in particular committed to establishing an international cooperation and assistance mechanism and a science and technology advisory mechanism, as well as taking forward the topic of compliance and verification.

I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands and now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Madam Chair, this year is the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons. The Russian Federation as the depositary state of the BWC is consistently implementing all of its provisions. However, after half a century since the Convention entered into force, we still cannot completely remove the issue of biological weapons from the international agenda. Some states continue to pursue their military biological activities. that violate provisions of the BWC. The substantiated questions raised by Western Federation with regard to the revealed facts about a military biological program being implemented in Ukraine in violation of the BWC, with the support of the Pentagon and its affiliates, including private companies, remain unanswered. The analysis of projects carried out in Ukrainian laboratories leads to the conclusion that biological weapons components were and are still being developed in close proximity to the territory of Russia. We consider any such activity as a direct threat to our national security. The Ukrainian case acutely confirms the necessity of consolidated efforts of the international community to universalize and strengthen the BWC regime. We believe the main priority here should be the resumption of work on developing a universal, legally binding, non-discriminatory protocol to the BWC that would provide for an effective verification mechanism of its implementation, as well as implementation on a stringent basis by States Parties on the national level. We intend to continue our active efforts to strengthen the BWC within the dedicated working group established by decision of the ninth review conference of the BWC. The strengthening of the expertise and technical capacity of the UN SG’s mechanism for investigation of indulgent use of chemical and biological weapons is urgently needed. We hope that the SG will promptly proceed with the review, with the help of expert consultants and taking into account proposals from Member States. We are committed to most actively contribute to this work. The Russian Federation attaches great importance to full and non-discriminatory implementation of the CWC and fully supports its strengthening. as the crucial international agreement. In recent years, the practice to discredit states they find undesirable with groundless accusations of violation of the CWC was commonly used by Western countries. At the same time, they studiously ignore violations of the CWC by Ukraine, although the Russian Federation has been conveying information about such facts constantly to the OPCW, the UN Security Council, and the General Assembly. We strongly urge States Parties to the CWC who care about the fate of this once successful disarmament mechanism to prevent the final degradation of the OPCW and to prevent, to restore its technical nature and authority. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa.

Chairperson, South Africa aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Non-Aligned Movement. We reiterate that collective responsibility to uphold the international norm against the production, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons established under the Chemical Weapons Convention. South Africa continues to support the OPCW as the only technical competent international authority in the field of chemical weapons. My delegation therefore calls on all States Parties to redouble their efforts towards cultivating a culture of consensus in the work of the Organization and restore an environment of cooperation. Chairperson, we underscore the importance of the full implementation of Article 11 in order to strengthen and accelerate the economic and technical development of States Parties. Regarding Article 7, South Africa encourages the OPCW Technical Secretariat to work closely with these Parties and to continue providing appropriate tailor-made assistance and technical support. The Africa Programme remains a core component of the International Cooperation and Assistance Programme, and to guarantee its sustainability, we see the importance of future phases of this programme being

fully funded under the regular budget of the OPCW.

The transfer of technology, knowledge, material and equipment for peaceful purposes also remains important. South Africa regrets that the ninth Biological Weapons Conventions Review Conference did not agree on a substantive outcome. However, we welcome the decision to establish a working group open to all States Parties with the aim to develop specific measures, including possible legally binding measures, that could include recommendations to strengthen and institutionalise the Convention. The delegation believes that the working

group on voluntary guidelines that was established at the fourth meeting of the working group on Article 7 on

assistance, response and preparedness remains valid and open for endorsement.

We share the view that Article 10 should promote the right of States Parties to participate in the

exchange of technology, equipment, material, and scientific information for peaceful purposes, and that the States Parties are in a position to do so.

should contribute to the further development of scientific knowledge and discoveries in this field.

South Africa also attaches

great importance to the United Nations Secretary General's mechanism to establish facts regarding alleged chemical or biological weapons incidents. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Chile.

Thank you very much, madam Chair. We wish to reaffirm our condemnation of the use and threatened use of biological and chemical weapons in all circumstances, at any time and in any context. We reaffirm our commitment to the Convention on Biological Weapons, and we hope to see its universalization. It is a fundamental component of the international legal architecture for weapons of mass destruction. vein, it is crucial that each national authority strengthen the activities under this instrument in terms of biosecurity, and capacity development must be continued, as must trust building and transparency to ensure it's complied with and implemented. It's vital to have continuous oversight of the research and use of possible dual-use goods. example, gMOs and zoonotic disease to prevent the misuse of these things as biological weapons. Madam Chair, Chile promotes the universal accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. We support and we are committed to the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW. The use of chemical weapons and toxic chemical products as weapons in any place and under any circumstances is completely reprehensible and runs counter to international law, specifically to the provisions of the Convention. Those responsible for using these weapons must be held accountable. As such, we note with satisfaction the effective functioning of the Convention as a multilateral treaty comprehensive in nature which prohibits weapons of mass destruction, establishes a verification system and promotes the use of chemical products for peaceful purposes. We, moreover, Madam Chair, wish to underscore the importance of resolution 1540 of the Security Council that establishes essential measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are a real threat to international security and stability. Finally, we reaffirm the need to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction whose prohibition must be total. We must have international monitoring which is in line with that goal. We are promoting international cooperation, and there must also be scientific and technical cooperation between teams and producers to ensure the proper use of biological, the non-use of biological and toxic weapons and the proper use of those products. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Chile, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of New Zealand.

Thank you, Chair. A core and enduring pillar of New Zealand's foreign policy is our unwavering opposition to the development, possession, and use of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. These indiscriminate and inhumane weapons have no place in the modern world. Despite the overall success of the Chemical Weapons Convention, we are now faced with the deeply alarming prospect of new use of chemical weapons. We are gravely concerned by reports of Russia’s use of riot control agents and other chemical substances in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Three technical assistance visits by the OPCW confirmed the repeated use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, which the Convention strictly prohibits. We have also seen deeply troubling allegations of the systematic use of more toxic substances, such as chloropicrin. We condemn these actions in the strongest terms and call on Russia to cease its use of chemical weapons, comply fully with its obligations, and cooperate transparently with the OPCW. We are moreover concerned that the use of chemical weapons against Ukraine is not an isolated incident, but part of an escalating pattern. Chair, New Zealand welcomes the Syrian Interim Authority’s renewed engagement with the OPCW. While we recognise the difficult conditions on the ground, this moment presents a vital opportunity to eliminate remaining chemical weapons in Syria once and for all. We urge the Interim Authority to continue to cooperate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to ensure full and verified destruction of all chemical weapons and related infrastructure. Sustained momentum is essential. Chair, New Zealand welcomed the establishment of the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC at the 9th Review Conference. The group's work is vital to ensuring the Convention's continued relevance in the face of rapid scientific and technological advances. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the BWC's entry into force. As we reflect, we must also ensure that the Convention is equipped to meet the challenges of the next 50 years. Chair, New Zealand will continue to advocate for the universalization and strengthening of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. We remain committed to achieving a world free from weapons of mass destruction. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Portugal.

Chair, it is consensual that other weapons of mass destruction, whether chemical, biological or radiological, represent a threat to international peace. On the one hand, our international normative framework is robust and upinned by the CWC and the BWC, which must be universalized. However, the confirmed use of chemical weapons in the past decades and the resurgence of non-state actors with ever greater means of acquiring weapons of mass destruction should encourage us to redouble our efforts towards disarmament. Apart from supporting the treaties and the OPCW, there are a variety of mechanisms and soft law instruments which may assist our efforts. Allow me to outline a few of them. From the Secretary General's mechanism to the international partnership against impunity launched by France, from the working group on strengthening the BWC ably chaired by Brazil, to the Security Council's resolution 1540 and many others. The means are in place. It is now a question of political will. Chair. To make our efforts successful, we must include disarmament in our development cooperation strategies. Portugal is proud to send national experts to regional workshops on the implementation of the BWC, and earlier this year, we organized a successful event for Portuguese-speaking African countries on biosecurity. Our national experts have also cooperated with ODA to translate the Guide to Implementing the BWC into Portuguese. This was the first time the document was translated to a non-official UN language. Chair, to conclude, we reiterate our call on all States to ensure compliance of their obligations regarding other weapons of mass destruction. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of protocol, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mozambique.

Madam Chair, Mozambique aligns itself with the statement made by on behalf of the No Alignment Movement, and we wish to make these following remarks in our own delegation, national delegation. The spread and use of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and radiological, continues to pose an existential risk to humanity. Furthermore, as the Secretary-General’s report A/8/164 underscores, the convergence between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation by emerging technologies and dual use of everyday innovation is heightening the global threat threshold. These technological conversions, including artificial intelligence driven by design, 3D printing, and unregulated drone technology, creates new routes for misuse. We are increasing our way of the growing potential of low-cost, high-impact option for non-state actors, compounded by the erosion of global cooperation, geopolitical rivalries, strong negotiations on verification and a no-proliferation protocol, diminishing the space for dialogue and compromise. Mozambique, therefore, urges the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 of 2004 and welcomes the ongoing cooperation between the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, Interpol, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. to strengthen national capacities and legal frameworks. Madam Chair, we recall that Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention, together with their verification assistance mechanisms, remain indispensable pillars of the disarmament architecture. Mozambique joins others in calling for renewed international engagement to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention through illegal binding of the verification mechanism, support for Africa regional centers of excellence on CBR risk mitigation under Africa Union United Nations partnership frameworks, and the integration of algorithmic accountability and artificial intelligence safeguards into future weapons of mass destruction governance regimes to prevent the automation of destruction. To conclude, Madam Chair, weapons of mass destruction cannot coexist with the Charter of the United Nations. Our generation’s responsibility is to ensure that the tools of science save lives.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mozambique. And now I give the floor to His Excellency, Permanent Representative of Lithuania.

Lithuania fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. The following remarks are in my national capacity. The use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, regardless of the location, time, perpetrator, or circumstances. Violations by certain States, including Russia, North Korea, and al-Assad’s regime’s Syria, have contributed to a gradual weakening of this norm. Given current security environment, strengthening enforcement mechanisms and international cooperation is critical to maintaining the chemical weapons prohibition. In this context, Lithuania welcomes serious cooperation with the OPCW and encourages further progress towards full compliance with the Convention. Madam Chair, Lithuania is deeply concerned by growing number of credible reports of Russia's use of riot control agents and possibly chloropicrin in Ukraine as a method of the warfare, which is explicitly prohibited under the convention. Despite mounting evidence, Russia refuses to provide an explanation under Article 9 of the CWC and resorting instead to denial. Ironically, a few speakers before me, Russian representative, noted how cooperative and supportive of the CWC they are. This is a familiar pattern that we saw with the attempted assassination of late Alexei Navalny, as well as the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. Lithuania calls for timely attribution and full accountability to uphold the global norms against chemical weapons. Madam Chair, I would like to reaffirm Lithuania's steadfast commitment to upholding the global norm against biological weapons and to express our continued support for the effective operation and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This is a commitment that is even more vital in the light of the growing opportunities, but also risks posed by the rapid advances of biotechnology, synthetic biology, and the globalization of related industries. In this context, we welcome fruitful work of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention. We look forward to the timely establishment of the two proposed mechanisms, as well as the launch of the open-ended Working Group on the Compliance and Verification. Again, we condemn Russia's attempts to divert attention from its unjustified and illegal full-scale war against Ukraine by spreading disinformation concerning Ukraine's and its partners' legitimate biosafety and biosecurity capacity-building initiatives. Madam Chair, We would also like to highlight the issue of chemical munitions dumped at sea, which pose latent yet growing global security threat, especially in the Baltic Sea. We urge this matter to be viewed through a security lens, especially amid rising maritime activity, natural degradation, and hybrid threats such as undersea infrastructure sabotage. Lithuania invites all Member States to cooperate actively on this important matter. I thank you.

I thank His Excellency Permanent Representative of Lithuania, and now I give the floor to His Excellency Distinguished Representative of China.

Madam Chair, this year marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the BWC. China supports the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in its comprehensive discussion in all topics mandated by RC9 as the basis for specific and effective measures, including possible legally binding measures. and recommendations on reinforcing and institutionalizing the Convention in all its aspects. The working group should consolidate consensus as the foundation for resuming multilateral negotiations on establishing a verification mechanism. China welcomes the concrete proposals in this regard. This November, China will co-host with Malaysia and UNODA the second regional workshop on implementing the BWC and promoting biosafety and security in Southeast Asia to be held in Guangzhou. We look forward to contributing discussions to more biosecurity capacity building in the region, better global biosecurity governance, and stronger international and regional cooperation. Madam Chair, China is committed to the maintaining the authority of the CWC towards the early realization of a world free of chemical weapons. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. The destruction of the JACWs in China is seriously lagging behind. We once again urge China to shoulder its historical responsibility and clear the remaining JACWs at an early date. China advocates resolving chemical weapons hotspot issues through dialogue and consultation, supports the OPCW's Technical Secretariat cooperating and working with the Syrian transitional government. Syria should respond to the international community's concerns on counter-terrorism. All stakeholders should address the chemical weapons issues related to the Ukraine crisis within the CWC framework and play a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis. Last June, China and the OPCW co-hosted the organization's first AI capacity-building workshop in Shanghai. China is ready to continue sharing experience and assist developing countries in capacity building. Madam Chair, the peaceful uses of science and technology is essential for developing countries to achieve the SDGs. China calls for implementing in an integrated manner the GA resolution entitled "Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security", relevant articles of the BWC and the CWC, and Security Council Resolution 1540, advance proliferation and peaceful uses in a balanced way, further prioritize peaceful uses and relevant international cooperation, and promote peaceful uses and inclusive sharing of biological and chemical technologies through more concrete actions. I thank you, madam Chair. The full version of this statement will be uploaded to the Committee's website.

I thank His Excellency, distinguished representative of China. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Malaysia aligns itself with the statements made by NAM and ASEAN.

There can be no genuine.

Security as long as the international community remains subject to the threat of any category of WMDs. Malaysia therefore reaffirms that the total elimination of all WMDs, nuclear, chemical, and biological, is the only effective guarantee against their catastrophic consequences. Malaysia underlines the commitment to the CWC and continues to serve as a regional hub for CBRN capacity building, contributing to preparedness and cooperation across Asia. From 13th to 19th August, 2025, Malaysia hosted the 13th Integrated Advanced Course and Exercise on Assistance and Protection for Asian State Parties, providing hands-on CBRN training in collaboration with this OPCW. We also reaffirm our full support for the OPCW in the discharge of its mandate with independence and impartiality. The re-emergence of chemical weapon use demands action and vigilance by the international community. Those who violate the international norm against chemical weapons must be held fully accountable. Malaysia welcomes the cooperation of the new Syrian authorities with the OPCW and the adoption of the OPCW Executive Council’s decision 8th October 2025 on the expedited on-site destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in Syria. These are positive developments in efforts towards comprehensively resolving outstanding issues and closing the Syrian chemical weapons file. Madam Chair, on the OBWC, Malaysia underscores the urgent need for progress in strengthening the Convention, including through a credible verification and compliance mechanism. We commend the constructive discussions at the sixth session of the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention held in August 2025 in Geneva. Pending a legally binding mechanism to assess BWC compliance, we recognize the role of confidence-building measures in enhancing transparency, trust, and confidence among State parties. Consistent with Article 10 of the BWC, Malaysia looks forward to strengthen cooperation in the peaceful applications of biological science and technology. Sustained efforts to universalize the CWC and the BWC also remain critical as we work together to protect the world from the unacceptable risk.

Posed by any and all WMDs.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Philippines.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I deliver this statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the non-aligned movement. ASEAN reaffirms its unequivocal commitment to upholding the international norms against the existence and use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and reiterates its support for the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, including its emphasis on ensuring respect for norms against chemical and biological weapons, which concerns the interests of all humanity. We strongly condemn the use of such weapons by any party under any circumstances, as this constitutes a serious violation of international law. ASEAN remains fully committed to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC in strengthening the Convention in a comprehensive and balanced manner. We recognize the necessity of multilateral negotiations and note the absence of a verification mechanism, which poses a challenge to the effectiveness of the BWC. We also place great importance on enhancing international cooperation, assistance, and exchanges in toxins, biological agents, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes. ASEAN likewise reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention, a landmark multilateral agreement that has verifiably eliminated all declared chemical weapons stockpiles under strict international supervision. We recognize the importance of strengthening efforts to address current and emerging global challenges related to the chemical security and chemical disarmament. ASEAN strongly believes that the international community should strengthen international cooperation and assistance in chemical safety and security, including through enhanced engagement with industry players as well as with the network of ASEAN chemical, biological, and radiological defense experts. ASEAN also commends and reaffirms its full support to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to carry out its mandated work as the implementing body of CWC in a comprehensive, objective, and impartial manner, in complementarity with the work of the United Nations. We urge a few remaining states not yet party to the Convention to accede without delay to achieve its universality as non-possessor states. We condemn the use of chemical weapons or toxic chemicals as a weapon anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances. Madam Chair, at the regional level, cooperation among the ASEAN CBRN Network continues to deepen. Since its launch in 2019, the network has grown from a network of 35 experts representing seven ASEAN member states to 51 nominated experts across all three CBRN domains from all ten member states in 2025. Supported by its dedicated secure web portal, the network facilitates information sharing, technical workshops, and tabletop exercises on harmonized sampling and analysis, interpretation of mass spectra, and investigation of CBRN incidents. These efforts significantly enhance regional preparedness, cooperation, and coordination in response to CBRN threats. Madam Chair, recognizing the threats and danger of the existence and use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, ASEAN continues to call for universal adherence to applicable international legal instruments prohibiting these weapons. We remain committed to addressing existing and emerging challenges in this field through strengthened international cooperation ensuring that scientific technological progress serves the security and well-being of all peoples. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank the Philippines for delivering the message on behalf of ASEAN, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe.

Madam Chair, my delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Non-Aligned Movement, and we make the additional remarks in our national capacity. Madam Chair, the prospect of biological or chemical weapons proliferation evokes critical global security concerns, which can only be addressed through multilateralism. Biological and chemical weapons can traverse the globe within a matter of hours, posing serious risks to international security.

Despite the very clear risks.

Significant disparities persist worldwide in biosecurity preparedness, including detection systems and response capacities. This year, we celebrate 50 years since the Biological Weapons Convention entered into force as the first multilateral instrument banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. 50 years later, there are many successes. However, we remain concerned with the lack of a verification regime under the BWC. while there is also need to address emerging issues such as synthetic biology and dual-use research. On this note, we call for the strengthening and enhancement of the BWC’s institutional architecture, including its capacity to support States to respond to international emergency situations. We also call for enhanced international cooperation and assistance for peaceful purposes. On chemical weapons, we commend the OPCW on its effective operation and verification regime, while promoting peaceful uses of chemicals. Zimbabwe applauds the OPCW for its role in the complete destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles. We implore all States to fully support the work of the OPCW in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We call for international cooperation on activities not prohibited under the CWC and for capacity-building in areas including detection, response and forensic analysis related to chemicals. We urge the OPCW Technical Secretariat to support States Parties to develop their chemical industrial capabilities for peaceful purposes. Meanwhile, rapid technological advancements prompt the need for continued focus on potential developments and new threats involving chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. Chair, let me conclude by reassuring you that Zimbabwe remains steadfast in its commitment to the total elimination and prohibition of all chemical, biological, and toxin weapons.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kuwait.

Madam Chair, we believe that multilateral action is the only way to address international disarmament challenges. The strength of the international disarmament regime lies in our collective commitment to transform it into effective measures in sync with technical and scientific developments which are occurring at a breakneck speed. Chair, weapons of mass destruction, whatever form they may take, are tools for death and destruction. and they do not distinguish between civilians and combatants. That's why we are fully committed to the two conventions, the BWC and the CWC, and we call for their implementation and for the development of effective verification mechanisms and for cooperation between states, namely in terms of looking at AI, biotechnology developments, etc. In our view, preserving unity and neutrality where the OPCW is concerned, and the non-politicization of its work is essential to retain its credibility and the essential role it plays in the non-proliferation regime. We welcome the fruitful results from cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW, and we welcome the positive measures taken by Damascus in that framework. That constructive cooperation should continue to guarantee the full implementation of the Convention. Chair, the absence of political will, the weakness of trust between States are both obstacles impeding complete disarmament. At the same time, conflicts, arms races are all undermining the international regime and worsening regional crises. We reiterate that guaranteeing collective security requires that we step up multilateral action and international cooperation in the sphere of disarmament and non-proliferation. This work should be based on the UN Charter, and our goal should be to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We call upon the international community to continue its joint efforts to impede terrorist elements and organizations from obtaining WMDs and their means of delivery. They should implement in so doing Security Council and General Assembly resolutions relevant here. We call for the building of national and international capacity in this crucial area to preserve international peace and security. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kuwait, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention have seen commendable progress in recent years. After more than a decade of the Assad regime’s hostility, Syrian authorities are engaging positively with the OPCW, allowing them access to chemical weapons sites. The OPCW’s Executive Council adopted a decision on measures to eliminate the former regime’s chemical weapons. Within the BWC, a working group has been tasked with advancing a breadth of topics. Canada is confident that the proposed mechanisms for science and technology review and international cooperation and assistance, if adopted, would meaningfully strengthen the BWC. Regrettably, these crucial conventions are also facing greater challenges than ever. Russia continues to violate the CWC. Ukraine has reported more than 10,000 chemical attacks against its forces since the start of Russia’s invasion. To date, three have been confirmed through technical assistance visits by the OPCW. I switch to French.

La CIA, the BWC and the CWC continue to be misused as platforms for disinformation, the airing of political grievances, and the targeted sabotage of the international disarmament machinery. We recall the contemptuous invocation of Article 5 of the BWC by Russia in 2022. That invocation allowed Russia to waste resources but did not allow Russia to prove its spurious claims. We also recall the support Russia extended to the former Assad regime, and in so doing, russia protected that regime from any accountability for their use of chemical weapons. To combat disinformation which aims to undermine the non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament Architecture, Canada is proud to support the Global Partnership G7 initiative, which aims to counter disinformation surrounding weapons of mass destruction. Chair, this year has been marked by anniversaries and grounds for optimism, namely the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol and the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the BWC. It is important to recall and remind ourselves that even in these difficult times, our goal remains ensuring compliance of norms against chemical and biological weapons. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Canada. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon.

Madame Chair, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons constitutes in and of itself an unacceptable threat for international security and humanitarian principles. This threat has now reached its height. through the fact that there is a risk that non-state actors procure these weapons, and we have a scenario whereby a strategic crisis has now become a total breakdown of the architecture protecting our collective security. This fact means that we need to take decisive action. Our collective security cannot withstand such a risk. This urgent need to act is all the more pressing, given that we're seeing the very founding walls of the architecture that's meant to protect us disintegrating. The conventions on chemical and biological weapons are crucial weapons against barbarism, and they're demonstrating signs of weakness. If we do not respond to that weakness, we run the risk of seeing these become dead letter. We're seeing scientific developments diverted to nefarious ends. Our control architecture is not able to deal with that fact, and we're seeing our international norms undermined by geopolitical confrontation. In the face of that danger, we propose collective action on three fronts. First, we must consolidate verification and transparency through robust control mechanisms. and fully operational verification mechanisms, there must be strengthening of dialogue between scientific authorities and others, and there should be proper border control and the control of stockpiles. We need to anticipate new threats and consolidate justice. We should develop tailor-made legal and moral frameworks which are in sync with new developments and can ensure there are no violations. We must together prevent scientific progress from being diverted towards the creation of tomorrow's scourges. We need to take resolute action to protect coming generations against these weapons of terror. The eradication of them is both our most sacred duty and our most lofty ambition. So, we need to bear in mind that there's a future we need, one where science and technology is synonymous with progress and not terror. We need a future where security is based on trust and not threats. That's the future we want. We are faithful to the spirit of the Treaty, and we intend to stand shoulder to shoulder with all peace-loving nations to build that future. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Hungary.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Hungary aligns itself with the statement delivered by the EU. This year is of particular significance. We commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol, and as equally important, we also celebrate the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the BWC. These milestones remind us of the relevance of these instruments and of our responsibility to ensure that their prohibitions remain strong, universal, and effectively implemented. Since last year, Comoros and Kiribati have joined the family of the BWC. We welcome the newcomers, and we got one step closer to universalization. In the face of accelerating advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, and dual-use research, the importance of the BWC cannot be overstated. Its norms must be defended, strengthened, and adapted to threats. We took note with interest of the U.S.’s initiation of an AI-based verification mechanism to enhance enforcement. While awaiting details, we are convinced that such a proposal, pursued in good faith and multilateral spirit, contribute to closing gaps in verification. Mr. Chair, Hungary submitted the draft resolution on the BWC. Let me introduce it. The resolution is a technical rollover. We updated dates and merged two paragraphs. We wish to remain the sole sponsor of the resolution. I would like to express our hope that the resolution will be adopted by consensus. It is our priority. By doing so, we send a powerful message that this disarmament regime is not the property of a few, but the shared commitment of all. Mr. Chair, the OPCW is at the forefront of international peace and security. By overseeing the verified destruction of declared chemical weapons, the organization has delivered one of the greatest disarmament achievements. Hungary is proud to have played part in this. As one of the early ratifiers of the CWC, Hungary fulfilled all treaty obligations and contributed with experts, training, and resources. We have hosted regional training activities and supported international cooperation programmes and contributed to the establishment of the Centre for Chemistry and Technology. Hungary reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the goals of the Convention and to the mission of the OPCW. Thus, we made a contribution of 50,000 euro to the Syria Trust Fund and the International Cooperation and Assistance Program this August. Hungary expresses its appreciation for the conduct of the election process for the next DG. We commend the constructive engagement and extend our thanks to all who supported our candidacy. We wish good luck to the next DG. In closing, Hungary reiterates its support for the BWC and CWC.

I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ecuador.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Resolution 1540 of the Security Council is an essential pillar of the global non-proliferation architecture. It is the only instrument that establishes legally binding obligations and imposes them on all the members of this organization in order to prevent non-state actors from developing acquiring, manufacturing, transporting, transferring, or using weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. In a global landscape marked by transnational threats, this resolution is a robust normative response to the risk of sensitive material falling into the wrong hands, particularly hands which may have terrorist agendas they wish to pursue. The comprehensive review of 2022 on the implementation of resolution 1540 reaffirmed its relevance and underscored significant progress. However, that review also identified persistent challenges. These challenges included the need to strengthen national legislative frameworks, improve border controls, and promote international cooperation in the field of technical assistance and capacity building. particularly in the field of chemical and biological weapons. Against that backdrop, in Latin America and the Caribbean, coordinated efforts between states and regional organizations have proven effective to share good practices, harmonize legislation, and to promote technical assistance. Ecuador reaffirms its commitment to these efforts and underscores the importance of continuing to strengthen regional coordination mechanisms. Ecuador recognizes the cooperation provided to the region by the European Union. This through its export control programs for dual use goods, the EUP2P. We also recognize Germany's assistance through the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control, my country appeals to all Member States to actively commit to the enforcement of provisions of Resolution 1540 and successive resolutions by strengthening their normative frameworks. as well as their institutional and operative frameworks, this in line with recommendations of the 2022 Comprehensive Review, particularly when it comes to chemical and biological weapons. We reaffirm our commitment to the Convention on Biological Weapons, the Convention on Chemical Weapons, and to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ecuador. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya.

In the name of God. Madam Chair, the State of Libya underscores its full support to the statement made by the Sultanate of Oman on behalf of the Arab Group. We reiterate our commitment to working seriously towards the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. namely, biological and chemical weapons, as they constitute a serious threat to international peace and security and the whole of humanity. Libya was amongst the first states that took a bold decision to forego voluntarily its WMD program to show that the world cannot be built through these tools, but through respect towards international law. Madam Chair, Libya stresses the need to ensure the full and total implementation of the BWC and CWC. We support efforts made to strengthen the role of the two relevant organizations mandated to implement them. We reiterate the need for the OPCW to continue to exercise its function in full neutrality and non-politicization, and to ensure investigations into the alleged use of prohibited chemicals, including the use by the occupying entity of deadly weapons against civilians in the Gaza Strip, in a blatant violation of international humanitarian law. The State of Libya considers that the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons cannot solely be achieved through legal commitments, but through strengthened international cooperation and national capacity building in prevention and protection, as well as response. to emergencies with the fostering of the peaceful use of technologies to end wars and in the best interest of the whole of humanity. We commend international efforts in the implementation of relevant conventions and treaties. We stress that such success hinges on mutual commitment and the respect of state sovereignty and the rejection of selectiveness in ensuring accountability. We call for the strengthening of legal guardrails that prevent the acquisition by non-state actors and terrorist groups of weapons of mass destruction and implementation of relevant United Nations resolution. In conclusion, the State of Libya reiterates its call for strengthened concerted action for a world rid of chemical and biological weapons and other WMDs, and the establishment of a zone free of such weapons in the Middle East.

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya, and now I give the floor to His Excellency Permanent Representative of Italy.

Thank you, Vice-Chair.

Italy aligns itself with the statement by the European Union. I will now.

I will add some remarks in my national capacity.

Almost three years ago, the main result of the ninth review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention was the establishment of a working group to strengthen it. It is with great interest that we listen to President Trump's statement in support of the BWC during the high level week of the General Assembly, in particular its reference to verification.

We stand ready to work with the United States and with all other States-Parties of the BWC.

To complete the work begun at the ninth review conference.

This means the adoption of two mechanisms, respectively on international cooperation and assistance, and on science and technology, at a special conference to be convened in August 2026.

At that same conference, we should establish a separate working group to tackle the issue of compliance and verification that remains the most challenging aspect of our work. Vice Chair, Italy remains fully committed to supporting the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW. We strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons anywhere at any time. by anyone, under any circumstances. We welcome the cooperation of the Syrian transitional authorities with the OPCW to fully eliminate chemical weapons from Syria. Italy remains deeply concerned by the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-state actors, particularly terrorist networks. This is why we support the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, including by increasing national.

Capacities in the implementation of non-proliferation measures.

We also attach great importance to the UN Secretary-General’s.

Mechanism, the only existing framework that provides for an independent investigation of alleged use of biological weapons.

Which worked successfully in the past. We reject any attempt to weaken this mechanism.

Thank you, Vice Chair.

I thank His Excellency Permanent Representative of Italy, and now I give the floor to His Excellency Permanent Representative of Myanmar.

Thank you, madam Chair. Madam Chair, Myanmar aligns itself with the statements of ASEAN and NAM. Myanmar reaffirms our commitment to uphold norms against biological and chemical weapons and underscores the importance of universalizing the BWC and CWC. The lack of a verification mechanism poses a challenge to the effectiveness of the BWC. Myanmar therefore welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Working Group in strengthening BWC by addressing structure and operational gaps, including verifications, compliance, and institutional mechanisms. Madam Chair, we commend the work of the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat in achieving the complete and verified destruction of all declared chemical weapons. Myanmar strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances. Those responsible for their use must be held to account. Dual-use industrial chemicals have been readily misused by the military junta, especially after the illegal military coup. Against this backdrop, I wish to stress the urgency of monitoring developments in Myanmar and taking pre-emptive measures against the junta based on the following reasons: First, the long-standing lack of transparency by the military junta over its past chemical weapons program. was reportedly operating a chemical weapons production facility in southern central Myanmar back in the 1980s, and constructing another one in central Myanmar in 2009. The former produced sulfur mustard as Annex 1 chemical. However, this program under its supervision was never declared by the military, putting Myanmar in violation of its CWC obligation. In the absence of the verifying destruction, the possession of chemical weapons struck by the military remains open to question. Second, growing evidence of the use of chemical agents by the military. Suspected use of chemical agents by the military was sporadically reported even before the coup. Since then, multiple reports on their use by the military have emerged in areas under control by the revolutionary forces.

Third and last.

In the inherent natures of the military junta, opacities, blatant denial of their atrocities, a mockery of international law, and compromising attitudes are all defining characteristics of the military junta. We believe that any pending issues on non-compliance with the CWC can only be resolved under the civilian oversight of the military. On this note, the planned sham election by the military junta will only give the military an open license to commit more atrocities with impunity, including the use of chemical agents against civilians. I ask the international community to reject this

I thank His Excellency, Permanent Representative of Myanmar. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Indonesia aligns itself with statements delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN. The CWC continues to stand as one of the most effective instruments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. We welcome the historic milestone of the verified destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles worldwide. Nevertheless, Risk posed by undeclared chemical weapons and reports of their use in conflict situations demonstrates the need for continued vigilance. We continue to urge the OPCW to enhance its role in supporting States to implement its obligations under the CWC, including in the discussions on emerging technologies. The work toward universalization of the CWC should also continue, and we urge non-Parties to the Convention to ratify or accede to the Convention expeditiously. Simultaneously, international cooperation and assistance in activities in line with the CWC should be promoted. In this regard, Indonesia is pleased to organize the regional seminar on the Chemical Weapons Conventions and chemical safety and security management for member states of the OPCW in Asia region in Jakarta, 30 September to 2 October 2025. Madam Chair, we also attach great importance to the implementation of biological Weapons Conventions. Nevertheless, the absence of a compliance and verifications mechanism remains a serious concern. We urge all Member States to work towards a robust, legally binding, and non-discriminatory verification regime, and not the possible establishment of an OEWG to advance work on compliance and verifications in an inclusive manner. While welcoming the importance of enhancing transparency through confidence-building measures, Indonesia believes that CBM is not a substitute for robust verification mechanisms of the Conventions. Ahead of the seventh session of the Working Group in December, Indonesia calls for renewed political will to ensure stronger, more effective, and universal Conventions. Madam Chair, Indonesia is also of the view that resolution 1540 should complement the existing multilateral mechanisms on disarmament and non-proliferation. We underline the importance of continuing the inclusive process of the review and encourage Member States to engage in the process. Indonesia reaffirms its readiness to work with all partners to build a civil world free of weapons of mass destruction. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia, and I will give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka.

Madam Chair, my delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of NAM. I wish to make the following remarks in my national capacity. The international security environment remains in a grave state of crisis. Conflicts, both interstate and intrastate, create an atmosphere of heightened tension and deep insecurity. Sri Lanka believes that addressing the threat of WMDs requires that we strengthen international treaties, take determined disarmament and nonproliferation measures, prevent the illicit acquisition by non-state actors, and enhance multilateral cooperation. With respect to chemical weapons, Sri Lanka reaffirms that the use of such weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances, is culpable and contrary to international law, particularly the CWC. We commend the work of the OPCW in overseeing the verified destruction of declared stockpiles and call for renewed commitment to the full, balanced, and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention. On biological weapons, Sri Lanka reaffirms that the BWC remains a critical pillar of the international disarmament architecture. The absence of a verification regime continues to undermine its effectiveness. We therefore welcome the establishment of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention at the 9th BWC Review Conference with a mandate to address compliance and verification, and to recommend measures to institutionalize and fortify the Convention. Sri Lanka is committed to working with all states in enhancing its capabilities to respond to biological threats, as well as to promote peaceful use of biotechnologies. Together with Netherlands, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Uganda, we co-hosted the side event in August 2024 on lessons learned from establishing a national inventory of dangerous pathogens. Madam Chair, Sri Lanka reaffirms the importance of Security Council Resolution 1540 in preventing non-state actors from acquiring WMDs and their means of delivery. Reviews of Resolution 1540 must be conducted through open and inclusive consultations and consider perspectives of developing countries. Madam Chair, the threats posed by WMDs are real, urgent, and their use would cause irreversible harm. Sri Lanka remains committed to working with all partners to strengthen existing legal frameworks, promote universal adherence to the CWC and BWC, and prevent the misuse of emerging technologies. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.

In the name of God, most compassionate, most merciful, Madam Chair, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aligns itself with the statement made by the Arab group and the statement made by NAM. We wish to add the following remarks in our national capacity. The Kingdom believes in the importance of global peace. We consider it as one of the main goals of our foreign policy. We pursue peace constantly through our commitments to the United Nations Charter and other international conventions and treaties which we adhere to, through respect to international law, and through the promotion of peaceful cooperation among states in the best interests of our peoples. In this framework, we underscore the responsibility borne by the international community in preventing the proliferation of WMDs, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons across the world and, in particular, in the Middle East. We call for a stronger role by the United Nations and international bodies to implement relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540, to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems by non-state actors, namely for terrorist purposes. Madam Chair, we underscore the importance of full commitment to the treaties on non-proliferation of WMDs, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, which we've joined in 1972, as the first convention prohibiting an entire category of WMDs, as it contributes to the safeguarding of international peace and security. We reiterate our commitment to the provisions of the CWC and the importance of its balanced and comprehensive implementation. We stress that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a blatant violation of international law and relevant Convention provisions, as well as a crime. We urge the OPCW to continue to discharge its duties in full impartiality, neutrality, and non-politicization. We call upon it to consider reports on the use by Israel of prohibited chemical weapons in its warfare against the Gaza Strip. Madam Chair, rapid technological advancements, including the integration of AI in WMD systems, pose risks which require international guardrails to ensure full human control over such weapons until they are totally eliminated.

I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Chair. Conventions prohibiting biological and chemical weapons are vital part of global arms control architecture, reflecting collective determination against the most abhorrent forms of warfare. Advances in biological and chemical sciences, coupled with AI and synthetic biology, present novel risks, expanding at a faster pace than governance frameworks. The challenge to prevent misuse while ensuring equitable access, particularly for developing countries, requires cooperation and resisting barriers to scientific progress. Within the CWC, we are encouraged by the continued deliberations on impacts of AI on the implementation of the Convention. There is also a need to establish a science and technology advisory mechanism in the BWC that could provide early warnings, identify dual-use trends, and inform verification techniques. Pakistan remains firmly committed to advancing the objectives of the CWC.

We condemn the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances.

We will continue our efforts in upholding the OPCW’s effectiveness and impartiality particularly in safeguarding its verification mechanisms. It is regrettable that consensus-based decision making has eroded within the CWC, and we hope to return to consensus-based outcomes to maintain the integrity and unity of the convention. Within the BWC regime, the development of institutional and organizational arrangements has not kept pace with evolving threats. We hope that the ongoing work in the working group to strengthen the BWC will help revitalize the convention. Chair, we consider the UN Secretary-General's mechanism an essential operational tool for investigating alleged uses of chemical and biological weapons and support regular review of its guidelines and procedures. Confidence-building measures play a vital role in enhancing transparency interest. However, these are no substitute for a legally binding verification protocol under the BWC. Such a protocol would guarantee that biological and toxin weapons are never developed, produced, stockpiled, or retained, thus precluding their use by any state party. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan, and now I give the floor to the distinguished, her excellency, permanent representative of Japan.

Thank you, madam chair. Japan remains fully committed to multilateral efforts for arms control, disarmament, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In this regard, Japan stresses the importance of strengthening and universalizing the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC, and the Biological Weapons Convention, BWC. Madam Chair, Japan is deeply concerned by reports that Russia has used chemical weapons and riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine. Noting with appreciation the leadership of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the continued engagement by the new government of Syria to resolve outstanding chemical weapons issues, Japan reaffirms its unwavering support for the Technical Secretariat's activities in Syria. Madam Chair, Japan has continued to expand its utmost efforts to make progress in the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons, ACW, in China. by investing in human and financial resources in line with the CWC. Japan has been accelerating the progress of the ACW destruction project. Both the number of the ACW declared and the number of ACW destroyed in 2024 were about five times higher than those in 2022. Japan will implement the project in constructive coordination with China for its completion as soon as possible. Madam Chair, as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the BWC and the centenary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, we must accelerate the strengthening of the BWC. Japan welcomes the thorough discussions at the BWC Working Group and continues to contribute to the early establishment of the two mechanisms One on scientific and technological development relevant to the Convention, and the other on international cooperation and assistance under Article 10. Japan calls on all States Parties to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the implementation of the Convention. Madam Chair, Japan also attaches great value to the UN Secretary General's mechanism as the only available tool to independently investigate any cases of biological weapon attacks. Strengthening implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is important, and in 2025, to promote its implementation in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan contributed $720,000 to UNODA. Japan will continue to support the implementation of the resolution. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank Her Excellency Permanent Representative of Japan, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Kazakhstan reaffirms the paramount importance of strengthening the international legal regimes prohibiting biological and chemical weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention remain key pillars of the global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. Their universality, integrity, and full implementation are indispensable in preventing the erosion of norms and addressing the emerging threats. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly exposed the systemic vulnerabilities in our collective ability to respond to biological risks. Advances in synthetic biology, dual-use research, and the life sciences have further magnified these risks. It is therefore urgent to ensure that biotechnology serves humanity safely, responsibly, and transparently. Kazakhstan notes the emergence of new ideas on strengthening BWC compliance and transparency, including through innovative technologies, as well as possible AI verification systems. While still at an early stage, such proposals deserve careful, inclusive, and multilateral examination. Innovation must serve confidence-building, not division, and must remain firmly within the Convention’s framework. In this context, Kazakhstan continues to promote the initiative to establish an international agency for biological security, first proposed at the 75th session of the General Assembly, and subsequently endorsed by consensus in GA resolution last year. Such a body, designed to reinforce the BWC rather than duplicate existing mechanisms, could provide a viable platform to coordinate assistance, strengthen national capacities, and explore responsible use of new verification tools under multilateral safeguards. This year carries symbolic weight: the centenary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 50th anniversary of the BWC. These milestones remind us that historic achievements must not only be preserved, but adapted to the realities of today’s rapidly changing security landscape. Kazakhstan also underscores the importance of the The verified elimination of declared stockpiles mark a historic success, yet universality remains unfinished business. Allegations of use must be addressed impartially, and verification system must stay credible, professional, and resourced. Madam Chair, Kazakhstan’s position on the issue of nonproliferation of WMDs remain firm. The use of biological and chemical weapons is unacceptable under any circumstances. We will work with all States Parties to ensure that these weapons are forever consigned to history so that our common security rests not on fear, but on law, cooperation, and confidence.

Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I wish at the outset to align myself with the EU statement and to add a number of comments in my national capacity. Weapons of mass destruction continue to constitute one of the primary challenges to global security. That means there must be an unwavering commitment to bolstering non-proliferation and disarmament instruments and to strengthening verification mechanisms. Spain supports the tireless work of OPCW and its Technical Secretariat in terms of effectively implementing the CWC. We reiterate our full support for the Director-General and for his team in their mission. The OPCW is more necessary than ever before. It is one of the most robust pillars of our weapons of mass destruction control system and has a commendable track record in terms of the verified destruction of declared arsenals. The unjustified aggression of Russia against Ukraine remains a frontal assault of the principles of the UN Charter. We underscore that the use of chemical irritants, including those classified as riot control agents, is strictly limited by the Convention to domestic situations where there are breaches of the public order, and they cannot be used in armed conflicts. We urge Russia to comply with the Convention. Spain applauds the restoration of cooperation between the OPCW and the new Syrian authorities. We support the presentation of the OPCW’s Syria Plan for destruction and verification of the chemical weapons. programme. We need to establish clear criteria to ensure the expedited destruction of chemical weapons in Syria and the search for those responsible for using them. There must also be met verification measures which would apply to declarations and related destruction activities in accordance with the Convention. We are committed to bolstering the BWC. However, it is a convention that does not have a verification regime attached to it that ensures compliance. Discoveries in areas such as biotechnology and AI have reduced the barriers with limited the production and manipulation of toxins and biological weapons, and now they can be used for weapons purposes, that has facilitated their proliferation. As such, we support the implementation of a verification mechanism which guarantees the adoption of measures that will make it possible to build trust in compliance with this Convention and safeguard innovations so that they can be used peacefully. We value the achievements garnered by the Working Group for the Strengthening of the BWC, specifically in terms of the implementation of an international cooperation and assistance mechanism under Article 10 of the BWC, and a scientific and technical advisory mechanism. Chair, the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction remains a common goal and a moral aspiration of the international community. It is only through joint action and sustained political will that it will be possible to build a world order based on mutual trust, shared security, and respect for international law. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Spain, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine.

Chair, Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the EU. We would also like to make additional remarks in our national capacity. Ukraine highly values the crucial role of the OPCW in maintaining the global norm against the use of chemical weapons and reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the goals and principles of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We note with appreciation the progress in cooperation between the Syrian authorities and the Secretariat, which has contributed to advancing efforts toward the complete elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. Ukraine hopes that the ongoing efforts of the Government of Syria to cooperate with the OPCW and to fulfil its obligations under the CWC will lead to the prompt identification and safe destruction of any remaining elements of the former regime’s chemical weapons programme, in line with the objectives of the Convention. Chair, Ukraine has been continuously monitoring violations of the CWC by Russia and promptly notifying the Technical Secretariat and State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention about such violations. It includes almost 11,000 documented instances of Russian military use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals, including chloro-picrine, in direct violation of the Convention. The OPCW has confirmed Ukraine's concerns about the use of chemical weapons against Ukrainian military personnel in three technical assistance visits reports. Ukraine emphasizes the importance of strengthening international attribution mechanisms to clearly identify those responsible for chemical weapons use. We welcome the work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, and we commend our intense cooperation to ensure that perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of such crimes are identified and held accountable. We would like to stress that it is intolerable that the Russian Federation continues holding positions within the OPCW’s decision-making bodies while perpetrating such violation. We call on the all state parties to oppose the Russian Federation candidacy to the Executive Council of the OPCW for the upcoming term. For Ukraine, contribution to smooth and consensus-based decision-making of the Executive Council and the OPCW is essential. We actively and fully cooperate with the OPCW to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons and uphold international norms. In this regard, Ukraine would like to call the state parties for the support of its candidacy for the Executive Council in 2026-2027. Chair, since 1975, Ukraine has been a party to the BTWC and fully complies with its provisions. All Ukrainian scientific and medical institutions operate solely for peaceful purposes, including public health, veterinary safety, and scientific research. At the same time, the Russian Federation systematically violates the BTWC. Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine has led to the destruction of essential medical and biological infrastructure, illegal seizure of Ukrainian laboratories, and threats to biosafety. also spread disinformation regarding alleged Ukrainian biological weapons programmes. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement. And now I give the floor to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament.

Thank you, Chair. The world emerged from the devastation of war in the 20th century with a collective resolve to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention are expressions of this resolve. Australia urges all states to comply with these treaties and calls on others to join without delay. Australia strongly supports the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We have a critical opportunity to eliminate the last remnants of the former Syrian government’s chemical weapons programme. Australia proudly co-sponsored the recent decision in the OPCW on expedited on-site destruction of remnant chemical weapons in Syria. We are deeply troubled by OPCW reports confirming use of riot control agents in samples collected from Ukraine. We support the OPCW and its capacity to investigate and attribute chemical weapons use. Australia urges the Russian Federation to conduct independent, transparent investigations into the Novichok attacks on Sergei Skripal and Alexei Navalny, and cooperate with the OPCW. We remain firm in holding the Russian government responsible for Navalny's mistreatment and death. Chair, the threat posed by biological weapons is growing. As we mark the 50th anniversary of the BWC, we remain committed to strengthening implementation through the BWC Working Group and achieving practical outcomes. Preserving the integrity of the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism is also essential. We oppose proposals for expansion of the UN Security Council’s mandate, which would interfere in the Secretary-General’s direction of the mechanism. As founder and permanent chair of the Australia Group, we are proud that the Australia Group supports the implementation of the CWC and BWC, and reduces the risk of WMD proliferation while promoting sustainable development and legitimate trade. We were honoured to host the 40th anniversary plenary of the Australia Group in Sydney this year. The Australia Group helps implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on prohibiting the spread of WMDs to non-state actors. We congratulate Panama on its leadership as Chair of the 1540 Committee. Chair, addressing proliferation risks is more important than ever. Australia’s commitment to preventing the spread of WMD remains strong and enduring. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Australia, and now I'll give the floor to the representative of Ireland.

Thank you, Chair. Ireland aligns with the statement of the European Union. The CWC and BWC remain as relevant today as when they first entered into force. Ireland remains steadfast in our support for the effective functioning of these conventions and call on the handful of states not party to either convention to ratify and accede to them without delay. Chair, Ireland is seriously concerned by the continued disregard shown by the Russian Federation towards the norm against chemical weapons use and its systematic use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. Three OPCW reports have provided convincing evidence of a pattern of use, yet no credible explanations have been provided by the Russian Federation. Ireland strongly condemns the use of all chemical weapons and calls for necessary measures to be taken to attribute these proven and serious treaty violations. Chair, after years of obstruction from the Assad regime, Ireland welcomes the Syrian Transitional Authority's commitment to cooperate with the OPCW. We commend the work of the Technical Secretariat's Office of Special Missions and particularly note the challenging and fragile environment in which they need to conduct their work. In spite of varied challenges, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has performed its mandated duties effectively and with impartiality. It is critical that the Organisation be fully supported to grasp this historic opportunity to rid the world of chemical weapons in Syria. Ireland also calls on States to ensure the OPCW has sufficient and sustainable resources to fulfil its regular mandate and the mission in Syria. Chair, this year marks 100 years since the first effort to combat biological warfare as codified through the Geneva Protocol. It is also 50 years since the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention entered into force. Arlene notes the progress made through discussions in the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC, and we believe it is time that States Party agree to establish mechanisms on science and technology reviews and international cooperation and assistance. We also welcome revived discussions on compliance and verification, which should continue through focused discussions in an open-ended working group. Ireland also underlines the importance of the UN Secretary-General's mechanism and its independence as the only international mechanism for investigating the alleged use of biological weapons. We reaffirm our strong support for UN Security Council resolution 1540. Ireland firmly supports the work of multilateral export control regimes, which play a vital role in countering the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, making the world safer and more secure. These regimes offer guidance to states and promote best practice sharing on reducing WMD proliferation risks without impeding economic development or posing obstacles to legitimate trade. We reject characterisations that seek to delegitimise these efforts. Chair, in these times of heightened tensions and conflict, we call on all states to uphold their international obligations and commitments and to work constructively to strengthen the CWC and BWC. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Ireland.

I now give the floor to Jordan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation supports the statement made by the Arab Group and that made by the NAM. I wish to add the following comments in my national capacity. Jordan reaffirms its staunch position in favor of all international efforts designed to usher in a world free of weapons of mass destruction. We emphasize the importance of creating a nuclear weapons free zone and one free of other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with resolution, international and UN resolutions in the field. Jordan reaffirms its tireless commitment to convention, the chemical weapons and biological weapons convention, and we insist that their provisions be implemented. We condemn any use of these weapons by any actor and in any circumstances, because that is a violation of international and humanitarian law. My delegation affirms that Israel's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, and they must submit all of their nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards agreement system, and indeed the fact they have done that is a crucial step to rebalancing strategic imbalances in the region and in terms of strengthening the credibility of the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes where WMDs are concerned, and a crucial step in ensuring international and regional security in a lasting fashion. We reaffirm our staunch commitment to the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation in all their forms, and we categorically reject any argument invoked to justify the holding or use of weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent or a tool for threats. We encourage the international community to step up efforts to support the negotiation process aimed at creating the aforementioned nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. That is a goal that we've been waiting to achieve for a long, long time. In that connection, we welcome the holding of five successful sessions of the UN Conference on the creation of the aforementioned zone in the Middle East, and we eagerly await the holding of the upcoming session, the sixth session, under the presidency of the brotherly Kingdom of Morocco. That will build on the momentum garnered in previous sessions. To conclude, we reiterate our support for international efforts to stop terrorist groups from accessing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. That is a true threat to international peace and security. We call for cooperation to continue at an international level in accordance with UN resolutions. Thank you.

I thank the delegate of Jordan.

The representative of Belarus.

Mr. Chair, the issue of preventing the development and manufacture of new types of WMD and new systems of such weapons remains one of the priorities on the international disarmament agenda. We reaffirm our dedication to the goal of consolidating international multilateral efforts to improve and strengthen the existing international instruments in this regard. We support strengthening the Platform of the Conference on Disarmament as a forum for developing and adopting international norms in this area in the interest of the entire international community. The Republic of Belarus over the past few years has been initiating and promoting at the CD constructive discussions of the issue of new types of WMD. Belarus continues to draw attention to problems linked to WMD falling into the hands of non-state groups and the use of scientific and technological developments to create new types of WMD. Preventive measures and proactive action, we believe, are the best means of responding to the new risks and threats posed to international peace and security. To enhance international procedures to monitor potential development of new types of WMD, we regularly, that is to say every three years, introduce a draft resolution at the UN General Assembly entitled "Prevention of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of WMD and New Systems of Such Weapons: The Report of the Conference on Disarmament." During the 78th session of the UN General Assembly, this draft resolution was submitted by Belarus to the First Committee and was adopted by the overwhelming majority of votes. This document is preventive in nature and aims to prevent the emergence of new types of WMD in the world. The resolution provides for the adoption of a response mechanism through the CD with the goal of observing the situation and developing relevant recommendations. The CWC remains one of the key disarmament and nonproliferation mechanisms. Belarus calls for depoliticizing the OPCW and returning it to consensus-based actions, as well as restoring the effectiveness of this Convention’s regime. We support efforts to strengthen the BWC, and we support developing legally binding norms to verify compliance with the Convention. We view Security Council Resolution 1540 as a unique instrument that provides a comprehensive approach toward combating the proliferation of WMD and relevant materials. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Belarus, and now I give the floor to the delegation of Colombia.

Thank you, Chair. A hundred years after the signing of the Geneva Protocol on the prohibitions of biological and chemical weapons use that entered into force in 1925. As such, we reiterate our commitment to ensuring that these weapons are not used because they wreak unnecessary and speakable suffering on humankind. As regards the dual use of chemical and biological agents, my country is working to design and implement a control system which is compatible with trade development, academic and scientific development related to the use of dual use goods, such as to further progress in health, education, agriculture and other areas. As regards the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacturing and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Weapons, I wish to reaffirm Colombia’s support for the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention. We hope that they produce the recommendations necessary to address modern risks in the field of biological weapons. Moreover, I urge all States Parties to participate actively in this working group and in the 10th Review Conference of the Convention with the goal of achieving transcendental agreements that will be pivotal to the future of that body. Allow me to reiterate my country's support for the technical, diplomatic, and impartial work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Their invaluable work has contributed to ensuring the 100% elimination of chemical weapons, as declared by States in possession of them. Chair, to conclude, Colombia underscores the importance of joint action both at a regional and international level, focused on strengthening the Convention. We also point to the need for balanced geographical representation and an increase in civil society, academic, and industrial participation in decision-making processes related to the total elimination of chemical and biological weapons. This is also important when it comes to the control of dual-use agents and non-proliferation. The inclusion of these groups will allow our joint efforts to have a much broader, far-reaching effect and will ensure their legitimacy and effectiveness. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Colombia. Now I give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

It aligns itself with the statement delivered by the EU and wishes to offer the following remarks in its national capacity. Impunity of serious violations of international law is at the root of much suffering in today's world, because impunity encourages perpetrators to continue and persevere. If we want to defend the international rules-based order that provides security for all, we must act in concert to end impunity for violations of the rules that we have established together. Chemical weapons remain, for now, the only weapon of mass destruction used in 21st century conflicts. The Assad regime employed them against its own people in Syria. Russia and DPRK have used them in assassinations, and Russia now on the battlefield in Ukraine. No state should enjoy impunity for such actions. The international community must continue collecting evidence for attribution prosecution. The EU has taken a lead and sanctioned a number of individuals and entities responsible for chemical weapons use in Syria and Russia. While prosecution is needed when the law is broken, prevention is the tool to avoid violations from happening. Multilateral export control regimes play an important part in this regard. There are no states to harmonize their export controls and enhance international cooperation in order to thwart would be proliferators of weapons of mass destructions and other malafide or criminal end users. Any weakening of the system of multilateral export controls will result in a less secure world. 50 years after the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention, the norm against the weaponization of disease is strong. In order to maintain this achievement, we must reinforce the institutions of the Convention and look for innovative ways to verify compliance and build confidence. Pending the strengthening of the BTWC, the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism to investigate the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons remains a crucial tool whose deployability must be protected and enhanced. To strengthen the international norm against biological weapons, Belgium proposed an amendment to the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court, the so-called Rome Statute. The amendment labels all use of biological weapons as a war crime. We call on all ICC State Parties to ratify this amendment outlawing one of the most inhumane methods of warfare. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Belgium. Now I give the floor to the representative of Brazil.

Okay. The use of weapons of mass destruction is one of the gravest threats to humanity. The mere existence of these weapons, whether nuclear, biological, or chemical, challenges international humanitarian law and the dictates of public conscience. The horrifying legacy of their past uses should serve as a solemn reminder of the catastrophic consequences. Recognition of the destructive power and indiscriminate nature of chemical and biological weapons dates back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Since then, we have successfully expanded prohibitions related to such weapons. However, our work is far from finished. Mr. Chair, this year marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the BWC, which established a comprehensive ban on the development and use of biological weapons. None of the last, it still lacks a verification mechanism and has limited institutional support, hampering compliance. As the current chair of the working group on strengthening the BWC, Brazil is facilitating discussions on a range of recommendations aimed at enhancing the regime's framework in many areas, including compliance and verification. Among the recommendations under consideration by the working group is establishment of two mechanisms under the BWC. One for international cooperation and assistance, and the other for reviewing and assessing scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Once in place, these mechanisms will be critical for maintaining BWC's relevance and effectiveness. Rapid advances in biotechnology have outpaced existing regulations, making it essential to develop adaptive instruments that keep the DWCE effective in addressing the risks of a radically transformed scientific and technological landscape. We thus emphasize that the fast approaching conclusion of the working group's mandate in 2026 presents a unique opportunity to enhance and update the regime and address its current challenges. The time for action is now. Mr. Chair, while the biological weapons regime remains poorly institutionalized, the CWC stands as a golden standard among multilateral regimes on weapons of mass destruction. As a state party to the Convention, Brazil firmly condemns the use or threat of use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, and under any circumstances. This is a long-standing and unwavering position that we cannot stress enough. Yet, the work of the OPCW has long been hindered by the politicization of all its bodies, which has undermined its culture of consensus. We stand ready to support the institutional strengthening of the organization through the depoliticization of its technical work, particularly in its inspection activities. As we prepare to welcome a new DG in the organization, the first woman in the position, we reiterate the importance of.

I thank the representative of Brazil, and now I give the floor to the representative of the Maldives.

Thank you, Chair. The Maldives aligns with the statement delivered by NAM. Persistent gaps in national legislation, enforcement, and cooperation leave our shared security vulnerable to those seeking to develop or deploy other weapons of mass destruction. This vulnerability persists because legal instruments alone cannot close the gaps. Their existence does not ensure compliance, and ratification does not guarantee implementation. Real security depends on building state capacity, strengthening laws, institutions, and technical capabilities so that commitments under the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention translate into action. We must therefore invest in stronger legal frameworks, effective enforcement, and closer coordination between health, security, and intelligence agencies. Verification and transparency mechanisms anchored in evidence are essential to sustain compliance. Radioactive waste management requires particular attention. Mismanaged waste is both a potential weapon and a great threat to our waters, communities, and economies. Enhanced monitoring, targeted investments, and sustained technical support are vital. As a new member of IAEA, the Maldives will work to strengthen capacity and meet global safety and security standards. The Maldives values the support of international partners, including UNODA and the EU, in advancing strategic trade controls and improving our legal and institutional readiness. At a time when mutual resistance is eroding and distrust is rising, no country can confront these threats alone. We must elevate cooperation and capacity building as core strategies. Only through collective vigilance, matched with enhanced national capabilities, can we deny terrorists and non-state actors access to weapons. I thank you.

I thank the representative of the Maldives, and now I'll give the floor to the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Madam Chair.

The DRC aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as the statement by Guinea-Bissau on behalf of the African Group, and we would like to make the following observations in its national capacity. Madam Chair, all of humanity is facing a real, growing, persistent threat. That is unchecked proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, some countries are engaged in a frenetic arms race, developing ambitious programs that target the use of WMD of varying natures, which leads the rest of us to fear a catastrophic scenario if we do not take action. We support the absolute prohibition of this kind of weapon. That is a step forward for the good of humanity. The DRC, for its part, will continue to support all efforts to create a world free of WMD. Madam Chair, 2025 is the 100th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on Biological Weapons. And we therefore must protect the integrity and credibility of this Convention on Chemical Weapons as well as the Convention on Biological Weapons. However, these instruments are facing a number of unprecedented challenges in light of the rapid development of new technologies, this ought to motivate the entire international community to ensure that these treaties remain fully enforced in our collective interests, security interests. We are concerned to note that we are pleased to note that the Pact for the Future reaffirms our determination. In closing, Madam Chair, my country staunchly supports the topic of WMD being always reviewed with the greatest of attention in light of the harmful and devastating consequences of the use of such weapons. Thank you.

I thank the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I shall now call on delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and to two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I will begin by first giving the floor to delegations who were unable to exercise their right of reply or their right to a second intervention yesterday due to time constraints. I call on the representative of the Republic of Korea for a second intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. In response to DPRK's remarks made yesterday in cluster one, my delegation has no intention to reiterate our well-known position on DPRK's nuclear and missile programs and our legitimate and defensive response. However, I wish to record that throughout this session, many delegations have expressed serious concern that DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs are not only unlawful, but also pose a serious threat to peace and security in the region and beyond. For clarification, contrary to DPRK's claim, my delegation underscores that the Republic of Korea has consistently pursued inter-Korean relations based on reconciliation and cooperation. In this regard, I'd like to recall that my government has clearly affirmed the recent UN General Assembly that it respects North's current system, will not pursue any form of unification by absorption, and has no intention of engaging in hostile acts. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea, and now I give the floor to the United Kingdom on a first intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Vice Chair, for giving me the floor. I am responding to the alarming comments from the Russian delegation yesterday that the question of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula is a closed book. Any suggestion by the Russian Federation that they would not challenge a non-nuclear weapons state developing nuclear weapons undermines the core tenets of the NPT and profoundly contradicts joint statements Russia has put its name to explicitly opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Russia's actions undermine the international community's work holding DPRK to account. and seeking a route back to compliance through dialogue. As a nuclear weapons state, Russia has a particular responsibility to uphold the NPT that they must adhere to. Mr. Vice-Chair, I also want to respond to criticism in this Committee of NATO’s nuclear policy. The UK recognises that some states have questions and concerns We are ready to discuss these, indeed, we do so in many of our dialogues with partners. But that dialogue must take place on the basis of fact. This includes the fact that NATO’s policy is entirely consistent with the NPT; the fact that the US retains full custody and control over its nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe; the fact that NATO does not engage in nuclear rhetoric, seeks no confrontation, and poses no threat to Russia; and the fact that NATO’s nuclear policies have made a vital contribution to the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. Thank you, Mr. Vice-Chair.

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom. And now we move to listen to the rights of replies for this meeting. The first speaker under this section would be the representative of the Sudan.

Thank you, Chair. Sudan requested the floor as a right of reply after hearing the interventions of Mexico, the UK, when it comes to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons. We would like to affirm the following: First of all, we are firmly attached to our legal commitments under the CWC, and we therefore reject the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances. We believe that the CWC is a key part of the international legal framework. reject these serious allegations. We understand it's under our legal responsibility and moral responsibility to prevent the use of such weapons. We have taken tangible measures to deal with these allegations. We have created a national committee of competent authorities that are fully empowered to engage in a transparent, investigation and to present a report as soon as possible. Thirdly, the National Commission has presented a preliminary report regarding these allegations of the use of chemical weapons based on testing performed on the ground, medical and forensic tests that have all demonstrated that there is no evidence of contamination by chemical or radioactive pollution. Fourthly, we continue our contacts and constructive engagement with the U.S. to gather all possible evidence to close our investigation and will publish a definitive report on these allegations. Fifthly, Sudan, discussed these allegations in detail during the 109th and 110th sessions of the Executive Board of the OPCW, which we are a member of, thus demonstrating our commitment and absolute support for the principles and content of the Convention. Sixthly, Sudan calls for sufficient space to be given to this technical process so that the work can be finalized within the framework of cooperation in light of the war of aggression that’s been imposed on the Sudanese people. In closing, we reiterate our unwavering commitment to the CWC and the support for international efforts to prevent proliferation and use of these weapons. Thank you.

I thank Sudan.

Distinguished Chair, we categorically reject the baseless accusations by Western countries with regard to the implementation of the CWC’s provisions. The Russian Federation is a responsible party to the Convention and fully implements its obligations under the CWC. In this context, we once again note that the chemical weapons have never been used by the Russian armed forces. Their use is not provided for in our national tactical doctrine in military actions. However, we know a rising number of provocations with the use of toxic chemical agents by the special services of Ukraine supported by external forces, which became possible thanks to the broad access of Ukrainian armed forces to special substances. of Soviet and Russian production within Ukraine itself, as well as on the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk, which are part of the Russian Federation, as well as territories of Kursk, which were temporarily under Ukrainian control. As a result, A number of media disinformation campaign launched against Russia. The key element here was the deliberate distortion of video evidence with the presence of Russian armed faces with various chemical agents, which were not prohibited by the CWC. Exhaustive explanations were presented by Russia at the OPCW. We call on all delegations who want to find out what really happened to carefully read these materials and draw their own conclusions. It would also be helpful to remind Western countries of the integrity of the CWC and the Technical Secretariat of that organization in June 2024, noted that out of the 50 chemical agents declared by States Parties to the Convention as chemical anti-riot agents, only 17 are prohibited by the Convention. The Russian Federation has repeatedly at the OPCW called for defining a concrete list of these 17 agents because their absence erodes the responsibility of States Parties for their use during military actions. But this initiative was not supported. especially by those who currently are loudly crying about the Russian threat. The reason is quite simple. NATO countries have a broad inventory of gas grenades. The UK, France, Germany, and Ukraine have them. In accordance with officially verified in these countries, these countries provide for the use of these non-lethal chemical agents. I’d like to also recall that the Russian Federation regularly provides the OPCW and the Security Council and General Assembly with technically and scientifically justified grounds for the use by Russian – evidence of the use by Kyiv armed – by the Ukrainian Armed Forces of chemical toxins against the Russian population. We will – they will continue to carry out these crimes with the goal – and we will continue to investigate these crimes with the goal of bringing those responsible to justice. Thank you.

I thank the representative of the Russian Federation and now call on the representative of Ukraine on a first intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The delegation of Ukraine would like to exercise the right of reply in response to statements made by the Russian Federation. First of all, we categorically reject any allegations on Ukraine's incompliance with both Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention. On Biological Weapons Convention, Ukraine strictly adheres to its international obligations. under this international convention, never intended to produce and does not produce biological weapons alone or in cooperation with any other state party. The existing in Ukraine institutions and facilities of medical and biological profile are being used only for the sake of public health and veterinary protection. The respective Ukraine-US cooperation has the exclusively peaceful nature aimed at strengthening the capabilities of medical and biological facilities in Ukraine. We would like to recall that the outcome of the 9th Review Conference of the State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as the BTWC official consultative meeting, during which Ukraine, United States, and the overwhelming majority of other BTWC state parties debunked Russia's allegation, all Russia's allegations. In addition, the UN Security Council failed to adopt the resolution on this issue as well. We would also like to reiterate that Russia's insinuations addressed to our country has a purpose to justify its unprovoked, full-scale war of aggression. against Ukraine to divert attention of the BTWC state parties from numerous war crimes committed against the people of Ukraine, as well as to conceal the activities of Russia circumventing the provisions of the BTWC. On chemical weapons convention, today, the global framework for non-proliferation disarmament, which plays a crucial role in upholding international security and stability, is currently under significant strain. as a result of the actions of the Russian Federation. Since Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been an increasing use of hazardous chemicals and chemical riot control agents by Russian forces in blatant violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Evidence indicates that Russia has extensively relied on these chemical agents during combat operations, using them alongside other weapons to impede the offensive operation of Ukrainian forces. Russia’s actions violate the CWC and pose a direct threat to global peace and security. These ongoing violations not only endanger the safety of Ukrainian people, but also undermine the integrity of the international community’s commitment to a world free of chemical weapons. As has been mentioned by our delegation earlier, we have documented around 11,000 cases of Russia’s use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals in violation of the CWC. More than 2,862 Ukrainian servicemen have sought medical care due to symptoms of chemical exposure. The overwhelming majority of the recorded cases involve the use of munitions of unspecified types. Known delivery systems for chemical weapons include K51 and RG-VO gas grenades, which are riot control agents prohibited as a method of warfare under Article 1, paragraph 5 of the CWC. The total number of such cases continues to rise. The Ukrainian authorities are actively compiling evidence of violations of CWC, with updates on the investigations to be shared with the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the State Parties to the CWC in due course. These violations have been confirmed in three OPCW reports. In addition, two independent OPCW-designated laboratories have confirmed that the evidence provided by Ukraine contains CS, a substance used in riot control agents. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of Ukraine and now give the floor to the representative of Israel to exercise the first right to reply.

Thank you, Chair. We react following some remarks by the Arab Group and some of its members in this room today, which called.

Israel to commit to certain processes and frameworks. We have made our point.

Very clear in the statement we have made yesterday, part of cluster one, just as we have made this point clear many times in the past. We will maybe be making this point again, hoping this message will finally be understood.

Israel will not join any artificial processes that bypass established practice.

The Arab Group approach is not multilateralism, it's not practical nor peace-promoting. It's purely political and interest-oriented, and therefore detached. And it's unfortunate the Arab Group is not capable of rising beyond such narrow, politicized interests. However, if the group wishes to spend time on meaningless ventures, such as discussing WMD disarmament with Iran, it’s welcome to do so. Chair Franklin, in light of what the Middle East region has gone through in recent years, it would have been better if the IAEA Group would have initiated a forum to discuss compliance measures, as four out of the five cases of non-compliance to the NPT took place in this region. This would have actually made more sense. We urge the group to spend time on discussing how it can improve compliance, rather than spread falsehoods against Israel, as it did in this meeting today. I thank you.

Thank you, representative of Israel. I give the floor to the DPRK on a first right of reply.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Let me make it short. My delegation is taking the floor in response to the groundless statement of ROK delegation, which we totally reject as the blatant violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK. We have already clarified our principled stand on the hostile assertion of the ROK delegation several times, and we do not feel necessary to repeat it. They never changed the allegation of ROK against the DPRK. It's simply one of the good evidences which prove the ROK has been and is and will be hostile against the DPRK. And we have no reason to sit together with it, and we do nothing together with it. Mr. Chair. DPRK delegation reiterates the fact that denuclearization of the DPRK has lost its meaning and has gone forever. The reality is the best reason, best explanation, the reason why. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of the DPRK, and I give the floor to the representative of Germany for a first right of reply.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm pleased to take the floor in response to the right of a reply of the Russian Federation today. Let me state that Germany always in support to Ukraine, its fight against Russian aggression. always observed the rules Germany is bound to as a member of the CWC, the BWC, or any other convention Germany is a part of. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of Germany, and I give the floor to the representative of Oman for a first right of reply.

Chair, the Arab group rejects categorically the allegations made in Israel's statement. They have no connection to reality. What we saw was a clear attempt to divert attention away from the fact that Israel is the only state in the Middle East that refuses to accede to international instruments aiming to prohibit weapons of mass destruction and to submit their facilities to the CSA of the IAEA. Israel's continuation of this position is a threat to regional and international peace and security, and it undermines efforts aiming to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs in the Middle East. That is a goal supported by General Assembly resolutions and by the in successive review conferences, and is a goal supported by the vast majority. Israel violates international humanitarian law. They use force disproportionately, and they They use prohibited materials against the Palestinian people, and they threaten the security of the region. Consequently, Israel cannot talk about respecting international norms and ensuring peace and regional peace and security. The Arab group underscores the fact that peace cannot be achieved through occupation and through the use of WMDs. Rather, it is achieved through compliance with international law, through complete disarmament. and the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction so that we can achieve a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

Thank you.

I thank the representative of the Sultanate of Oman, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group.

The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In response to the As a representative of the Israeli regime, I would like to make it clear that if there is any entity in our region that has both the capacity and a proven willingness to produce and use weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, and nuclear, it is none other than the Israeli regime. This is the only regime in the region that illegally possesses all types of WMDs and remain outside all international instrument on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. And the reason is clear. This is a regime that has even weaponized the most basic necessities of life, water, and food, as tools of war and oppression. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and now give the floor to the representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the first right of reply.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. In response to the right of reply just delivered by the Israeli representative, in particular its reference to the Arab Group statement and my delegation’s statement, allow me to recall that the observations to which the Israeli representative objects merely reflect the reality on the ground. Israel stands alone in the Middle East as the only state that that refuses to join international treaties banning weapons of mass destruction. It has neither signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and it remains outside the Biological Weapons Convention. This deliberate refusal to commit to transparency and accountability undermines every global effort to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, to build security and trust. For decades, nations of the region have called for equality and balance, for a collective security. Yet Israel's stance remains a wall against progress. Israel chooses secrecy over responsibility, and now its representative lectures about international law and global disarmament efforts. This is the true face of hypocrisy. And when a state stands outside of the law, claims that authority to speak in its name. I thank you.

I thank the representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. And I would give the floor to the State of Kuwait on a first right of reply.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In response to the remarks by the delegate of Israel, the State of Kuwait categorically rejects the intervention, which was entirely false and groundless. which is not recognized in many states. It is ironic that Israel speaks about upholding norms this state, which is party to no international instruments that would allow for the verification of this compliance. Israel has refused to join the NPT, and its facilities are not under the comprehensive safeguard regime. This sheds light on the Israeli policy, which undermines international policies aiming to make the Middle East a region free of WMD and nuclear weapons. In order to bring about regional peace, there must be an end to occupation. There should not be any hiding of arsenals. Rather, it must be brought about through respecting international law with no exceptions. Thank you.

I thank the representative of the State of Kuwait, distinguished delegates. we have exhausted the time available for this meeting. The committee will convene tomorrow at 10:00 AM in this conference room to continue the thematic discussion under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction. The meeting is adjourned.