First Committee, 21st plenary meeting - General Assembly, 80th session

The 21st meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee, First Committee, of the 80th session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, the committee will now begin the third and final phase of its work, namely action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 90 to 106. As previously announced, today's meeting is convened to hear general statements and statements in explanation of vote before the vote on proposals submitted under Cluster 1, Nuclear Weapons. Action on proposals will take place at tomorrow's meeting. Allow me now to explain the process for the action phase. The Committee will be guided by the informal papers that are issued by the Secretariat containing the draft resolutions and decisions on which action will be taken each day. Informal paper 1/Rev.3 has been circulated and is available in the conference room. The Secretariat will revise this informal paper on a daily basis in order to update the drafts that are ready for action at each of our remaining meetings. I propose that we follow the same procedures adopted by the Committee at previous sessions concerning the conduct of business during this action phase. That is to say, we will have the following established four steps process. First, general statements under each cluster, followed by explanation of vote before action, action on the drafts, and explanation of votes after action. Under each cluster listed for any given day, the Committee will first hear general statements. This is the opportunity to introduce draft resolutions and decisions ready for action on that day or at subsequent meetings. I would request that the general statements kindly be made as brief as possible, in no more than five minutes. Next, delegations wishing to explain their positions on any of the drafts under a cluster We have the opportunity to do so in a single intervention before the Committee proceeds to take action on those drafts. I would like to remind delegations that in accordance with the modalities decided at the organizational meeting of 3 October, explanations of vote are limited to five minutes, with the option of longer statements being reflected on the e-statements portal. Also, in accordance with rule 128 of the Rules of Procedure, Sponsors of draft resolutions and decisions are not permitted to make any statement in explanation of their votes on their proposals, either before or after action is taken. Before I explain the next and third step of the process, action on the drafts, allow me to remind that today's meeting will only proceed with the first two steps for proposals under cluster one. Once the Committee hears the last speaker in explanation of vote before the vote, it would normally take action on all proposals under the cluster, one after another, without any interruption in between. Pursuant to Rule 1.2.8 of the Rules of Procedure, after the Chair has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with actual conduct of the voting. In the case of a voting error, delegations wishing to register the original voting intention should not disrupt the voting process to request the correction by taking the floor. They should instead submit their voting intention online via eDelegates or approach the secretariat on the process for submitting the original voting intention for reflection in the official records. Once the committee completes action on all draft proposals under a particular cluster listed in the day's informal paper, delegations preferring to explain their positions or votes after action is taken will also have the opportunity to do so. Similar to the consolidated explanations of vote before the vote, delegations are requested to make the explanation in one intervention. Delegations seeking recorded votes on any draft resolutions or decisions are requested to kindly inform the secretariat of their intention as early as possible and before today's meeting begins. All delegations wishing to postpone action on any draft they submitted are also requested to inform the secretariat at least one day before action is scheduled to be taken on the draft in question. Nonetheless, I appeal to all delegations to make every effort to refrain from delaying action. In order to ascertain that every delegation fully understands the process for the action phase, the Secretariat has prepared an information sheet similar to the one that was circulated in previous years regarding the ground rules for taking action on GAF resolutions and decisions. With your full cooperation, I intend to follow the procedure I have just explained in order to ensure the full and efficient utilization of the remaining time for this final stage of our work. May I take it that the Committee wishes to proceed accordingly? I hear no objections. It is so decided. Distinguished delegates, the committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions listed under cluster one, nuclear weapons, as contained in informal paper 1/rev3. Distinguished delegates, I now open the floor for delegations wishing to make either a general statement or to introduce new or revised drafts under cluster one, nuclear weapons. Let me remind all delegations once again that the sponsor of draft resolutions and decisions may make general statements at the beginning of the consideration of drafts and their cluster, but may not make statements in explanation of their vote on their proposal before or after action is taken. Statements are limited to five minutes. Microphones will be automatically cut once the time limit is reached. Kindly press the speaker button on your console in order to be recognized. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia to make a general statement.

Thank you, Chair. On behalf of the 11 member states of ASEAN, I have the honor to introduce draft resolution L.50 entitled Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, or the Bangkok Treaty. The Bangkok Treaty, which was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1997, established Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapon-free zone. The resolution on this item was first adopted by the General Assembly in 2007. and was most recently adopted in 2023. It is an important initiative in enhancing the profile of the treaty at multilateral fora. The text has been endorsed by the Sean Fest Commission, comprising the ASEAN foreign ministers. It reflects ASEAN's commitment to preserving the Southeast Asian region as a nuclear weapon free zone. and free of all other weapons of mass destruction, and more broadly, ASEAN's support for international efforts towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. ASEAN calls on all Member States to support this draft resolution, with a view to maintaining its adoption as a whole by consensus. We record our appreciation to delegations which have co-sponsored the draft, and encourage others to do so. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In this general statement, Brazil will introduce draft resolutions L59 on behalf of Brazil and Norway, and L61 on behalf of Brazil, Indonesia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Mr. Chair, Brazil and Norway presented the resolution entitled "Establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification." We thank all the delegations that participated in the consultations mandated by resolution 79/240, which paved the way to this year's proposal. The objectives of the GSTE and the areas for its consideration indicated in the resolution stem from more of a decade of exchanges. This draft builds on a solid foundation, which includes previous resolutions, two GGE reports, and the final document of the SSOD I itself. We must not lose momentum on this topic, and therefore the need to adopt this resolution this year. Mindful of the constraints faced by the UN, The resolution stipulates that the first meeting of the group will only take place in 2027. This, therefore, not triggering PBI for 2026. This will allow member states to prepare and to discuss the financial support to the group in the regular budget negotiations for 2027. Finally, we hope that with this resolution, we can establish a platform of scientific exchange that organizes information already existing across different initiatives and that expands our collective knowledge and expertise in a multilateral setting. This is a concrete contribution to the larger goal of a complete, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Moving to the next proposal, Mr. Chair, Brazil, Indonesia, New Zealand and South Africa submitted L61, which contains the draft entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas." This text underscores the vital role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in reinforcing the global non-proliferation regime. It welcomes the entry into force of all zones in the Southern Hemisphere and urges nuclear-weapon States to join the relevant protocols and withdraw reservations inconsistent with their purpose. The resolution also welcomes progress toward new zones, including in the Middle East, and encourages stronger coordination among existing ones to better support States in achieving their disarmament goals. We thank the States that already co-sponsored the draft and kindly request the broad membership to support its adoption this year. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Brazil. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Mr. Chairperson, Egypt is proudly the main sponsor of resolutions L1 on establishment of nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as L2 on behalf of the Arab group on the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East region. Serious steps towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East can spare the region and the world as a whole from a plethora of distressing risks and threats, and significantly contributes to strengthening the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including by advancing the universality of the NPT, as well as the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. We encourage member states to maintain their overwhelming support for these two texts and consequently for the fundamental imperatives and principles that underpin them, building on a long thread of decisions and resolutions at the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly and MPT review conferences outcomes, including the 1995 Middle East resolution. Moreover, Egypt highlights the major importance of L55 on towards a nuclear weapon free world, accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, tabled by Egypt in its capacity as the current coordinator of the New Agenda Coalition. An ambitious and principled text that reflects the existing nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, and contributing with rich inputs to the 11th review of the NPT. Mr. Chairperson, Egypt has co-sponsored and will continue to lend its firm support to numerous draft resolutions under this cluster, which in our view provide a meaningful contribution to the achievement of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and arriving at a nuclear weapon-free world. In this regard, we highlight a number of these commendable texts that we encourage member states to join us in supporting them. L5 by Pakistan on conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. L15 by the Non-Aligned Movement on follow-up to 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly. L17 by Austria and core group on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. L25 by Malaysia on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. L26 by South Africa and Core Group on the ethical imperative for a nuclear-weapon-free world, L31 by the African Group on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive waste, and L32 by the African Group on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty. In addition, we underline our strong support to L50 tabled by Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN on treaty on the Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone, Bangkok Treaty, as well as L40 tabled by Mexico on the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I thank the representative of Egypt. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Kyrgyzstan.

Chair, distinguished delegates, on behalf of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and a broad cross-regional group of co-sponsors, we have the honor to introduce the draft resolution L57 entitled "Addressing the Legacy of Nuclear Weapons: Providing Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation to Member States Affected by the Use or Testing of Nuclear Weapons." At the outset, we wish to convey our deep appreciation to all co-sponsors for their continued support and constructive engagement. Last year's resolution, supported by 174 member states, established a strong mandate for this work and reaffirmed the international community's shared responsibility in this area. The present resolution represents the next concrete and forward-looking step in this process. It defines the modalities for the international meeting on victim assistance and environmental remediation, pursuant to the mandate established by the General Assembly last year. The meeting will serve as a practical and inclusive platform for dialogue amongst nuclear weapons states, affected states, survivors, and relevant United Nations entities. In preparing the text, we worked closely with the secretariat to ensure that the financial implications remain limited and sustainable, noting that the secretariat will, to the extent possible, seek to absorb those requirements within the overall approved regular budget resources for 2026, with any portion that cannot be absorbed to be reported in the context of the financial performance report for the year. In this spirit, we invite all delegations to co-sponsor and to vote in favor of this resolution. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Burkina Faso. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of the European Union.

Mr. Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the member states of the European Union with the alignment of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Monaco and San Marino concerning the draft resolution L1, establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East. It remains a strategic priority of the EU to support peace and stability in the entire Middle East. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as agreed by NPT States Parties. The EU remains committed to the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, and the path for action as set out in the 2010 Action Plan is the most promising basis on which to proceed. Such zones can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between all states of the region concerned. Dialogue and confidence building among stakeholders is the only sustainable way to agree on arrangements for a meaningful conference to be attended by all states of the Middle East. The process must be inclusive for it to be effective and proposals that force the issue risk failure. The EU has consistently presented its disposition at the UN. The EU welcomes the fifth session of the conference on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs, held from 18 to 22 November 2024 in New York. The EU reconfirms its readiness to assist the process leading to establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD and the delivery systems, as it has done in the past by facilitating dialogue among states of the region. The EU is supporting a process of confidence building leading to the establishment of the zone, most recently through Council decision of 26 June 2023, in an evolving regional security environment. Its objectives are to assist in mitigating regional WMD proliferation trends, encourage regional security arrangements and arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament norms and processes, develop a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between the Middle East WMD-free zone and current regional and international developments, and promote an effective, verifiable, inclusive, and sustainable Middle East WMD-free zone. The EU also continues to assist the Middle East region via the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative, launched in response to the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside the Union to mitigate CBRN risks. The Centres of Excellence established in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates all contribute to enhanced capacity building in the region and cooperation between these states. The EU continues to call on all states in the region which have not yet done so to accede to and abide by the NPT, CWC, BTWC, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol, and, as applicable, a modified small quantities protocol with the IAEA. We also encourage subscription to the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missiles proliferation that could contribute to regional confidence building, which is necessary for progress towards a Middle East WMD-free zone. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of the European Union. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Thank you, Chairman. Mexico is the honor of Presenting draft resolution L56, possible risks of integration of artificial intelligence in command control communication systems of nuclear weapons for consideration of this first committee. The concern regarding the integration of artificial intelligence in the systems of command and control of nuclear weapons has been expressed frequently in various international forums on disarmament, and the first committee has not been an exception. We welcome all groups, including the Non-Aligned Movement, and Member States individually, who have mentioned this concern in the previous days, and the need for the international community to address these risks. The measures and expectations expressed in this draft resolution must be clearly understood in the hope of and the expectation of complete nuclear disarmament. and recognizing that the only guarantee against the risk of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. We're grateful to all delegations who actively participated during the consultations on the draft resolution. The consultations reflected there's a possibility of constructive participation and dialogue that generally is absent in the First Committee. The draft that was recorded as a result of proposals received since we began the process in July of this year. This is your text. I would like to highlight that the draft resolution will not have any program of budgetary implications, nor is there any mechanism or new process that is being proposed. We're grateful to the countries that have already co-sponsored the text of the resolution, and we invite all those who have not done so yet to do it as soon as possible before the action is taken tomorrow morning as planned, tomorrow morning in the morning session. Lastly, we call on all member states to vote in favor of the text. It's imperative for the General Assembly to begin to address these challenges. Not to do so would imply greater risks that could lead to a catastrophic scenario. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Mexico. Giving now the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Every year since 1994, Japan has submitted its resolution laying out a pragmatic path towards the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons to strengthen the momentum for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This resolution has been adopted by the General Assembly every year. This year, the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 11th NPT Review Conference was held. States Parties reconfirmed the belief that maintaining and strengthening the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime is in the interest of the international community as a whole. The threat of nuclear weapons use and concerns over a new nuclear arms race are higher today than at any time since the height of the Cold War. A divergence in approaches towards nuclear disarmament and a lack of mutual confidence in international security makes it more difficult for the international community to cooperate in advancing towards a world without nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop, it is all the more necessary for the international community to overcome the differences in our positions and to work together. Our draft resolution this year, titled Steps to Building a Common Roadmap Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons, is based on the resolution adopted last year, which reflects the Hiroshima Action Plan presented by Japan during the 10th NPT Review Conference in 2022. This draft resolution reaffirms the importance of realistic and practical efforts towards our common goal. The main changes from last year's resolution include reference to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the importance of nuclear weapons states' efforts regarding transparency and accountability, and the addition of a call for negotiations on a future nuclear arms control framework. As the only country to have suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan will continue to make every effort toward the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. As this year marks the 80th year since the atomic bombings, Japan hopes to further strengthen international cooperation towards this goal. Japan hopes this draft resolution will gain the widest possible support from Member States, and co-sponsorship is still also open. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of Japan. Again, the floor to the distinguished representative of Myanmar.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, I wish to commend you and the Bureau members for your leadership, dedicated hard work, and continued guidance throughout this first committee session. Allow me to formally introduce the draft resolution A/C.1/L.44 entitled "Nuclear Disarmament" under the agenda item 99B. Myanmar has annually tabled this resolution through the First Committee of the General Assembly since 1995. Every year, it has garnered a wide range of support from the Member States and continued to be adopted by a majority vote. The draft resolution urges all nuclear weapons states to take effective disarmament measures to achieve the total elimination of all nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time. and underlines the importance of applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to the process of nuclear disarmament. It welcomes the entry into force of the TPNW and also calls for the early entry into force of the CTBT as a contribution to nuclear disarmament. Overall, the draft resolution contains only technical updates without any substantive changes, as has been the case in recent years. Mr. Chair, in light of this trend and the ongoing UNAT initiative, Myanmar takes into account of the recent efforts undertaken by Member States to improve the efficiency of the Committee's work. Myanmar, together with like-minded countries, continue exploring ways and means for the efficiency of the Committee, including priority of submissions of this resolution to the UN General Assembly in its future sessions, in line with the spirit of Member States who share the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We stand ready for constructive engagement and remain open to suggestions from Member States in this regard. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, Myanmar reaffirms our position that nuclear disarmament remains at the forefront of our agenda. Myanmar maintains our steadfast belief that the only way to secure a world without nuclear weapons is by their total elimination. To this end, we kindly request all Member States to support the draft resolution, L/44, by co-sponsoring and voting in favour of it. Taking this opportunity, We wish to extend our sincere appreciation to those who have already co-sponsored and expressed their long-standing support for it. Now is the time to reinvigorate our commitment to the universal goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and secure a safer world for the current and future generations. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of Myanmar and again I'll defer to the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Thank you, Chairman. The most important priority in the sphere of disarmament must be and continues to be the elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible way. This is the only way to guarantee that humanity will never suffer once again their terrible impact. Pursuant to this, we urge all delegations to support and vote in favor of the following draft resolution that Cuba sponsored. L5, conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons as a whole. L40 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Treaty of Tlatelolco L26 Ethical Imperatives for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World L17 Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons L18 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons L23 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons L24 Reducing Nuclear Danger L25 follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons l57 addressing legacy of nuclear weapons providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to member states affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons and l61 nuclear weapons free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas Draft resolution L15, just titled, "Follow-up to the 2013 High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament" is an initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement that makes it possible to hold an International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons each 26th of September. The draft resolution L56, "Possible Risks to Nuclear Disarmament," is one of the texts that covers this in the most comprehensive ways. It urges all nuclear weapons possessor states to adopt effective disarmament measures to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Cuba. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.

Thank you, Chair. On behalf of Australia, New Zealand and Mexico, I am pleased to introduce the resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, this year's draft L43. The CTBT is essential to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. It is a fundamental component of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and supports international peace and security. Our countries reaffirm the vital importance of the CTBT's entry into force, despite ongoing challenges regarding ratifications. With signature by 187 states and ratification by 178 states to date, the overwhelming support for the treaty is undeniable. A universal and effectively verifiable treaty would strengthen implementation of the NPT. We welcome the range of ratification outreach being conducted and the support the CTBTO Preparatory Commission provides for this work. We once again call upon all remaining Annex II States whose signature and/or ratification is needed for the CTBT to enter into force to take the decisive step towards adhering to the treaty without delay or preconditions. We would also like to congratulate Dr. Robert Floyd on his reappointment as Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. We appreciate his efforts to promote the treaty's value, pursue its entry into force, and continue strengthening its institutional operation. The treaty already provides support to people all over the world. Its international monitoring system is an invaluable resource beyond its primary goal of being able to detect nuclear explosions wherever they occur. This global network, as a byproduct, also contributes in other beneficial areas, For example, natural disaster protection, including earthquake and tsunami warnings. 80 years since the first and only use of nuclear weapons in war, we call on all states to continue upholding the moratoria against nuclear weapons testing and refrain from any activities that would undermine the object and purpose of the CTBT. We cannot take this for granted until the prohibition on testing is legally binding. Finally, we thank those delegations that have co-sponsored the text and encourage all delegations to vote in favor this year. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Australia. The Committee will now hear from delegations wishing to explain their position on the draft resolutions and decisions under Class A/1. You may request the floor by pressing the speaker button. I recognize the distinguished representative of Oman, to whom I will give the floor.

Mr. Chair.

The Sultan of Oman is speaking on behalf of the Arab Group to explain our vote before the adoption Step 4, steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons. We would like to thank Japan to hold negotiations and consultations on this issue, in particular with the Arab Group. Through informal consultations in Geneva last September, the Arab Group takes note in a positive manner the two amendments. on paragraphs 13 and 15 in the preamble, which is a change compared with last year. And we thank the amendment in paragraph 13, which explains unequivocally the need to create a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East to which is in line with the various texts coming from the review conference. And we also would like to thank the welcome paragraph 15 on weapons of mass destruction, which came out of the review conference, and the indefinite extension and the plans relating to that, we should continue. calling for the implementation for the three main entities here, because this is a basis for the indefinite extension and universalization efforts. The Arab Group will move from abstention to support of paragraph 13 and will abstain on paragraph 15. Furthermore, we think that the positive response by Japan to the request of the Arab Group on nuclear weapons-free zone in the Near East is not only measure with the importance of this issue for the people and government here. We are disappointed that the wording of paragraph 13 in the preamble was not strengthened, in particular the reference to the annual conference aiming to create an area free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East under decision 73/546. Now, I'd like explanation of paragraphs 13 and 15 in the preamble here without prejudging the reservations and statements by other members of the Arab Group on disarmament and proliferation generally. Furthermore, the Arab Group reiterates the importance it attaches to the issue of multilingualism within the United Nations. and to the status of the six official languages, including the Arabic language, ours, that is. And we would like to make sure that this tradition is not to be undermined within the UN. We, therefore, are in support of draft resolution L59 with the transregional group. We think that all resolutions in future which undermine the status of the Arabic language under the pretext of the liquidity situation at the UN are rejected by us. We will continue supporting the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and arriving at a world free of those weapons, the implementation of T and WP and its three pillars. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Oman. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to explain voting position on some of the draft resolutions being considered in the committee. Mr. Chair, on L2, even as we support many elements of the draft, we will be obliged to vote against PP5 and PP6 due to references to the universality of NPT, on which Pakistan's position remains unchanged. This treaty remains inherently unequal and discriminatory. Pakistan will therefore neither be a party to it nor is bound by any of the conclusions and recommendations emanating from the NPT review conferences. Chair, on L4, we will once again be obliged to abstain on the resolution as a whole. while voting against PB3, PB11, and OP5, which contain ritualistic calls on FMCT negotiations and NPT's universality. On OP6, we do share concerns of the sponsors on production of plutonium for military purposes under the guise of civilian facilities. It is an issue we have highlighted as well in the context of our neighborhood. However, this issue cannot be reduced to the framing of NPT or document INFOSIRC/549. Chair, Pakistan will abstain on the draft resolutions contained in L17 and L26. Pakistan is mindful of the concerns associated with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. Nevertheless, we believe that the discourse on nuclear weapons cannot be reduced solely to its humanitarian and ethical dimensions. by trivializing and sidestepping the fundamental and legitimate security concerns of states relying on nuclear weapons to deter aggression. Chair, we will vote against L18 due to shortcomings of TPNW. Pakistan did not take part in the negotiations of the TPNW due to its various conspicuous procedural and substantive shortcomings. It reduces the discourse only to humanitarian dimensions, while ignoring the legitimate security concerns of states. The treaty was also negotiated outside the established machinery of disarmament. Pakistan does not, therefore, consider itself bound by any of the obligations arising from this treaty. We reiterate our view that this treaty neither forms a part of nor contributes to the development of customary international law in any manner. Pakistan is committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world through the conclusion of a universal, verifiable, and non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons in the CD, consistent with the universally agreed principles in the consensus outcome document of SSOD-1. For the same reasons, we will be constrained to abstain on L25 as well. Chair, we will vote in favor of L43, and we want to highlight that Pakistan had participated constructively in the CTBT negotiations in the CD and supported its adoption by the General Assembly in 1996. We have since consistently voted in favor of this resolution in this committee and at the UNGA. Nonetheless, on IRSP P10, given our clear position as a non-party to the NPT, we will be obliged to abstain. On L44, my delegation will abstain on the draft text as a whole and on its preamble paragraph 33. In addition, we will vote against OP.16 in accordance with our clearly stated position on FMCT. Chair, on L.55, my delegation will abstain for the reasons explained in regard to NPT. Also, we will vote against its OP.25, which has an unrealistic call on Pakistan to accede to the NPT. Pakistan's nuclear capability was demonstrated after induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia by our neighbor. Our capability is solely meant to deter aggression. And I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Gracias. Thank you, Chairman. The delegation of Cuba, as in previous years, has co-sponsored and will vote in favor of draft resolution L18, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. pursuant to our unshakable commitment to this extremely important instrument. The resolution highlights the importance of the treaty, which is the first legally binding instrument that prohibits nuclear weapons in all circumstances. It confirms the illegal, inhumane, immoral, and ethically indefensible character of these types of weapons, and strengthens and complements the NPT, in particular the implementation of its Article VI. We confirm our strong support for this resolution, to the treaty and the work of the scientific advisory group, which is the first international organ of this type established to foster nuclear disarmament in the framework of a multilateral treaty. Each new state that joins the TPNW contributes in a practical way to the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons and to the priority objective of nuclear disarmament. The TPNW already has 95 signatories and 75 states parties. after the accession this year of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the ratification by Ghana. This is a decision that Cuba applauds and congratulates the two countries. We will continue advocating for its universalization. We urge those states that have not yet done so to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The universalization of TPNW will contribute in an effective way to nuclear disarmament by establishing a categorical prohibition on nuclear weapons in all circumstances, the TPNW delegitimizes the existence of these weapons and offers a path towards their total elimination. in a way that contributes to the fulfillment of the objectives of the NPT, especially its Article 6. Cuba will continue to advocate tirelessly for a world free of nuclear weapons as a state party of NPT, TPNW, and the Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We also do this based on our commitment proclaiming Latin America and Caribbean as a zone of peace that confirms our priority that concerns our region on nuclear disarmament. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The UK would like to express our thanks to Australia, Mexico, and New Zealand for tabling resolution L43, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, on which we will vote yes. The CTBT's verification regime contributes to wider non-proliferation and disarmament goals, and has important civil and scientific applications. The UK remains a member of the CTBT. We are committed to maintaining our voluntary moratorium on conducting nuclear test explosions. The United Kingdom remains a proud supporter of the CTBTO. The UK maintains its national data centre and hosts 13 facilities spread across the UK and our overseas territories, which support the CDBT's international monitoring system. As a leading contributor to the CDBTO, we continue to provide over 4.5 million annually, whilst contributing the time and resources of UK experts. Chair, The UK would also like to thank Canada, Germany and the Netherlands for tabling decision L.39, Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, keeping this important topic on the First Committee's agenda. We will support this draft decision. We see an FMCT as an essential next step for global non-proliferation and disarmament, and achieving a world without nuclear weapons. We support calls for urgent commencement of negotiations of an FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament. The UK remains committed to our voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. Again, the floor to the distinguished representative of the DPRK.

Mr. Chair, my delegation is taking the floor to explain its position before the vote on OP.26 of the draft resolution L.55 entitled "Toward a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", OP.11 of the draft resolution L.4 entitled "Steps to Building a Common Roadmap Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons" and OP5 of the draft resolution L43 entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." DPRK delegation totally and categorically rejects those paragraphs of the above-mentioned draft resolutions, which blatantly violate the sovereignty of the DPRK and seriously infringe upon its sovereign rights. DPRK's possession of the nuclear weapons is totally self-defensive deterrence aimed at safeguarding the sovereignty and the rights to existence and development in the face of the nefarious anti-DPRK hostile policy and nuclear threats of the U.S. for several decades. It is none other than the United States who has introduced nuclear weapons into the Korean Peninsula in the last century and posed nuclear threat for several decades. It is the U.S. who is talking unhesitatingly about the end of the regime of a sovereign state and maintaining first use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK as its national policy. As the history and the reality reveals, it is not the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons that makes the U.S. hostile towards the DPRK. The U.S. hostility and the nuclear threats to the DPRK for over 70 years compelled us to make a historic decision to possess these nuclear weapons. This sovereign entitlement of the DPRK should not be questioned or put on the table of discussion by any resolutions in this committee. The status of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, which is now clearly stipulated in its constitution, is as fixed as irreversible forever. The DPRK has trodden a historical path of difficulties and secured nuclear weapons in order to defend the security and development interests of the state and people, but not to secure recognition or endorsement from others. Chair, it is most outrageous and illegitimate act of interference in internal affairs to try to impose a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization on the DPRK. It is tantamount to forcing the DPRK to abandon its sacred national law. Furthermore, at the backdrops of the current situation of the Korean Peninsula, where the DPRK and the US, the most hostile nuclear weapon states, are acutely confronting each other, CVID of DPRK is one-sided and even dangerous logic that fosters the disturbance of balance of power in the region. As repeatedly stated, DPRK has never recognized the anti-DPRK resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, which are aimed at denying and obliterating the sovereign right to existence, development, and defense of our people. DPRK should never allow any threat to approach the security sphere under the state's influence. As long as there exist nuclear weapons on this planet, and the hostile forces stick to the doctrine of omnipotence of nuclear weapons, the DPRK will follow through the course of bolstering its nuclear force in order to defend peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the rest of the region. In this context, my delegation categorically rejects and will vote against those paragraphs of the above-mentioned draft resolutions. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of DPRK. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.

Mr. Chairperson, my delegation wishes to explain its vote before the vote on draft resolution L4, entitled "Steps to building common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons". as presented by its main sponsor, Japan. Let me start by thanking the delegation of Japan for its efforts in managing this draft resolution and conducting early consultations about it. This year's draft derives particular importance from being the last in the cycle preceding the upcoming NPT review conference. As included in the AOV by the Arab Group, we consider this year's revisions in PP13 and PP15 of the draft resolution as a helpful step in the right direction, and it encourages us to shift towards supporting PP13 and continue to vote in support of PP15. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that the draft resolution addresses the matter of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, in a manner lower than the level of expectations and ambition, as well as previous precedents related to the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the 2010 action plan. The text fails to factually recognize the significant development of the UN annual conference on establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East pursuant to UNGA resolution 73/546. whose roles and contributions are widely acknowledged after five sessions of its work. While we take note of the diligent efforts by our friends and partners from Japan, we regret that the draft resolution continues to be a source of great division in the First Committee. Although the text was subject to increased record number of separate paragraph votes, as well as being voted as a whole, as recently as last year, the approach, structure, and most of the content and the spirit remain unchanged. We notice the increasing selective framing in a number of the paragraphs in a manner that may negatively impact the causes advanced by these paragraphs. It is regretful that the text fails to capture a handful of alarming geopolitical developments and deterioration of security environment, including in the Middle East and South Asia, and prioritizes the tackling of other situations and regions. Egypt does not consider this approach as a viable platform of convergence of views ahead of the REPCONN. Chairperson, we summarize our reservations and concerns in the following: First, Once again, we are not in a position to support any language which can be perceived as a dilution of or backtracking from responsibilities of nuclear weapon states and their legal obligations and commitments to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Examples are PP6, PP11, PP16, OP1, OP2, OP4, OP5, and OP7. As part of the New Agenda Coalition, we call for a vote on PP16 due to our concern with the conditionality it places on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. Second, Egypt is and will continue to advocate for the preservation of the integrity and credibility of the NPT and the quest to achieve its universality as a matter of urgency. As a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, The essence of the NPT is the grand bargain of the balance between the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and facilitation of the exercise of the inherent right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination. It must be implemented in a comprehensive and integrated manner. Some paragraphs of this draft resolution fail to capture this crucial balance or arbitrarily addresses issues of nuclear safety and security. Cases in point are PP3, PP21 and OP10. Fourth, we are also concerned with the paragraphs that either endorse procedure or uninstitutional, unagreed practices or intensively mix ideas in an incoherent manner. I'm referring to PP5. Likewise, we consider PP24 as intrusively forced on the text and is not relevant. For these reasons, Egypt once again finds itself obliged to abstain on the draft resolution L4 and will not be in a position to support many of its paragraphs subject to separate votes. We look forward to continue to engage with the main sponsor with a view of addressing the outstanding concerns. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. Now the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Thank you, Chair. I'd like to make an explanation of vote in favor of draft resolution L23. Mexico has traditionally supported the resolution convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, L23 this year. We are convinced that all proposals to make the world more secure and peace based on international law and not on weapons are valid. However, Mexico would like to note that certain elements of the resolution should be updated to reflect recent developments. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use. Rhetoric on the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible and dangerous. Considering the current international environment, Mexico considers that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has become more relevant than ever due to the renewed attention to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons and the continuing development and modernization of nuclear arsenals. We consider that the TPNW is the most important advance in nuclear disarmament over the past few years, and it's completely compatible and complementary to the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. By the same token, this treaty already contains a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in its Article 1, as well as a prohibition to contribute to others using it or threatening with nuclear weapons, among other activities prohibited by the treaty. Lastly, we regret that in spite of efforts of various delegations, The Conference on Disarmament continues to not be able to fulfill its mandate, especially to begin negotiations on new agreements of universal scope. Thank you very much.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Mexico. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel.

Thank you, Chair. Israel would like to deliver an explanation of vote before the vote on resolutions L1, L2, and L18. Chair, it took a long time and considerable international efforts to reach past consensus on L1, resolution on the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. It is regrettable that consensus is no longer achievable due to one-sided actions by the Arab group. Israel attaches high importance to the non-proliferation regime and shares its goals. Nevertheless, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East with the widespread culture of noncompliance clearly demonstrates that the NPT in itself does not provide a remedy to the unique security challenge of the region. Even though Israel has its own deep reservation on the language, and we always had, as well as the modalities of the resolution, we supported it in the spirit of consensus as part of our constructive and consensus-oriented approach. By imposing a new unilateral and unconstructive resolution in 2018, the Arab group embarked on a process which has altered the status quo and forced Israel to oppose the draft resolution. Experience from other regions demonstrate that any framework of regional security can only be the outcome of a mutual political desire of all regional parties to engage with each other taking into consideration the security concerns of each and every State and reflecting arrangements freely arrived at by all States concerned, as stipulated in the 1999 Disarmament Commission report on guidelines and principles for the nuclear-weapon-free zone. The ill-motivated UN conference regarding the WMD zone in the Middle East clearly fails to do so. Regarding L2, draft resolution, the risk of the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East has been submitted once again by the Arab Group. Once again, Israel will vote against this resolution. This is an unfortunate attempt to divert the First Committee's attention away from the real proliferation challenges facing the Middle East. This approach serves neither the interests of regional states nor those of the international community. This draft resolution is detached from reality and, first and foremost, fails to genuinely confront the real WMD risks in our region. The reality is that the entire Middle East region is under turmoil as the Iranian regime and its proxies have orchestrated a multi-front attack against Israel and is proliferating weapons with the aim of sparking an all-out war. In addition, it is important to recall that certain countries in the region evidently violated their NPT obligations and embarked on clandestine military nuclear programs, violating their international nonproliferation obligations. The sponsors of this resolution clearly overlooked Iran's continued aspiration for nuclear weapons. It is clear that the sponsors of this resolution have deliberately misdirected their efforts. Iran and its allies are the real risks in the Middle East and beyond. Chair, we reject this draft resolution in its entirety. Attempts to divert the world's attention by submitting one-sided and biased resolutions in multilateral fora will not succeed. It will most certainly not contribute to a positive atmosphere in the region. And finally, Chair, Israel did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and will vote no on L18, as we did on previous resolutions of the First Committee and the UN General Assembly. Israel's deep reservations regarding this treaty are based on substantive as well as procedural considerations. Israel is concerned by arms control and disarmament processes which fail to give due regard to the relevant security and stability context. Israel also firmly believes that negotiations and such a treaty should have been undertaken in the appropriate forum under the appropriate rules of procedure which would not undermine the inclusiveness of the process. It should be emphasized that the treaty does not create, contribute to the development of, nor indicate the existence of customary international law related to the subject of, or the content of the treaty. Moreover, the treaty does not reflect legal norms that apply to states that are not party to the treaty, and it does not alter in any way existing rights or obligations upon states that have not joined it. The treaty's entry into force is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it. Hence, Israel is not obliged by it in any way. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Israel. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.

Thank you, Chair. Australia takes the floor to explain our vote before the vote on L56, possible risks of artificial intelligence in command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons. Australia is pleased to support this draft resolution. Chair, working with the international community to reduce nuclear risk is a major focus for Australia. This work goes hand in hand with global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and build pathways towards their elimination. In her remarks to the UN Security Council's recent open debate on the implications of AI for international peace and security, Australia's foreign minister spoke of the importance of any decision to use nuclear weapons being constrained by human judgment and human conscience. In our view, the draft resolution sends an important demand signal about the need to ensure human control of the decision to use nuclear weapons. The resolution also sends a signal that the international community continues to expect transparency on nuclear policies and doctrines, which can make an important contribution to building the trust and confidence necessary to advance nuclear disarmament efforts. Chair. While we acknowledge that this resolution is focused on potential risks, it is Australia's view that AI, as an enabling technology, is neither inherently positive or negative, and we seek to balance discussions on AI's application. As such, while we welcome PP9, the resolution would have benefited from more balance and reference to the opportunities AI may present. Australia is supportive of any constructive role AI could play in nuclear risk reduction, as well as other opportunities to improve safety and security. Australia would also like to highlight the vital role of nuclear weapons states in addressing nuclear risks. They are, after all, the states that are ultimately responsible for managing these risks and are integral to any future discussions. We appreciate that the resolution supports the existing commitments of China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States in PP 7 and 8. We encourage Mexico to continue engaging nuclear weapons states on this important issue. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia and I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First and foremost, I categorically reject the absurd claims made by the representative of the Israeli regime. All these blatant lies are nothing but this desperate excuse to deflect the international community's demand that this terrorist regime should join the NPT and the Middle East Free Zone process. Mr. Chair, I would like to present a summary of my delegation's position on several draft resolutions before the vote. Regarding draft resolution L.39, which calls for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, we regret that despite our repeated calls for the inclusion of language reflecting the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the sponsors have remained inflexible. Since last year, they have chosen to alter the proposal into a draft decision instead, a move that undermines multilateralism and has negative implication for international peace and security. Consequently, we have no option but to vote against L39. Regarding draft resolution L4, we are compelled to oppose it due to the inclusion of contentious language that deviates from established NPT review process and places undue emphasis on non-proliferation at the expense of disarmament. Accordingly, Iran will vote against the draft as a whole, including on PP5, which refers to failed and rejected documents. Furthermore, OP10 fails to address the persistent non-compliance of nuclear weapon states with their disarmament obligations, a major shortcoming of the text. Our abstention on certain paragraphs are based on the following consideration. PP6 introduces conditionality concerning disarmament without adequately addressing the legitimate concern of non-nuclear weapons states. It is essential that this paragraph also reflect all relevant instances of threats made by nuclear weapons possessors against non-nuclear weapons states, in particular, unlawful attacks against Iran peaceful and safeguarded nuclear facilities, as well as the irresponsible threats of nuclear annihilation directed against Iran and Gaza by the Israeli terrorist regime, must be duly reflected in this paragraph. PP11 fails to affirm the negotiation on a fissile material treaty should be conducted within a comprehensive nuclear disarmament framework. PP12 does not extend negative security assurances to the majority of non-nuclear weapon states. PP15 introduced caveats that are inconsistent with the language of the source documents it references. PP21 imposes conditions on the inalienable right of states to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. PP23 fails to acknowledge the divergent views expressed during the NPT deliberations. OP3 advances non-consensual concepts that are inconsistent with agreed disarmament obligations. OP5 should present a balanced approach regarding the FMCT, the role of the IAEA and the CTBT. Conversely, we support PP3, PP19, PP20. We also welcome the removal of unnecessary caveat where appropriate, which strengthens PP13 on the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zone. Likewise, the inclusion of the term "implementing" in PP15 is a positive development that further reinforces the paragraph's intent. We proposed several amendments aimed at steering the draft in a more constructive and balanced direction. Regrettably, the sponsors demonstrated limited flexibility. Iran will vote in favor of draft resolution L43 on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as the treaty seeks to halt the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. However, 28 years after its adoption, its objective remains unfulfilled, particularly as certain nuclear weapon states, most notably US, UK, and France, continue to modernize their arsenals. At the same time, we maintain reservation regarding certain aspects of the draft. The activities of the Preparatory Commission should remain focused on ensuring the treaty's effective future implementation. While we acknowledge the potential benefits of the CTBT's monitoring system, this should not divert attention from the treaty's core disarmament objective. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of India.

Thank you, Chair, and good evening, colleagues. I will present India's explanation of votes on the following resolutions in the nuclear cluster. India is voting in favor of resolution L17 on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, consistent with our participation in the four meetings in Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Our participation in these meetings was premised on the shared concern of the serious threat to the survival of humankind that could be posed by the use of nuclear weapons. On L25, India was originally the only state possessing nuclear weapons, which had traditionally co-sponsored this resolution. We were disappointed with the substantive changes made to the traditional text of the resolution in the past, including that the references to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, co-submitted by the lead sponsors themselves, had been dropped. Further, the objective of this resolution, as reflected in OP2, is ambiguous. Therefore, India will abstain on the resolution. On L26, India agrees with several provisions of this resolution, in particular its acknowledgement that nuclear disarmament is a global public good of the highest order. We support the ICJ advisory opinion that there exists a legal obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. In this regard, India has supported the NAM proposal for the commencement of negotiations in the CD on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention. The global elimination of nuclear weapons will require progressive steps aimed at reduction of their military utility and their role in security policies underwritten by a universal commitment to nuclear disarmament with a global and a non-discriminatory multilateral framework. Until that goal is accomplished, reflected in specific international legal instruments, questions relating to the immorality of nuclear weapons must be examined in the framework of the sovereign responsibility of states to protect their security in a nuclearized global order. India's nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence with the posture of no first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states achieves this very balance. Therefore, India is constrained to abstain on this resolution. India will vote in favor of resolution L32. India respects the sovereign choice of non-nuclear weapon states to establish nuclear weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned. This principle is consistent with the provisions of SSOD-1 and the UNDC guidelines. India has friendly ties with countries of Africa and we respect the sovereign choice of states parties to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. As a nuclear weapon state, India conveys its unambiguous assurance that it will respect the status of African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. On L37, India's position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is well known. India did not participate in the negotiations of TPNW. While underlining that India is not bound by obligations that arise from TPNW, India remains committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. This goal can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework consistent with India's working paper titled Nuclear Disarmament, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2006. In this regard, India supports the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament. India will vote against the resolution L55. This resolution is embedded in the NPT context. India's views on the NPT are well known. We have called a vote on OP25 since India cannot accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. In urging India to accede to NPT promptly and without conditions, the draft resolution negates the rules of customary international law as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. which provides that a state's acceptance, ratification or accession to a treaty is based on the principle of free consent. Let me reiterate, India is a responsible nuclear weapons state. There is no question of India joining NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conformant that we seek, nor is it a status for others to grant. Thank you, Chair. The full version of the explanation of votes will be uploaded online.

I thank the distinguished representative of India. I give another floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to clarify the position of the Russian Federation regarding the draft resolution L56, potential risks of integrating artificial intelligence into command control and communication systems of nuclear weapons complexes. We think it's counterproductive to isolate nuclear aspects of AI integration from the broader context of a strategic stability. Fundamentally, such discussions should be conducted in an integrated manner and primarily among States possessing nuclear weapons potential, as they touch, in all senses of the word, extremely sensitive issues. Moreover, such initiatives are clearly premature. The authors of the draft resolution are essentially prejudging the outcomes of complex international discussions on the military use of AI technologies. The global community is still quite far from achieving tangible results in this area. And what I'm referring to is a lack of shared understanding regarding the key concepts, particularly the definition of artificial intelligence itself and the related concept of human control. It is obvious to us that without a consensus-based foundational language here, any declarations or commitments in this field will inevitably be speculative in nature and open a wide field to varied interpretations. Now, based on these considerations, we intend to vote against this draft resolution and urge other delegations to do the same. Now, regarding draft resolution L59, establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification. Here, we underscore again that Russia consistently opposes efforts to accelerate, to push through practical cooperation in nuclear disarmament verification aimed at developing some kind of a universal verification toolbox and doing it in isolation from negotiations on specific agreements. We believe it's not desirable to initiate such work without a clear understanding of the parameters of a future international legal instrument on nuclear disarmament, as well as without understanding the nature and scope of the final commitments of participating states. And for these reasons, we see no objective justification currently for establishing a group of scientific and technical experts on the UN auspices at this stage. And consider it's a mistake to submit a draft resolution on this. Let me remind here that the that there is no consensus on creating such a group, and this is very clearly stated in the report of GGE on nuclear disarmament verification, which worked in 2022-2023. Unfortunately, this fact is not reflected in UN Secretary-General's report A/18/93. Based on these considerations of principle, we will not participate in the group of scientific and technical experts if it is established. Furthermore, in any future nuclear disarmament negotiations involving Russia, any materials prepared by this group, and therefore without Russian experts, will not carry any authoritative weight for us. and the corresponding verification mechanism will help basically renegotiate it from scratch. Such a futile effort would only divert financial and human resources, and both from member states and the UN. And in this regard, the establishment of such a group, it seems to be extremely ill-timed, especially given the UN's deep financial crisis. Russia will vote against this draft resolution, calls on other delegations to do the same. We also cannot support draft resolution L.57, convening a 2026 meeting on assistance to victims and environmental remediation. The document references resolution 78/40 and 79/60. And the shortcomings of these resolutions, something that we previously explained in detail. This draft seeks to compel nuclear weapons states to provide assistance not voluntarily, but upon request. It also contains unacceptable to us references to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the humanitarian consequences of nuclear testing. Most importantly, the resolution does not distinguish between states that have used nuclear weapons in combat and those that have conducted nuclear testing. Similarly, it does not differentiate between states that tested on their own territory and those that conducted tests of their weapons on foreign soil. In other words, it equates states that, disregarding the interest of indigenous populations, established nuclear test sites in distant colonies or used nuclear weapons in densely populated cities with those that tested only on their own territory. I thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, Agita Flotko. to the distinguished representative of China.

Mr. Chairman, before the vote, China would like to provide its EOV with regard to draft resolution L4, steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons. China has always taken an extreme cautious and responsible approach on the issue of nuclear weapons. It is advocate for a complete prohibition and total destruction of such weapons. China is of the view that the nuclear disarmament process should advance step by step under the principle of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. The states possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should fulfill their special and priority responsibilities by further reducing their nuclear stockpile substantially so as to create a condition for other nuclear weapons states to join the process. The main sponsor of the draft resolution L4 has ignored the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. The relevant elements contained in L4 is not objective, unbalanced, and heavily politicized, which does not contribute to pragmatically promoting the goal of nuclear weapon-free world. During the negotiation and the consultation for draft resolution, China on numerous occasions expressed the concerns and proposed amendments which were not taken on board. Therefore, China will vote against draft resolution L4 in its entirety. The sponsor of the draft resolution L4 has introduced many controversial elements into the draft resolution, resulting in a high number of paragraph-based votes. China expressed its concern on contents in the draft resolution such as moratorium on the production of fissile material, nuclear transparency, nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, and visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others. The language in the relevant text is not objective and balanced, thus unconducive to building consensus among the parties. For an example, in PP8, the phrase of the so-called the three states with the largest nuclear arsenals is written for the first time into the draft resolution. This deviates from the existing international consensus and will only serve as a tool for certain nuclear superpower to shirk its nuclear disarmament responsibility and achieve its geopolitical goals. PP23 and OP4 of the draft resolution are related to nuclear transparency. Some individual countries attempt to expand the nuclear transparency measures into uniform standards measures, and this is to simplify complex security issues. This does not offer any realistic feasibility. On the issue of nuclear transparency, China advocates that important principles of undiminished security of all countries and enhancing strategic mutual trust should be followed Full consideration should be given to the differences in terms of scale of nuclear forces, nuclear policies, and strategic security environment of nuclear weapons. As a result, there are differences in transparency and priority focuses, which should be accepted. Measures should be implemented voluntarily by countries in accordance with national conditions. PP19 of the draft resolution touches on the visit to nuclear explosion sites. China reiterates that it is not against the visit itself, but resolutely opposes the Japanese government's distortion of the history of World War II so as to downplay its responsibilities as a perpetrator. In view of the above, China will vote against the above-mentioned relevant paragraphs, PP8, PP23, OP4, PP19. will vote against these paragraphs. Thank you, Chairman.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria.

Thank you, Chair. I'm taking the floor to explain Austria's vote before the vote on L4, entitled "Steps to Building a Common Roadmap Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons." and would like to thank the delegation of Japan for submitting the resolution. Austria has decided to abstain on this resolution for the following reasons. First, we maintain our concerns about the framing of the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, which runs through the text. We need to be more honest about the fact that the step-by-step approach is clearly not leading progress. It remains stuck at the first step and shows no promise of any progress for nearly two decades now. New momentum is urgently needed in light of the precarious global situation as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, and the repetition of the same concepts is not going to lead us forward. Second. While we share the concerns about nuclear threats and the intransparent nuclear buildup by some nuclear weapons states, the resolution should have been also more explicit about the qualitative improvements on nuclear weapons, the significant modernization programs in all nuclear-armed states, and the resulting arms race dynamics that are of grave concern to us. The resolution should also be factually correct about the extremely concerning inversion point on global stockpiles we have arrived at. Thirdly, we have concerns about how language on the agreed 2010 NPT Action Plan is being qualified and conditioned with barriers or preconditions to disarmament. Nuclear weapons diminish all of our security. International security will be increased by their elimination. Fourth, we would have preferred stronger language on the humanitarian consequences on risks of nuclear weapons, reflecting the discussions during the 2022 NPT Review Conference on this issue. The same goes for the recognition of victims of nuclear testing. We achieved concrete progress in our NPT discussions. The draft resolution was presented as supposedly reflecting NPT agreements that could not be adopted due to disagreements on unrelated matters. Yet, in the important areas of humanitarian consequences, risks and victims, the progress achieved was ignored by the text in front of us. And finally, the TPNW is now an established treaty that is supported by a majority of UN member states. Continuing to ignore the security concerns raised by a majority of states worldwide is not a way to unite towards nuclear disarmament. We would have therefore expected some improvements on how the TPNW is referenced. Mr. Chair, we acknowledge the difficulty of presenting an omnibus resolution on nuclear disarmament, and we commend Japan for its efforts. Austria gives utmost importance to making clear and credible progress on nuclear disarmament, and we made concrete proposals during the consultations to improve the text. We look forward to early discussions on this resolution in the future to achieve a text that captures the urgency of making progress on nuclear disarmament to a greater extent. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Austria. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain.

Thank you, Chair. Spain would like to make an explanation of vote. regarding draft resolution L.31 entitled African L.32 African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. Spain has always been in favor of the objectives of the Pelendaba Treaty and advocated for its entry into force. After having studied very carefully the invitation made to Spain to join Protocol 3 of the Pelendaba Treaty, my government, in consultations with Parliament and taking into account the guidelines adopted by consensus in the Commission on Disarmament of the United Nations, in its substantive session of 1999 on the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone based on freely reached arrangements among the countries of the region in question, after that decided not to sign that protocol, which was communicated at the time to the depositary of the treaty. On this point, I would like to simply highlight two issues. First of all, The Pelendaba Treaty does not contain any provision, obligation, guarantee or safeguard in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that Spain has not already adopted covering the totality of its national territory. Pursuant to its belonging to various international organizations, Spain has contracted a number of obligations and safeguards in the framework of Euratom and the safeguards agreement, complemented by the additional protocol that was signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These go beyond those contained in the Pelindaba Treaty and which we are complying with. Secondly, the entire territory of Spain is is denuclearized militarily since 1976. This prohibition of introducing, installing, and stockpiling nuclear weapons on Spanish territory was reiterated by our parliament when Spain joined NATO in 1981, and this was approved in an advisory referendum that took place in March of 1986. Consequently, Spain has already taken all necessary measures so that the contents of the Pillen Dava Treaty applies throughout its national territory. Mr. Chairman, Spain is joining consensus on this resolution of the first committee since it was presented for the first time in 1997. However, the delegation of Spain is not considered that it is associated with the consensus regarding operative paragraph 5. This is why we've been working with other delegations to find a more balanced language that would be acceptable to all parties and trusts that discussions on this resolution can bring positive results in future sessions. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Spain. The floor to the distinguished representative of France.

Mr. Chair, I would like to explain my vote on draft resolutions L.4, L.57, L.58, and L59. We thank Japan for introducing resolution L4, which sets out several fundamental steps for making realistic progress towards nuclear disarmament. The efforts already made in this direction are reflected this year to a greater extent, and France welcomes this. Nonetheless, France will again abstain on this text because of the references to the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in PP20. As you know, this is my country's consistent position. France considers that a TPNW is neither complementary to nor compatible with the NPT and is not an effective measure within the meaning of Article VI. This treaty is not binding upon us and does not create new obligations. With regard to PP19, France, while recognizing the suffering caused by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, opposes any language that fails to take into account the strategic context as an essential element in achieving effective and sustainable nuclear disarmament, Mr. Chair. Now, with regard to resolution L57, France is the first nuclear weapons state to have signed and ratified, together with the United Kingdom, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT. Regardless of this treaty, France fully assumes its responsibilities and implements the necessary measures to compensate the victims of nuclear tests in accordance with the French law of 5 January 2010 on the recognition and compensation of victims of French nuclear tests. As was the case last year, France will not support this draft resolution insofar as it applies resolution 79/60. to which we are opposed, and which resolution reaffirms elements of information about the consequences of the tests without referring to conclusive scientific studies. France is aware of the consequences of nuclear testing and will continue to be fully committed to assisting victims. as it has always done in accordance with the commitments. We are committed to upholding and maintaining our national moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to supporting the International Monitoring System, IMS, and the International Data Center, IDC, of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Mr. Chair, France voted in favor of resolution L59, in line with its longstanding commitment to nuclear disarmament verification. France has taken an active part in consultations on the establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification, and thanks the authors for deleting the paragraph stipulating English as the sole working language of the group. But here we would like to reiterate our commitment to the use of the six official languages of the United Nations in all of its forums and working groups. France would like to have interpretation and translation services to be included in the budget for the Group. And finally, France notes that the elements proposed to define the Group's work programme are indicative. It recalls that the conclusions reached by this group cannot bind the position of member states with regard to a disarmament treaty, whose verification regime will be negotiated in due course by its states parties. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of France. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Thank you, Chair. This explanation of vote pertains to L1, establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. L2, the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. L5, conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. L32, African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and L40, Treaty of Tlatelolco Zone Treaty, and L61, Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas. Our full statement will be posted online. The United States has long supported nuclear weapon free zone treaties as a way for states to improve security in their respective regions. These treaties reinforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and advance security and disarmament on a regional basis. The United States firmly believes in the principles and guidelines on the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999, including the central principle that such zones be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among all states of the region concerned. While the United States continues to support the goal of securing a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, efforts to impose a zone on states in the region without their consent and direct involvement are designed to fail and should not gain our collective support. Israel continues to be locked out of these important discussions as some regional states refuse to negotiate in good faith on an inclusive path forward. It is also absurd that these resolutions are focused on one regional state when there are serious, proven concerns regarding the activities of others. Such an approach serves to drive the regional states further apart and undermine prospects for meaningful dialogue on nonproliferation, arms control, and regional security. We urge all the regional states concerned to refocus efforts toward direct dialogue and practical steps with their neighbors to address nuclear proliferation risks, rather than continuing to pursue tendentious resolutions that have long been detached from regional security and political realities. Chair, while we understand there may be concerns about potential statements to the relevant protocols to nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, we must repeat Statements in connection with ratification or signature are permitted under international law. The United States is open to discussing statements we have made in connection with the ratification of the relevant protocols. However, we firmly believe discussion should focus on ensuring reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the relevant protocol to the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. Chair, we stand by our negative security assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. However, efforts to address a single global negative security assurance in multilateral fora have revealed divergent interests that make a one-size-fits-all approach problematic, if not impossible. By linking its legally binding negative security assurance to a nuclear weapon-free zone, a nuclear weapons state can base its decision to provide legally binding negative security assurances on relevant factors, such as the security relationships it has with the states within the zone, the zone's regional stability and international nonproliferation regime, and the nature of the obligations the parties to the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty undertake in relation to each other. It is U.S. policy to maintain a credible deterrent for the United States and its allies and partners consistent with our current and future security requirements. A global, legally binding negative security assurance treaty or convention is not consistent with that policy. To that end, we reiterate our positive security assurance to provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the UN Charter to any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT that is a victim of, an act of, or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, distinguished representative of the United States. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa.

Chairperson, I take the floor in explanation of vote on draft resolution L4, entitled Steps to Building a Common Roadmap Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons. As we approach the review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2026, we appreciate initiatives that contribute to building momentum towards this critical conference. The key to the future strength, credibility, and vitality of the NPT rests on the fundamental bargain across its three mutually reinforcing pillars, which must be recognized and upheld. Consequently, the test of the NPT's effectiveness will be the full implementation of the treaty and its obligations and commitments. In this regard, significant progress on nuclear disarmament would be essential, given the implementation gap between disarmament and nonproliferation obligations. We acknowledge the efforts of the delegation of Japan to adjust this resolution by addressing some of the concerns we had in previous years and incorporating some of the proposals that we presented, including on PP13 on the nuclear weapon-free zones. However, most of our concerns have not been addressed in the current iteration. Chairperson, we remain concerned about the number of inconsistencies, including language that we are not accustomed to, and consequently may create more challenges that assist us in taking forward the work of the nuclear disarmament. Regarding PP8, we know that the language excludes reference to a successor framework to the New START Treaty, which South Africa deems important as a basis for negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The language also seems to replace the treaty with a new arms control framework with the inclusion of a third nuclear weapons state. While arms control is not a substitute to nuclear disarmament, we need to be careful when calling for future arms control agreements that aim at restrictions and restraint rather than reduction. On PP16, a fundamental concern for South Africa is that it sets conditionalities for nuclear disarmament and is a justification to maintain nuclear deterrence. This undermines the security threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. Instead of raising the level of ambition to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world, Nuclear weapons states are given a free pass, not only to continue with the status quo, but to even reinterpret their agreed commitments. In our view, steps towards nuclear disarmament would not lead to diminished security, but in fact, increase security for all. While South Africa is supportive of the UN 80 initiative in principle, we do not think that it's a reference within the context of PP24 is appropriate. This is a concern as it may be used as a reason not to undertake or fulfill commitments on nuclear disarmament. The current framing of OP3 and OP4 is a problematic one to my delegation in that it is selective in its approach to nuclear weapon states. Our approach has always been and continues to be in favor of treating the nuclear weapon states equally in a fair and as far as their implementation of commitments to the NPT are concerned. Chairperson, it is for these reasons that South Africa decided to abstain on key paragraphs of this resolution and to abstain on the resolution as a whole. South Africa remains committed to constructively contribute to a nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and encourages delegations to work diligently as we approach the review conference of the NPT in 2026. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa, distinguished delegates. We have heard the last speaker for this meeting. The next meeting of the committee will be held tomorrow, Friday, at 3:00 p.m. sharp in this conference room, when we will take action on the draft resolutions and decisions on the cluster one. The meeting is adjourned.