Disarmament and International Security Committee.
Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items A/C.1/80/L.1, A/C.1/80/L.2, A/C.1/80/L.3, A/C.1/80/L.4, A/C.1/80/L.5, A/C.1/80/L.6, A/C.1/80/L.7, A/C.1/80/L.8, A/C.1/80/L.10, A/C.1/80/L.11, A/C.1/80/L.12, A/C.1/80/L.13, A/C.1/80/L.14, A/C.1/80/L.15, A/C.1/80/L.16, A/C.1/80/L.17, A/C.1/80/L.18, A/C.1/80/L.20, A/C.1/80/L.21, A/C.1/80/L.22, A/C.1/80/L.23, A/C.1/80/L.24, A/C.1/80/L.25, A/C.1/80/L.26, A/C.1/80/L.27, A/C.1/80/L.28, A/C.1/80/L.29, A/C.1/80/L.30, A/C.1/80/L.31, A/C.1/80/L.32, A/C.1/80/L.33, A/C.1/80/L.34, A/C.1/80/L.35, A/C.1/80/L.36, A/C.1/80/L.37, A/C.1/80/L.38, A/C.1/80/L.39, A/C.1/80/L.40, A/C.1/80/L.41, A/C.1/80/L.42, A/C.1/80/L.43, A/C.1/80/L.44, A/C.1/80/L.45, A/C.1/80/L.46, A/C.1/80/L.47, A/C.1/80/L.48, A/C.1/80/L.49, A/C.1/80/L.50, A/C.1/80/L.52, A/C.1/80/L.53, A/C.1/80/L.56, A/C.1/80/L.57, A/C.1/80/L.58, A/C.1/80/L.63
Machine-readable formats: Plain text · JSON
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. Learn more
The 23rd Meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee First Committee of the 80 Session of the General assembly is called to order.
Distinguished delegates, this morning the Committee will continue to take action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 92 106. We will begin by listening to delegations requesting the floor for explanation of vote after the vote on Cluster 1 nuclear weapons as contained in Informal Paper 1 Rev 6 thereafter, the Committee will take up the remaining draft resolutions and decisions as reflected in the informal paper. Distinguished delegates, the Committee will now hear expansion of vote after the vote on Cluster 1 nuclear weapons. I will first give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba. Gracias, senor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Cuban delegation respectfully abstained from the draft decision. L39 treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We believe that it is insufficient to have an instrument that simply solely prohibits the production of fissile material because the stockpiles of such material would continue to be uncontrolled and unverified and they could continue to be used for the development and modernization of nuclear arsenals. We do not aspire to have another selective non proliferation treaty.
The Conference on Disarmament is the only multilateral forum for negotiations in the disarmament field, is the only body that is able to negotiate without delay a treaty that prohibits both the production and the stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. My delegation wishes to explain its vote after the vote on resolution L43 comprehensive test ban Treaty and thanks its main sponsors Australia, Mexico and New Zealand. As a signatory of CDBT and an active participant at the preparatory work of the ctbto, Egypt strongly believes in the purposes and principles of ctbt, a key legal instrument that provides concrete measures in support of both nuclear disarmament and non proliferation.
For this reason, Egypt continued to vote in favor of this resolution. We continue to engage constructively at CTBT's Article 14 conferences tasked with advancing entry into force of the Treaty and the realization of its universality and joined the declaration of its most recent conference held on 26 September in New York. Nevertheless, like previous years, we continue to disagree with the resolution's failure to capture the different respective responsibilities vis a vis the entry into force of the treaty. We recall and disregard Action 10 of the NPT 2010 Review Conference Outcome Document which underlined that all nuclear weapons States undertake to ratify CTBT with all expediency and also the Nuclear Weapon States special responsibility in encouraging Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to NPT and continue to operate unsafe guarded nuclear facilities to sign and ratify. In light of these considerations, Egypt abstained on paragraphs pp.
6, op. 1 and op. 7. Mr. Chairperson, we thank Mexico for the leadership it demonstrated in tabling L56 on risks of integration of artificial intelligence into NC3 of nuclear weapons. Mexico led a commendable consultative process and brought an issue of common concern to most of the international community to the un.
Egypt supports the objective of the resolution and voted in favor. On the other hand, we regret that the text had to give up on a considerable portion of its ambitious and robust outlook in supporting the objective of nuclear disarmament and disciplined nuclear risk reduction. We further regret that with Mexico's genuine attempts to seek convergence of views, nuclear weapons States still elected to turn their back. On the other hand, we reiterate that risks of integration of AI and the entire lifecycle of nuclear weapons are real and not possible. We need an urgent scientific evidence based discussion to frame this before it is too late.
Mr. Chairperson, we extend our appreciation to Brazil and Norway for their efforts on L59 establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification. We acknowledge the good intentions behind the initiative as a potential contribution to discussions on implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. For that reason we voted in favor. However, we underline once again that existing national and international experiences, complemented by the role of the IAEA in confirming that nuclear material and facilities are used for exclusively peaceful purposes already can respond to the arising needs. Egypt cautions against the abuse of the discussion on enhancing capabilities of nuclear disarmament verification as one more way to distract the focus on the essential matters related to nuclear disarmament or as an additional pretext to delay implementation of obligations and commitments by nuclear weapon States.
As mentioned in pp. 13 of this resolution, the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the political will of States, especially nuclear weapon States. We are also concerned with the budgetary centric character that the discussion acquired during the process. Mr. Chairperson, who clarified that our voting in Favor of decision L39 to maintain the agenda item treaty banning the production of facilities material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices is without prejudice to our long standing position that for such a treaty to be balanced, effective and credible, it must encompass existing stockpiles. We call and continue to call for a fissile material treaty and not a fissile material cut off treaty.
Finally, we thank Kiribati and Kazakhstan on tabling L57 that we supported for the third year help. However, we underscore that for OP1, any formal UM meeting is automatically provided by Conference Services with or without this insertion. Meanwhile, for OP2. For OP2, the participation of stakeholders need to observe the rules, procedures and relevant applicable participation modalities. I thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. And I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of a swift Switzerland.
Merci, Monsieur le President. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Switzerland wishes to explain its vote regarding several resolutions under the nuclear weapons cluster. Our position on Resolution L2 entitled Risk of the Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle east remains unchanged. This position reflects our support for the full implementation of NPT commitments as well as for the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle east supported by all Member states of the region.
We regret that this resolution continues to address only one dimension of proliferation risks and singles out one state. The resolution would benefit from adopting a balanced and comprehensive view of the region's WMD related challenges regarding Resolution L4 steps to building a Common Roadmap towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons we appreciate the efforts made to find common ground on this important topic. We voted in favor of the resolution as a whole. However, we have question marks about certain paragraphs, notably OP4. It does away with all references to nuclear disarmament.
That is why we abstained on the vote from this paragraph. We consider that pp. 23 and OP3 do not fully reflect the norm that we should seek to establish under the NPT regarding transparency and accountability. Additionally, selective references are made to some nuclear weapons states. That further explains our abstention on these paragraphs.
My third point. As in previous years, Switzerland this year abstained on draft resolution L18 entitled Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We refer you to our Explanation of Vote Red at the 74th session of this Committee. That explanation of votes sets out our position on this resolution as well as on the TPNW in general. This position, along with the fact that Switzerland is not a state party to the tpnw, also informed our yes or abstention vote on certain paragraphs under Resolution L18 as well as on other paragraphs in resolutions referring to the TPNW.
Fourth, we voted in favour of resolution L54 towards a nuclear weapon free World accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments. We did that because we endorse its general objective and its direction. However, we abstained on preambler paragraph 8. We are not fully convinced by considerations expressed in this paragraph because it introduces a number of new concepts. We also abstained on OP10 because we believe that establishing a subcategory of States under the NPT is a decision that ought to be taken by the NPT States Parties and not by this Committee.
Finally, we voted in Favor of Resolution L56 possible risks of integrating Artificial Intelligence in Command Control and Communications Systems of Nuclear weapons. We welcome this new resolution as it raises legitimate and important concerns regarding international security security as posed by the integration of AI in NC3. We also commend the author of the resolution for better focusing and balancing the text during consultations to broaden support. These considerations fueled our positive vote. However, we believe that the text could further be improved.
It notably does not take into account the specificities of ensuring human control in the field of nuclear weapons. Neither does it set out sufficiently in concrete terms how the proposed follow up work should be should proceed. These aspects need to be dealt with in greater depth. The text could have better highlighted how AI might help reduce the risks of nuclear war. We abstained on pp.
6 because of conceptual concerns on which we require further clarification. Specifically, the reference to malfunction, exploitation and intrusion in this context seem to conflate the general digital risks with AI specific vulnerabilities. The phrasing might also overstate risks by implying that AI errors could directly cause nuclear incidents. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland. And I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea.
Thank you Mr. Chair for giving me the floor. I'd like to explain my delegation's position on the direct resolution L55. The Republic of Korea wishes to begin by reaffirming our unwavering support towards the realization of our shared objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. To this end, my delegation has been one of the many member states that have been consistent in expressing its view that nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved overnight but should be taken forward throughout pragmatic step by step basis.
This would require concerted efforts by both nuclear weapon states as well as non nuclear weapon states. Divisive approach is certainly not the way forward. To our dismay, however, this resolution, particularly its OP10 in effect creates a third category of state parties in the NPT. It is certainly not conducive to strengthening nuclear non proliferation regime under the NPT and is a divisive approach that moves us farther away from the heart of the problem. Having said that the Republic of Korea fully supports OP26 on the DPRK nuclear issue, which indeed poses a key stumbling block to realizing nuclear disarmament and a present threat to the international non proliferation regime and peace at large.
I thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Vietnam.
Mr. Chair. I am taking the floor to make an explanation of Vietnam's votes on the draft resolutions tabled under the first cluster on nuclear weapons.
My delegation voted in favor as a whole of all draft resolutions under this cluster on the basis of Vietnam's consistent policy to support all international efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non proliferation and ensuring the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Having said that, Vietnam is of the principal position that all states shall fulfill their obligations on disarmament, arms control and non proliferation under all circumstances in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. We believe strong, balanced, non discriminatory and constructive approaches that adhere to and strengthen the global nuclear disarmament, arms control and non proliferation architecture must be adopted in the face of today's increasingly challenging and complex security environment. Vietnam is of the view that nuclear weapons states play an especially important role in demonstrating commitment towards nuclear arms reduction and total and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, maintaining and resuming dialogue on strategic matter, refraining from actions or statements that may complicate the situation and building trust and mutual understanding to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in use. We support languages on the full implementation of the NPT and important treaties and agreements in this area and on the impending need for the CTBT to enter into force and for the TPNW to achieve universalization in membership.
We also support discussions on the implications of new technologies towards facilitating common understanding and approaches. Finally, Vietnam will continue to make efforts together with ASEAN Member States to fully implement and operationalize the treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, an instrument of significance to regional and global peace and security. In that spirit, we are ready to engage with all states to contribute to the work of this Committee and beyond. I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Vietnam. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.
Thank you, Chair. The United States remains committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear war. Our votes at this year's first Committee reflect that commitment and the Administration's priority to make the UN more efficient and fit for purpose. The United States voted to abstain on L4 steps to building a common roadmap toward a world without nuclear weapons. Because of policy differences with multiple paragraphs in this year's resolution, including on gender and the Sustainable Development Goals, we will address US Policy on these two matters during a later cluster explanation of position as they appear in multiple resolutions across the UN First Committee.
Our L4 vote in no way reflects on our steadfast commitment to our Japanese allies. We support the incremental and verifiable approach to nuclear disarmament at the heart of this resolution, especially the emphasis on avoiding a new nuclear arms race and the call for nuclear weapons states to engage with one another to make progress toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Let us be clear, the obstacle to nuclear disarmament today is not a shortage of conferences, working groups or joint statements. The obstacle is that China and Russia have not engaged in meaningful arms control while China rapidly and opaquely builds its nuclear forces and Russia pursues novel and destabilizing nuclear weapons systems. After a decades long decline in global nuclear stockpiles, China is engaging in the largest nuclear weapons buildup since the end of the Cold War.
With no end in sight, China cannot claim to be working to prevent an arms race with this behavior. Meanwhile, Russia is developing novel and destabilizing nuclear systems, including conducting tests of nuclear powered cruise missile and the underwater nuclear powered Poseidon during this very First Committee. By contrast, President Trump wants to restrict nuclear weapons. All countries should encourage Russia and China to engage with the United States on nuclear arms control to advance the goals of the non Proliferation Treaty. The United States voted no on L43 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty because several paragraphs are inconsistent with U.S. policy or are undergoing policy review.
This vote in no way reflects on our steadfast commitment to our Australian allies. The United States is not currently pursuing CTBT ratification and therefore cannot support calls for ratification and entry into force. We appreciate the interest many other countries have taken in strengthening disarmament verification and we share that goal. Effective arms control and disarmament verification measures can help prevent one side from cheating to gain a strategic advantage and build confidence among parties. Nonetheless, we voted against L59 establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification due to our concerns regarding the extensive costs associated with the establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts and the process in this challenging budget environment.
Concerning l31 prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, we have substantive concerns with some of the radiological weapons language in the resolution and how it relates to future negotiations. While we agree that non proliferation efforts are critical for for preventing both state and non state actor development or acquisition of radiological weapons. This resolution is not the best place to address issues pertaining to this unique category of weapons. Chair the United States understands the importance some countries attach to their annual nuclear cluster resolutions, even when we have long disagreed on substance or policy. Nonetheless, we reiterate our request to shift them to biennial or triennial schedules in future years to avoid having the same contentious votes every year, particularly for resolutions that seldom change substantively.
Chair I also refer you to our joint explanation of vote delivered by France on Friday alongside our British and French allies that expands on our position on a number of other resolutions in this cluster. We will submit this statement to the Secretariat for posting on the website. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Japan would like to explain the reason for its votes on draft resolutions L17, L18 and L56. First, we voted in favor of L17 humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan fully shares the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons and fully recognizes the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.
Based on our firsthand experience, we have made various efforts in sharing our experiences to raise awareness of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, and we will continue to do so in the future. Second, we voted against L18 treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. As the only country to have ever suffered the devastation of atomic bombing during war, Japan fully shares the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as the final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, in order to change the reality, engagement with nuclear weapon states is necessary.
Japan calls on all states, both nuclear and non nuclear weapons states, to join forces to achieve our shared goal and to focus on realistic and practical measures for advancing nuclear disarmament, regardless of divergent views on how to achieve our common goals goal I'd also like to emphasize that Japan has not changed its position on the tpnw, though there is a factual reference to that treaty and in L4. Third, Japan recognizes the importance of the topics raised in L56 possible risks of integration of artificial intelligence in command control and communication system of nuclear weapons. Japan also highly values Mexico's efforts to engage with member states with different views and the revisions made to the draft resolution. We abstained on L56 considering the risks and opportunities associated with AI and the need to strike a balance between them. However, Japan would like to continue the dialogue on nuclear disarmament and the topics raised in this resolution with Mexico and other relevant member states, based on the spirit of dialogue and cooperation and with a realistic and pragmatic approach to nuclear disarmament.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan. And I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Equatorial guinea.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The delegation of Equatorial guinea wishes to export explain its vote on draft resolution L4 and L4053. Our country voted in favour of the majority of the votes under this cluster, reaffirming our commitment to general and complete disarmament, global peace and multilateralism that is genuine in nature. We firmly believe that national sovereignty must be rooted in cooperation and not deterrence. On draft L4, we fully share the goal of reaching a world free of nuclear weapons. However, our delegation abstained because the text does not reflect a just or genuinely inclusive balance.
The NPT's traditional framework is useful, but it does give asymmetrical privileges distributed unevenly between non nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states, which generates disadvantages. Unfairly. The text does not recognize the value of the tpnw, which is a crucial component of the disarmament regime and the legitimate expansion of the global south with verifiable controls. Our region has demonstrated that nuclear disarmament is possible and effective through the Treaty of Tasylolulco. So in order to be truly global, this nuclear weapons free roadmap must reflect all voices and these zones of peace.
Moreover, we regret the inclusion of references to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that is a conventional and not a nuclear conflict.
If stakeholders wish to broach that conflict, they know nevertheless that this cluster deals with nuclear weapons and that that conflict does not fall within this remit. Consequently, interested stakeholders should prepare a specific resolution to deal with it in the appropriate forum without perturbing work on this segment whose focus should be disarmament. Nuclear disarmament strictly. Finally, the text introduces an implicit distinction between illegit and legitimate nuclear weapons states that contradicts the very principle of the sovereign equality of states. There are not responsible or acceptable nuclear weapons.
It would be a pipe dream to think that a bomb launched by one person against another would not cause destruction. Whichever way the bomb is launched, it causes global devastation. In terms of L43, Equatorial guinea is party to the CTBT. We have been since 2022 and we promote its universalization as a key disarmament instrument and one for international verification. However, we abstained because the text, instead of strengthening technical cooperation and trust, adopts a punitive political tone focused almost exclusively on condemning nuclear tests as conducted by the DPRK.
The last such test was September 2017. Equatorial guinea does not justify those acts. But we believe that a resolution adopted in 2025 cannot continue to be rooted solely on something that happened almost a decade ago. Without referring to the numerous detonations undertaken by other powers between the 1940s and the 1990s. If you mention some tests or some events, you should mention them all because a selective memory weakens the disarmament radio regime and it means that we have a zero sum game and one that does not take account of the sovereign equality of states.
Our challenge today involves keeping memory alive since 2017. We also need to strengthen second scientific cooperation and dialogue. We believe that dialogue with the DPRK is the most effective way to preserve the calm and to allow us to gradually move towards verifiable denuclearization. The international community, however, seems to insist on intimidation and if it focuses on specific resolutions, that they will move away from that goal. We need to make the most of current stability to forge ahead with negotiations and not fan the flames of tension.
Deterrence and intimidations are not tools of diplomacy. Only understanding, respect and concord can lead to a lasting peace. Chair Equatorial guinea reaffirms that international security cannot be based on deterrence, but rather total elimination of nuclear weapons, and this through a universal, verifiable and irreversible process guided by mutual respect and multilateral cooperation. True peace is not built on fear, but on justice, equity and mutual trust.
This is and will remain Equatorial Guinea's guiding principle before the United Nations. We will root out work, injustice, peace.
The microphone is being cut off. Equatorial Guinea Gironado Flor to distinguish Representative of IRAN
thank you, Mr. Chair.
Iran voted in favor of the RAF Resolution L1, which reaffirms the principle of nuclear non proliferation and calls for a mutually verifiable nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle east. Recognizing the UN's vital rule in this regard, OP7 rightly urges nuclear weapon States to support the establishment of such a zone and refrain from actions that contradict its objectives. Also, the text of L1 has remained unchanged for years. Circumstances have evolved and consensus has been undermined. We therefore urge its sponsor to update the resolution, notably by removing pp.
9 and opinion as peace negotiations in the Middle east no longer exist amid ongoing Israeli regime aggression and occupation. The resolution should also express regret over the Israeli regime and the United States refusal to join the conference on WMD Free zone in the Middle east as well as Israel's continued non accession to the NPT and failure to place its facilities under IAEA safeguards. It is unsurprising that the Israeli regime, the the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in the region and the main obstacle to a WMD free zone in the Middle east, votes against L1. The United States, despite its commitment under the 1995 resolution under the Middle east, also voted against demonstrating once again its unreliability in honoring international obligations. Iran also voted in favor of L2, reflecting broad concern over the Israeli regime's destabilizing nuclear capability and reaffirming the urgent need for a nuclear weapon free Middle east to ensure lasting peace and security.
Stability will remain elusive as long as the Israeli regime maintains its nuclear arsenal. Since 1948, Israel has conducted over 40 wars and acts of aggression, including its heinous June 2025 attack on Iranian territory, while its leaders continue issuing nuclear threats against Iran and Gaza. We strongly support OP5 and OP6 of L2 urging the Israeli regime to join the NPT without del renounce nuclear weapons and submit its facilities to IAEA safeguards. Iran remains fully committed to advancing the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle east in all relevant international forums, including the NPT review process. Iran abstained under act decision L59 regarding the group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament verification due to its limited and non transparent membership criteria that risk politicization.
We stress the importance of equitable geographical distribution, a principle that has been undermined for the first time in this resolution on L55 towards a nuclear Weaponry World. Iran voted in favor, but clarifies that this does not imply support for non negotiated or vague language, especially in pp. 22 on gender perspectives. The failure to incorporate necessary amendments reflecting Member States views on the Pact for the future led us to abstain. Iran also voted in favor of L18 on the treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Consistent with our principal position on nuclear disarmament, the TPNW's Adoption and Enter into force mark important progress complementing the npt. However, further comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible measures are essential for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Iran also supported L56, recognizing it as an urgent step to enhance transparency and accountability regarding nuclear Weapon States approaches to their arsenals. Pending their complete elimination under Article 6 of the NPT. We commend Mexico for this timely initiative which rightly underscores the need for meaningful human control over nuclear decision making that must never be delegated to to autonomous systems.
Iran reiterates that risk reduction cannot replace genuine disarmament and remains concerned that certain states prioritize technological advantages over collective security. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to upholding the integrity and centrality of the United nations and express our hope that our principled and balanced proposals will be duly reflected in future iterations of this proposal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I thank the distinguished representative of Iran.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Fiji.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Peace and security is critical for Fiji. We have been clear in our position regarding all nuclear disarmament instruments as we have echoed in our primary statements in this Committee. Fiji takes the floor this morning with respect to her voting position on resolution L4, in particular on pp.
15, which we abstained in our vote last week, including the resolution as a whole. We wish to thank Japan for its leadership regarding this resolution and the long standing cordial bilateral relation established between our two countries. While we welcome the review in some of the languages, we regret that we cannot support the others. For instance, the amendment in relation to pp.15 with strengthened implementation in our view is selective and requires further consultation. Additionally, we regret that we cannot support the selection of certain regions only as in pp.
15 as a whole. Thus, we abstained on pp. 15 on the resolution as a whole. Chair, this is not a one off matter. It is also consistent with the position Fiji has taken in resolution L1 and L2, which we thank the delegation of Egypt for its efforts in these two resolutions.
We regret that the categorical selection of certain regions or a country in particular cannot be supported by my delegation. The political intent of such a resolution is clear to my delegation. Having served in the Middle east for close to five decades on peacekeeping duties, we are of the view that there are other issues that should be considered holistically in a balanced manner before signaling a region or a country. In this regard, I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Fiji.
Give the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm taking the floor to explain my delegation's position on the draft resolution L55 entitled Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitment. Singapore voted in favour of this resolution as we remain a strong supporter of concrete and meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament and non proliferation which is essential to strengthening international peace and security.
We would like to highlight that we have in previous years consistently abstained on the language in pp. 30 and op 29. While no vote has been called on pp. 30 and op 29 this year, Singapore would like to reiterate our clear and consistent position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, we recall that our concerns were not fully addressed when the TPNW was adopted and reiterate that the TPNW should not in any way affect the rights and obligations of State parties under other treaties and agreements, including the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or npt, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the UN Convention under the Law of the Sea, as well as treaties establishing regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel.
Thank you. Chair Israel would like to deliver an explanation of vote after the vote on resolutions L39 and L43. I will spare the time of this Committee and will not refer to the lies and distorted view worldview presented by the Iranian regime representation regarding L39, the treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The relevance of a fissile material cutoff treaty to address current proliferation challenges, including non compliance by States with their international obligations in the nuclear domain, is questionable. It has been Israel's long standing position that the FMCT could be part of of a possible consensual regional security architecture. Unfortunately, the essential prerequisites for that are far from being fulfilled at this time. Regarding L43 Israel voted in favor of resolution L43 in light of its long standing support of the CTBT organization and Treaty which we signed in 1996. Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT, Israel has actively participated in the development of all elements of the Treaty's verification regime.
Israel transmits data from its certified seismic stations to the International Data center and actively participates in various relevant activities. Israel's significant support and involvement in the substantive work of the CTBTO PREPCOM is consistent with the importance it attributes to this Treaty and demonstration of its contribution to the United States enhancement of international Peace and Security. Chair Notwithstanding Israel's favorable approach towards the Treaty as outlined earlier, we were unable to support the resolution in its entirety due to the language contained in preamble paragraph 5, 6, 10 and operative paragraph 1 and 7. These paragraph votes include paragraph 10, which refers to another treaty, the NPT, and its Review Conference, which is extraneous to the subject of the resolution. The treaties differ not only in their subject matter but also in scope, obligation and membership.
With regards to pp. 5, pp. 6, op. 1 and op. 7, it should be noted that the completion of the Verification regime is a prerequisite for entry into force of the treaty in accordance with the Treaty's text.
It also constitutes a major consideration for ratification for Israel. While significant progress has been made in the development of the Treaty's verification regime, further efforts are still required, especially in the Middle east region where significant gaps still exist in stations as well as in coverage. Chair the regional security situation in the Middle east, including adherence to and compliance with the treaty by states in the region, is another major consideration for ratification for Israel. A third significant consideration for ratification is Israel's equal status in the policy making organs of the Treaty's organization. The fact that the Mesa Regional Group, as defined in Annex 1 of the treaty, has been paralyzed for over 20 years due to a few extreme members holding the group hostage is an inexcusable situation that Israel cannot and will not accept.
I thank you Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Israel. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My delegation is taking the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution L56. Zimbabwe supported the draft resolution entitled Possible Risks of Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Command Control and Communication System Systems of Nuclear Weapons not as a license for any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but as a clear and unequivocal demand that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, these weapons of mass destruction must remain under total and uncompromised human control. The total elimination of nuclear weapons should not be a mere prospect in the distant horizon. It remains the highest disarmament priority and should be transformed into an action oriented imperative with real accountability. Such accountability should be rendered to the entire international community through the review conference processes under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.
In that context, nuclear weapons states should fulfill their disarmament obligations in line with Article 6 of the NPT and other relevant instruments and agreements. Computer systems and AI should never be in a position to make decisions related to the launch of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons should be totally, impeccably and impenetrably safeguarded from mistaken, accidental or malicious AI related command control or communications to ask the risks are not merely possible, they are real. The quantitative and qualitative enhancement of nuclear arsenals is an unacceptable backsliding towards a nuclear arms race that appears to be underway. Zimbabwe congratulates Mexico for these initiatives and its tireless efforts to facilitate the negotiations. We call for continued focus on this important agenda item at various disarmament forum.
We conclude by reiterating that nuclear risk reduction measures are not a substitute for disarmament. I thank you.
Thank you, distinguished representative of Zimbabwe. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of India.
Thank you Chair. I will explain India's votes post voting on the resolutions under the Nuclear Cluster Chair India has abstained on the resolution L4. India acknowledges that Japan, the lead sponsor, is the only country to have suffered nuclear weapon use.
We share the resolution's aspiration of nuclear disarmament. India remains committed to a nuclear weapon free world. India also supports call for good faith negotiation on a future nuclear arms control framework by the States with the largest nuclear arsenals in line with SSOD 1. India has abstained on OP5 and OP6. India supports the commencement of negotiations on FMCT in the CD on the basis of CD 1299 and the mandate contained therein.
However, India believes that the moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices is by its very nature voluntary, reversible and not verifiable. Unlike an FMCT which will impose a treaty obligation and will be verifiable and irreversible, India has not joined INFSERC 549. India's obligation in respect of IAEA safeguards of fissile material are contained in India's Specific Safeguards agreement with the IAEA contained in INFSERC 754 and an additional protocol contained in INFSERC 754 Addendum 6. While India remains committed to full fully implementing these agreements, it does not recognize additional obligations or commitments in respect of safeguards or management of fissile material beyond the scope of the two documents. India's views on CTBT are well known on account of which we have voted against OP7.
However, I want to reiterate that India continues to maintain a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear activity. Explosive testing chair on L56 India acknowledges that the use of AI in the military domain poses ethical, legal and security concerns. We are committed to addressing these challenges. India acknowledges that the use of AI in NC3 raises questions. India's position is that decisions should to use nuclear weapons would be taken by humans.
AI in NC3 is a very complex subject and requires further deliberation, including about concepts on which there is lack of common understanding and interpretation. India also believes that AI could potentially have positive effects in enhancing NC3. Further, a technology as a whole should not be stigmatized. India was therefore constrained to abstain on the resolution L56. Chair on L57 India shares the sentiment embodied by the sponsor of the resolution.
India has participated in the four meetings on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and supported relevant resolutions on the issue in multilateral forums. Our approach is premised on the shared notion of the serious threat to survival of humankind that could be posed by the use of nuclear weapons. However, we would reiterate, like we did last year, that the parent resolution does not sufficiently differentiate between the impacts of the use and testing of nuclear weapons nor between the different kinds of tests that have been conducted. India was therefore constrained to abstain on the resolution. Chair on L59 India supports furthering work on nuclear disarmament verification and has also supported the idea of a group of scientific and technical experts and and has therefore voted in favor of the resolution.
We have, however, a number of concern on this resolution. India believes that the GSTE should be subsidiary to the Conference on Disarmament which has the right mandate, membership, rule of procedure as well as the experience to supervise technical work on verification. India called a vote on OP1 because of concern about the manner in which this group is proposed to be constituted. Given the nature of the issues of nuclear disarmament, we believe that expert work relating to nuclear disarmament verification should be undertaken by governmental experts. India called a vote on OP4 because India believes that GSTE should work on the basis of consensus.
India called vote on OP5 and OP6 because the scope and program of work of the proposed GST requires further deliberation and should not be prejudged. An overly detailed program of work leaving little or no room for the scientific and technical experts will be counterproductive. I thank you Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of India. Giving all the floor to the distinguished representative of New Zealand.
Thank you. I take the floor to explain New Zealand's vote on Resolution L4 entitled Steps to Building a Common Roadmap towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons. New Zealand once again abstained on this resolution. While we note minor improvements from last year, overall we remain disappointed with several aspects of the text. In view of limited time, I will mention only a few of those concerns on PP.
5. As we have noted in previous years, the clear expectation in the 1995 MPT outcome was that subsequent MPT prepcoms should adopt their reports by consensus. Welcoming the practice of Chairs papers is incongruent with this principle. In pp. 6 we have concerns with the reference to irresponsible nuclear rhetoric which suggests there is such a thing as responsible nuclear rhetoric.
In pp. 7 we also have concerns about the inclusion of the non transparent and opaque qualifications rather than communicating concern about all expansion of nuclear forces. We continue to have significant reservations about pp.16 including how it adds conditionality to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, which is a legal obligation. In our view, effective measures to progress nuclear disarmament would advance international stability and lower the temperature, thereby improving international peace and security, not the other way around. For years, New Zealand has been consistent in our view that we do not support the conditionality in pp.
16 and yet it continues to appear in this resolution. For that reason, we, as part of the New Agenda Coalition, called for a vote, a step we do not take lightly. On pp. 23, we reiterate new Zealand's continued commitment to to finding ways to progress transparency and reporting, with a view to improving accountability with nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. We note that despite a welcome increase in engagement on this theme in the npt, including from the Nuclear Weapon States, we are yet to see evidence of new steps they have taken to demonstrate transparency with respect to their nuclear weapons, for example Additional numerical and qualitative information.
We therefore abstained again on this paragraph. On OP3, we still have several concerns. This paragraph still includes, for example, the phrase to provide frequent and detailed reporting on the implementation of the treaty, which extends the scope of reporting to all pillars of the treaty rather than on Article 6, the pillar with the deficit. Finally, we have concerns with OP4 and urge the draft to be more direct in stating the problem, which is that over which is that overall nuclear weapon numbers appear to be increasing once again. Chair in closing, we welcome new resolution L56 entitled possible risks of Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Command Control and Communication Systems of Nuclear Weapons.
We thank Mexico for its efforts and we were pleased to vote in favor of it. Thank you.
You. I thank you. The distinguished representative of New Zealand.
Give out the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil.
Thank you. Chair My delegation wishes to explain its vote on draft resolution L4 steps to building a common Road map towards a world without nuclear weapons Brazil fully shares Japan's aspiration of our world world without nuclear weapons and commands its efforts efforts to find common ground towards this end, especially in the current international context. Unfortunately, we remain concerned with the wording of the text and a lack of balance that remains unresolved. These aspects led us to abstain once more in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole. Regarding some of these specific provisions, Brazil decided to abstain on PP5, which takes note of various documents issued in the context of the preparatory process to the 2026 review conference of the NPT.
Brazil has voiced concerns with the process of elaboration of some of the documents mentioned and with numerous substantive elements contained therein. Therefore, Brazil is not in a position to recommend them as a basis for the work of the review conference. Regarding pp. 6, the text is not a balanced reflection of the factors that contribute to the deterioration of the current security environment and ignores other regional contexts and actions that are among the primary drivers for the situation. Therefore, Brazil decided to abstain.
Regarding pp. 8, why Brazil supports the overall message of concern with the approaching expiry of the New START treaty and on the urgent need to negotiate a successor agreement, we are concerned with the language introduced on this year's draft which suggests additional elements of conditionality towards this goal. Regarding pp. 12, which pertains to negative security assurances in the context of treaties that established nuclear weapon free zones, the text ignores the concerns of states of such zones with the reservations made by nuclear weapons states with regard to such assurances which undermine their objective and purpose. Together with our partners of the New Agenda coalition, we asked for a vote on pp.
16 and Brazil abstained due to our concern with the wording that suggests conditionality of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. Turning now to pp.23, we believe that transparency measures adopted by some nuclear weapon states, while welcome, still fall far short of fulfilling the long standing necessity of endowing the NPT regime with an effective accountability mechanism. The same reasons motivated Brazil's abstention on OP3 in relation to pp. 24, which refers to UN80 process. Brazil believes that such a reference is premature since the initiative is still at a preliminary stage and needs to undergo appropriate intergovernmental negotiations.
Regarding OP4, we have concerns with the text which does not offer a comprehensive reflection of the casual factors, causal factors that contribute to the increased risk of a resumed nuclear outrace. Finally, on OP11, the new additions in the text were not sufficient to address our concerns. Therefore, our abstention. We reaffirm our willingness to continue our engagement with the penholder in order to address these concerns. Should the text be introduced again at the next session of the unga, for example, Committee, I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey.
Distinguished delegates, we have heard from the last speaker for the explanation of vote after the vote on Cluster 1 nuclear weapons, the Committee will take up the now the draft resolutions and decisions under clause cluster 2. I now open the floor for delegations wishing to make either a general statement or to introduce new or revised drafts under cluster 2 Other weapons of mass destruction.
I recognize the distinguished representative of Poland. You have the floor.
Please thank you, Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates. In almost three decades since the CWC entered into force, much has been achieved to bring us closer to the world free of chemical weapons.
A lot of effort has been invested to complete the process of destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles, promote the universality of the Convention and ensure that the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat are fit for purpose and able to support the State's parties. Despite these positive developments, chemical weapons use was recorded in six states parties to the Convention in the last decade. Most recently, the return of a full scale war to Europe brought about by the Russian aggression against Ukraine has shown that the use of chemical weapons remains a persistent threat. Three reports issued by the OPCW Technical Secretariat following technical assistance visits requested by Ukraine have confirmed the presence of riot control agents on the battlefield in Ukraine. The CWC prohibits the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare.
This violation of the Convention must be urgently addressed by the State parties to defend the CWC and the norm against chemical weapons. There must be zero tolerance to any use of threat of use of chemical weapons and all perpetrators of such acts as well as the masterminds should know that there will be no impunity. Mr. Chair, irrespective of the aforementioned challenges this year we have also witnessed some positive and reassuring developments directly related to the implementation of the CWC which are reflected in the text. We welcome the restoration of the cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW following the fall of the Assad regime.
The new transitional authorities in Damascus have sent a strong signal that they are committed to Syria's swift return to full compliance with the cwc. This is an important change which strengthens the non proliferation and disarmament architecture. At the same time, we need to be mindful of numerous challenges related to inspection, verification and destruction activities in Syria. Locating the remnants of chemical weapons in Syria, inspecting all locations identified as possible places where the Assad regime might have continues its secret chemical weapons program and offering the new Syrian authorities all possible support in fulfilling their obligations under the CWC should be a top priority. Poland is pleased to note that the recent developments in Syria were among the main points of interest for the State parties participating in the consultations on this year's draft resolution.
I would like to thank all participants, including the Syrian delegation, for the constructiveness and flexibility building on the consultation's outcome and recognizing the monumental positive change in Syria. Poland, as the penholder of the text, has decided to add the language specifying that the current challenges in Syria stem from the Assad era. We have done it against the backdrop of the Syrian authorities commitment to dismantle any remains of the chemical weapons program developed under the previous regime, as well as to ensure that justice is achieved for the victims and solid international standards preventing the recurrence of chemical weapons are established. All States parties should support Syria related OPCW activities and help interim Syrian authorities reach those aims. Poland, for its part, has recently offered a financial voluntary contribution to the OPCW Trust Fund for Syria.
Mr. Chair, the annual resolution on the implementation of the CWC has become an integral element of the First Committee's agenda. As in previous years, Poland is proud to remain the sole sponsor of this important tactic. As always, we have tried to preserve the accurate language, adding only the elements we deem indispensable for keeping the resolution factual, relevant and up to date. Since its first introduction, the document has contributed to the international peace and security.
It has enhanced prevention of reemergence of chemical weapons and supported the implementation of the CWC, DOPCW and its Secretariat. It's a living text documenting the current situation around the implementation of the CWC as well as related challenges. We can only regret that the resolution is not a consensual one anymore. Yet with the current momentum in Syria, we hope that the text will enjoy even broader support this year. Chair, I would like to kindly ask all Member States for the favorable consideration of the draft resolution submitted by Poland and voting in favor of it.
We must demonstrate the determination to preserve the universal norm against the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. We must react resolutely to every attempt to undermine the integrity and credibility of the CWC or opcw. Let us show the world that we remain united in pursuing these goals. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative for of Poland. Distinguished delegates. Before the Committee proceeds to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions in Cluster two, we will hear from delegations wishing to explain their position on those drafts.
I recognize the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.
Mr. Chair, at the outset, the Russian Federation rejects all of the accusations against us that we've heard from the sponsors of draft resolution L62. These allegations have nothing in common with reality. Furthermore, this characteristic of this resolution as fact based doesn't stand up to any scrutiny. The very statement delivered shows that this draft is politicized and it boils down to two issues, the Russian issue and the Syrian issue.
The Russian Federation remains fully committed to the purposes and the principles of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the cwc and also we're committed to strengthening this important mechanism. However, for several years in a row, we've been compelled to vote against this resolution and some of the resolution resolutions in the GA about the implementation of the cwc. On the whole, Russia flatly opposes the inclusion in the resolution of the illegitimate decision of the Executive Council in the Conference of States Parties of the opcw. Based on the conclusions of the Identification and Investigation Group. We believe that the decision to give the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW attributive functions was taken in contravention of Article 15 of the Convention which oversteps the authority of the main body of the organization.
Thus, Russia does not recognize this group on the whole, nor its reports which contain distorted facts and knowingly politicized and mendacious conclusions. What is absolutely unacceptable for us, and what is baffling too are the provisions in OP2 which are exclusively politicized. Not only did they impose a false interpretation of the situation in and around Ukraine which exceeds the authority of the opcw, but they contain groundless allegations against Russia as a good faith participant of the Convention. At the same time, they deliberately ignore cases of multiple violations of commitments under Article 1 of the CWC Violations by Ukraine's armed forces, including the use of toxic chemicals and chemical riot control agents in the area of the special military operation. And also also they're preparing for large scale provocations to accuse Russia of supposedly using poisonous agents.
We've repeatedly conveyed to the OPCW and other relevant international fora cases of which we are aware of the brazen and egregious violations by the Kyiv regime of its obligations under international law in terms of the banning of this type of wmd. But none of that was reflected in the draft. What's unacceptable too is the distorted portrayal of the alleged poisoning of Navalny. The Russian side has yet to receive the exhaustive information that we've requested from the relevant authorities in Germany about what actually happened with the Russian citizen after he left the territory of the Russian Federation. We're also compelled to note the hasty nature of decision 110 of the session of the Executive Council of the OPCW on the expedited on site destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in Syria.
We believe that actions to close the Syrian chemical file should proceed stringently in alignment with the provisions of the Convention. In practice, this means there must be no predetermined conclusions. Without irrefutable evidence, one can't give any reason to doubt the consistent, technical and deep politicized work of the opcw. And one can't make any exceptions based on the political situation. An example of such an approach could be taking a decision decisions taken in situations that were like the Syrian situation about the destruction of the Libyan chemical stockpiles, then this process would be in strict alignment with the procedures under the opcw.
We think that the decision taken by the Executive Council is not in keeping with the established practice of the opcw. Specifically, we see no point in including inclusion by certain states parties of the OPCW or independent specialists in the detecting analysis or the liquidation of chemical stockpiles. If we haven't, we haven't confirmed that these stockpiles exist. Finally, we exist. We object against the issue of the aerosolized use in law enforcement of central nervous system agents.
The only thing that we've seen over the four years of its adoption is a lack of viability of the resolution. We think that the draft doesn't strengthen the OPCW or consolidate the efforts of the international community in terms of non proliferation of chemical weapons. Instead, it makes takes us farther away from prospects for non discriminatory and effective cooperation toward resolving current CWC issues. Given the foregoing, the Russian Federation will vote against draft L62 and its paragraphs which are put to a separate vote.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to speak in explanation of vote before the vote on resolutions on the cluster on WMDs. Mr. Chair, the delegation of Belarus supports the consensus on measures to prevent the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction.
We believe this resolution logically supplements you in Security Council resolutions which is an important resolution to prevent WMDs and their delivery systems from falling into the hands of non state actors and terrorists terrorist organizations. Traditionally, we attach great importance to the problems that have to do with the acquisition of WMDs by non state actors, including as regards the achievements of science and technology to create new MDs. A preventive measure is a better is to respond to security threats amid the development and improvement of existing weapons systems. We want to see international systems strengthened to track the situation around the possible creation of new WMDs. In that regard, what should be mentioned is another important initiative in this area.
That's the traditional resolution preventing the development of new WMDs which we are going to be submitting to the first committee next year. Belarus is going to vote against all paragraphs put for a vote in Draft Resolution 62 on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production Stockpiling Use of Chemical weapons and on their destruction.
Elements of the resolution continue to remain politically biased and this harms the resolution itself, which was always unifying in nature for the First Committee, but it also undermines the global chemical weapons architecture. We don't think that this opportunity should be taken to accuse Member States and to intervene in their domestic affairs. We view the Chemical Weapons Convention as a key element of international efforts to prevent and destroy chemical weapons and we are not going to object to the resolution as a whole, but we are going to abstain on the vote. Belarus also supports the consensus on draft resolution L60 on the on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and on their destruction. We consistently back efforts to bolster the BWC and to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Convention.
We welcome steps taken to update the current mechanisms of the General assembly to track possible uses of chemical and biological weapons. Belarus has joined the statements delivered by the delegation of the Russian Federation. On behalf of the relevant Group of States, I thank you.
Thank you, Distinguished representative of Belarus. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Morocco.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to present the following statement on behalf of the Arab on behalf on draft resolution L62 on the CWC application, the Arab Group would like to underscore its principal position for a world free of weapons of mass destruction while giving the necessary priority to the importance of creating a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east in accordance with relevant international resolutions. The Group of Arab States has made important efforts in getting rid of weapons of mass destruction and continues to support the CWC and its important and vital role in maintaining and enhancing regional and international security and we condemn any use of chemical weapons, regardless of who uses them and regardless of the circumstances, as they are weapons that violate international humanitarian law in a grave manner. The Group of Era of States welcomes the draft resolution's factual reflection of the last few months developments in turning over a new leaf of cooperating cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW and moving to a new stage of cooperation and partnership between Damascus and the opcw.
We welcome the pivotal role that was played by the sisterly State of Qatar in representing Syria's interests at the organization and in establishing this partnership. We also welcome the positive efforts reflected in the resolution made by the Syrian government and their positive engagement with the OPCW through submitting a draft decision to the Executive Council of the OPCW last month for the expedited on site destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons. This was adopted by consensus by the council Mr. Chair, the group of Arab States underscores the importance of operative paragraph 6 which recognizes the significant challenges that are posed to the Syrian Arab Republic after 14 years of war and their efforts to eliminate the remaining chemical weapons, at the forefront of which was the secretive nature of the former regime's chemical weapons program as well as limited constraints and insufficient equipment and the insufficient institutional memory. We also support the paragraph 6 and what it calls for offering in terms of offering the necessary technical expertise and the necessary support to Syria so that it can deal with the unusual situation that it inherited from the past regime and in a matter that would help it achieve and fulfill its commitments not towards the CWC alone, but also towards the victims and survivors of chemical attacks and their families and to establish justice and hold those perpetrators accountable.
The Group of RFTS believes that drawing a full picture picture of the challenges and obstacles that would recognize the negative impact of Israeli attacks on Syria, including attacks that target suspected sites and the resulting obstruction of the cooperation between Syria and the OPCW is established. Moreover, this matter was brought up in an exceptional meeting of the OPCW's executive council that Syria called for in July.
The group welcomes OP14 which notes the the that the chemical weapons program is a result of the previous regime and this resolution could have been improved by adding more clarity to the resolutions and decisions that were mentioned in OP5 and OP11 and where a better time frame would describe description of the TAFI would have been given which is that they happened before the former regime departed. We express or we welcome the open and transparent era of cooperation between Syria and OPSW now and we call upon the international community to support Sister Lee Syria in fulfilling its commitments towards the CWC and in a manner that would serve the enhancement of regional and international security and peace and to continue giving it support effective support to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east as a basic contribution toward enhancing regional international peace and security and enhancing the non proliferation regime. I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco. The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution L22 entitled Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons or mass destruction.
I give the floor to the Secretary of the committee.
Thank you Mr. Chair. Draft resolution L22 was submitted by the representative of India on 12th October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are contained in document A C1.
The additional CO sponsors in the E Delegate portal of the Committee are currently reflected on the screen. Will all delegations kind Are there any delegations not reflected on the screen. Who wish to co sponsor draft resolution L22? If yes, my candidate requests those delegations to indicate by pressing the speaker button in order to be added to to the list of sponsors and be duly recorded. The additional co sponsors of draft resolution L22 are as follows.
The Congo, Guinea, Burundi.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you. Secretary of the Committee for a statement. The sponsor of the draft resolutions have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly. It is so decided.
Draft resolutions L22 is adopted.
The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions L60 entitled Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological, Biological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction. I give the floor to the Secretary of the committee.
Draft resolution L60 was submitted by representative of Hungary on the 15th of October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are contained in documents A, C1 80, L60. Thank you, Mr.
Chair. I thank the Secretary of the Committee for his statement. The sponsor of the drafting resolution has expressed the wish that the drafting resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly. It is so decided.
Draft resolution L60 is adopted.
The Committee will now proceed to take action on graft resolution L62 entitled Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on the Disruption. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Commission meeting.
Draft resolution L62 was submitted by the representative of Poland on 15 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are contained in document A, C1 80, L62. Thank you, Mr.
Chair. I thank the Secondary Committee for a statement. Separate votes have been requested on the seventh preambler paragraph and operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of draft resolutions A, C1 80, L62. We shall now begin the voting process. I shall therefore put these paragraphs to the vote first, one by one.
Those in favor of the the seventh preamble or paragraph, please signify those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on the seventh preambler paragraph of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all delegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor 121 against, 6 abstained. 20. The seventh paramor paragraph is retained.
Those in favor of operative paragraph 2, please signify those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 2 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all the allegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor of 77 against, 8 abstained. 55. Operative paragraph 2 is retained.
Those in favor of operative paragraph 3, please signify those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution LCD. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all the allegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor 84 against, 8 abstained. 51. Operative paragraph 3 is retained.
Those in favor of operative paragraph 4, please signify those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 4 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all the allegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor 75 against, 10 abstained, 60. Operative paragraph 4 is retained. Those in favor of operative paragraph 5, please signify those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 5 of draft resolution L62.
The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all delegations kindly confirm that our votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor 97 against, 8 abstained. 41. Operative paragraph 5 is retained.
Those in favor of operative paragraph 6, please signify those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 6 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all delegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurate and reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor of 114 against, 7 abstained. 24. Operative paragraph 6 is retained. Those in favor of operative paragraph 9, please signify those against abstentions.
The Committee is Now voting on Optiff paragraph 9 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all the allegations kindly confirm that the votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor of 125 against, 7 abstained. 15. Operative paragraph 9 is retained.
Those in favor of operative paragraph 10, please signify. Those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 10 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is on lock. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all delegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor 121 against, 4 abstained. 22. Operative paragraph 10 is retained. Those in favor of operative paragraph 11, please signify.
Those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 11 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all the allegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor 114 against, 7 absent. 28. Operating paragraph 11 is retained.
Those in favor of obligated paragraph 12, please signify those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 12 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all delegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor of 105 against, 7 abstained. 34. Operative paragraph 12 is retained.
Those in favor of operative paragraph 13, please signify. Those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optif paragraph 13 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all the allegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor 102 against, 7 abstained. 38. Operative paragraph 13 is retained.
Those in favor of operative paragraph 14, please signify. Those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 14 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all delegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurate and reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor of 118 against, 7 abstained. 23. Operative paragraph 14 is retained. Those in favor of operative paragraph 15, please signify.
Those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on optive paragraph 15 of draft resolution L62. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board.
Will all the allegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor, 116 against, 7 abstained. 23. Operative paragraph 15 is retained.
The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution S62 as a whole. Those in favor of draft resolution A, C1 80 L62, please signify. Those against abstentions. The Committee is now voting on draft resolution L62 as a whole, which is entitled Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. The voting machine is unlocked.
The allegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board. With all the allegations, can it confirm that their votes are accurately requ reflected on the board?
The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.
The result of the voting is as follows. In favor of 151 against, 10 abstained. 13. Draft resolution S62 is adopted.
I now call on delegations wishing to explain their position. After the vote, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Syria.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow me to explain our vote.
An explanation of vote on L62, especially the part that pertains to Syria. We voted for the draft resolution and for the paragraphs on Syria, supporting the wording that demonstrates the cooperation of the new government of Syria and shows its active cooperation with the organization.
While during the general debate I affirmed that this should be done in accordance with international resolutions, that the resolution shows the history and spotlights the suffering of the people as well. In this regard, we believe the resolution today shows how much our people has suffered from the suppression of the truth and from chemical weapons too. We are giving justice to the Syrian people today and we're allowing them to breathe freely once more. In this regard, we thank the friendly state of Poland which undertook great efforts to achieve this result, which spotlighted the challenges that we face. We also thank Poland for continuing its responsibility to present the draft resolution over the last few years, and we know that this gave them many difficulties.
We thank all states that supported the Syrian people. We are looking forward to the future in optimistic fashion and we hope this resolution will continue to reflect the truth and explicitly the positive developments on the ground too, and will do justice to the Syrian people after the ravages to which they were subjected from chemical weapons. Furthermore, it is our hope that you will support us because we're all victims and we hope that we can rid Syria and the international community of these weapons. We welcome paragraph six, which shows the challenges imposed by the reality of in Syria after 14 years of war and major difficulties were created by the chemical weapons program of the previous regime. We welcome paragraph 7 2, which welcomes the cooperation of the Syrian government with the OPCW.
We welcome paragraph 9 on cooperation with the international community and paragraph 10, which welcomes the Executive Council's decision about Syria presented by Syria and Qatar on the expedited destruction of all remnants of chemical weapons remaining in Syria. We also welcome paragraph 14, which recognizes the historic and institutional context of the chemical weapons program's development and implementation limitation. We express our full trust in terms of the discussion of the draft resolution in the previous session of this in the next sessions. Rather, we think this discussion needs to take place quickly to reflect positive developments going forward, developments that we all believe in and we will work for them tirelessly too. We also express our hope that the resolution will be improved, demonstrating more clearly the context of the adoption of the resolution and the report of the aforementioned organization in the draft resolution, which should avoid any ambiguities and any mixing between the past period, which was characterized by procrastination and manipulation, and this current stage, which seeks to get rid of this chemical weapons program that we inherited.
To conclude, we express our support for turning a new page for cooperation with the OPCW and to begin genuine partnerships. We thank the State of Qatar, which is a kindred country, for the predominant role it played in this partnership. We will continue to work positively to shoulder our commitments under the Convention. We urge the international community to support us to allow us to definitively strengthen international peace and security. Thank you.
Thank the distinguished representative of Serbia. Give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba.
Gracias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The delegation of Cuba voted against draft resolution L62, implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction and on a set of paragraphs in the text.
In our view, we've strayed from the purpose of this draft resolution and as such we're unfortunately losing the opportunity to ensure that the General assembly send out a universal message of support for the Convention on Chemical Weapons Weapons. We reiterate that in no way does this text contribute to strengthen this important instrument. If we bring to the First Committee controversial issues that divide Member States within the context of the opcw, it's not the role of the First Committee or the General assembly to duplicate discussions on controversial issues, discussions that take place in the iea. Consequently, we need to underscore here our commitment to the Convention and the world free chemical weapons. We need to avoid politicization and the polarisation affecting the OPCW's weapons and we need to effectively implement the CCW at all times.
We must preserve the impartial, objective function of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW in strict compliance with the letter of the Convention. We emphasise that it's not up to the First Committee to take action on the results of reports presented to the Security Council that are in no way rooted in comprehensive research on the ground in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. We are not in favor of singling out any State to State in the Convention on Chemical Weapons. There needs to be conclusive, non politicized research based on faithful evidence and on samples taken on the ground. Chair, it is vital that the only text that we have at the First Committee on Chemical Weapons return to consensus as we managed to do for many years, many years ago.
Rather, despite the fact that there have always been controversial issues under OPCW discussion, once again we call for us to correct the politicized course that we have set upon. And in the future we need to have a resolution where one of the Member States, all Member States work together to guarantee the non discriminatory application of the Convention. This in spite of the fact that that the controversial elements of this resolution do exist, but in spite of them, we remain committed to fully implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. We categorically reject the possession use of these type of weapons and we champion the complete irreversible and verifiable destruction.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba giving out the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Allow me to speak in explanation of vote on draft resolution L62 and on the paragraphs that were put to a separate vote.
We voted so as to reflect our support for the Syrian Arab Republic and the constructive cooperation between the new government and the opcw. Furthermore, we call for returning to a consensus based approach when addressing questions that have to do with the Convention. Indeed, divisions in the international community will not serve the interests of disarmament.
This consensus based approach means avoiding the inclusions of non consensus based questions such as the paragraphs which have content that have to do with particular States or technical elements that are not agreed upon at the OPCW or in the context of the ccw. We need to address the relevant technical issues in the ideal context, which is in the opinion opcw. We voted for the draft resolution and on these particular paragraphs, but this is without prejudice to our position about the technical issues that are discussed in the opcw, in the relevant bodies and in the relevant Conventions. In this context we reiterate our support for the goals of the Convention and we reiterate our our staunch conviction and our condemnation of all use of chemical weapons by anyone under whatever pretext. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of China.
Mr. Chair, the Chinese delegation voted against draft resolution L62 on the implementation of the CWC as a whole and against some of its paragraphs. We will offer an EOV on our position. China is always committed to upholding the purposes and objectives of the CWC and strictly fulfills all its obligations under the Convention. China firmly opposes the use of chemical weapons by any individual.
We're going have to country under any circumstances and always advocates resolving chemical weapons related hotspot issues through dialogue and consultation. At present, the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles was completed at the global level. However, the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons, in particular those abandoned by Japan in China, remains unfinished. The task of the destruction of Japanese abandoned chemical weapons, or jacob has been delayed for four times according to its schedule, with the progress severely lagging behind. The early complete and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons, including abundant ones essential to fulfilling obligations under the CWC and achieving a world free of chemical weapons.
Regrettably, the main sponsors of draft resolution L62 failed to incorporate China's tax proposal on urging the acceleration of the destruction process for jac.
Politicizing and instrumentalizing the issue of alleged use of chemical weapons will not help solve the problem but will seriously undermine the authority and effectiveness of the cwc. China's consistent position is that the mechanisms stipulated in the CWC for investigating alleged use of chemical weapons are the only legitimate way to deal with and handle hotspot issues related to chemical weapons. Any investigations strictly follow the the provisions of the CWC and its verification annexes to ensure compliance with the procedures based on reliable evidence and reaching credible conclusions. The mandate of the so called accountability mechanism and IIT went beyond the scope of the Convention and the investigation procedures and methods have not followed the relevant provisions of the Convention, making it difficult to ensure that the conclusions are reliable and can stand the test of history and fact facts in light of the aforementioned, China believes that the draft resolution L62 is not objective, balanced or comprehensive. It failed to adequately incorporate the views and positions of all parties and failed to address China's concerns.
Therefore, China voted against the draft resolution as a whole. China abstained from voting on pp. 7 and op. 10 and voted against other relevant opinions. Peace thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. My delegation would like to explain its vote on the proposal contained in document L62 just adopted entitled Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Egypt aligns itself to the explanation of vote delivered by the Arab Group. Before the vote, we convey our appreciation to the delegation of Poland for its continuous diligent work on this important annual resolution. Egypt has actively participated in the negotiations leading to to the CWC and continues to strongly support its objectives in line with our firm stance against all weapons of mass destruction for several years.
My delegation voted in favor of this resolution led by Poland as a reiteration of Egypt's principal position in support of the total elimination and prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction and its firm condemnation of any use of such weapons by any party anywhere under any circumstances. However, we regret that the text continues to disregard the legitimate aspiration for the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle east and the relevant efforts in support of this objective with a view of addressing the structure, strategic and contractual imbalance in our region and allowing the universality of the mpt, CWC and bwc, including in the Middle East. In a different connection, while we continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons by any State or non state actor and stress the fundamental necessity of an objective, transparent and impartial investigation into any allegation of this gravity, my delegation will not be in a position to express an informed opinion on several paragraphs related to the work of the OPCW and decisions of its Executive Council. Being an organization of which Egypt is not a member, we register our growing concern with the expansion in addressing country specific situations within this annual resolution and the associated possibility of politicization in a manner that may cast its shadow on the level of support required for the important principles and objectives of the Convention and consequently the relevant resolution at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. For the aforementioned reasons, Egypt continued to abstain on this resolution and several of the paragraphs subject to a standalone vote.
I thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.
Thank you. Chair I am delivering this explanation of vote on behalf of 41 countries Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and my own country, the United States states on Resolution L62 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Our respective countries voted in favor of this resolution as we believe it accurately reflects the objectives and goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC and key developments of the past year. The resolution further highlights the fact that the threat of continued use of chemicals as weapons in violation of the CWC is real and persistent. Specifically, the New operative paragraph 2 expresses grave concerns about the results of three OPCW technical assistance visits TAV requested by Ukraine, which confirmed the presence of prohibited riot control agents in samples, including grenades collected from the battlefield. This comes on top of evidence that has been well documented by Ukraine and presented to the international community time and time again.
We take note of the assessment by the United States, Germany and the Netherlands that Russia has used a chemical weapon, chloropicrin, as well as the riot control agent CS as a method of warfare against Ukraine. As responsible Member States, we cannot be helpless by bystanders. We therefore support calls for the OPCW attribution of confirmed chemical attacks in Ukraine, including incidents involving munitions addressed in the TAV reports. As soon as possible, the international community should also take steps to ensure that violators of the CWC are held accountable, including for the widespread chemical attacks in Ukraine. Additionally, let us not forget that the resolution further underlines the need for a full and transparent investigation and accountability for the reported chemical weapons against Alexei Navalny by the Russian Federation.
Chair as we continue to celebrate the OPCW's confirmation that all declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed, more work is needed. Under Assad, Syria refused to comply with its obligations under the cwc. We thank the Transitional Syrian Government for committing to do everything in its power to resolve the discrepancies in its national declaration related to the Assad era chemical weapons program work towards the complete and verifiable elimination of whatever remains from it and eliminate the proliferation threat to the Syrian people and the region. The goal of a chemical weapons free Syria is now within reach. We also commend the Transitional Syrian Government for its commitment to accountability.
All States parties to the Convention are bound by its obligations. If we fail to hold wrongdoers to account, the use of chemical weapons will continue. We must turn our words into actions and prevent the re emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons. Thank you, Chair.
I thank you. Distinguished representative of United States. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia positions on draft resolutions under this cluster is a reflection of our long standing positions that the use of any weapons of mass destruction by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances is unjustifiable. We reveal our strong support for the full and effective implementations of the Biological Weapon Conventions and the Chemical Weapon Conventions. And we believe that all effort to support these conventions must be rooted in a commitment to consensus building.
Mr. Chair, on draft resolution L62 we found it difficult to endorse several paragraphs leading us to 14 abstentions on certain preambulatory and operative paragraphs. In our view, the paragraph on which we abstains risk perpetuating long standing divisions among Member States rather than fostering mutual understanding some content characteristics that do not fully reflect the complexity of the issues or the diversity of perspective among states. In particular, Indonesia is of the view that disarmament and non proliferation efforts must be grounded in variable facts, objective information and agreed multilateral processes. We put it in favor on paragraphs that in our view reflect the unity and objective of the issues at hand.
Those paragraphs align with the object objective of full and effective implementations of the Conventions. We are of the view that much remains to be done to ensure effective implementations of the CWC as the Conventions remain a highly effective instruments within multilateral disarmament and non proliferation efforts. In support of this goal, Indonesia voted in favor of the draft resolutions L62. In closing, my delegation Rate Rate's commitment to bridging and differentiating and achieving consensus in advancing the objective of the conventions. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran.
Thank you. Mr. Chair. I have taken the floor to explain the vote of my delegation on draft resolution L62 concerning the chemical Weapons Convention. The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirmed its strong and unwavering support for the CWC as a unique multilateral instrument that has not only codified and reinforced the international norm against chemical weapons, but has also achieved remarkable progress in their elimination.
The Convention further provides an important framework for international cooperation and the exchange of scientific and technical information among State parties for peaceful purposes. Mr. Chair, while the CWC and the OPCW must remain effective, impartial and universal in their implementation, it is regrettable that the draft resolution before us has been used for political purposes rather than to advance the objective of the Convention. Instead of fostering unity and consensus, it has deepened divisions among State parties and introduced controversial elements that undermine the spirit of cooperation that has long characterized the work of the opcw. This draft has been formulated to reflect specific political positions held by a limited group of State parties, thereby polarizing the organization and attempting to transform the Technical Secretariat from the professional and technical body into a politicized instrument serving narrow interests.
Such an approach jeopardized the credibility, independence and effectiveness of the opcw. Iran condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. At the same time and in line with its principled position, Iran firmly rejects any politicized approach that single out Member States or undermines the integrity and provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran emphasizes that the strict observance of the principles of impartiality, independence and professionalism, including the preservation of the chain of custody, is essential in conducting investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons. Unfortunately, some of these principles were not duly observed in the preparation of related reports and in the handling of specific cases.
This has seriously undermined the credibility and reliability of those reports and their conclusions. For these reasons, my delegation voted against draft resolution L62 as a number of its paragraphs are highly politicized and inconsistent with the objective of maintaining the CWC as a consensus based technical and non political instrument. We sincerely hope that the politicization of the opinion, the CW's work and of this resolution will come to an end, allowing the Committee in future sessions to adopt a consensual resolution on the implementation of the cwc. As was the practice for many years during the only informal consultation held on distrap, Iran and several other Member States put forward constructive and consensus oriented proposals aimed at restoring balance and inclusivity. Regrettably, we witnessed no flexibility from the main sponsor and the proposals discussed were not reflected in the final text.
This lack of openness prevented the achievement of a truly consensual outcome. Iran remains ready to engage constructively toward restoring consensus and ensuring that the work of the OPCW continues to be be guided by professionalism, impartiality and respect for the Convention's letter and spirit. I thank you, Mr. Chair. I thank the distinguished representative of Iran.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel.
Thank you, Chair. I would like to express Israel's explanation of vote after the vote on resolution L62, the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. Chair following the developments in the Syrian Arab Republic since the fall of the Assad regime, Israel welcomes the prospect for the elimination of the chemical weapons program in Syria and commends the substantial efforts and activities of the Technical Secretariat and other member States of the opcw. In this regard, Israel supports the OPCW and the international community's efforts to dismantle and extract sites, stockpiles and equipment associated with the chemical weapons program. Israel recognizes the importance of Resolution L62 and supports its goal.
However, Israel abstained on OP10 because of the reference to the report of EC110 as the EC and the subsequent report do not reflect the full realities on the ground. Chair, Let me be also clear and stress our concern regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's secret chemical weapons program based on weaponized pharmaceutical agents. Everyone should be aware of the rising chemical threats coming from Iran, a country that cynically continues to call for state responsibility in the chemical weapons arena, all while secretly developing a program that violates its obligations under the cwc. The CWC is yet another convention that is an empty promise for Iran, a country that consistently signs treaties only to deliberately violate them. Finally, Chair, Israel voted in favor of L62 due to our long standing support of this resolution and the goals and purposes of the Chemical Weapons Convention which we signed in 1993.
Moreover, Israel maintains ongoing dialogue with the OPCW and its party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. I thank you, Chair. I thank the distinguished representative of Israel. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of India. Thank you, Chair.
India has been supporting the resolution on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. India attaches importance to the CWC and all its provisions. India is against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anybody and under any circumstances. India underlines the need for upholding the integrity of the CWC and to avoiding politicization of the issues. We reiterate the importance of impartial and objective investigation process into any alleged use to establish facts and reach evidence based conclusions consistent with the provisions of the Convention.
While India has supported the resolution as a whole, however, it was constrained to abstain on some paragraphs due to the inclusion of some contentious issues. I thank you Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of India. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine.
Mr. Chair, the delegation of Ukraine aligns itself with a joint statement in explanation of vote after the vote delivered by the United States on behalf of a group of states on L62 draft resolution. We would also like to make additional remarks in our national capacity with explanation of our vote on this resolution. Ukraine voted in favor of L62 because we believe that this draft accurately reflects the objectives and goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as the key developments related to the implementation of the CWC and relevant deliberations within the opcw. In particular, the resolution expresses grave concern about allegations of the use of chemical weapons by the Russian Federation in its war of aggression against Ukraine and urges the OPCW to continue to closely monitor the situation, be ready to investigate the matter as appropriate.
In this context, the resolution knows the request for clarification on this issue submitted under Article 9 of the CWC and subsequent discussions in the Executive Council of the OPCW and recall the technical assistance provided to Ukraine by the Technical Secretariat of the Ukraine also welcomes the inclusion of operative paragraph 3, in which the resolution notes with grave concern the reports of the Technical Secretariat for the OPCW of 18 November 2024, 14 February 2025 and 20 June 2025, following technical assistance visits requested by Ukraine which confirmed the presence of riot control agents known as cs in samples collected from locations along the confrontation lines in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Mr. Chair, Ukraine has been continuously monitoring violations of the CWC by Russia and promptly notifying the Technical Secretariat and State Parties to the CWC about such violations. It includes almost 11,000 documented instances of the Russian military's use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals, including chloropicrine, in direct violation of Chemical Weapons Convention. Ukraine continues to collect and submit evidence of use of chemical weapons in line with the OPCW standards.
As a responsible State party to the Convention, we remain fully committed to our obligations to strengthening cooperation with the opcw. Ukrainian close cooperation with the technical security of the OPCW continues ensuring compliance with international law and the Chemical Weapons Convention. This includes supporting and coordinating collective efforts aimed at ensuring effective attribution, identifying perpetrators, organizers sponsor of chemical weapons use, and advancing accountability through appropriate international mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you. The distinguished capacity of Ukraine and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I wish to explain our vote on the various paragraphs of L62. We reiterate our steadfast position as we reject the use of chemical weapons by any party at any time or place and under any circumstance. This use constitutes a blatant violation of IHL and the provisions of the cwc.
It also undermines international peace and security.
And based on our support to international efforts to ensure the full and balanced implementation of the cwc, Iraq has voted in support of a number of powers of the draft resolution as we welcome the cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic in the implementation of its commitments under the CWC and to encourage the constructive approach to strengthen mutual confidence amongst relevant parties and stakeholders. At the same time, we reiterate the need for all efforts on the implementation of the CWC to be depoliticized or rid of any measures that allow for division amongst state parties. And we call for the need to prioritize discussion, dialogue and consensus on issues pertaining to the implementation. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq. Distinguished delegates, we have heard from the last speaker for the explanation of vote after the vote on cluster 2, other weapons of mass destruction. Distinguished delegates, the Committee will now take up the draft resolutions and decisions under Cluster 3 as contained in Informal Paper 1 Rev. 6 First, I shall give the floor to delegations wishing to make either a general statement or to introduce new or revised drafts under Cluster 3. Outer Space Disarmament ASPECTS I recognize the distinguished representative of Iran, Mr.
Chair. Actually, I requested for right of reply. Sorry, sorry. Of Sri Lanka. There was a glitcher in it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Sri Lanka has long recognized outer space as the common heritage of humanity, to be preserved, protected and used for exclusively peaceful purposes. The prevention of the weaponization of outer space is a moral imperative, one that determines whether the skies far above remain a realm of hope, discovery and cooperation or are instead transformed into another theatre of rivalry and conflict. In this backdrop, Sri Lanka, together with Egypt, introduced our annual omnibus resolution L3 titled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer space.
Under item 97A. The resolution stressed that the exploration and use of outer space by all states shall be for peaceful purpose and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of the degree of economico scientific development. We express appreciation to the delegations that have already co sponsored this resolution and invite the delegations that have not yet cosponsored to consider doing so. We also request the support of Member States for this resolution during its consideration to ensure that the outer space remains a domain that unites but not divides. I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Kappa center of Sri Lanka. Give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.
Chair the Chinese delegation submitted drafter resolution L3 prevention of an arms raising outer space error 36 transparency and confidence building measures in outer space activities arrow 37 no first placement of weapons in outer space arrow 38 further practical measures for the prevention of Arms race in Outer Space we would like to take this opportunity to elaborate China's position. China always advocates for peaceful use of outer space, opposes weaponization of and arms raising outer space, and actively promotes negotiations on a legally binding treaty for outer space arms control. China supports the CD in fulfilling its role as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and urges for early negotiation and conclusion of international legal instruments and outer space arms control. This is the most fundamental and effective approach to address current outer space security issues. Draft resolutions ERA 3, 36, 37 and 38 aim to advance the realization of these objectives.
China calls upon all parties to support these draft resolutions. Chair China notes with regret that certain country requested a separate vote on the PP5 of draft resolutions error 37 and error 38 concerning the concept a community of a shared future for humankind. Outer space is a global commons and shared asset of humankind. As evidenced by statements made during the general debate and thematic discussions of this session. Maintaining lasting peace and security in outer space and ensuring sustainable development is a shared aspiration of the international community in the field of outer space.
The concept of community of a shared future for humankind represents the interdependence of national interests and a sharing of rights and responsibilities. It advocates for peaceful development over conflict and confrontation, common security over absolute security, mutual benefit and win win outcomes over zero sum games. This concept is fully consistent with international consensus on the peaceful use of and the prevention of anomalous race in outer space. It should be noted that the term community of a shared future for humankind is neutral in nature. It emphasizes the close interconnection of national interests and a shared destiny of humankind.
Although proposed by China, this concept is the result of the wisdom of the broad membership of the un. It is a public good that enriches and develops the concept of outer space security. It carries no ideological connotations and is a true embodiment of multilateralism. Highly consistent with the content of the relevant resolutions. China calls upon all parties to vote in favor of PP.5 of draft resolutions L37 and R38.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. The delegation of Cuba supports and co sponsors the draft resolution L3 entitled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. L35 New Practical Measures to Prevent an arms race in outer space. That is L38, L36 transparency and confidence Confidence Building Measures in Outer space activities and L37 no first placement of weapons in Outer Space.
We encourage all delegations to support these drafts that have long been considered here. Outer space should be used for exclusively peaceful purposes and should be viewed as common heritage of humankind. Despite the manifold efforts made to prevent an arms race in outer space space, we cannot continue to postpone negotiations and the ultimate adoption of a multilateral treaty which is legally binding on that topic. That treaty should include the prohibition of first placement and the use of any weapons such as to complement and strengthen the legal regime applicable to space. Voluntary transparency and confidence building measures are useful.
We support them alone. However, they are insufficient to prevent an arms race. These measures are not a substitute for legally binding instruments that we need for outer space. We support and champion the policy of no first placement of weapons in outer space, and as such, we do not support any placement of weapons in that milieu under any circumstances. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.
Mr. Chairman, as a responsible participant in outer space activities and the author of initiatives seeking to prevent an arms race in outer space, PAROS Russian Federation substantially contributes to preserving outer space free from weapons, and we've contributed to preventing its transformation into another sphere of tensions and armed confrontation too. Our principled position here remains ironclad, and achievement of this aim is possible only through development of a multilateral, legally binding instrument that would be comprehensive and would seek to prevent an arms race in outer space. Guided by this goal, Russia has submitted to the First Committee of the UN General assembly three draft resolutions. Further Practical Measures for preventing an arms race in outer space. L38 Transparency and confidence building measures in outer space activities.
L36 no first placement of weapons in outer space L37 all three of these documents are grounded in analogous UNGA resolutions from previous years that garnered the absolute majority, garnered the support of the absolute majority of UN Member states, and they're intended to promote a key task development of a multilateral, legally binding instrument prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space and the use or threat of force against outer space objects or using outer space objects. In line with the Special Session on disarmament of 1978. Russia's space drafts welcome the contribution of the GGE on PAROS to efforts on this track. And they also welcome the adoption by consensus of the report of this group which serves as a basis for further measures and negotiations on international legally binding. On an international legally binding instrument on PAROs, including the Prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space in various forms.
We have considered in the draft resolutions all the wishes of delegations. The documents have been updated. Given the recent achievements in outer Space. Specifically, all three UNGA draft resolutions note the establishment pursuant to UNGA Resolution 79512 of a open ended working group and they note the holding of meetings of this oawg. And they also welcome by the adoption by consensus of the agenda and the program of work for 2025 and 2028 and also the beginning of substantive discussions.
The draft resolution on TCBMS also calls for convening at the 81st session of the UNGA a joint half day discussions forum with participants participation by representatives of the Disarmament and International Security Committee that's the First Committee and the Committee on Special and Special Political and Decolonization affairs, the Fourth Committee to consider possible problems which might pose a threat to security and sustainability in outer space. This situation, rather this provision is included in this resolution. Every two years we urge all delegations to support Russia's draft resolutions on space. In so doing, we call upon them to choose to keep outer space exclusively free for peaceful use and to lay the ground for non discriminatory access to outer space benefits and technologies and to use them for sustainable development. Distinguished Chair in closing, the Russian Federation would like to express its disappointment.
This is due to the putting for a vote draft resolutions L3 on prevention of an arms race in outer space and draft resolution L36 transparency and confidence building measures in outer space. Both of these drafts for many years were adopted by the First Committee of the UN General assembly in their entirety without a vote. We see the departure from the consensus as regards these draft resolutions as a step backward in terms of preventing an arms race in outer space. This cannot but elicit the regret on the part the regret of our delegation and I hope that all of the other delegations also experience regret at this. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of United Kingdom.
Thank you. Chair. I take the floor to introduce draft decision A C1 80L35 on responsible space behaviors. Mr. Chair in Light of the merged open ended Working Group on PAROS in all its aspects and our shared commitment to improving efficiency across the UN disarmament machinery, the UK has chosen not to table its traditional resolution this year.
Instead, this draft decision serves as a pragmatic means to keep the Responsible behaviours approach on the Committee's agenda while recognizing that Member States now have the opportunity to discuss and agree potential norms alongside other paras measures within the current oewg. I would like to put on record Once again the UK's deep appreciation to the core group for their collaborative approach to establishing the OEWG at last year's Unger First Committee. I also want to express my delegation's disappointment that proponents of some resolutions under this cluster this year felt unable to welcome the commencement of substantive work within the OEWG. Mr. Chair, endorsed by 162 member states last year, the Responsible Behaviours approach remains central to our collective efforts to ensure space remains safe, secure and sustainable.
We firmly believe that norms of responsible behaviour are essential to reducing misunderstanding and mitigating the risk of conflict in an increasingly contested space environment. And we're pleased that they remain on the OEWG's agenda. The United Kingdom urges all States to vote in favor of this decision. Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I take the floor to illustrate our view as a main co sponsor with Sri Lanka of Resolution L3 on the Prevention of arms race in outer space. Space this resolution was and still is presented by two countries of the Global south to affirm three points. First, that outer space is not a property of a single state.
Second, that activities within outer space and the legal regime governing it shall not be exclusively monopolized by states with major state capabilities with major space capabilities. Third, and most importantly, that outer space should be preserved as a peaceful domain for all humankind where benefits of exploring it should accrue to all nations irrespective of their level of economic development. On that backdrop, it comes to us with great disappointment that this year the resolution has been put for a vote despite its historical consensual nature. The main spirit of this resolution lies in its call for preserving the peaceful nature of outer space in line with outer Space Treaty 1967 through the Prevention of an arms race in outer space by all possible and viable means, be that through TCBMs, rules and principles of responsible behavior or multilateral instruments without prejudice to their nature as contained in Op. 7 of the resolution.
These expectations are not and should not be a matter of contention or debate. These expectations should be the cardinal principles to which we shall abide in respect. Mr. Chair. Violations to our existing rules and laws, including testing weapons and missiles in outer space, shall not be a pretext for us to do away with existing regimes or halt our efforts to upgrade and improve these regimes.
Accordingly, I call upon the general membership to vote in favor of L3 and uphold our commitment to a safe, stable outer space free of weapons. Thank you so much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. Give now the floor to the distinguished representative of belagrous.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Belarus advocates for the support for strengthening the development and universalization of multilateral mechanisms designed to prevent the weaponization of outer space, which seek to prevent outer space from turning into an arena for weapons or hostilities. That is why we supported the following L3 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space L36, transparency and confidence building measures in outer space L37, no first placement of weapons in outer space and L38, further practical measures to prevent an armed race in outer space. We call upon all member States to support the relevant drafts. Turning now to draft resolution L37 and L38, we support all of the paragraphs that were put to a separate vote.
We strongly support the provisions that seek to encourage joint efforts to craft a common future for all of humanity. We are steadfast supporters of the Russian and Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space and against the use of threat of force against outer space objects. We cannot Support draft resolution L35 on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors. During the previous session we voted against this draft resolution. Our reasons are clear and understandable.
We have always prioritized the development of unambiguous, binding and coordinated international legal instruments. Intergovernmental treaties that regulate the interaction of states in outer space in the context of the concepts of the so called rules and principles of responsible behavior. They. They are ambiguous and they could undermine the efforts of states to develop concrete norms and agreements in outer space. Belarus will adhere to its consistent position as regards to this draft decision.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative Bergus. Before the Committee proceeds to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions in Cluster three. We will hear from delegations wishing to explain their position on those drafts.
I recognize the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.
Mr. Chairman, Russia, as a sponsor of a number of initiatives seeking to prevent an arms race in outer space. Welcomes any ideas that could contribute to preserving outer space free from any type of weapons and that could prevent outer space from turning into another arena for tensions and armed conflict. We're prepared to discuss them and to work on them with all interested parties, all interested states. Our principal position has remained steadfast achieving this. This goal can be done only through developing an international legally binding instrument that would be comprehensive and that would seek to prevent an arms race in outer space.
As for the British initiative which was presented in draft resolution L35, we can only reaffirm that its entire contains a huge number of loopholes. In the context of responsible behavior in space is superfluous and artificial given its context in preventing an arms race in outer space. According to paragraph 12 of a resolution on reducing outer space threats on the rules and principles of responsible behavior. This concept calls for addressing the prevention of an arms race in outer space by combining legally binding international instruments and non binding measures. In essence, what is being reproduced is something that already exists.
A regimen that requires parallel work on legal and political commitments in terms of ensuring outer space security with the understanding that the latter will supplement but not replace the former. So the rules of responsible behavior are not a universally recognized category of international law. They are subjective and they require development of a common notion of by whom and based on what criteria will they be determined. And is the behavior of a particular participation participant in outer space activity responsible or not? The international community on the whole has determined how to prevent an arms race in outer space.
Right now we need to implement this approach in practice. This is what joint efforts are aimed at at the Conference on Disarmament and in the context of the OAWG created pursuant to the General assembly resolution. Considering that the work of these organizations are aimed at substantive recommendations, Great Britain's initiative runs counter to these other initiatives. Implementing it will not resolve the key task of preventing an armed space in outer space. And it won't maintain international peace and security.
Instead, it will only increase indeterminacy and escalating tensions in outer space. We believe that this has been proposed with only one to focus the attention of UN Member States on in order to put paros to fob it off into secondary fora and to be and and to act to the detriment of other countries. The development of legally binding instruments would be put off indefinitely or completely blocked. What the proponents of this initiative are doing and a number of Western countries are doing is preserving space as an arena for confrontation and an area for possible hostilities. That is, they're in essence legitimizing the possible use of of force in the conduct of military operations in outer space.
And also they have doctrines that aim to place weapons in orbit, ensuring their supremacy and domination. That fact only confirms our fears. Given the artificial and non productive nature of this initiative and the fact that it is not related to preventing an arms race in outer space, and given the fact that it's not related to legally binding international instruments, we don't. Russia doesn't agree with the inclusion of this item on the agenda and we call for voting against L35. We will vote against it and we call upon others to follow suit.
Thank you.
I thank you. The distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I give now the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I take the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft decision L35 entitled Reducing Space Threat through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behavior. The threat of an arm race in outer space, once considered a distant concern, has now become a stark and alarming reality. To effectively address this grave challenge, the international community must move beyond politically motivated narratives and voluntary norms.
What is urgently required is a comprehensive, legally binding instrument on Paris. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, though historic, is no longer adequate to ensure the peaceful use of outer space. It contains no prohibition on the placement of weapons in orbit, nor does it regulate the expanding range of military activities now taking place in this domain. The emerging threat posed by mega Constellations and commercial space actors clearly illustrate the growing regulatory gap. The rapid expansion of private operators, often acting in close coordination with certain governments, has blurred the line between civilian and military space activities.
Under the pretext of commercial innovation and responsible behavior, these actors are now directly enabling military operations, thereby undermining collective efforts to preserve outer space as a peaceful and cooperative environment. A particularly serious case occurred during the unlawful aggression of the Israeli regime against Iran in June 2025, when weapons systems, including UAVs and aircraft, relied extensively on satellite based communication, communications and Internet services provided by Starlink Constellation. The use of such commercial systems in supporting armed attacks resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure demonstrates the direct involvement of mega Constellations in military operations and war crimes. Even more alarming are projects such as Star Shield and Golden Doom, which explicitly aims to militarize space and operationalize weapons systems in orbit. Moreover, despite the clear prohibition of the International Telecommunications Union, the operator of Starlink has repeatedly provided unauthorized services within Iran's southern territory.
Following Iran's formal complaint, the ITU Radio Regulation Board ruled in favor of Iran, demanding immediate cessation of these activities. Yet the operator and its licensing state have ignored this legally binding decision, continuing to act in defiance of international regulations. Such behavior reveals the double standard of those who lecture others on responsibility while violating international law themselves. Beyond legal violations, unauthorized satellite services pose d deep political and social threats being used to distort public opinion, interfere in domestic affairs and undermine national identity and sovereignty. This hybrid use of space assets, combining military intelligence and psychological operations, represents a dangerous new dimension of space militarization that current international law fails to address.
This situation underscores the urgent necessity necessity of negotiating a legally binding parus instrument capable of addressing both traditional and emerging threats, including those arising from commercial systems. Only through such a framework can the safety, security and sustainability of outer space be guaranteed for all nations on the basis of equality, transparency and respect for sovereignty. Outer space is the common heritage of humankind, not a domain for a few powers and corporations to dominate. The RAF decision L35, like its predecessors, fails to address the real drivers of insecurity in outer space and continues to rely on selective and politicized notions of responsible behavior. It deliberately diverts attention from the need for a binding legal regime and therefore cannot contribute to genuine stability of disarmament in space.
For these reasons, the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran remains unchanged. We will once again vote against draft decision L35. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iran. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Denmark.
Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union with the alignment of the candidate countries, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Bosnia Herzegovina and the after country, Iceland, Member of the European Economic Area as well as San Marino and Canada. To explain our vote against the proposals contained in L37 no first placement of weapons in outer space and L38 further practical measures on the prevention of an arms space arms race in outer space.
The EU and its member states are actively engaged in promoting the preservation of a stable, safe and secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutable acceptable basis for all. We remain strongly committed to the prevention of an armistice in outer space, thus safeguarding the free exploration and long term use of the space environment for peaceful purposes. We share the view that we need further practical measures for Paris in accordance with the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty as it is also set out in the final document of the first SSOD in 1978. Such measures can be a combination of legally binding and non legally binding ones. And should cover all aspects of parags, including the prevention of the outbreak of a conflict in outer space.
Draft Resolution L38, however, leaves ambiguity on definition regarding the question of what constitutes a weapon in space. Almost every object could in one way or another be considered a weapon if used in an aggressive manner. In the same vein, draft resolution L38 fails to address the reality of growing threats emanating from Earth to peace and stability in space. Also, given the rapidly evolving space activities and threats, we do not believe that legally binding prohibitions would be the only tool to curb those. They can be addressed through a combination of legally binding and non legally binding measures, while reaffirming the importance of developing verifiable legally binding instruments in this field.
The EU and its Member States believe that developing norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors is the most pragmatic and immediate way forward to make progress on Paris and improve space security. Only through considering various format measures measures can we build common understanding on key concepts and objectives and eventually building on this, consider the negotiation of legally binding instruments on Paris, avoiding as much as possible duplication of efforts and redundancy of action. We hope to discuss these issues extensively at the upcoming substantive session of the Open Ended Working Group on Paris in all its efforts aspects. As per his mandate adopted last year, our goal is to reach a synthesis of different narratives there in the interest of all which this Draft Resolution does not help in our view. Mr.
Chair, with regards to draft resolution L37, our position has been known for many years and remained unchanged. We stress that the no first placement approach neither addresses the difficulties, the difficult issues of defining what a weapon in outer space is, which continues to make this resolution ineffective, nor does it address threats from the malign use of space system to interfere with other space systems. Ambiguities regarding the use of certain objects and regarding intentions on their use could lead to misinterpretations, misunderstanding and miscalculations, and could consequently increase the risk of conflict in space. Again, we expect substantial in detail discussion on this matter at the upcoming substantial session of the Open ended Working Group on Paris in all its aspects. Furthermore, with space being increasingly contested and congested, we remain concerned about the continued deployment and testing of anti satellite weapons and the repeated threats by the Russian Federation to target commercial satellites.
We underline the importance of addressing such dangerous and highly destabilizing actions promptly, comprehensively and as part of international efforts to prevent an armed race in outer space, something that this resolution does not do sufficiently. Mr. Chair, again this background and as per resolution 77 41. The EU welcomes the international commitment commitments made by an increasing number of UN member states not to conduct destructive direct ascent and to the satellite missile tests, including all EU member states. This contributes to building the necessary confidence between states to reach our overarching goal of Paris.
The EU member states will vote against these two resolutions and call on other member states to do the same. I thank you, Chair.
I thank you, the distinguished representative of Denmark. Distinguished delegates, we do not have enough time to start voting on proposals under Cluster 3. I shall therefore now call on delegations who have requested right to reply. May I remind members that the statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I call on the representative of China to take the floor.
Mr. Chair, in the Evo V just made, the US delegation continued to distort and discredit China's nuclear policy and modernization of our national defense forces, which the Chinese delegation resolutely rejects. So we have no choice but to exercise our right of reply. China wishes to reiterate that its nuclear policy and intentions are very clear and remain highly stable, continuous and predictable. China is the only nuclear weapons state that pursues a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, advocates that nuclear weapons should not be used and nuclear wars should not be fought.
We pursue unconditional negative security assurance policy and we have not and will not engage in any forms of arms race in the past or in the future. China will continue to actively support and participate in international arms control, disarmament and non proliferation process. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that bilateral dialogue must be based on respect for each other's interests and concerns. The US should adopt a rational and pragmatic attitude, meet China halfway, take practical actions to create national conditions and atmosphere for the dialogue instead of provoking China on issues related to China's core interests while requesting China to engage in dialogues. The US as one of the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, has turned a blind eye to the international consensus on nuclear disarmament and together with certain countries hyped fabricated narrative of so called three states with the largest nuclear arsenals.
China formally opposes to this irresponsible approach which completely contradicts the facts. China's nuclear forces are not in the same league with the two largest nuclear weapon states which possesses more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons and it is unfair, unreasonable and feasible to ask China to participate in trilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. China will continue to actively participate in international nuclear disarmament efforts but will not agree to or accept any coercion. China wishes to remind the U.S. delegation that it is the United States that has invested trillions of dollars in recent years in upgrading its nuclear triad, vigorously developing new types of nuclear weapons and lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. It is the United States has continued to undermine the international arms treaty control system over the years by withdrawing from the ABM and IMF treaty and other legal instrument armed control and delaying the negotiation on extension mentioned the new Starts treaty and have repeatedly made irresponsible nuclear related statements.
It is the United States has deployed nuclear weapons aboard, enhances extended deterrence and attempts to replicate the nuclear sharing arrangement in Asia Pacific region. Engaging cooperation on nuclear submarine involving the transfer of weapon grade nuclear materials to non nuclear weapon states continues to push for deployment of global anti missile system and Deploys land based IRMs on the main regional and global strategic balance and stability.
We urge the United States to do some soul searching and self reflection instead of blaming China and diverting international attention. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the representative of China for his intervention. I give the floor now to the representative of the Russian Federation.
Mr. Chairman, we flatly reject the baseless allegations leveled by Western countries in terms of the implementation of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russian Federation is a responsible party to this Convention and we are fully abiding by the commitments we've taken on here. In this context, we reaffirm that chemical means chemical riot control efforts are not in the Russian armed forces. Their use is not in keeping with the tasks set in hostilities. However, we wish to note the growing number of provocations with the use of toxic chemicals.
These are organized by the Special Services of Ukraine and they're receiving support from abroad. This is possible due to the broad action access by Ukrainian armed groups of special chemicals that were produced both in Ukraine and they've been used in Ukraine and in the Donetsk and Lugansk territories of the Russian Federation and in the temporarily controlled areas of Kursk Oblast in the Russian Federation. I want to recall that the Russian Federation regularly provides to the OPCW and to the UN Security Council information that is technically and scientifically backed up and which shows the systematic use by Ukrainian regime armed groups against Russian soldiers and against civilians of toxic chemicals and also chemical riot control agents. We will continue to document these these crimes, our end goal being to hold to account their perpetrators and those who aid and abet them. Mr. Chairman, the Russian Federation also rejects all of the empty and baseless insinuations that we've heard about the outer space activities of our country.
The activities of our country in exploration and use of outer space are carried out in accordance with our international commitments and exclusively for peaceful purposes. They do not threaten the activities of any state. Other states in outer space we strictly abide by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which is the cornerstone of international outer space law. And we also adhere to other agreements in this realm. Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty clearly bans the launching into near Earth orbit of any nuclear weapons or any other types of WMDs.
Establishing and deploying this sort of weapon in outer space in any other way is also banned under the treaty and we are stringently abiding by this provision. No confirmation, including at the level of the UN Security Council is required by the Outer Space Treaty and the There should be no direct or indirect revision of the Outer Space Treaty or any other outer space agreements. These absurd conjectures that are completely unmoored from reality are part of a propaganda campaign seeking to discredit the outer space activities of Russia and its initiative to refrain from the first placement of weapons in outer space. Our country for many years has substantially contributed to keeping out space free from weapons of any type. And we've contributed to the prevention of its transforming into yet another arena for tensions and armed conflict.
It was Russia that insisted that the member states of the UN adopt binding commitments not to deploy any type of weapons in outer space and to refrain from the use or threat of force against outer space assets or using those assets. We call for a comprehensive ban on space based strike weapons that are intended to strike outer space assets. I thank you. I thank representative of the Russian Federation for his intervention. I give now the floor to the representative of the dprk.
Thanks Chair. My delegation is compelled to tactoflow in response to the remarks of some delegations who is still talking about the denuclearization of the DPRK in the last session of cluster 1. As we clarified DPRK's position of the nuclear weapons is totally self defensive deterrence aimed at safeguarding the sovereignty and the rights Sovereignty and the rights to existence and development. From general debate to thematic discussions of this committee. DPRK delegation clarified our stance towards the so called denuclearization of the DPRK several times and we uploaded our statements on the UN General so we recommend those member states who are still arguing and dreaming about the denuclearization to read them again and study carefully.
We will show with patients that denuclearization is a pipe dream which can never be realized. Even they talk about it thousand times. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, representative of the DPRK. I give now the floor to the representative of Iran.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation categorically rejects and strongly condemns the fabrications and absurd accusations made by representative of the Israeli regime. A regime that for more than seven decades have been engaged in systematic crimes, terrorism and genocide in Palestine and across the region, with its hands stained by the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. If there is any entity in our region that has both the capacity and proven willingness to produce and use weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and nuclear, it is none other than the Israeli regime.
This is the only regime in the region that illegally possess all types of WMDs and remain outside all international instruments on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. And the reason is clear. This is a regime that has even weaponized the most basic necessities of life, water and food as tools of war and oppression. There is credible and documented evidence of the use of prohibited munitions, including white phosphorus and depleted uranium. Unifel itself has confirmed that its personnel were injured by such weapons in Lebanon, as similar reports have emerged from Gaza.
Moreover, it is both ironic and outrageous that a regime which has not acceded to any of the international instruments prohibiting weapons of mass destruction dared to level accusations against a state like Iran, a responsible party to all these conventions, fully and transparently committed to its international obligations. The world knows well who possess clandestine nuclear arsenals, who stands outside the legal framework of disarmament and non proliferation treaties, and who has turned defiance of international law into a permanent policy. The real and present threat to regional and global peace and security emanates not from those who uphold their legal obligations, but from those who systematically violate them. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the representative of Iran for this intervention. Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available to us this morning. The next meeting of the committee will be held tomorrow, Tuesday, November 4th, at 10:00am in this conference room. We will immediately take action on the draft resolution and decisions under Cluster 3 contained in Informal Paper 1 Rev. 6 the meeting is adjourned.
