First Committee, 15th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, the 15th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, you may recall that the Committee concluded its considerations of the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction at our meeting this morning. You would also recall that yesterday there was some discussions on interpreting the decision taken by the committee. That statement in the right -- in the exercise of the right of reply will be heard at the end of the day. Mr. Chair, I would like to clarify how I intend to proceed. At the end of today's meeting and in keeping with the decisions of the Committee at its organizational meeting, there will be an opportunity for statements in the exercise of the right of reply. First, there were some delegations who were unable to exercise their right of reply this morning for second interventions on the cluster relating to nuclear weapons. First, we will hear from them. We will next hear from the delegations requesting to exercise the right of reply on the remaining clusters. We shall proceed accordingly. The Committee will now begin its thematic discussions on the outer space. The first speaker on the list is distinguished representative of Indonesia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The full statement of this statement will be submitted to the Secretariat. Mr. Chair, NAM recognizes the common interests of all humankind and the inalienable, legitimate, sovereign rights of all states in the exploration and the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all peoples. NAM expresses its serious concern regarding the threats of international peace and security by the possible weaponization of outer space or turning outer space into a domain for warfare and armed conflict. NAM rejects the declaration by the United States in 2018 that space is a war-fighting domain or the next battlefield, and accordingly re-emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding and multilaterally verifiable instrument, inter alia, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. NAM emphasizes the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. NAM also calls for the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Non countries welcome the consensual adoption on 16 August 2024 of the report of governmental experts GGE on the substantive elements of a legally binding instrument on the prevention of arms race in outer space, as established pursuant to GA resolution 77 250. and considers this important and positive development as a key opportunity to advance further practical measures for prevention of an arms race in outer space and a good basis for further negotiations towards adopting an international legally binding instrument. NAAM also takes note of discussion on norms, rules and principles for the responsible behavior of states in outer space without prejudice to imperative of developing a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. NAAM calls upon all states to engage constructively in the OEWG to adopt further measures on the prevention of arms race in outer space. NAM underscores that voluntary TCBMs may partially contribute to reducing mistrust and enhancing the safety of outer space operations in the short term. That said, they can neither be a substitute nor precondition for the early conclusion of a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including the prohibition of the placement of any weapons in outer space, as well as the threat or use of force against outer space objects. NAM strongly urges States to refrain from any unilateral coercive measures which contravene international law and which could impede or prevent space activities for peaceful purposes by developing countries and the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the principles and treaties governing international space law. NAM continues to reaffirm the need for a universal, comprehensive, and non-discriminatory multilateral approach toward the issue of missiles in all its aspects, negotiated multilaterally within the UN. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia speaking on behalf of ASEAN.

Mr. Chair, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of ASEAN. The full statement will be made available online. ASEAN remains seriously concerned by the possible weaponization of outer space or turning outer space into a domain for warfare and armed conflicts. We reaffirm the vital importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and call on the General Assembly to continue playing a leading role in ensuring the peaceful use and exploration of outer space. ASEAN knows the importance of ongoing multilateral discussions on outer space, inter alia, within the framework of the OEWG on PAROS. We welcome progress in its three substantive sessions and look forward to the fourth. We reiterate that access to outer space is an inalienable right of all states and must be pursued solely for peaceful purposes and for the collective benefit of humanity. The OEWG is an important platform to foster common understanding on practical measures to reduce threats and prevent an arms race in outer space in order to maintain it as a peaceful, safe, stable and sustainable environment. We recall the consensus adoption of the 2024 final report of the GGE, demonstrating that differences in positions on outer space are not intractable. ASEAN supports advancing PAROS, including through non-legally binding instruments such as norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviour and practical transparency and confidence-building measures to reduce risks misunderstandings and miscalculations. Such measures can contribute towards a verifiable, legally binding instrument and should not substitute, prejudice or delay the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding and multilaterally verifiable instrument on PAROS. Relevant UN resolutions remain important political commitments supporting PAROS. ASEAN calls on all states to ensure that the use and exploration of outer space remain peaceful. The General Assembly must play a vital role in fostering continued dialogue on current issues and challenges in this field. We note the Conference on Disarmament's continued substantive consideration of PAROS, including under subsidiary body 3. We look forward to the adoption of the ASEAN declaration on space cooperation at the 49th ASEAN Summit, strengthening cooperation in space science and technological innovation, and promoting responsible, peaceful, and sustainable use of outer space. ASEAN will continue supporting regional dialogue through the ASEAN Regional Forum, whose November 2025 workshop on peace and security in outer space addressed security threats and transparency and confidence-building measures. We welcome efforts to expand on TCBMs that were discussed at that workshop, including voluntary, practical and mutually acceptable measures that may reduce risks, enhance transparency and prevent misperception and miscalculation, taking into account the legitimate security interests of all states and their inherent right to the peaceful uses of outer space. ASEAN reaffirms its collective commitment to peaceful and sustainable outer space through multilateral cooperation to address security challenges and strengthen international cooperation in its exploration and use for peaceful purposes. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia speaking on behalf of the ASEAN. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya speaking on behalf of the Arab Group.

Mr. Chair, the Arab Group reaffirms the importance of ensuring that the use of outer space will remain exclusively for peaceful purposes, and we stress the importance of prohibiting all forms of armament and conflict in outer space. bearing in mind that outer space is the common heritage of humanity. And therefore, all peaceful activities conducted there should be regulated under the United Nations in order to guarantee the principles of exclusivity and the foundation of international consensus in this vital field, and to ensure that all different countries benefit from it, regardless of their level of advancement or economic development. And this is in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty of the year 1967. The Arab Group believes that the legal framework governing outer space through the five relevant instruments has played a positive role in promoting the peaceful use of outer space. However, this legal framework now requires further development to keep pace with the rapid changes over the past decade, especially in light of the announcement by several states that they are developing capabilities either to deploy weapons in outer space or to conduct armed attacks against satellites and outer space assets. In this regard, the Arab Group believes that the development of the current legal framework must be done on two parallel tracks. The first track is to continue the development of rules and principles for responsible behavior in outer space, which remain important frameworks, albeit insufficient. The second track would be through launching a process to discuss the possibility of reaching a legally binding international instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space based on the report of the group of government experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space on the objective elements of a legally binding instrument in this regard pursuant to GA Resolution 72/250. The group stresses the importance of ensuring that the envisaged legally binding international instrument must include a prohibition on the deployment of weapons, be they offensive or defensive, in outer space, a prohibition on any armed attack against or deliberate damage to objects in outer space, a prohibition on the development or testing of any weapons or technologies intended to carry out armed attacks against objects in outer space. It should also establish mechanisms and procedures that allow for the verification of these obligations in a multilateral setting. The Arab Group emphasizes the need to strengthen international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of outer space and to work on integrating developing countries into the community of states that use and benefit from space activities and applications. This includes capacity building activities, technology transfer, and the exchange of information and expertise. In closing, the Arab Group welcomes the ongoing discussions within the framework of the newly established Integrated Open-Ended Working Group which was created by GA resolution 79/512, which contributed towards consolidating the various tracks in dealing with this vital issue in the United Nations. The group looks forward to the working group's continued consideration of the various aspects of efforts aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya, speaking on behalf of the Arab group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of European Union, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states.

I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member states. Nord Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Monaco, and San Marino aligned themselves with this statement. The EU promotes the preservation of a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space. We remain strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Threats, real and perceived, are multiplying in outer space, risking the safe and secure delivery of essential services vital for societies and global issues. Improving space security is in the interest of all states. The EU reaffirms the applicability of international law, including international humanitarian law, to outer space, the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty. All space activities must be conducted in accordance with the existing international legal framework. We encourage all to ratify the Outer Space Treaty and fully implement it. We particularly emphasize Article 4 of the OST, obliging states parties not to place in orbit nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction. which would constitute a severe breach of international law and would have severe consequences for peace and security. We welcomed the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 79/20 and deeply regret Russia's veto in the Security Council on a similar resolution. The goal of PAROS is achievable through a combination of legally binding and non-legally binding measures. We believe that developing norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior is the most pragmatic way to make progress on PaRos and improve space security. The development of non-legally binding measures does not preclude future negotiations on legally binding measures. We welcome active discussions at the third session of the OEWG on PaRos. contributing to better understanding of positions, as well as more convergence of views on some issues and increased recognition of the contribution of non-legally binding measures. We consider it important to continue to discuss threat perceptions and further steps to enhance space security. Civil society, industry, academia, and international and intergovernmental organizations need to be part of these discussions. Transparency and confidence-building measures serve as a tool for cultivating trust and forging common understandings. The HCoC sets a good example of the use of TCBMs to avoid misunderstandings and increase trust. We encourage all States to subscribe and fully implement HCoC rules. We remain open to collecting good practices to elaborate more detailed guidelines for notifications on space manoeuvres. We remain concerned about ambiguous, unfriendly or hostile activities in outer space and underline the importance of addressing potentially escalatory developments. Among the most urgent threats are destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests. The EU strongly condemned Russia's conduct of such a test in 2021 as an act of irresponsible behaviour. We welcome the commitments not to conduct these destructive tests and encourage all states to make such a commitment. We are open for the consideration of a more formal ban on these tests. The full version of this statement will be...

I thank the distinguished representative of European Union speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member state. Now I give the floor to the distinguished member of parliament of India.

India is a major spacefaring nation. Our space program has both developmental and security dimensions.

India landed a spacecraft on the moon in 2023.

We are preparing for our human spaceflight program, Gaganayana, and plan to build a national space station called the Bharatiya Antariksha Station.

India believes that outer space belongs to all of us.

We are one Earth, one family, with one future.

It is our view that our outer space should remain a realm for cooperation, not conflict. Chair. New actors are emerging in the outer space domain. Dual-use space technologies and assets are now a reality. A difference of opinion continues on approaches to preventing an arms race in outer space, or PAROS.

And on which approach should take priority chair India reiterates its preferences for a legally binding instrument on peros one that is universally acceptable ver verifiable and multilaterally negot negotiated at the conference on disarmament we take.

A note of the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space as a basis.

For further discussion India is open to Universal.

And non-discriminatory, non-binding norms and transparency and confidence-building measures. These can complement and but not substitute a legally binding instrument. India notices, India notes that threats to the safety, security and sustainability of outer space, the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation and the threshold for what constitutes use of force in outer space must all be considered together a selective focus on some threats or others would be counterproductive verifying space Behavior including access to relevant information and data also poses

real challenges mandates of various for focusing on space security safety and sustainability must be respected overlaps and the creation of multiple standards on the same set of issues should be.

Chair, as a developing country, India believes that any.

Outcome of this process must not discourage the exchange of scientific and technological research for peaceful, legitimate purposes.

India stands ready to help strengthen the international legal framework governing outer space and to ensure its peaceful use while enhancing safety, security and sustainability.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished member of parliament of India. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Italy.

Thank you, Chair. We align ourselves with the statement by the European Union, and I want to add the following. Outer space security has become an increasingly urgent priority. Preserving a safe, secure, and sustainable space environment is essential, not only for international peace and security, but also for protecting the technological progress. Our societies increasingly depend on space-based infrastructures and services for communications, navigation, transportation, weather forecasting, disaster management, and countless other aspects of daily life, including banking. Ensuring space security is therefore a wide common interest. Against this background, Italy strongly reaffirms the centrality of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Outer space must be explored and used for the benefit of all countries without national appropriation. Weapons of mass destruction must not be placed in orbit or otherwise stationed in outer space, and the moon and other celestial bodies must be used exclusively for peace, peaceful purposes. Chair, Italy believes that preventing an arms race in outer space requires a pragmatic and progressive approach. Norms, rules, and principles addressing behaviors and activities in outer space can respond to immediate security concerns, reduce the risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and help build confidence. These approaches are not alternatives, but complementary. At the same time, the civilian, commercial, and security dimension of space activities are increasingly interconnected. Italy, therefore, attaches particular importance to strengthening synergies among different international fora, avoiding unnecessary duplication. Geneva and Vienna have distinct mandates, but the work can and should reinforce each other. Italy continues to engage actively in the open-ended working group on the prevention of arms race in outer space in all its aspects under the leadership of Ambassador Carlos of Argentina. At the same time, Italy has the honor of sharing co-ops for the 2026-2027 term. We should encourage appropriate channels of communication between these processes and engagement with other relevant actors. Cheers. In some areas, I lost my text. In some areas, discussions have already reached a significant degree of maturity. We should build on this convergence and translate into concrete progress. Once such area is destructive, direct descent, and anti-satellite missile testing. Italy reiterates its support for the commencement of negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting such tests. The entirety of this statement will be.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative to the CD of Italy. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Angola.

Outer space must remain a domain of peace, cooperation, and scientific advancement, serving the interests of all humanity, rather than become an arena for military confrontation or geopolitical competition. Mr. Chair, I would like to address three points today. First, the increasing militarization of outer space presents a serious threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. The deployment of weapon in space, the development of anti-satellite capability, and the potential targeting of civilian space infrastructure threaten not only global stability, but also essential service upon which millions of people depends. International security in outer space cannot be achieved through unilateral actions alone. Existing international space law must be fully respected by all nations, regardless of their level of technological development or military capability. Prevention of arms race in outer space. We must work to strengthen multilateral cooperation to effectively prevent an arms race in outer space and work to promote transparency and build confidence through meaningful dialogue and multilateral cooperation. We must also make sure that benefit of specific technology contributes to peace, development and prosperity for all humanity. Third, benefit of space exploration must be accessible and equally shared by all nations. Access to space technology should not become another source of global inequality. Instead, it must contribute to sustainable development, scientific research, economic growth, environmental protection, and the improvement of living conditions for all people on Earth. We support and ask international cooperation in satellite communication, earth observation, capacity building, technology transfer on mutually agreed terms, and the training of young scientific and scientist engineers. These efforts, Mr. Chair, can help developing countries strengthen their technological capability and address challenges such as climate change, natural disaster, food insecurity, and digital divide. Mr. Chair, Angola stands ready to cooperate with all member states in promoting secure, sustainable, inclusive, and peaceful outer space for all. Angola aligns itself with the statement delivered by India on behalf of NAM and the statement that will be delivered by Namibia on behalf of the African Group. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Angola. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia, speaking on behalf of the African group.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The African group aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The group statement, full statement, will be shared via e-statement. Mr. Chair, The outer space and other celestial bodies must continue to be regarded and safeguarded as a common heritage of humankind and must be used, explored and utilized for peaceful purposes for the benefit and interest of all member states irrespective of their social, economic or scientific development. The African group stresses the importance of the prevention of an arms race in outer space through a legally binding instrument that would complement the international legal framework in a manner that allows for the equal exploration of outer space based on the principles of non-appropriation and peaceful uses of outer space in conformity with United Nations treaties governing space activities, in particular the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Mr. Chair, the group welcomes the General Assembly's resolution 80/19 on prevention of an arms race in outer space. 80/20 on non-first placement of weapons in outer space, and 80/21 on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. These resolutions reaffirm the importance and urgency of the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space and the willingness of all states to contribute to reaching these common goals. We also welcome resolution 80/44 on the transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, which reaffirms that preventing an arms race in outer space is in the interest of maintaining international peace and security. The African Group welcomes the establishment of a new consolidated open-ended working group on the prevention of arms race in outer space in all its aspects pursuant to the General Assembly resolution 79/512 as a way to avoid duplication in work and efforts. In this context, the groups unequivocally wishes to stress the urgent need for outer planet, including outer space, to be free of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and indeed all kinds of weapons, as their presence constitute an existential threat to global peace and security, as well as the survival of humanity. The African Group expresses concern that the uncontrolled use of satellites in low Earth orbit, including large-scale satellite constellations, poses significant challenges to outer space security and efforts to preserve it. The Group underscores the urgent need to address the implications of such systems for the security and long-term sustainability of outer space activities. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia speaking on behalf of the African group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.

Thanks, Chairperson. Egypt wishes to highlight the following five points. First, the centrality of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the imperative that its state parties carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security, and including through refraining from installing weapons in outer space, regardless of their nature and purpose. Outer space should remain a platform exclusively used for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. Second, the need for reviewing our international legal framework in outer space to cope with the development over the past four decades, particularly speaking and without prejudice to the value of TCBMs and the set of norms and principles for responsible state behavior. As an interim measure in this regard, there is a need for convening a discussion on the possibility of formulating legally binding measures and a legally binding instrument in this regard, particularly on the prevention of arms race in outer.

Space from all its aspects. Third.

The importance of putting more emphasis on the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation and the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Take into account the needs of developing countries and with the aim of bridging the digital divide, including through technology transfer and capacity building. Fourth, Egypt supports continuing the discussions within the newly consolidated working group establish in accordance with resolution 79/512 and in line with its agreed agenda and indicative timetable for the period 2025-2028, including through building upon the report of the GGE contained in the document A/79/364. Fifth and finally, Egypt has once more, with Sri Lanka, tabled the traditional joint annual omnibus draft resolution entitled prevention of an arms race in outer space. And we look forward to the support and the co-sponsorship of member states to this draft resolution.

Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Costa Rica.

Gracias, senor.

Thank you, Mr. President. Our growing reliance on space technologies compels us to ask an essential question. Do we want outer space to mirror the confrontations seen on Earth, or should it remain a realm of cooperation for all of humanity? To address this, Costa Rica offers the following reflections. First, we must preserve space for peaceful, safe, and sustainable purposes. Space systems underpin communications, navigation, climate action, and disaster response. Protecting them is a matter of strategic stability as well as a matter of human security and development. Second, preventing an arms race requires moving beyond the mere statement of principles towards concrete measures. Costa Rica views the development of norms for responsible behavior and the negotiation of legally binding obligations as complementary efforts, in particular It supports the universalization of norms against the use and destructive testing of direct ascent and anti-satellite missiles, as well as efforts toward their legally binding prohibition. Third, artificial intelligence is transforming space activities. While it can enhance Earth observation, space traffic management, and emergency response, It also introduces risks related to autonomy, bias, cybersecurity, and data manipulation. Its use must be guided by transparency, accountability, human oversight, and data integrity. Finally, space governance must be truly inclusive. Developing countries are increasingly dependent on space services, yet they often lack adequate access to data, technical capabilities, or computational infrastructure. Capacity building must enable them to benefit from these technologies and to participate in shaping the rules that will govern them. The principles set forth in Resolution 2222 and the Outer Space Treaty, which ensure that the exploration and use of space are carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all States, cannot be fully realized without diverse inclusive and representative participation, including the equitable inclusion of women, in all such endeavors. Mr. President, when designing public policy, there should be no artificial separation between Earth and space. The sustainability of the space environment, including the mitigation of space debris, the management of space traffic, and the potential exploitation of space resources, must be addressed with the same level of ambition applied to the protection of global commons here on Earth. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Costa Rica. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Germany.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Germany aligns itself with the statement just delivered by the European Union. Outer space remains one of the most dynamic domains and is becoming one of the foundational pillars for all aspects of our common civilization. Therefore, maintaining stability and avoiding escalation in outer space is an absolute priority for Germany. Since we last met in this committee, states and private actors have made important achievements in their space programs, including on launch capabilities, reusability, and satellite systems for both civilian and military purposes. it is clear that the trend towards increasing counter space capabilities continues as well. Against the backdrop of these developments, it is all the more imperative to drive forward our work on identifying measures to reduce risks and preserve stability in, as well as access to outer space for all. For this reason, Germany remains firmly committed to the open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects with its mandate laid down in decision 79/512. Germany firmly stands behind its comprehensive approach combining binding and non-binding measures, addressing both capabilities as well as behaviors in outer space. We welcome the progress made in this year's session under the able stewardship of Ambassador Carlos Foradori of Argentina, where States discussed their respective threat perceptions, made concrete.

Proposals and identified potential common ground.

We look forward to the Chair's briefing tomorrow.

We call on all States to continue this important.

Work and to refrain from undermining the inclusive mandate of the Group that brings together all proposed approaches. We particularly welcome discussions on the commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests, and would like to reiterate our call on all States that haven't done so to join this commitment. Chair, at the United Nations we come together from all parts of the world, crossing oceans, mountains and borders. In outer space, there are no borders. We are all direct neighbors. Let's keep this in mind and let us come together in a cooperative spirit to preserve.

The benefits of space for all nations.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Germany. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada.

Thank you, Chair.

Outer space has never been more important to our collective security and prosperity. The satellites and space enabled services upon which we all depend, support communications, disaster response and economic activity worldwide. Yet these benefits face growing pressures amid heightened international tensions and evolving security challenges. In this environment, building confidence, reducing risks and maintaining channels of communication are essential for Canada. This reality underscores the urgency of preventing conflict in outer space and preserving the domain for peaceful purposes. Chair, even where states may hold differing views on longer term approaches to PAROS, we all share an interest in reducing the risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation. Practical measures that enhance predictability, improve information sharing, and support dialogue can help reduce these risks and enhance stability. Canada therefore strongly supports the open-ended working group on PAROS. Canada welcomes the strong engagement and concrete proposals advanced during the most recent OEWG session.

These efforts contribute to preserving outer space as a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable domain, and we look

forward to continuing these discussions.

Mr. Chairman, Canada remains convinced that legally binding and non-legally binding measures are mutually reinforcing and complementary measures to advancing objectives related to preventing an arms race in outer space. The history of space governance demonstrates this clearly. Political commitments, norms, and voluntary measures have helped shape the evolution of international frameworks, and fostered cooperation amongst states. In the presently increasingly complex security environment, it is more important than ever before to adopt practical risk reduction measures alongside discussions of legally binding instruments. Canada remains committed to working with all partners in order to maintain outer space as a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable domain. By adopting concrete measures to reduce risks today, we can help to create the conditions for stronger cooperation tomorrow and ensure that outer space continues to benefit present and future generations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Canada. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway.

Next year, sorry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Next year marks the 60th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty, and full compliance with the treaty remains as important as ever. at least its obligation not to place in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Now, we're increasingly concerned about the growing development of counter space and anti-satellite systems and the lack of transparency around such activities. Space-based services are increasingly indispensable to our modern societies. And destruction, disruption, or degradation of such services could have serious consequences. Mr. Chairman, greater transparency and confidence-building measures should be an integral part of our effort to prevent an arms race in outer space. Indeed, increased transparency regarding military space capabilities, doctrines, and activities can help reduce mistrust and the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The Hague Code of Conduct provides an important example of practical transparency and confidence-building measures, and we encourage broader adherence to it. Mr. Chairman, we welcome the Open-Ended Working Group's progress in terms of taking forward its important mandate. Its work is needed more than ever, And we should properly address space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior. Threat reduction should be our primary objective. Now, this approach continues to offer a way towards a legally binding instrument, political commitments, or both. Mr. Chairman, the importance of outer space continues to increase, and so too does the importance of maintaining its security. On the doorstep of 2027, we should all renew our efforts to ensure that we preserve space as a peaceful, safe, stable, secure, and sustainable environment for the benefit of all. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kenya.

Thank you, Chair. The benefits derived from all the space satellite-enabled services have become integral to national development efforts supporting sustainable development, economic growth, and human security. However, limited access to space situational awareness capabilities hampers the ability to effectively monitor and respond to hazards such as orbital debris and uncontrolled reentries. These challenges underscore the need for enhanced international cooperation and capacity building. They also call for targeted partnership, technology sharing, and access to relevant data to close existing infrastructure and knowledge gaps. Kenya is investing practical solutions and regional capability, capacity through stronger data sharing and the tracking capabilities and expertise in space law, policy, and governance. Through initiatives such as the forthcoming regional space law technical advisory mission at the Marine Space Center, scheduled for November 2026, we strive to strengthen African participation in space governance. The growing number of space actors together with the expanding use of dual-use technologies and visual intelligence, cyber capabilities, increases the potential for miscalculation and escalation in outer space. We reiterate that human responsibility and meaningful oversight must remain central to all decision that security implications. Kenya recognizes the role of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the complementary disarmament efforts to prevent an arm race in outer space. We support the development and implementation of norms, rules, and the principles of responsible behavior that enhance predictability, reduce risks, and strengthen strategic stability through effective and verifiable measures, including legally binding instruments. The future of our outer space should be divined not by strategic competition or exclusion, but by cooperation and responsibility and shared progress. We therefore support strong international and regional cooperation, including through the African Space Agency, to ensure that outer space remains a peaceful, secure, stable, and sustainable domain for present and the future generations. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka.

- Alliance itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to add the following remarks in a national capacity. Today, our lives increasingly depend on space-based technologies and services. This growing reliance underscores the importance of preserving outer space as a domain of peaceful use and international cooperation. Sri Lanka has long recognized outer space as the common heritage of humanity. Mr. Chair, we strongly believe that activities in outer space should be guided by the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, particularly Article 2. We further call for all activities in outer space to align with the existing provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Sri Lanka has worked for the prevention of an arms race in outer space for decades.

Together with Egypt, we continue to bring the annual

First Committee resolution on PAROS before this body, reflecting our continued commitment to this objective. I invite all States to co-sponsor and support this resolution.

Mr. Chair, voluntary norms, guidelines and TCBMs are also vital in building confidence towards ultimate goal.

but they cannot be a substitute for legally binding and verifiable treaty architecture to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space. We welcome the work of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. These distinct approaches of this working group can lay the foundation for a shared goal of prevention of arms races in outer space. Mr. Chair.

It is important that international frameworks relating to outer space also keep pace with rapidly evolving space technologies.

Any future framework should be broad enough to address emerging developments that could contribute to an arms race in outer space. This mechanism will need to be credible and adaptable and able to keep pace with the technological and operational developments in the space domain. At the same time, the pursuit of security must never hinder the legitimate peaceful use of outer space by developing nations. Mr. Chair, in space domain, humanity still holds an opportunity we have to often let slip here in North,

to prevent an arms race before it takes hold.

We should not regard conflict in outer space as inevitable, simply because technology has made it possible. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina.

Thank you, Mr. President. Argentina reaffirms that the Treaty on the Principles that should govern activities of states in exploration and the use of outer space of 1967 is the cornerstone of the international legal regime governing space. Its Article 4, which prohibits the placing of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction, should be fully upheld. In 2024, our country co-sponsored, together with the United States and Japan, resolution 79/18, entitled "Weapons of mass destruction in outer space," which was adopted with broad support. We reiterate the commitment that space must remain free of nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction. We reiterate our commitment to the Hague Code of Conduct against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and urge states that have not yet done so to accede to this code of conduct. At the national level, Argentina continues to develop its space capabilities for peaceful purposes. In addition to the development of nanosatellites, we're continuing to work on the satellite SABYMR for ocean and coastal observation. Its launch is scheduled for 2027. These advances contribute to maritime security, environmental management, and sustainable development in the framework of international cooperation. The growing dependence on space-related services and increase of state and non-state actors make it urgent to prevent an arms race. Our contribution to this is the chairmanship of the open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in Geneva. In this context, we value the start of a substantive debate, and we hope to continue working together to reach consensus with the active participation of all stakeholders. Mr. President, Argentina is convinced that outer space must be used for the benefit of all of humanity and exclusively for peaceful purposes. We will continue working constructively towards this objective. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The weaponization of and an arms race in outer space have become a real threat. The United States has defined the outer space as a war-fighting domain and openly acknowledged the deployment of space control weapons on orbit, sending an extremely dangerous signal to the international community. The acute contradiction between the aspiration of the overwhelming majority of states to safeguard space security and the pursuit of one country for hegemony in outer space represents the greatest challenge. China proposes the following. First, perils and preventing the organization of the outer space should be the most urgent task of space security governance. Without resolving this fundamental issue, other rules governing outer space will be undermined. All states should uphold the proposition that space war cannot be won and must never be fought. No state could seek to dominate outer space nor engage in great power competition or confrontation in outer space. Second, international efforts to negotiate and conclude an arms control treaty on outer space must be strengthened. Facts have proven that voluntary measures cannot stop the organization of outer space. The PPWT draft proposed by China and Russia is currently the only proposal on table for a legally binding instrument on outer space arms control. We welcome all parties' efforts to discuss and refine the BBWT text, make good use of the report of GGE and OEWG, and contribute more substantive elements to the legally binding instrument on outer space arms control. Third, we must uphold multilateral consultations and oppose double standards. Rules for outer space should be jointly developed by all countries. We must not create small cliques or exclusive arrangements. We should also actively promote international cooperation on the peaceful use of outer space. Selective arms control, while turning blind eyes to the deployment of weapons in orbit are not conducive for safeguarding the peace and security in outer space. Fourth, governance on emerging issues must be prioritized. We need to conduct in-depth research into the legal disputes and practical problems arising from the commercial aerospace actors intervening in armed conflicts of other states and put forward viable governance solutions based on extensive consultations. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Namibia aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group. We thank you for your stewardship at a moment when the aspiration to a peaceful use of outer space is facing unprecedented strain. With significant advances in technology, outer space has become indispensable to sustainable development climate monitoring, disaster management, agriculture, connectivity, and the daily functioning of modern societies. For developing countries like Namibia, space-based technologies are critical tools for achieving the sustainable development goals and strengthening resilience. Yet, the very domain that supports global progress is increasingly threatened by the accelerating militarization of outer space Namibia is deeply concerned by the growing number of military doctrines, capabilities, and activities that risk transforming outer space into a theater of conflict. The testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons and development of outer space capabilities and the absence of legally binding norms to prevent the arms race in outer space undermine international peace and security. These actions jeopardize the long-term sustainability of outer space and place all nations at heightened risk. NABARI affirms that outer space must remain a domain used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We call for the negotiations of an international legally binding instrument to prevent this dangerous trend, prohibiting the placement of any weapon in outer space and strengthening transparency and confidence-building measures. The current reliance on voluntary guidelines is insufficient in the face of rapidly evolving threats. We also stress the importance of equitable access to outer space. The benefits of outer space of space science, technology and applications must be shared fairly. Namibia calls for the removal of discriminatory barriers that prevent developing countries from accessing space-related technologies for peaceful purposes, including for climate adaptation, environmental protection, agriculture and early warning systems. Mr Chair, the future of outer space depends on the collective responsibility Namibia urges Member States, particularly those with advanced space capabilities, to demonstrate restraint, listen to the voices in this Committee, uphold the principles of the UN Charter and engage constructively in multilateral processes. As a peace-loving nation, Namibia wants outer space to remain global commons for benefit of all humanity. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Namibia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Chile.

Thank you, Mr. President. Chile is convinced that the use of outer space must be peaceful, sustainable, and for the benefit and the interests of all of humanity. My country acknowledges the common interests and sovereign rights of all states in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes, independently of their level of economic or scientific development. This is why we would like to make an appeal to promote and strengthen international cooperation in the exploration and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. We would like to express our concern with regard to the threats to international peace and security derived from a possible militarization of outer space. We reject any placing of any kind of weapons in outer space, as it is primordial to prevent an arms race in outer space and its transformation into an area favorable for war and armed conflict. We are aware of the environmental and humanitarian consequences of harmful activities against space systems. We warn against environmental threats that could result from the destruction of satellites. These are actions that could lead to negative effects for the planet. Mr. President, for Chile, discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space are of particular relevance. This is in line with our foreign policy, which is geared towards defending multilateralism, prevention of conflicts, and strengthening international law, and in this specific case, the promotion of the peaceful use of outer space by all states. My country champions the existence of norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior regarding space systems. We would like to make an appeal to continue open discussions in order to exchange ideas to move towards binding and non-binding norms for a peaceful and safe outer space. Along these lines, Chile promotes greater transparency and the adoption of concrete measures to reduce risks. Lastly, would like to express our consternation regarding interference and malicious cyber activity aimed at navigation and communication satellites. We would like to make an appeal to strengthen the existing international legal framework in order to address in an effective way concerns regarding space security and rapid advances of technology. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Chile. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Netherlands.

Chair, in addition to the statement by the EU, I make the following remarks in my national capacity. It is in the interest of humankind to ensure the sustainability, safety, and security of the outer space environment. The open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects presents a unique opportunity towards this end. It is our view that our collective efforts in this group should focus on strengthening the normative framework by promoting responsible behavior in outer space. A first step could be addressing destructive debris-generating counter space activities. The debris created by such actions risks making the outer space environment, or a significant part of it, unusable for generations to come. These activities are more suitable for regulation and, through improving space situational awareness, destructive counter-space activities are easier to detect, verify, and attribute than many non-kinetic counter-space actions. Chair, Whilst essential to further develop the normative framework for outer space, it's equally important to recognize that international law already applies to activities in outer space. This includes, but is not limited to, the five UN treaties on outer space, the Charter of the United Nations, and international humanitarian law. Of these, I would like to highlight Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which, amongst others, prohibits the placements of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Placing nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapon of mass destruction in outer space would constitute a serious breach of international law and it would undermine the negotiations in the Open-ended Working Group. Chair, in promoting the normative framework and responsible behavior, it is important to recognize that non-aggressive military uses of space, including for reconnaissance, navigation, communication and surveillance, have been widespread and uncontested under the existing treaty regime. Chair, in closing, we're all astronauts of spaceship Earth, to quote the first Dutch astronaut. We share a common obligation in preserving a sustainable, secure, and safe outer space on which international peace, security, and global development depend. It's our collective duty to preserve this outer space for the benefit of humankind. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Netherlands. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia.

Mr. Chair, Malaysia associates itself to the statements delivered on behalf of NAM and ASEAN. Outer space has become indispensable to our daily lives, economic development, and collective security. Yet, as our reliance on space-based technologies deepens, so are the risks arising from growing strategic competition and the development of counter-space capabilities. Outer space must remain a domain of cooperation, not another arena of confrontation. Maintaining the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes is imperative, especially in times of rising tension and major power rivalry. Malaysia remains deeply concerned over the risk of an arms race in outer space. We firmly oppose the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against space objects. Malaysia reiterates the urgent need for an international legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. While confidence building measures have their merits, they must complement, not replace legally binding commitments. Mr. Chair, Malaysia welcomes the continued substantive deliberations of the OEWG on PAROS, including its third session held this year. We encourage all delegations to engage constructively in identifying areas of convergence and advancing practical measures to address existing and emerging space threats. Our differences in approach must not become an obstacle to our shared responsibility to prevent an arms race in outer space. In this endeavor, Malaysia reiterates the importance of an inclusive and coherent multilateral process with the equitable participation of all states, particularly developing countries. Malaysia's commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space is reflected in the full implementation of the Malaysian Space Board Act 2022, our accession to the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, and ratification of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty in 2025. Building on this momentum, Malaysia is actively preparing to ratify and accede to two additional UN space treaties. These ongoing initiatives reaffirm our commitment to international law and the responsible, safe, and sustainable use of outer space. Malaysia also recognizes the important contributions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs in strengthening international cooperation, capacity building, and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. In conclusion, Malaysia reiterates that outer space must remain a domain of peace and cooperation, not a frontier for military confrontation. Preventing an arms race in outer space is not merely an aspiration, but a collective responsibility that demands concrete actions. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.

Thank you, Chair. Today, every nation depends on space. Communications, navigation, disaster response, financial systems, and climate monitoring all rely on resilient space capability. The safe, secure, and sustainable use of outer space is a shared interest of all states. Australia welcomes this year's work in the Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Its discussions have demonstrated the value of an inclusive forum to examine space security challenges. Preventing an arms race in outer space requires us to confront the realities of today's space environment. For Australia, recent developments regarding space control capabilities support the case for responsible behaviours and practical measures. Transparency, observable conduct, risk reduction, crisis communication, safe operations and protection of civilian services enable us to maintain a safe and stable space environment as new capabilities come online. Australia welcomes greater transparency about space and counter space capabilities and encourages all countries to commit to this norm. Absent responsible and transparent behaviors, dual use capabilities can heighten tensions, create ambiguity, and increase miscalculation risks. Managing these challenges requires a combination of legal, normative, and practical responses. Chair, no single measure can address every space security risk. Australia supports efforts to clarify how existing international law applies to space activities, develop common understandings where uncertainty remains, and consider additional measures where genuine gaps are identified. Practical, non-binding measures can make an immediate difference. Australia is committed to best practice. We maintain transparency around domestic space launches, including through notification and engagement with our Pacific partners. We encourage all states to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation and participate in its launch notification arrangements to reduce misunderstanding. Regional participation is essential to lasting outcomes. Together with Singapore and Philippines, Australia co-chaired an ASEAN regional forum workshop to deepen understanding of space security issues and encourage OEWG participation. As we approach the Outer Space Treaty's 60th anniversary in 2027, we should all reaffirm our commitment to its principles and obligations. Chair, we remain committed to working with all States to advance practical and inclusive approaches. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland.

Chair, Ireland aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union.

Ireland remains firmly committed to preventing an arms race in outer space and to preserving a safe, secure and sustainable space environment.

Outer space must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes on an equitable basis for the benefit of all humankind. Our economies, essential civilian infrastructure, and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals all rely on satellites and other space-based systems.

All states, spacefaring or otherwise, share a responsibility to strengthen the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities. Chair, recalling the obligations set out in the Outer Space Treaty, Ireland restates its opposition to the placement of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The development, deployment, or testing of nuclear or other weapons in orbit, as well as the proliferation of anti-satellite technology.

Not only pose serious risks to global communications and the functioning of modern societies, but also risk grave humanitarian consequences. Ireland supports a comprehensive approach within the multilateral system to address such threats, and emphasizes that civilian space-based services must be protected, including in situations of armed conflict, in accordance with international humanitarian.

Law. Chair, outer space is a global commons and it requires global governance. Ireland attaches great importance to developing rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour grounded in existing international law to reduce space threats. This includes the UN Charter, international humanitarian law and other relevant UN treaties and instruments.

Preventing an arms race in outer space and maintaining a safe and secure outer space require both legal measures and non-binding norms of responsible behavior.

These approaches are complementary.

Norms can lay the groundwork for legal instruments.

While Ireland sees merit in the eventual negotiation of legally binding instruments, we consider voluntary pragmatic measures to be both necessary and achievable.

These should be developed through a transparent, multilateral, and multi-stakeholder process. Ireland welcomes the ongoing work of the open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, and was encouraged by the.

Breadth and depth of discussion at the July meeting.

We particularly welcome the measures related to protecting critical civilian and humanitarian space-based services.

We hope to see emerging common understandings translated into concrete recommendations as a matter.

Of urgency, given the rapidly evolving nature of outer space activities. We continue to regret the challenges related to.

Observer participation and reiterate that meaningful inclusivity, including the involvement of non-state stakeholders, is essential to ensuring that the group's work reflects the full scope of rapidly evolving developments in outer space.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Hungary.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Hungary associates itself with the statement delivered by the EU. The full statement will be available online. For Hungary, the Outer Space Treaty remains the cornerstone of international space law. We firmly believe that outer space must be used for peaceful purposes for the benefit and in the interest of all countries. Preserving free and equitable access to outer space is therefore a common responsibility. This principle has a very tangible meaning for Hungary. Last year, we proudly sent our second astronaut into space, more than four decades after the first Hungarian space flight. We were equally pleased to welcome him safely back to Earth, helped by the fact that our outer space remains a place where astronauts do not have to dodge weapons on their way home.

We should keep it that way.

The space environment is becoming increasingly crowded, competitive, and contested. Jamming, spoofing, and counter-space capabilities increase the risk of miscalculation, mis.

Understanding and escalation, while the dual-use nature of space technologies adds complexity.

Hungary therefore supports a comprehensive approach to space security. We believe that norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors can make an immediate contribution to reducing space threats and building confidence for further measures. welcome the substantive work of the OEWG on Paris and encourage states to build on previous discussions in the OEWG, the UNDC and the Paris GGE. Discussions should remain inclusive and pragmatic without prejudging the future measures, including the possibility of legally binding instruments. Hungary strongly supports establishing a universal norm against destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests, which create orbital debris and pose discriminate risk to human space flight and space assets in this regard we welcome the US initiative launched in 2022 to establish a voluntary moratorium on distractive daa set testing Hungary co-sponsor the relevant G resolution and join the initiative, we encourage states to follow suit. Chair, finally, we are equally clear that placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit is prohibited under Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Any action undermining this fundamental obligation would have great consequences for international security and strategic stability. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Iraq aligns itself with the statements delivered by the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. We'd like to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Mr. Chair, Iraq reiterates that outer space is a common heritage of humankind and that its exploration and use must be for exclusively peaceful purposes to guarantee that all States benefit from it equally and with no discrimination. We stress the need to enhance international efforts to prevent an arms race there. In this context, Iraq emphasizes the importance of arriving at a legally binding international instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. Such an instrument should prohibit the placement of weapons, be they offensive or defensive, in outer space. And the launching of armed attacks, it should prohibit launching armed attacks against space objects or the deliberate damaging of such objects, and the development or testing of weapons and technologies designed to carry out such attack. Moreover, this instrument should establish multilateral mechanisms and procedures to verify compliance with the obligations contained in it. Iraq welcomes the General Assembly decision 79/512, which established the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and all its aspects for the period between 2024 to 2028. We stress the need to benefit from the working group's work to enhance mutual understanding, to coordinate international efforts, and to build upon the outcomes of the GGE. in a manner that would contribute to the development of practical recommendations that support efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. We further emphasize that these efforts must contribute towards making tangible progress towards the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument. In closing, IRAC stresses the need to coordinate relevant international initiatives and tracks so that we would avoid the duplication of efforts and to guarantee the inclusiveness and transparency of the negotiating process and strengthen the role of the United Nations in this regard. The ultimate objective is to establish an international regime that would prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure that outer space remains safe, sustainable, and accessible for present and future generations. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon.

Chairman, outer space has become indispensable for our security, for our economies, as well as for our development. And yet, those who depend most on space-related services are those who have the most limited means when it comes to addressing disruptions in that area. And this is a security, a collective security challenge and an issue of equity and development For our state, three challenges are inextricably linked, and namely, preventing risk of confrontation, preserving in a sustainable way this shared environment, and helping states to enjoy peaceful uses under the most equitable conditions. The 1967 treaty remains a legal bedrock for action and does not prohibit all military activity in space, and therefore, there's an important need to enhance transparency as well as confidence-building measures and consultations in order to prevent any incidents or risks of escalation. In parallel, proliferation of satellites and debris undermines the space activities, the legitimate activities, and long-term reliability thereof. There is a need for greater sharing of information as well as national capacity building. Safeguarding space right now means allowing future generations to have opportunities to benefit from this. Space-related governance can only be achieved in a sustained way if the benefits are equally accessible. Satellite data can improve agriculture, natural resources management, as well as disaster a prevention, provided that all states have means to use this. We propose a voluntary initiative for space capacity building and resilience building for developing states. hinging on three priorities, facilitating access to satellite data, building local capabilities, and developing public policy tools. The first would include rethinking available needs and capabilities for those interested states, the Office of Space. at the United Nations, through its mandate, would help to launch pilot projects based on data sharing, joint training initiatives, as well as bringing together expertise with support provided on a voluntary basis by partners. And these measurable objectives will help us to achieve headway. Our ambition is clear to make space-related cooperation a concrete tool for achievement of resilience and development, not a benefit that is just reserved for the best and most endowed states. African solidarity and capacity building will contribute to providing for a safer, more secure, more inclusive, and equitable space governance. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation.

Mr. Chairman, the Russian Federation consistently and steadfastly advocates for keeping space free of weapons of any form and preventing its being transformed into yet another arena for armed confrontation. The situation in the area of space security is rapidly deteriorating. The recent statements from the U.S. main defense representative and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee statement from Mr. Kane about the possible conduct of military operations in near-moon space shows that aggressive outer space ambitions of Washington are now being brought into the practical dimension. These statements were the first public confirmation of the presence of weapons-related capabilities, orbital-based capabilities of the U.S., as well as preparations for the conduct of hostilities in near-Earth space. Aggressive actions of Washington include the Golden Dome project, which include multi-sphere anti-missile defense capabilities, including interception of capabilities. This is swiftly increasing the likelihood of armed confrontation in orbit. There are tremendous risks being generated for numerous space technologies, socio-economical processes on the ground, on Earth, which directly determine the well-being of people. Russia believes firmly that at the present juncture, there still is an opportunity to prevent such negative turn of events. We welcome progress achieved by the Open-Ended Working Group to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space, which was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 78/512. Its organizational parameters allow for the work of the group to focus on considering substantive elements of a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. The Russian Federation also stands ready to discuss possible non-legally binding measures to achieve the goals of PAROS, and they should complement, but not supplement, effective agreements on preventing an arms race in outer space. We continue to need an international mechanism for political obligations not for related to non-first placement of weapons in outer space. The Russian Federation has submitted for the consideration of the first committee two draft resolutions and one decision on outer space security. We call upon all states to support these initiatives as well as to co-sponsor them. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the representative of Russian Federation. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Philippines.

- delivered by ASEAN and NAM. As an emerging space-faring nation, the Philippines advocates for the peaceful uses of outer space, the prevention of arms race in outer space, and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. We recognize the important role of outer space in achieving the sustainable development goals in addressing the adverse impacts of climate change. And we support the inalienable right of states, particularly developing countries, to access peaceful space applications. We consider space as a global commons that must never be weaponized. We remain deeply concerned by growing threats to space security, safety, and sustainability, including security doctrines that consider outer space as a theater of conflict, testing and use of direct ascent, anti-satellite missiles, and other anti-satellite weapons, as well as dangerous incidents of rocket debris falling into our maritime zones. We continue to pursue ratification of the Outer Space Treaty as part of our commitment to align our national space activities with existing legally binding instruments and join the international community in calling for a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We thank the group of governmental experts for their report containing substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on PAROS. including the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. We likewise support transparency and confidence-building measures, such as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and encourage states to submit pre-launch notifications and declarations on their space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles programs. We also call upon launching states to provide advanced, proper, and adequate notification to other states located along the drop zones of falling space debris to ensure that they are sufficiently prepared to mitigate and respond to such incidents to prevent threats to infrastructure, maritime shipping, and fishing. Central to defining responsible space behavior is the legally binding obligation of due regard under Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty, which requires states to balance competing rights in good faith exercise due diligence and engage in open consultations before undertaking activities that could impair the interests of other states. We reiterate that voluntary political commitments and responsible behaviors and legally binding instruments on PAROS are mutually reinforcing and not mutually exclusive. Norms of behavior complement and do not substitute negotiations on a legally binding, multilaterally verifiable instrument prohibiting the placement of weapons and the threat or use of force against space objects. Finally, Chair, it is a firm view that the goal of outer space security should be securing outer space for the peaceful uses of all nations and preserving this vital domain for future generations. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Philippines. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa.

Chairperson, South Africa aligns with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group. Many Member States consider outer space as an arena for peaceful uses rather than a frontier to place weapons. Recent developments concerning the use of outer space have signalled a reason for Member States to intensify discussions at the UN aimed at addressing these challenges. South Africa urges Member States to refrain from unilateral coercive measures which contravene international law and which could impede or prevent space activities for peaceful purposes by developing countries and the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the principles and treaties governing international space law. We remain committed to the eventual negotiation of a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. If there is political will to negotiate transparency and confidence building measures as a temporary stopgap measure, we could accept this as a pathway towards a PAROS treaty. South Africa continues to call on states to refrain from placing objects carrying any type of weapon, including weapons of mass destruction into orbit, installing weapons on celestial bodies and threatening to use force against objects in outer space. Chairperson, there is no justification for the placement of weapons in outer space, nor does any state have the right to impede the use of outer space by developing countries for peaceful uses. We underscore that the scientific research and developmental needs of developing states should not be hampered, and we should strive to maintain the integrity of space systems. The existing framework, such as the Outer Space Treaty, provides the foundation for international space law and clearly prohibits the militarization of outer space. South Africa would further like to reiterate the importance of adhering to the Charter of the UN, international humanitarian law, as well as the importance of the implementation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Moon Treaty. It would be incorrect to assume that outer space is the exclusive domain of a handful of countries. The open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in all its aspects, should continue to support the discussions on space security in the context of allowing legitimate, peaceful uses of outer spaces to prevail. In this regard, we look forward to the further sessions of the OEWG on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in 2027. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of France.

Mr. Chairman, France aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, and we wish to deliver the following remarks in our national capacity. France believes that the preservation of a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable space environment as the cornerstone of our policy. And it is with this in mind that we organized last September an international space summit. And we will continue in this vein to support the work underway in Geneva within the OEWG on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all of its aspects. The principles upheld by France take on full significance at a time when space is becoming an arena of rivalry and confrontation. I wish to reiterate the foundations of this. So the United Nations Charter and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty remain the legal framework of reference for the governance of space activities. We call for their full respect, which is a fundamental prerequisite for any discussions. aimed at developing measures or instruments to reduce space-related threats. Technological and strategic developments, nevertheless, require this body of law be expanded to incorporate concrete and immediately applicable measures. This entails greater transparency regarding space activities in order to reduce ambiguity and to prevent any risk of uncontrolled escalation. We are playing our full part in this by implementing the transparency and confidence building measures which were agreed to in 2013 and endorsed by a growing number of states and international organizations. Strengthening space related security must therefore be rooted in a combination of existing obligations and non legally binding instruments. France will continue to support transparency and confidence-building measures within the framework of PAROS. We will pay particular attention to the characterization of conduct rather than technologies and capabilities, and this work will form the basis for future binding legal measures and instruments. Mr. Chairman, France intends to continue to further commitment to all work aimed at strengthening space security, and we will approach the resolution tabled with the same constructive approach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of France. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Outer space has become a major strategic arena for global geopolitical rivalries. We are concerned about plans and announcements about placement of weapons in orbit and anti-satellite capabilities, as well as the deployment to jamming or the use or disruption of other messages and signals and other disruptive activities are alarming. These undermine stability in orbit as well as safety and security of essential critical civilian infrastructure. Moreover, we highlight serious concerns related to the potential risks of escalation and the potential consequences of this for the long-term viability and peaceful use of outer space. And we stress the importance of strengthening the international framework governing operations and activities in this realm and to prevent an arms race. outer space, the internationally existing legal framework is an important basis to address these threats. The Outer Space Treaty prevents the orbiting of nuclear weapons as well as the deployment of such weapons in celestial bodies and their placement in any other way in outer space. International law, including international humanitarian law, also applies when it comes to outer space. Recognizing these applications under no circumstances means legitimate the use of force in this environment. Although the normative framework applicable in space needs to be fully complied with and upheld, at the same time, it is also necessary to enhance this. And in this regard, we welcome discussions underway at the working group on preventing an arms race in outer space. And the group is nearly midway there, and it will be undertaking an exchange of views for the crafting of recommendations. And in our view, numerous new measures are necessary to improve security in outer space, whether this includes development or deployment of certain capabilities, responsible conduct norms, such as those including operations and rendezvous, or transparency in space outer operations, and these are but a few examples. Mr. Chairman, the next few years will be decisive when it comes to shaping how we will govern developments in outer space. Space needs to remain a realm where exploration and scientific research, as well as peaceful use, can be continued for the benefit of all. Preserving this environment requires that we tackle emerging security-related challenges before they fully take root. Respect for existing international law and the drafting of new rules and norms need to remain at the heart of our efforts. There is an urgent need to prevent space becoming an arena for armed confrontation. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for his statement. I now call on the distinguished representative of Portugal. Sorry, okay. Sorry for this.

Chair, Portugal aligns with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make some remarks in its national capacity. I will focus on three points. First, outer space must remain a domain of peace. Our dependence on space grows every day. Disrupting the operation of satellites disrupts economies and societies. independently of the political borders. Debris created in seconds can endanger space for generations. Portugal rejects the weaponization of outer space and remains committed to preventing an arms race in space. International law, including the United Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty, provides the foundation. The prohibition on placing nuclear weapons and the other weapons of mass destruction in orbit must be upheld without ambiguity. Disarmament efforts related to outer space should focus on the PAROS agenda, an essential tool to preserve international security and stability. Second, we must strengthen Trust through complementary approaches. Existing legally binding commitments and norms of responsible behavior can reinforce each other. Portugal supports inclusive, substantive work within the open-ended working group on preventing an arms race in outer space. Transparency, information sharing, and communication can reduce misperceptions and prevent escalation. particularly where these technologies serve both civilian and military purposes. Finally, third, security must advance alongside equitable access and inclusive governance. All countries should be able to help shape governance and benefit from space activities. Building on the Lisbon Declaration, the UN Portugal Outer Space Fellowship developed with UNOOSA and UNITAR strengthens developing countries' capacities in space law, policy and cooperation. Its second edition, held in Lisbon last March, translates inclusion into practice. Chair, the choices we make today are paramount to maintain space accessible to all countries. Across these priorities, let us act through law, restraint and cooperation, ensuring that expanding human capabilities also expands our shared opportunities for peace and sustainable development for future generations. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for his statement. I now call on the distinguished representative of New Zealand.

Chair, New Zealand is one of the world's most active launch nations. As both a space-faring nation and a user of space-based services, we have a strong interest in ensuring outer space remains peaceful, secure, and sustainable. As we approach the 60th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty next year, New Zealand reflects on its enduring value as the foundation for the peaceful use of outer space. The treaty remains the cornerstone of the international legal framework governing outer space activities. At a time of growing strategic competition, we call on all states to reaffirm their commitment to the treaty's principles and faithfully uphold its provisions, including those contained in Article 4. All activities in outer space must be conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. Chair, for decades, the international community has recognized the risks associated with conflict in outer space and the prospect of an arms race in the space domain. As capabilities evolve and geopolitical tensions deepen, those concerns are taking on renewed urgency. Keeping outer space free from conflict remains in the interests of all states. It is an enduring international security imperative. New Zealand remains committed to reducing the risk of conflict in space. We continue to support efforts to advance shared understandings on the applicability of international law, including international humanitarian law, to outer space activities, as well as measures to protect space systems that provide critical civilian services. We are increasingly concerned by the growing divergence of views on space security issues. As long-standing space security challenges become increasingly tangible, effective multilateral dialogue is more important than ever. Forums such as COPUOS and the OEWG on PAROS remain essential venues for building understanding, improving transparency, and identifying practical ways forward. New Zealand continues to support efforts to strengthen norms, rules, and principles that reduce the risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and conflict. We advocate practical measures that enhance transparency, build confidence between states, and encourage responsible behaviour in outer space. Nearly six decades on, the central lesson of the Outer Space Treaty remains as relevant as ever. Cooperation is essential to ensuring outer space remains a domain of peaceful use and shared benefit. New Zealand will continue to work constructively with all partners to advance this goal. The future of outer space will be shaped not only by the capabilities we develop, but by our willingness to work together to manage the challenges they present. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Maldives.

For the Maldives, outer space, like the ocean, is a shared domain where cooperation is essential, and every state must have a voice in shaping the rules.

For Maldives, an island state spread across the Indian Ocean, space technologies are part of our daily life.

They help us monitor our waters, prepare for disaster, and connect our islands.

Equitable access is therefore essential to protecting our people and securing our sovereign future.

The Maldives call on all.

States to prevent an arms race in outer space and refrain from action that could fuel confrontation. Preserving space as a peaceful domain requires transparency and international cooperation.

The Maldives membership of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space since 2025 reflect our commitment to ensuring that all states, regardless of technological capacity, contribute to space governance and benefit from its space uses.

The expanding role of commercial operations brings opportunities, but also risk.

Dependence in limited number of providers rise in question about reliable access, especially during crisis.

More this therefore call for progress in three areas.

First, turn transparency and confidence building measures into practice.

Second, strengthening dialogues between state and commercial operators on continuity of essential space-based service.

During crisis.

Access should not depend on the size or technological capacity of the state. Third, ensure that small island developing states can contribute effectively to the open-ended working group on prevention of an armed race in outer space in all its aspect. For Maldives, the principle is simple. Space should expand the choice available on small state, not create new dependencies.

Every state must help shape the rule and benefit from the peaceful use of outer space.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Maldives for her statement. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Algeria.

Algeria aligns itself with the statements delivered by NAM and the African group.

We.

Recognize the outer space as the province of all humankind and the inalienable rights of all states to explore and use it exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of their level of economic or scientific development. We express serious concern over the threat arising from the possible weaponization of outer space. Preventing an arms race in outer space, or PAROS, is imperative for international peace and security. It must be addressed holistically through legally binding instruments, a priority that cannot be delayed or substituted.

We welcome the ongoing work of the Open-Ended Working Group on PAROS.

We call on all states to engage constructively so that the group can deliver concrete recommendations that advance legally binding measures and avoid duplication of efforts. The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum, must establish a dedicated subsidiary body on PAROS to negotiate the prohibition of the placement of any weapons in outer space and of attacks against space objects. The Russia-China draft treaty constitutes a solid negotiating basis in this regard. We emphasize the need for strict compliance with existing international arrangements and agreements, in particular the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, while developing appropriate frameworks to address new challenges. Transparency and confidence-building measures are important complementary steps, but they cannot substitute for legally binding instruments. We call upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the peaceful uses of outer space and to refrain from actions that run counter to this objective. We express concern.

Over activities that threaten space security and call for restraint and transparency.

We emphasize the strengthening of international cooperation based on equality and non-discrimination in accordance with the declaration on international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all states. Finally, developing countries must benefit equitably through capacity building, technology transfer, and information exchange, free from discriminatory restrictions. Any regulatory arrangements must not impede legitimate peaceful uses of outer space.

And I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Mr. Chair, as humanity's reliance on outer space deepens, so do the risks of conflict in this domain.

Since we last met, those risks have moved from doctrine to deployment.

Last month, weapons in orbit were officially acknowledged for the first time.

Anti-satellite, directed energy, and other non-kinetic capabilities continue to proliferate, and major powers openly.

Describe outer space as a warfighting domain. The integration of missile defense with space-based systems is eroding strategic stability.

Such deployments will trigger countermeasures and accelerate an arms race that no one can win. Yet the window to prevent the weaponization of outer space has not closed.

It has narrowed, and recent announcements have made it far harder to hold ajar. That is precisely why we must act now, before deployments harden into facts that no instrument can reverse. Chair, existing space law, while valuable, has not prevented an arms race. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but not other weapons. SSOD-1 recognized this gap when it called for further measures and appropriate international negotiations.

Pakistan has consistently supported negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding instrument on PARAS.

Including on the basis of the proposed treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer.

Space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

Transparency and confidence building measures and norms of responsible.

Behavior are complementary, but they can neither substitute for legally binding obligations nor be made a precondition for them.

In our working paper submitted this year in the open-ended working group on PAROS.

Pakistan has set out a holistic framework addressing both behaviors and capabilities.

A behavior-only approach ignores the weapons being designed, developed, and deployed explicitly for war fighting in space. Lasting security requires addressing both, as precedents in other disarmament regimes show. The OEWG on Paris, in all its aspects, offers a unique platform to bridge differences where useful discussions are taking place. We must build on these discussions to lay the foundation for both legally and non-legally binding measures.

Chair, in conclusion, monopolies over technologies never endure.

We must pursue a comprehensive approach that can preserve outer space as a domain free from conflict for future generations.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Brazil. We shall now call on the delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I will begin by first giving the floor to the delegations who were unable to exercise their right of reply to a second intervention this morning due to time constraints. So now I give the floor to the representative of Russian Federation for the second intervention under the cluster of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First and foremost, we would like to repudiate the latest unsubstantiated allegations against us from the delegation of the Republic of Korea. They are entirely divorced from reality. Furthermore, we also wish to repudiate the baseless insinuations against the Russian Federation from Western states regarding the Budapest Memorandum. Frankly speaking, the inadequacy attempts by Western states to levy to have unsubstantiated, baseless allegations against Russia have in recent years are really have reached staggering levels. In recent years, we have provided detailed, repeated commentary about this, which shows the flimsiness of these fabrications. And they show that the reality is such that there are serious concerns about the Budapest memorandum as in implementation by Kyiv and its Western patrons. For those in the West who were unable to to hear our ironclad argumentation, we would like to call upon you to listen and familiarize yourselves with statements delivered by Russian representatives at international forums, including the first committee, and the texts that are published. The relevant web resources are not hard to find. Wasting time time on allegations about this absolute subject is something which we no longer view as appropriate. Thank you.

I now call on the representative of Italy for the first interventions under the cluster of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Chair. I would like to bring a little bit of clarity concerning the reference that was made today by the delegation of the Russian Federation to the exercises of NATO taking place in Italy. I want to strongly reject the attempts to portray NATO's defensive activities, including exercises taking place in Italy, as provocative. NATO is a defensive alliance. Its nuclear deterrence, including extended deterrence posture, is designed to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. NATO exercises, in particular, Stadfast Noon, are regular exercises. They took place in Italy already several times. They don't involve weapons at all. And the areas concerned are even publicly available on the site of ENAC if you really want to go fly these days in Italy. So it's routine. They are transparent and fully consistent with international obligation. It's a bit misleading for this room and for the esteemed delegations to invoke the risk of nuclear escalation referring to such exercises. and while continuing a war of aggression against Ukraine. So we reserve to a very clear distinction in this field. Deterrence is not intimidation, and defensive preparedness is not aggression. Thank you.

I now, under the cluster of other weapons of mass destructions, I call on the representative of Netherlands.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will be speaking on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany and my own country, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in response to Russian remarks with regard to politicizing the OPCW. And I would like to share some inconvenient facts with regard to documented violations of the CWC and the BWC. First, with regard to the widespread use of riot control agents in Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities have documented more than 14,000 cases of the use of riot control agents since 2022. They also have collected samples from the battlefield. Analyses by OPCW-designated laboratories have confirmed the presence of the riot control agent CS. Upon Ukraine's request, the OPCW has published three reports from technical assistance visits to Ukraine to confirm the use of the prohibited riot control agent CS along the front lines. Taken together, the documented cases of RCA use, the findings of the TAV reports, and the analysis carried out by the OPCW-designated laboratories all point to a pattern of systematic use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, which is prohibited under Article 1 of the CWC, as was also stated this morning by the distinguished representative of the OPCW. Second, on the use of chloropicrin in Ukraine. On 4 July 2025, Dutch Intelligence and Security Service and the German Federal Intelligence Service made a joint public announcement. Based on independent intelligence investigations, the services identified an intensification of Russia's use of chemical weapons in Ukraine, more specifically the deployment of the more potent chloride picrine. Due to its lethal effects, this constitutes an even more flagrant violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The CWC prohibits the deployment of this choking chemical weapon under all circumstances, And we recall that chloropicrine is listed as Schedule 3 under the CWC. Now, with regard to the use of epiebetadine in the case of poisoning Mr. Alexei Navalny. Mr. Navalny died on February 16, 2024, while held in a Russian prison. On February 14, 2026, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK issued a joint statement. Based on analysis of samples from Navalny, the governments of the five countries are confident that Alexei Navalny was poisoned with a lethal toxin. These analyses have conclusively confirmed the presence of epibatidine, And epibetadine is a toxin found in poison dart frogs in South America. It's not found naturally in Russia. Russia claims that Navalny died of natural causes. But given the toxicity of epibetadine and reported symptoms, poisoning is highly likely the cause of his death. Mr. Navalny died while held in prison, meaning that Russia had the means, motive and opportunity to administer this poison to him. The Director General of the OPCW confirmed that the use of epibetadine falls under the scope of the CWC. In August 2020, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, and partners condemned Russia's use of Novichok to poison Alexei Navalny. This followed Russia's use of Novichok in Salisbury in 2018, which led to the tragic death of a British woman, Dawn Sturgess. These latest findings once again underline the need to hold Russia accountable for its repeated grave violations of the CWC. Furthermore, as a State Party to the BWC, the Russian Federation has also violated the BWC, We recall that under Article 1 of the Treaty, State Parties...

I now call on the representative of Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The delegation of Ukraine wanted to exercise the right of reply under cluster 1, if it is already closed, just question. If not possible, then we would like to make a statement later.

So you, yeah, you can, you can make this.

The right of reply to the statement by the Russian Federation made earlier.

Just a secretary, just, you know, clarified to me that the Ukraine hides already placed, you know, when I was reading to the, moving to the second cluster, cluster on the other weapons of mass destruction. So in this case, I think, you know, it is better to give the floor to the Ukraine.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for clarifications. Thank you. We would like to exercise the right of reply to the statement made by the Russian Federation earlier in our proceedings. So we just want to reject Russia's claims that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is a Russian nuclear facility. The ZNPP is and will remain an integral part of Ukraine under Ukraine's sovereignty and jurisdiction. And also, Russia's sham referendums and the so-called treaty signed in September 2022, Ukraine considers as null and void. They have no legal effect whatsoever on the status of the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine. Also, as we mentioned before, the General Assembly has made this unequivocally clear in its resolutions. that which reaffirmed Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and rejecting Russia's attempted illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories. Regarding military activities near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Russia tells the IAEA that the military personnel present at the ZNPP are there to protect the facility. At the same time, Ukrainian defense and intelligence authorities continue to document Russian military activity at and around the ZNPP and occupied Enerhodar, including the deployment of military equipment and infrastructure, and the launch and support of Russian UAV operations against Ukrainian-controlled communities on the opposite bank of the Dnipro River. Ukraine has regularly provided relevant information to the IAEA Secretariat because such activity directly affects the implementation of the IAEA Director General's five concrete principles and the nuclear safety and security of the plant. The contradiction is increasingly difficult to conceal. Russia describes its military personnel as being present solely to protect a civilian nuclear facility, while Ukrainian forces. document military operations being conducted from the area in which the facility, that facility is located. The military logic behind Russia's continued occupation therefore becoming clearer. The ZNPP provides Russian forces with an exceptionally protected environment, precisely because it is a nuclear power plant. Moscow knows that Ukraine must exercise extraordinary restraint around the facility and take into account not only an immediate military threat, but also the potentially catastrophic consequences of any action affecting nuclear safety. In other words, Russia is exploiting the special protection that a civilian nuclear facility should enjoy in order to provide protection for its own military activities. The development of drone warfare makes this issue even more important. Military use of a nuclear site today cannot be assessed solely by looking for tanks or artillery pieces. UAV launch positions, control antennas, communication equipment, and other relatively small infrastructure can directly support combat operations. The five concrete principles must therefore and capable of addressing the realities of modern warfare. Equipment used to launch, guide, or support attack drones does not become compatible with the protection of a nuclear facility merely because it is smaller or less visible than traditional heavy weaponry. also would like to remind that in February 2025, a Russian drone struck the new safe confinement over the destroyed Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP, seriously damaging a structure built through decades of international effort and enormous financial and technical contributions from many countries represented, including in this meeting room. This was not merely damage to Ukrainian infrastructure. It was an attack on one of the most important international nuclear safety projects ever undertaken. On 7th June this year, Russia UAV also struck the centralized spent nuclear fuel storage facility near Chernobyl. Building were damaged, including premises used by IAEA personnel. So I would like just Diane to underscore that this nuclear safety threat will continue and until the time that Russia returned, will leave the ZNPP and the nuclear object will return to Ukraine's full control. Thank you.

I now give the floor to the representative of Russian Federation for the first intervention under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman, the Russian Federation categorically repudiates the baseless allegations of Western countries, including those we have just heard from the delegation of Netherlands vis-a-vis the violations of the provisions of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. The Russian Federation is a conscientious party to the CWC, and we comply with the obligations we assumed in full. In this context, we reaffirm that chemical riot control agents do not constitute part of the arsenal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, their use is not provided for the achievement of national tactical objectives in the conduct of hostilities. We repeatedly, over the course of many years, attempted to establish professional-level expert dialogue about these and other allegations against Russia about the alleged violations of the CWC. However, as was the case with the notorious Skripal case, provocations with imagined poisoning of Navalny as well as the Ukrainian file, any of our and all of our attempts to leverage the convention mechanisms to shed light on these baseless allegations are consistently disregarded. All of this only reinforces our conviction about the fact that there is no evidence whatsoever underpinning these insinuations and The group of countries brandishing them is seeking to -- is undermining the integrity of the CWC to achieve the self-proclaimed goal of inflicting strategic defeat on the Russian Federation. Moreover, these are baseless allegations with no facts underpinning them whatsoever from a group of countries who are providing cover for the chemical crimes of the Kyiv regime. Nor can there be any doubt about the fact that it is indeed with their consent that the Ukrainian armed groups are systematically using toxic chemicals and riot control agents against Russian soldiers and representatives of constituent territories of the Russian Federation and civilians as well. Over the past three years, we submitted to the OPCW and the Security Council and the General Assembly approximately 40 notes with information about similar instances of Ukraine's use of riot control agents. in breach of their obligations under the CWC. These have all been disregarded and dismissed, both by the Kyiv regime and by those complicit in its crimes. We also deem it appropriate to recall that, in accordance with the conclusions of the Scientific and Technical Council of the OPCW, dating 27 June 2014, from the 59 of the 59 chemicals announced by states parties to the CWC as riot control agents, only 17 fall under the definition set out under the convention. Russia repeatedly at the OPCW proposed a concrete list of these 17 chemicals insofar as the absence of this dilutes responsibility of member states, of states parties for the use of these chemicals in hostilities. But this initiative was not supported, first and foremost, by those who are now shouting loudest about the Russian threat. The reason is exceedingly clear. NATO states have a wide range of gas grenades developed by the UK, France, Germany, and Ukraine. And according to the technical instructions set out by those states, there are stipulations for the use of these kinds of special substances by military personnel as chemical weapons of a non-lethal effect. To conclude, we would like to underscore that Russia continue to flag such crimes perpetrated against our citizens with the aim of holding perpetrators and accomplices to account. Mr. Chairman, turning to the unsubstantiated allegation from the delegation from Netherlands about Russia's violation allegedly of the BWC, Russia, as a depository state of this convention, has been scrupulously fulfilling all of its provisions. Now, when it comes to these statements by the European states. So we provided a detailed reaction to these statements. This has been circulated amongst all member states, and we would once again call for parties to familiarize themselves with that. Thank you.

I now give the floor to the representative of Israel for the first intervention under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction.

Thank you, Chair. As we stated earlier, the Middle East is still suffering from a chronic lack of compliance with nonproliferation and arms control norms, obligations, and mechanisms. Certain states are part of binding treaties and international frameworks, yet deliberately and systematically violate them. References to establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East are detached from the current reality in the region. We call to those delegation who made those references to update their policy statements and devote more time and efforts to pursuing a Middle East where all countries recognize each other's right to exist. Chair, regarding the Arab group statement on Gaza, it is regrettable that some states depart from the professional discourse of this debate in order to advance political narratives and agendas to make claims that are substantively flawed and factually incorrect. It is striking that a statement devoted to weapons of mass destruction makes no mention of the real threats to the region and the global security, Iran's ongoing pursuit of nuclear and other unconventional capabilities, and its repeated violation of its obligations. Chair, in regard to the statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran, during Operation Royal Lion, Israel acted to eliminate Iran's capabilities and developments of unconventional weapons. Israel acted in accordance with obligation under international law and as a part of its ongoing armed conflict with Iran. Iran continues to prove to the international community that it not only fails to meet its obligation and cannot be trusted, but also that it destabilizes the region and the world as a violent and destructive actor that disrupts the international order. Iran proves time and again that it has the willingness and the ambition to produce weapons of mass destruction. Over the past two decades, Iran has been secretly developing a chemical weapons program based on weaponized pharmaceutical agents. It has been developing such weapons in various sites, such as the Shahid Maysoumi Research Group Complex, the Hakim Anshark Research Company, and the Tufik Darou Research and Engineering Company. As we stated in our statement, Covertly developed Iranian munition have been transferred to Iran's regional proxies, most notably the Houthis and Hezbollah, for deployment against Israel and other countries. Colleagues, Iran is a threat not only to Israel, but to the region and to the world. The international community must not stand idly by and allowed and allow Iran to develop unconventional capabilities, be they nuclear, biological, or chemical. I thank you, Chair.

Now I call on the representative of Sudan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation was compelled to take the floor to express its total rejection to the false allegations presented by the delegations of the United States and other delegations regarding the claimed use of chemical weapons in Sudan. Sudan firmly adheres to its legal obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and categorically reject the use of chemical weapons by any party under any circumstances. Sudan considers the Chemical Weapons Convention to be an integral part of its national legal framework. Sudan has consistently fulfilled its obligation under the Convention on the Chemical Weapons by renewing notifications and refraining from producing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. Therefore, Sudan rejects any unilateral actions or announcements in this matter. which violates the Convention itself, especially from a party with a well-known history of employing false allegations to threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. The Government of Sudan is addressing these allegations seriously and transparently. Sudan has already begun taking practical steps to address the allegations, foremost among these measures is establishment of a national committee comprising representative of relevant authorities the committee has been granted full authority to initiate transparent investigation and to submit its report without delay the National Committee published a preliminary report refuting the allegations of chemical weapon use the report was based on field tests forensic reviews and medical data all of which confirmed that There was no evidence of chemical or radiological contamination. The United States has failed to provide any evidence to the competent authority, namely the OPCW, which both Sudan and the United States are members of its Executive Council. The Government of Sudan has been on regular contact with the United States on this issue since the announcements of these allegations, but to date, no evidence was presented. nor the invitation to send a technical team to conduct a joint inspection to verify this allegation was accepted. Sudan renewed its invitation to the United States to submit the available evidence, if any, to the OPCW. Otherwise, these allegations can only be regarded as a tool for political pressure. Sudan reaffirms its firm commitment to the total prohibition of chemical weapons and that all chlorine stockpiles in Sudan are exclusively for the civilian water purification and industry energy sectors. Allegations remain allegations until verified. Sudan calls on all member states to refrain from referring to these allegations at least until they are verified by the competent authorities. I thank you, Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of China for the first intervention under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction.

China firmly rejects Japan's sophistry regarding the issue of Japanese ACWs. The CWC clearly stipulates that each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party in accordance with the provision of the provision for the purpose of destroying abandoned chemical weapons. Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility, as well as other resources. China has actively provided necessary assistance to Japan in carrying out its operations. In contrast, Japan has yet to provide comprehensive, detailed, accurate information regarding the whereabouts of the ACWs. This is entirely due to Japan's inadequate attention and investment, which has resulted in the destruction plan falling behind schedule four times, posing a severe threat to the lives, property, and ecological safety and security of the Chinese people. According to the incomplete statistics, since the end of the Second World War, Japanese ACWs have caused a cumulative total of more than 2,000 casualties among the Chinese population. As of September 2026, across 18 Chinese provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, at more than 200 locations, around 400 pieces of Japanese ACWs have been initially identified, with only 160,000 pieces destroyed, less than half of the total. According to the new destruction plan agreed upon by China and Japan, Japan is required by 2027 to complete destruction of the Japanese ACWs at Harbin and ACWs at all other locations by the end of, declared at the end of 2022. As things stand, a fifth missed deadline appears inevitable, eliminating the scourge of Japanese ACWs is not only a historical, political, and legal responsibility that Japan cannot deny or escape, but also international obligation under the CWC. China once again urged Japan to earnestly assume its responsibilities. Fully, completely, and accurately implement the destruction plan, vigorously accelerate our disposal of these chemical weapons, restore clean environment to the Chinese people, restore and remove the greatest obstacle to achieving a world free of chemical weapons. Thank you, Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of USA for the first intervention under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction.

Thank you, Chair. I'd like to respond to comments made yesterday by our Russian counterpart. Regarding the claims made with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the BWC and does not develop or possess such weapons anywhere. We have already provided exhaustive and definitive clarifications on this matter through the formal mechanisms of the BWC's Article V process. Those procedures are concluded and the matter is closed. The United States openly and transparently works with our foreign partners in support of Article X of the BWC to enhance their capacity to detect, prepare for and respond to infectious disease outbreaks and to help them protect human and animal health in their countries. And we believe it is in the interest of all our shared global health security that governments share clear, factual information quickly and openly about potential infectious disease outbreaks. Thank you, Chair.

Now give the floor to the representative of Islamic Republic of Iran for the first intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation categorically rejects and strongly condemns the baseless and politically motivated accusations made by the representatives of the United States and the Israeli regime under cluster two and what we just heard in the Israeli regime's right of reply. If there is any entity in our region that poses both the capacity and the proven willingness to produce and use weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and nuclear, it is none other than the Israeli regime, with the United States fully complicit in its atrocities through its unwavering political, military and financial support. This is the only regime in the region that illegally possesses all types of WMDs and remains outside all international instruments on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. And the reason is clear. This is a regime that has even weaponized the most basic necessities of life, water and food, as tools of war and oppression. There is credible and documented evidence of the use of prohibited munitions, including white phosphorus and depleted uranium. UNIFIL itself has confirmed that its personnel were injured by such weapons in Lebanon, and similar reports have emerged from Gaza. The repeated allegations against Iran are a calculated attempt by the Israeli regime and the US to divert attention from the issues they would rather this committee not confront, namely the Israeli regime's crimes in Gaza, the West Bank, Iran, and across our region. No amount of politically motivated accusation can conceal these realities or relieve the Israeli regime of accountability. The United States is in no position to lecture others while obstructing decades of negotiations on a legally binding BWC compliance and verification protocol, maintaining its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and evading scrutiny of its extensive overseas network of over 120 biological laboratories across more than 30 countries. thereby raising serious accountability concerns under the DWC. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Chair. The United Kingdom rejects in the strongest possible terms the baseless allegations made by the Russian Federation in its most recent statement. The claim that the United Kingdom possesses or employs chemical gas grenades is entirely false and without foundation. Russia's intervention was, regrettably, characteristic of its ongoing campaign of disinformation and distortion, which seeks to undermine confidence in the chemical weapons convention and to distract from its own violations.

The UK remains a firm supporter of the CWC.

Our commitment to the full and transparent implementation of its provisions is unwavering. We recall that the OPCW technical secretariat and independent investigations have repeatedly documented and attributed instances of chemical weapons use by the Russian Federation in Salisbury, Syria and Ukraine. Russia's attempts to invert this reality are an affront to the integrity of the Convention and to this Committee. We also note Russia's cynical misuse of technical discussions within the OPCW to obfuscate clear obligations. There is no ambiguity in the Convention's prohibition on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. The UK calls on all States Parties to reaffirm that prohibition and to reject any effort to reinterpret or erode it. Finally, we urge all delegations not to be distracted by these fabrications, but to focus instead on restoring trust, accountability, and compliance within the CWC framework, principles that Russia itself continues to undermine through its words and its actions. Chair, I would also like to align myself with the comments of the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands on Russia's use of etopatidine against Alexander Navalny. Thank you.

I now give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The other stated, Japan remains fully committed to multilateral efforts for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including the CWC. Japan has continued to expend its utmost efforts to make progress in the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China. by investing in human and financial resources in line with the CWC. Also, as I stated, the ACW project is a joint project between Japan and China. And as Japan is proceeding with this project, it is sharing perceptions with the Chinese side on various issues. and appropriate and timely cooperation from the Chinese side is also necessary to advance the project as planned. Japan has also provided information that indicates the location of the ACWs to the extent possible. Also, to ensure the safety of people and the protection of the environment is the most important matter, and it is a top priority for Japan. and Japan's measures meet the requirement of the CWC and Chinese domestic laws and regulations in destroying chemical weapons. Also, as I already stated, Japan and China jointly submitted destruction plans through the discussion to seek a feasible plan. And in accordance with this destruction plan, Japan has been making the best possible efforts to complete the destruction with necessary cooperation by China. We will continue to make our utmost efforts based on the destruction plan beyond 2022. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Now I give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Thank you, Chair.

We reject the attempt by the Russian Federation to dismiss serious concerns.

Regarding their breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention by obscuring facts or trying to reallocate responsibility to others.

The matter at hand is serious. It concerns compliance with international law and obligations freely undertaken by the Russian Federation under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russian Federation has an obligation to address legitimate concerns and to abide by the fundamental norm that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time, under any circumstance is unacceptable. Traces of the lethal toxin epibatidine were confirmed in biological samples from Mr. Alexei Navalny. Only Russia had the means, motive, and opportunity to carry out this poisoning. Three OPCW technical assistance visits have confirmed the presence of the riot control agent CS in battlefield samples in Ukraine. Repeating alternative theories is not the same as providing proof. Obscuring facts does not absolve the Russian Federation from its obligation to answer legitimate questions. Attempts to create doubt does not invalidate evidence.

I thank you.

Now, I call on the representative of Netherlands for the second intervention under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor once again. Let me start by quoting a remark that was made just a few minutes ago. Allegations remain allegations until verified. And what I said earlier on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands was not an allegation, but was a reference to documented violations of the CWC and the BWC. And let me provide a little bit more detail then on those documented violations. There were indeed three technical assistance visits. The first report is from November 18, 2024, and it confirmed the presence of CS tear gas based on samples from an incident on 20 September 2024 near Ilinka in the Dnipropetrovsk region. The second technical assistance visit report from the 14th of February 2025 confirmed CS presence following three additional incidents in October 24 near Marifka and Ilinka. The third TFA report, dated 20 June 25, confirmed the presence of CS-related compounds and degradation products in seven environmental samples gathered from the near Popetels region in February 2025. And those are not allegations by the Federal Republic of Germany, neither by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It's us. It's us in this room, because we are the OPCW. Thank you.

I now call on the representative of Russian Federation for the second intervention under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman, the Russian Federation, as a depository to the Convention on Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons, pays precise attention, regardless of what the delegation might say, to its full compliance at the national level. And this is reflected in the corresponding annual reports from the Russian Federation. We are undertaking active measures to help facilitate the strengthening of the BWC regime. And in this regard, we are palled that such politicized talking points such as those made by a number of Western states, including the United States, regarding certain biological programs of the Russian Federation. These unsubstantiated allegations are against us. This year, there has been a great deal of talk about transparency. So we call upon Western states, first and foremost, the United States, to be transparent and to finally respond in the most exhaustive way to those questions that the Russian Federation put forward back in 2022 regarding the something that had been for a very long time concealed and denied by the Biden administration. I refer to the military biological activity abroad, including on the soil of Ukraine. The soundness of our complaints are confirmed by this statement from former Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard during an 11 May and 12 June briefing. She informed about the potentially risky experiments with dangerous pathogens and viruses, financed by the United States in more than 120 foreign laboratories, more than 40 of which are located in Ukraine. Madam Gabbard's material confirmed the location, which had previously been mentioned by Russia, and the operations of the biolaboratory. And the specific examples, we would point to the Central Reference Laboratory of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Anti-Plague Institute, the Metchnikov Institute in Odessa, which has directly been identified as a place for the storage of bioweapons. And this is directly spoken about by Madam Gabbard, and her statement confirms the open, the blatant hypocrisy of the former U.S. administration and their allies who deny the presence in Ukraine of U.S.-financed biolaboratories. as well as the microphone has been cut off.

Now we will move to the cluster of outer space. I call on the representative of the United States of America for the first intervention under this cluster.

Mr. Chair, I take the floor to respond to comments made by China and Russia regarding U.S. outer space policy. The United States leads the world in sustainable, rules-based space activities. Our approach is guided by the Outer Space Treaty, other applicable international law, and voluntary commitments. We are the most transparent of all space operators. Because of this, Russia and China seek to criticize the United States as a way to deflect any attention to their development, testing, and working on anti-satellite weapons. They falsely attempt to gain legitimacy by calling for prohibitions on the placement of weapons in space by equipping and training their military forces to fight wars in outer space. And speaking of transparency, we call on Russia and China to be transparent about the weapons that they have already placed in outer space. Chair, I have already commented on their criticism about Golden Dome, but it bears repeating that these complaints are disingenuous. It is simply an attempt, which has been going on since the 1980s, to leave countries defenseless to their ballistic missiles. Finally, as we discuss ways to reduce the risk of conflict in space, I would note that Russia cannot even bring itself to acknowledge that there are two resolutions that form the foundation of the OEWG. Russia's statement deliberately left out reference to Resolution 78/20 due to the growing momentum behind creating shared, non-legally binding measures. This is the most pragmatic way to work toward verifiable and effective legally binding measures, and Russia refuses to engage seriously in good faith. As we consider Russia's resolutions, we must recognize that their attempt to undermine the reference to this important compromise that was reached by the majority of countries in this room could have serious consequences for the OEWG. The United States seeks practical behavior-based approaches to stability in outer space, observable, confirmable, and conducive to the security of the United States and our allies.

Thank you.

I now give the floor to the representative of Russian Federation for the first interventions under the cluster of outer space.

Thank you, Mr. President. We reject all unjustified insinuations about the space activity of the Russian Federation. These insinuations have nothing to do with the reality. They are part of a propaganda campaign by Western countries aimed at discrediting peaceful space activity of Russia and our initiatives to prevent an arms race in outer space. The steps of our country in research and development of space are conducted in accordance with international commitments, exclusively for peaceful purposes, and do not threaten other states. The Russian Federation strictly adheres to the founding treaty on space of 1967 and other treaties. Article 4 of the treaty prohibits putting any objects into orbit that are linked to arms or any kind of weapons of mass destruction. Placing these kinds of weapons in space in any other way is also prohibited. The Russian Federation has strictly adhered to this provision. There are no The treaty on space does not require any confirmation as far as any kind of revision of this treaty. We consider it unacceptable. Our country has for years been active in ensuring that space remains an open area and free of weapons or free of any kind of military confrontation. Russia has consistently proposed to UN member states to adopt a legally binding treaty on non-placing weapons of any kind in outer space and also the non-use of force or the threat of the use of force with regard to space objects or their use. Every year, we introduce a resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly on a draft on the space issues. I want to recall our proposal to UN member states to join the international initiative on not being the first to place weapons into space. The list of participants in this initiative is 37. It is aimed to uphold international peace, ensure indivisible security for all, as well as the security and predictability of states in conducting research and peaceful use of space and maintaining it for the benefit of all humanity. Unfortunately, these goals are not shared by far from all states. We see increasing risks every year of converting space into a kind of platform for aggressive war. Western states are openly pursuing a policy of placing weapons into space, all with the goal of ensuring their domination and hegemony. They are implementing large-scale programs and developing weapons aimed at using force or the threat of force in space or against space. As a result, long-term stability of peaceful use of space is threatened, as well as on land. The US and a number of their allies seeking to achieve their hegemonic ambitions and trampling on the fundamental interests of the majority of countries. Their actions require strongest condemnation by the international community and demands to end this. And in conclusion, Mr. President, the statements by the delegation of the US regarding transparency, particularly regarding placing offensive weapons in are the height of cynicism the delegation of the United States has calls on us to show transparency in the placing of weapons in outer space escalating the situation in outer space and converting outer space into a space for armed conflict. What is this other, except as cynicism, when the delegation itself claims that it has escalated the situation in space, has placed offensive weapons there, and de facto undermines all efforts of the international community to prevent the arms race in space. prevent the placing of weapons in space and convert it into a platform for armed conflict and military activity. Thank you.

I now give the floor to the representative of China for the first interventions under this question.

In a statement just delivered, the U.S. delegations made unfounded accusations against China's policies on arms control out of space and space activities, spreading the false narrative of so-called Chinese threat in outer space. China firmly opposes it and wishes to make the following points in response. First, China opposes the U.S.'s attempt to project its own hegemonic mindset under China in the pursuit of dominance in outer space. China is not the U.S., has never sought to dominate outer space as the U.S. does. China has neither a military strategy or plan to dominate outer space or now engage in any arms space in outer -- arms race in outer space. China's commitment to the peaceful use of outer space and its position in favor of Paris and the weaponization of outer space remain unchanged. By fabricating false narratives and falsely alleging that China, Russia are weaponizing outer space, the U.S. is simply seeking to justify its massive expansion of combat-oriented space capabilities and its pursuit of hegemony in outer space while diverting international attention. Secondly, the US is the foremost driver of the weaponization of outer space and arms race in the domain. The US colleague touched on confident transparency. Let's look at how transparent the US is. The U.S. has openly designated outer space as an operational domain, publicly announced its plans to advance the Golden Dome missile defense program, and deploy interceptors in outer space, openly declared that it has deployed space control weapons in orbit, even threatened to win a war in the cislunar space. These actions by the U.S. in outer space undermine the longstanding international consensus on preventing the weaponization and militarization of outer space, set a dangerous precedent by being the first to deploy weapons in outer space, undermine global to do balance and stability and push international efforts to prevent arms race in outer space to the brink of collapse. On the one hand, the U.S. claims that deploying such weapons in outer space does not violate existing international law. On the other hand, it has long obstructed negotiations on international legal instrument This lays bare the true motive of the U.S. to prevent its own development of space capabilities from being subject to substantive constraints under international law. Third, the grave security situation in outer space today underscores the urgent need to negotiate a legal instrument arms controlling outer space. Facts have shown that non-legally binding measures, such as so-called norms of responsible behavior, cannot fundamentally prevent arms race in outer space or its weaponization. Launching negotiations on a legal instrument arms controlling outer space is more than ever. We urge the U.S. to abandon its strategy of seeking dominance in outer space and its negative approach to arms control in this domain, and instead to work in earnest with the overwhelming majority of the international community to advance the process of arms control in outer space, prevent the weaponization of outer space and arms race in this domain, and safeguard lasting peace and tranquility in outer space. The United States must not allow the old pattern of developing armaments first and pursue arms control later, seen in the nuclear domain, to be repeated in outer space. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, we have adjusted the time available for this meeting. The Committee will reconvene tomorrow morning in this conference room. And we will continue the thematic discussion under the cluster of the outer space. And we will also hear a briefing by the chairpersons of the open-ended working group on the preventions of an arms race in the outer space. The meeting is adjourned.