First Committee, 16th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Good morning, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates. The 16th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished Delegates, in accordance with this programme of work, the Committee will first hear a briefing by our panelists under the cluster on outer space. and engage in an informal exchange with him. The committee will then resume its discussions on outer space. First, allow me to warmly welcome to the podium the chair of the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Armed Space in Outer Space in all its aspect, His Excellency Carlos Mario Horadury, permanent representative of Argentina Republic to the United Nations Office in Geneva. I now invite him to address the committee. Your Excellency, you have the floor now.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, distinguished colleagues and friends. Allow me first to congratulate you, Ambassador Lo Bahadur, on your election to chair the First Committee and to extend my warm congratulations to the other members of the Bureau. You may count on my full support and cooperation in the discharge of your important responsibilities. And grateful for the opportunity to report on the third session of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of Armed Race in the Outer Space in all its aspects, which I have the honor to chair. The group met in July and in accordance with its indicative timetable, continued its substantive consideration of the issues under agenda item 6. I will speak about the issues discussed, the proposal advanced, and the differences that remain. But before doing so, I wish to report something equally important, something that cannot be adequately conveyed by a catalog of technical discussions. the speed in which those discussions took place. Every delegation, every single delegation without exception, contributed to a constructive, serious, and cooperative atmosphere. They did not all agree. They were not expected to agree. They came with different histories, different security concerns, different priorities, and different ideas about the obligation that the state should undertake. Yet, They came prepared to engage. They listened when they disagreed. They explained their positions. They challenged arguments without abandoning the process. And they demonstrated that even in a divided world, respectful diplomacy remains possible. That deserves more than a passing acknowledgement. At a time when suspicion is often easier than understanding and confrontation is sometimes louder than reason, The willingness to remain at the same table is itself a precious achievement. We should recognize it, we should protect it, and we should build upon it. Mr. Chair, the first cluster of discussions concern measures and obligations related to intentional damage to and destruction of space systems, as well as the threat of use of force. Many delegations expressed concerns about acts that damage, destroy, degrade, disrupt, or interfere with space objects, and related space infrastructure, particularly acts that generate space debris. The consequences of such actions are not necessarily confined to the immediate target or to the state whose object is affected. Debris can endanger other systems, other operators, and activities on which many societies depend. A destructive action may last only a moment. Its physical and political consequences may persist for years. This is precisely why an exchange of technical views also becomes an exchange about international responsibility. Delegations considered possible rules, guidelines, and commitments not to conduct destructive anti-satellite missile tests or tests of other destructive counter-space capabilities. They discussed the applicability of the Charter of the United Nations to outer space and possible guidelines or obligations concerning the threat or use of force and intentional acts causing temporary or permanent damage, degradation or destruction of space objects. No single approach commanded universal agreement. We should not suggest otherwise. Some delegations emphasize concrete behavioral restraints, other focus on the need for legally binding obligations. Still others raise questions about scope, definitions, implementations and the relationship between proposed measures and existing law. They were not obstacles to be dismissed. They were substantive questions to be examined, and they were examined with seriousness. The second cluster concerned the protection of critical space-based services for civilians and services supporting humanitarian operations, including associated ground and information infrastructure. Here, the connection between activities in orbit and human life on Earth was unmistakable. space systems, health support, communications, navigation, emergency response, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Their importance is not confined to those states that possess advanced space capabilities. Their interruption can affect people who have never seen a satellite, who have no role in a strategic competition, and who nevertheless depends upon the services it provides. Delegations explore the application of existing rules of international law possible definition of critical space-based services, transparency measures, restraints from actions capable of disrupting those services, further development of the principle of due regard, and commitments to refrain from impairing services essential to civilian populations or humanitarian operations. The questions of definition, reach, and practical application remain difficult. but there was a recognizable concern that civilian consequences of insecurity in outer space must not be treated as an afterthought. The third cluster addressed the prevention of the placement of weapons in the outer space and operational and technological measures of self-restraint designed to prevent adverse developments in state space activities. These questions go to the heart of the differing assessments of security that our group has been established to discuss. Delegations addressed the dual-use nature of space technologies and the absence of an agreed definition of a space weapon. They advanced proposals on self-restraint, transparency and confidence-building measures. no first placement of weapon in outer space, and possible prohibitions on the creation, testing, deployment, or placement of weapons. Ideas were also presented concerning system designed for anti-satellite or besides defense purposes, including proposal for dismantling such systems. These approaches reflect genuine differences in nation assessments and in view of international law. Our purpose as a working group is not to erase these differences by choosing convenient language, nor is it to transform them into a reason for silence. It is to place them before all state to examine them carefully and fairly and to determine whether there are elements from which more widely supported understanding may eventually emerge. That is slow work, sometimes frustrating work, But diplomacy worthy of the name must be able to distinguish between a position that has not yet gained acceptance and a conversation that is not worth continuing. The first is an ordinary feature of negotiation. The second would be a choice, and in my view, a regrettable one. The fourth cluster related to rendezvous and proximity operations, the safe operation of space objects, and unauthorized interference with those objects. Proximity operations can serve legitimate and peaceful purposes, yet they can also generate uncertainty as to intent and uncertainty in a sensitive security environment can lead to misunderstanding and miscalculations. Delegations examined proposals on safe and professional operations, safe separations, prior notifications, possible guidelines for rendezvous and proximity operations, national point of contact, communication channels, consultations and further transparency and confidence building measures. They also consider measures related to unauthorized interference with another state's space objects, including the alteration of trajectories, physical attachment or disruption of normal operations without prior consultations or consent. The lesson is a practical one. Predictability can lower risk. Communications can prevent an incident from becoming a crisis. Consultations can create the opportunity to clarify actions before assumptions harden into accusations. Such measures are not necessarily a substitute for legal obligations. They may, however, help establish the habits of responsible conduct and mutual understanding upon which stronger arrangements can be built. Mr Chair, taken together, our discussion showed broad support for reducing risk to the safety, security and sustainability of outer space through practical non-binding measures and consideration of legally binding obligations. We also identified areas of convergence. the protection of civilian space services, the prevention of harmful interference, greater transparency, more reliable channels of communications, and the reduction of risk of escalations. Important differences remain on definitions, on the scope and design of possible legal instruments, on priorities, and on the most effective path forward. They are real. They cannot be overcome by a rhetorical flourish a careful draft objective, or a simple passage of time. I would do a disservice to the Committee if I suggested that consensus is already within our grasp. But I would do an equal disservice if I confused the absence of immediate agreement with the absence of progress. Progress may begin with a delegation more clearly understands another delegation's concern. It may continue when a proposal is refined to address a legitimate objection. It may take shape when states agree not yet on the ultimate destination, but on the value of keeping a common road open. And this is where we must speak of trust. Trust is not an ornamental word in disarmament diplomacy. It is not a courtesy to be placed in the final paragraph of a statement. It is one of the foundations within which lasting commitments become vastly more difficult to negotiate and still more difficult to sustain. We must also be candid. Trust is a scarce ingredient in international relations today, very scarce. and it has been weakened by tensions, by conflicting threat perceptions, by accumulated disappointments, and by the broader deterioration of international atmosphere. We cannot simply announce that trust exists or command it into being through a resolution. Trust must be built, and once built, it must be maintained. That requires patience, a great deal of patience, and it requires something more, an extra measure, indeed, a renewed and replenished dose of dialogue. Not dialogue conducted merely to satisfy the schedule, not speeches delivered in parallel with no intention of hearing the answer, but patient, sustained, honest dialogue, the kind in which we ask difficult questions. listen to uncomfortable answers, return to unresolved matters, and continue working even when agreement seems remote. We need more dialogue precisely when dialogue becomes harder. We need more patience precisely when impatience is more tempting. We need more opportunities to build confidence precisely when confidence is shortest supply. That may sound paradoxical, but it is the daily logic of diplomacy. We do not build bridges because two shores are already joined. We build them because they are separated. Here again, I wish to pay tribute to all delegations without exception, to those that submitted ambitious ideas and to those that urged cautions, to those that insisted on legal commitments and to those that emphasized practical measures, to those that pressed difficult questions and to those that patiently answered them, to those that spoke often and to those that choose their words carefully. Every contribution honestly advanced has helped keep the process alive and substantive. Cooperation does not demand that the states surrender their convictions. It has something both more modest and more demanding, that they defend those convictions while respecting the right of others to defend theirs. And they examine proposal of their merits, not merely on their origin. and that they remember that a disagreement need not to become a rupture. Mr. Chair, the group will meet again for its fourth session in November. We will do in an international environment that remains challenging. Political tensions will not disappear at the entrance of the conference room. Different national priorities will not magically converge when the meeting is called to order. We should be neither naive about these realities nor discouraged by them. I thank every delegation for its professionalism, its commitment and cooperative spirit through our work. I thank the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for its invaluable support and the representatives of civil society, academia and industry for their expert contributions and perspectives. We cannot promise that our agreement will come quickly. We can promise to give it a genuine chance. And if we preserve the spirit of cooperation that all delegations have demonstrated, if we sustain the dialogue and patiently build the confidence now so scarce, we will have a strong foundation on which any meaningful future achievement must rest. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank Ambassador Foradori, the chair of the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects, for his very comprehensive remarks and his works, as well as highlighting the importance of building and maintaining trust, cooperation, and collaboration. In keeping with the established practice of the Committee, I will now suspend the meeting to afford delegations the opportunity to have an interactive discussion on the briefing we just heard through an informal question and answer session. The meeting is suspended. Does any delegation wish to make any comments or raise questions on the briefing we just heard? I.

is a pragmatic, complementary, and step-by-step approach. In this context, we welcome the substantive progress made at the third session of the OEWG on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Chair, normative and legal approaches should be mutually reinforcing elements of a common effort to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes. However, given the pace of technological development and the complexity of the current geopolitical environment, A behavior-based approach can provide more timely and adaptable responses to the challenges we face today. My delegation also believes that the wider implementation of such voluntary commitments and responsible practices can, over time, foster the confidence and common understanding needed to consider further legally binding instruments. Chair, we are living in a new space era, where space activities have become indispensable to our daily lives. Also, more countries and private companies are engaging in space activities and driving innovation. These developments underscore the growing importance of peaceful uses of outer space. Korea remains committed to this common goal. In September, Korea hosted the ROK-UN workshop on the International Space Weather Initiative in Seoul, bringing together experts from around the world to strengthen cooperation on space weather. Earlier this month, Korea successfully launched the fifth flight of our Korean space launch vehicle Nuri, KSOV-2. The launch placed 14 satellites into orbit for scientific research and other applications, including monitoring space weather, marine debris, and fine dust, which will allow Korea to further contribute to the peaceful uses of outer space. Chair, no single country can ensure a secure, safe, and sustainable outer space. As space activities continue to expand, international cooperation and the roles of COPUOS and UN OOSA are becoming increasingly important. With its growing membership, COPUOS provides an essential forum for addressing issues such as space situational awareness and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. Korea will continue to support COPUOS and UN OOSA in promoting dialogue and cooperation. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Republic of Korea. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Armenia.

Mr. Chair, Armenia promote the common interest of all in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and emphasizes the importance of the relevant articles of outer space treaty. In this vein, Armenia traditionally supports the initiatives that contribute to exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, as well as initiatives preventing an arms race in outer space. We support the peaceful use of outer space and firmly believe that it must remain a domain of peace, cooperation, and scientific progress. In 2022, Armenia launched its first satellite, developed with European technology and launched into orbit by SpaceX. Just one year later, we reached another important milestone with the first Armenian satellite fully assembled and tested by Armenian specialists. Armenia plans to establish a distributed network of ground stations that could serve not only our national needs, but also support international space missions and the growing global demand for satellite data and services. Armenia's ambitions extend beyond national development. We aim to participate more actively in international space programs and create opportunities for Armenian engineers and companies to contribute to the design, engineering, and manufacturing of complex systems and equipment for space exploration. Armenia also recognizes the growing convergence between artificial intelligence and space technologies, particularly in areas such as satellite data analysis and space situational awareness. Mr. Chair, The international responsibility must accompany the technological progress. Armenia supports stronger international cooperation on space situational awareness, responsible use of space technologies, the reduction of space debris, and efforts to prevent arms race in outer space.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Armenia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan.

peaceful use for outer space has direct national and historical significance. Baikonur connect our country to the beginning of human space flight. Kazakhstan is a party to the core United National treaties outer space, submit information, its space object to the United National register and participant of the work of the committee of the peaceful use in outer space. Kazakhstan reaffirmed the central importance of Outer Space Treaty and applicable international law, including the United Nations Charter, to activities in outer space. We support efforts to prevention of an arm race in outer space, including the political commitments on no first placement of weapons in outer space, as well the advancing the negotiation and legally binding instrument on parrots within in conference on disarmament to address the gaps in the existing frameworks. Kazakhstan support a moratorium of destructive anti-satellite testing. The debris created by such tests can remain in in orbit for years, endangering other spacecraft and limited access to space for future users. Preventing more debris is a practical measure that all states should support. Work on responsible behavior and legally binding measures should reinforce each other. Transparency and confidence building measures, including information exchange and communications channel, can reduce the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation while negotiation and legally binding instrument continue. Kazakhstan support equal access to peaceful use of space for all countries. The full text of statement will be available on e-delegate portal. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Vietnam.

Chair, Vietnam aligns itself with the statement of ASEAN and the Non-Aligned Movement. We underscore the importance of preserving outer space as a domain of peace for the benefit of all humankind. All activities in outer space must be conducted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Vietnam supports all international cooperation efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure the safety and security of space infrastructures. We further emphasize the equal and inalienable right of all states to access, explore, and use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. Vietnam welcomes the ongoing discussions within the open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and we support the pursuit of negotiation on an internationally legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We also recognize the value of developing rules, norms and principles to promote the safe, responsible, transparent and sustainable use of outer space in complementarity to a legally binding framework. Mr. Chair, Vietnam is deeply concerned about the growing risk of weaponizing and using outer space as a domain for military confrontation. We call upon all States to engage constructively in dialogue, strengthen mutual trust, including through the transparency and confidence building measures, and take practical steps to prevent miscalculations and reduce the risk of conflict and an arms race in outer space. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Vietnam. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ethiopia.

Mr. Chair.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Non-Aligned African Group.

Peaceful use of outer space is critical to advancing sustainable development, scientific progress, and fostering global cooperation. My delegation supports international cooperation in capacity building measure to ensure that all states can benefit from peaceful space activities. Outer space must remain accessible to all states on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law. Ethiopia considers the prevention of an arms race in outer space to be an urgent priority for international peace and security. An arms race in outer space would disproportionately affect states with limited space capabilities by increasing costs, creating security risks, and potentially restricting equitable access

to space.

We recognize the existing normative and legal frameworks governing the security aspects of outer space have not fully kept pace with the evolving risks and challenges. Therefore, the negotiation of an effective, universal and legally binding international instrument on PAROS should be an important long-term objective. Ethiopia emphasizes that developing and non-spacefaring states must have a meaningful voice in shaping international space security rules. Decisions concerning the future security architecture of outer space cannot be determined exclusively by states possessing the most advanced space capabilities. Mr. Chair, we recognize the importance of existing international law, transparency and confidence-building measures, and support efforts toward effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral arrangements to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the placement of weapons in outer space. The ongoing Open Ended Working Group process provides an inclusive platform for developing common understandings concerning the full range of space threats, while the Conference on Disarmament provides the appropriate forum for advancing substantive negotiations on legally binding disarmament measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. In conclusion, Ethiopia is against weaponization of outer space in all its manifestations. We reaffirm that outer space must remain a domain for useful exploration and use, and must not become an arena for armed conflict or an uncontrolled arms race.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ethiopia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Thailand.

Chair, Thailand aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the NAM and ASEAN, and the full versions of the statement will be available online. Thailand views outer space as a global commons and affirms the inalienable right of all states to explore and use it for peaceful purposes. Our region depends on satellite services for disaster management, agriculture, navigation, and connectivity. Protecting these services is therefore a matter of practical security. Thailand is concerned by the growing militarization of outer space and the development of increasingly sophisticated counter space capabilities. Such trends risk fueling an arms race, increasing the risk of miscalculation and undermining the peaceful and sustainable use of outer space. Against this backdrop, we would like to highlight three points. First, Thailand reaffirms its support for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the work of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. We encourage States to advance practical measures to protect space systems and space-based services essential to civilians and humanitarian purposes. We should build on areas of convergence to achieve consensus recommendations as the OEWG approaches the midpoint of its mandate. Second, Thailand builds norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors and legally binding measures as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Practical measures can reduce risks in the near term, while a legally binding instrument can provide a stronger foundation over the long term. Third, transparency and confidence-building measures are essential to reducing mistrust and miscalculation. Thailand supports pre-launch notifications, information exchange, and consultative mechanisms accessible to all states, including emerging space nations. However, the TCBMs can complement but cannot substitute for legally binding measures on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We also emphasize the synergy among the OEWG, the COPUS and the ITU to advance space security, sustainability and international cooperation. And lastly, as chair of the 63rd session of the Scientific Technical Subcommittee of COPUS in 2026, Thailand remains committed to promoting space sustainability, responsible space activities and the meaningful participation of all states. share. Safeguarding the responsible, peaceful and sustainable use of outer space is a shared responsibility and its benefits should be enjoyed by all. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia.

Chair, Indonesia aligns itself with the statements

delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN and wishes to add the following in its national capacity. Outer space must remain a domain of peace, cooperation and shared opportunity.

As dependence on space-based technologies grows, so do the dangers of confrontation.

Indonesia therefore shares grave concerns over threats to the security and sustainability of outer space, including weaponization and militarization, as reflected in recent declarations concerning deployment of on-orbit space control weapons. Chair, Indonesia also wish to highlight the following three points. First, we must address the growing risk of space debris and destructive activities. Orbital congestion and debris from destructive activities threaten essential civilian infrastructure and developing countries' future access to outer space. For an equatorial archipelagic country such as Indonesia, space-based services are indispensable for disaster preparedness, maritime safety, environmental monitoring, and connectivity. We urge States to refrain from destructive anti-satellite activities that generate long-lived debris and to strengthen international cooperation and information sharing in this regard. Second, we must address risk to space systems while preserving their legitimate peaceful uses. Growing counter space capabilities, harmful interference, and potentially threatening proximity operations risk deepening mistrust and endangering critical civilian services. Practical measures, including advanced notification, information sharing, and consultation, can reduce this risk. But they must complement and not substitute for a legally binding commitment. Third, and most importantly, we must make concrete progress towards a treaty on prevention of an arms race in outer space. Indonesia supports substantive negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a universal, legally binding, and multilaterally verifiable instrument on PAROS. Such an instrument must comprehensively address the full spectrum of threats, including prohibition of any weapons in outer space. Indonesia welcomes the ongoing work of the Open-Ended Working Group on PAROS in all its aspects, and encourages constructive engagement in this process. Finally, Mr. Chair, Indonesia stands ready to work with all delegations to strengthen the foundations for a peaceful, secure, and sustainable outer space. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.

We align ourselves with the statement by the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of NAMM and we deliver this statement in our national capacity. Outer space is the common ownership of all humanity and for future generations. Accordingly, we emphasize the importance of ensuring that the use of outer space remains devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes and that it is a field for international cooperation to achieve the shared interests of all member states. We welcome the initiatives aimed at regulating and governing activities and exploration of outer space to promote its peaceful use and to serve humankind without prejudice to existing international treaties and agreements relating to outer space, and without restricting the inherent right of states to the peaceful uses of outer space. We should take into account that any effort to regulate outer space activities should preserve the interests of all states. Mr. Chair, it is essential that outer space remain a peaceful domain, free from conflict and military activities. and that any form of weaponization that could cause serious harm to humanity should be prevented. We underscore the importance of enhancing TCPMs to enable the responsible and sustainable exploration of outer space by all states without discrimination, while reducing the risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and related threats. In this context, we stress the need to and activities associated with weapons capabilities in outer space and prevent attempts to destroy satellites or inflict material or cyber harm on ground stations or intercept and jam signals. We also emphasize the importance of limiting space debris over the long term. We hosted the second edition of the Space Debris Conference in Riyadh from 26th to the 27th of January, 2026, with broad international participation from 75 countries, including senior officials. and leading international experts in the space sector to review global initiatives concerned with sustainability of the space sector and to address challenges. In this regard, we are fully prepared to cooperate with all parties to support international efforts aimed at developing effective and practical solutions to address threats in outer space and to strengthen its security and sustainability. We call upon all states to conduct their activities in outer space in a spirit of responsibility and transparency to strengthen confidence and security building measures in accordance with international law and its principles, and to contribute in preventing an arms race in outer space, to achieve consensus on a legally binding and verifiable international instrument that would prevent, among other things, an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Myanmar.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Myanmar aligns with the statement of ASEAN and NAMM. Mr. Chair, outer space is the shared domain of humanity. Its peaceful explorations and use are essential for sustainable development, scientific advancements, and international cooperation. However, growing geopolitical tensions, increasing military activities, and the risk of weaponization of outer space continue to threaten international peace and security. Myanmar reiterate that preventing an arms race in outer space remain an urgent priority. At the same time, Myanmar reoffends the right of all states to explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes without discrimination. We emphasize the importance of international cooperation, capacity building, and equitable access to space technology, particularly for developing countries. At the same time, the dual use nature of space technology requires greater responsibility to prevent their misuse for military purposes that threaten civilian lives. Mr. Chair, again, this backdrop, we are seriously concerned about the expanding cooperation between the military hunter and a major space foreign state in satellite technologies. Recent developments, including reported agreements on satellite imagery acquisitions and ongoing satellite data collections, have heightened concern over their potential military applications. Since the illegal military coup in February 2021, the military hunters continue atrocities against civilians, particularly its indiscriminate area attacks has claimed thousands of lives and inflicted immense suffering on the people of Myanmar. In this context, the potential misuse of satellite-derived intelligence and other dual-use technology raises serious concern about the further harm to civilians. Amid the junta's continued aerial attacks against civilians, we are deeply concerned that satellite-derived intelligence and other dual-use technology could facilitate further atrocities against the people of Myanmar. We therefore urge all member states, particularly those possessing advanced space capabilities, to exercise utmost cautions and refrain from providing space-related technologies and intelligence that could be misused against civilians. Mr. Chair, outer space must remain a domain of peace and international cooperation, rather than becoming another arena for armed conflict and human suffering. And thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Myanmar. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Thank you, Mr. President. We align ourselves with the statement of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. For our delegation, a legally binding international instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space that would include preventing the placement of weapons there, should also prohibit the use or the threat of the use of force against satellites or any other types of space objects. We oppose the extension of an arms race in outer space to the refinement of space weaponry, or the presence or placement of military material in outer space. The acknowledgment by the United States on their deployment of weapons in outer space is further evidence of their unceasing quest for military dominate and imperialist domination and its notorious scorn for international law, the UN Charter, and multiple resolutions opposing such actions. With this statement, the United States further promotes the unchecked arms race, putting in grave danger the future of humanity. We are also concerned about the extensive existing spy satellite network, which is incompatible with peace and development of nations, that continues to clutter geostationary orbits with space debris. Member States have a duty to promote the use of space for exclusively peaceful purposes. Space technologies must contribute to the genuine aspirations for peace and development of all peoples, including the achievement of the goals and targets envisioned in Agenda 2030 for sustainable development. Such technologies cannot be used in any case as a means to undermine the sovereignty of nations. We firmly advocate for the respect of the legitimate right of all states to accede to outer space on an equal footing and without any discrimination and to benefit from cooperation in such spheres as training, transfer of space technologies and applications. We demand an end to unilateral coercive measures that hinder or prevent space activities for peaceful purposes in developing countries and the full effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the principles and international treaties that govern space law. We have a moral duty to preserve outer space as a common heritage of humankind for present and future generations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Greece.

Greece fully aligns with the statement.

Delivered by the EU and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity.

My country reaffirms that the five United Nations treaties on outer space, in particular the Outer Space Treaty, as well as the.

Relevant UN General Assembly sets of principles.

Constitute the cornerstone of international space law and attaches great importance to their implementation. Greece believes that outer space must remain a domain free of weapons of mass destruction. In this connection, we welcome the adoption by the UN General Assembly of Resolution 80/76 on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. We recognize the need for the international community to come together and discuss ways to reinforce space governance in the interest of maintaining a sustainable outer space.

For the benefit of present and future generations. COPUOS and its two subcommittees should remain the main platforms for an inclusive dialogue on space law and policy issues.

Mr. Chair, peace cannot be achieved without preventing an arms race in outer space. The goal of PAROS.

Is achievable by a combination of legally binding and non-legally binding tools based on capabilities and behaviors.

An approach based on responsible behaviors offers a more realistic framework to improve space security today, given the dual-use nature of.

Of many space systems without excluding the possibility of new legally binding instruments in the future.

My country acknowledges that the ongoing.

Discussions within the Open-ended Working Group on PAROS in all its aspects contribute to better understanding of different positions.

We hope that the upcoming fourth session will result into achieving more convergence of views.

We recall that 38 UN member states, including Greece, have committed themselves not to conduct destructive direct ascent anti-satellite.

Missile tests, and we...

And we encourage all states to make such a commitment.

We support.

Continuing discussions aiming to enhance international understanding on technical issues related to definition, verification, and attribution concerning anti-satellite missile tests. To conclude, Greece will continue to engage actively in the dialogue on the prevention of an arms race in outer.

Space, as it does for the.

Promotion and deepening of international cooperation in the space domain and the conduct of space activities in accordance with.

National law.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Greece. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria.

The statement. Chair, we align with the statement by the European Union. We are deeply concerned about current dynamics threatening to turn outer space into another unstable arena for military conflict. The fragility of space and space infrastructure demands our urgent attention. We are particularly concerned about the potential humanitarian consequences of a conflict in outer space on Earth. Austria is therefore highly supportive of multilateral efforts to reduce threats, strengthen security, and prevent an arms race in outer space, which would come to the expense of the security and interest of all humankind. The deployment of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destructions in outer space is strictly prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty. We emphasize that international law fully applies to outer space. This includes the UN Charter, the five UN treaties on outer space, and international humanitarian law. We encourage states that have not yet done so to ratify all outer space treaties. Mr. Chair, the OEWG on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects offers a holistic approach, building upon existing work streams and longstanding multilateral efforts to address normative issues. While we support the long-term goal to fill the legal gap, we also highlight the role that practical behavioral measures can make to reduce risks, avoid escalation in outer space, and build trust. The development and testing of kinetic anti-satellite capabilities is of great concern to us. It endangers the peaceful use of outer space, raises threat perceptions, and creates extensive space debris. We call on all states that have not yet done so to join the commitment to refrain from conducting destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite tests. We are equally concerned about the conduct of non-kinetic and cyber attacks on outer space systems, accountability for which is difficult to ascertain. We hope for recommendations resulting from the OEWG in this regard. Mr. Chair, the Hague Code of Conduct is the only transparency and confidence-building instrument covering both ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. We welcome the recent establishment of a troika and consensual press release. We continue to support efforts to examine how the code can contribute most effectively to outer space situational awareness in complementarity with the convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Outer space must remain the province of all humankind as set out in the Outer Space Treaty, and it needs all of our engagement to ensure it does. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Austria. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on the Disarmament of Brazil.

Mr. Chair, Brazil remains deeply concerned about deteriorating security in outer space. The integration of space capabilities into military doctrines, development of counter space technologies, and announced placement of weapons in orbit bring us dangerously closer to an arms race. The openization of the outer space would exacerbate strategic instability and nuclear risks, jeopardize essential civilian service, and disproportionately affect developing countries increasingly dependent on space infrastructure. Mr. Chair. Brazil welcomes the substantive discussion initiated within the Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects. This unified process, to which Brazil actively contributed, represents an important multilateral achievement. The Group's comprehensive mandate offers an opportunity to overcome long-standing divisions and address all dimensions of space security. Its work should build on previous processes and translate areas of convergence into substantive recommendations. Brazil considers the placement of weapons in outer space and development of counter-space capabilities mutually reinforcing threats requiring joint action. We remain committed to negotiating a legally binding instrument on PAROS. Voluntary norms, transparency and confidence building measures and responsible behavior should complement, not replace, binding commitments. Mr. Chair, the international community must adopt concrete measures to prevent destructive activities, reduce miscalculation risks, and protect critical space infrastructure. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty remains the cornerstone of international space law. Its prohibitions must be upheld, while the framework should be strengthened to address evolving threats. Outer space must remain accessible for peaceful purpose to all countries. Brazil urges all states to exercise restraint and engage constructively in preventing armed conflict in this domain. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on the Disarmament of Brazil. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Spain.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Spain endorses the statement of the European Union and would like to make the following comments in its national capacity. We are firmly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well as to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and to reducing risks that could affect essential space-based services. We cannot allow for international tensions to compromise the security and sustainability of the space environment. At the same time, we must also ensure that new technologies and the involvement of new actors genuinely contribute to the development of a peaceful, stable, and secure space environment for the benefit of all. We reiterate the obligation to ensure full respect for international law and international treaties in force on space, whose universalization is a matter of urgency and priority. and particularly the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 must be fully complied with. We recall that international humanitarian law is equally applicable in outer space in the event of an armed conflict, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in an attack. Spain condemns destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests and supports a voluntary moratorium on this, which we have committed to at the national level together with a growing number of other states. We invite other states who have not yet done so to join this initiative. Spain has been actively participating since the beginning in the dialogues of the working group on PAROS, as we believe that it is urgent to agree on measures that would prevent an arms race in outer space. This is based on our, in this regard, we understand that norms of responsible state behavior and risk reduction measures can contribute to this and they can lay the groundwork once a sufficient basis exists for future legally binding, specific and verifiable commitments. We promote transparency and confidence building measures, which we believe are essential to move forward in this process. We support information exchange and pre-launch notification initiatives as provided for in the Hague Code of Conduct. And we encourage all states to subscribe to it and to fully implement its provisions. Thank you very much, Chair.

I thank the disarmament representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Spain. Now I give the floor to the disarmament representative of Ghana.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity. Ghana reaffirms its commitment to preserving outer space as a domain of peace, cooperation, and shared opportunity. space applications advance sustainable development. Offering vital tools for agriculture, communications, climate monitoring, disaster management, and scientific discovery among several other benefits. Humanity can derive from space technology. Their protection is therefore essential to sustainable development. Ghana's cabinet has approved the establishment of a space of a Ghana space agency and work is underway to develop the necessary legislative institutional framework to advance this. This initiative reaffirms our commitment to the peaceful application of space science and technology in advancing national development. Mr. Chair, Ghana remains concerned about the weaponization of outer space and its related activities that threaten space systems and reiterates the importance of compliance with international law, including the Outer Space Treaty, in the UN Charter, in the management of the space governance architecture. We reiterate our support for substantive multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding, multilateral, viable instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Transparency and confidence building measures remain valuable compliments to this objective, but cannot substitute for legally binding obligations. Ghana supports inclusive multilateral dialogue to reduce misunderstanding, build trust, and strengthen cooperation. Mr. Chair, Ghana maintains that all states, irrespective of their level of development, must enjoy equitable and non-discriminatory access to peaceful uses of outer space. we support stronger international cooperation, capacity building, and knowledge sharing to enable developing countries to benefit fully from space technologies consistent with the aspirations of African space policy and strategy within the framework of agenda 2063. The intentional creation of space debris through destructive and satellite missile testing remains a major concern for Ghana due to its ramifications on the future exploration and use of outer space. Accordingly, efforts to address these risks must safeguard the long-term sustainability of outer space without restricting the development of peaceful...

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Ghana. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of United States of America.

Thank you, Chair. Space activities power our way of life, drive economic development, and enable our shared security. All nations share a common interest in advancing these benefits by maintaining stability in space, but we must acknowledge the fundamental reality: space has long been weaponized. The chief proponents of longstanding UN space initiatives, Russia and China, have been developing, testing, and operationalizing weapons for years. Just last weekend, Russia's Ministry of Defense satellite, Kosmos-2612, exhibited threatening behavior by intentionally maneuvering dangerously close to a commercial satellite. These behaviors appear consistent with an on-orbit weapons operation. The decision to conduct these activities was deliberately reckless and violated long-established safety thresholds in low Earth orbit. The United States believes these maneuvers are being conducted in an unprofessional manner and do not reflect the behavior of a responsible spacefaring nation. We call on Russia to be transparent about what this satellite was doing in orbit. Focusing our efforts on creating a treaty that would purport to ban weapons in space would not change this reality. We must instead move beyond calls to focus solely on an ineffectual and unrealistic legally binding arms control measure, which would inevitably be violated by its proponents while interfering with our ability to defend against those who would cheat on their obligations. Developing non-legally binding measures centered on voluntary behaviors practiced by space operators is the most practical way to reduce the risk of tensions arising from misperceptions and miscalculations. Voluntary norms, rules, and principles of behavior can reduce risks and are the most practical solutions to address space threats. Widespread adoption and continued practice of these behaviors can establish norms that allow all to understand operators intent, including for national security. The proposals contained in some annual resolutions for legally binding instruments that these two governments support, including further practical measures and no first placement, are unverifiable and hypocritical. They must be rejected. As we approach the 60th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty, the United States reiterates our call for all nations to accede to OST. We call for those who are parties to honor their obligations to comply with Article 4's provision prohibiting the placement in orbit around Earth on any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. This prohibition originated in a GA resolution, demonstrating that the work we do to develop shared understanding of behaviors can help inform states' further development of legally binding measures. Put another way, we have seen how widespread voluntary practice of norms, rules, and principles of behavior over time and with trust among nations can meaningfully reduce risks into and from space. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of United States. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Next year, we will mark the 60th anniversary of the entry into force of the Outer Space Treaty. The importance of outer space has been increasing significantly, and its use impacts every fabric of our lives. It is in the common interest of present and future generations to ensure and maintain the security, stability, and sustainability of outer space activities. As outer space has become a major arena for geopolitical competition in diplomacy, defense, economic activities, and intelligence, there is a pressing need for effective measures to mitigate and reduce risks and threats in this domain. Japan once again underscored the importance of the Outer Space Treaty at the cornerstone of the international legal framework governing this critical domain and the urgency for States parties to implement or operationalize the treaty's obligations. In this regard, Japan recalls the importance of General Assembly Resolution 79/18, which calls for compliance with existing legal obligations. Mr. Chair, Japan believes that advancing norms, rules, and principles is an essential starting point for mitigating and reducing space risks and threats posed by destabilizing and irresponsible space activities. In Geneva, the OEWG on PAROS, in all its aspects, is guiding us in deepening our understanding of the current state of risks and threats in outer space. Japan emphasizes the importance of inclusive, holistic and comprehensive dialogues with multi-stakeholder engagement. In this regard, Japan welcomes the joint statement delivered by ASEAN member states in July this year at the OEWG. Japan strongly supports the continuation of discussions on norms, rules, and principles that could reduce space risks. In particular, Japan stresses the importance of the moratorium on destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile testing. Japan considers this a practical way forward in achieving the objectives of PAROS by reducing destabilizing space activities that could result in misperception, mistrust, and miscommunication among actors, by mitigating risks and threats associated with those risks, and by paving the way for our collective actions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Chair. The UK supports the EU statement on space, and I have a few remarks to say in our national capacity. Chair, competition in outer space is accelerating. It is characterized by the increased development and use of counter space and dual use capabilities, including ground based and in orbit systems. In an increasingly contested era, we must recognize the risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation that may come from the use or testing of these capabilities. The stakes are high. A conflict involving space could undermine the significant economic, societal and security benefits provided by satellites and lead to serious strategic and humanitarian consequences. Chair, our starting point for avoiding these consequences must be full compliance with existing international law, which remains relevant and applicable to contemporary space threats. In particular, we emphasise the importance of compliance with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, prohibiting the use of force, and Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty, prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit. Many states have called for new legally binding measures to address threats in outer space. The UK has engaged constructively with such proposals and has been clear consistently that any instrument should be capable of effective verification, address relevant risks in a meaningful way, and contribute to reducing the likelihood of misunderstanding or escalation. Where proposals for legally binding measures are verifiable, workable, and capable of commanding broad support, they deserve serious consideration. An example would be the destructive testing of direct descent anti-satellite missiles, which could generate long-lived debris and potentially pose risks to all space users. Chair, banning the placement of weapons in space cannot provide an effective solution. Robust verification remains challenging. Space objects are distant, move at high velocity, and often conceal their payloads within their structures. Without credible verification, states could secretly deploy prohibited capabilities in space while others comply with their obligations. This creates asymmetric risks, increasing mistrust and undermining strategic stability. Risk reduction offers a more practical approach to mitigating the risks of increased competition in space. Non-legally binding norms, guidelines and confidence building measures can enhance transparency and predictability, reducing the risk of misunderstanding and unintended escalation. Priority areas to address include debris-generating tests, actions that affect civilian infrastructure, unsolicited close approaches, and transparency around ambiguous activities. The UK stands ready to work with all states to advance practical measures that reduce risks and enhance the long-term stability of the space domain.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. As an emerging spacefaring nation, Turkey promotes responsible state behavior as well as transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. We welcome the constructive discussions at the open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects in Geneva. Turkey looks forward to deepening our common understanding on preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict. We hope that OEWG will deliver effective and verifiable measures that strengthen security, stability, and sustainability in outer space. Against this backdrop of growing pressures on the international determination and security architecture, sustained international cooperation and effective multilateralism remain indispensable. Turkey remains ready to contribute constructively to efforts aimed at preserving outer space for peaceful purposes and ensuring it is safe, secure, and sustainable use for benefit of all. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore.

Singapore aligns itself with the statements delivered by Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN and by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. We wish to make additional points in our national capacity. As we increasingly rely on space-based systems to tackle modern and global challenges, such as climate change, we are made even more aware of the risks of their disruption. It is therefore critical that we continue to preserve outer space as a global commons and ensure that states live up to their collective responsibility in ensuring its peaceful, responsible, and sustainable use by all. I will make the following three points. First, a rules-based approach anchored in international law must remain the foundation for the exploration and use of outer space. As party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Singapore reiterates the importance of ensuring that outer space is explored and used for peaceful purposes. At the same time, there is increasing urgency to develop a common governance framework, building upon states' obligations in the OST, to address space security challenges. Singapore supports continued discussions on all practical approaches towards such a framework, including through the development of non-legally binding norms or a legally binding and verifiable instrument. These are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Against this backdrop, we welcome the substantive discussions at the third session of the OEWG on PIROS in all its aspects in July this year, which seek to advance such discussions. Second, concrete steps must be taken to enhance transparency and confidence-building between States, particularly among those with spacefaring capabilities. The growing complexity and dual-use nature of space activities increase the risks of misunderstanding, mistrust and miscalculation. To reduce such risks, We encourage Member States to build on areas of existing consensus, including the 2013 GGE on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, and the 2024 GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Singapore reiterates our support for the transparent conduct of outer space activities, including advanced notification for proximity operations, and prior consultation and/or consent for rendezvous operations, to the extent practicable. to reduce the risk of misinterpretation with potentially serious consequences. Third, discussions on outer space security must remain inclusive. As space activities have global consequences, it is essential that all states, including small and developing states, have the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to discussions on outer space security. ASEAN is doing its part in that respect. In our region, initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Peace and Security in Outer Space held in November 2025 have helped promote continued dialogue and a shared understanding of outer space security challenges. To conclude, the preservation of a sustainable, secure, and stable outer space environment must remain a shared priority. Singapore will continue to work constructively with all the

I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran.

We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM. The Outer Space Treaty provides the foundation for preserving outer space for peaceful purposes. Yet the actions and policies of the US and the Israeli regime are undermining this objective. The U.S. has deployed weapons in outer space, established its space force, designated space as a warfighting domain, and pursued initiatives such as Golden Dome. It has employed offensive military space capabilities in its aggression against Iran. We strongly condemn the U.S. and the Israeli regime for their destructive policies and activities, which threaten international peace and security and accelerate an arms race in outer space. During the recent aggression, Iran's peaceful civilian space infrastructure, including university facilities and scientific and research centers, was damaged. We strongly condemn these attacks as violation of the UN Charter and international law, undermining a state's legitimate rights to explore and use outer space peacefully. The weaponization of outer space extends beyond a state military programs. The exploration of commercial satellite systems, including Starlink, for reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and targeting in military operations against Iran is extremely alarming. Such practices turn civilian services into instrument of aggression, blur the distinction between civilian and military applications. Equally concerning is the continued unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals in Iran. Despite repeated Radio Regulations Board decisions since 2023 calling for the cessation of unauthorized transmissions, the administration concerned, particularly those of the US and Norway, have failed to act. This disregard for Iran's sovereignty and international telecommunications regulations is unacceptable. Under the Outer Space Treaty, states bear international responsibility for national space activities and must authorize and supervise non-governmental activities. No states can evade its obligations by outsourcing military functions to commercial operators. These developments underscore the urgency of multilateral action and the inadequacy of voluntary measures. must commence negotiations on a comprehensive, legally binding, and non-discriminatory instrument prohibiting the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects or from outer space against any state. The Russia-China draft PPWT provides an important basis for these negotiations. The full text of the statement will be submitted to the Secretary.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Nigeria aligns itself with the statement delivered by NAM and that of the African Group. I wish to make the following remark in our national capacity. Nigeria reaffirmed its commitment to the prevention of an arm race in outer space and the preservation of outer space as a domain of peace, cooperation, and shared benefit for all humanity. We remain concerned that growing geopolitical tension, emerging military technologies, and the increasing reliance on space-based infrastructure could heighten the risk of conflict and undermine international peace and security. My delegation underscores the urgent need to strengthen the existing international legal framework through a legally binding and verifiable instrument prohibiting the placement of weapons in outer space and preventing the threat or use of force against space objects. Such an instrument should be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the principle of peaceful uses, non-appropriation and equitable access enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Nigeria welcomes the establishment of the consolidated open-ended working group on PAROS and encourages constructive engagement towards achieving substantive progress during its mandate. We equally reiterate our call for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on comprehensive and multilaterally verifiable instruments to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Mr. Chair, Nigeria recognizes the important role of transparency and confidence-building measures in reducing mistrust and preventing miscalculations in outer space activities. We therefore encourage all We will therefore encourage all states, particularly those possessing advanced space capability, to exercise restraint and refrain from action that could destabilize the space environment. My delegation wishes to reiterate that the benefit of peaceful space exploration and technology must remain accessible to all nations, irrespective of their level of scientific and technological development. In this regard, we support enhanced international cooperation, transfer and capacity building to enable developed country to a next phase application for sustainable development, disaster management, environmental monitoring, and social economic advancement. In general, we trade that the prevention of arm race in outer space is a collective responsibility. We call upon all member state to demonstrate a new political will, strengthen multilateral cooperation, and advance concrete legal and binding, legal binding measure to ensure that outer space remain a domain of peace, security and sustainable development for present and future generations. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of United Arab Emirates.

Mr. Chair, the United Arab Emirates underscores the importance of preserving outer space as a shared resource, offering immense opportunities for all humanity. We stress the need to reinforce the principles of peaceful use of outer space, ensuring that scientific progress and technological knowledge serve sustainable development and strengthen peace and security on Earth. The UAE commends the United Nations efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. Advancing this objective requires stronger multilateral cooperation. and the full compliance by all states with the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. We also call on the states to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction or other weapons in Earth's orbit or elsewhere in outer space, preserving its peaceful character and keeping it free from threats. Mr. Chair, responsible straight behavior in outer space is essential for strengthening space security and building mutual trust. This requires adherence to relevant international agreements, practical measures to reduce the risks associated with space activities, and efforts to prevent sensitive technologies from reaching non-state actors. In this regard, we call for greater exchanges in information and expertise to raise awareness and advance the best practices for the safe and sustainable use of outer space. The UAE reaffirms the sovereign rights of all states to access and use outer space for peaceful purposes and share equitably in its benefits, enabling developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capabilities. It's vital to ensure that these benefits improve the quality of life and support the achievement of sustainable development goals. We look forward to continuing efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects and to promote responsible state behavior, preserving outer space as a safe, sustainable domain for generations to come. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of United Arab Emirates. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine.

Chair, Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. We would like to make a few additional remarks in our national capacity. Ukraine remains firmly committed to preventing an arms race in outer space and preserving outer space as a safe, secure, and sustainable environment for peaceful exploration and use by all states. Ukraine reaffirms that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and international humanitarian law, applies to activities in outer space. We believe that preventing an arms race in outer space requires practical measures to strengthen transparency, predictability, and responsible behavior. Ukraine, therefore, supports the development of clear norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior in outer space. Regrettably, certain states continue to exploit outer space for military purposes, pursuing activities that threaten security and sustainability of outer space. Russia's actions, in particular, are demonstrate how responsible military activities can endanger the space environment and undermine international peace and security. In November 2021, Russia conducted a destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile test, generating thousands of pieces of orbital debris and

threatening the safety of spacecraft.

Of particular concern is the information presented by the United States regarding Russia's development of a space-based nuclear device intended for deployment in low Earth orbit. The deployment and potential use of such a weapon could have catastrophic and indiscriminate consequences, destroying or disabling satellites and severely disrupting essential services on which billions of people depend. Let us be absolutely clear, the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth would constitute a flagrant violation of Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty. Ukraine takes very seriously the information presented by the United States in this committee this morning concerning Russia's military satellite, Kosmos-2612. These revelations raise grave concern and further underscore the growing threats posed by Russia's military ambitions in outer space. against the backdrop of Russia's persistent disregard for international law and its record of irresponsible actions. Such developments underline that any unprovoked escalation should face a focused international response rather than harsh rhetoric. However, modern threats have gone beyond purely orbital objects. The Russian Federation is using in its war of aggression against Ukraine intermediate-range ballistic missile systems and advanced exoatmospheric missiles. Those flight trajectories pass directly through international outer space. This constitutes an unprecedented use of outer space for carrying out terrorist attacks against the civilian population and critical infrastructure of Ukraine. The use of such weapons to attack Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure demonstrates the need for comprehensive discussions of threats involving space-related technologies. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya.

Thank you, Chair. We would like to congratulate you for presiding over our meetings. We align ourselves with the statements of the African Group, the Arab Group, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Outer space is not merely a domain of scientific exploration. It has become an essential pillar of sustainable development, communication, climate monitoring, and human and economic security for all states. For this reason, we follow with great concern the accelerating militarization of outer space and the escalation of geopolitical competition. which constitute warning signs of potential conflicts and wars. The persistent absence of a legally binding instrument preventing an arms race in outer space threatens international stability and exposes a vital infrastructure to the risk of destruction or harm with potentially disastrous consequences for humanity. In this regard, we would like to stress the following: We reiterate What follows? First, the peaceful nature of outer space. Outer space is the province of all mankind, and as such, it should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and in the service of human development. We categorically reject any attempt to weaponize outer space, including the placement of weapons in outer space. Second, transparency and confidence building. We call for the strengthening of the TCBMs, as well as for the implementation of existing international legally binding instruments and the development of new ones capable of keeping pace with the challenges posed by emerging technologies. Third, the right to equitable access. Access to space technologies and the applications should be guaranteed to all states, particularly developing countries, without discrimination. In conclusion, We reiterate our commitment to international cooperation aimed at ensuring the security and sustainability of outer space for future generations. We further stress that security in outer space is an integral part of international peace and security. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent observer of OLCI.

Mr. Chair, human activity in outer space continues to expand at a remarkable pace. Space-based technologies have become integral to communication, navigation, scientific research, and many other aspects of modern life, while offering significant opportunities for cooperation and integral human development. Given this growing reliance on outer space, its preservation for peaceful purposes is a collective responsibility.

Outer space has also become increasingly important in economic, military, and security terms.

However, its militarization poses serious risks that could jeopardize the peaceful use of space,

as well as the continuity of essential civilian services.

Furthermore, the competition for strategic advantage and development of counter space capabilities

increase the risk of escalation, weaponization, and an arms race.

In this regard, my delegation remains deeply

concerned that the international community has not yet reached a formal consensus on banning all types of weapons related to outer space. While the existing legal framework prohibits the placement in orbit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, it does not comprehensively prohibit other types of weapons in outer

space.

The gap is becoming increasingly concerning as new capabilities are being developed that could disrupt, disable, or destroy satellites and other space systems. Such developments could have consequences that extend far beyond the space domain. The destruction of satellites could generate longstanding debris that would endanger space activities and jeopardize the services upon which societies are increasingly dependent.

Furthermore, the prospect of warfare extending into outer space also

raises serious questions regarding self-defense and the application of international humanitarian law. Mr. Chair, nearly years after the adoption of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, its foundational principles remain as essential as ever.

Outer space must be explored

and used for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, regardless of their level of economic or scientific development. It should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the promotion of the common good, rather than for the exclusive benefits of individual states or private actors, which would only lead to further strategic competition and conflict. Preserving these principles requires renewed efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. The Holy See, therefore, continues to support progress towards effective, legally binding measures in this regard. as well as transparency and confidence-building measures to reduce mistrust and the risk of miscalculation. At a time when conflicts and mistrust are already putting severe strain on the international order, humanity ought not afford to extend an armed race beyond the Earth. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished permanent observer of the policy. And the committee, I just heard the last speaker on the cluster on outer space. and 62 delegations made statements this year compared to 61 statements last year. Excellencies, additional delegates, the committee will now begin its thematic discussions under the cluster on conventional weapons. The first speaker on the list of speakers is the distinguished representative of Indonesia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The full version of this statement is provided to the Secretariat. NAM continues to affirm the sovereign right of states to acquire, manufacture, export, and import, and retain conventional arms and relevant parts, components and ammunitions for their self-defense and security needs. NAM expresses its concern about unilateral coercive measures in this area and emphasize that no undue restriction should be placed on the transfer of such arms. NAM recognizes the significant imbalance in the production, possessions, and trade in conventional weapons between industrialized and the non-aligned countries. and calls for a significant reduction in the production, possessions, and trade of conventional weapons by industrialized states, with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security. NAM remains deeply concerned over the illicit transfer, manufacture, and circulation of small arms and light weapons, and their excessive accumulations and uncontrolled spread to unauthorized recipients in many regions of the world. NAM reiterates the importance of capacity building on through life conventional ammunition management and welcomes the establishing a standing dedicated fellowship training program. NAM state parties to the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention reiterate their commitment to the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan and the CMR-AP-ANGKOR Action Plan 2025-2029 and further express their disappointment regarding state parties that have recently withdrawn or announced decisions to withdraw from the Convention, which represents a regrettable reversal of commitments toward the objective of a mine-free world. NAMMRE reiterates its condemnation of the ongoing Israeli military aggressions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including military aggressions on the Palestinian people and condemns the occupying power's indiscriminate shelling and bombing of Palestinian civilian areas. Expressing grave concern over the reported use in civilian areas of harmful and potentially fatal incendiary weapons, such as white phosphorus, NAMR reiterates its call for a thorough investigation into this serious matter by relevant bodies under the appropriate international conventions and agreements. Nam State parties to the CCW welcome the conclusion of the GGE on laws, which on for September 2026 adopted its substantive report by consensus. Nam State parties to the CCW look forward to the seventh review conference of the CCW in November 2026 and call for an ambitious negotiating mandates building upon the substantial work already undertaken. with a view to negotiating an appropriate legally binding instrument on laws. NAM state parties to the CCW reaffirmed that international humanitarian law continues to apply fully to all weapons systems, including the potential development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Finally, NAM expresses concerns at the record of global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development. including on fulfilling relevant commitments by developed countries. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia speaking on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Timor-Leste, speaking on behalf of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries.

Mr. Chair.

I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the member states of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, CPLP. We reiterate our deep concern regarding ongoing conflicts and call for their peaceful resolution in strict accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Chair, the current geopolitical context continues to be marked by polarization on the global stage, escalating tensions, increasing militarization, and growing illicit transfer of weapons. In 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross recorded more than 130 armed conflicts. In the same year, the United Nations documented at least 37,000 civilian deaths across 20 armed conflicts. Behind these figures lie, to a large extent, conventional weapons. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons,

which rapidly find their way into the hands of armed

groups, terrorists and criminals, prolongs conflicts and perpetuates cycles of instability and forced displacement. It is civilians who bear the most disproportionate impact.

We recall that all parties

to conflict are obliged to respect international humanitarian law and ensure the protection of civilian populations, as firearms are frequently associated with conflict-related sexual violence. The women, peace and security agenda is inseparable from arms control efforts. The 2030 agenda recognizes that there can be no sustainable development without peace. And target 16.4 calls for a significant reduction in illicit arm flows. Yet in 2025, global military expenditure reached approximately $2.89 trillion. marking the 11th consecutive year of increase. We therefore welcome the Secretary-General's call for a rebalancing of such expenditure in favour of development and human security. Mr Chair, the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which marks its 25th anniversary this year, remains the key framework for combating the illicit trade in these weapons. We welcome the adoption of the outcome document of the 9th Biennial Meeting of States and reaffirm our

commitment to its full implementation.

We also encourage preparation for the first meeting of States in 2027 of the global framework. In this regard, we wish to highlight two issues of particular urgency.

First, new manufacturing technologies, weapons produced through 3D printing and

other privately manufactured are becoming increasingly present in illicit markets. We welcome the beginning of the work of the open-ended technical expert group on this issue and underline the importance of adopting national legislative frameworks, strengthening international cooperation, ensuring best practices. Second, regional cooperation within the CPLP, the Council of Police Chiefs

has been working

to establish a network of national focal points on firearms and explosives and has created a Commission on weapons and explosives dedicated to the exchange of experiences and best practices among law enforcement. The translation into practice of the Frontex guide on firearms for border guards and custom officers illustrates the added value of our language. Mr. Chair, conventional weapons continue to claim more lives than any other category of weapons. In line with the Pact for the Future, the CPLP reaffirms its commitment to reducing the human cost of weapons, advancing human security, and for a multilateralism capable of transforming commitments into results.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Timor-Leste speaking on behalf of the community of the Portuguese-speaking countries. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of New Zealand, speaking on behalf of CAANGS group.

Thank you, Chair. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand remain deeply concerned by the civilian suffering caused by armed conflict. From Gaza and Ukraine to Sudan and Myanmar, conventional weapons are destroying lives and essential services, while explosive remnants of war prevent communities from returning home. As just one example, the Cluster Munition Monitor recorded more than 1,000 people killed or injured by cluster munitions in 2025. 87% were civilians. These weapons continue to cause harm long after fighting has ended. Chair, international humanitarian law provides the legal foundation for protecting people affected by armed conflict. All parties must comply with its rules, including those governing distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Violations by one party do not release another from its obligations. The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons give practical effect to this protection by prohibiting or restricting particular weapons. These conventions have saved lives, enabled the destruction of stockpiles, and helped communities reclaim contaminated land. Recent withdrawals from humanitarian disarmament treaties risk weakening these achievements. Growing insecurity makes their protections more important. Cairns reaffirms its commitment to these instruments and urges States Parties to implement their obligations fully, particularly during conflict. We urge universal adherence and call on all states to refrain from actions that undermine the norms these treaties establish. The Arms Trade Treaty also has a vital role. Its implementation requires rigorous export risk assessments and compliance with its transfer prohibitions. Decisions must account of the risk that arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL. We call on all states to support the first committee resolutions promoting these instruments. We also encourage all states to endorse and implement the political declaration on explosive weapons in populated areas, the safe schools declaration, the declaration for the protection of humanitarian personnel, and to support and engage with the ICRC global IHL initiative. These political commitments complement states' existing legal obligations to guide policy and practice, helping to protect civilians, safeguard access to education, and keep humanitarian personnel safe. Implementation requires sustained investment, including in training armed forces to better understand their obligations under IHL, to prevent incidental loss of life and injury to civilians, and ensure accountability for violations. It also requires support for mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Programs must respond to the different needs of all persons, including persons with disabilities, and involve affected communities in their design. Chair, protecting civilians requires consistently upholding and respecting international humanitarian law, as well as international human rights law, and sustaining support for those living with the consequences of conflict. that remains our shared responsibility. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand, speaking on behalf of Cairns. The committee will now hear from the distinguished permanent representative of Cambodia, speaking on behalf of Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of ASEAN. ASEAN align itself with the statement of the NAM delivered by Indonesia. The full statement will be available on e-statement. The international community continue to confront a complex and consistently, increasingly precocious security environment amid persistence and devastating impact of the conventional weapons and civilian populations. ASEAN remain deeply concerned about the illicit trade, diversions, and misuse of these weapons, which fuels conflicts, violence and instability. Mr. Chairman, ASEAN reiterates that the implementation of the relevant international agreements on the conventional weapons should align with the core principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, with states bearing the primary roles. ASEAN recognizes the legitimate right and authority of sovereign nations to acquire and manage their conventional inventories, as well as use conventional weapons to maintain internal securities and to defend territorial integrity, while understanding the need to address the growing illicit proliferation of conventional weapons, which hampers economic and social progress and threaten peace and security. ASEAN welcomes the report of the 9th Biennial Meeting of the States held from 1st to 5th June this year in New York. and reaffirms its commitment to the full and effective implementation of the programme of actions and international tracing instruments. Mr Chair, ASEAN is committed to further strengthen cooperation among ASEAN member states in the collective effort to prevent, counter and combat transnational crimes, particularly those identified as priority area under the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime. ASEAN reiterates its commitment to curb the illicit smuggling of firearms and their ammunitions through enhanced information exchange, practical cooperation, and capacity building. ASEAN commands the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center as the center and and recognizes its essential role in addressing the humanitarian and social economic challenges posed by the landmine and explosive remnant of war. ASEAN expresses concern about the possible negative consequences and impact of the autonomous weapon systems on global security and regional and international stabilities, including the risk of an emerging arm race, lowering the threshold of the conflict and proliferation, including the non-state actors. In conclusion, ASEAN reaffirms its steadfast commitment to promoting responsible conventional weapons management and strengthening regional and international cooperation in regulating the flow of these weapons and preventing their illicit trade. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Cambodia, speaking on behalf of ASEAN. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Libya on behalf of the Arab group. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, The Arab League attaches particular attention to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, particularly in light of their devastating repercussions and incessant illicit flows in the Arab region, as well as the actions of certain governments that provide terrorists and armed groups, illegal groups, with such weapons. groups which violate international law and a number of Security Council resolutions. We stress the importance of the United Nations program of action to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. We stress the need to preserve the value of that plan of actions as a consensus, consensual basis for eradicating this phenomenon. We believe that any measure taken within the framework of the plan of action must not be run counter to the inalienable right of states under Article 51 of the Charter to possess these weapons for self-defense. It is also prohibited to provide these weapons unless the importing states provides its clear authorization. We call for increased international cooperation in this area and call for the program of action to to ensure that this program of action does not enter into conflict with any other international mechanisms such as those for ammunition management, financial and material assistance is necessary to implement this plan and the ammunition framework by sharing the necessary capacities with developing states based on the needs of recipient countries and without interfering in their domestic affairs. We underscore the essential role that should be played by the states that are responsible for the mines left behind after World War II. They bear the responsibility for demining. Financial support as well as technical support must be provided. as well as compensation to parties that have suffered damage. We welcome the 9th biennial meeting on the Programme of Action in June, and we look forward to the next meeting in 2027. Thank you very much.

And the distinguished representative of Libya is speaking on behalf of the Arab Group. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of European Union. speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states. You have the floor.

Thank you.

Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member states, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, sorry, that's double, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino align themselves with this statement. The EU is resolute in its support for and advancing of the humanitarian objectives of the Anti-Personal Mine Ban Convention. The convention has been critical to the protection of civilians in times of armed conflict and post-conflict, the reduction of human suffering and the restoration of land, livelihoods and development prospects in affected communities worldwide. The EU has a long track record of support for mine clearance, assistance to victims, and the destruction of stockpiled anti-personal mines. The EU remains deeply concerned by the massive contamination resulting from the use of anti-personal mines and from explosive remnants of war in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. We urge Russia to adhere to its international legal obligations, including international humanitarian law and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. We are deeply concerned by the impact on civilian populations of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions. The EU calls upon all actors to refrain from such use and to fully comply with IHL. The EU recalls that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its protocols are key instruments for and an integral part of IHL. We encourage all states to join the CCW and its protocols without further delay. The EU welcomes the work undertaken by the GGE on lethal autonomous weapons systems. The positive outcome of this process a substantive final report adopted by consensus must now form the basis for future work. We consider that the CCW is the appropriate forum to discuss the issue of Laos, and we expect the 2026 review conference to adopt an ambitious negotiating mandate for the GGE to take forward the work on an instrument without prejudging its nature and build on the set of elements of an instrument and other possible measures formulated in the latest GGE laws. We encourage continued international dialogue and cooperation to address the opportunities and challenges presented by artificial intelligence in the military domain. The EU supports, inter alia, an action-oriented approach and would support a focus on the development of TCBMs. The EU remains fully committed to preventing and curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition worldwide, also through support for the implementation of the Global Framework on Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management. Chair. The EU expresses concern over the continued severe global impact of improvised explosive devices and their indiscriminate use and effects. The EU also highlights the heavy consequences caused by the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of mines other than anti-personal mines. We recall the important adoption of the Ireland-led political declaration on strengthening the protection of civilians from the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Finally, the EU reaffirms its strong support for the Arms Trade Treaty. We call on all States parties to ratify or accede to the treaty without further delay and on all parties to comply with their obligations. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the EU, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states. The committee will now hear from the distinguished permanent representative of Austria. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. My delegation is aligned with the EU statement. The UN Charter, IHL, humanitarian disarmament treaties, and international human rights law provide essential protections for civilians and for human dignity during and after armed conflict. Yet these norms are increasingly challenged and at risk of erosion, resulting in humanitarian harm. We must defend these instruments and norms. International law must apply universally and must not be contingent on political considerations. The protection of civilians is a key priority for Austria's upcoming non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, reinforcing the links with the women, peace and security and children in armed conflict agendas and with humanitarian disarmament. Chair, anti-personal landmines and cluster munitions have been outlawed because they cause unacceptable humanitarian suffering that supersedes any arguments of military utility. We condemn We condemn their use by any actor, as well as their production and transfer. Austria remains a staunch supporter of the APMBC and the CCM, and both treaties have achieved major progress. We call on all States to join them, and on those that have withdrawn to reconsider their decisions. Austria is honored to chair the 14th meeting of States Parties of the CCM, and we will do our utmost to strengthen the Convention and to build on the successful recent third review conference. Chair, we're deeply concerned about the humanitarian consequences of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and strongly support the EVIPA political declaration, its universalization and its implementation. In 2026, Austria co-organized a regional conference with Ghana and an international military-to-military workshop with UNODA in Geneva. Chair, as Austria's Foreign Minister stated unequivocally during UNGA High-Level Week, I quote, "One of the most urgent threats today is the loss of human control over weapons. We need international rules for autonomous weapons built around one clear principle: no machine may decide to take a human life." End of quote. After 10 years of discussions, it is urgent to use the upcoming CCW review conference to agree on an ambitious negotiation mandate on laws. Chair, I therefore have the pleasure to introduce draft resolution L.37, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, on behalf of a cross-regional group of countries. The resolution again stresses the urgent need to address the challenges posed by autonomous weapons systems and calls on high contracting parties to advance to negotiations on an instrument. We hope for your support. The full version of the statement will be uploaded.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Austria to the CD for his statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished Member of Parliament of India. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. As a party to all five protocols of the CCW, India believes that its enduring strength lies in the balance it strikes between military necessity and the humanitarian imperatives, and bringing together, within a single framework, States with diverse security interests. Chair, the AP Second, balances humanitarian concern posed by landmines with the legitimate defense need of states with long borders. India has met its obligation under the protocol, including on non-production of non-detectable mines and rendering all anti-personal mines detectable. The protocol also provides a framework for addressing IEDs often deployed by terrorists and illegal armed groups. India accords high priority to IED threat mitigation and victim assistance. As an international signatory to Protocol V, India remains deeply conscious of the humanitarian harm caused by explosive remnants of war. Our India for Humanity initiative has run over 30 limb fitment camps, fitting more than 15,000 artificial limbs across several countries in recent years. Chair, further, India participated constructively and co-sponsored the first ever UN informal exchanges on AI in the military domain. India has developed a domestic framework for evaluating trustworthy AI in defense, built around five principles including reliability, safety, and transparency. Chair, India supports the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and International Tracing Instruments and works actively, including with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, based in Kathmandu, against the illicit arms trade that fuel terrorism. This year, India hosted the first ever UN Fellowship for SALW Control in Asia Pacific Region in India, bringing together 18 state representatives to enhance our collective efforts in capacity building. India remains committed to strengthening the global non-proliferation architects for conventional weapon and dual use technologies while promoting their use for peaceful purpose. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished member of parliament of India for her statement. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Nigeria speaking on behalf of the Africa group. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The African group aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the non-aligned movement. The group remains deeply concerned over the illicit trade, transfer, manufacture, possession, diversion, and circulation of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world, especially on the African continent. The group emphasizes great concern regarding the humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences of their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled and overall detrimental impact on national, regional, and international peace and security. In this regard, the African group attached great importance to the central role of the United Nations Program of Action on to prevent, combat, eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and the international tracing instrument. They are crucial multilateral instrument dedicated to fighting the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons. The group recall the adoption of the final outcome document of the fourth review conference by consensus in the implementation of the POA and the ITI held in New York from 17 to 28 June 2024, and welcome the successful convening of the ninth biannual meeting of the State Party from 1st to 5th June 2026, which offer an opportunity to renew our collective commitment to their full and effective implementation. The group also welcomed the holding of the first meeting of the Open-ended Technical Expert Group on Development in Small Arms and Light Weapon Manufacturing, Technology and Design, under the chairmanship of Sierra Leone. The group welcomed the convening of preparatory meeting of the Global Framework for Tru-Life Conventional Ammunition Management in June 2025 and the consensus adoption of its report and look forward to the first meeting of the States on the global framework to be held in 2027 Mr. chair the African group acknowledge the effort by state party to the armed trade treaty and the treaty's universalization the group take note of the convening of the 12th conference of the state party held from 25 to 28 August 2026 and urge state party to the treaty to implement in it a balance and objective manner that protect the interest of all state the group reaffirms sovereign right of state to acquire, manufacture, export, import, and retain conventional arm, conventional arms, their part, and component for their security need in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Africa continues to be at the forefront of the regions that suffer the most from the effects of illicit trade and transfer of small arms and light weapons, mainly produced outside the continent, yet acquired and used by unauthorized recipients and illegal armed groups within Africa. The African Group thus considers this session as another opportunity for the international community to renew efforts to stem the tide of small arms and light weapons in conflict, to create enabling environment for peace, security, and social economic development. It is important to state that promoting a peaceful, unfettered, and inclusive participation of nation in global action toward addressing the flow of illicit arms, particularly in Africa, will facilitate the achievement of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union Agenda 2063. The group reiterated that such assistance should not be conditional, be impeded or disrupted from the recipient state. The full statement is already uploaded on e-statement. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria speaking on behalf of the Africa Group. Distinguished delegates, I shall now call on delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I'll begin by first giving the floor to the delegations who would like to intervene under the cluster of outer space. I call on the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. President, given the continuing unfounded statement about the space activity of the Russian Federation, we are forced to take the floor again. It's clear that in their attempts to distract the attention of the international community of their own destructive steps in space, Western countries, headed by the United States, continue to use loudspeaker diplomacy, repeating absurd accusations about Russia's space activity. more than once explained the position of our country regarding the statements of these countries that have nothing in common with reality. Russian initiatives in the area of space security is aimed at launching work on international legally binding instrument prohibiting placement of any kind of weapons in space, the use of force or threat of force against space objects or using them, which unambiguously confirms our intention not to allow for an arms race in space. The openly destructive position with regard to our proposals by Western states clearly demonstrates their true intentions and plans. The recent statements by the Secretary of the Air Force, Mink, about the possession of so-called orbital arms and by the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US, Mr. Kane, about the possible conduct of military operations in the near moon space, points to the fact that aggressive military space ambitions of Washington have moved into a practical stage. The recent statements have become public confirmation that the United States possesses military capability of orbitally based military capacity. and they're preparing for aggressive actions. Now, evidence of the aggressive thrust of the US space activity remains the global air missile defense Golden Dome project, which envisions deployment of offensive means of interception technology. Now, this is increasing the threat of of military conflict in space. However, Washington, to further its rapacious ambitions, is ready to completely ignore the catastrophic consequences of the steps that it has taken for humanity. We are witnessing the blatant disregard by the U.S. of the interests of the entire international community. The so-called moratorium promoted by the collective weapons on testing direct ascent anti-satellite missiles is dripping in hypocrisy. In fact, this moratorium in reality does not affect the use of such weapons, which the United States possesses, and it does not extend to other types of anti-satellite weaponry that Washington is interested in developing. The actively promoted concept of so-called responsible conduct in space is based on illegal subjective notions and is aimed at ensuring that these states have a free hand for the use of space as an arena for military confrontation. We call on member states to give the proper response to the aggressive military space ambitions of the United States. Only through coordinated actions by the international community will we be able to stop a devastating arms race in space, which, through the efforts of Washington and its allies, is nearing the point of no return. Thank you for your attention.

I call on the representative of Finland.

Mr. Chair, FINA would like to use this opportunity to express our support for the concerns expressed by the United States regarding recent threatening behavior against a commercial satellite by a Russian satellite, Cosmos 2612. This kind of behavior is inconsistent with the proven safety thresholds in low Earth orbit and does not meet the standards of a responsibly acting space nation. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I call on the representative of China.

Mr. Chair, the U.S. representative in his statement made just now continued to distort and smear China's outer space policy and activities. China firmly opposes this and has to respond again to set the record straight. China is always committed to the peaceful use of outer space, opposes arms races and weaponization in outer space. and upholds the common interests of all countries in the peaceful use of outer space. This policy and position remains unchanged. China firmly adheres to a defensive national defense policy and has never and will never participate in any arms race in outer space. In contrast, the US, as the biggest driver of the current arms race and militarization of outer space, has a poor track record of misconduct in outer space security. The U.S. openly defines outer space as a war-fighting domain and has announced the deployment of on-orbit space control weapons, violating the principle of the peaceful use of outer space promoted by the Outer Space Treaty and seriously undermining international efforts in Paris. The U.S. has also openly announced the implementation of the Golden Dome anti-missile program, aiming to build a global, multi-layered, and multi-domain missile defense system. It has specifically proposed the deployment of space-based interceptors capable of both offense and defense, blatantly advancing the weaponization and militarization of outer space, and severely undermining global strategic balance and stability. It should be noted in particular that in order to avoid substantive constraints on the expansion of its space capabilities, the United States has long blocked negotiations on a legal instrument on Paris, and resorted to promoting non-legally binding measures like the so-called norms for responsible space behavior. Facts have proven that the so-called code of conduct for responsible space behavior cannot fundamentally prevent an arms race or the weaponization of outer space. This concept is highly subjective and is easily reduced to becoming a tool for political manipulation by certain countries. We must ask this question, are the US's actions in outer space examples of responsible behavior? Does the so-called destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile testing initiative really constrain the expansion of U.S. space capabilities in any way, especially its deployment of space-based weapons? Can the code of conduct for responsible space behavior fundamentally and effectively prevent the weaponization and militarization of outer space, Mr. Chair? Negotiating an international legal instrument on outer space arms control to address current gaps in international space law is the most fundamental and effective path to addressing current outer space security issues. Voluntary TCBMs can complement, but not substitute, this legal instrument, much less set preconditions for negotiating such an instrument. China urges the United States to stop fabricating false narratives and distracting international attention, abandon its strategy of space hegemony and its negative policies on outer space arms control, actively participate in the arms control process on outer space, and contribute to maintaining lasting peace and security in outer space. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I call on the representative of the United States.

Mr. Chair, I take the floor to respond to the comments made by Russia and Iran. The statement by Russia denying that they have weapons in outer space is precisely the reason why the United States supports practical behavioral-based approaches to stability in outer space. Countries can, of course, deny until they are blue in the face that they have weapons in orbit, but observable and confirmable behaviors are hard to deny. What you do up there speaks much louder than what you say down here. As such, I would note that Russia did not attempt to explain why a Russian military satellite moved to within tens of meters of another country's commercial satellite. The decision to conduct operations violated long established safety thresholds in low Earth orbit. Is this what the Russian delegate meant in October 2022 when he stated here at the UN First Committee that Western satellites aiding Ukraine could become, quote, a legitimate target for retaliatory strike, close quote. Again, this is why, in order to make progress, we must move away from futile efforts to ban capabilities. In this example, it is wholly impractical to ban the technology used to move a satellite. Instead, we should focus on creating shared understanding of which voluntary operational behaviors can reduce the risk of tensions arising from behaviors that could lead to misperceptions and miscalculations. Regarding Iran's statement, I'd like to respond to the hypocritical criticism of the United States for using space in conflicts. The fact is that Iran's military fully uses space in all of its operations. Iran's missiles use navigation signals from satellites for guidance when seeking to strike targets in neighboring states. Iran's military has launched missile attacks against commercial satellite infrastructure in neighboring states. Iran's military has used commercial satellite imagery it acquired to publicly show the damage its attacks have caused to neighboring states. And Iran's military has launched rockets that use ballistic missiles as part of the rocket that have placed reconnaissance satellites in orbit, all while not being a party to the Outer Space Treaty. Thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of Israel.

Thank you, Chair. Iran systematically deceives the international community at every turn. For years, the Iranian regime has used its purportedly civilian space program as a cover to advance military ambitions and develop its ballistic missile capabilities. actions that directly defy UN Security Council resolutions and pose a grave threat to regional security and stability in the Middle East. This is not an isolated phenomenon, but a deliberate and systematic pattern of hiding behind a civilian facade. This side is clearly demonstrated across Iran's space infrastructure. At the Shahrud launch site, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched the Sireh-1 and Sharmen-1 satellites aboard the Khyam-100 launch vehicles, a platform utilizing technology essential for long-range ballistic missiles. In Tehran, the Iranian Space Agency's main research center operates as dedicated research and development hub for military satellites and space capabilities. Furthermore, the Khayyam satellite, ostensibly a civilian asset, has been actively cooperated by the IRGC to advance terrorist operations. Iran's space institutes continues to be weaponized by the IRGC to orchestrate attacks and project threats across the region. In addition to expanding these programs in violation of Security Council resolutions, Iran actively disrupts civilian satellite communications, employing electronic warfare both as an offensive military tool and as a means to suppress its own brave citizens. It is therefore profoundly cynical and utterly hypocritical for Iran, the very state that routinely disguises military infrastructure under civilian cover, to accuse other nations in using civilian capabilities for military purposes. During Operation War and Lion and the United States Operation Epic Fury, Israel and the United States acted jointly in full accordance with international law to eliminate Iran's unlawful military hostile capabilities, assets weaponized to fuel terrorism and undermine stability across the Middle East. Specifically, Israel targeted ballistic missiles, manufacturing facilities, and research and development centers. installations developing anti-satellite attack weapons, launch infrastructure, and IRGC space facilities used for terrorist purposes. I thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We categorically reject the baseless allegations made by the representatives of the U.S. and the Israeli regime. It is both ironic and absurd that a regime with a long record of aggression, occupation, genocide, and violation of international law dares to lecture others on legal and technical matters. We strongly condemn the hostile and unlawful use of outer space by the US and the Israeli regime during their acts of aggression against my country in 2025 and 2026. These reckless behaviors marked a dangerous escalation in the weaponization of outer space and a blatant violation of the Charter of the Outer Space Treaty. Such actions endanger the international peace and security and must not go unanswered. Those responsible must be held fully accountable. In this regard, I draw attention to a statement made by the U.S. Secretary of the Air Force concerning the deployment of weapons in outer space and by the commander of the U.S. Space Force regarding the operational use of space capabilities during the recent aggression against Iran. The U.S. Space Force has provided operational support, secure communications, and early warning capabilities for U.S. missile defense, while also employing electromagnetic weapons stationed in Earth's orbit offensively against Iran. These statements and activities point to the deployment of weapons in orbit and their use against ground targets. Furthermore, the Israeli regime's Minister of Defense has announced the necessity of developing space-to-ground capabilities and the plans to do so. with the aim of striking Iran and other nations in the region. The international community must not allow them to convert outer space into a military domain. The representative of the United States, rather than leveling baseless allegations against Iran, should respond to the serious concerns raised by delegation under this cluster regarding his country's destructive policies and actions in outer space. including recent public statements by US officials openly and blatantly acknowledging the deployment of weapons in outer space. International law impose no restriction on the peaceful, scientific, and technological activities of Iran or any other sovereign state in the field of space research and exploration. Iran's space program is entirely transparent, peacefully, and consistent with international law. Regarding our missile program, I must emphasize that it is a conventional and legitimate defense capability. Our missiles are designed solely to deter acts of aggression, such as those committed by the U.S. and the Israeli regime in 2025 and 2026, and to safeguard our people and sovereignty. Any attempt to portray this as a threat is deceptive, politically motivated, and aimed at undermining Iran's inherent right to self-defense under the UN Charter. Linking Iran's peaceful space facilities activities to the ballistic missile development is yet another baseless pretext and excuse to justify pressure, sanctions, and hostility toward my country. Iran will continue to exercise its sovereign right in accordance with international law, and no amount of distortion or intimidation will deter us from pursuing our peaceful scientific and technological progress. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I now give the floor to the Russian Federation for its second intervention under the cluster of outer space.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to react to the unfounded statement by the delegation of the United States, the delegation of Finland, and other delegations regarding Russian peaceful space activity. Once again, we will repeat for those delegations that all Russian activity in space fully corresponds to international commitments and obligations of Russia, is purely peaceful in character and is not aimed at any states. This applies to the activity related to the Kosmos-2612 space equipment. If the US has any concerns about this activity, we have been suggesting for many years to deal with these concerns very simply by developing and adopting a legally binding instrument on preventing an arms race in space, which would prohibit the placement of weapons in space. It also would prohibit certain types of activity and would limit them. As for the attempts to distort the approaches of the Russian Federation to space activity, that supposedly they only apply to capabilities, that is not the case. We are suggesting bans and prohibitions, both on specific capabilities and certain types of activities. As for a statement in 2022, we would like to appeal to the U.S. to support the relevant draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation, which we're presenting in the fourth committee of the General Assembly, and which is aimed at prohibiting the use of civilian space satellites for non-civilian purposes. And in conclusion, I'd like to use the words of the United States itself, that the actions of the United States sound much louder than the words they speak here in the committee, and these activities should not mislead anyone. The transparency that the US demonstrates is aimed merely to promote an arms race and aimed at justifying the placement of weapons in space. Thank you.

Now, under the rights of reply for the end of today, I call on the representative of the United States.

Thank you, Chair. The United States notes the comments from the Russian delegation yesterday regarding the U.S. cooperative biological activities and wishes to exercise our right of reply in response to these repeated allegations, which were made as the last comment before we moved on to a new cluster. Let me be clear. Russia's allegations against the United States and Ukraine -- Excuse me.

There is a point of order. Russian Federation, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would like to request a clarification, as we thought that we had finished work on the second cluster yesterday. All statements under the right of reply were completed on that cluster. Today, We're not discussing-- we haven't discussed the second cluster. And at the end of today's meeting, as far as we understand it, our segments on the right of reply apply to a third cluster, space, and fourth cluster, conventional weapons. The delegation of the United States had a chance to exercise its right of reply yesterday. Today, as we see it, statements on the second cluster contradict the procedure that we agreed and our methods of work. Thank you.

I would like to remind that at its organizational meeting, the Committee decided that attendance to in exercise of rights of reply will take place at the end of each day. There were differing interpretation of this decision when more than one thematic cluster is considered at a given meeting. Yesterday, the chair proceeded with taking all statements cluster by cluster at the end of the day. Today, Once again, two thematic clusters are being considered. Delegations can exercise their rights of reply at the end of the day, but the Chair has first allowed rights of reply on the first cluster, which was concluded earlier today. The Committee is now listening to rights of reply at the end of the day. I hope this clarifies the situation. Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We completely agree with your explanations and fully ready to follow those explanations. But based on these explanations today at the end of this meeting, we have an opportunity of making statements under right of reply on the clusters that we have been discussing today, just as we did yesterday. Today, we discussed cluster three, space, and cluster four, conventional weapons. We did not discuss cluster two, other types of weapons of mass destruction. This is why we believe that it is not quite consistent with the explanations you have offered us and the decisions that have made not quite consistent to give the US the possibility of a right of reply on the second cluster. Of course, on cluster three and four, of course, but we completed our discussion of cluster two yesterday. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation in response for his interpretation and as I mentioned as a vice chair I'm giving the floor to delegations to exercise the rights of reply at the end of the day Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we understand it, we cannot claim our right of reply on any topics at the end of the day. Otherwise, we'll start to exercise our right of reply on any items of the agenda at the end of the day. and this segment could extend ad infinitum. As we understand it, from the explanations that were provided yesterday and today by you, we are exercising our rights of reply now on items that we have been discussing during this meeting. That is cluster 3, space, and cluster 4, conventional weapons. Furthermore, following the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the delegation of the United States made a national statement today, after the statements of the Russian Federation on cluster two, other types of weapons of mass destruction, and had a chance in that national statement to react to our intervention, if it felt it necessary to do so. So even taking that into account, we feel that is not quite logical or appropriate or a good idea as far as the methods of work at the committee to allow for a right of reply on cluster two now. So Mr. Chairman, we would request that we continue a right of replies on cluster three and four, which we have been discussing today. We have not discussed cluster two today. Thank you.

United States.

Thank you, Chair. Yesterday, the Russian Federation, as the final right of reply in cluster two, discussed comments, purported comments from a former US government official. to which the United States was not able to respond because the chair moved immediately afterwards into cluster three. We would like the opportunity to reply to that. I understand if the Russian Federation doesn't want to hear that reply or if the Russian Federation feels like they have not had ample opportunity through rights of replies that they have been afforded, that is an entirely different matter. Thank you.

Under the rights of reply of today, I call on the representative of the United States.

Thank you, Chair. Let me be clear. Russia's allegations against the United States and Ukraine are false. As we stated yesterday, the United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the BWC. It does not develop or possess biological or toxin weapons anywhere. all of our biological activities are for purposes fully consistent with our obligations under the BWC. This includes the cooperation and assistance activities that Russia and others seek to malign. In addition, the United States has been extraordinarily transparent about the history of our program and its elimination. In December, we held a side event on the margins of the BWC, where we shared extensive detail on the processes to destroy our biological weapon stockpiles and convert US facilities to peaceful purposes in the 1970s, processes in which we invested millions of dollars. Notably, there has not been an equal degree of transparency from the Russian Federation about its own history with biological weapons. Russia claims that we have provided no responses to its questions. In fact, we have answered those questions over and over. In a written response provided detailed information on US cooperation and assistance activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, which was shared both with Russia and with the other BWC states parties, and in statements and technical briefings at the 2022 Article 5 formal consultative meeting. It is clear that Moscow is not interested in hearing our responses to its questions, nor in engaging in good faith. But the fact is that the United States has been open and transparent about our past offensive program and its elimination, as well as the nature and details of our cooperative overseas activities. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the Russian Federation. Thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Chairman, we'd like to react to the statement of the European Union, which has tried to distort the situation on the anti-personnel ban convention. The withdrawal of neighboring countries of Russia from that convention is an example of their cavalier attitude to international legal commitments, readiness to reject any of those that are inconvenient whenever they feel it necessary. Attempts by these states to motivate these steps by so-called national security or so-called ostensible threat from Russia do not hold water. from the Convention is accompanied by a significant increase by these countries of military activities on their eastern borders, directly next to Russian borders, as well as plans to establish legal production of earlier banned munitions for the needs of the Ukraine armed forces, which clearly does not contribute to easing tensions that these states keep talking about. On a separate point, we'd like to just mention the obligations of Ukraine under the Convention and its inconsistent steps with regard to this document. The continued use by the Ukrainian armed forces of anti-personnel mines is a violation of the Convention on Banning Anti-Personnel Mines. Ukraine continues to be a party to that convention in spite of its notification of suspension of the document. In accordance with the Article 65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such a suspension can only take into effect if no objections have been raised by parties within three months. At the same At the same time, based on information we have, such objections were submitted to the Secretary General of the UN by certain member states of the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention soon after the notification by Ukraine. At the same time, obligations under the Anti-Mine Convention were not fulfilled by Kyiv even before this notification, according to the requirements of the Convention. Ukraine was supposed to, back in 2010, destroy its stockpiles of all its anti-personnel mines except a minimal amount required for developing methods of identifying means and training specialists. However, it did not do so. The use by the Kyiv regime of anti-personnel mines against civilians is regularly identified by the Russian security forces. At the same time, these violations of the convention did not lead to a response from its member states. The situation around the Convention simply confirms Russian assessments regarding the weakness of this treaty. The Convention does not have the necessary leverage on countries which, one way or another, avoid fulfilling its obligations. Unlike the aforementioned countries, the Russian Federation continues to fulfill its obligations in good faith under Protocol 2 and Protocol 5 on the Convention on inhumane weapons. With regard to the use of mines, from the very beginning of the special military operation, the Russian Armed Forces are acting in accordance with a manual on international humanitarian law for the Armed Forces of Russia. In this document, inter alia, it identifies the main requirements on the use of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Protocol II of the Convention on Inhumane Weapons. The results of our national efforts to prevent the mine threat are regularly reflected in Russian reports under the Convention on inhumane weapons and its additional protocol 2 and protocol 5. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we would request that you strictly follow the methods of work that we have agreed on. The Russian Federation will oppose the violation of these methods of work by any delegation, no matter which delegation undertakes these steps. We will not accept rights of reply on just on any clusters at the end of the day. We only discuss items that we discussed during this specific meeting or during that day. Thank you.

I call on the representative of Israel.

Requesting the right of reply.

I call on the representative of Lithuania.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In the response of.

The right of reply made just by the Russian Federation, my country would like to emphasize that Russian Federation is not in opposition to the lecture on the withdrawals from the Convention itself, is not a party to. We have witnessed Russia's deliberate targeting of civilians, Russia's extensive and indiscriminate use of cluster munitions and mines in Ukraine, and Russia's complete disregard for international humanitarian law. Russia is not a party to the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions. Lithuania's decision on the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions were not made lightly, nor in isolation. These decisions followed broad consultations domestically and with partners, and were taken in full transparency and in full accordance with the provisions of the conventions.

We continue to value the.

Humanitarian character of the conventions and recognize their important role in protecting civilians worldwide, not as Russia.

Thank you.

I call on the representative of Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Our delegation would like to exercise its right of reply to the statement made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. Russia, which is not a state party to the Ottawa Convention, has extensively used anti-personnel mines throughout its war of aggression against Ukraine, has neither the legal nor the moral authority to lecture about Ukraine's obligations. under the Ottawa Convention. We would like to remind that in 2005, Ukraine ratified the Ottawa Convention and since then has faithfully fulfilled its obligations. At the same time, the Russian Federation launched an armed aggression against Ukraine since 2014, has extensively used anti-personal mines as a method of warfare. Since 2022, when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its mass use of such means has created an asymmetric advantage for the aggressor.

We emphasize that at the time of.

Ukraine's signing and ratification of the Ottawa Convention, such circumstances did not exist and could not have been foreseen. As a result, Ukraine has found itself in an equal and unjust situation that restricts its right to self-defense, as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Ukraine is not alone and facing the difficult choice between fulfilling its obligations under the Ottawa Convention and ensuring the effective defense of its homeland from a ruthless aggressor that disregards all norms of international law. Ukraine believes that the international community must understand that the regional security situation has significantly deteriorated since Ukraine joined the Ottawa Convention. In this regard, in order to protect our country from Russian atrocities, Ukraine has made a difficult but necessary political decision to stop the implementation of certain obligations under the Ottawa Convention. In the context of Russia's ongoing genocide aimed at destroying Ukraine as a state and the Ukrainians as a nation, Ukraine is compelled to give unconditional priority to the security of its citizens and the defense of our state. This applies in particular to our state's participation in international legal instruments and mechanisms.

Thank you.

I call on the representative of EU on behalf of its member states.

Thank you, Chair. In response to Russia's right of reply, The widespread contamination of Ukraine's territory with anti-personal mines, other mines, unexploded ordnance, and other explosive remnants of war as a result of Russia's war of aggression continues to kill and injure civilians, including children, obstructs access to agricultural land and essential services, and will have severe long-term humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences. Russia must fully comply with international humanitarian law, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. Those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law must be held accountable. The EU will continue to support efforts to survey, mark, clear, and safely dispose of mines, unexploded ordnance, and explosive remnants of war in Ukraine, as well as risk education, victim assistance, and broad recovery efforts. Humanitarian demining is essential to protect civilians, restore livelihoods, and enable the safe return of displaced persons. The EU also underlines the importance of international cooperation and assistance in addressing the long-term impact of explosive hazards in Ukraine. Thank you, Chair.

I call on the Russian Federation for a second intervention.

Mr. Chairman, we'd like to react very briefly to the spurious accusations against the Russian Federation by a number of delegations who just spoke. I would like to assure all these delegations that the special military operation is being conducted by the Russian Federation in full compliance with its international obligations and previous statement under the right of reply, we provided the necessary arguments to back that up. As for the special military operation itself, I would like to assure these delegations that in full compliance with international law, the goals of the special military operations will be fully met. Thank you.

Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available for this meeting. The Committee will reconvene tomorrow, Thursday, 22 October, at 10 a.m. in this conference room, when we will continue our thematic discussion under the cluster on conventional weapons. The meeting is adjourned.