First Committee, 20th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, good afternoon. The 20th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, in accordance with the programme of work, the Committee will first hear briefings by our panelists. under the cluster of regional disarmament and security. The committee will sense then to an informal mode to afford delegations the opportunity to ask questions. Thereafter, the formal plenary will resume to allow the committee to continue its thematic discussions under the cluster. I would like to warmly welcome to the podium The Chief of the Regional Disarmament Information and Outreach Branch at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Radha Ray. Director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Mr. Anselme Abourid. Director of UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and Pacific, Mr. Dipayan Basu Ray. and Director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Ms. Soledad Urrutia. Distinguished delegates, I now give the floor to the Director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Mr. Anselme Avery. You have the floor now.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, it is an honor to address the First Committee on behalf of the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. I will highlight key regional challenges and recent progress in disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation complementing the Secretary-General's report S/2021/152. Over the past year, UNREC's investment in regional partnerships has translated into stronger institutional cooperation across Africa, connecting the African Union, regional organizations, and member states around shared arms control priorities. These partnerships are increasingly turning regional commitments into coordinated national and sub-regional action. Across Africa, the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and inadequate ammunition management aggravate conflict, terrorism, and organized crime. These dynamics are driven by porous borders, insufficient state presence and basic public services, diversion and misuse by non-state actors, sustaining demand for illicit weapons and ammunition. Illicit small arms and light weapons proliferation is also closely intertwined with illicit cross-border transfers, the illicit exploitation of natural resources, the financing of armed groups, cattle rustling, kidnapping, extortion improvised explosive device capabilities, poaching, and maritime insecurity. Rapid technological advances are further complicating efforts to mark, trace, and control weapons. The consequences are profound. This proliferation contributes to severe humanitarian and socioeconomic impacts, including the displacement of millions. ammunition storage explosions, gender-based violence, human rights violations, and intercommunal violence, while slowing socioeconomic development. For example, in 2025 alone, armed conflict caused 14.5 million displacement in sub-Saharan Africa, nearly half of the global total. In West and Central Africa, almost 15,000 schools are closed by violence, twice as many as in 2019. making the youths easy prey for recruitment by armed groups who often also traffic minerals and other natural resources for transnational criminal networks. Taken together, these trends are deepening insecurity across the continent. They underscore the importance of implementing global, regional, and national frameworks, strengthening regional cooperation, and reinforcing measures to prevent diversion and illicit transfers. Over the past year, UNREC supported the development of national action plans in the Gambia and Burundi, and continued assisting seven member states and United Nations country teams in integrating arms control consideration into development and peacebuilding efforts. To strengthen armed violence prevention, UNREC, in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR, And the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs conducted a study in West Africa and published guidance on integrating the prevention of violent extremism with efforts to address illicit weapons proliferation. UNREC is also cooperating with the West African Economic and Monetary Union to support the development and implementation of a new initiative of the union aimed at addressing illicit small arms and light weapons and improvised explosive devices threats with a focus on border areas. AMREC also deepened its regional engagements on arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. The center organized a series of regional consultation on gender-responsive arms control with the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Southern African Development Community. UNREC and ECOWAS further strengthened their partnership through an addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding on 21 August this year. In addition, the Centre collaborated with the Regional Centre on Small Arms, RECSA, which plays the role of secretariat for the Nairobi Protocol to implement the African Amnesty Month initiative under the AU-UNODA cooperation matrix. The center also supported the AU Disarmament Fellowship and implemented the second edition of the United Nations Fellowship on Small Arms and Light Weapons, bringing together 23 fellows consisting of arms control practitioners and diplomats from across the continent and 20 member states capacities. Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, looking ahead, under the forthcoming phase of its support for implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. UNREC will provide country-level technical assistance and, together with the African Union, develop an operational guidance note on gender, small arms and light weapons, and ammunition. With the UNSCAR Trust Fund support, UNREC is also planning direct support to up to 12 countries, 12 SITUEN country teams, and their host countries in integrating small arms and light weapons risk into the common country analysis and social development cooperation frameworks. Our joint work with UNID and Switzerland on the linkages between the prevention of violent extremism and weapons and ammunition management will also expand to Central Africa, addressing both illicit supply and the conditions that can facilitate armed recruitment. We will also support the West African Economic and Monetary Union to harness its potential as bridge between the Alliance of Sahel States and ECOWAS to implement a regional project to strengthen arms control and community resilience in the eight member states across the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. To conclude, I wish to thank our host country, Togo, the European Union, as well as member states, notably Switzerland, France, and Germany, donors and partners for their continued confidence and support, including through their voluntary contributions. Predictable voluntary funding remains essential for the center to respond effectively to national requests and sustain this work. We count on your continued engagements. I thank you for your kind attention.

I thank the director of the UNRWA for his comprehensive statement. I now give the floor to the Director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, UNRC PD, Mr. Dipayan Basu. Mr. Basu, you have the floor now.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, thank you for the opportunity to address the First Committee. in my capacity as Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, or UNRCPD. I will highlight the key developments in the Centre's work over the past year and several trends shaping the region's security environment. Further details are contained in the Secretary-General's report A/81/153. Over the past year, UNRCPD has helped build increasingly networked communities of practice across Asia and the Pacific, connecting governments, experts, and practitioners in a region where sustained disarmament dialogue remains limited. These networks have expanded opportunities for peer exchange, strengthened regional expertise, and created more durable channels for cooperation beyond individual activities. The Asia-Pacific remains one of the world's most dynamic and diverse regions, yet it continues to face complex security challenges that underscore the importance of disarmament and arms control. Persistent regional tensions, increasing military expenditures, and rapid technological advancements, including those in artificial intelligence, autonomy, and cyber capabilities, are transforming the strategic environment. Ongoing and unresolved intra- and interstate conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region threaten lives and livelihoods, while also putting hard-won development and economic gains at risk within the region and beyond. The illicit proliferation of small arms, ammunition, and other conventional weapons fuels armed violence, organized crime, and gender-based violence across the region. These challenges are compounded by institutional capacity gaps, insufficient data, and shrinking opportunities for multilateral engagement. Despite this difficult environment, Asia-Pacific Member States continue to demonstrate a commitment to dialogue and to uphold disarmament and arms control norms. In this regard, UNRCPD has continued to develop and deliver on its mandate and support Asia-Pacific Member States in three principal ways. First, by strengthening regional collaboration, second, by building partnerships, and third, by providing technical assistance on request. First, in a region where opportunities for sustained disarmament dialogue, where these remain limited, UNRCPD has created practical platforms for regional collaboration. Flagship activities included the China-ASEAN Biosecurity Workshop, the 24th Annual Joint Republic of Korea-United Nations Conference, the inaugural Small Arms and Light Weapons Fellowship in partnership with India in 2026, and the fourth edition of the highly subscribed Disarmament Toolkit training program. Second, UNRCPD continued to build and deepen collaborative partnerships, including through joint briefings with Asia-Pacific experts on military expenditure, on artificial intelligence, and other emerging issues. The Center also launched the Asia-Pacific Disarmament Education Network, which will come online in November. Third, UNRCPD continued to provide technical assistance, expert guidance and advice to support the universalization and implementation of disarmament agreements and treaties. This work was supported through UNSCAR, the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund and bilateral donors. Looking ahead, Mr. Chair, the Centre will remain focused on priority issues for the Asia-Pacific Member States, including preparations for next year's GFA Meeting of States, the continued delivery of flagship initiatives such as the Small Arms and Light Weapons Fellowship training program, and deepening engagement with regional partners. UNRC PD expresses its sincere gratitude to our host country, the government and the people of Nepal for their continued and unwavering support. We also thank Thailand for its regular annual contribution and the Republic of Korea, China, India, and the European Union for their voluntary contributions to the Centre's work. These contributions are indispensable for the Centre's ability to deliver on all of its mandate. We are deeply grateful for the support provided to UNRCPD and encourage Member States to consider extending similar support to UNODA's regional centres. I would also like to take a moment to thank the team at UNRCPD for all their extraordinary hard work and dedication. I thank you for your time.

I thank the Director of UNRCPD for his very insightful and comprehensive remarks. I now give the floor to the Director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Ms. Soledad Urruela. Ms. Urrutia, you have the floor now.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, it is an honor to address the First Committee on behalf of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, LIRIC. I will highlight key regional trends and recent progress in the Centre's work, complementing the Secretary-General's report contained in document A/81/155. Since I last briefed the First Committee, UNLIRIC has helped move disarmament beyond a standalone technical agenda by embedding arms control and violence prevention more systematically within peace, security and development efforts. Through subregional roadmaps, UN country teams and broader development frameworks, this approach is increasingly linking firearms control with institution building, citizen security and sustainable development. Latin America and the Caribbean continue to face high levels of armed violence driven by illicit firearms and ammunition trafficking, organized crime, and increasingly diversified illicit economies. These dynamics remain particularly acute in Haiti, Ecuador, and parts of Central America and the Caribbean, where illicit arms flows continue to undermine security, governance, and development gains. At the same time, criminal groups are increasingly exploiting technologies such as uncrewed aerial vehicles, creating new risks that demand anticipatory and coordinated responses. Alongside these persistent challenges, the region is undergoing important political and institutional shifts. Across much of the region, governments are placing greater emphasis on citizen security and on combating organized crime, illicit trafficking, illegal mining, and armed violence. While national approaches differ, there is growing recognition that these threats impose significant human, economic, and developmental costs and require coordinated action. This convergence creates an important opportunity to deepen cooperation, strengthen implementation of international commitments, and advance practical arms control measures at the national and subregional levels. UNLIRIC has responded to these challenges through one guiding principle. Disarmament is most effective when integrated into broader efforts to advance security, development, institution building, and prevention. This approach is reflected in the region's three sub-regional firearms roadmaps. The Caribbean Firearms Roadmap completed its midterm review during this reporting period, confirming its continued relevance while identifying priorities to strengthen prevention, sustainability, and monitoring. In Central America and the Dominican Republic, implementation continues to advance, with national coordination mechanisms being strengthened and regional action plans and national action plans under development, including Guatemala's adoption of the first national action plan under this roadmap. In the Andean subregion, states have advanced the development of a new subregional roadmap, including through the first in-person meeting of national points of contact and the identification of initial priorities. Together, these initiatives make Latin America and the Caribbean the only region implementing a comprehensive network of subregional firearms control frameworks. UNLIRIC is also working to ensure that arms control is increasingly integrated into wider United Nations efforts. Through support to resident coordinators and United Nations country teams, the center helped embed helping embed arms control, violence prevention, and citizen security considerations into broader peacebuilding and development efforts. In Haiti in particular, our support continues to strengthen national capacities for physical security and stockpile management, investigations and responses to illicit trafficking as part of a broader and coordinated United Nations approach. Looking ahead, and LIRAC will continue to promote the meaningful participation and leadership of women and young people in disarmament. The Latin American and Caribbean edition of the Youth Leader Fund for a World Without Nuclear Weapons is already underway and will culminate in a festival of peace in Mexico in February of next year, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Through initiatives such as Women Forces of Change and Generacion Paz, We aim not only to enable participation, but also to support women and young people as leaders, innovators, and decision makers shaping the future of disarmament in the region. We are looking forward to implementing the second edition of the United Nations Fellowship on Small Arms and Light Weapons next month in Lima, and we will also continue to strengthen cooperation across the United Nations system. For the first time, ODA, through UNLIRIC, is expected to participate in several United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks, helping to ensure that arms control, violence prevention, and security considerations are reflected in broader development planning and action. Finally, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to our host country, Peru. as well as to our donors and partners, including Canada, Germany, the United States, the European Union, Panama, and others whose support makes our work possible. At a time of financial constraint and growing reliance on voluntary contributions, sustained and predictable support for the regional centers is more important than ever. It enables us to respond to member states request, strengthen national ownership and deliver practical, cost effective assistance where it is needed most. I'd also like to take this opportunity to thank my fantastic team for their hard work. And with that, I thank you for your attention.

I thank the director of only Rake for her comprehensive statement. Distinguished delegates, in keeping with the established practice of the Committee, I will now suspend the meeting to afford the delegations the opportunity to have an interactive discussion on the briefing we just heard through an informal question

the importance of the subregional firearms roadmaps in our region. As has been mentioned, illicit trafficking and armed violence do not stop at the border, and our responses must also be coordinated, subregional and regionalised. Roadmaps are a a great framework that allows for this coordination and cooperation, both at the level of donors, implementing partners, and then of course the states themselves, where they can undertake both actions at the subregional level, but at the national level as well. And to underline as well that these roadmaps are the countries. They are not UN roadmaps or and in community secretariat roadmaps, they are the countries, and we are there in a co-custodian capacity to support these state-led initiatives, and national ownership remains a key element in combating illicit trafficking. Thank you.

I see no request for the floor. With this, we have come to the end of this informal session. On behalf of the delegations, I thank our excellent panelists, the directors of the regional disarmament centers, for briefing the committee, also engaging in interactions with the member states. I thank you again. And the committee will now resume its formal meeting. The meeting is resumed. Distinguished delegates, the committee will now continue its thematic discussions under the cluster on regional disarmament and security. The first speaker on the list of speakers is the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran, speaking on behalf of a group of states.

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, Mr. Chair, I have the honor to deliver the following statement on behalf of the group of countries, namely Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, and my own country, Islamic Republic of Iran, on the issue of the prohibition of all forms of attacks and threat of attacks against nuclear sites and facilities under IAEA safeguards and devoted to peaceful purposes. First, we underline the importance of full and effective realization of the objectives of the IAEA, in particular its statutory mandate to accelerate and enlarge the contributions of the atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, and reaffirm the inalienable rights of all states to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Two, we recall the United Nations Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981, which strongly condemned the military attack against nuclear facilities, as well as the relevant decisions and resolutions of the IAEA General Conference, namely GC53/DEC/13, GC29/RES/443, GC29/RES/444, and GC34/RES/533, which clearly reflect the longstanding position of the international community against attacks or threat of attack against nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and devoted to peaceful purposes. We reaffirm that attack or threat of attack against nuclear facilities is violation of the principles of the UN Charter, international law, and the statute of the IAEA, and is profoundly inconsistent with the objects and purposes of the NPT. Four, we emphasize that attacks against nuclear facilities have grave implications for nuclear safety, nuclear security, and constitute a serious threat to the integrity, effectiveness, and credibility of IAEA safeguards system and the wider global nonproliferation architecture. Five, we stressed that attacks against nuclear facilities would adversely affect the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international cooperation, and may result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the state concerned, including severe impacts on civilian populations and long-term damage to the environment. Six, we emphasize that silence in the face of attack against safeguarded nuclear facilities undermine established international norms, erode confidence in the international legal order, and risk the normalization of such attacks. Seven, we therefore reaffirm that nuclear facilities shall never, under any circumstances, be subjected to attack or threat of attack. Eight, We call upon all Member States to stand united in upholding the integrity and credibility of the IAEA safeguards system, strengthening nuclear safety and security, and protecting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international cooperation by expressing a clear and unequivocal opposition to any attack or threat of attack.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran, speaking on behalf of a group of states. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya, speaking on behalf of Arab group.

Mr. Chair.

The Group of Arab States wishes to recall the relationship between the maintenance of international peace and security on the one hand, and disarmament and arms control efforts, especially nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all other forms of weapons of mass destruction on the other hand. We also recall Article VII of the NPT, which affirms the right of states to conclude regional agreements to ensure the complete absence of nuclear weapons from their territories. And while nuclear-weapon-free zones do not constitute a substitute for achieving the goal of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Arab Group highly values the efforts undertaken by the five existing nuclear-free nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. We welcome their positive contribution to peace and security. The Group commends the adoption of General Assembly resolution 79/241. on updating the comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons-free zones and the reports resulting from the working group's work. The group also reaffirms the central importance of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which just the need to take concrete and immediate measures to achieve this objective, as was endorsed by paragraph 63 of the final document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. This objective embodies the principles and purposes of the Charter of the UN and international law. It is also something that is called for by the annual Arab resolution entitled "The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East," which the Arab group submits every year. We look forward to the continued support of the international community for this important resolution. We also call and emphasize that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, this resolution is an integral part of the package that enabled the treaty's indefinite extension. The Group calls upon the three sponsoring States of that resolution to assume the responsibility for its implementation. We also renew our determination to make every possible effort to achieve a Middle East that is free of all weapons of mass destruction, in a manner that would bolster the prospects for peace and security in one of the world's most conflict-prone and unstable regions. Mr. Chair, the Group welcomes the convening of six sessions for the conference of the establishment of a nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction pursuant to GA decision number 73/546 as well as the valuable deliberations and reports produced during these sessions the group urges all parties invited to the conference as members or observers we encourage them to participate in the next edition of the conference in November the Arab states have upheld their share of responsibility, and they've demonstrated good faith. Now it remains incumbent upon the other parties to assume their own responsibilities. And here we express our deep concern over the continuing risks arising from the Israeli entity's continued refusal to accede to the NPT, as it remains the only party in the Middle East that has not joined the treaty and continues to refuse to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA's comprehensive safeguard system. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya, speaking on behalf of the Arab group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, speaking also on behalf of Paraguay.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of Paraguay and my own country, Peru. head of the regional center for peace, disarmament and development in Latin America and the Caribbean, UNRILEC. Since it was created in 1987, UNRILEC has been a pillar of the multilateral architecture. for disarmament, translating international promises into specific results for our region. Its mandate reflects the conviction that there can be no lasting security without development, and there is no development possible if there is no security and democracy. Through its technical and legal assistance, the center strengthens national capacities and regional capacities to prevent the illicit trafficking in arms and explosives and weapons, and reduce armed conflict related to transnational organized crime. Amongst its success stories, we have the roadmap of the Caribbean and for Central America, the Dominican Republic, as well as assisting Haiti. We also stress the advances of the roadmap for the Andean community that links prevention of illicit arms trafficking to fighting transnational organized crime, a primary challenge for Peru and for Paraguay. Also, UNRLEC promotes programs for young people and vulnerable groups, working through prevention to create a culture of peace and strengthening national capacities. However, this progress contrasts with our limited resources. UNRLEC depends principally on voluntary contributions, and therefore, Peru has decided to increase its voluntary contribution, more than doubling it. And we are grateful to Panama, Canada, the United States, Germany, and the European Union for their contributions. And in this regard, we would call upon Member States and international partners to maintain and increase, if they are able to, their voluntary contributions, recognizing the strategic value of UNRILEC. And finally, Grulac has the honour to present the draft resolution on UNARLEC, which reaffirms its mandate, including new actions, and recognises its contribution to fight transnational organised crime. one of the most urgent challenges that we face. And we invite Member States to support this resolution and to continue to strengthen this example of effective multilateral cooperation. UNRELEC represents a collective investment for peace and for generations that today are building a more secure, hopeful future for Latin America and the Caribbean. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Peru, speaking also on behalf of the Paraguay. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.

Thank you, Chairperson. Egypt aligns itself with the statements of the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. The role of nuclear-weapon-free zones continue to be of most importance to peace and security and the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Egypt continues to support the timely convening of a fourth United Nations Conference on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Egypt welcomes the revised study on this question of nuclear-weapon-free zones developed by the group of qualified experts mandated by the United Nations General Assembly. We commend the substantial attention and recommendations it accorded to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. which calls upon nuclear weapon states to subscribe without preconditions or reservations to the protocols of existing treaties and to provide effective, nonconditional and irrevocable legally binding assurances. We recall the norm on the impermissibility of armed attacks against all peaceful and safeguarded nuclear facilities. Chairperson, three years ago, an Israeli minister threatened to drop a nuclear bomb over Gaza. A zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East can spare the region and the world from similar distressing risks and threats. The resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, similar to numerous United Nations Security Council and UNJ resolutions, called upon all states in the Middle East that had not yet done so without exception to accede to the treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full scope agency safeguards. This resolution provided the basis on which the treaty was indefinitely extended. We express our deep disappointment with the third consecutive failure of the NPT Review Conference and reiterate the existing commitments, including under the 1995 resolution, remain valid until fully and effectively implemented. In this connection, Egypt tabled its annual draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and presented, on behalf of the Arab Group, the draft resolution on risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Chairperson, Egypt welcomes the continued progress at the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. We look forward to the seventh session under the presidency of the Sultanate of Oman. We urge all invited members and observers to engage with this conference constructively. which is characterized by inclusivity and consensus-based process. We note with appreciation that the last draft outcome document tabled for consideration of the NPT Refcon acknowledges the progress made at this conference. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Estonia.

Thank you, Chair. Estonia aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier today by the European Union. In addition, we would like to highlight some following points in our national capacity. Chair, the European security architecture is founded on the rule of law and respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Russia continues to severely undermine these principles. Its illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine remains a direct violation of the UN Charter. Russia is not acting alone. The DPRK continues to provide Russia with ammunition and ballistic missiles while its troops fight alongside Russian forces. Iran provides military support, including drones and missiles. Belarus enables Russia's aggression through its territory and infrastructure. China-based companies continue to provide dual-use goods and components that sustain Russia's military industrial capacity. The implications of Russia's aggression extend far beyond Ukraine. Russia is seeking to demonstrate that military force, threats, and pressure can determine the security choices of sovereign states. We therefore reaffirm that European security cannot be based on spheres of influence or the right of the strongest to dictate the choices of others. Any credible discussion about peace and European security must respect Ukraine's sovereignty and the right of all European states to determine their own future. Chair, Russia's aggression is also increasingly accompanied by hybrid activities against European states, including sabotage, cyber attacks, arson, and attempts to interfere with critical infrastructure. These are not abstract threats. The arson attack against the Estonian defence company Mildrem Robotics was an act of sabotage ordered by the special services of the Russian Federation. These incidents show how Russia is deliberately bringing the consequences of its war onto European soil to undermine support for Ukraine. Chair, Estonia also condemns Iran's destabilising activities, which undermine regional and international security. Tensions in the Gulf also threaten global markets and economic resilience. Estonia remains committed to a rules-based international order in which sovereignty is not conditional, borders cannot be changed by force, and security is not achieved at the expense of others. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Estonia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Angola.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Republic of Angola aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the non-alignment movement.

No place on this planet is safe from war.

Terrorism and military confrontation, regional disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security are mutually reinforcing. They require a collective response grounded in dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation among states. Mr. Chair, the persistence of armed conflict, terrorism, and political instability, together with the humanitarian consequences, continue to undermine security and development across several regions. On the African continent, this challenge calls for concerted and coordinating action that applaud the purity and solution identified by Africans themselves. The Pelindaba Treaty declared Africa a nuclear-free zone, which remains a strong symbol of Africa's commitment and unified determination to prevent nuclear proliferation, promote disarmament, and reinforce peace and regional stability. In this context, allow me to highlight three priorities: first, strengthening prevention, diplomacy, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Our experience demonstrates that peace is a continuing process requiring political will, leadership, and inclusive dialogue. The full and effective participation of women and young must be an integral part of conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding efforts. Second, deepening cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union, and the regional economic community. Such cooperation must be sustainable, coherent, and geared toward strengthening the region's capacity while respecting states' sovereign and national ownership of peace process African voice must be central to decision affecting the continent's security. We will therefore reaffirm the central role of United Nations in mobilization, collective response to make last peace a reality for all people. Third, advance disarmament and effective implementation.

Of relevant multilateral instruments, Angola reiterate its commitment to it.

I thank the distinguished representative of Angola. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia.

Mr. Chair, Malaysia associates itself with the statements delivered by NAM and by ASEAN. Ending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon-free zones play a key role in preventing the total elimination, preventing proliferation and advancing disarmament. Malaysia reaffirms its support for continued efforts and to consolidate existing nuclear weapon-free zones and establish new ones in all regions of the world. In Southeast Asia, the Treaty of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone remains an indispensable anchor of regional peace and security. As regards to the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty, Malaysia remains committed to constructive engagement with fellow ASEAN Member States and all nuclear-weapon States towards resolving all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty. This is vital to securing the signing and ratification of the protocol without reservations and ensuring the provision of legally binding negative security assurances by the nuclear weapons states. Having co-sponsored General Assembly Resolution 79/241, Malaysia welcomes the conclusion of the work of the qualified group of experts and the submission of its comprehensive study to the General Assembly at the current session. Marking the first such comprehensive UN study in five decades, We trust that its findings and recommendations will make a tangible contribution to strengthening existing zones and advancing the establishment of new ones. Further, Malaysia welcomes progress made under the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, mandated by General Assembly decision 73/546, and looks forward to the convening of its seventh session in November. We also underlined the imperative of the full implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East. Malaysia remains gravely concerned over the situation in the Korean Peninsula and underscores the urgent need for all concerned parties to exercise restraint and resume peaceful dialogue towards the realisation of a lasting peace and stability in a denuclearised Korean Peninsula. Realizing our shared disarmament goals requires sustained multilateral action, including through the efforts of relevant regional mechanisms. Malaysia will continue working closely with all partners to this end. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon.

Chair, disarmament is based on international negotiations, setting common goals. Their effectiveness depends, however, on how this is translated into the reality of each situation. The universality of these commitments is the foundation of disarmament, but the implementation at a regional level increases its effectiveness. For Cameroon, regional cooperation is neither an alternative to multilateralism nor a departure from international commitments. It's an essential extension of them. This complementarity is particularly important given the cross-border threats in the Lake Chad Basin, the Boko Haram activities, and the work of the Islamic State West African Province has demonstrated the need for close cooperation among the states concerned. Prevention also requires a permanent framework for dialogue, and Cameroon attaches particular importance in this regard to the United Nations Standing Advisory on security questions in Central Africa, uh, and the, uh, we hosted the 53rd meeting in 2022. This helps to promote, uh, regional preventive diplomacy. The existence of regional mechanisms, however, does not in itself guarantee their effectiveness. Regional disarmament requires institutions that are capable of managing the situation, strengthen national capacity and predictable resources, and it also requires specific cooperation against the illicit trafficking in weapons, and arms diversion, which is so destabilizing. But also what's important is the full participation of states in security decisions. For Cameroon, regional ownership cannot just be limited to implementing initiatives. It must also be part of design and evaluation. This approach must strengthen the effectiveness of international partnerships and help them adapt to the priorities of states. Chair, we have seen that there's no one fits all solution. we need to have a convergence of efforts and shared responsibility between states. Regional disarmament does not depend solely on the availability of resources, but also our collective capacity to prevent crises and reduce the risk of armament and protect our populations. And it's on that condition that the universality of our commitments can be found in each region of the world. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The full text of my statement will be published electronically. Today, regional security in various parts of the world is continuously facing the most serious challenges. Disregard for the fundamental pillars of international law, refusal to recognize and take into account the core interests of other states, and attempts to gain unquestionable military superiority at all costs are creating a new reality in the area of security. The practice of expanding military alliances continues alongside the emergence of new alliances. The fundamental principle of the indivisibility of security is being flagrantly violated. Russia, for many years, as a proponent of establishing a coordinating system of arms control and confidence and security-building measures has called on its partners to consolidate efforts in this area. Our proposals have met with no response from Western representatives. Europe has set a course for open confrontation with the Russian Federation and for the dismantling of the comprehensive system of arms control and confidence-building measures. The steps taken by current Western leaders are destroying the foundations of European security. Intelligence activities near our borders are off the charts. The number of exercises with a provocative anti-Russian bent has multiplied near the Russian border. Western doctrinal documents enshrine Russia as the enemy. The NATO countries have already become effectively embroiled in a military and political confrontation with our country. The situation has begun to take on an even more dangerous nature. Now there is already talk of Europe preparing for a full-scale war with Russia by 2030. At the same time, for decades, the U.S. and its allies have continued their dismantling of key agreements in the area of arms control and confidence building, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. The admission of Finland and Sweden into NATO has radically altered the military and political situation in Europe. Extraordinary circumstances have arisen that threaten the supreme interests of the Russian Federation. In response, our country inter alia withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. An integral part of the CFE process are the confidence and security-building measures which were adopted back in 1975 and subsequently modernized and improved several times. Russia for a long time has advocated for their timely adaptation to new realities, but Western countries have repeatedly blocked our proposals to develop this politically binding agreement. We have no grounds to treat our partners with trust now, especially since they do not comply with many of the military and political commitments adopted within the OSCE. Russia reaffirms its readiness for constructive work in these areas, provided that Western countries begin to adhere to the principles of equality, mutual respect, and taking into account the justified concerns and legitimate needs of our country in military security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With that, now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Philippines.

The Philippines aligns itself with the statements delivered by ASEAN and NAM. Regional disarmament efforts do not exist in isolation. Rather, they complement, support, and strengthen multilateral instruments and mechanisms by operationalizing legal obligations, principles, rules, and norms of responsible behavior as adapted to unique and evolving regional circumstances and challenges. Robust regional security architectures contribute to shaping international governance advancing mutual trust and confidence, strengthening regional and national capacity building, fostering international cooperation and partnerships, and championing preventive diplomacy, thereby reinforcing the wider multilateral disarmament architecture. In our region, ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the ASEAN Political Security Community, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting and ADMM+, serve as vital platforms for promoting peace and security. We reaffirm our steadfast commitment to preserving Southeast Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone under the Bangkok Treaty, and appreciate the publication of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. We continue to engage all nuclear weapons states, all of which are either ASEAN dialogue or development partners, to clarify reservations and resolve outstanding issues to facilitate their signing and ratification of the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. We urge them to provide and adhere to unconditional, legally binding negative security assurances and to commit to not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and within nuclear weapon-free zones. We continue to strengthen our regional capacity to address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, including through the network of ASEAN CBR defense experts and the ASEAN protocol for preparedness and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. Through the ASEAN TOM, we advance the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while observing the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. In line with our efforts to tackle traditional and non-traditional security challenges, The Philippines hosted last year the ARF workshop on peace and security in outer space. And earlier this year, the Philippines hosted the ARF intersessional meeting on ICT security and the intersessional meeting on non-proliferation and disarmament. We likewise welcome the active participation of ASEAN representatives and various groups of governmental experts, open-ended working groups and other studies, as they share a regional experience and expertise in addressing relevant issues. We look forward to the adoption of the ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on the Advancement of Space Science, Technology, and Innovation Cooperation during the ASEAN Summit in Manila next month. Finally, Chair, human dignity and adherence to international law remain front and center of our regional approach, in line with the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 to achieve a resilient, innovative, dynamic, and people-centered ASEAN. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Philippines for her statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Zimbabwe aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, and we add the following in our national capacity. Distinguished delegates, Zimbabwe reaffirms its principled and longstanding position that nuclear-weapon-free zones constitute one of the most effective and practical measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They also serve to advance the cause of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are not abstract ideals, but practical, legally grounded, and achievable disarmament measures. They contribute meaningfully to non-proliferation, building confidence among states, and reinforcing the norm against nuclear weapons. Zimbabwe calls upon all nuclear weapons states to sign, ratify, and fully implement nuclear-weapon-free zone protocols without reservations or preconditions. In our region, through the Treaty of Pelindaba, Africa has demonstrated that it is possible to renounce nuclear weapons collectively, to establish legally binding commitments, and to build confidence through verification and cooperation. This achievement reflects our shared understanding that true security cannot be founded on weapons of mass destruction, but rather on acting in good faith and in the spirit of cooperation and respect for international law. Mr. Chair, the global nuclear-weapon-free zone map remains incomplete. In this regard, Zimbabwe calls for the full and effective implementation of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference's resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Distinguished delegates, with regards to conventional weapons, Zimbabwe reiterates its commitment to the implementation of the Silencing the Guns in Africa Programme in line with Africa's Agenda 2063. This includes practical measures for countering the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons. In conclusion, Chair, Zimbabwe reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the promotion of regional disarmament measures as imperative foundational pillars for international peace and security. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe for his statement. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, regional disarmament and maintenance of security constitute an important part of realizing humanity's desire for building a peaceful world without war and armed conflict. However, in recent years, the international community witnessed unabated military conflicts and disputes across the globe. The Ukrainian crisis, inevitable outcome of the NATO's reckless eastward expansion, continues to be fueled by an endless flow of lethal weapons and war funds from the Western countries. Furthermore, at a time when the U.S. is enforcing implementation of its hegemonic Indo-Pacific strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Japan is more undisguised in scrambling to rearm itself and become a military power, causing grave concern of the international community. Japan's top political figures openly advocate the revision of the three non-nuclear principles, which explicitly shows the core objective of its accelerated moves to become a military power. The reckless military hostility on the part of the U.S. and its followers have now turned the Korean Peninsula into the world's greatest hotspot caught in never-ending vicious cycle of mounting tension and instability. Typical examples are the U.S.-ROK large-scale joint military exercise, Freedom Shield in March, Ulchi Freedom Shield in August, involving tens of thousands of troops and combat equipment, including the forces of ROK and U.S. member states. The U.S. and its allies may describe the exercises as annual and defensive. They may produce a bunch of soft talk, provide whatever justification or adjusted elements of the exercise. Nonetheless, the nature of the exercises remain as it is, the confrontational nature as high-intensity war rehearsals against the DPRK staged by our adversaries on our very doorstep. Constant repetition of dangerous war drills by the U.S. and other hostile forces puts the security of the DPRK at great risk and will ultimately aggravate the tension on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia Pacific to a touch-and-go situation where war can break out at any moment. This is a fact everyone is well aware of. Until the U.S. and its allies wake up from the reckless pipe dream to overpower anyone by force, and until they fully give up all attempts to destroy the power equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia-Pacific, we will exercise the right to self-defense in a more explicit and stronger manner to resolutely contain the military threat of the hostile forces. As a responsible nuclear-armed state, the DPRK will continue to fulfill its noble mission and duty in safeguarding peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Iraq. You have the floor.

Thank you. Chair, Iraq aligns itself with the statements delivered by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group, and I would like to add the following in my national capacity, Chair. We stress the importance of regional disarmament measures as a fundamental pillar for strengthening mutual trust, reducing tensions and preventing arms races. In this regard, we renew our call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in implementation of the decision of the NPT Review Conference of 1995, as well as other decisions adopted by NPT Review Conferences of 2000 and 2010. Iraq is deeply concerned over the non-implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the implications this has for the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also regrets that the review conference of 2026 was not able to adopt a final consensual document. We welcome the efforts undertaken. in the framework of the Convention on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, and we stress the importance of continuing its work during the conference and to build on what was achieved at previous sessions and to ensure that the seventh session is successful in order to guarantee results. In conclusion, achieving security and stability and peace in the Middle East requires the Israeli entity to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state party and to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards. The absence of these commitments undermines efforts aimed at establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We must address this situation in order to guarantee our collective security and uphold the principle of equality in the implementation of international obligations. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Chief of Iraq, for his statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Maldives. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. This December marks 55 years since this Assembly adopted resolution 2832, declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Its vision of an ocean free from great power rivalry, military confrontation and weapons of mass destruction remains vital. For the Maldives, Regional security is inseparable from maritime security. Almost all territory is maritime. The Maldives sits midway between East Africa and East Asia, along some of India's most important sea routes. Disruption to shipping therefore quickly affects the flow of food, fuel and basic supplies. No state can confront piracy, illicit trafficking, or IUU fishing alone. These threats demand strong international cooperation grounded in international law. A sovereign future means having the freedom and capacity to determine our own development and security priorities. Small states must not bear the consequence of geopolitical rivalries beyond their control. The Maldives contribute its cooperation as a founding member of Colombo Security Conclave through joint maritime exercise and a participant in Djibouti Code of Conduct. Regional cooperation is strongest when it translates into capabilities that smaller states can use. Therefore, the Maldives calls for three actions. First, preserve the Indian Ocean as a region of peace. We urge states to exercise restraint, respect international law, and avoid extending conflict into the region. The principle of the Zone of Peace Declaration should continue to guide our effort. Second, strengthen practical maritime security cooperation. We call for better information sharing, joint training, and technical assistance, especially for SIDS, so they can prevent and respond to transnational threats. Third, strengthen regional disarmament institution. 55 years after the zone of peace declaration, our task is to turn its principle into practical cooperation. A secure Indian Ocean gives every state, large or small, greater freedom to shape their own future. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Maldives for her statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Portugal. You have the floor.

Portugal aligns with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make a few remarks in its national capacity. I will focus on three points. Connecting global and regional efforts, addressing proliferation risks, and strengthening cooperation against illicit arms trafficking. First, regional cooperation must translate global commitments into effective implementation. Regional insecurity rarely stays regional. Weapons cross borders, proliferation connects theaters, and mistrust spreads. Our response must connect international norms with regional expertise and national action. For Portugal, European integration, transatlantic cooperation, and partnerships across the Portuguese-speaking world demonstrate the value of working together. Transparency, dialogue, and confidence-building measures can reduce miscalculation, provided they rest on reciprocity, good faith, and respect for international obligations. Second. Regional proliferation challenges require diplomacy backed by credible verification. We remain concerned by nuclear proliferation risks in the Middle East and in the Korean Peninsula. We support diplomatic solutions, verifiable compliance, and demand the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The IAEA must fulfill its mandate independently. States must honor safeguards obligations and provide the access required for effective verification. Third, cooperation must curb the illicit weapons that sustain violence. Small arms trafficking fuels organized crime, prolongs conflicts, and undermines development. Our priorities are practical, robust export controls, better information exchange, effective tracing and accountable stockpile management, supported by international assistance. Chair, across these three areas, our purpose is clear: to turn shared commitments into fewer illicit weapons, safer communities, and greater trust between neighbors. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for his statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament. You have the floor.

Brazil firmly believes that regional cooperation is essential to international peace and security. At a time of growing geopolitical tensions and weakening arms control arrangements, Regional initiatives offer concrete opportunities to strengthen trust, promote disarmament, and advance collective security. Latin America and the Caribbean have demonstrated this commitment through the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The treaty is a landmark since it established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region. Brazil reiterates its strong support for OPANAL and for strengthening cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones. We welcome the completion of the new comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones prepared by a qualified group of experts. We believe its recommendations can contribute to strengthening existing zones and encouraging the establishment of new ones. Mr. Chair, in 2026, we celebrate the 35th anniversary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, ABAC. Its unique bilateral verification system, operating alongside IAEA safeguards, demonstrates how regional cooperation can build less in confidence, transparency, and trust, and open the way to progress in other important areas such as economic integration, trade, culture, and technical cooperation, and a strong political partnership to deal with shared challenges. Brazil also reaffirms its support for UN LIREC and its valuable assistance in combating illicit trafficking of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. We attach particular importance to regional cooperation and implementation of the global framework on ammunition management, including capacity building, safe stockpile management, and preventing diversion. The forthcoming meeting of States in 2027 offers an opportunity to consolidate practical progress. Mr. Chair, Brazil remains committed to preserving Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace and strengthening regional contributions to global disarmament. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Brazil to the CD for his statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Indonesia. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia aligns itself with the statements delivered by the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN. Indonesia regards nuclear-weapon-free zones as an essential pillar of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Indonesia strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist and the strengthening of all existing zones. Indonesia recognizes that their establishment requires sustained regional ownership, engagement with nuclear-weapon States, and credible negative security assurances. We call upon nuclear-weapon States to respect the legal status of these zones, and sign and ratify outstanding protocols without delay and in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty. Mr. Chair. Indonesia remains firmly committed to preserving Southeast Asia as a region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We commend Timor-Leste's accession to the Bangkok Treaty last year, which further advances this objective. Indonesia and ASEAN member states will continue to strengthen the full and effective implementation of the treaty, including through intensified engagement with nuclear weapon states and other zones. Chair, beyond Southeast Asia, Indonesia remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East remains valid until its objectives are fully realized. We call upon all states in the region, without exception, to engage in good faith negotiations towards a legally binding treaty establishing the zone. We also urge all states to refrain from actions that further escalate tensions and undermine prospects for its establishment. Indonesia supports stronger cooperation among existing nuclear-weapon-free zones through regular consultations and exchanges of best practices. This will strengthen confidence building and amplify our collective contribution to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Indonesia welcomes the Qualified Group of Experts' comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, and call for its practical follow-up. Chair, Indonesia calls for renewed political commitment to strengthen existing zones, establish new ones, and ensure effective security assurances as concrete steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for his statement. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, our delegation endorses the statement on behalf of the Arab Group and on behalf of the NAM. We would like to offer the following statement in our national capacity. First, we're convinced of the importance of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. In particular, for the preservation of peace and security regionally and internationally, we're also convinced of the central role played by the NPT. We call for strengthening the NPT and guaranteeing the implementation of its provisions. And we want to see universalization happen to reach our ultimate aim, which is ridding the world of these weapons. Second, nuclear-weapon-free zones are an example of success in terms of strengthening the nonproliferation and disarmament regime and in terms of establishing regional security. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of other WMDs in the Middle East is a collective responsibility not only up to the regional countries. It's an international responsibility, in particular for those who have co-sponsored the relevant resolution on the creation of the aforementioned zone. In this regard, the 1975 resolution is a key element here. This resolution is still in force until these goals are met, referring to the 1995 resolution in this regard. Resolution 75/166 calls upon the Secretary-General to establish a conference to establish a legally binding instrument on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and one free from other WMDs in the Middle East. We back all efforts aiming to implement this policy, and we stand ready to cooperate with the countries of the region and the international community to reach this goal. By way of conclusion, we welcome the success of the six sessions of the conference on the creation of the aforementioned zone in the Middle East, and we thank the Kingdom for its chairmanship during the sixth session. And we are looking forward to the seventh session in November under the presidency of the Sultanate of Oman, with participation of all stakeholders, in particular the presence of the co-sponsors, in order to implement this resolution. Thank you.

The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of COOPI. You have the floor.

Thank you. We support the statement of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Regional and sub-regional initiatives in the fields of disarmament and arms control make a substantive contribution to the goal of achieving a safer world by complementing multilateral efforts and negotiations in this area. The proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace is an important document adopted at the second summit of heads of state and government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, CELAC, in Havana. It reaffirms the commitment of Latin America and the Caribbean to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Its message of peace should be taken into account and respected, both by regional as well as extra-regional actors. This important document, endorsed by the heads of state and government of all CELAC countries, reflects the commitment and vocation of our region as a promoter of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, as a priority objective with a view to strengthening confidence among nations. The Latin American and Caribbean region has played a pioneering role in disarmament. It was the first densely populated area in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapons-free zone through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, an important asset of the international community that has served as inspiration for the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world. The countries of our region have continued to advocate for the withdrawal of the interpretative declarations to Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that have been made by nuclear-weapon States. These declarations are incompatible with the purpose of the Treaty. We highlight the efforts of Brazil and Mexico, with the support of the States Parties of OPANAL, to promote a new comprehensive study on the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. Chair, we regard nuclear-weapon-free zones as a contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of peace and security at the regional and international levels. Accordingly, we advocate for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various countries and regions of the world. We support the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Cuba will continue to advocate steadfastly for general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and will remain a firm defender of regional and international peace and security. We will continue to demand full observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Greece. You have the floor.

Mr. Tetzschner, my country fully aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union and has the following remarks in its national capacity. Greece reiterates its support to regional cooperation in the field of disarmament and security as an effective step in fulfillment of our goal for a general and complete disarmament on a global level. We commend the important work of the United Nations Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in Asia, as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean. Greece contributed to this year's report of the Secretary General on strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region and is ready to support the relevant resolution under the same topic. Respect for international law and the principle of good neighborly relations is of paramount importance for safeguarding and strengthening peace and security in the Mediterranean region. Greece, as a pillar of stability in the region, has always been committed to the rules of international law and remains a strong advocate of the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, emphasizing on the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of force, as well as on international cooperation to this end. Moreover, my country has always exercised its sovereign rights in its maritime areas in accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the UNCLOS, abstaining from activities which could exacerbate tensions and jeopardize regional peace and security. Greece has sought to strengthen cooperation in trilateral or enhanced formats, demonstrating dedication and commitment to addressing rapidly changing dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and to foster a more stable, integrated, and prosperous region. These platforms have already promoted and have great potential to further advance long-term collaborations in diverse areas of fields such as cybersecurity, innovation, and civil and environmental protection, contributing to peace and stability in the region. Greece will continue to upgrade, expand, and deepen this regional cooperation architecture towards advancing common interests and fostering a more connected and resilient community in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. Also, my country fully supports the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Finally, Greece commends the work of the Southeastern and Eastern European Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Greece for his statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of the United States. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The United States remains steadfast in its commitment to effective arms control and nonproliferation. Yet we cannot ignore that in the past year, certain actors have tested the frameworks we rely on for predictability and security. For decades, Iran has maintained a nuclear program that has repeatedly raised serious proliferation concerns, alongside its support for terrorist proxies and other destabilizing activities across the Middle East and beyond. Despite repeated opportunities to negotiate in good faith, Iran has repeatedly chosen escalation over diplomacy. The United States remains open to a genuine diplomatic resolution with Iran, one that includes verifiable constraints on its nuclear weapons aspirations, restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and an end to its support for terrorism. But we are clear-eyed about the nature of this regime, and our position is unequivocal. Iran will never be permitted to possess nuclear weapons. The Russia-Ukraine war continues to exact a devastating human toll. The United States remains actively engaged in pursuit of an end to the war and is committed to achieving a durable and lasting peace. Russia and Ukraine should negotiate in good faith. We call on Russia to end activities that increase nuclear risk, including the development and testing of exotic nuclear power delivery systems. The illicit transfer of weapons and sensitive technologies also poses a direct challenge to regional and international security. Ballistic missiles and related components, Unmanned aerial systems, conventional munitions, and sensitive dual-use technologies can fuel conflicts and increase risks to civilian populations. Deepening military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, Iran's provision of weapons and support to proxies and other non-state actors, and the DPRK's continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs undermine the international nonproliferation framework and increase the risk of further proliferation. Chair, despite these challenges, sustained diplomacy continues to produce meaningful results. The United States has worked with partners to preserve ceasefires, advance peace efforts, secure the return of hostages, and create space for dialogue in some of the world's most difficult conflicts. Progress remains possible. Risk reduction, transparency, crisis communication, and sustained diplomacy remain essential to preventing conflict and reducing the risk of miscalculation. But these tools require responsible action and a willingness to engage. The United States stands ready to engage with member states in pursuing practical, verifiable measures that advance genuine security and not merely the appearance of it. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Conference on Disarmament. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, rather than deliver my originally prepared statement, and in the interests of using our time as effectively as possible, I would like to use this moment to respond to the joint statement delivered by Iran on behalf of a group of States. My apologies to the interpreters for this late change. The United Kingdom understands the concern and interest in discussing the issues raised in the joint statement, which are already well provided for by a comprehensive framework of existing international law. The United Kingdom recognises that attacks on nuclear facilities could pose safety and security risks. It is critical that all parties to an armed conflict ensure that IHL is applied, respected and upheld in all their actions. For the avoidance of any doubt, the United Kingdom is absolutely committed to complying with applicable international law. Nuclear facilities already benefit from important protections under international law. The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against states subject to limited exceptions. During armed conflict, IHL protects nuclear facilities that constitute civilian objects in the same way as other civilian objects. They must not be made the object of attack. The rule of proportionality must be respected, and all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid and, in any event, minimize incidental civilian harm. in accordance with article 57 of the additional protocol 1 to the Geneva conventions. Article 56 of additional protocol 1 provides specific protection for works and installations containing dangerous forces, including nuclear electrical generating stations. Mr. Chair, historic IAEA resolutions reflected the concerns of their time, but they did not override or alter the established and robust legal framework. Our concern is not with discussion of this important issue, but with calls for approaches that are not aligned with established law and that may risk creating confusion. A comprehensive legal framework is in place, and our focus should be on ensuring that it is applied, respected and upheld.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the CD for his statement. The Committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Togo. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, the delegation of Togo reaffirms the importance of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in efforts to support States with the implementation of their commitments on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation, while taking account of the specific features and priorities in each region. In Africa, the role carried out by the United Nations Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa provides essential support to the efforts of States to ensure peace and security on the continent. There are persistent security threats, given that this is an indisputable tool for accompanying African states as they deliver their commitments. In this regard, Togo believes that the resolution on the regional center should continue the annual review cycle. This is not a simple administrative meeting. These are operational tools for Member States to record their priorities for the Centre, given the evolving situation and new challenges, in particular the management of ammunition, the prevention of armed violence and the impact of new technologies. An annual review would ensure that guidance set up by States would remain in lockstep with their needs. It would also allow for regular dialogue with the center, whose efforts mainly involve what the member states want. This frequency would allow for monitoring results while ensuring visibility in terms of disarmament mission goals in the First Committee and elsewhere. Reducing the frequency of this resolution would not even cause any significant savings. It would risk, on the other hand, diminishing opportunities for dialogue, follow-up, and political guidance to the detriment of the activities of the center in terms of the activities of the states. For Togo, regional disarmament is an essential pillar for conflict prevention and for peace building. My delegation therefore supports maintaining the annual review of this resolution so as to preserve the commitments of States and to strengthen the work of the regional center, especially that of UNREC in Africa. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Togo for her statement. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Pakistan. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Recent Recent events have shown more starkly than any in recent memory that threats to international peace and security are born in regions. From the Middle East to South Asia, unresolved disputes, military imbalances, and the absence of restraint have turned regional tensions into armed conflict with consequences felt far beyond. As SOD1, the 1993 Disarmament Commission guidelines And successive resolutions of this committee form a simple truth. Regional and global approaches to disarmament must advance together. Global arms control cannot succeed while regions remain locked in insecurity. The principles are well established. Defense capabilities should be balanced at the lowest possible level. Militarily significant states bear a special responsibility. and the peaceful settlement of disputes creates the political conditions for arms limitations. Many regions have demonstrated how adherence to these principles through conventional arms control and confidence building measures can lay durable foundations for peace. Yet when a state resists such regional approaches, whether in pursuit of global ambitions or for domestic political gain, it obstructs peace not only in its neighborhood but across the international order. Nowhere is the cost of ignoring these principles clearer than in South Asia. Excessive accumulation of armaments, aggressive doctrines, and a refusal to engage in a dialogue have brought two neighboring nuclear-armed states into direct conflict. Pakistan's proposal for a strategic restraint regime remains on the table. Its three interlocking elements, conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint, and conventional balance, offer a practical framework for stability in South Asia. Chair, confidence building measures have proven their value in reducing risk, but they must evolve with the times. Unmanned systems, loitering munitions, and AI-enabled capabilities are lowering the threshold for conflict and compressing crisis decision-making. Regional CBMs must be updated to address these technologies and strengthen crisis communication. For decades, Pakistan has championed regional disarmament, conventional arms control, and CBMs annually in this committee. To help rationalize this committee's work, Pakistan has biennialized its resolutions on regional disarmament and CBMs. Our commitment to their objectives remain undiminished. We count on the continued support of Member States. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Syria. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My delegation adds its voice to the statement by the Arab Group and NAMS. Mr. Chairman, commitment to multilateralism under the challenges that we face is increasingly important, particularly in the Middle East, where we see military escalation. It shows the urgent need for a nuclear-weapon and other WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Mr. Chairman, Syria stresses its commitment to work to free the Middle East from nuclear and other WMDs, because we believe that creation of such a region would fundamentally contribute to promoting international and regional peace and security. Syria is a state party in the NPT, in the Conventional Weapons Convention. It is a signatory to the Biological Weapon Convention and fully commits to its obligations under those instruments. This is reflected in its activities to render the Middle East free of all WMDs. We stress the need to intensify international efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East through practical implementation of relevant international resolutions, particularly the resolution adopted by the NPT conference of 1995, we believe this is a collective responsibility and fully part of member states commitments under the treaty. The delay, the long delay in implementing this resolution led the states of the region to hold a conference on the creation of such a nuclear-free zone as a supporting instrument and not an alternative one. We look forward to the seventh conference under the presidency of Oman. The conference has taken positive steps throughout the past six sessions through involving all states. Nevertheless, the fundamental obstacle is the absence from Israel in its activities. The fact that only one state in the region has nuclear facilities outside IAEA guarantees is a threat to any opportunity to create such a zone. Mr. Chairman, the, uh, transformation witnessed by Syria after, uh, uh, decades of non-implementation of international commitments has opened wide horizons. However, it requires a major effort to ensure the commitment by all of the fundamental laws on disarmament and non-proliferation in the region. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Nigeria, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Nigeria aligns its statement with that of NAM and wish to make the following remark in its national capacity. Nigeria reaffirms its unwavering commitment to multilateralism and the strengthening of the United Nations disarmament machinery. We underscore the importance of preserving and enhancing the effectiveness of institutions through renewed political will, constructive dialogue, and sustained international cooperation consistent with the principle and purpose of the United Nations Charter. We, Nigeria, remain deeply concerned by the persistent security challenges confronting Africa, particularly the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, transnational organized crime, terrorism, and diversion of conventional weapons and ammunition. These interconnected threats continue to undermine regional stability, particularly in the West Africa and Sahel region, the Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, and the African Great Lakes region. Mr. Chair, Nigeria attaches particular importance to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, as the regional arm of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. UNRWA remains an indispensable mechanism for providing vital technical assistance, capacity building and institutional support to African states, thus playing a pivotal role advancing regional peace, security and disarmament. We commend the Centre We commend the Centre's contribution to combating illicit arms trafficking, strengthening national capacity and promoting cooperation with the African Union, ECOWAS, among other regional stakeholders. These efforts support African Union Agenda 2063 and its Silencing the Gun Initiative. Against this backdrop of involving security challenges across Africa, Nigeria emphasizes that the implementation of UNREC mandate must remain responsive to regional security dynamic, emerging challenges, and the priority identified by member states. Nigeria further call for adequate predictable and sustainable human, financial, and technical resources to enable UNREC to discharge its mandate effectively and expand its demand-driven capacity-building program and strengthen cooperation with relevant regional and international partners. Nigeria remains committed to strengthen the United Nations Regional Disarmament Mechanism. We urge all member states and develop developmental partner to sustain their political, technical, and financial support for UNRWA in recognition of its vital contribution to peace, security, and sustainable development in Africa. And thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement. Distinguished delegates, I shall now call on delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I'll begin by first giving the floor to delegations who would like to intervene under the cluster of other disarmament measures and international security. I call on the representative of the Russian Federation. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Russian Federation roundly condemns what we heard in this hall, the baseless attacks against our country. What is outrageous are the attempts to present Russia as the aggressor in the digital realm, although exactly the situation is quite the opposite. In the beginning of 2022, Russia's information structures started being attacked by countless computerized attacks. Primarily, they're coming from the Zelensky regime, a regime that is a tool and a platform for carrying out offensive cyber operations in the interest of NATO. Kyiv is choosing civilian targets. They're trying to take out of commission electronic services, equipment. They're trying to steal the personal data of our citizens for later targeted operations. And the Ukrainian authorities are not only not hiding, but they're even taking on responsibility for these acts of cyber sabotage. In the context of this harmful activities, the Zelensky regime has amassed a large number of IT fraudsters, the so-called IT army, which is under the control of the army. We're talking about the Ukrainian field centers that are engaged in theft of ordinary Russians and Ukrainians. And and Europeans. This is a conveyor that has over 100,000 people. And just Dnipropetrovsk, there are some 500 such institutions by our calculations. Of course, speaking about some independence of the Kyiv regime in this regard is not something that is accurate. Most of the anti-Russian activities are carried out with the collusion of NATO, including carried out by the coalition of the willing against Ukraine and the Tallinn mechanism. The total financial support provided to Kyiv in this format is at least 800 million euros. And the Alliance is not limiting themselves to technically fueling and aiding and abetting Ukrainian hackers. On the territory of this country, there are forces under the control of Western security forces and others who, in real time, are coordinating attacks against our country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I now call on the representative of China.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In remarks delivered this morning, the United States representative unjustifiably hyped up the so-called issue of China's notification regarding a missile test launch. China firmly opposes this. China has already made its solemn position clear on multiple occasions. I would like to emphasize that China's missile test launch was entirely reasonable, lawful, and legitimate. It was conducted to verify the reliability, safety and effectiveness of the relevant weapons system, and was not directed at any specific country or target. China provided advance notifications to relevant countries and issued navigational warnings, and made sure that the test did not harm the interests of any country, fully demonstrating China's goodwill and responsible attitude. China is not a member of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and is therefore not bound by its provisions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I now call on the representative of Israel.

Thank you, Chair. Once again, Iran has chosen to divert this forum's attention from the real threat, Iran itself. The Islamic Republic of Iran carries out cyber attacks against Israeli civilian infrastructure continuously. Iranian state and state-affiliated actors have attacked vital medical systems and leaked patients' data. They have wiped and leaked the systems of more than 100 Israeli organizations. They have hijacked security cameras and used them to support attacks, and they have targeted Israeli journalists, academics, and officials with phishing and espionage campaigns. But Israel is not alone. Iran does the same around the world. In recent years, it has waged a sustained and escalating campaign of malicious cyber operations against civilian infrastructure, democratic institutions, and ordinary citizens. Actors affiliated with the IRGC have compromised industrial control devices, many of them in the water sector, including drinking water pumping station. They defaced control screens and disabled the devices. Iranian state actors have launched destructive attacks on government networks. They deployed ransomware and wiper malware that took public services offline and destroyed data. They have also targeted democracy itself. They stole voter information and sent threatening messages to voters. They hacked a presidential campaign and leaked the stolen material, all in order to influence an election. They wiped the global network of a medical technology company, forcing offices around the world offline. And they systematically target journalists, parliamentarians, academics, and human rights defenders for espionage. Chair, this is the conduct of the Iranian regime abroad. Now consider how it behaves at home. The same regime deprives its own population of access to information and communication. During periods of public protest, it has imposed nationwide internet shutdowns, reducing connectivity to a small fraction of normal levels for days and even weeks at a time. It has repeatedly quarantined mobile data services. And over the past year alone, Iranian authorities imposed a near-total national blackout that lasted almost three months. It was the longest shutdown ever recorded. Tens of millions of people were cut off from the outside world. Major international platforms and messaging application remain blocked. Access to internet is increasingly rationed through the state-controlled national network, which reserves unfiltered connectivity for approved users only. The possession of satellite internet equipment has been criminalized, and the authorities have gone further still, jamming satellite television broadcasts, satellite internet signals, and even civilian navigation systems. So let us be clear about what we are looking at. A regime that attacks medical systems, water systems, and elections abroad, while silencing its own citizens at home, cannot claim the mantle of responsible behavior in cyberspace. It is not the defender of these firm principles. It is a violator of them. I thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of Czech Republic.

Chair, I'm compelled to take the floor in reaction to the statements by the Russian Federation delivered both yesterday and today. At the outset, please allow me to fully echo the statements delivered yesterday by my Estonian and Polish colleagues. Chair, I must confess that I'm a little bit puzzled by the repeated statements from the Russian Federation that it remains in full compliance with international humanitarian law. Is there not an already mounting evidence confirming Russia's serious breaches of international humanitarian law? The war crimes committed in Bucha and use of riot control agents and chloropicrine at the Ukrainian battlefront, repeated shelling at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and destruction of the Kakhovka dam. These are but a few examples attesting Russia's utter noncompliance with international humanitarian law, including the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions or the CWC. Let me also turn to the topic of cluster five as the growing number of hybrid attacks against European countries cannot be left amiss. Recently, the National Cyber and Information Security Agency of the Czech Republic issued a warning that actors primarily linked to Russia have attempted to gain access to accounts on the encrypted messaging application Signal, belonging to politicians, government officials, and security

experts.

A similar pattern was previously witnessed in several other European countries. Furthermore, it was the EU that exposed the 16th Center of Russia's Federal Security Service, FSB, as controlling a variety of cyber threat groups. Their activities have included infiltration of governmental networks and sabotage of critical infrastructure across several EU member states. Chair, I must admit that the attempts of the Russian Federation to repeatedly paint itself as a victim in Ukraine, when faced with so-called collective West, when accused of malicious cyber attacks and spread of disinformation, a prime example of hypocrisy, by twisting the reality and shifting blame to others. The list of Russia's so-called facts goes on, and I'm sure we will all shortly hear why my current statement is misleading or misinterpretation of some lengthy historic evolution. Regardless how hard Russia or anyone else tries, you cannot change the hard facts. You cannot return the lost lives.

I thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of Ukraine.

Mr. Chair, Ukraine is compelled to exercise its right of reply in response to the accusations made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. There is a striking contradiction between the accusations voiced by Russia today and its own conduct in cyberspace. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is not confined to the conventional battlefield. Cyberspace has become another domain in which Russia seeks to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty, weaken its defense capabilities, and inflict maximum damage on the civilian population. For years, Russia has conducted malicious cyber activities targeting Ukrainian government institutions, energy infrastructure, communications networks, financial systems, and essential civilian services. Let us recall the cyber attack against Ukraine's power grid in 2015, which caused widespread electricity outages, and the devastating NotPetya attack in 2017, which spread far beyond Ukraine and caused enormous economic damage worldwide. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has increasingly combined missile and drone strikes with malicious cyber operations against Ukraine's critical infrastructure. In the first half of 2026 alone, Ukraine's computer emergency response team, CERT-UA, handled more than 3,100 cyber incidents, with local authorities, government institutions, the security and defense sector, and energy infrastructure among the principal targets. These figures illustrate the scale of the cyber threats Ukraine continues to face. Russia's malicious cyber operations are an integral part of its war of aggression, conducted alongside constant missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Mr. Chair, despite this sustained pressure, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable cyber resilience, thanks to the professionalism of its institutions and the strong support of international partners. We are particularly grateful to the members of the Tallinn Mechanism, which have committed more than 300 million euros in civilian cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine since its establishment in December 2023. Established in response to Russia's persistent cyber threats, the TALIN mechanism provides a coordinated international framework for strengthening Ukraine's civilian cybersecurity capabilities and long-term resilience. It helps mobilize technical expertise, financial resources, and practical assistance to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen national cybersecurity institutions, and enhance Ukraine's capacity to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from malicious cyber operations. The very existence of this initiative demonstrates that Russia's malicious cyber activities are not an isolated concern, but a persistent challenge requiring sustained and coordinated action. Thank you.

Now, I call on the representative of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation is compelled to take the floor in exercise of its right of reply in response to the unfounded and absurd allegations made by the representative of the Israeli regime. We categorically reject these baseless and politically motivated accusations. Instead of engaging in unfounded allegations against others, these delegations should reflect on their own conduct, which is well documented and known to the international community. There is a profound contradiction in hearing accusations concerning attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure from the representative of a regime whose own conduct has resulted in extensive civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure in our region. Such statements attempt to invert reality by casting the aggressor as the victim. The international community is well aware of the facts and cannot be misled by such narratives. Iran has long been one of the primary targets and victims of malicious cyber activities directed against its critical infrastructure, particularly by the Israeli regime. The Stuxnet attack against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities, together with cyber attacks targeting the country's steel and petrochemical industries, fuel distribution system, gas stations, and municipal public services are only a few examples of such malicious activities. The U.S. and Israeli regimes' unlawful attacks in 2025 and 2026 against Iran have not been confined to kinetic operations. They have also involved extensive malicious cyber activities directed against Iran's critical infrastructure and civilian services, disrupting the daily lives of our people and the functioning of essential public services and business. The Israeli regime which has gone so far as to weaponize even food and water against innocent civilians, has over the past eight decades carried out more than 3,000 terrorist operations, displaced over 7 million Palestinians, martyred and wounded hundreds of thousands, and imprisoned more than 1 million Palestinians. This is the very same regime that has launched military aggression against its neighbors, remains a party to none of the international instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and maintains hundreds of nuclear warheads in its arsenal. The Israeli regime, burdened by such a dark record, lacks any credibility to lecture other States and express sympathy with the Iranian people. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Now I call on delegations requested for the rights of reply at the end of the day today. I call on the representative of the Russian Federation for a second intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to be brief. So as not to tire out the distinguished delegate of Czechia, I'm not going to repeat all the arguments that we repeatedly have voiced in this hall as regards our implementation of our international law and IHL as well. All of you can see them in the materials of the sessions of the First Committee. I just want to supplement my statement by adding one thing. At a time when all states of the world are in lockstep in the resolve to strengthen the international IT security and to work toward the effective implementation of the tasks of the global mechanism that we've created, The State of Ukraine, the Zelensky regime, is the only country in the world that is not only not hiding, but even openly acknowledging and even boasting about the fact that it is carrying out hacks of purely civilian IT infrastructure in violation of norms of international law and the rules of responsible behavior of states in cyberspace, which was adopted by the General Assembly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The representative of the United States is asking for the floor on the other disarmament measures.

Thank you, Chair. I take the floor to respond to Iran regarding their joint statement on the topic of attacks on nuclear facilities. Colleagues, the Iranian-led joint statement you've heard during this session is full of dubious content. In particular, the joint statement distorts international law and selectively quotes the IAEA statute, the NPT, and other documents adopted by the IAEA General Conference and United Nations, taking them out of context and drawing inaccurate conclusions. For example, there is no provision in the IAEA statute that prohibits attacks on nuclear facilities or addresses such attacks in any fashion. It is also inaccurate that there is a per se prohibition on attacks on nuclear facilities under international law, including international humanitarian law. Instead of pursuing this joint statement, Iran should be focused on fully cooperating with the IAEA, which it is obliged to do under its NPT-related safeguards agreement, and as the international community has called on Iran to do for over five years, helping to assure the international community that its nuclear program is indeed peaceful in nature. This is not a determination that Iran, or any state, can make on its own accord. The United States remains committed to achieving lasting peace and security in the region, including and especially for the people of Iran. Thank you, Chair.

Now I call on delegations for the rights of reply at the end of the day today. I call on the representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Russian Federation has already explained many times the origin of the Ukrainian crisis. We'd like to recall that those countries that are complaining about the Russian Federation in the context of the Ukrainian conflict, for many years blocked our efforts to find a political and diplomatic solution that would have allowed for ensuring the security equally of Russia and of Ukraine. The European countries were consistent in their sabotage of the agreements reached in February 2014 and the Minsk agreements. adopted by the Security Council and the Istanbul negotiations that could have ended the conflict back in 2022. For many years, we've seen flat unwillingness to set aside an escalation of the conflict and to consider Russia's legitimate national security interests. Instead of that, Brussels is ramping up the delivery of weapons to the Kyiv regime. This is only worsening the situation. Russia is not refusing and not evading negotiations or direct contacts with the Ukrainian side. We're prepared to continue dialogue so as to ensure a comprehensive long-term settlement, a settlement that would address the root causes of the crisis. There's another thing that's absolutely unacceptable for us. It's what we've heard in this section of the First Committee. I'm referring to attempts to tarnish Russia's peacekeeping efforts in Transnistria. The Moldovan public statements we've heard are completely unglued from reality. Statements calling for the withdrawal of Russian soldiers from Transnistria. The presence of peacekeepers is the only real factor that guarantees peace and calm in the region. were concerned by the fact that Moldovans are no longer talking about OSCE documents about granting Transnistria a special status. Ukraine took the same path in pretending to implement the Minsk agreements. Any non-diplomatic ways of resolving the situation that jeopardize the security of our soldiers are attempts that we will view as an attempt to as an attack on the Russian Federation. We advocate for normalizing dialogue among the parties, and we want to see agreements reached previously observed. We trust that Moldova will be constructive and respond to the calls of Tiraspol to sit at the negotiating table. The end goal should be developing with international mediation a formula for a viable comprehensive settlement. Chairman, We've heard statements by Georgia too, given them. We need to clarify the state of affairs around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These are independent states recognized by Russia and a number of countries based on a free vote held by the South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples. That expression of will was fully in line with the norms and principles of international law, including the Charter. And that concludes the matter for us. A real contribution to stability and security in the region would be a legally binding agreement on the non-use of force between Georgia on the one hand and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other hand, as well as the process of delimiting the state borders and later demarcating them. And finally, I want to underscore the absolutely legitimate nature of Russia's cooperation with all of its partners and allies. That includes Belarus, Iran, and the DPRK. We would ask the Western delegations to stop their much-favored practice of meddling in the sovereign affairs of our state. All of our actions are aimed at ensuring national, regional, and international security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I call on the representative of Ukraine.

Mr. Chair, Ukraine wishes to exercise its right of reply in response to the statement delivered by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of a group of states. We welcome the fact that the issue of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities has been raised and that such attacks are claimed to be unacceptable. For Ukraine, this issue is a matter of immediate and profound concern. Yet, there is a striking contradiction between the principles proclaimed in today's statement and the actions of one of its authors, the Russian Federation. Indeed, Russia has considerable practical experience in precisely the activities it now seeks to condemn. On 24 February 2022, the very day Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its armed forces occupied the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site. The occupation continued until 31st March 2022. Less than two weeks later, on 4th March 2022, the international community witnessed Russian troops carrying out a direct military assault against the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. During the military action against Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the plant's premises came under fire. Several buildings were hit. The training center sustained substantial Substantial damage, a fire erupted, and other infrastructure and equipment were affected. Russian forces subsequently established control over Europe's largest nuclear power plant. This was not merely a warning, a threat, or a hypothetical risk. It was an actual armed attack on a civilian nuclear installation, followed by its forcible seizure and continued occupation. Mr. Chair, Russia's actions against Ukraine's nuclear infrastructure did not stop there. On 14 February 2025, a Russian drone struck the New Safe Confinement at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, a protective structure constructed through international efforts to contain the consequences of one of the most devastating nuclear disasters in history. The attack triggered a fire and inflicted significant damage on the facility. More recently, on 7th June 2026, another Russian drone strike targeted the Ukraine civilian nuclear infrastructure, this time a centralized spent nuclear fuel storage facility. The attack partially destroyed the container reception building and damaged nearby structures, including facilities used by IAEA personnel. So for one of the authors of today's statement, attacks against nuclear facilities are not an abstract legal concept, nor is a military seizure of nuclear facility. is a theoretical scenario. Few delegations in this room can claim such extensive firsthand experience with the subject of attacks and seizure of nuclear facilities. Ukraine, therefore, takes note of the Russian Federation's newly expressed condemnation of attacks and threats of attack against nuclear facilities. We hope that this evolution in rhetoric will soon be followed by an evolution in conduct. Nuclear facilities must not be attacked. They must also not be seized by military force. They must not be occupied, they must not be militarized, and they must not be used to support military operations. If the Russian Federation genuinely wishes to demonstrate its declared commitment, it doesn't need another joint statement to do so. It can start with withdrawal from the nuclear power plant it attacked, seized, and continues to occupy, namely the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I call on the representative of Israel.

Chair, once again, Iran has chosen to exploit this distinguished forum to distort the facts, evade responsibility, and portray itself as a victim of the very threat it continues to generate. Iran's claims regarding the alleged peaceful nature of its nuclear program cannot be reconciled with its longstanding record of concealment, noncompliance, and obstruction of international scrutiny. These are not allegations. They are findings documented by the IAEA itself. Mr. Chair, Iran's nuclear program extends far beyond the peaceful threshold in pursuit of military nuclear capabilities. At Natanz and Fordow, Iran enriched uranium to 60 percent, a level far beyond the requirements of conventional civilian nuclear power generation. In Isfahan, Iran operated uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities, while in Arak, it pursued a heavy water reactor designed for weapons-grade plutonium that clearly violated its obligations. Iran's history of undeclared nuclear material and activities further undermines its claims of exclusively peaceful intentions. In June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors formally found Iran's being in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, a finding reiterated recently in June 2026. Iran has repeatedly failed to meet its obligation to the IAEA, withholding essential information and obstructing international verification. According to the Director-General's September 2026 report, during the reporting period, the agency received no information regarding the safeguard status of Iran's 22 declared nuclear facilities and one location at such facilities, nor was it granted access to conduct verification activities. The implications are grave. According to the IAEA, Iran's estimated stockpile of last year included 400 40.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent. More than a year later, the agency has lost continuity of knowledge regarding the material and cannot determine the current sites, composition, or whereabouts of Iran-enriched uranium stockpile. Despite the IAEA repeated attempts and requests for inspections, Iran has been determined to obstruct and evade international scrutiny. Ultimately, the IAEA has explicitly identified the situation as a serious proliferation concern, requiring urgent resolution. It cannot verify that the nuclear material has not been diverted into military purposes, nor provide assurance that Iran's program is exclusively peaceful. Peaceful intentions are demonstrated through transparency and compliance, not exploitation of this forum. Evidence of Iran's rough conduct is reflected in the restoration of UN Security Council sanctions, the international community's response through the UN frameworks to Iran's significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA and the Security Council Resolution 2231. Mr. Chair, it's equally troubling that certain member states continue to lend diplomatic legitimacy to Iran's misleading narratives. Those who defend or excuse Tehran's conduct should consider the message they are sending, that repeated noncompliance, obstruction of international inspectors, and the threat to civilian populations can be overlooked for political convenience. This committee must not allow distortions to replace established facts. Israel calls upon the international community to insist on Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA and compliance with its binding international obligations. Ultimately, Action speaks louder than words, and Iran's actions speak for themselves. I thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of Finland.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, Finland exercises its right of reply in response to the statement made by the Russian Federation. Finland firmly rejects the Russian Federation's attempt to portray Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership and NATO's defensive activities as threats to its security or as justification for its withdrawal from the CFE Treaty. Russia ceased implementing the treaty already in 2007, long before Finland and Sweden joined NATO. Russia has caused an effect backwards. It was Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and its attempts to dictate the security choices of its neighbors that fundamentally changed Europe's security environment. Finland's decision to join NATO was sovereign, democratic, and based on a thorough assessment of the changed security environment with strong public support. NATO's strengthened deterrence and defense are a response to Russia's actions, not a threat to Russia. Finland and Sweden exercise their sovereign right to join a defensive alliance. Our membership is not directed against anyone. Russia cannot shift responsibility for its own actions onto those responding to them.

I thank you.

I call on the representative of the United States. I call on the representative of Sweden.

Thank you, Chair.

Sweden exercises its right of reply in response to the statement made by the Russian Federation. We reject the assertion that the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO altered any security in Europe. Sweden's decision to reorient its foreign and security policy was taken in response to the fundamentally changed security environment following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Let me underscore the sequence of events.

It was only after Russia's aggression against Ukraine that Sweden concluded it was necessary to end more than 200 years of military non-alignment and seek NATO membership. Sweden's decision to join NATO was a sovereign one. If Russia considers such sovereign choices to be problematic, it should be well advised to reflect on the consequences of using military force to pursue political objectives. It should also be placed on record that NATO is a defensive alliance. The accession of new members for the purpose of collective defence does not threaten Russia or any other country.

Thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Chair. My delegation had not intended to take the floor today. But the DPRK delegations repeated and groundless allegations has left us with little choice but to exercise our right of reply. First, the DPRK is consistently misleading the situation. The ROK-U.S. combined defense and deterrence posture is a response to the DPRK's ever-growing military threat, not the other way around. The DPRK has continued to develop its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. In this situation, as our security is threatened, the ROK is maintaining the ROK-U.S. combined defense and deterrence posture, including the conduct of combined trainings exercise. This posture constitutes a legitimate and defensive response to protect the lives and safety of our people and to contribute to regional peace and security. Second, on the role that DPRK claims for regional peace and security. Peace is not built through repeated nuclear tests, through missile launches that violate council resolutions, or through military cooperation that does the same. The DPRK can contribute to peace and security of this region in only one way, by complying with its obligations and abandoning its nuclear weapons and program. Once again, we would like to emphasize that we need to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue comprehensively through dialogue.

Thank you, Chair.

I call on the representative of DPRK.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. The DPRK delegation is compelled to take the floor in response to the provocative allegations from some delegations who took the floor this afternoon. First, to the representative of the United States, it is the U.S. who has first introduced the nuclear weapon into the Korean Peninsula in 1950s and still continues the nuclear threat against the DPRK, putting the DPRK on its list of preemptive nuclear attack. It is also the U.S. who has evolved its regional military bloc into a nuke-based one, staging large military exercises in and around the Korean Peninsula, targeting the DPRK, allowing ROK to access to U.S. nuclear weapons under the pretext of Washington Declaration and Nuclear Consultative Group. while deploying ultra-modern military assets such as F-35 stealth fighters and intermediate-range missiles. It is highly legal and as a matter of course for the DPRK to respond reflectively to the nuclear threat of the U.S. to safeguard its national security interests. The DPRK will remain committed to its mission to fully guarantee the security and the well-being of its people and its sovereign right. and to the delegate of the ROK. The DPRK has no intention and no reason to do anything with ROK. Nevertheless, ROK is staging anti-DPRK nuclear war drills with U.S. every year, blatantly talking about the countermeasures against the DPRK. What countermeasures are they talking about against a nuclear weapon state? Developing their indigenous nukes or attacking DPRK with U.S. nuclear weapon? Even last August, the ROK launched large military exercises with U.S., another undisguised nuclear war rehearsal aimed at getting familiar with the procedures and mode for attacking DPRK with nuclear weapons, according to the nuclear operation guidelines. It is not the DPRK, but ROK who is provocative. DPRK delegation strongly recommends ROK to find ways and means to ensure its own security, rather than provoking us. My delegation also rejects those groundless claims made by Estonia and EU delegate on the legal cooperation between DPRK and Russian Federation. DPRK armed forces have participated in Kursk liberation operation, and it has been just and falls into the jurisdiction of our sovereign rights. It also completely meets the words and spirits of the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership between DPRK and Russian Federation, as well as international laws, including UN Charter. DPRK and Russian Federation has been standing on the side of justice and will in the future represent the aspiration and demand of the world community for the equality and justice and against the supremacy by means of resolute struggle. Thank you, Chair.

I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation for the second intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to respond to the latest attempts by the delegation of Ukraine to distort the situation around the Russian Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. It was specifically the Kyiv regime that has continued to deliberately create a threat of a serious nuclear incident in this plant. Just recently, on the 4th of October, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked the laboratory block two of the station, which is in direct proximity, just 200 meters away from the energy block of the plant. Kyiv also carried out shelling of a radioactive waste processing area. An attack on this plant could damage equipment the proper functioning of which is necessary in order to handle radioactive waste properly. Ukraine has continued to strike the plant and the related infrastructure. Its aim is to hamper the operation of the plant and create the risk of a nuclear incident. This balancing on the brink of a nuclear disaster is showing the terrorist nature of the Kyiv regime. This has become possible because there's been no reaction to such acts from the Western countries. There are many attacks and provocations, and they've continued to provide them with weapons, such attacks that the Ukrainian military is making show that they don't care about nuclear safety and security at various international fora, like at the IAEA and the UN, and they're able to -- and it's showing that they want to achieve their goals using any terrorist methods. Thank you.

I call on the representative of Israel for the second intervention.

Thank you, Chair. We have heard some delegations' remarks regarding nuclear disarmament and the Middle East. I would like to make it clear, Israel will not participate in processes that bypass established UN practices, are ill-motivated, and are detached from the current reality in the Middle East. It is regrettable that these delegations continue to overlook the real destabilizer of the Middle East, Iran. We have already addressed this at length, so we will not take more of this committee's time. We call on these delegations to update their policy statement and devote more time and effort to pursuing a Middle East where all countries recognize each other's right to exist. I thank you, Chair.

I now call on the representative of Ukraine for the second intervention.

Chair, the delegation of Ukraine is compelled to exercise again its right of reply in response to the statement just made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. Ukraine has repeatedly raised the issue of nuclear safety and security, including earlier today during the General Assembly's consideration of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. When where the Russian Federation once again demonstrated its disregard for nuclear safety and security by voting against the relevant resolution. The Russian delegation has once again attempted to turn reality upside down, portraying the aggressor as a victim and Ukraine, which is defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as the source of threats to nuclear safety. Let us recall one simple fact. Before Russia's full-scale invasion, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was operating under Ukraine's sovereign control. There were no Russian troops on its premises, no military equipment deployed there, and no risks arising from its military occupation. All these dangers emerged as a direct consequence of Russia's aggression and its subsequent seizure of this facility. Russia cannot create a grave threat to nuclear safety and security, perpetuate it through its illegal military occupation, and then seek to blame Ukraine for the consequences of its own actions. The solution is neither complicated nor controversial. Russia must withdraw its forces, return the plant to Ukraine's full control, and end its war of aggression against Ukraine. Thank you.

The following delegations are unable to exercise their rights of reply due to time constraints. They will be heard, the delegation of Iran, they will be heard as the first speakers to exercise the right of reply at our next meeting. Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available for this meeting. The Committee will reconvene next Monday, 26 October, at 10:00 a.m. in conference room 4, when we will continue our thematic discussion on the regional disarmament and disarmament machinery. 30 next Monday, the Committee will hold its award ceremony for the 2026 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Certificates. Should the committee conclude its consideration of the cluster on disarmament machinery early on Monday, and taking into consideration rights of reply and the award ceremony, we will begin the third and final phase of its work, namely action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items, where we will hear general statements and explanation of vote before the vote on proposals submitted under Cluster 1, Nuclear Weapons. Let me be clear, no voting will take place next Monday, only statements. In this regard, the Committee will be guided by the informal papers issued by the Secretariat containing the draft resolutions and decisions which action will be taken each day. The meeting is adjourned.