First Committee, 22nd plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Good afternoon, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates. The 22nd meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the Eighty-first Session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, the Committee will first continue its thematic discussions under the cluster on disarmament machinery, to allow any delegations that are unable to speak this morning to make their presentations. Immediately thereafter, the Committee will hear all statements in exercise of the right of reply. After these statements, the Committee will begin the third and final phase of its work, namely actions on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items, to hear general statements and explanations of vote before the vote on proposals submitted under cluster one, that is nuclear weapons. I would like to emphasize that there will be no voting today, only statements. Kindly note also that those delegations that are not able to speak this afternoon will have an opportunity to do so before action tomorrow. At approximately 5:30 PM today, the Committee will hold its award ceremony for the 2026 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship certificates in this conference room. it is customary the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs will address the graduating fellows. The committee will now hear from the distinguished representative of Thailand speaking on behalf of Group of States.

Chair, I have the honour to deliver this joint statement on behalf of 75 States across regional groups. We wish to underscore the importance of strengthening the integration of gender perspectives in the work of the First Committee and across the entire disarmament machinery. 26 years ago, the Security Council adopted the landmark Resolution 1325, establishing the basis of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. This resolution recognized the particular impact of armed conflict on women and girls, as well as the critical roles women play in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, and post-conflict recovery. We recognize the differential impacts of weapons on women, men, girls, and boys. We reaffirm the fundamental importance of the WPS agenda and the need to advance women for equal, meaningful, effective, and safe participation in this process. The importance of mainstreaming gender perspectives in our work is regrettably being regularly challenged, including in disarmament and non-proliferation fora, despite evidence showing that gender equality is a primary predictor of sustainable peace. Chair, the systematic mainstreaming of gender perspectives in the disarmament machinery strengthens the diverse, inclusive, and meaningful participation for all in all aspects of our work. It also contributes to the implementation of the Pact for Future, the Sustainable Development Goals, UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, and its subsequent resolutions, and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. The differential gender impacts of armed conflict, including conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence, are critical considerations in the effective implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. We therefore underscore the need to further strengthen the collection and the use of disaggregated data in the disarmament policies. For example, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has differentiated impacts on women and girls, including in relation to societal roles, educational opportunities, and participation in economies, both during and after armed conflict. Similarly, the destructions of civilians' infrastructure and housing, and the resulting forced migration and illegal displacement heighten the risk of gender-based violence. Chair, research by UNIDIA also highlights that women remain underrepresented in armed control and disarmament fora, particularly in leadership and decision-making roles. Diverse perspective can bring new insights and improve the functioning of the disarmament machinery. We strongly encourage specific targeted actions so that women are fully, safely, equally, and meaningfully represented in our work, including in decision making to help achieve effective and sustainable solutions towards disarmament and nonproliferation. This includes championing the pivotal work of civil society in gender mainstreaming. In light of the concerted pushback to the relevance of gender perspectives and equality in disarmament matters, we call on all states to reflect on the ways in which the world burdened by the scorch of weapons in a safer, more inclusive, and equitable world for everyone. In closing, Chair, we reiterate that collectively incorporating gender perspective in all efforts related to disarmament, non-proliferation, cooperation and arms control can only improve the functioning of the Disarmament Machinery and strengthen international peace and security for all. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand speaking on behalf of Group of States. Now I understand that there are no more speakers in the debate under the cluster on Disarmament Machinery. A total of 50 delegations made statements this year, compared to 46 statements last year under this cluster. Distinguished delegates, I shall now call on delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I will begin by first giving the floor to the delegations who were unable to exercise their right of reply or their right to a second intervention last Friday due to time constraints. With this now, I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for a first intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation takes the floor in response to the remarks made by the representatives of the UK and the US regarding the joint statement on the prohibition of attacks and threat of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Both delegations profess an unwavering commitment to international law. Yet their actions stand in stark contradiction to their rhetoric, rendering their declarations of commitment wholly devoid of credibility. The UK invokes a supposedly comprehensive legal framework to dismiss the initiative, while the US accuses it of distorting international law. Yet neither delegation has addressed the fundamental issue. Why should efforts to strengthen the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities be dismissed rather than supported? The UK representative’s own reference to Article 56 of Additional Protocol I is telling. Paragraph 6 expressly encourages further agreements to provide additional protection for installations containing dangerous forces. This directly undermines the suggestion that strengthening existing protection is unnecessary or incompatible with international law. Nor can the historical record simply be brushed aside. IAEA General Conference Resolution GC 444 addressed armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes, while Security Council Resolution 487 adopted unanimously, condemned the Israeli regime's attack against Iraq's nuclear facilities. These instruments reflect longstanding international concern, not a distortion of law. If the United States genuinely believes that our joint statement misrepresents international instruments, let it identify the specific provision allegedly misquoted or misinterpreted. General accusations are no substitute for legal argument. Equally unacceptable is the attempt to divert this discussion to baseless allegations concerning Iran’s compliance with its safeguard obligations. Safeguards compliance and protection against military attack are separate legal questions. Neither political allegations nor disputes over safeguards can justify attempts to obstruct efforts to strengthening the prohibition against attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. Against this backdrop, we put a straightforward question to both delegations: What specific rule of international law authorizes an attack against a peaceful nuclear facility under IAEA safeguards? We expect a legal answer, not another political diversion. It is hardly surprising that the U.S. and the U.K. oppose this initiative, which seeks to prohibit attacks and threats of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. The United States, together with the Israeli regime, has itself carried out repeated attacks on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities and continues to threaten further attacks. The UK, for its part, must be held accountable for its role in facilitating this aggression through the provision of military bases and facilities under its jurisdiction for the preparation and execution of these attacks. Finally, if Ukraine genuinely considers this issue one of immediate and profound concern, as its representatives claim, It should demonstrate that concern through action, not rhetoric. Ukraine should join Iran, the Russian Federation, and other supporting countries in advancing concrete measures to strengthen protection against attacks and threat of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will now give the floor to the delegations who would like to intervene under the cluster of regional disarmament. And I now call on the distinguished representative of Russia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are compelled to take the floor in right of reply to clarify certain facts that were mentioned by the delegations of Finland, the Czech Republic and other European states in the context of the discussion on regional disarmament and international security. The Russian side has already repeatedly, including in this session of the First Committee, provided exhaustive and fact-based explanations about the history of all of the events and the root causes of the conflict. However, a number of delegations have continued to operate with primitive propaganda statements that are attempting to tarnish our country. The NATO countries, as we have already repeatedly seen, like to rewrite history. This time, Finland made the statement that its entry into NATO happened significantly later than Russia's withdrawal from the CFE. Allow us to recall that this country entered into the so-called defensive alliance on the 4th of April 2023. This led to the definitive disruption of the balance of forces stipulated under the treaty, and on the 29th of May, 2023, Russia's president signed a law denouncing the CFE, which entered into force in November of the same year. As for 2007, which is mentioned by the Finnish delegation, then at that time, we suspended the effect of the CFE. This was in response to a cascade of many years of hostile actions by NATO member states. I hope that I don’t need to explain the difference between the suspension of the agreement and its denunciation, and that April comes before May. Moreover, the entire history of recent decades has shown that the responsibility for the disruption – for the destruction of the delicate system of disarmament in Europe lies with those who have always attempted to tell the world about the defensive nature of their alliance. I also want to draw the distinguished delegate of Czechia’s attention and that of the other European colleagues, to the fact that they need to be guided by facts and not distort reality. We've often heard insinuations about the so-called incident in Bucha and about other events, and these are based on fabricated news reports and statements of officials that use the phrase "highly likely." Russia has repeatedly tried to clear up the facts based on which the accusations rest. In the context of Bucha, we asked for a list of those who died, but in four years, neither the Kyiv regime nor the UNSG has able to provide anything. But – and they can’t do it because this is a fabrication and not a fact. Even a rudimentary analysis of these sources, primarily the Ukrainian sources, shows that the names that are engraved in the memorial in Bucha that is is well known, is actively visited by European leaders. These names are not citizens – are not civilians, rather. The majority of them were participants of neo-Nazi battalions, and they died in completely different circumstances. I want to ask the Western delegations a question. When you talk about observing international humanitarian law, are you talking about the deliberate shelling by the Ukraine formations of civilian infrastructure and the civilian population in Belgorod province and at other regions of Russia? in which the weapons your countries are delivered are being used? You don't have to answer us, but please just answer for yourself. Thank you.

I now call on the representative of Bahrain.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am responding on behalf of Arab Member States of the GCC, Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Kingdom of Bahrain. I am responding to the statement made by the Iranian delegate. Resolution 28 17 of these Security Council co-sponsored by 136 countries condemned Iran's aggressions against these countries, namely against Bahrain. The council demanded that these attacks cease immediately because they are violations of international law and threatened international peace and security. Paragraph five of the aforementioned resolution demands that the Islamic Republic of Iran cease immediately. unconditionally all attacks and all provocations, namely the use of intermediaries or proxies. The resolution of the 25th of March 2017, 61/50 of the Human Rights Council demands that Iran fully comply with resolution 2817 of the Security Council and to remain faithful to its obligations under international law, namely IHL. and international human rights law, it demands that Iran put an unconditional, immediate end to unjustified attacks and provocations against the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, namely through the use of proxies. The same resolution calls for the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure. We cannot distort truth here. Thank you.

I will now give the floor to the delegations who would like to intervene for right of reply at the end of the day today. I call on the representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would like to reject something we heard that was unmoored from reality. I’m referring to accusations of the violation of the principles of inclusivity and multilateralism at the Conference on Disarmament. It’s important to recall that the CD is a negotiating forum of limited size, which acts based on the principle of consensus. At the member states of the CD have responsibility for implementing the mandate of the conference and ensuring the conference works effectively. Thus, the members of the forum have the right to allow those to participate that are positively and constructively contributing to the work of the conference, and quite the contrary, to reject the requests for observership on the part of those who are not committed to equal, mutually respectful dialogue and have no interest in joint work. like to emphasize that all of this is done in strict alignment with the Rules of Procedure. Practice in the past sessions of the CD have shown that the participation of a number of European countries as observers has not only failed to foster the resumption of the substantive work of the Conference, it’s had the opposite effect. It’s only moved us farther away from resolving this issue, and it has brought in unnecessary politicization. The countries of the European Union are using their status as observers at the CD to circulate baseless accusations against Russia and other countries, and also to promote their narrow group-based political and bloc-based doctrines. And they haven't proposed any solutions to existing problems here, and they have not at all fostered the substantive work of the forum. We see a similar situation, and we have for many days during this current session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. We want to emphasize the following point: The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the roles of observers. However, the observership question needs to be resolved, considering the specifics of each concrete forum and in strict compliance with the Rules of Procedure. Accusations against the Russian Federation from the delegates of the European Union are all the more absurd because the representatives of this self-same formation consistently neglected the Rules of Procedure of the CD. More specifically, they're trying to voice the position of the EU on a whole range of issues. on arms control, nonproliferation. And although this organization has no status in the Conference and doesn't have the right to intervene in the interstate dialogue here, we will consistently stop these attempts, and we will continue to contribute constructively to substantive work in the CD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal to the delegation of the Netherlands to decide about their approach. We’re hearing accusations that Russia’s blocking observers on the one hand, but from the same delegation, we hear that the CD shouldn’t meet at all if there isn’t any negotiation work going on. So what is the distinguished delegate of the Kingdom of the Netherlands want? I also want to underscore that it’s impossible to move forward on carrying out the mandate in UN disarmament mechanisms if we don’t allow states the opportunity to speak. The decrease in the speaking limits, the attempt to politicize them, all of these issues are not fostering and unblocking of the substantive work of our forums, nor do they help solve the issue of disarmament, arms control, or the strengthening of international peace and security. Thank you.

Distinguished delegates, the Committee will now begin the third and final phase of its work, namely action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 92 to 109. As previously announced, the Committee will hear general statement and statement in explanations before the Board on proposals submitted under cluster 1, that is nuclear weapons. Action on the proposal will take place at tomorrow's meeting. Allow me now to explain the process for the action phase. The committee will be guided by the informal paper that are issued by the Secretariat containing the draft resolution and decisions on which actions will be taken is day. Informal paper 1/2 has been circulated and is available in the conference room. The Secretariat will revise this informal paper on a daily basis in order to update the drafts that are ready for actions at each of our remaining meetings. I propose that we follow the same procedures adopted by the Committee at previous sessions concerning the conduct of business during this action phase. That is to say, we will have the following established four-step process: first, general statement under each cluster, followed by explanations of vote before action, actions on the draft, and explanations of vote after actions. Under each cluster listed for any given day, the committee will first hear general statements. This is the opportunity to introduce draft resolutions and decisions ready for action on that day or at subsequent meetings. I would request that the general statement kindly be made as brief as possible and no more than five minutes. Next, delegations Wishing to explain their positions on any of the draft under a cluster will have the opportunity to do so in a single intervention before the Committee proceed to take actions on those drafts. I would like to remind delegations that, in accordance with the modalities decided at the organizational meeting of October 5, explanations of vote are limited to five minutes. with the options of a longer statement being reflected on the e-statement portal. Also, in accordance with Rule 128 of the Rules of Procedure, sponsors of draft resolutions and decisions are not permitted to make any statement in explanation of their votes in their proposals either before or after action is taken. Before I explain the next and third step of the process, actions on the draft, allow me to remind that today's meeting will only proceed with the first two steps for proposal under cluster one, that is general statement and explanation of vote before actions. Once the committee hears the last speaker in explanation of vote before the vote, it would be normally take actions on all proposals under the cluster, one after another, without any interruptions in between. The pursuant to Rule 128 of the Rules of Procedure, after the Chair has announced the beginning of the voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual conduct of the voting. In the case of a voting error, Delegation wishing to register their original voting intention should not disrupt the voting process to request the corrections by taking the floor. They should instead submit their voting intention online via e-delegate or approach the Secretariat on the process for submitting the original voting intention for reflections in the official records. Once the committee completes actions on all draft proposals under a particular cluster listed in the day's informal paper, delegations preferring to explain their positions or votes after action is taken will also have the opportunity to do so. Similar to the consolidated explanations of vote before the vote, delegations are requested to make their explanations in one intervention. Delegations seeking recorded votes on any draft resolution or decisions are requested to kindly inform the Secretariat of their intention as early as possible and before the day's meeting begins. I would like to inform that, in response to a request by several delegations, I have circulated and will continue to circulate information relating to the identity of delegations requesting a vote on the proposals contained in the informal paper. All delegations wishing to postpone action on any draft they submitted are also requested to inform the Secretariat at least one day before action is scheduled to be taken on the draft in question. Nonetheless, I appeal to all delegations to make every effort to refrain from delaying actions. In order to ascertain that every delegation fully understands the process for the action phase, the Secretariat has prepared an information sheet similar to the one that was circulated in previous years regarding the ground rules for taking actions on draft resolutions and decisions. With your full cooperation, I intend to follow the procedures I have just explained in order to ensure the full and efficient utilization of the remaining time for this final stage of our work. May I take it that the Committee wishes to proceed accordingly? I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We’re grateful to you for your detailed explanation of the process that we all have to go through. We have no problem with that. Nonetheless, we’d like to point out that you didn’t say anything about statements in right of reply. We hope that we won't have to avail ourselves of that right. But at the same time, we would like to understand at what time you plan to give delegations the floor if this need should arise. Thank you.

So you are talking about tomorrow, during the action phase, right of reply during the action phase?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, I meant the right of reply in the context of voting or the statements that would be made before, after, or as the resolutions are being introduced. It’s possible that one of the delegations may see the need to take the floor in right of reply. The same happened in previous sessions. As I understand, as a rule, this happens after the voting, after the statements and explanation of vote after the vote are delivered, and then the delegations at the end of each cluster would have the ability to speak, if needed, in right of reply. I'd like to hear from you whether or not we understand that this situation. Thank you.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Denmark.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for your hard work.

And we're looking forward to you steering us gently through the last part of this endeavor. I don't recall there are right replies during the action phase. It is possible for states to deliver statements, they can choose to come in late

in the speaking list as we punch in,

but I don't recall from previous years that we had right of reply during the action phase.

I might have forgotten the previous layer years of first committee sessions, but I don't recall it. So I'm looking forward to the secretariat giving us some clarification of this.

Thank you.

Can I give the secretary to clarify on that?

Thank you, chair. As the chair has just explained, the voting process cannot be interrupted on any issue other than the point of order. However, when the voting has concluded and the delegations delivered EOVs, they will be in position to request the right of reply at the end of the cluster, at the end of the day. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you. Denmark again, yeah.

Thank you.

Just a point of clarification.

Where is this stipulated in the GA Rules of Procedure, just so we have the reference?

Thank you.

Can I keep to the Secretariat again?

Yes, thank you, Chair. The Rules of Procedure do not limit the right of Member States to request the right of reply. In the Rules of Procedure, there is no limitation on that right. The modalities of the right of reply, whether it can be requested at the end of the cluster or on the end of the day, which has been the practice of this Committee, can be determined by the Committee itself. But other than that, the Rules of Procedure do not provide any limitation to that right. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Secretary. May I take it that the committee wishes to proceed accordingly, what I already said? Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation again.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and apologies for taking the floor again. I simply wanted to pin this down ultimately, and with your words, that do I understand that we will use the right of reply at the end of the cluster, at the end of the day? And if you say that, then we have no problem with continuing our work. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As the Secretary has already clarified, the voting process cannot be again interrupted once any issues other than the point of order, which I already stated. However, after the voting on a cluster has been concluded, the delegations will be given the opportunity to request for the right of reply. So can I – may I take it that the Committee wishes to proceed accordingly? I hear no objections. It is so decided. Distinguished delegates, the Committee will now proceed to take actions on the draft resolutions and decisions listed under cluster one, nuclear weapons, as contained in informal paper 1/Rev.2. I now open the floor for the delegations wishing to make either a general statement or to introduce new or revised draft under cluster one, nuclear weapons. Let me remind all delegations once again that the sponsor of draft resolutions and decisions may make general statement at the beginning of the considerations of drafts under a cluster, but may not make statement in explanations of their vote on their proposals before or after action is taken. Statements are limited to five minutes. Microphones will be automatically cut once the time limit is reached. Kindly press the speaker button on your console in order to be recognized now. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of European Union.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the member states of the EU concerning draft resolution L1 on the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina align themselves with this statement. It remains a strategic priority of the EU to support peace and stability in the entire Middle East. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD and their delivery systems. The EU remains committed to the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference, and to the path for action as set out in the 2010 Action Plan as the most promising basis on which to proceed. As agreed at the 1995 NPT RefCon, nuclear weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among states of the region. The EU strongly urges all stakeholders to engage urgently in meaningful consultations to build an inclusive and consensus-based process to implement the 1995 resolution. Dialogue and confidence building among stakeholders is the only sustainable to agree on arrangements for a meaningful conference to be attended by all states of the Middle East. The process must be inclusive for it to be effective. The EU has consistently presented this position at the UN. The EU welcomes the sixth session of the conference on the establishment of the Middle East WMD-free zone, held from 17 to 21 November 25 in New York. The EU reconfirms its readiness to assist the process leading to the establishment of the WMD-free zone. It has done in the past so by facilitating dialogue among states of the region. Since 2019, the EU has also been supporting a process of confidence building measures for the establishment of a Middle East WMD free zone, most recently also through a new council decision. Its objectives are to assist, the objectives of the council decision are to assist in mitigating regional WMD proliferation trends, encourage regional security arrangements, arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament norms and processes, develop a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between the Middle East WMD-free zone and current regional and international developments, and promote an effective, verifiable, inclusive, and sustainable Middle East WMD-free zone. The EU also continues to assist the Middle East region via its Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiatives. launched in response to the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside the Union to mitigate CBRN risks. The centers of excellence established in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates all contribute to enhanced capacity building in the region and cooperation between these states. The EU continues to call on all states in the regions. in the region which have not yet done so to accede to and to abide by the NPT, CWC, and BTWC, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement. the additional protocol, and as applicable, a modified small quantities protocol with the IAEA. We also encourage subscription to the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation that could contribute to regional confidence building, which is necessary for progress towards a Middle East WMD-free zone. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil, to be followed by Malaysia, Cuba, Mexico, Iran, Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On behalf of Brazil and Mexico, I have the honor to introduce draft resolution L6/1, entitled “Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects”, presented by Brazil and Mexico. Nuclear-weapon-free zones make an essential contribution to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and international peace and security. Amid growing nuclear risks, strengthening these arrangements and supporting the establishment of new zones remain shared responsibilities. The adoption by consensus of the new comprehensive study by the qualified group of experts represents a significant achievement. It demonstrates that substantive cooperation remains possible even in an international environment marked by profound divisions. We commend all experts for their constructive engagement and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for its support. Mr. Chair, the study provides a thorough analysis of existing zones and Mongolia's nuclear weapon-free status. It also examines options and recommendations for strengthening existing arrangements and establishing new zones, including in the Middle East. Its value, however, will ultimately depend on its practical impact. The draft resolution before us seeks to ensure that this collective effort continues to inform our deliberations and inspire concrete action. The text invites States to consider and widely disseminate the study's options and recommendations. It also places the item on the agenda of the General Assembly's 80/30 session in 2028, providing an opportunity to return to this important question. We attach particular importance to strengthening negative security assurances, including through regular consultations and sustained engagement with nuclear-weapon States, and to enhancing cooperation among zones. As we approach the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco next year, Openau’s experience also illustrates how institutional arrangements can strengthen the capacity of States-Parties to act collectively. These questions deserve the attention of the entire membership. The benefits of nuclear-weapon-free zones extend beyond their geographical boundaries. With that in mind, Brazil and Mexico invite all delegations to co-sponsor and support this draft resolution. We hope that the spirit of consensus that guided the Group’s work will also guide this Committee’s consideration of the text. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. As we work to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world, the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons remains of contemporary significance, even after 30 years of its issuance.

This is especially the case in times of heightened tension and mistrust.

Amidst threats to the credibility and integrity of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Malaysia therefore has the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C1/81/L.27, entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”, Technical updates have been made to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly last year. In addition, its periodicity has been changed to biennial consideration. This adjustment is in line with the UN 80 initiative and in no way diminishes Malaysia's unwavering commitment to nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Malaysia invites colleagues to co-sponsor and support this draft resolution, and would like to record our sincere appreciation to the many delegations which have already co-sponsored it. Let us continue to underline the ICJ’s unanimous conclusion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Chair, the utmost priority in the disarmament domain is and must remain the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible fashion. This is the only way to guarantee that humankind will never again suffer their devastating impact. In light of the above, we urge all delegations to support and vote in favour of the following draft resolutions, which Cuba is co-sponsoring: L/7, conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; L/12, humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; L/13, treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons; L/27, follow-up to the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of nuclear weapons or the threat of nuclear weapons; L/56, reducing nuclear danger; and L/71, addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons, providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons. Draft resolution L/46, follow-up to the 2013 High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, is an initiative of NAM which renders possible the declaration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons every 26 September. The draft resolution L/23, entitled “Nuclear disarmament”, remains one of the texts that broaches this matter in the most comprehensive fashion. This is due to the fact that, inter alia, it urges all nuclear-weapon States to adopt effective disarmament measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Thank you very much, Chair. My country is delighted to present the following three draft resolutions and decisions under the nuclear weapons cluster. First, as coordinators of the New Agenda Coalition, bringing together Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa, we are presenting draft resolution L/22, entitled "Towards a nuclear weapons-free world: Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations." The draft heeds and is a response to the worrying deterioration of the international security environment, the growing dependency on nuclear weapons and the lack of tangible progress towards their elimination. In view of the successive failures of the three previous NPT review conferences, the text reaffirms that the obligations and commitments previously established remain fully in force and that they must be fulfilled. Moreover, it urges nuclear-weapon states to adopt tangible measures to reduce their arsenals and the role they play in military doctrines, as well as making an appeal for increased transparency and accountability of nuclear weapons states through substantive reports, benchmarks, and timelines which make it possible to objectively evaluate progress towards nuclear disarmament. Secondly, we are presenting draft resolution L/25, entitled “Complete Test Ban Treaty”. That was a text tabled together with Australia and New Zealand. As we mark the 30th anniversary of its opening for signature, L25 reaffirms the fundamental importance of the above treaty for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the urgent need to achieve its entry into force. Moreover, it urges States that have not yet done so, particularly Annex II States, to sign and ratify the treaty unconditionally and without delay. Moreover, the text points to progress made within the international verification regime and the need to guarantee the sustainability thereof. The text reiterates its appeal to maintain moratoria on nuclear tests, recording that these moratoria cannot replace a permanent and legally binding prohibition on such tests. Finally, Mexico, in its national capacity, is presenting draft decision L/21, entitled possible risks of the integration of AI into nuclear command, control, and communication systems. Mexico is grateful for interest shown in this initiative and discussions thereon since its presentation in 2025. We believe that there are substantive issues here that require greater reflection. For that reason, we opted to present a decision which allows us to maintain the item on the agenda and to continue informal consultations during 2026. This with a view to developing a revised resolution. This approach is also in line with our commitment to revitalize and make efficient use of the First Committee's time. Finally, Mexico urges all Member States to support the adoption of these three texts and to co-sponsor draft resolutions L.22 and L.25. please do that before action is taken on the text that is scheduled for tomorrow, the 27th of October. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its serious concern over the substance and direction of the draft resolution entitled “Common Steps Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons”. This year’s draft has moved even further away from the fundamental objective of nuclear disarmament. This shift stands in stark contradiction to both the title of the resolution and its professed objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The sponsor has claimed that the draft has been revised in light of discussions and outcomes of the elements NPT review conference. Yet, despite this claim, the draft fails to address several of the most pressing concerns raised by the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear weapon states during the review conference. This omission is not accidental; it reflects Japan’s selective and one-sided approach. which subordinates the collective interests and legitimate concerns of the international community to certain political interests. Despite proposals put forward by Iran, the draft continues to single out particular countries while deliberately overlooking concerns and serious nonproliferation challenges involving the sponsor and its allies. This selective approach exposes a fundamental contradiction in Japan’s stated commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament cannot be advanced by disregarding the policies and obligations of certain nuclear-weapon states that are Japan’s allies, while placing disproportionate scrutiny on selected non-nuclear-weapon states. Nor can the objectives of the NPT be achieved by applying different standards to different State Parties or by selectively invoking their obligations. This alignment with U.S. policy is also evident in the treatment of gender-related issues. Japan, which disregards the legitimate views and concerns of the majority of the international community, particularly non-nuclear weapon states, readily removed all reference to gender-related issues from the draft resolution at the mere request of the US and sought to justify this change as nothing more than streamlining the text. Equally troubling is the draft’s complete silence on the unlawful attacks carried out by Japan’s allies, namely the US and Israeli regime, against Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. If Japan genuinely intends to reflect contemporary realities and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, how can it justify ignoring military attacks against facilities subject to the Agency's safeguards? Such attacks undermine the integrity of the safeguard system, threaten nuclear safety and security, and violate fundamental principles of international law, including the Charter of the UN. A draft resolution that selectively invokes nonproliferation concerns while ignoring such grave violations cannot credibly claim to offer a balanced or comprehensive assessment of the current international security environment. Singling out Iran while remaining silent on attacks against its safeguarded nuclear facilities is not an objective approach to nonproliferation. It is an exercise in political selectivity. Iran, as a State Party to the NPT since 1970 and a party to a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, has consistently affirmed its commitment to its international obligations. Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, and its safeguarded nuclear activities are subject to the Agency’s verification framework. Iran’s extensive cooperation with the IAEA has demonstrated its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the implementation of its safeguards obligations. We categorically reject any attempt to politicize Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities or to use this resolution as an instrument of selective pressure against an NPT State Party. Such an approach neither strengthens the nonproliferation regime nor advances nuclear disarmament. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Chair. I have requested the floor to introduce the draft resolution on negative security assurances contained in document L/7. This year marks six decades since the General Assembly, in resolution 2153A of 1966, first took up the question of assuring states that do not possess nuclear weapons against their use or threat of use. It has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since its very first session, and it remains among the oldest unresolved items on the disarmament agenda. Pakistan's commitment to this objective is longstanding. In 1979, we presented a draft international convention on NSAs contained in document CD/10. We have tabled this resolution every year since 1990. In 2023, we submitted a working paper to the conference, CD/2317, setting out the core elements of a legally binding instrument. Chair, NSAs remains the lowest hanging fruit before the CD. In 2025, Subsidiary Body 4 on NSAs reached a degree of convergence that would have produced an agreed outcome had it not been made conditional on parallel progress in other subsidiary bodies. The case for legally binding NSAs has only grown stronger. We are witnessing eroding strategic restraint, the unraveling of the arms control architecture, and evolving nuclear doctrines that appear to lower the threshold of use. In such an environment, a legally binding instrument on NSAs would be a major confidence-building measure. between those who possess nuclear weapons and those who have force on them. Last year, this resolution was adopted in the General Assembly with the support of overwhelming majority. We thank all delegations that have supported and co-sponsored it, and we look forward to the continued broad support. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have taken the floor to introduce draft resolution L18, common steps towards a world without nuclear weapons, and request Member States' support. In recent years, the international security environment has become increasingly severe and complex. Due to divisions over approaches to nuclear disarmament and the waning of mutual trust over security concerns, it is becoming more challenging for the international community to make concrete progress towards nuclear disarmament. Although the 11th NPT Review Conference earlier this year was not able to reach consensus on an outcome document, the conference served as an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. Under this recognition, Japan has submitted this draft resolution in order to revitalize the momentum toward nuclear disarmament. It is extremely important for the international community to overcome differences in positions and move forward together, even step by step, towards the realization of a world without nuclear weapons. Building upon the discussions held at the 11th NPT Review Conference, this draft resolution proposes realistic and pragmatic measures that could be supported by states with diverse positions. This is a genuine wish and effort by the Japanese government. This draft resolution has been streamlined and made as concise as possible, and places a stronger focus on nuclear disarmament. We'd like to express our appreciation to all countries for their engagement during the three rounds of informal consultations. We express our gratitude to those countries that have decided to co-sponsor the resolution and those who have communicated their support to us. We hope that this draft resolution will be adopted with broadest possible support, and serve as a foundation for international efforts, common efforts, on nuclear disarmament going forward. We call upon all UN Member States to vote in favour of this resolution. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Vietnam.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On behalf of Vietnam, our delegation has the honour to introduce draft resolution L/65, entitled Twelfth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee. In accordance with established practice, and building upon the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly adopted in preparation for the tenth and eleventh review conferences, The draft resolution seeks to ensure the necessary arrangements for convening the twelfth review conference and its preparatory committee, thereby facilitating the timely and orderly commencement of the next review cycle. Vietnam appreciates the constructive approach and flexibility demonstrated by Member States in considering this draft resolution, and we hope to receive their support for its adoption. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Vietnam. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The DPRK delegation is taking the floor to explain its position before the vote on OP 14 of the draft resolution L/18, entitled “Common steps towards a world without nuclear weapons”, OP 27 of the draft resolution L/22, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments”, OP 5 of the draft resolution L25, comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. DPRK delegation totally and categorically rejects those paragraphs of the above mentioned draft resolutions which blatantly violate the sovereignty of the DPRK. Those provisions, which completely ignore the objective reality of the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region, were fabricated in accordance with impure political motives of the specific forces which are hostile to the DPRK and bear absolutely no relation to genuine international peace and security. As in the past, but today, the global military and political context is worsening day by day, and the unlimited abuse of power has become a commonplace. Especially in the Korean Peninsula, the US-Japan-ROK military alliance unmistakably aimed at the DPRK, is being involved by the United States into a more offensive and aggressive military block with a nuclear element. The US is conspiring with its allies to systematically amend and update the anti-DPRK nuclear war scenarios and to steadily cultivate and master their performance capabilities through the provocative war rehearsals of all hues and military buildup. Furthermore, the U.S. has approved and is encouraging ROK’s ambition to possess nuclear-powered submarines, which relocating and deploying different military hardware, including the latest missiles and drones on the Korean Peninsula and in its vicinity. On the other hand, Japan, An A-class war criminal that inflicted untold sufferings and disasters upon mankind in the last century is taking advantage of the present international turbulence. It accelerates its attempts at rearmament with an unprecedented commitment involving the revision of the peace constitution. Especially under the signboard of counterattack capability, Japan has buckled down to the development and position of position of long-range attack weapons that put neighboring countries within striking range. Nevertheless, no physical conflict has occurred on and around the Korean Peninsula, a hot spot of the world, and the security index is being maintained at a higher level than any other part of the globe. We owe to the fact that the DPRK has a war deterrent in place powerful enough to break anyone’s will to start a war of aggression against the DPRK. This vividly proves that the nuclear deterrence of the DPRK is the guarantee for defending its security and safety of the state, stability of the region. As long as there exist nuclear weapons on this planet and the hostile forces stick to the doctrine of omnipotence of nuclear weapons, the DPRK will follow through the course of bolstering its nuclear war deterrent in order to defend peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the rest of the region. In this context, the DPRK delegation firmly opposes and categorically rejects those paragraphs which take issue with the legitimate measures taken by the DPRK to safeguard its national sovereignty and regional security, deny the current status of our State, and do nothing to contribute to international peace and security. We therefore will vote against those paragraphs. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of DPRK. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt, followed by Mongolia.

Mr. Chairperson, Egypt is the main sponsor of resolutions L/1 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region, as well as L/2 on behalf of the Arab Group on the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Serious steps towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East can spare the region and the world from a plethora of distressing risks and threats, and significantly contribute to strengthening the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including by advancing the universality of the NPT as well as the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We encourage Member States to maintain their overwhelming support for these two texts, and consequently for the fundamental imperatives and principles that underpin them, building on a long thread of decisions and resolutions at the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and MBT review conferences outcomes, including the 1995 Middle East resolution. Mr. Chairperson, Egypt has co-sponsored and will continue to lend its firm support to numerous draft resolutions under this cluster, which, in our view, provide a meaningful contribution to the achievement of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. And we wish to highlight a number of these texts. First, L/7 by Pakistan on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. L.11 on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, L.12 on ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world, L.22, presented by Mexico in its capacity as the current coordinator of the New Agenda Coalition, titled Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments, L.27 by Malaysia on the follow-up of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the legality of threat of use of nuclear weapons, L.31 on the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and finally, L.46 by the Non-Aligned Movement on the follow-up on the 2013 High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament. In addition, we underline our support to L.65 tabled by Vietnam the 12th Conference of Parties of the MPT. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mongolia, to be followed by Australia.

Thank you, Chair. On behalf of Mongolia, I have the honor to introduce the draft resolution entitled Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear Weapon Free Status, contained in document L33 for the committee's consideration. At the outset, my delegation wishes to express its sincere appreciation to all co-sponsors for their continued support. We also welcome additional co-sponsors for this important initiative. The draft resolution builds upon previous resolutions adopted without a vote and contains only technical updates. We also thank the Secretary-General for his report on the implementation of the resolution. Mr. Chair, Mongolia's internationally recognized nuclear weapon-free status remains a practical contribution to international peace and security, as well as to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Mongolia remains firmly committed to strengthen its nuclear weapon-free status and advancing cooperation with the United Nations and member states to promote its international security. In this spirit, we hope that the Committee will once again adopt the draft resolution by consensus, reaffirming its longstanding support for Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.

Thank you, Chair. Mr. Chair, I have the honor to deliver an explanation of vote on the resolution entitled "Humanitarian Consequences of

Nuclear..."

This is not the explanation.

Ah, my bad. Thank you very much.

Distinguished delegates, the committee will now hear from the delegations wishing to explain their position on the draft resolutions. I am decision under cluster one. You may request the floor by pressing the speaker button now. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain, to be followed by United States, India, Germany, Iran, Cuba, Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Spain wishes to issue an explanation of vote with regards to draft resolution A/C1/81/L31, entitled Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Africa: The entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. in 2009 was a significant contribution to strengthening international peace and security, and it was particularly crucial for all African nations. Consequently, Spain has always unequivocally expressed its support for the goals of the Pelindaba Treaty and commended its entry into force. Spain maintains close ties with African nations and has been devoting significant efforts through the action of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and with the European Union and within the Spanish Development Cooperation Agency to promote sustainable development for all these countries. Spain is also ready and willing to do what it must to ensure that States Party to the Treaty of Pelindaba acquire the capacities they require to effectively comply with the Treaty within their borders. Chair, after having studied very closely indeed the invitation that was extended to Spain to form part of Protocol 3 of the Pelindaba Treaty, my Government in consultation with the Parliament and bearing in mind the guidelines adopted by consensus within the UN Disarmament Commission in the substantive session of 1999 on the creation of nuclear weapons-free zones in accordance with freely developed arrangements among the region concerned, decided not to move to the signatory thereof. That was kind communicated to the Depository. I wish to underscore two matters at this juncture. Firstly, Spain has, extending across the fullness of its national territory, adopted all provisions, obligations, guarantees and safeguards contained in the Pelindaba Treaty. Pursuant to our belonging to various international organizations, Spain has undertaken a number of obligations and safeguards within the framework of Euratom and the Safeguards Agreement, supplemented by the additional protocol that we signed with the IAEA. These go beyond the provisions of the Treaty of Pelindaba. and we fully comply with them. Secondly, the full extent of Spanish territory is military denuclearized and has been since 1976. This prohibition in terms of introducing, installing, or stockpiling nuclear weapons across Spanish territory was reiterated by the parliament when Spain entered NATO in 1982. And the this was adopted in an advisory referendum held in March 1986. Consequently, Spain has already done everything it needs to do to ensure that the content of the Treaty of Pelindaba applies across its national territory. Chair, Spain has joined consensus around this First Committee resolution and has done so since it was first voted on in 1997. However, the Spanish delegation does not associate with the referred to consensus in operational paragraph 5. Consequently, we have been working with delegations to find a more balanced wording which is acceptable to all Parties, and we trust that discussions on this resolution might produce satisfactory results with a view to the next sessions. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Spain. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Chair, I had the privilege of delivering this explanation of vote on behalf of France, the United Kingdom, and my own country, the United States of America. Our three countries share the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Our three countries remain committed to and continue to implement our obligations under the NPT, including Article 6, as stated by the P3 during the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Draft resolutions L12, L13, L27, and L46 each contain references to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which we do not support or view as an effective disarmament measure. We note that the TPNW has proven divisive between states that possess nuclear weapons and those that don’t, as opposed to serving as a bridge or mechanism toward disarmament. The TPNW does not change the obligations applicable to our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. The TPNW created treaty obligations that only bind on its States-Parties. It neither reflects nor has contributed to customary international law. Chair, our countries are fully cognizant of the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war, and that nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war for as long as they continue to exist. We are unable to support resolutions L/11, L/12, L/22, L/27, and L/46 due to their incorrect assertion that any use of nuclear weapons would cause catastrophic humanitarian consequences, and additional language contained therein that is incompatible with our security considerations. These resolutions do not accurately reflect the balance of obligations in the NPT, nor the positive actions already taken by some nuclear-weapon states with regard to nuclear disarmament. They conceal or fail to acknowledge the rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup of one nuclear-weapon state and the development of novel and destabilizing nuclear weapons systems by another. We are further concerned by the language in L-22 that incorrectly frames extended deterrence relationships as “hastening nuclear decision-making.” This does not reflect reality. Extended deterrence arrangements have contributed to the stability and have never stood in the way of arms control arrangements, and have enabled many states to eschew developing or acquiring their own nuclear weapons, thereby advancing global nonproliferation objectives for decades. Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands have tabled decision L/42. We recall that one nuclear-weapon State is engaged in a significant and opaque build-up in its nuclear weapons arsenal and has not declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Our three countries continue to adhere to our voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and urge the one nuclear-weapon state that has not yet taken this step to do so. On resolutions L/31, L/33, and L/70. We strongly support the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all States of the region concerned. Such treaties reinforce the NPT and the global non-proliferation regime. On decision L/21. Our three countries reiterate our long-standing commitment to maintaining human control and involvement for all actions critical to informing and executing sovereign decisions concerning nuclear weapons employment. On behalf of our three countries, I thank you for giving me the floor.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of India.

Thank you, Chair. India believes that the focus of the resolution L2 should be limited to the region that it intends to address. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that states are bound by any treaty based on the principle of free consent. Therefore, the call to those states outside the NPT to accede to it and accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities does not create obligations for them. India is not a party to the NPT and is therefore not bound by its outcome documents. The same applies to certain operative paragraphs contained in the resolution. Chair, India is voting in favor of the resolution L11 on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, consistent with our participation in the four meetings in Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Our participation in these meetings was premised on the shared concern of the serious threat to the survival of humankind that could be posed by the use of nuclear weapons. Chair, on LL13, India’s position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is well known. While underlining that India is not bound by the obligations that arise from TPNW, India remains committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. This goal can be achieved through a step-by-step process, underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory, multi-track framework, as outlined in India’s working paper titled “Nuclear Disarmament” submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2006. Chair, India was originally the only state possessing nuclear weapons to traditionally co-sponsor the resolution L27. We were disappointed with the substantive changes made to the traditional text of the resolution in the past, including that the references to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, co-submitted by the lead sponsors themselves, had been dropped. Therefore, the objective of this resolution, as reflected in OP2, is ambiguous. Therefore, India will abstain on the resolution. Chair, India will vote in favor of resolutions L31 and L33. India respects the sovereign choice of non-nuclear weapon states to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements, arrangements freely arrived at among states of the region concerned. This principle is consistent with the provisions of SSOD I and the UNDC guidelines. We respect the sovereign choice of Mongolia and State Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. India has close and friendly ties with Mongolia and countries of Africa. As a nuclear weapons state, India conveys its unambiguous assurance that it will respect Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and that of African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Chair, finally, India will vote in favor of the resolution L61. India notes that the new comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, contained in the document A/81/293, prepared pursuant to the resolution 79/241, India underlines that the study, including its options and recommendations, as the report itself records, reflect the assessment of the qualified group of experts rather than a negotiated agreement among Member States. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of India. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Germany.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to deliver the following explanation of vote on the resolution A/C1/81/L11 entitled "Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons". My delegation will vote against this resolution. Let me be clear from the outset: Germany's vote against this resolution does in no way imply that we do not take seriously the potential humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear testing. The humanitarian dimension remains a core element of our engagement to strengthen global nuclear disarmament efforts and the global non-proliferation architecture. The devastation visited upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the first and only use of nuclear weapons in war remains a stark reminder of the necessity and urgency of pursuing our ultimate goal of a safer world without nuclear weapons. Mr. Chairman, Germany cannot support this resolution simply for the reason that its language is not compatible with our security arrangements, which are first and foremost embedded into NATO, a defensive alliance. The purpose of NATO's nuclear deterrence is to preserve peace, to deter aggression, and to prevent nuclear coercion. As long as nuclear weapons exist, maintaining credible nuclear deterrence is essential for NATO and for European security, particularly in today's extremely challenging security environment. Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine unabatedly. It dismantled the European security architecture, despite all its statements here to the contrary, and has violated fundamental international law. We have two unsolved proliferation crises, Iran and the DPRK. Security considerations will remain an essential part of our approach alongside the humanitarian perspective. Mr. Chairman, Germany's goal remains a safe world free of nuclear weapons. Germany will continue to work on practical measures to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. We are and remain a strong and steadfast supporter of the NPT, with its crucial plea in the preamble: “Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war, and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.” I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Germany. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, I would like to reject and condemn the baseless allegations we heard just now from the representative of Germany regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear program. Mr. Chair, regarding draft decision L/42, which calls for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, we regret that despite our repeated calls for the inclusion of language reflecting the outcomes of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the sponsors have remained inflexible. Since 2024, they have chosen to alter the proposal into a draft decision instead. a move that undermines multilateralism and has negative implications for international peace and security. Consequently, we have no option but to vote against L/42. For the fourth consecutive time, Iran will vote against the draft resolution L/18 entitled “Common Steps Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons”. as a whole, including operative paragraphs 10, 13, and 14, and abstain on operative paragraph 9. This decision reflects the sponsors’ politicized, biased, and selective approach. Despite its professed commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, Japan has steered this draft further away from genuine nuclear disarmament. Regarding operative paragraph 10, We will vote against it, because it merely reiterates existing commitments while failing to address the urgent need for legally binding and unconditional negative security assurances for all nuclear-weapon States. We will vote against OP.14, because we reject the politicized practice of singling out a particular country while deliberately overlooking comparable concerns involving the sponsor and its allies. We will abstain on OP 9 because it fails to adequately reflect the particular responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the NPT in ratifying and implementing the CTBT, while respecting the principle of State consent in treaty adherence. Regarding OP 13, we will vote against it because it exemplifies the draft’s discriminatory and politically motivated approach. It singled out Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, while deliberately overlooking serious nonproliferation challenges involving Japan and its allies. The sponsor’s position is particularly untenable, given its silence on the military attacks carried out by the U.S. and the Israeli regime against Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards. Japan cannot credibly invoke the integrity of the safeguard system while disregarding attacks against facilities operating under that very system. While attempting to portray Iran as a proliferation concern, Japan deliberately ignores the policies and practices of its own allies that pose serious challenges to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. These include the continued modernization of the nuclear arsenals of the US, UK, and France, the illicit nuclear arsenal of the Israeli regime, NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements and policies of extended nuclear deterrence, the AUKUS partnership and its serious implications for nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards, statements by officials in certain countries, including Japan, calling for the accusation of nuclear weapons or advocating the deployment of US nuclear weapons on their territory, and the unresolved concerns surrounding the handling and discharge of contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant. This is the essence of the problem. Japan scrutinizes the peaceful nuclear activities of a non-nuclear weapon state, while shielding its allies from comparable scrutiny over their nuclear doctrines, arsenals, and policies. Such an approach does not advance nonproliferation; it entrenches nuclear privilege and undermines the credibility of the NPT regime. For these reasons, Iran cannot support this draft resolution. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The delegation of Cuba, as it has done in previous years, this year has co-sponsored and will vote in favor of draft resolution L13, entitled Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This is in line with our unstinting commitment to this crucially important instrument. The resolution underscores the importance of the treaty as the first legally binding instrument that prohibits nuclear weapons in all circumstances. The text reaffirms the illegal, inhumane, immoral, and ethically indefensible nature of these weapons and reinforces and supplements the NPT, in particular, the implementation of Article 6. We reiterate our staunch support for this resolution, the treaty, and the work of its Scientific Advisory Group, the first international body of its type created to champion nuclear disarmament within the framework of a new multilateral treaty. We urge states that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Every new state that accedes to the TPNW is, in so doing, making a practical contribution to the de-legitimisation of nuclear weapons and is bringing us closer to achieving the priority goal of nuclear disarmament. The TPNW now has 96 signatories and 75 States-Parties. following the accession this year of Tonga and the signatory of Guam. We welcome that decision, and we continue to champion its universalization. Cuba welcomes the holding of the first review conference of the TPNW. It will stand as an important opportunity to assess progress with the implementation of the treaty, to reaffirm our collective commitments, and to step up efforts to achieve its universalization and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, we congratulate South Africa on their appointment as President of the Conference. Cuba will tirelessly continue to advocate for a world free of nuclear weapons as a State Party to the NPT, the TPNW, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the CTBT. This stance is also borne of our commitment to the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace that confirms our region’s commitment to nuclear disarmament. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Chair. I wish to explain Pakistan's votes before the vote on the following drafts: L/42, L/51, L/56, L/58 and L/71. Chair, Pakistan will abstain on L/56 and vote against L/58. Pakistan has consistently signaled its willingness to consider measures for restraint, risk reduction, and the avoidance of an arms race in South Asia. We continue to support arms control and disarmament initiatives that are equitable and non-discriminatory. The sponsor of these two drafts, however, has been increasing rather than reducing nuclear dangers in our region. It continues to expand and modernize its conventional and nuclear arsenals. raising the readiness of its nuclear forces through canisterization and induct destabilizing weapon systems, and it has now deployed nuclear weapons at sea. While calling for a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, the sponsors seek space for limited war in a nuclearized environment and feels increasingly emboldened to undertake aggression while dismissing strategic risks. Supporting L56 and L58 would have lent legitimacy to that contradiction. Pakistan will therefore abstain on L56 and vote against L58 this year. Chair, Pakistan will also vote against L42. The draft decision once again carries the title of a treaty that would ban only the future production of fissile material and builds on earlier texts that Pakistan has opposed. A treaty that freezes future production by leaving thousands of tons of existing stocks untouched would perpetuate asymmetries. It would advance neither nuclear disarmament nor strategic stability, and it remains cost-free for most of its proponents. Any future conflict would be fought with what is already possessed and deployed, not with what is yet to be produced. Our position on this has once again been vindicated by the recent announcement by some nuclear weapons states to increase their warheads without resuming fissile material production. We reiterate our call to begin work on a new basis for negotiations, a treaty with a fresh mandate whose scope expressly covers existing stocks and applies equally to all States without discrimination. Chair, Pakistan will abstain on L51. Pakistan recognizes the importance of confidence-building measures relating to the flight testing of ballistic missiles. At the same time, we would like to highlight that there is no one-size-fits-for-all approach on this topic. For instance, in our region, we have a legal agreement with our eastern neighbor. Under the 2005 agreement on pre-notification on flight testing of ballistic missiles, Pakistan provides advanced notification on launch windows and issues the corresponding navigational and airspace warnings. And it has consistently urged full compliance with that agreement in letter and spirit. At the same time, Pakistan is not a subscribing state to the Hague Code of Conduct. The code was elaborated outside the UN through a process in which the wider membership did not participate on an equal footing. In certain cases, it has been used more as a political instrument and as a step of passage to another exclusive export control arrangement on missiles. Pakistan continues to believe that the question of missiles should not be politicized and should be addressed comprehensively in all its aspects within the UN framework on a cooperative basis that is inclusive, non-discriminatory, and equally applicable to all. Pending such an approach, Pakistan supports the strengthening of bilateral and regional notification arrangements, which have demonstrated their value in their own region, and stand ready to engage constructively with all states on practical measures to reduce strategic risks. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Before I give the floor to another delegation, may I remind the delegations to speak at a reasonable pace in order to facilitate the interpretations? With this now, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, to be followed by Australia and Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Chinese delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolution L18, entitled "Common Steps Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons". Japan, the main sponsor of this draft resolution, has adopted a hypocritical position on nuclear disarmament. Japan repeatedly promotes its identity as the only victim of nuclear bombings, Yet, it refuses to acknowledge the immense suffering it inflicted on neighboring countries as the aggressor, and it remains silent on the fact that its own militarist crimes were the fundamental cause that led to the use of nuclear weapons against it. While Japan is keen to champion the cause of a nuclear-weapon-free world on the international stage, domestically, it seeks a gradual relaxation of nuclear constraints. It continues to move away from the three non-nuclear principles, steadily strengthens cooperation with its allies under the framework of extended deterrence, and even pursues the possibility of redeploying nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. In September this year, the head of Japan's defense authorities even made reckless statements that there should be taboo-free discussions on the possession of nuclear weapons. The international community should remain highly vigilant regarding Japan's narratives and actions regarding nuclear armament and firmly oppose them. As a country that says one thing but does another on nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, Japan's nuclear disarmament resolution is fundamentally flawed. For many years, it has been among the resolutions in the First Committee of the General Assembly that have generated the sharpest divisions among Member States. This year’s draft resolution is still filled with content that is neither objective nor balanced. It will only create further divisions among Member States, and it will do nothing to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In light of the above, China will vote against draft resolution L18 as a whole, as well as the related paragraphs. China calls on Member States to recognize Japan’s hypocrisy on issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, and to carefully consider their voting positions. China urges Japan to abide by the three non-nuclear principles, completely abandon its ambitions of remilitarization and nuclear armament, and faithfully fulfill its obligations under international law regarding nuclear nonproliferation. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.

Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon again, colleagues. I have the honour to now deliver an explanation of vote on the resolution entitled “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”. On behalf of Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, North Macedonia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and my own country, Australia. At the outset, I would like to reiterate that our collective commitment to nuclear disarmament is based on the simple truth: that the short and long-term impacts of nuclear war on humanity and our planet are clear and catastrophic. The devastation visited upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the first and only use of nuclear weapons in war remains a stark reminder of the necessity and urgency of nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was born of exactly this recognition, that the devastation of nuclear war must be averted to safeguard humanity. To protect future generations, we must continue to pursue complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament. We reiterate that the nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We urge nuclear weapons states to continue to reaffirm this in light of growing nuclear risks and their primary responsibility to prevent conflict. Chair, our countries have abstained on this resolution due to the incompatibility of language contained in the resolution with our security arrangements. Our State’s position on this resolution does not diminish the gravity we attach to the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing. The humanitarian perspective. guided by science and information, underpins our policies and reinforces our commitment to reduce nuclear risks and advance disarmament in practical, verifiable, and irreversible ways. Security considerations will remain an essential part of our approach, alongside humanitarian perspectives. There are no shortcuts to disarmament, and progress depends on working with nuclear-weapon states. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would like to speak an explanation of vote of the Russian Federation on L/17, “Joint actions to craft a world free from nuclear weapons,” submitted by Japan. We’re compelled to note that this time, There's the fact it's something that is challenging, the fact that Japan itself is championing this resolution. It's continuing to say that this is a genuine desire to build a bridge among the participants of the agreement. This looks extremely hypocritical, given the drift of the current Japanese authority toward calling into question the three nuclear principles, and also the provocative acts that the senior officials have done, possibly laying the ground for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. These steps cannot be viewed as anything else than a direct attack on the main regime of the NPT. the Japanese have been participating – have been positioning themselves as a mediator between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. In essence, this fact shows that there is an agreement that in practice there’s a sort of an intermediate category of States Parties to the NPT. including the Japanese and the group of the collective West, that are participating in various mechanisms of the extended nuclear deterrence. Turning now to the direct content of Japan’s document they presented, the authors used as a basis certain elements of non-agreed and non-adopted language of the final document of the 11th Review Conference of the NPT. But these provisions were not only very selectively pulled out of their context, but they were reworded in a cavalier fashion in keeping with the short-sighted and the narrow interests of Japan and of its allies as well. This is particularly glaring as regards the outcome document of the conference and the passages that were proposed for voting by the P5 nuclear countries. So this approach is not respectful, and it is fundamentally unacceptable. Given the aforementioned matters of principle, we intend to vote against this draft, and we call upon other delegations to follow suit. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation. Distinguished delegates, as I noted earlier, the award ceremony for the 2026 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship certificates is scheduled to begin in a few minutes in this conference room. As is customary, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs will address the graduating fellows. For that purpose, and in accordance with established practice, I shall suspend the meeting at this point. I kindly ask all the delegations to remain in their seats for the ceremony in order to congratulate and encourage our junior colleagues. The meeting is suspended. Distinguished colleagues, now I give the floor to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, and dear Disarmament Fellows, I am delighted to have this opportunity to address this group of junior and mid-career diplomats and government officials participating in the 2026 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services Programme. Established at the initiative of Nigeria by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, so-called SSOD-1, the programme has proven to be one of the session's most visionary and enduring achievements. Since its inception, it has served as an exceptional capacity building mechanism for diplomats and government officials, particularly from developing countries. To date, the program has trained several generations of experts, bringing together more than 1,170 fellows from 173 member states. Many alumni has become influential leaders within the disarmament community in New York, Geneva, Vienna, The Hague, and elsewhere. They serve as diplomats, officials of the United Nations or other international organizations, distinguished academics, and active members of civil society. Their ongoing contributions to disarmament and arms control are deeply valued and widely recognized. I would now like to take a moment to recognize those alumnii who are present here with us today. May I kindly ask all former fellows in the room to please stand. I invite everyone to join me in recognizing and thank you so much for your contribution, continued contribution, to the cause of disarmament. This is also an opportune moment to express our sincere appreciation to all Member States who have contributed to and supported the programme this year. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the European Union for their generous support of the 2026 programme. Owing to organizations' financial constraints that you all know, the duration and the scope of this year's study visits had to be reduced, and, regretfully, it was not possible to include stops in Africa and also South America. Nevertheless, the study visits that did take place proved highly valuable and impactful, providing fellows with important opportunities for learning, dialogue, and engagement with key disarmament stakeholders. We are also grateful to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, CTBTO, the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW, for organizing study visits for the 2026 cohort. I would also like to thank the International Criminal Court, ICC, International Court of Justice, ICJ, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, UNODC, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, OSA, and Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, VCDNP, for hosting special briefings for them. Heartfelt thanks also go to our colleagues across the broader disarmament community, including permanent representatives and diplomats in Geneva, Vienna, and New York, as well as staff from the UN, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, GCSP. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD, Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator, Gesta, International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, of course, Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, Implementation Support Units of the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention, and of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. civil society, and academia, who generously share their expertise with the Fellows. Your contributions are indispensable to the success of this program. What makes this program unique is its comprehensive and multifaceted approach. It combines e-learning, research, expert briefings, simulations, practical exercises, and study visits to international organizations and host governments. Through this exceptional curriculum, fellows gain invaluable insights into key issues and priorities shaping the global disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control agenda. Its impact, however, extends far beyond the acquisition of technical knowledge. Over the course of several weeks, through countless hours spent in conference rooms, simulations, and discussions, the Fellows have forged lasting friendships, developed a strong sense of camaraderie, and gained a deeper appreciation of one another's perspectives. These are precisely the qualities we need to navigate the challenges of an increasingly polarized world. Through this shared experience, they have also become part of a growing network of alumni who will support one another as trusted partners and work together to address the complex challenges that lie ahead. Indeed, When asked about the program's most significant impact on their careers, many alumni consistently pointed not only to the particular lecture or visit, but to the personal and professional connections they developed. These relationships have made their work not only easier, but also more effective. Let me now turn to another remarkable group, the Fellows of the 2026 cohort. This is a vibrant and diverse cohort of young and mid-career professionals representing a wide range of geographical, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds. Many are already actively engaged in disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control, and together, they reflect the full breadth of expertise and experience across the field. I will have the pleasure of meeting them later this week, and I am convinced that this program has not only strengthened their professional expertise and deepened their understanding of international disarmament architecture, but also strengthen their belief in the power of multilateralism and reinforce their commitment to advance the cause of disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control in pursuit of a safer and more secure world. Now, dear 2026 Fellows, I wish you every success in your professional careers. I am now pleased to invite the chair of the first committee, your excellency, to join me in presenting the fellows with their certificates. Now, regrettably, not all fellows were able to travel to New York, as some were not granted visas. Nevertheless, they remain an integral part of this cohort, and we were proud to celebrate their achievements today. Now, I invite the coordinator of the program, Ms. Silvia Macorincho, to introduce the fellows, and we will be presenting together the certificates to the fellows.

So here we go, Mr. Ali Jad Bura from Algeria. Mrs. Skyler Devoe from Bahamas. Mrs. Latoya Felicia Archer from Barbados. Mrs. Olga Butovich from Belarus. Mrs. Nadouat Abeje Rafi Saka from Benin. Mrs. Sokly Charn from Cambodia. Mr. Karl Peace Bibio Anoma from Côte d'Ivoire. Mrs. Rosanis Romero Lopez from Cuba. Mr. Alejandro Delgado from El Salvador. Mr. Erki Sven-Marnja from Estonia. Mr. Juho Eino Ilmari Mikkonen from Finland. Mrs. Rhoda Azare from Ghana. Mr. Bharat Yadav from India. Mrs. Nursul Kalyaskar from Kazakhstan. Mr. Sitthiakh Phinvongsa from Lao People's Democratic Republic. Mrs. Rabetso Molapo from Lesotho. Mrs. Suriya Hani Jahaya from Malaysia. Mr. Nishant Dahal from Nepal. Mr. Hassan Abbas from Pakistan. Mr. Gaspard Liyoko Mboyo from the Republic of Congo. Mr. Hessoé Bamaze from Togo. Thank you.

Distinguished delegates, the Committee will now resume in a formal setting. The meeting is resumed. Distinguished delegates, we have come to the end of the program today. The next plenary meeting of the First Committee will be held tomorrow at 3:00 PM in this conference room, when we will continue the third and final phase of its work, namely, actions on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items. In this regard, the Committee will be guided by the informal papers that will be issued by the Secretariat containing the draft resolutions and decisions on which actions will be taken today. We will take actions on the drafts under each cluster listed therein. The Secretariat will revise the informal paper on a daily basis in order to update the drafts that are ready for actions at its of our meetings during this stage. In keeping with the past practice, at the start of our meeting tomorrow afternoon, I will again explain the procedure that will guide our work during the action stage. I will also provide an opportunity to delegations that were unable to make a general statement or EOB before actions today to do so. Let me emphasize that this opportunity will be provided only to the delegations that were unable to make such statements today. The meeting is adjourned.