First Committee, 3rd plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Good morning, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. The third meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, The committee will continue this morning with its considerations of CRP1. As I mentioned at the second committee of the committee yesterday, our delegations have requested a vote on the provisional program of work and timetable of the first committee for 2026. is contained in A/C.1/81/CRP.1. In view of the discussion yesterday and this request for a vote on document CRP.1, I would like to inform delegations of the withdrawal of the Chair's proposal entitled "General debate of the First Committee at its 81st session of the General Assembly." as said on October 5. Despite our best efforts to find consensus on this issue, including this proposal, which was a genuine attempt to bridge the gap between interested parties, these recent developments now render it absolute. On 6 October, the representative of the Russian Federation submitted an amendment to the provisional program of work and time timetable of the first committee for 2026 is contained in a slash c1 slash 81 slash crp1 in accordance with the rule 130 the committee will first consider the amendments submitted by the delegations of the Russian Federation's the committee will then consider provisional program of work and timetable of the first committee for 2026. The committee will now consider the amendment, which reads as follows. Replace footnote B with the following. During thematic discussions, delegations are encouraged to limit their statements to three minutes but the statements should not exceed to a maximum of five minutes, as well as to limit statements on behalf of a group of countries to four minutes, but the statements should not exceed to a maximum of seven minutes." End of quote. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, we must note that the First Committee at the initiative of one delegation has begun its work with a vote on the organizational modalities of this session. Instead of looking for compromises, we are imposing or some are trying to impose decisions which do not enjoy consensus and do not satisfy the interest of all member states since the very start of the first committee session we are laying the groundwork for confrontation for non-consensus a non-consensus environment here at the committee which might have an impact on the outcome of the committee's work we hope that this will not be the case, although the committee seems to be moving towards fragmentation, towards division, further and further away from an effective resolution of international security, disarmament and non-proliferation. We're very concerned that For the second year in a row, before we've completed our discussion on the working methods of this forum, before we've come to an agreement, we've seen in a position of changes to the modalities of the first committee, such destructive steps are being taken on the pretext of saving resources and a so-called reform of the committee. In fact, what is happening is a radical change to well-established approaches which have proven to be very effective for the First Committee. In light of the fact that many countries are promoting transparency and openness, those principles, the Russian Federation must ask the Secretariat to ask which delegation asked for the vote. Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, as the program of work in AC.1/70-81/CRP.1 Following the fact that a vote was called, we disseminated an amendment to the draft document. This is underpinned by a proposal by Vietnam on 5 October in informal consultations regarding the work of the First Committee at the 81st session of the UNGA. Specifically, we asked for a replacement of footnote B with the following wording, well, the wording you just read out, Mr. Chairperson. The Russian proposal is a compromise solution, striking a balance between the traditional approach and what you, Mr. Chairman, proposed, the measures you proposed. If we don't have clarity regarding the number of delegations who are going to take the floor and whether we need to cut down the speaking time, our amendment introduces flexibility into our work, maintaining the efficiency of our work at the same time. So, Member States will have the opportunity to extend their group or country statements to five and, uh, seven minutes, to seven and five minutes respectively. The duration of national and group statements could be up to 10 minutes in some fora. Sometimes there are no restrictions at all, Mr. Chairperson. Today's vote is not just adopting a decision on the draft program of work and the duration of speaking time. We are, in fact, determining the future of the First Committee and the entire General Assembly. Here and now, we must take a decision whether we intend to defend the sovereign right of states to state their position and to engage in professional, focused dialogue on the issue at hand, or are we going to reduce and, in fact, undermine work on disarmament, non-proliferation, and the like here at the UN. We call on all Member States who are not indifferent to the fate of the First Committee to lend their support to the Russian amendment, a compromise amendment. We are counting on delegations making the right choice today. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation. And I would like to inform that the United States asks for the vote on CRP1. And with this, I should like to remind that, pursuant to rule 128 of the rules of the procedures of the General Assembly, after the chair has announced the beginning of the voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connections with the actual voting. actual conduct of the voting. Those in favor of the amendment to the provisional program of work and timetable of the first committee for 2026, please signify. Those against and abstentions.

The committee is now voting on the amendment submitted.

To the provisional program of work and timetable of the First Committee for 2026 as contained in document A/C.1/81/CRP.1. The voting machine is unlocked. Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board. Will all delegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board? The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.

The result of the voting is as follows 15 in favor 63 against 56 abstained the amendment to the provisional program of work and timetable of the first committee for 2026 is rejected A recorded vote has been requested on the provisional programme of work and timetable of the First Committee for 2026. It's contained in A/C.1/81/CRP.1. The Committee will now vote on the provisional programme of work and timetable of the First Committee for 1926. It's contained in document A/C.1/81/CRP.1. AC1/81/CRP1. We will now begin the voting process. The delegations in favor of the adoption of the program of work, please signify against an abstention.

The committee is now voting on the program of work as contained in document AC1/81/CRP1. The voting machine is unlocked.

Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes on the board. Will all delegations kindly confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the board?

The voting has been completed. The machine is locked.

The result of the vote is as follows: in favor 135, against 7, abstentions 5. The provisional program of work and timetable of the First Committee of 2026 is adopted. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I now open the floor for the statement in the general debate. I would like to remind delegations that I do count on your cooperation to limit statements to seven minutes when speaking in their national capacity, and 10 minutes for those speaking on behalf of several delegations for this session. To assist the speaker in this regard, and with your understanding, we will use a timing mechanism by which the red light on the speaker's microphone will begin to blink when approaching the time limit for their statement. The time limit will be strictly enforced, including through microphone cutoff, as announced at our organizational meeting. Also, as mentioned during our organizational meeting, I encourage delegates who have longer statements to deliver a summarized version and share their full statement to e-statement@un.org so that it could be posted on the UN Journal. I would encourage speakers to speak at a reasonable speed to allow adequate interpretations. I would further remind delegations that the ruling list of speakers for the General Debate will be closed today at 5 p.m. Therefore, all delegations intending to take the floor during the general debate who have not yet inscribed on the list are encouraged to do so before this deadline. I would like to give the floor to Nicaragua on a point of order.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. A very good morning to you. I would like to make a few general comments before we begin the general debate, if you allow me to do so.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nicaragua. A chair. I have listened to the positions of the delegations on these issues, both on Monday and yesterday. Given the time constraint we face and the limited number of the meetings allocated to the committee, I will not entertain explanation of votes at this time, but will proceed instead to the general debate. This is my ruling. We'll now hear from our first speaker on the general debate in accordance with the established practice. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria on a point of order.

Thank you, Chair.

Very briefly, first of all, I would like to commend your dedicated effort to find a compromise.

As we are already behind schedule and in the end of time, our EUV may be inserted in our general debate statement. But I just want to say that if we squeeze the lemon too hard in search of procedural efficiency, we end up with nothing but seeds in our eyes or at best, sour juice, food or fruit for thought.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria. Now, I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran on the point of order on the conduct of the meeting.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Open the adoption of the program of work. I am obliged to draw the kind attention of you and other distinguished delegates to a serious situation concerning the Iranian, concerning the failure of the host country to issue visas to Iranian representatives who were scheduled to attend the meetings of this committee. This unjustifiable situation has seriously hampered the effective participation of my delegation in the work of the committee.

I give the floor to the point of order on the conduct of the meeting. I think it is not related to the conduct of meeting.

Okay, Mr. Chair, in that case, I will include my statement in general statement.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nicaragua.

Gracias.

Thank you, Chair. Our statement will be included in our statement for the general debate, but we do want to make clear our position that we are concerned about the limit for the deliberations of this committee. We believe that if there are financial cuts in the organization, they should be managed in a more efficient manner and without limiting deliberation times for member states, because this organization is supposed to serve member states. So we just wanted to make that very clear. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nicaragua. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent-- we'll now hear from our first speaker in the general debate. In accordance with established practice, we will begin with group statements. With this, now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Uruguay, speaking on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor of delivering this statement on behalf of Member States of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, CELAC. CELAC would like to congratulate you for your election to chair the work of the First Committee during the 81st session of the General Assembly, and we would like to extend our congratulations to the other members of the Bureau. You can count on the full support and cooperation of our region to develop the work of this Committee. Our region has a long tradition of promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. In fact, the signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 is a fundamental milestone. We consider that these are priority issues and they should occupy a central place in the UN agenda because they are essential components for the maintenance of international peace and security. We reiterate our conviction. Complete, verifiable, transparent and irreversible nuclear disarmament is one of the highest priorities of our community. The mere existence of nuclear weapons continues to be an unacceptable threat for humanity, and any kind of nuclear detonation, whether it is intentional or accidental, would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Therefore, we reiterate that the only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total prohibition and elimination. We would like to express our deep concern over the modernization of nuclear arsenals as well as the development of new nuclear capacities and growing relevance of these weapons in security doctrines and policies. We reiterate our call to nuclear weapons states to fully comply with their obligations and commitments when it comes to nuclear disarmament and to support effective measures in order to totally eliminate their arsenals. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone of our disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We regret that the 11th Review Conference concluded without a substantive final document, despite intense consultations and the significant participation of State Parties. They should reinforce our collective determination to preserve and strengthen the NPT and its review process, as well as moving forward with specific and effective measures when it comes to its three pillars. We would like to underline the importance of the full implementation of the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We also reiterate the inalienable right of States Parties to peacefully develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy without discrimination and pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty. We would like to also highlight the importance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a contribution to the goal of reaching and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. We reaffirm the complementarity between the TPNW and other instruments that make up the international architecture for disarmament and nonproliferation. We value the first review conference of states parties of the TPNW that will be held in New York from November 30th to December 4th, 2026, and we invite all states that are still not a party of the treaty to consider ratifying the treaty or joining it. This year we commemorate the 30th anniversary of the open for signatures of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We would like to highlight that Latin America and the Caribbean was the first region in the world that reached universality when it comes to this instrument. We urge states in Annex 2 that still have not signed or ratified it and whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force to do it without greater delays. We are convinced that nuclear weapons-free zones constitute an important contribution to nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. In this context, we would like to once again highlight the historic importance of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and we reaffirm our support to the establishment of new nuclear weapons-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived upon between states of the relevant regions. We would also like to reaffirm the legitimate request of nuclear weapons states so that they negative security guarantees that are unequivocal, unconditional, and legally binding for the states that make up those nuclear-weapon-free zones and pursuant to international treaties that establish them and their additional protocols. CELAC notes with growing concern the rapid scientific and technological advances and their possible implications for international peace and security. Specifically, we consider it is necessary to continue addressing in relevant multilateral fora the challenges and risks associated to the use of AI in the military sphere on the basis of international law, including international humanitarian law. Mr. Chair, CELAC reaffirms the importance of promoting safe, open, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable space when it comes to ICTs. We should redouble efforts to avoid for this space to become a scenario for conflicts and ensure that it is used exclusively peacefully. This would allow us to fully make the most out of ICTs to contribute to social and economic development. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring that the use of ICTs fully confirms to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, especially the sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-interference in domestic affairs of states, abstaining from the use or the threat of the use of force in international relations, and solving international disputes through peaceful means and peaceful coexistence among states, which provides a critical and fundamental framework to guide states in the use of ICTs. We would like to highlight the relevance of confidence-building measures, international cooperation and the importance of capacity building in order to reduce digital gaps and ensure that all states can make the most out of these technologies and face existing and potential threats. In this context, we welcome The fact that the global mechanism on developments in the area of ICTs has begun in the context of international security and the promotion of the responsible behavior of states in their use as a standing forum, which is inclusive and the sole remit of the United Nations in order to continue moving forward with these issues. We would like to reiterate the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and of preserving this area only for peaceful uses and to the benefit of all State, regardless of their degree of economic, scientific or technological development. In this sense, we continue supporting the negotiation of a treaty on preventing an arms race in outer space. Until this can happen, adopting international measures when it comes to transparency and confidence building and related activities is appropriate and necessary. Chair, CELAC reiterates its deep concern over the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their munitions, which continues exacerbating armed violence, organized crime, and conflicts with serious humanitarian, social, and economic consequences for our countries. This problem also affects our efforts to reach sustainable development and has differentiated impacts on women, men, girls and boys. We reaffirm our commitment to the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eliminate the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in all of their aspects and the International Tracing Instrument. We also highlight the importance of strengthening international cooperation and assistance. This includes capacity building to prevent the illicit trafficking of these weapons and their munitions. CELAC recognizes the valuable contribution of women and youth to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security, and we reiterate the importance of fostering their representation and full, equal, significant, and effective participation in policy-making processes, planning, execution, and evaluation when it comes to disarmament and nonproliferation. We also recognize the important work done by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, and specifically the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean to support the efforts of states in our region when it comes to disarmament, arms controls, and nonproliferation, Chair. In an international context characterized by growing tensions and serious challenges for international peace and security, CELAC reaffirms the importance of multilateralism, dialogue and diplomacy as critical instruments in order to move towards general and total disarmament. Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a verifiable, transparent, and irreversible manner as a matter of priority and pursuant to the proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace. We will continue to work so that resources as well as scientific and technical advances contribute to peace, sustainable development, and the well-being also of our peoples. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Uruguay, speaking on behalf of the community of Latin American and Caribbean states. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Finland, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries.

Mr. Chair, I have the honor to speak. Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and my own country, Finland. We congratulate you and the other members of the Bureau on your election and assure you of our full support. We meet at a difficult time. Armed conflicts, geopolitical tensions, and growing distrust continue to challenge international peace and security. This makes accountability and international cooperation more, not less, necessary. The Nordic countries defend the UN Charter and remain firmly committed to multilateralism and a global order based on international law and common norms. These principles have helped provide peace, security and prosperity for generations. We strongly condemn Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia continues to egregiously violate the UN Charter and undermine the rules and principles upon which international peace and security rest. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine's self-defense, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Russia must end its war now and withdraw its forces from the territory of Ukraine. This would also serve to end the current threats to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine stemming from Russia's war. Regarding the occupied Palestinian territory, the Nordic countries call on all parties to commit to the implementation of the comprehensive peace plan and Security Council Resolution 2803, urge an immediate halt to settlement expansion and violence, and underscore the need to comply with international law. We remain firmly committed to the two-state solution. Conflicts in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East illustrate a broader reality. We must step up our efforts for the benefit of the international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture. The world faces serious threats that have to be met with determination. Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon and must resume full cooperation with the IAEA. The DPRK must abandon all its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and nuclear programs. And both states must comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Mr. Chair, following the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the Nordic countries reaffirm the central role of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The Review Conference demonstrated the enduring importance of the Treaty and the need to redouble our efforts to advance its objectives across all three mutually reinforcing pillars. Amid growing tensions and diminished trust, nuclear risk reduction remains essential. We encourage all nuclear weapons states to make full use of available measures to reduce risks, increase predictability, and prevent miscalculation. We welcome the renewed engagement among the P5 during the review conference and strongly encourage them to build on this momentum. We call on the P5 to deepen their dialogue on strategic stability, reducing international tensions and increasing transparency, building mutual trust and advancing nuclear risk reduction. The expiry of the New START Treaty has left the international community with fewer safeguards and less predictability. We call for urgent efforts to establish a new legally binding framework limiting the largest nuclear arsenals and encourage all nuclear-weapon states to participate and contribute constructively to strategic stability. We continue our strong support for the IAEA and its independent, impartial, and professional work. Its safeguard system is indispensable to the global nonproliferation regime and must be fully respected. We welcome the recent conclusion of the Syria safeguards file, which demonstrated the value of full cooperation with the IAEA in line with safeguards obligations. We underline the importance of the CTBT, this year celebrating its 30th anniversary, and the importance of its verification system. We urge all states to uphold its object and purpose and call on those who have not yet signed and ratified it to do so. We further support the immediate commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations. The Nordic countries remain fully committed to the BTWC and the CWC and will continue to defend the global prohibition against the use of biological and chemical weapons under any circumstances. We condemn any use of such weapons. Russia's use against Ukraine of the choking agent chloropicrin a prohibited Schedule 3 toxic chemical, and of riot control agents as methods of warfare constitute clear violations of the CWC. We reiterate our full support for the OPCW and emphasize the importance of accountability for all violations of the Convention. We urge all States Parties to work constructively towards a substantive outcome at the December session of the BTWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention. As regards conventional weapons, The illicit trade and diversion continue to fuel violence and instability in many parts of the world. We remain committed to strengthening relevant international instruments and reaffirm our strong support for the ATT and call for its universalization and effective implementation. We support the development of an ambitious and action-oriented five-year strategy for the ATT. The Nordic countries also remain major supporters of humanitarian mine action. The Nordic countries underline the importance of gender equality and the women, peace and security agenda across disarmament and international security. The full, equal and meaningful participation of women in disarmament processes is essential. Mr. Chair, the international community must keep pace with emerging technologies to ensure their responsible use in accordance with international law. The Nordic countries welcome the landmark consensus reached in the CCW group of governmental experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems on the set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures. We look forward to the CCW Review Conference agreeing on an ambitious way forward within the CCW framework towards a possible instrument addressing laws. Finally, we underline that the multilateral export control regimes are important elements of the non-proliferation architecture and serve to facilitate international cooperation on peaceful uses of technology. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Finland, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the CARICOM.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor to address this committee on behalf of the 14 member states of the Caribbean Community in this general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items. First, allow me to extend congratulations to you and the members of the Bureau on your election to guide the deliberations of the First Committee. We assure you of CARICOM's full support and cooperation. Chair, in this difficult global environment, CARICOM remains convinced that international peace and security are best advanced through adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, respect for international law, and a steadfast commitment to multilateralism. As we move ever closer to the target date of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, insecurity, conflict, and the diversion of resources towards armaments continue to undermine sustainable development efforts, particularly for small island developing states. CARICOM therefore reiterates that disarmament and development are mutually reinforcing objectives. Progress in one remains dependent on progress in the other. Chair, the illicit trafficking, diversion, and misuse of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition remain the most immediate and pressing security threat facing the Caribbean region. The proliferation of illegal firearms continues to fuel gang violence, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, and insecurity across our region. These challenges threaten public safety, weaken institutions, undermine economic development, and impose significant social costs on our societies. CARICOM therefore reaffirms the critical importance of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the international tracing instruments. We welcome ongoing efforts to implement the outcomes of the Fourth Review Conference and emphasized the need for strengthened international cooperation, information sharing, and the capacity-building support to combat illicit arms trafficking. In this context, we also welcome the convening in June 2026 of the Ninth Biennial Meeting of States to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action and the first meeting of the open-ended Technical Expert Group on developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology, and design. We further underscore the importance of the global framework for through-life conventional ammunition management as a practical tool to strengthen stockpile security, prevent diversion, and reduce armed violence. CARICOM also reaffirms the importance of the Arms Trade Treaty as a key instrument for promoting responsibility, transparency, and accountability in the international trade in conventional arms. Effective implementation of the treaty remains essential to preventing the diversion of weapons into illicit markets and reducing the devastating impact of armed violence on vulnerable communities. Chair, the security challenges confronting our region cannot be viewed in isolation from broader global dynamics. The continued flow of illicit weapons into the Caribbean from outside of our region demonstrates the interconnected nature of contemporary security threats and reinforces the need for enhanced cooperation among exporting, transit, and destination states. In this regard, CARICOM welcomes the continued implementation of the CARICOM Firearms Roadmap and the efforts of CARICOM impacts to strengthen regional cooperation, intelligence sharing, border security, and firearms tracing capabilities. These initiatives demonstrate our collective determination to address armed violence through practical and coordinated action. Mr. Chair, nuclear weapons continue to pose an existential threat to humanity. At a time when nuclear arsenals are being modernized, doctrines are evolving, and strategic competition is intensifying, CARICOM remains deeply concerned by the growing risks associated with nuclear weapons. We reiterate that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We know that the 11th Review Conference concluded without a consensus outcome document. Nevertheless, the absence of consensus must not diminish our commitment to the objectives of the Treaty or weaken efforts to advance all three of its pillars. The international community cannot afford continued stagnation on nuclear disarmament. CARICOM also reaffirms its support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and looks forward to the first review conference to be held later this year. This offers an opportunity to strengthen norms and accelerate momentum toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. We also remain hopeful for the early entry into force of the CTBT. Our region brings a unique perspective to these discussions. Through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Latin America and the Caribbean established the world's first nuclear-free weapons zone in a densely populated region, demonstrating that security is best achieved through cooperation, confidence building, and collective commitment to peace. On the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons, Caricom reiterated support for the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. We further emphasize the importance of strengthening international cooperation to address emerging biological risks and to ensure that advances in science and technology are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and in accordance with international law. As we look ahead, the rapid development of emerging technology presents some of the most significant challenges facing the international security landscape. We remain committed to the position reflected in the CARICOM Declaration on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, adopted in 2023. We continue to support international efforts aimed at negotiating a legally binding instrument that would ensure that autonomous weapon systems remain subject to meaningful human control and operate in full compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. CARICOM is equally concerned by the increasing integration of artificial intelligence into military systems, targeting processes and operational decision-making. While recognizing the potential benefits of technological innovation, we emphasize that artificial intelligence must not be permitted to erode established principles of responsibility, accountability, and compliance with international law. The establishment of clear norms and safeguards governing the military application of artificial intelligence is therefore of particular importance. CARICOM welcomes continued discussions within the UN on artificial intelligence in the military domain and supports efforts aimed at promoting transparency, confidence building, and responsible state behavior in this rapidly evolving field. Chair, CARICOM recognizes the critical role of women in promoting peace, security, and disarmament. Women continue to be disproportionately affected by armed violence and insecurity. while remaining underrepresented in many security-related decision-making processes. We therefore reaffirm our commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda and call for the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women across all disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control processes. In this regard, CARICOM recognizes the leadership of Trinidad and Tobago on the biennial resolution entitled, Women Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Arms Control, which continues to make an important contribution to advancing gender responsive approaches to international security. CARICOM also wishes to recognize the valuable contributions of civil society, academia, and youth in advancing disarmament and international security objectives. Finally, Chair, we acknowledge that the challenges before us are interconnected and complex, yet they also reinforce the enduring relevance of multilateralism and the urgent need for collective action. For the Caribbean community, international law, multilateral cooperation, and effective disarmament are not abstract principles. They are essential safeguards for our security, development, and resilience. CARICOM therefore remains committed to working constructively to strengthen the disarmament architecture, address emerging threats, reduce armed violence, and advance our shared objective for a safer, more peaceful, and more secure world for present and future generations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the CARICOM. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Kazakhstan, speaking on behalf of Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

Mr. Chair, excellencies, distinguished-- hello. OK. Mr. Chair, excellencies, distinguished delegates. On behalf of the five Central Asian states, I extend our sincere congratulations to you, Mr. Chair, and to the members of the Bureau on your election. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the five state parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and my own country, the Republic of Kazakhstan, which currently serves as chair of the treaty. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Semipalatinsk Treaty on 8 September 2006. For the five countries of Central Asia, the Treaty embodies a shared commitment to regional security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to a world free of nuclear weapons. For two decades, the first and still the only nuclear weapon-free zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere has demonstrated that neighboring states can achieve through dialogue, cooperation, and verifiable commitments. This achievement carries particular meaning for our region. Central Asia knows firsthand the devastating consequences of nuclear testing. Nuclear tests have left a lasting human and environmental legacy. We pay tribute to all those affected in Central Asia and elsewhere and reaffirm our determination that such suffering must never be repeated. The nuclear legacy of Central Asia extends beyond the consequences of nuclear testing and also includes the environmental and humanitarian challenges associated with former uranium mining and processing sites and radioactive waste. Particular importance to the continued international cooperation in the safe remediation of uranium legacy sites and tailings facilities, the management of radioactive waste, and the protection of affected communities and the environment. Mr. Chair, the international security environment gives renewed urgency to our work. We remain concerned by the lack of substantial progress on nuclear disarmament. including under Article VI of the NPT, the erosion of key arms control arrangements, and the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals. A new nuclear arms race must not be accepted as inevitable. Nuclear weapons states bear a particular responsibility to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, reduce nuclear risks, and engage in good faith negotiations towards nuclear disarmament. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and indispensable pillar of international security. We regret that the 11th NPT Review Conference was unable to reach consensus on a substantive outcome. This makes sustained dialogue and the balanced implementation of all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the treaty even more important. We reaffirm our strong support for the International Atomic Energy Agency and its indispensable role in safeguards and in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This year also marks the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. All five Central Asian states have ratified the CTBT and remain firmly committed to its universalization and entry into force. We urge all States that have not yet done so, particularly the remaining Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. Pending its entry into force, all States should maintain existing moratoria on nuclear weapon tests and any other nuclear explosions, and refrain from actions contrary to the objective and purpose of the Treaty. Moratoria remain important, but cannot replace a permanent, legally binding and effectively verifiable prohibition. Mr. Chair, a nuclear-weapon-free zone is only as strong as the commitments made to respect it. The security of our zone is reinforced by the Protocol on Negative Security Assurances to the SIMPO Treaty. We welcome its signature by all five nuclear weapons states and its ratification by China, France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom. We express our hope for the earliest ratification by the United States, thereby completing the framework of legally binding security assurances for the zone. We call upon all five nuclear weapons states to respect the status of the zone and comply fully with the obligations not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any state to the treaty. At a time of growing nuclear risks, nuclear weapon-free zones demonstrate that regional security can be strengthened through legally binding commitments to remain free of nuclear weapons. Their value extends beyond the regions they cover. Together, they reinforce the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture. Looking ahead, we believe that the next stage should focus on further strengthening the institutional framework of the Tsimbalan Treaty and expanding cooperation with other nuclear-weapon-free zones. These efforts would help strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and advance our shared commitment to international peace and security. Memorandums of cooperation have been concluded with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, AFCONE, and the Agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, OPANAL. We continue our engagement with the state parties to the Bangkok and Rarotonga treaties and with Mongolia. We invite the United Nations and all member states to engage constructively with the Central Asian states in advancing these efforts and to contribute to identifying practical steps. We support regular coordination and exchanges of experience among nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the establishment of further zones based on arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the regions concerned in accordance with the guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In this context, we reaffirm our continuing validity and relevance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, pending its full implementation. Mr. Chair, 20 years ago, the five countries of Central Asia made a collective choice. Our region had experienced nuclear testing and the presence of nuclear weapons. We chose another path to build security through cooperation, legally binding commitments, and mutual confidence, and to keep nuclear weapons out of our region. Today, we reaffirm that choice. We remain committed to the full implementation of the Simplified Treaty, strengthening of the international norm against nuclear testing, and closer cooperation among nuclear weapon-free zones. The experience of Central Asia demonstrates that regional cooperation can strengthen security, nonproliferation, and nuclear disarmament. We stand ready to work with all member states to strengthen the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime and advance our common goal to a world free of nuclear weapons. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Kazakhstan, speaking on behalf of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, speaking on behalf of New Agenda Coalition.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, Excellencies. Distinguished delegates, I have the honor to take the floor on behalf of the members of the New Agenda Coalition, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and my own country, Mexico. At the outset, the New Agenda Coalition congratulates you, Ambassador Lok Bahadur Tapa of Nepal, on your assumption as chair of the First Committee. You can count on the NAC's support. Chair, the New Agenda Coalition was established as a cross-regional group of non-nuclear weapon states united by the common objective to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, including through the full implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Our position remains grounded in a simple principle: nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation are mutually reinforcing, and the credibility of the Treaty depends on the implementation of both. That principle has particular importance today. It is particularly concerning that we are witnessing a deterioration of the international security environment in which nuclear weapons are acquiring greater prominence instead of having their role progressively diminished pursuant to commitments undertaken under the NPT. Nuclear arsenals are being modernized and expanded. Nuclear weapons remain key to security doctrines and extended deterrence arrangements. Nuclear rhetoric and threats have become more frequent, while important elements of the disarmament and arms control architecture have been weakened, lost, or simply disregarded. These negative trends undermine and reverse the limited achievements toward the pending and urgent priority of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. For the NAC, a more difficult security environment cannot be rational for greater reliance on nuclear weapons. The increased prominence of nuclear weapons deepens existing risks, reinforces nuclear competition, and further erodes confidence in the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. It is precisely in times of greater tension and uncertainty that arms control and nuclear disarmament commitments and obligations have proven most useful and are most needed. Chair, the fundamental problem facing the NPT today is not the lack of agreed commitments. In 1995, the indefinite extension of the treaty with imperative of permanence and accountability was accompanied by decisions to advance its implementation and strengthen accountability. In 2000, the nuclear weapons states adopted an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. 10 state parties agreed on to an action plan containing concrete commitments on nuclear disarmament. Yet, more than three decades after 1995 decisions, the gap between what has been agreed and what has been implemented continues to grow. The failure for the third consecutive review conference to agree on a substantive outcome of meaningful steps forward is a serious setback for the treaty. but it does not create a vacuum, nor does it release state parties from obligations and commitments already undertaken under the treaty. The decisions and resolutions of 1995, the commitments agreed in 2000, and the 2010 action plan remain valid and fully implemented, until fully implemented. The reaffirmation is necessary, their implementation indispensable and urgent. The challenge now is to translate those commitments into action. The erosion of the disarmament and arms control architecture makes this all the more necessary. With New START expired and no successor arrangement in place, the two states possessing the largest nuclear arsenals are no longer subject to legally binding numerical limits on their strategic nuclear forces or mutual inspections or monitoring systems. In this context, renewed dialogue, restrained and practical, meaningful measures to reduce nuclear risks are essential. The NAC supports such efforts, but reducing immediate dangers is not enough. Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear risks are complementary to, but cannot substitute for, nuclear disarmament. What is needed is concrete, verifiable, and irreversible progress towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Implementation also requires accountability. The indefinite extension of the NPT was predicted upon the notion that progress in the implementation of the treaty will be subject to periodic review. State parties must be able to determine whether nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments are actually being fulfilled by the nuclear weapons states. Vertical and horizontal comparability across nuclear weapons states reporting to determine their progress or lack thereof remains essential. Despite the failure to advance related measures on transparency and accountability at this year's NPT Review Conference, the issue continues to be a matter of the highest priority for the NAC, as it should also be for the nuclear weapons states. Chair, the upcoming first review conference of the TPNW will provide an opportunity to reinforce the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The NAC reaffirms that the TPNW is fully consistent with the NPT, and both treaties offer a sound and mutually reinforcing legal framework for nuclear disarmament. Chair, the urgency of nuclear disarmament is inseparable from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Scientific knowledge continues to demonstrate that any use of nuclear weapons will have consequences far beyond national borders and beyond the capacity of any state to respond adequately. The report of the United Nations Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War next year will depend on our understanding of these consequences. We already know enough to act. This reality must remain at the center of our work. Chair, it is in this context that the New Agenda Coalition presents its draft resolution entitled, "Towards a Nuclear Weapons-Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Obligations and Commitments." Its message is clear. The international security environment might have changed, but the obligations contained in the NPT have not. Agreed commitments cannot be set aside because their implementation has become more difficult, nor can repeat failures to reach consensus weaken what the state parties have already agreed. The task before us is to urgently close the gap between commitment and implementation, and to ensure that the commitments made in 1995, 2000, and 2010 are not merely remembered as promises of another time, but actually fulfilled today. At the moment when nuclear weapons are once again being presented as instruments of security, we must offer a different vision. A safer world will not be built by giving nuclear weapons greater prominence, but by reducing their role and salience, reducing nuclear dangers, and ultimately eliminating all nuclear weapons. That is not only the underlying purpose of the New Agenda Coalition; it is a responsibility shared by us all, for our world, for our peoples. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation, speaking on behalf of Russian Federation and Belarus.

Mr. Chairman, we States parties to the agreement on the establishment of the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus reiterate our commitment to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter as well as international law. For instance, the sovereign equality of states, political independence, the territorial equality and integrity of all states, noninterference in internal affairs, inviolability of state borders, and peaceful settlement of disputes. We're in favor of international peace and security, friendly relations between states, as well as showing the use of force or the threat thereof. We note that new geopolitical, military, and political realities create the need to establish a sustainable architecture of equal and indivisible Eurasian security for all states and organizations on the continent without exception. A joint declaration was adopted on the 25th of September of this year, the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century, start of negotiations. We reiterate the fact that the Charter's development is now underway. We call on all states in Eurasia to assist us in the forging of such a security architecture on the continent, to address regional development, international development issues, and to join the work on the Charter. We are guided by a novel commitment to strengthening international peace, security, and stability in Eurasia and all over the world. We underscore that the multipolar world order that is being forged should be underpinned by international law, with the UN playing a central coordinating role. We continue to cooperate so as to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. stand ready to continue coordinating efforts to ensure that the NPT is holistic and sustainable, although some Western states are trying to use the agreement to further their own political ends. This has nothing to do with the object of the treaty. We are disquieted by NATO's and NATO member states activities which seek to create threats to the security and interest of Russia and Belarus. The most destabilizing actions of NATO states, which are provoking serious strategic risks, are the ongoing hostile steps within the context of the Ukraine crisis, which put us at risk of a direct armed conflict between nuclear states, as well as plans and practical steps taken to deploy in Europe, American, other Western land-based intermediate range and shorter range missiles, bolstering of anti-missile defense, which are forging and expanding the European segment of the US's global anti-missile system, the erection of military infrastructure and significant strike forces, as well as the intensification of military activities of NATO member states at Russia's and Belarus's borders. as well as bolstering capacity of NATO's so-called nuclear sharing initiatives, which are based on the deployment of nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons in Europe. We are against the placement in outer space of any kinds of weapons, the use of force or threat thereof as regards space objects and using space objects, as well as attempts by some states to use outer space for military confrontation, including in the framework of the US's so-called golden dome, which includes the development and deployment of space-based interception means. We note serious negative consequences that these steps will have, steps which aim to achieve military dominance in outer space and to use outer space as a theater for military operations. We reiterate the need to start international negotiations on an international legally binding instrument on the preventing of an arms race in outer space and a ban on the placement of any forms of weapons in outer space, the use of force or use or the threat thereof as regards space objects or using space objects. We're in favor of universalization of the international initiative. or a political commitment on the non-placement of weapons in outer space. We underscore the need to uphold the BWC, including the institutionalization and the adoption of a legally binding protocol to the convention, which Interlalia would call for an effective monitoring mechanism for compliance. We believe it's unacceptable to create international mechanisms which duplicate BWC functions, circumventing the Security Council. States should not conduct any military biological activities on their own territory or on the territory of other states which pose a threat to the security of other states. We are in favor of the OPCW's work becoming once again depoliticized and technical on the principle of consensus. We are against any allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons without evidence and keeping with the CWC. We note the need to ensure that election to the Executive Board of the OPCW should be done in keeping with Article 8 of the Convention. We are in favor of ensuring the effectiveness of the UN's disarmament mechanism, including here at the First Committee. We believe the Committee is a key universal platform for discussing issues of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation under the current geopolitical context, which is characterized by a systemic crisis in this sphere. Collective efforts underpinned by dialogue are a key pillar If we are to achieve regional and international security, we should focus our efforts on ensuring the effectiveness of the multilateral toolkit we have. A toolkit which should work on the basis of genuine equality, mutual understanding, and due regard for the lawful interests of all states. Unfortunately, of late, the first committee's work has been characterized by excessive politicization of discussions, deeper divisions, and more and more confrontational rhetoric. Some states are demonstrating the fact that they're not interested in equitable multilateral dialogue at the UN on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. They're not hiding their desire to use the committee to promote their biased agenda. This trend can deal a serious blow to the First Committee's work, turning it into an instrument of political pressure exerted against countries not to the liking of some. We cannot allow this. We note the need to maintain the long-established practice of how the First Committee functions. We stand convinced that existing working methods of the Committee are relevant and effective. We see no need to change them. We believe that the international community is facing a lot of contradictions in the sphere of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. But this is not due to shortcomings of disarmament fora. It's because some states are not prepared to partake in equitable and mutually respectful dialogue. Any initiatives and proposals aimed at changing the methods of the First Committee should be carefully assessed at the expert level, they should fulfill the purposes of this forum and be adopted by consensus at a special UNGA session on disarmament. Against the backdrop of these discussions of the First Committee, what's important is maintaining the ability of Member States to put forward initiatives in the sphere of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Ensuring sovereign states can submit resolutions and decisions to the GA and determine their periodicity, their content themselves, paves the way for the effective work of the Committee and the effectiveness of all decisions taken. We call on states to refrain from submitting non-consensus-based proposals to the First Committee, ones which will not result in us searching for mutually acceptable but rather further fragment it and politicize the work of the First Committee. We stand ready to engage in substantive dialogue on all First Committee issues at this regular session. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation speaking on behalf of Russian Federation and Belarus. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia, speaking on behalf of the African Group.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the African Group. At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Lok Bah Dure Tapa, on your election as chair of the first committee at its 81st session. I also congratulate the other members of the Bureau and assure you of the African Group's full support and cooperation. The African Group aligns itself with the statement to be delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to make the following remarks, of which a full statement will be shared via e-statement. This General Debate takes place at a critical juncture for the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The failure of the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, held in May 2026, To adopt a consensus outcome document for the third consecutive time underscores the persistent challenges confronting multilateral disarmament efforts. The disappointing outcome reinforces the urgent need to rebuild trust, demonstrate political will, and translate long-standing commitments into concrete progress. The African Group reaffirms that multilateral diplomacy and constructive engagement remains indispensable to addressing international disarmament and security challenges, consistent with the United Nations Charter and the principles and the objectives of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Chair, the continued existence of the nuclear weapons remains an existential threat to humanity. The African Group reiterates that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed in the Pact of the Future remains the only absolute guarantee against the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. We therefore call upon nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations through concrete, transparent, verifiable, and irreversible measures within clearly defined timeframes. The group remains deeply concerned by the continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals reliance on the nuclear deterrence doctrines, nuclear sharing arrangements, and the growing risks associated with emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control systems. Mindful of the enduring humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear testing and uranium extraction on the African continent, the group welcomes the inaugural international meeting on the victim assistance and environmental radiation remediation convened on 1st September 2026 pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/60 and looks forward to its recommendations. Chair, the group reaffirms the important contribution of nuclear weapon-free zones to international peace and security. In this regard, we welcome the successful conclusion by consensus of the comprehensive study on nuclear weapon free zones pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/241. We also reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the Treaty of Pelindaba as a cornerstone of Africa's contribution to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We welcome the six sessions of the United Nations Conference on the establishment of Middle East free zone East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, convened pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/546. We encourage all participants and invited states to engage constructively at the seventh session of the November 2026 under the presidency of Oman towards negotiation of a legally binding treaty. The group further affirms the inalienable right of the states to develop and use nuclear energy and peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the international obligations. We underscore the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in technology, in technical cooperation, capacity building, and ensuring nuclear safety and security, particularly in support of sustained development. The Group recognizes the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as an important contribution to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, contemporary to the NPT and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free zones. We look forward to the first review conference of the TPNW, scheduled for 30th November to 4th December 2026 under the presidency of South Africa to encourage and broad and broad the broadest possible participation including by observer States chair the African group welcomes the operationalization of the global mechanism on developments in the field of information and communication technology in the context of international security and advancing responsible states' behavior in the use of ICT. The group remains deeply concerned by the illicit trade, manufacture, transfer, and uncontrolled circulation of small arms and light weapons, particularly in Africa, where these weapons continue to fuel conflicts, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and instability. We reaffirm our commitment to the full and effective implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument. We also reaffirm the sovereign right of States to acquire and retain conventional arms for legitimate security and defence needs, consistent with the United Nations Charter and applicable international obligations. The African Group commends the valuable contribution of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in providing technical assistance and capacity building support to African states. We call for adequate, predictable and sustainable resources to enable the Centre to fulfill its mandate effectively. The group reiterates the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and supports the development of a legally binding instrument to complement the existing international legal framework while safeguarding the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for benefit of all humanity. The Group also attaches great importance to the ongoing discussions on the military applications of artificial intelligence and lethal autonomous weapons systems. We look forward to the seventh review conference of the Convention on Certain Chemical Weapons, scheduled for 16 to 20th November 2026, and urge meaningful progress towards addressing the humanitarian, legal and security challenges posed by these technologies. In conclusion, Chair, the African Group reiterates that sustained political will, mutual trust, transparency and genuine multilateral cooperation remain essential to advancing our collective disarmament objectives. We urge all delegations to approach the deliberations of this committee with renewed commitment and strengthen international peace and security. During this session, the African Group will present two draft resolutions, namely the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. We count on the continued support and constructive engagement of all delegations towards their adoption. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia speaking on behalf of the African Group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya speaking on behalf of Arab Group.

Mr. Chair.

At the outset, Ambassador Lok Bahadur, the Permanent Representative of Nepal, please allow me to congratulate you on your election as Chair of the First Committee at the 81st session of the General Assembly. We also congratulate your bureau members. We are pleased that Sudan is representing the Arab Group. We align ourselves with the statement to be delivered by the NAM. At the outset, We deeply regret the restrictions on the state of Palestine, which meant that the president of the state of Palestine could not participate effectively in the high-level segment. While the Palestinian voice is targeted at the UN, Israeli violations continue. Israel has deliberately caused a famine that was documented by the UN. Israel has forcibly displaced millions and continue to violate all principles of international law and the UN. In this context, we underscore the importance of facilitating the participation of all member states in the work of the United Nations in accordance with the headquarters agreements and relevant obligations. In this context The Arab group condemns the unlawful Israeli military aggression against nuclear facilities under IAEA full scope safeguards. We also condemn the Iranian interference in the internal affairs of many Arab states, mainly through its military support for militias and armed groups. This poses a threat to regional security and destabilizes the region. We strongly condemn. the Iranian attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. We recall Security Council Resolution 2817 of 2026, according to which these Iranian attacks violate international law and pose a dangerous threat to international peace and security. Mr. Chair, we underscore the need to eliminate nuclear weapons and direct resources instead towards development. As we have previously mentioned, the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. Agreed obligations must be upheld in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the NPT, and other internationally agreed upon obligations and undertakings. This remains the most effective means to achieve the ultimate objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We regret, once again, the third failure of the NPT Review Conference to adopt an outcome document in April 2026. We also regret the failure to universalize the Treaty. Nuclear weapons States do not uphold their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and refuse to commit to specific timelines. On the other hand, they continue their qualitative and quantitative modernization and development of nuclear arsenals. Arms controls arrangements are being eroded, and extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements continue in violation of the NPT. We call for negotiations leading to a convention on the complete and total nuclear disarmament. The balanced implementation of the three pillars of the NPT is a must, mainly the implementation of the disarmament pillar, where minimal progress was achieved. Cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be also strengthened. Non-nuclear weapon states must be supported to exercise their inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as they continue to uphold their obligations under the IAEA CSAs. This is particularly important as some states that are not parties to the NPT benefit from extended nuclear cooperation. We commend the positive contributions of confidence-building measures and nuclear risk reduction, but these measures are not a substitute for the effective nuclear disarmament. We warn against the integration of AI into nuclear weapon systems. We underscore the importance of full human control. We welcome the IAEA Board of Governors decision of 9 September 2026 to end its consideration of the agenda item of the former defunct Syrian regime on Syria's implementation of the safeguards agreement under the NPT. This important development wouldn't have been possible without the Syrian Government's cooperation and transparency, grounded in a national and sovereign will to turn the page on the legacy of the defunct regime and regain its natural place in the international order. We commend the Arab countries, members of the Board of Governors, namely Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. for co-sponsoring the draft resolution and for their constructive efforts to facilitate its consideration and adoption by consensus by the Board of Governors. In this context, We are proud of Kuwait's election to chair the Board of Governors of the IAEA for the term 2026-2027 by acclamation. This embodies international trust in Kuwait and recognizes its role in promoting cooperation, dialogue, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We wish Kuwait every success in shouldering this responsibility. thus strengthening the role of the IAEA in serving peace and development and safeguarding the inalienable right of states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We were shocked by the 2023 statements of an Israeli minister who threatened to drop a nuclear bomb on Gaza and the besieged Palestinian people. These extremist and irresponsible statements must be categorically and unequivocally condemned at the Security Council and by the General Assembly. These statements highlight the need to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a key pillar to maintain regional and international peace and security. We highlight the importance of the treaties establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Israel refuses to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. and refuses to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full scope safeguard agreement. This poses a dangerous threat to peace and security and is a violation of tens of UN resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 487 and 687. We express our deep concern over the ongoing procrastination in the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. and also the procrastination in implementing the outcome document of the 2010 Review Conference. We recall that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was and remains an integral part of the indefinite extension of the NPT. Immediate measures must be taken to establish this zone in the Middle East. This year, we will once again put forward the Arab draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. We look forward to continued broad support for this draft resolution. We also support the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We look forward to the adoption of both resolutions by consensus. We also welcome the sixth sessions of the Conference for the Establishment of a Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. We look forward to further important and constructive discussions at the seventh session to be presided over by Oman in November 2026. We call on all members and observers to effectively participate in this conference. I will stop now and I will submit my full statement to the First Committee for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the European Union, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement. We meet at a time of profound strain for international peace and security. The rules and institutions that support international peace and security are under severe pressure. The EU's firm commitment to the rules-based international order is rooted in its history. We are acutely aware that great power rivalry at a time of low international trust can lead to devastating consequences. The EU will therefore continue to invest in and advance the global architecture for disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and export controls, and peace and security. We will continue to defend and promote multilateralism, international law and the rule of law founded on the UN Charter. Chair, Russia's unjustified, full-scale and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine continues to inflict a heavy toll on the Ukrainian people first and foremost, but with spillover effects on the wider region and across the globe. The EU condemns Russia's aggression in the strongest terms and calls upon Russia to end this war now. We strongly condemn Russia's aggressive actions, including widespread use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, and nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force in its unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, which are irresponsible, provocative, dangerous and escalatory, and which further demonstrate how Russia's repeated actions undermine international commitments of peace and security. The EU also condemns the Belarusian regime's complicity in Russia's war against Ukraine and Russia's deepening military cooperation with the DPRK and Iran. The EU remains committed to supporting all efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. Full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, as well as the full accountability for international crimes committed, remain our priority. The EU deplores the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza, and calls on Israel to allow immediate, unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance into and throughout Gaza. The EU remains firmly committed to a lasting and sustainable peace based on a two-state solution. The Comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza and UN Security Council Resolution 2803 must be implemented urgently and in accordance with international law. The EU is also deeply concerned by the open hostilities that have erupted in regions in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, and that entail grave non-proliferation and disarmament risks. Chair, the EU is also profoundly concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Gulf region. The EU condemns Iran's unjustifiable attacks against regional states and ships in the Strait of Hormuz, and supports diplomatic efforts and negotiations that bring about a lasting solution. The EU has consistently made clear that Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. We therefore call on Iran to fully comply with its legally binding nuclear safeguards obligations under the NPT, the IAEA and relevant Security Council resolutions. The EU calls on DPRK to abandon all its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes as required by multiple UN Security Council resolutions, and supports efforts towards achieving a denuclearised Korean Peninsula. The NPT remains the cornerstone of global non-proliferation and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We regret that State Parties were unable to reach consensus on a substantive outcome at the 2026 NPT Review Conference. The absence of consensus does not diminish the significance and security benefits provided by the NPT, nor the legal obligations undertaken under the Treaty. Nor does it remove the responsibility of State Parties to implement previous commitments, including concrete progress towards the implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The expiry of the New START Treaty resulted in an absence of agreed nuclear arsenal limits and mutual inspection and monitoring systems between the US and Russia. The EU calls for good faith negotiations for a new legally binding nuclear arms control framework limiting the largest nuclear arsenals. We urge Russia to engage meaningfully and call on China to contribute and engage actively and constructively. The EU strongly encourages nuclear weapons states to pursue discussions on confidence building, transparency, risk reduction and verification. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction contributes to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts. We will continue to reaffirm the importance and redouble our efforts to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT. We will also continue to engage for the early conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty and support the work of the IAEA. The EU remains strongly committed to preventing the proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems. We support the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and actively advocate for its universalisation and complete implementation. The EU will continue supporting and strengthening international instruments aimed at combating chemical and biological weapons. In this context, the EU highlights the important role of the UNSG's mechanism for investigating the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. The EU strongly condemns Russia's use of chemical weapons, including the systematic use of riot control agents on the front line in Ukraine. The EU welcomes important progress made by Syria in cooperation with OPCW. The EU reaffirms its unwavering support for the Arms Trade Treaty and its core objectives, and remains fully committed to its universalisation and effective implementation, which it continues to encourage and fund. The EU firmly supports conventional arms control instruments, such as those designed to prevent the diversion of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. Chair, the EU supports the humanitarian objectives of the Anti-Personal Mine Ban Convention, which remains an important, effective and successful multilateral humanitarian disarmament instrument. The contributions of the EU to both the APMBC and CCM have helped to prevent casualties and injuries, and to bring back economic development to affected communities. The EU recalls the importance of the Political Declaration on Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. And the EU will also continue to address the implications of new and emerging technologies for international peace and security. The set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, agreed by consensus in the GGA on laws, represents an important milestone, and the EU remains fully committed to building on this positive outcome and expect the 2026 Review Conference to adopt an ambitious negotiating mandate for the GGE to take forward its work, building on the latest GGE laws, report and other outcomes of the GGE process. The EU will support further efforts within the framework of the Convention at its seventh Review Conference and beyond. Outside the CCW, the EU supports ongoing discussions aimed at developing voluntary guidelines for the use of AI in the military domain. Chair, the EU reaffirms the importance of preserving a secure, safe, stable, and sustainable space environment. It underlines the necessity of full compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, and supports the universalization and full implementation of the Outer Space Treaty. while promoting norms of responsible behaviour as a means of preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. We support the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women and reiterate our strong commitment to the WPS, YPS and CAK agendas. The EU will continue to promote responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, and we welcome the launch of the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security. And finally, Mr Chair, The EU will also continue to promote the full and active participation in the multi-stakeholder community, including youth, private actors, academia, and civil society, in discussions and processes on disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. And the full version of this statement will be available online. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Bahrain, speaking on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC.

Mr.

Chair, I have the honor to make the statement on behalf of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the UAE, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait, and my country, the Kingdom of Bahrain. We congratulate you on your election at the helm of the First Committee. We also congratulate the bureau members. We take pride in the Arab representation at the bureau. We align with the statements of with the statement of the Arab Group. Mr. Chair, this session is taking place amid a regional and international security environment marked by growing tensions, risks of proliferation and armament, a growing use of missiles and drones. This threatens security and compounds humanitarian suffering. Accordingly, our countries stress that Arms races do not lead to sustainable security, but rather confidence building, adhering to international obligations, and promoting dialogue and cooperation. Mr. Chair, we reiterate our commitment to the NPT as the central pillar of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. We also stress the importance of fully implementing in a balanced and non-selective manner of its three pillars. We also stress the importance of achieving the universality of the NPT and upholding the right of state parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in line with international obligations and while fully adhering to assurances and norms of safety and transparency. The 11th RevCon in 2026 was unable to reach a substantive consensual outcome. Accordingly, we call for redoubling efforts in order to recover consensus and to enhance the efficiency and credibility of the treaty, as well as translating existing commitments into practical and tangible steps. Chair, we welcome the adoption by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on the 9th of September of this year a resolution submitted by Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding concluding, ending the consideration of the item on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic. We affirm that the adoption by consensus of this text reflects the support of the Board of the positive developments regarding the implementation of the IAEA's safeguards in Syria. We also stress the importance of fully committing to the comprehensive safeguards agreement with their impartial role when it comes to nuclear verification. We further stress the importance of protecting peaceful nuclear facilities from hostilities and military threats, given what could arise from them in terms of risks on civilians, environment, and regional and international security. We also stress the importance of respecting international norms of nuclear safety and security and the role of the IAEA in this regard. When it comes to the protection of civilian and critical facilities, we condemn the Iranian attack against the Gulf Petrochemicals Industries Company in Bahrain. These facilities must be protected from hostilities with adherence to international law and relevant international norms. The targeting of these facilities carry risks, but at the same time, we underscore the importance of developing peaceful nuclear programs while respecting transparency and international norms. In this regard, we note the peaceful nuclear program of the sisterly UAE as a practical model to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a frame of transparency and close cooperation with the IAEA, as well as commitment to assurances and nuclear safety and security norms. Chair, the GCC countries reaffirm their full support for the establishment of a free zone, or a zone free of nuclear weapons out of the WMDs in the Middle East. We also stress the importance of the full implementation of the 1995 resolution and relevant outcome, most notably the 2010 RevCon outcome document as well as resolutions 487 and 687 of the Security Council. We support the process launched by the GA. under Resolution 73/546 regarding achieving a binding legal instrument. We look forward to the holding of the seventh session of the conference next November under the presidency of the sisterly Sultanate of Oman. We hope that this will bring closer positions and allow for the engagements of all relevant stakeholders. At the same time, we express our concern as to the continued development and modernization of nuclear arsenals. We call on nuclear countries to respect their obligations in disarmament and to take practical measures to limit use and unintended escalation or calculation. When it comes to the elimination of chemical weapons in light of their grave consequences on people and the environment, we welcome the adoption by the Executive Council of the OPCW of a draft resolution presented by Assis 36 of Qatar regarding the restoration of the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic at the organization. With 66 states sponsoring this draft. This shows the success of the Qatari diplomatic efforts to build a broad consensus around this text. We condemn the Iranian aggressions against the territories of members of the Council and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This was also condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 2817 as a violation of international law and a threat to international peace and security. We also warn as to the use of naval mines and other weapons and explosives in waterways, given the threat this poses to international navigation and regional security and stability. We also stress the importance of implementing Security Council resolutions and adhering to the UN Charter, as well as the importance of de-escalation and respect for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity. We reject the fact that non-state armed groups are provided with weapons and developed military technologies. We stress the importance of preventing that and implementing relevant international resolutions. We also condemn in the strongest terms the two separate attacks carried out by the terrorist Houthi militia last September involving drones. One was an attempted attack against Mecca al-Mukarrama, and this is a violation of the sanctity of Islamic holy sites, and this is a threat to the safety of civilians. We stress that the security of Mecca al-Mukarrama and its holy sites is an issue that is not confined the region. It is towards Mecca that the prayers of Muslims turn, and Mecca has a special place in the heart of 2 billion Muslims around the world. The second attack was against a power facility in Medina that provides the Nabawi Mosque with services. Mr. Chair, we also attach great importance to cybersecurity and the responsible use of emerging technologies, including AI, in the military domain. We stress the importance of continuing the development of international frameworks on the responsible behavior in the cyberspace, bridging the digital divide, and building the capacities of developing states. In terms of outer space, we stress the importance of using outer space for peaceful purposes and preventing the placement of weapons in order to avoid new arms races. We stress the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures for sustainable use, and especially to use technology for development, peace, and stability. We stress that disarmament is a shared responsibility. We will continue to cooperate with the United Nations. Microphone cut off.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Bahrain, speaking on behalf of the GCC. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It has been 80 years since the first General Assembly of the United Nations, but the main goal of nuclear disarmament continues to be unrealized. There has not been a nuclear catastrophe, but the threat hasn't just not disappeared, it has deepened and diversified. We find ourselves today facing increasingly sophisticated armaments, growing military spending, and the persistence of a false sense of security offered by a doctrine of deterrence and the recurring use of force in international relations. According to the most recent numbers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military spending reached a new historic record in 2025 of $2.887 billion. This is the accumulation of 11 consecutive years of growth. The states that have the three highest military budgets by themselves represent 51% of that spending. This trend contrasts and exists alongside deep social inequalities and growing needs for financing development. As long as there is a sustained rise in military spending, there will be fewer resources for sustainable development, reducing poverty, as well as supporting education, health, and peace building. Mexico, faithful to its pacifist tradition and its principles of foreign policy as well as the principles of the UN Charter, rejects that nuclear weapons somehow uphold international peace and security. The 11th Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was held for a third time without any substantive results. The lack of progress has become a new reality at a time when this crisis requires preserving the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, as well as compliance with obligations and pending commitments, and to once again walk upon the path towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. In parallel, The first review conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is an opportunity to strengthen the legal and political framework for their prohibition and, at one point, eventual elimination. We urge all States that still have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty and to participate in the conference. Security without nuclear weapons is viable and possible. In 2027, we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty that established the first nuclear-weapons-free zone in a region that is highly populated. Today, 116 states belong to nuclear-weapons-free zones. They are tangible contributions to regional security and the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. While AI offers dramatic opportunities for our societies, its integration in command, control and communication systems for nuclear weapons poses very serious risks that we cannot afford to ignore. In 2025, Mexico introduced the first resolution that will study this very sensitive issue. When it comes to autonomous weapons systems, the time has come to go from the identification of risks to the negotiation of prohibitions and legally binding regulations that ensure human control over the of force. The challenges that we face make it indispensable to reform the multilateral disarmament machinery. We cannot aspire to craft new agreements or norms at a time when the organs and the bodies created to negotiate them remain at a standstill. The Conference on Disarmament should comply with its negotiating mandate and the Disarmament Commission should show that it can craft substantive recommendations. Mr. Chair, Threats to our security do not come solely from weapons of mass destruction. Small arms and light weapons take lives on a daily basis and feed armed violence, conflicts, and the activities of organized crime. For Latin America and the Caribbean, preventing their traffic and diversion is also a priority when it comes to security and development. Therefore, Mexico welcomes that in the ninth biennial meeting of states on the program of action, we have paid special attention to the prevention and detection of diversion towards unauthorized users and illicit markets. Governments, Mr. Chair, cannot do this alone. The weapons industry and other relevant actors from the private sector should also uphold their responsibilities and ensure that weapons and munitions do not end up in the hands of unauthorized users, including organized crime. Mr. Chair, we need to strengthen international cooperation to disband routes, intermediaries, and financial flows that sustain this trafficking. Esteemed colleagues, bigger arsenals do not result in greater security in the long term. Growing military spending, like the one we see today, does not guarantee more peaceful societies. more technology in war does not result in greater global stability. Mexico remains convinced that progress on disarmament means preserving the human species. This should continue to be the main purpose of disarmament. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of Mexico Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America.

On behalf of the United States, I congratulate you on your election to lead this 81st session of the UN General Assembly First Committee. Chair, under President Trump's peace through strength policy, the United States continues to lead international efforts to promote peace and security globally by managing risks associated with weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and other threats to the international security. President Trump has repeatedly reiterated to the world his desire for a world with fewer nuclear weapons and reduced nuclear risks. His vision spurred the US proposal for the next era of arms control centered on talks with China and Russia. This approach can advance strategic stability, prevent a nuclear arms race, reduce the risks of nuclear war, and help enable peace. But for this to work, we need China and Russia to substantively engage. US transparency on nuclear weapons has bolstered the global nonproliferation regime, but unilateral US restraint in the absence of corresponding Russian and Chinese action does not promote arms control. We call on Russia and China to adhere to their stated nuclear explosive testing moratoria. Regular meetings of the five nuclear weapons states, or P5, provide an important venue for making progress on our obligations under the NPT, including Article VI's obligations to pursue negotiations in good faith related to nuclear disarmament. But all members need to participate. Chair, to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation, the United States generously supports international nuclear safeguards through the IAEA, underscoring the U.S. government's continued focus on ensuring compliance with nonproliferation obligations and advancing initiatives to reduce nuclear risks worldwide. The United States also promotes nuclear nonproliferation by ensuring that civil nuclear cooperation agreements uphold the highest standards of safety, security, and safeguards. These agreements strengthen global alignment with nonproliferation norms while fostering responsible nuclear energy use. Additionally, the United States implements responsible export controls to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations and to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation, providing assurance that sensitive materials, equipment, and technology will not be diverted to programs that undermine national or regional security. Multilateral export control regimes complement these U.S. controls. Critically, access to sensitive technology must be paired with measures that give exporters confidence, empowering legitimate trade worldwide. Chair, Iran has, over the course of many years, pursued a nuclear program with no credible civilian justification, raising significant proliferation concerns. President Trump is committed to ensuring that Iran never develops or acquires a nuclear weapon, and his longstanding preference is to use diplomacy to achieve this objective. The United States also remains committed to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK, which continues to advance its destabilizing WMD and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. These programs pose a danger to all and undermine security in the region. Chair, the United States reiterates President Trump's call to action to end the development of biological weapons once and for all and to address 21st century biological weapons threats and with 21st century tools, including superintelligence. Modern technologies such as SI can strengthen implementation of the BWC, enhance transparency, and possibly support future verification and compliance measures. The United States is actively exploring how to harness these capabilities to eliminate inefficiencies and increase collective confidence in compliance. The United States welcomes dialogue on how to firmly reinforce the BWC framework. Concurrently, the United States calls on all UN member states to uphold the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention. States that use chemical weapons and refuse to return to compliance directly undermine this critical treaty. Ridding the world of these horrific weapons remains our urgent, collective responsibility. Chair, the United States continues to encourage all states that have not ratified or acceded to the Outer Space Treaty to do so without delay. Any indication that a country intends to place a nuclear weapon in orbit should concern all nations, as such a capability could threaten satellites operated by countries and companies worldwide. The placement of nuclear weapons in orbit would be unprecedented, dangerous, and unacceptable, with potentially grave consequences for global security. On cyber, the United States also calls on states to address the growing threat of malicious actors targeting critical infrastructure, including telecommunications, healthcare, energy, and financial systems. We urge all nations to prevent the misuse of cyberspace by state and non-state actors and to support the UN Global Mechanism on ICT security. Chair, during this year's first committee session, the United States will look for opportunities to support resolutions aimed at reducing risks posed by WMD and their delivery systems, strengthening arms control and deterrence, and calling out those who obstruct and prevent meaningful progress. We hope the United States resolution on compliance will help unite member states this year behind the importance of treaty compliance, verification, and accountability. And we urge all UN member states to support and co-sponsor the resolution. The United States continues to promote reform, accountability, cost savings, and efficiency across the UN system, and we seek permanent change in implementing more efficient practices, such as reducing the number and frequency of resolutions. In 2025, the United States drove significant progress toward a more efficient United Nations, and we remain committed to building on this momentum in 2026. We must bring the UN back to basics. back to its founding purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the Distinguished Representative of the United States of America. Now I give the floor to the Distinguished Representative of Australia.

Thank you, Chair. We meet at a moment of profound consequence for international peace and security. Across the globe, conflict is causing immense human suffering, strategic tensions are rising, and rapid technological change is reshaping the security landscape in ways we are only beginning to understand. Yet this is not a moment for resignation or division. It is a moment for leadership, cooperation, and resolve. The answer to these challenges is not to retreat from cooperation or weaken the institutions we have built together, but to develop global responses to global challenges. Australia believes that our collective security is strongest when it is built on international law, effective multilateral institutions, and a shared commitment to preventing conflict. It is in this spirit that Australia is running for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2930, where we will ensure the voices of small and mid-sized states are heard on the challenges facing our world. Chair, for more than half a century, the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has helped make the world safer. The treaty, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear order. The International Atomic Energy Agency provides indispensable safeguards, security and safety functions and technical cooperation activities. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has established a powerful global norm against nuclear testing. The Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention are indispensable pillars of the international disarmament architecture. The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Arms Trade Treaty continue to save lives, protect civilians and reduce the human cost of armed conflict. Australia is committed to defending these institutions and ensuring they remain effective, credible and responsive to future challenges. Chair, Australia remains firmly committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. But achieving that goal requires collective effort. It requires practical and effective measures that reduce nuclear risks, strengthen verification, increase transparency, build confidence, and create the conditions for further disarmament. We are deeply concerned by some nuclear weapons states expanding their nuclear arsenals. This includes one state rapidly and opaquely expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, while signaling that engagement in dialogue on future arms control arrangements is a matter for others. We are also deeply concerned by claims that certain states have undertaken explosive nuclear testing. All states must uphold their testing moratoria. We support the US's proposal for multilateral strategic stability talks And we urge the states with the three largest arsenals to engage in dialogue without preconditions. We remain deeply concerned by the DPRK's ongoing development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions, and by Iran's repeated failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA. we urge Russia to immediately cease all hostile actions against Ukrainian nuclear facilities and to withdraw its military and associated personnel from Ukraine without delay. Chair, the security challenges confronting us are not confined to nuclear issues. Australia is committed to the development of international norms and standards on the responsible use of AI in the military domain. AI must remain under human direction, oversight, and control. We support further dialogue that is inclusive, pragmatic, and grounded in international law. We urge states to build on the consensus outcome of the CCW Group of Government Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems to ensure autonomous weapons are only used in full compliance with international humanitarian law and in ways that ensure civilians are protected. We encourage all states to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and participate in its launch notification arrangements to reduce misunderstanding. Chemical and biological threats continue to evolve. Rapid technological change presents new opportunities, but also new risks. Responsible behavior in cyberspace, the safe and sustainable use of outer space, and the development and application of emerging technologies all require renewed international cooperation. Not every challenge requires a new treaty. Political commitments, existing international law, confidence building measures, export controls, and norms of responsible behavior all make important contributions to international peace and security. Chair, Australia's commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation is demonstrated through action. We will continue investing in institutions, partnerships and practical initiatives that reduce risk and build confidence. We will continue supporting effective multilateralism because no state can resolve today's security challenges alone. We will continue working with all member states so that together we can build a safer and more stable world. Chair, how we work together matters. Progress requires dialogue, it requires listening, it requires inclusion. First Committee provides us with an opportunity and a responsibility to protect the institutions we rely on, to identify practical areas of common ground, and to make meaningful progress towards a safer, more secure world. Australia stands ready to work constructively with all delegations to achieve these goals. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Indonesia.

Chair, allow me to congratulate you and members of the Bureau on your election. Please be assured of my delegation's full support and cooperation throughout this session. Indonesia aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of ASEAN. Mr. Chair, Indonesia approaches this session with the conviction that dialogue and cooperation can advance our shared goal of a more peaceful and secure world. Geopolitical rivalries and prolonged conflicts are straining international law and disarmament commitments. Nuclear risks are rising, while rapid technological advances are transforming the security environment. Yet our shared interest in peace and security provides a basis for rebuilding trust and advancing collective action. In this spirit, Indonesia would like to share three points to take this committee's work forward. First, we must recognize the universal nature of today's security risks. Any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences transcending national borders. Their continued existence and reliance upon them therefore concerns us all. The modernization of nuclear arsenals, the absence of strategic arms limit between the largest nuclear weapon possessors, and increasingly advanced conventional weapons further heightens these risks. Reducing immediate nuclear and strategic risks requires returning to diplomatic dialogue, reviving arms control frameworks, and fulfilling legally binding disarmament obligations under international law. Second, We must translate this understanding into concrete progress. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remains our shared goal. This requires both the fulfillment of existing obligations and renewed political will. advancing nuclear disarmament; universal adherence to the NPT, BWC and CWC, entry into force of the CTBT, universalization of the TPNW, stronger nuclear-weapon-free zones, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and promoting effective regulation of conventional weapons. We also reaffirm the importance of upholding the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and its humanitarian objectives. Following the expiry of New START, renewed dialogue, restraint and negotiations toward effective and verifiable strategic arms limits are urgently needed to rebuild confidence. Long-standing deadlocks in the disarmament machinery cannot be a permanent feature. Indonesia stands ready to bridge differences and translate common ground into concrete progress. Third, we must ensure that the governance of new and emerging technologies advances rather than undermine international peace and security. Artificial intelligence, autonomous system, space technologies, and cyber capabilities are transforming warfare. They offer important opportunities, but also create vulnerabilities, accelerate decision-making in crisis, and risk lowering thresholds for the use of force. Our response must be timely and inclusive. All states, regardless of their level of technological development, must shape the norms governing these technologies. UN deliberations on artificial intelligence in the military domain and autonomous weapon systems must advance practical measures to ensure meaningful and effective human control, accountability, and full compliance with international law. Technology must serve humanity. Technology should not create insecurity. Mr. Chair, peace and security are global public goods. We all share the responsibility to promote peace and security. Indonesia stands ready to work with all member states to translate that shared responsibility into concrete progress through dialogue and cooperation. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Indonesia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Costa Rica.

Thank you, Chair. Costa Rica would like to congratulate you and other members of the Bureau for your election, and we wish you success in your work. You can count on Costa Rica's support. Mr. Chair, Today the world faces the highest number of state-based conflicts since the end of the Second World War: 61, double the figure from just 15 years ago. At the same time, global military spending reached a historic high in 2025 of $2.9 trillion. Violence cost the global economy $21.8 trillion, the equivalent of 10.5% of global GDP. These figures reveal an uncomfortable truth. For every $200 allocated to military spending, we invest barely a dollar in peacebuilding and peacekeeping. It is clear that the world is facing a crisis of priorities. Against this backdrop, Costa Rica wishes to highlight three critical dimensions that challenge our collective security. First, the existential urgency of nuclear disarmament. The recent review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concluded once again without a final document. In times of rising tensions, arsenal modernization, and risks of escalation, this failure reminds us that inaction carries an incalculable human cost. Every year without concrete progress toward the verifiable and irreversible elimination of these weapons is a year in which we continue to live on the brink of the abyss, entrusting our fate to the precarious balance of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, rather than moving toward building a comprehensive peace rooted in cooperation and diplomacy. Costa Rica insists on the fact that the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are complementary components of an architecture that must lead us to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of these weapons. the need to strengthen the control of conventional weapons. We celebrate the success of multilateralism in this field. The 9th Biennial Meeting on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the progress made on the Arms Trade Treaty to protect civilians and populated areas demonstrate that when there is political will, international mechanisms are capable of evolving to close gaps that jeopardize human security. However, these commitments are insufficient if they ignore the differentiated impact of violence. In six countries with disaggregated data, between 70 and 90% of conflict-related sexual violence incidents involve firearms. Therefore, Implementing the Programme of Action and the Women, Peace and Security agenda are mutually reinforcing efforts. Controlling weapons also means addressing the dynamics that threaten the lives of the most vulnerable populations. Third, the ethical challenge of artificial intelligence and autonomy in warfare. While we attempt To contain the weapons and conflicts of the present, technology is transforming the warfare of the future. Between 2018 and 2025, drone attacks increased by approximately 11,500%, while automation and artificial intelligence increasingly compress the time available for making critical decisions. Recent discussions on AI in the military domain confirmed that the mere presence of an operator does not guarantee meaningful human control. The speed, scale, and opacity of certain systems can reduce the time available to verify information, create reliance on automated recommendations, and complicate the attribution of responsibility. Humans must retain responsibility and a true capacity for judgment, especially when AI influences decisions regarding the use of force. The speed of machines must not become the speed of our decisions concerning life or death, war or peace. As the papal encyclical Magnifica Humanitas warns, it is unacceptable for an algorithm to attempt to replace considerations of human dignity in life or death decisions, decisions that are inherent to the use of weaponry and new military technologies. Mr. Chair. These three fronts, nuclear, conventional, and technological, converge on a single conclusion: security must not be limited to deterrence practices or be understood as a race to strike first. It must be reimagined as a collective capacity to build trust and prevent conflict, grounded in unwavering respect for international law and international humanitarian law, because without rules that protect human dignity at all times and under all circumstances, any security doctrine will be reduced to the mere technical management of force and destruction. True international stability is ensured not by the force that we are able to exert, but by the norms we are willing to respect. And this reality can only be built when the international community assumes its collective responsibility to invest in prevention, strengthen multilateral institutions, and foster transparency, as well as the ethical and consistent observance of the agreements that bind us together, Mr. Chair. in a world that spends increasingly more on managing insecurity, Costa Rica insists on championing investment in prevention, prevention rooted in diplomacy, disarmament, and the strengthening of international law, because true security is not purchased with arsenals, but built by eliminating the root causes that make weapons necessary. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Costa Rica. I now give the floor to the distinguished Poomannin representative of Estonia.

Thank you, President. The first committee is meeting against the backdrop of heightened international tensions and serious proliferation challenges. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine remains the most serious threat to international peace and security. Russia's aggression has caused enormous human suffering, devastated civilian infrastructure, and created severe humanitarian consequences. Russia's conduct is fundamentally at odds not only with the responsibilities and obligations of a permanent member of the Security Council, but also with the principles expected of every UN member state. Russia has also violated international law by seizing, militarizing, and controlling Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Any damage to the plant or disruption of its operations could have catastrophic and far-reaching consequences. Any attempt to connect and integrate the plant into a Russian power grid would create additional serious risks. Such actions could endanger countless lives, contaminate vast areas with radiation, and cause long-term environmental, economic, and humanitarian devastation well beyond Ukraine's borders. The path forward requires stronger and sustained collective international pressure on Russia to bring an end to the war and secure a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russia must be held to the full obligations of a permanent member of the Security Council and comply with the principles and responsibilities enshrined in the UN Charter. Estonia also strongly condemns the continued military support provided by the DPRK, Belarus, and Iran to Russia, which enables it to sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine. And we also call on China to end its role as a decisive enabler of this war. By ending its material and political support for Russia's war efforts and acting in full accordance with the UN Charter and international law, China can demonstrate responsibility expected of a permanent member of the Security Council. Chair, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of a global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the fundamental framework for nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The failure of 11th Review Conference to reach consensus on a substantive final document is regrettable. It makes our collective commitment to the Treaty all the more important. We call on all NPT States Parties to uphold, implement, and further strengthen the Treaty and to advance its universalization. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture, including its nuclear sharing arrangements, is fully consistent with empathy and remains a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. NATO's extended deterrence has long contributed to preventing proliferation and creating a more stable security environment. In an increasingly insecure world, it remains critical to deterring aggression, promoting peace and collective security, and preventing conflict. Estonia also welcomes the French initiative to strengthen deterrence on the European continent. And Estonia supports all international efforts towards the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. We urge all states, in particular the remaining annex two states, to take the steps necessary for the treaty's entry into force. Estonia also supports the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and calls on nuclear weapon states to declare or maintain moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Chair, we cannot discuss nuclear nonproliferation without addressing Russia's reckless and escalatory nuclear rhetoric, threats, and signaling. Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, its revocation of its ratification of CTBT, its violation of a Budapest Memorandum, and its suspension of participation in New START have all contributed to the erosion of nuclear restraint and strategic stability. New START expired on 5th of February, 2026, leaving the world without binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. Estonia is deeply concerned by China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal. China's growing nuclear capabilities risk adding further complexity to a strategic environment and make greater transparency and dialogue increasingly important. These measures are essential to reducing mistrust and strategic uncertainty. We therefore call on China to engage constructively in nuclear risk reduction and arms control, including for greater transparency, reliable communication channels, and clarification of its strategic intentions. The situation in the Gulf region raises serious concerns for regional and global security. Estonia condemns Iran's attacks against regional states and vessels in the strongest terms and supports diplomatic efforts aimed at lasting solution in accordance with international law. We remain deeply concerned about the challenges surrounding Iran's nuclear program and its cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran must fully cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency, ensure transparency, and comply with its international obligations. And in particular, Iran must comply fully with its safeguard obligations and provide International Atomic Energy Agency with the information and access it requires for verification. Estonia strongly condemns the DPRK's continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. These programs threaten regional and international peace and security. The DPRK's military cooperation with Russia, including the transfer of ballistic missiles, further undermines international security and violates relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We call on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, comply with relevant Security Council resolutions, and cooperate fully with International Atomic Energy Agency. Chair, Estonia remains firmly committed to strengthening international law and effective multilateralism with the UN at its core. We will continue to support the implementation and strengthening of existing disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation instruments. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Estonia. Distinguished delegates, I shall now call on the delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and to two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I call on the representative of DPRK.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The DPRK delegation is compelled to exercise the right of reply in response to the provocative remarks made by the United States, Australia, and some European states. My delegation totally and categorically rejects their politically motivated accusations, which denies the current status and constitutional right of the DPRK. It is no surprise they again repeated so-called denuclearization. On the contrary, it would have been surprised and questionable if they hadn't mentioned about it. It is failure in strategic thinking and logic to still adhere to the so-called denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which had already lost its meaning, conceptually and practically. The present geopolitical crisis and current escalated military situation in and around the Korean Peninsula being created by the United States and its followers proves once again that the way we are going is absolutely right and just. The DPRK's position is very clear. The nuclear deterrence is the ultimate shield for the national sovereignty. Furthermore, it is the constitutional right of the DPRK. Whatever they say, the position and the significance of the existence of the DPRK as a responsible nuclear weapons state to keep the balance of the strength and ensure the geopolitical security in and over the Korean Peninsula are final and irreversible. Chair, the DPRK remains unchanged in its view and stand that the U.S. and the West's threat to the security of Russia that has been systematically getting serious since the end of the Cold War is the main factor that triggered the current Ukrainian crisis. The better future of Europe cannot be realized apart from the core interests and the will of the Russian Federation. The overall cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation is strictly in accordance with a treaty on the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two sides, which is in conformity with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter, and is a legal domain of exercise of sovereign rights. The DPRK constantly remains concentration on its duty as a contracting party of the interstate treaty between the DPRK and Russian Federation in conformity with its allied nature and remains boundlessly faithful to it. Thank you.

Now I call on the representative of Russian Federation.

Mr. Chair, as part of the meeting we had on the 5th of October on the organizational aspects of the First Committee, we discussed a great deal the need for a constructive, depoliticized dialogue, the need to discuss relevant arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation matters, which fall within the purview of this committee, the objective being to bolster the committee's effectiveness. However, the died-in-the-wool acolytes of this model, first and foremost European states, are themselves introducing politically biased topics into the discussion. This is why we're exercising our right of reply in order to ensure consistency and accuracy surrounding the situation in Ukraine. We want to respond to the statements that were made. They are divorced from reality. The Russian Federation has on numerous occasions expounded on this matter. We've provided evidence, including at the state leadership level. Despite this, a number of delegations continue to use primitive propaganda, trying to tarnish my country's reputation, they allege, falsely, that none of them are involved in instigating this conflict, although at this very moment they're claiming, in fact, to defend the interests of the Ukrainian people above all. These insinuations, we will not let them pass. Indivisible security is the founding for peaceful coexistence, and a violation thereof is one of the main triggers of conflicts, including the Ukraine conflict. Euphoria and a thirst for domination on the part of those who, after the post-Cold War, proclaimed themselves the victors, have resulted in the fact of them trying to unilaterally impose their subjective stance on everyone else. However, in order to achieve their objectives, these states have been very indulgent with themselves, allowing themselves to violate international law, replacing it with so-called rules. It's a free-for-all, and this is one of the main sources of the Ukrainian tragedy. We'd like to note, in particular, that those states who are levying allegations at Russia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, these very countries have obstructed our efforts for years to find a political and diplomatic solution to the situation, one which would allow us to equally uphold the security of Russia and Ukraine. Europeans sabotaged the 2014 February agreement, the Minsk agreements, the Istanbul negotiations process as well. The truth of the matter is, for these countries, the Ukrainian people are expendable. The fate, the interests of the Ukrainian people, they don't care about them one bit. This is a dictatorship of the West. They are engaged in all sorts of adventures. They are not ready to engage in any kind of compromise. And this has been confirmed here at the session of the first committee. The Russian Federation objects to Western states concoctions regarding what is happening in Ukraine. We'd like to underscore that we are not letting up our efforts in search of a political and diplomatic solution to the situation, to the conflict. The Russian Federation has never strayed from the negotiations process, nor have we turned away from direct contacts with the Ukrainian our Ukrainian counterpart. We continue to engage in dialogue with a view to achieving a long-term settlement so as to address the root causes of the conflict, something we've discussed on numerous occasions. This is something that would allow us to ensure that Russia's lawful interests are upheld. I thank you for your attention.

Now I call on the representative of Israel.

Thank you, Chair. In light of today's statements by some delegations, we are compelled to deliver this right of reply. Chair, colleagues, today, October 7th, Israel stops to remember its victims, exactly three years after the October 7th massacre. Memorial ceremonies are held nationwide and around the world. The Israeli flag is today at half mast as Israel remembers 1,200 of its people that were brutally murdered on that painful day. We remind this room that on this day three years ago, thousands of Hamas terrorists invaded Israel's territory to murder, rape, abduct, and burn. The terrorists showed no distinction between men, women, children, Jews, Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists. All were targets. This was a day in which true evil showed its face in the darkest forms. The October 7th massacre is the deadliest terrorist attack Israel has suffered in its history, and one of the most horrific terrorist attacks ever, anywhere. It is a date that will remain forever in infamy. Colleagues, On October 7, we must remember that terrorism is a threat to humanity, to global peace, and to our shared future. Without commitment to these goals, what we are discussing here, namely disarmament and arms control, are all tasks that can never be fulfilled. We will never forget October 7, and the world must never forget this day. Chair, As emphasized countless times before, Israel is committed to security, to peace, and to the rule of law in the face of the most complex conditions. Failing to recognize the situation in the Middle East and the threats my country has been confronting during the last three years, and indeed since its creation, is not conducive to any sustainable solution. I thank you, Chair.

I now call on the representative of Belarus.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In light of the accusations levelled at Belarus on the part of the EU and Estonia, I would like to say the following: We categorically condemn all of the allegations levelled at my country. The Republic of Belarus, more than anyone, wants a swift, peaceful settlement to the conflict being undertaken by two brother peoples. kindred peoples for Belarus. We're in favour of the crafting of fair and equitable solutions which meet the interests of both parties and which will ensure lasting peace on the principle of general indivisible security. While Western countries continue to supply Ukraine with weapons, the Republic of Belarus, meanwhile, is making a tangible contribution to peace through prisoner exchanges, transfers of bodies of the deceased, facilitating civilian movements in both directions. We're hosting Ukrainians into Aliya. Half a million Ukrainians have come to Belarus since the start of the conflict. They found a second home and they enjoy equal rights with our citizens. They have health care, access to education, and so on. We stand ready to continue making a tangible contribution to settling the conflict and minimizing the consequences thereof. This is our unstinting position, something the head of my state has voiced on numerous occasions. Secondly, Mr. Chairman, we insist on the EU delegation using the official name of my country in their statements, abstaining from from non-diplomatic language that is not in keeping with diplomatic ethics and is offensive. We call on you, Mr. Chairman, to make sure this is the case, to be vigilant about this. I thank you.

I now call on the representative of United States.

Thank you, Chair. I'd like to address My esteemed colleague from the Russian Federation, allow me first to respond to the criticism of Golden Dome. Golden Dome will further the US goal of peace through strength by defending against ballistic missiles, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and next generation aerial attacks from peer, near peer, and rogue adversaries. Let me stress, defending against. The need for a Golden Dome America is urgent and a top priority given other nations' effort to put our homeland at risk. It's interesting that Russia would criticize US investments in missile defense when Russia itself does the same and has been doing the same for many decades. I must also point out that Russia's statement on its position in outer space is inconsistent, considering that Russia and China continue development, testing, launch, and operationalization of anti-satellite weapons. The United States also remains concerned that Russia continues to develop a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-satellite capability. The use of such a weapon would have significant consequences for all states. On NATO nuclear sharing, NATO is a defensive alliance, first and foremost, and one that benefits more than just its members. These alliances increase global stability, deter nuclear war, and remove the incentive for allies to develop nuclear weapons themselves. All nations benefit from protection against an unstable world and nuclear proliferation. I feel it's important to reiterate what I've said again in this room before. I will likely have to repeat again, despite the nomenclature, under NATO nuclear arrangements, there is no sharing of nuclear weapons. The United States is not and has not transferred control over nuclear weapons directly or indirectly at any time. The President of the United States has the sole authority over the decision to employ US nuclear weapons. We reject the false narratives of NATO's nuclear mission as spearheaded by Russia and China as an attempt to distract the world from their own irresponsible behavior as NPT nuclear weapons states, particularly in the area of covert nuclear testing in support of modernized theater nuclear forces. We note Russia's dismissal of charges on the use of chemical weapons as well. However, I'd like to remind everyone that the United States has certified that Russia is in noncompliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Russia's use of highly toxic nerve agents, its systematic widespread use of chemical weapons and riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine, and its undeclared chemical weapons program are all violations of its CWC obligations. We call on Russia to fully declare and eliminate its chemical and biological weapons programs and come into full compliance with its obligations under the CWC and BWC. On the issue of the conflict in Ukraine, the United States remains committed to stopping the killing in Ukraine and supporting a lasting peace. We remain ready to support direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine to end the war. Thank you, Chair.

I now call on the representative of Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation categorically reject the baseless allegations made by the representative of the United States, which are devoid of any credibility. The joint unlawful military aggression carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran in June 2025 and February 2026 resulted in the deaths of more than 4,000 people, including hundreds of children, among them 168 schoolgirls killed when an elementary school in Mina was struck. A wide range of civilian infrastructure was also deliberately targeted, including peaceful nuclear facilities, cultural heritage sites, oil refineries, hospitals, petrochemical facilities, and residential areas across my country. If international law were genuinely upheld and applied consistently, the United States and its allies would today be sitting in this hall as violators of international law, rather than portraying themselves as its guardians or as defenders of the UN Charter and the NPT. The representative of the United States also spoke of diplomacy. The world has witnessed what this so-called diplomacy entails: negotiations in word and the use of force in practice. Twice, while diplomatic engagements where ongoing, the United States choose aggression over dialogue, attacking Iran and its safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities. My delegation also categorically reject the baseless and politically motivated allegations made by a representative of the EU, the Nordic countries, and certain Western countries concerning Iran's exclusively peaceful nuclear program. Rather than repeating unfounded allegations against Iran, They should address the serious concerns of the international community regarding the reliance of certain EU and Nordic countries and others on extended US nuclear deterrence, a practice that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of Article 1, 2, and 6 of the NPT. These same countries, while lecturing others on nonproliferation, remain silent about unlawful military attacks against Iran, including attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities and the targeting of nuclear scientists and infrastructure under the IAEA oversight. Their silence in the face of such grave violations raises serious questions about the credibility and consistency of their statements. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I now call on the representative of Libya.

Say the race.

Mr. Chair. Further to my statement on behalf of the Arab group, I would like to reiterate the following points. Actually, the points mentioned are an objective assessment of the situation on the ground. The Israeli regime continues to violate international law and the Charter of the United Nations. These are facts. The Israeli regime The Israeli regime is locked out of international consensus and refuses to join the NPT. The Israeli regime continues to obstruct international efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. These are defiance of the international will and a direct threat to regional and international peace and security. As chair of the Arab Group this month, We underscored these facts. At the same time, we reiterate that peace and stability in the region cannot be achieved as some continue to overlook the failure to uphold international law. Thank you.

I now call on the representative of Islamic Republic of Iran for the second intervention.

Mr. Chair, my delegation categorically rejects the baseless allegations advanced by the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. These delegations seek to portray themselves as victims by distorting the facts while omitting their own roles in facilitating the brutal attacks carried out by the US and the Israeli regime against Iran. Such operations were enabled through using territory and airspace of these countries by the United States for planning, preparation, equipping, and execution of unlawful military attacks against the Iranian people. We have detailed the use of these countries' territories in attacks against Iran in multiple letters to the UN Security Council, which remains available for delegations seeking further information on this matter. Iran reaffirms its inherent right to respond to such attacks as their source and to prevent their recurrence in accordance with international law. The position advanced by PGCC are entirely one-sided and deliberately ignore the root cause of the current situation, the unlawful use of force against Iran and its peaceful nuclear facilities by the US and Israeli regime, as well as the support provided through military facilities in parts of the Persian Gulf region. This omission alone calls into question the credibility of the statement we have heard. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I now call on the representative of Bahrain for the first intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In response to the statement by the representative of Iran, Security Council resolution, one this up 2817, one brought support from member states and the resolution condemned attacks against my country and other countries. The resolution called for the immediate cessation of these attacks that posed a threat to international peace and security. I would like to quote the paragraph five of the resolution. The resolution in this paragraph calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran immediately and unconditionally to stop its attacks and threats to neighboring countries, including through its proxies. In addition, the Human Rights Council, in its decision L38 of 25 March, condemned Iranian attacks. And I quote paragraph seven. It called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully comply with Security Council Resolution 2817 and to uphold its international obligations, including under international law and IHL and international human rights law. It also called on Iran to stop all its threats and unjustified provocations against the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, including the use of proxies. It also called for the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure. There can be no way to distort facts. Thank you.

I now call on the representative of USA for the second intervention.

Thank you, Chair. I would like to remind my distinguished delegates here that Iran's nuclear program has threatened peace and security for many years. Last September, the UN Security Council reimposed previously lifted UN Security Council resolutions, which reestablished the 1737 Committee based on a widely held concern among members about an Iranian nuclear program progressing in the dark without the international community's visibility. For well over a year now, IAEA inspectors have been unable to access either Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile or other previously declared low enriched uranium stocks at facilities struck a year ago. In violating its NPT safeguards obligations and denying IAEA access to verify the suspension of its enrichment activities, Iran has contravened resolutions 1737 and 1929. Iran must fully comply with the IAEA, fully implement its NPT-related safeguards obligations, and fully comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. I'd like to also remind the distinguished delegates here that President Trump is committed to ensuring that Iran never develops or acquires a nuclear weapon, and his longstanding preference is diplomacy. Thank you, Chair.

Distinguished delegates, we have adjusted the time available for this meeting. Before we adjourn, let me remind Once again, delegation, that list of speakers for the general debate closes today at 5:00 p.m. The list of speakers for the thematic debate will open immediately thereafter. The next meeting of the committee will be held tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. sharp in this conference room. I appeal to all delegations to be punctual to enable us to proceed with our work in a timely manner. The meeting is adjourned.