First Committee, 5th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Good morning, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. The Fifth Meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, the committee will continue this morning. with its general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items allocated to it. I do count on your cooperation to respect the time limit for the statements and to speak at a reasonable speed to allow adequate interpretations. Longer statements can be said to each statement to be posted on the UN General. I now give the floor to the Russian, the distinguished representative of Russian Federation on a point of order. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nepal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me begin by congratulating you and the members of the Bureau on your election. The foundations of international security and disarmament remain under profound stress. The continued existence and modernization of nuclear weapons, coupled with increasing reliance on deterrence, pose an existential threat to humanity and serious challenges to international peace and security. The expiration of the New START Treaty without a successor framework has further underscored the urgency to preserve and extend the nuclear arms control and disarmament arrangements. At a time when development financing remains severely constrained, global military expenditure has soared to a record high of over USD 2.8 trillion. In this particular context, our Prime Minister, in his address to the General Debate of the General Assembly, said, I quote, "Intercontinental missiles arrive on time. Rifles and ammunitions cross borders, clear every bottleneck, meet each deadline, but a peasant in Nepal cannot procure his fertilizer or fuel at market price at a time of need. We have built a world with flawless logistics for war and broken logistics for food." We regret that the 11th NPT Review Conference failed for the third consecutive time to achieve a substantive outcome. We therefore call for renewed political commitment to the NPT through universal adherence and the full, balanced and effective implementation of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nepal's principal position remains unequivocal. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. Nepal regards the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a significant milestone towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. We look forward to its first review conference later this year as an opportunity to advance its core objectives. Nepal also calls for universalization and early entry into force of CTBT. We equally reiterate the urgency of resuming negotiation on a fissile material cut-off treaty to further strengthen the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We continue to support the establishment and strengthening of nuclear-weapon-free zones across all regions. Nepal reaffirms the critical importance of legally binding security assurance for non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance. The inalienable right of states under Article IV of the NPT to peaceful uses of nuclear technology must be fully respected. We recognize the indispensable role of IAEA in facilitating such peaceful applications while maintaining effective safeguards. Nepal remains firmly committed to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention and calls for the universalization, full and effective implementation. Mr. Chair, Nepal welcomes the successful conclusion of the Ninth Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and calls for a standard implementation of both the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. We emphasize transparency, accountability and responsibility in international arms transfers and underline the importance of strengthening humanitarian disarmament instruments. Artificial intelligence and increasing autonomy in weapon systems raise profound legal, humanitarian, ethical and security questions. We support continued multilateral efforts to address lethal autonomous weapons systems, consistent with international law, while ensuring human responsibility and accountability. Mr. Chair, cyberspace and outer space must remain domains of cooperation, rather than new theaters of confrontation. Nepal welcomes the establishment of the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and responsible state behavior, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 80/16. We look forward to its contribution to strengthen an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment, including through capacity building for developing countries. We support the prevention of an arms race in outer space and encourage constructive engagement in the open-ended Working Group towards practical measures that strengthen transparency, confidence and security. The lack of progress in the UN Disarmament Commission this year and the long-standing impasse in the conference on disarmament remind us that the principal deficit in multilateral disarmament is not the absence of institutions, but the absence of strong political will to make them work. We therefore call upon all member states to demonstrate greater flexibility, rebuild trust, and revitalize the multilateral disarmament machinery. Mr. Chair, regional initiatives can further reinforce global efforts through dialogue, confidence building, and practical cooperation. As host country, Nepal attaches particular importance to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific in Kathmandu, and deeply appreciates its contribution across the region. As in previous years, Nepal will table draft resolution, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the pacific in current session, and looks forward to the continued co-sponsorship and support of all member states for its adoption by consensus. Mr. Chair, let me conclude with a clear message. Our collective security must be built on dialogue, diplomacy, mutual confidence, respect for international law, and effective multilateral cooperation. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nepal. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Guyana.

Thank you, Chair. I join in congratulating you and the Bureau on your election and assure you of Guyana's full cooperation and support. My delegation aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of CARICOM and CELAC. In my national capacity, I wish to add the following reflections. First, much has been said about today's complex geopolitical realities. My delegation joins the growing calls for the First Committee to resist becoming mired in division during times of tension, and to prioritize trust building. We also echo High Representative Nakamitsu's appeal to dedicate more time to developing new transparency and confidence-building measures, and to accelerating the implementation of those already agreed. Second, Guyana is compelled to address the proliferation of illegal arms and ammunition. especially small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, which continue to pose a grave threat to the peace, safety, security, and stability of the countries in our region. They not only fuel organized crime, gang crimes, and gender-based violence, but also pose a major threat to gains made in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. At the national level and across CARICOM, we are doing our part by advancing the CARICOM Firearms Roadmap. It promotes a unified regional approach to small arms and light weapons and ammunitions control, while strengthening coordination across national, regional, and global security frameworks. Its implementation has already supported a successful adoption of updated firearms legislation across the Caribbean. This progress demonstrates our firm commitment to reducing illicit arms and ammunition flows, enhancing law enforcement capacities, and lowering the risk of diversion within our territories. Notwithstanding, one hand cannot clap by itself. My delegation continues to stress the importance of exporting States also doing their part by taking effective measures to safeguard against the illicit diversion of such weapons and ammunition, to ensure proper export controls in their own countries, and to improve the implementation of existing instruments. Only by working together, each doing their part, Can we truly end this scourge? In this vein, we welcome the adoption of the BMS 9 report and commitment to apply and enforce adequate controls throughout the entire life cycle of small arms and light weapons. We also take positive note of the commencement of deliberations within the open and the technical expert group on advancements in the manufacturing, technology and design of small arms and light weapons. We look forward to continued engagements during the intercessional period. Third and finally, Chair, my delegation would like to once again express its support for the full, equal, meaningful, and effective participation of women at all levels in the disarmament deliberations and decision-making processes. Experience has shown that disarmament initiatives have been most successful when they involve effective partnerships between governments, the expert community, and civil society, and when women are at the table and empowered to contribute to the decision-making. We must continue to coordinate and integrate their contributions and expertise into our work. On this point, my delegation would also like to encourage the Committee's continued support for the biennial resolution tabled by Trinidad and Tobago and other CARICOM Member States on women, disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. In closing, Chair, Guyana reaffirms its firm commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and to working closely with fellow Member States in a spirit of cooperation and partnership to ensure that advancements in technology serve only to enhance our common security and well-being and not exacerbate existing risks and tension. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Guyana. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Kenya.

Mr. Chair, I congratulate you and the members of the Bureau on your election. Kenya assures you of its full support and constructive engagement. We align with the statement delivered on behalf of the African Group. I will now add a few remarks in our national capacity. At a time when the international security environment is increasingly complex and volatile, the theme of the eighth first session of the General Assembly, Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation, a United Nation that Delivers for All, carries a particular weight for disarmament and international security. Kenya approaches this General Debate with a clear conviction. We must restore trust in the rules, manage the transformations reshaping international security, and ensure that collective action delivers greater security for all. The multilateral disarmament framework has achieved important milestones, demonstrating the value of collective action. However, persistent divisions continue to impede progress. The failure of three consecutive NPT's review conferences to reach a consensus outcome, coupled with the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals, and has caused the need to bridge the gap between commitments and implementation. Without renewed political will, existing disarmament obligations will remain unfulfilled. Nuclear weapon states must therefore meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and pursue concrete, verifiable, transparent, and irreversible steps towards disarmament. We also call for meaningful progress on legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states. We remain firmly committed to the vision of the Berendaba Treaty of an African nuclear weapon-free zones that strengthen regional and international security. Kenya expresses concern that 30 years after the CTPB's opening for signature, it has yet to enter into force. We urge the remaining Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the CTPB without delay. For many developing countries, the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons remains the most immediate security threat. Across Africa, these weapons contribute to terrorism, organized crime, communal violence, and instability. Kenya calls for stronger implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument. Effective arms control must prevent diversion across transfers, stockpiles in the Middle East, transport networks, and end users. This will support conflict prevention, peace building, and sustainable development. Kenya welcomes the establishment of global mechanism on the use of ICTs in the context of international security, and they reaffirm support for responsible state behaviors in cyberspace, including protection of critical infrastructure, confidence building measures, and enhanced capacity building for developing countries. Rapid advances in artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies present new opportunities as well as risks for the global security landscape. In this regard, their development and use must be consistent with the UN Charter as well as international law. We support inclusive international efforts to address security implications of AI in the military domain, but are particularly concerned by the increasing accessibility of relatively low-cost drone technologies to both state and non-state actors. Such capabilities carry significant implication for regions already facing fragile security environments. We also support efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humankind. As reliance on space-based services continue to grow, all countries, particularly developing countries, must be able to access and use outer space safely, securely, and equitably. Mr. Chair, our security choices have direct development consequences. Rising military spending and arms competition divert resources from health, education, food security, climate resilience, and economic opportunity, particularly in developing countries. We therefore reaffirm the right of states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Peaceful nuclear application can advance healthcare, agriculture, energy, scientific development. Equitable access to these benefits must go hand in hand with the set AIA standards of safety, security, and safeguards. Mr. Chair, Kenya calls for a practical and forward-looking disarmament agenda to restore confidence and reduce risks and keep disarmament responsible to future security challenges. Strengthening compliance, transparency, and accountability is critical to addressing implementation gaps and preserving the integrity of the disarmament regime. We must neither accept the inevitable reliance on nuclear weapons nor permit the normalization of nuclear threat. Similarly, Emerging technologies must not become new drivers of instability, nor diminish meaningful human control and accountability in decisions on the use of force. Disarmament must remain anchored in human security. It should support affected communities and reflect the perspectives of developing countries, women and young people, whose participation is essential to achieving inclusive and sustainable outcomes. Finally, let us move from commitment to implementation, from arms competition to arms control, and from managing risks to addressing their root causes. In doing so, we can renew the promise of United Nations and advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Philippines.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. The Philippines congratulates you on your assumption as chair of the First Committee. We assure you and the Bureau of our full support. We align ourselves with the statement of ASEAN. Amidst growing geopolitical challenges, protracted conflicts, and rapidly evolving technological risks, the First Committee remains a crucial multilateral forum for dialogue on disarmament and security. To navigate a future of increasing uncertainty and volatility, This committee must be preserved as a platform for dialogue, international cooperation, and mutual understanding. It is our hope that our discussions in the weeks ahead will reflect our collective resolve and deliver tangible commitments to strengthen international peace and security. Mr. Chair, the relentless pursuit of strategic advantage and reliance on nuclear deterrence continue to imperil our peoples and our planet. The expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, coupled with dangerous rhetoric, erode global stability and take us closer to brinkmanship. The only path forward is through sustained reduction and ultimately the total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Philippines reaffirms its commitment to the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. We urge nuclear weapons states to accelerate implementation of their obligations under Article VI and the 64-point action plan through time-bound, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament. We recognize the inalienable right of all states to peaceful uses of science and technology for socioeconomic development. We reiterate the complementary role of the TPNW and look forward to its first review conference later this year. As co-coordinator of the Article 14 process together with Sweden, we stress the urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT and call on the remaining Annex 2 States to ratify it without delay and preconditions. We urge the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. We likewise encourage States to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. a practical transparency and confidence-building measure to monitor and limit the proliferation of WMD delivery vehicles. These three instruments help curb the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons. Beyond nuclear disarmament, the threat of other weapons of mass destruction demands concerted global action. We reaffirm our commitment to the full and effective implementation of the CWC and BWC, and reiterate our support for the OPCW. In our region, we work towards preserving Southeast Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. We continue to engage nuclear-weapon states to resolve outstanding issues and facilitate their urgent ratification of the protocol to the treaty. Mr. Chair, rapid technological advancements require a global governance regime that is responsive, future-proof, and most of all, human-centric. We closely monitor the weaponization of AI in the military domain and remain concerned over the irresponsible integration of AI in the military, cyber operations, and lethal autonomous weapon systems, disregarding ethical considerations and amplifying risks to international peace and security. Technology must serve humanity and uphold international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. and never replace human judgment and accountability in decisions regarding the use of force. In this regard, we call for a concrete, legally binding instrument governing autonomous weapon systems. Mr. Chair, outer space is a shared global common and must be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. We strongly caution against expanding strategic competition into space and call for the prevention of its weaponization. We reaffirm our commitment to concluding a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, complemented by norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior. Mr. Chair, the human dimension of conventional arms also demands sustained action. As a state party to all humanitarian disarmament conventions, including the ATT, the CCW, the Anti-Personal Mine Landmines Convention, and the CCM, the Philippines remains committed and guided by a victim-centered approach. We also recognize the critical role of women and the youth in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, as we continue to champion the women and youth peace and security agendas. In closing, Mr. Chair, the First Committee provides a valuable space for multilateral dialogue, cooperation, and practical action. Let us use this opportunity to strengthen trust, build bridges, reduce the risk of escalation, advance responsible norms and global governance, and reinforce arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments in pursuit of sustaining peace and stability. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Philippines. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Netherlands.

Chair, allow me to congratulate you on your election. In addition to the statement delivered by the EU, I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. We again meet at a time of profound security challenges. Combined with an international environment increasingly characterised by strategic rivalry and rapid technological developments, the international security situation has grown more unpredictable. These developments make that in 2025, high-intensity conflicts continue to have a global impact. estimates amount to an alarming number of approximately 240,000 conflict-related fatalities. Moreover, conflicts and sustained violence are not confined geographically, but remain active across multiple regions. The global conflict level thus remains worrying and forms a stark reflection of the current growing global tensions. It is against this backdrop that we convene for the 81st session of this Committee. It falls to all of us to shoulder our responsibility and to ensure that the international architecture for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation demonstrates that it is still able to achieve results. It's therefore regrettable that for a third consecutive time, the State Parties to the NPT were unable to achieve consensus on a final outcome document at this year's Review Conference. Having said that, the NPT remains the cornerstone of our global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture and continues to deliver every day. Yet to preserve its integrity, Sustained and good-faith engagement by the international community are required. I therefore call on all delegations here today to recommit to genuine dialogue and cooperation to achieve this. Chair, new and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, are increasingly influencing our lives, including in the military domain. AI offers opportunities to strengthen our security, for example through enhanced cyber resilience and defense innovation. However, emerging technologies also pose significant challenges. Without a responsible approach, the implications of rapid, uncontrolled development and use of certain technologies risks blurring the responsibility and accountability of individuals and states. In a number of cases, the use of AI-assisted military targeting systems in active conflicts has resulted in tragic instances of civilian casualties. It's therefore a significant milestone that the international community has achieved a substantive outcome in the GGE on laws last month. While I understand that some would have preferred an even more ambitious outcome, let us focus on what has been achieved. consensus among 128 high contracting parties on a characterization, a description of the human involvement, and examples of measures to comply with IHL, as well as language on accountability and responsibility, which cannot be transferred to machines. As Chair of the GGE LOS, I wish to once more thank all High Contracting Parties for their constructive cooperation over the past three years. This positive outcome shows that progress is still possible in the field of ADN. Now it's time for a meaningful next step in the CCW, and building on the agreed set of elements of an instrument and other measures. Chair, the Netherlands is a vocal advocate for the responsible use of AI in the military domain. Last year, as the year before, UN Member States adopted with overwhelming support the resolution on artificial intelligence in the military domain, submitted by the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Keeping with this momentum, we will once again table a follow-up resolution which focuses on the next step. Structured dialogues centered on a focused agenda and concrete outcomes. We encourage all delegations to participate actively, share their expertise, and help shape the international agenda on the use of AI in the military domain. Chair. Allow me, during this general debate, to say also a few words with regard to the UN disarmament machinery. So far, the UNAT debate has not paid much attention to it. While the machinery is far from running smoothly. Let me take, for instance, the Conference on Disarmament. In the last 30 years, it did not negotiate a single new agreement, treaty or convention. Instead, we hold lengthy discussions and duplicate the work of the UN Disarmament Commission, and afterwards we often cannot even agree on what we actually discussed. Furthermore, its membership is not inclusive, and in 2026 again a number of UN Member States, non-members of the CD, were blocked from participating as observers. Yet they are paying for its non-functioning. We really have to ask ourselves what to do with what is still emphasised as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community". While the Netherlands recognises that the CD serves a purpose, we believe a critical assessment is needed to determine whether the resources collectively invested in this forum are still proportional to its outputs. We believe that UNAT provides the right framework for steps towards more efficiency within the CD and the disarmament machinery as a whole. Let us use the coming weeks to make meaningful steps to this end. Chair, let me conclude. In a time of growing tensions, we need a functioning disarmament architecture that addresses the urgent present and future challenges. This is our responsibility, not only to ourselves, but to future generations. Let us focus on where we can truly make a difference. As the Netherlands, we stand ready and are eager to work with all delegations in the weeks ahead. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Netherlands. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Latvia.

Thank you. Mr. Chair, please allow me to congratulate you on your election as a chair of the first committee and assure you of the active cooperation of the Latvian delegation. Latvia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. Mr. Chair, the first committee is again taking place in a security environment imperiled by rising tensions, deliberate violations of international norms, and weakening restraint. The result is a world less stable, less predictable, and less secure. Upholding international law, including the UN Charter, is paramount to reverse these trends. Consequently, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation remains crucial for reducing risks, fostering predictability, and maintaining peace and security. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is a blatant assault on the people of Ukraine and on the UN Charter. It threatens security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, requiring other countries to significantly boost and adapt their defenses. This year, even more than before, we are facing Russia's systematic and escalating strikes against Ukraine's civilians, cities, and critical infrastructure. Russia's illegal seizure and continuing militarization of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains the most serious threat to nuclear safety and security, marking the first instance in history of a nuclear facility being used for military purposes. Latvia condemns Russia's actions in the strongest terms. Russian forces must withdraw. Ukraine's territorial integrity must be restored within its internationally recognized borders, and Russia must be held accountable. By supplying Russia with weaponry and direct military support, the DPRK, Iran, and Belarus are complicit in this aggression. Russia's dangerous nuclear conduct is of particular concern. The reckless and escalatory nuclear rhetoric, announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, revocation of CTBT ratification, and suspension of New START implementation, coupled with employing a strategic weapon on the battlefield, directly undermines credibility of the global arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regime. Latvia calls on Russia to cease these destabilizing actions and return to full compliance with its international obligations and commitments. We also take note of China's continued rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal and unwillingness to engage in dialogue on strategic stability. Latvia calls on China and Russia to engage meaningfully on strategic risk reduction. Mr. Chair, Latvia emphasizes that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. An integral part of preserving this crucial architecture is ensuring that non-proliferation commitments are universally respected. The lack of agreement on the outcome document of the 2026 review conference should not be interpreted as weakness of the NPT. On the contrary, it should serve as a call to mobilize our common efforts towards strengthening this treaty. Latvia's chairmanship of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in 2026 reflects this commitment as we work to advance the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT and reinforce the border nuclear broader nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. Upholding of the nonproliferation regime depends not just on political commitment, but also on respect of international law and legal norms. Security Council's reinstatement of sanctions against Iran reflects Iran's systematic noncompliance with JCPOA, its longstanding failure to meet its safeguard obligations, and obstinate lack of the cooperation with IAEA. Latvia encourages Iran to reverse its course, return to good faith diplomacy, and resume verifiable cooperation with IAEA. Likewise, DPRK illustrates the ultimate dangers of proliferation. It maintains a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program that threatens regional and global stability. Latvia supports the relevant Security Council resolutions and calls for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK. Latvia welcomes the commitment, cooperation, of the government of Syria with the OPWC on the identification and verified elimination of all remaining chemical weapons in the country, as well as Syria's transparency and cooperation with IAEA to resolve outstanding safeguards issues related to Syria's past nuclear activities. Mr. Chair, the security of outer space is inseparable from broader international stability. Latvia maintains its robust commitment to the principles enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty, including access to space resources and rules for responsible behavior in space. The increase in malicious activities in cyberspace requires effective measures to counter them, build cyber resilience, and generally implement the UN framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Latvia welcomes holding the first plenary session in July on the global mechanism on ICT security. The development of artificial intelligence offers vast opportunities while also presenting emerging challenges to international peace and security, including ethical dilemmas, vulnerabilities in cyber and bi security, and the growing risks of information manipulation and interference in democratic processes. As elected member of Security Council, Latvia promotes engagement on emerging threats to peace and security, focusing on issues as cyber threats, disinformation, and malicious use of emerging technologies, as well as the potential contribution of such technologies to conflict resolution efforts. Mr. Chair, upholding principles of transparency, reciprocity, and verifiability remains crucial for an effective conventional arms control. Emerging technological risks further underscore the need to address illicit trade and unauthorized on small arms and light weapons, which fuels instability and armed violence.

Latvia remains

committed to global arms and export control frameworks, including Armed Trade Treaty, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement. We actively support capacity building and sharing the best practices. Latvia also reaffirms its unwavering commitment to WPS agenda. Latvia has developed our second national plan on WPS with focus on removing stereotypes that still persist about women meaningfully participating in all stages of security policy. We must turn the WPS agenda into measurable progress on the ground. To conclude, we believe that inclusive and transparent engagement, which promotes international law and advances effective multilateralism, can contribute to international peace and security. Latvia is committed to advancing these goals during 81st session of the First Committee. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Latvia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Venezuela aligns itself with the statement made by Uruguay on behalf of CELAC. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is closely monitoring the significant challenges currently being faced by the international architecture for security, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The complex international context demands that we step up collective efforts to preserve and strengthen the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as well as the multilateral mechanisms that have for decades contributed to international peace and security. Venezuela believes that this Assembly, and more specifically the First Committee, has a responsibility to advocate for renewed commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation, as is the case with Venezuela itself, which is currently in a period of rebirth. The UN and multilateralism must also be reborn, rising strengthened and with resolve to thus be in a position to save the planet from the existential danger that are weapons of mass destruction Chair, international security cannot be rooted solely in strategic balance or in the stockpiling of weaponry. It must be based on respect for international law, the strengthening of confidence and trust between States, and the effective advancement of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation processes. Venezuela continues to hold its historical position whereby it has championed the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this connection, we reiterate the importance of gradually progressing towards the cessation of processes to develop and modernize nuclear arsenals and their means of delivery, as well as the importance of strengthening existing international instruments. We urge all States to consider acceding to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and acceding to other international legal instruments in the field. Moreover, Venezuela believes that it is timely to contemplate the continued increase seen in resources devoted to military expenditure, particularly those related to weapons of mass destruction. We must also reflect upon the need and importance of balancing these investments with urgent sustainable development needs, as well as the urgent need to eradicate poverty and fulfill Agenda 2030. We also wish to underscore the need to continue promoting dialogue and continuing to build common understanding within the framework of the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to in so doing strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In Venezuela's view, zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction stand as tangible contributions to international peace and stability. Latin America and the Caribbean continue to offer an invaluable example in this regard through the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the proclamation of the region as a zone of peace. Chair, Venezuela condemns any and all use of chemical and biological weapons. We support their total and complete elimination. We reiterate the importance of preserving the technical, professional and impartial, unbiased nature of the mechanisms responsible for implementing relevant conventions and those responsible for promoting international cooperation in the development of chemical and biological activities for peaceful purposes and which are beneficial to humankind. It is, in our view, vital to continue to strengthen verification, transparency and investigation mechanisms under these international instruments, we must always guarantee scientific rigour and cooperation between States Parties. Chair, we cannot cease to closely monitor the humanitarian consequences of the manufacture, transfer and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons. International cooperation, rooted in respect for international law, and the strengthening of national capacities is a crucial component with which we can tackle this phenomenon. With this in mind, we hail the adoption of the outcome document of the ninth biennial meeting of states to review the implementation of the program of action on small arms and light weapons. We also commend the decision taken to establish more structured procedures through which to channel international assistance. This progress reflects that multilateral dialogue is crucially useful to produce tangible results. The ever quickening development of ICTs poses new opportunities but also brings with it significant challenges for international peace and security. As such, in our view, it is necessary to continue to strengthen frameworks for cooperation, confidence building, and international governance in this field. We hope that the global mechanism on ICTs will make it possible to foster progress towards a legally binding international framework able to promote the responsible use of these We also hope it will be able to take account of asymmetries that exist between countries, that it will strengthen international cooperation and heed the specific needs of developing nations. It is also vital to tackle the implications that AI and automation might have in the military domain. Venezuela is of the view that it is crucial to move towards international standards which guarantee meaningful human control over all stages of the life cycle of autonomous weapons systems. Decisions related to human life must always be underpinned by human responsibility. Venezuela reaffirms the importance of preserving outer space as a sphere devoted exclusively to activities for peaceful purposes which benefit all of humankind. We must champion international cooperation to guarantee that this common heritage continues to be used for scientific purposes, for the aim of development and for cooperation between nations. To conclude, we must here affirm that humankind is facing increasingly complex security challenges. However, it also has the tools necessary to broach these challenges through dialogue, cooperation and respect for international law. Venezuela will continue to promote a vision of collective security which is based on disarmament, mutual trust, and the strengthening of multilateralism as an essential tool with which to preserve peace. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Venezuela. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kuwait.

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Gracious, Mr. Chair, at the outset, we would like to congratulate you and the Bureau on your election to chair this session. We also are proud to see Arab representation in the Bureau, as Sudan, the fraternal state of Sudan, is represented in the Bureau. We wish you every success in the discharge of your duties, and we would like to join the statements delivered by the GCC and the Arab Group. The State of Kuwait condemns in the strongest of terms the blatant Iranian violations and attacks that have targeted our territories and the GCC states and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan since the 28th of February 2026. This includes attacks carried out by Iran-backed militias in the state of Iraq. This has targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure and critical infrastructure in a blatant violation of the sovereignty of states and the UN Charter and international law. We reemphasize that we are not a party to the conflict, and we have not allowed for our territory or airspace or waters to be used to launch attacks on Iran. This cannot be used as a pretext. No pretext may be used to justify attacks on our people. We call Iran to fully comply with Security Council Resolution 2817 of 2026. We call upon Iran to cease its attacks and threats, whether carried out directly or through proxies, and to respect the sovereignty of neighbors and the principles of good neighborliness. Insecurity in the Middle East also requires addressing the occupation and aggression and impunity of Israel against the Palestinians and the states of the region. Continued occupation must end. We cannot speak of any sustainable regional peace while these policies continue and while Israel, the occupying power, remains exempt from the regime of nuclear obligations that all other countries in the region are respecting. Therefore, we once more call the international community to call upon Israel, the occupying power, to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state, as well as to subject all its nuclear facilities and activities to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA. international community must take serious steps to urge Israel, the occupying power, to respond to these demands and implement the relevant resolutions. Its continued exemption from such obligations undermines the non-proliferation regime and further destabilizes the region. International obligations cannot be incumbent upon some and possible to ignore by others. We emphasize our firm support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in implementation of the Middle East resolution of 1995 and other relevant obligations. We wish for the Sultanate of Oman every success in its presidency of the seventh session of the conference concerned with the creation of this zone. We emphasize our readiness to cooperate towards the success of a legally binding treaty with the participation of all relevant parties in order to guarantee all our peace on equal footing. We regret to see that the review conference for the NPT for 2026 was unable to find a consensus outcome document, and this failure actually increases our obligation to uphold current commitments, chief among which are the commitments to fulfill nuclear disarmament under Article VI. The lack of consensus does not render obligations void, and it does not justify postponing their implementation, especially in light of increasing nuclear risks. And given our support for the nonproliferation regime, we are proud to have been selected to chair the Governor's Board of the IAEA for 2026-2027 with a unanimous acclamation from the members of the board. We take this responsibility as an obligation to increase the credibility of the IAEA and its independence, and an obligation to increase subjective and technical standards in upholding its mission. We will seek to build new bridges of cooperation in order to uphold these obligations and push forward technical cooperation towards tangible results that serve the countries and peoples of the world, because we believe that the power of the global nuclear regime is measured by the integrity of its implementation and not allowing the benefits of the use of nuclear power to only go to some. In the field of conventional weapons, we emphasize the importance of the safe and secure and sustainable management of the entire lifetime of such conventional weapons and the importance of preventing them from being diverted to unauthorized actors. We look forward to the international meeting on the international framework for the management, for the through-life management of conventional weapons to be held in 2026. And we emphasize that the resolutions and decisions we adopt here are not the end of the road, but rather are the starting point of a joint responsibility that cannot be completed without serious national measures and serious international cooperation and true follow-up on the implementation. And from that perspective, we call all states to uphold implementation of obligations in good faith for the international nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kuwait. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Norway.

Chair, colleagues, good morning. I will make seven points. First, peaceful uses, non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing. This basic principle runs through all the major disarmament treaties. Nuclear science, biotechnology, space systems, digital technologies and artificial intelligence are transforming how we treat disease, connect societies, and drive economic development. Access to these technologies will be critical to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Norway firmly believes that their peaceful use is an inalienable right of all states. Humanity has never possessed more powerful tools, but the benefits of technology are also accompanied by risks. exacerbated by a deteriorating security environment. Export controls are essential. They are not obstacles to peaceful cooperation. They are enablers, indispensable to prevent proliferation while facilitating trade, science and peaceful cooperation. Second, Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has direct implications across this Committee's agenda. Waged from behind a shield of nuclear threats, Russia is deliberately using nuclear risk as a tool to support war. The scale and magnitude of Russia's ongoing violations of international law and its reckless nuclear behaviour is not a regional issue. It is a systemic risk to us all. Third, we are entering a new era of nuclear competition and risk. Risk reduction is urgent. Dialogue among the major nuclear powers is the first step. We welcome the substantive exchanges among the nuclear weapons states at the NPT Review Conference in May on risk reduction and strategic stability, and encourage China and Russia to accept the United States' invitations to engage in a multilateral strategic stability dialogue. The states with the three largest nuclear arsenals have a special responsibility. We also call on states not signatory to join the Hague Code of Conduct. Fourth, ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used again is in the interest of the very survival of humanity. The humanitarian consequences would be catastrophic. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We must double down to defend the existing architecture. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The treaty continues to deliver through the indispensable work of the IAEA. The lack of progress in three consecutive review conferences is, however, not acceptable. The next review cycle must deliver across all three pillars. Entry into force of the CTBT should be a priority for all. Pending that, nuclear testing moratoria must be maintained. Preservation is, however, not good enough. We must uphold our collective ambition for progress. Some of our most significant milestones were reached at times of tremendous great power tension. Progress on arms control and disarmament may seem difficult today, but windows of opportunity can open suddenly, and we must be ready. Working on verification is a way to prepare. It builds confidence today, and it develops the tools, expertise, and networks needed to craft future agreements. We call on all to support the work of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which starts in 2027. Fifth, artificial intelligence is reshaping international security. Advanced AI amplifies existing threats and creates new security risks. Its effects extend from cyber operations and biotechnology to nuclear decision making and autonomous weapons systems. We encourage all states to join the call by the President of Finland and the Prime Minister of Norway for control on frontier AI models. Human judgment, control and accountability must remain at the centre of decisions that affect human life and international peace and security. This must also guide our work on autonomous weapons systems. The consensus outcome in the GGE on LOS provides a sufficient basis for negotiations on an instrument to start. The CCW review conference should mandate such negotiations. Sixth, biotechnology and AI are advancing rapidly. The BWC must keep pace. We cannot wait for a catastrophe before strengthening the regime designed to prevent one. The BWC working group must deliver a meaningful outcome in December. The prohibition on chemical weapons is clear. Russia's use of chloropicrin in Ukraine shows the cost of allowing violations of the CWC to go unanswered. Every use must be condemned, investigated, and met with accountability to preserve the norm against chemical warfare. Finally, strategic competition is intensifying in cyberspace and outer space, increasing the risk of misunderstanding, escalation, and conflict. In cyberspace, Norway reaffirms its support for the UN framework for responsible state behavior and the new UN global mechanism on ICT security. We call for focused work in the open-ended working group, ARUS, to reduce space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior. And I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Norway. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, global politics today are undergoing tremendous changes. Threats and dangers are closely intertwined with opportunities and risks. A new, more just world order, multipolar world order is emerging. The countries of the global south and east are asserting themselves as sovereign centers of development. In an effort to cling to their slipping dominance, a group of Western states that clearly constitutes a global minority is resorting even more often to brute force, imposing its own rules of the game on everyone, deliberately provoking chaos and disorder, jeopardizing lives and well-being of the overwhelming majority of the population in all regions of the world. of such reckless, inhumane, and destructive policy include the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and the capture of its legitimate president, Mr. Maduro, the assassination of Iran's supreme leader, Mr. Ali Khamenei, and members of the military and political leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the energy blockade of Cuba. Europe has taken a course towards total militarization. Aggressive exercises of NATO are conducted in the immediate vicinity of our country, including offensive scenarios against our country being practiced, and a possible blockade of the Kaliningrad region and isolation of the Russian ports on the Baltic Sea. The situation in the Asia-Pacific region is deteriorating as a result of the collective West actions as they are seeking to NATO eyes, so to quote, through military activity being scaled up and the subsequent establishment there of networks of America-centric unions and coalitions which undermine ASEAN-centric approaches to strengthening global collective security in the Asia-Pacific region. There are also developments of destabilizing algorithms of expanded nuclear deterrence. We are seeing the negative role of and growing. Like Europe, it is also being remilitarized at full steam, including allowing the revision of the three non-nuclear principles and the deployment of US intermediate and smaller range missiles. The security of the Russian Federation will be provided for under all circumstances, as was stated by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Russia does not threat and has no intention to pose a threat to European states. But there should be no doubt whatsoever about the fact that we have all the capabilities necessary to respond to any aggression. The 11th NPT Review Conference, despite all of the efforts by the Vietnamese presidency to find acceptable solutions, concluded without adoption of an outcome document. This outcome does not call into question the relevance of the treaty, which has and remains the is and continues to be the cornerstone of the international security and nuclear nonproliferation regime. Irreparable damage has been done to the the AEA's authority into the regime by the unprovoked US-Israeli attacks against Iran when unfounded allegations against Tehran of allegedly violating its obligations under the treaty were used as a pretext for arms aggression. This right is inalienable and cannot be cast into doubt and cannot be limited for the benefit of political agendas or for the advancement of certain states. US military leadership has referred to an on-orbit weapons possession and possible combat operations in cislunar space. This indicates that Washington's aggressive space weapons ambitions are moving into the practical track. This reflects a new reality in which space is gradually being transformed into an arena for combat operations. We call for the immediate development of an international legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space, prohibiting the placement of weapons of any kinds of weapons in outer space and the use or threat of force against or by means of space objects. We welcome the launch of the work of the permanent United Nations Global Mechanism on International Information Security as the central platform to which there is no alternative for the discussion of all aspects of security and the use of information communications technologies. We emphasize the need to comply with the modalities of the mechanism approved by the GA, including above all its intergovernmental character and the principle of decision making by consensus. With the development of new technologies, attention to continue too heightened when it comes to the issue of military use of AI. We believe it is inadmissible to impose additional restrictions and prohibitions on the use of this technology for military purposes. We look forward to the GGE of the States Parties on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on lethal autonomous weapons systems continued constructive work based on a new mandate and to reach a new mutually acceptable solution to the CCW Seventh Review Conference. We are committed to advancing a unifying agenda in the First Committee and the Disarmament Forum, while preserving the traditional parameters of our work. We aim to reach mutually acceptable solutions. We look forward to constructive cooperation across the full spectrum of issues related to upholding international peace and security. The Russian Federation submits for consideration by the First Committee draft resolutions entitled "Non-first placement of weapons in outer space," "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities," "Practical further measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space," as well as "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security." I would like to underscore the draft decision on strengthening, developing the system of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation treaties and agreements. We count on their full support. and co-sponsorship of documents by delegations. The full statement has been posted to the relevant online resources, and I would call upon colleagues to closely read this. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to CD of Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I congratulate you and other members of the Bureau on your election. We meet in a year in which wars have spread, international law has receded, and restraint has been abandoned. recourse to the unilateral force has become routine. Global military spending has risen for the 11th consecutive year. Rearmament is becoming a norm rather than compulsion. The conflict on the Middle East have reverberated far beyond the region. Precious lives have been lost. Pakistan calls for immediate de-escalation, restoration of normal passage, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region. Regrettably, the Russia-Ukraine Ukraine conflict has raged on for four years now, it is more than evident that there is no military solution to the conflict. In Gaza, the ceasefire remains fragile. It must uphold and lead to a sovereign, viable state of Palestine, with Al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital, based on pre-1967 borders. Pakistan's answer to this disorder has been to further invest in dialogue and diplomacy, as demonstrated by our UN Security Council Resolution 2788 on strengthening mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes. Guided by these foundational principles, Pakistan acted as a mediator between Iran and the United States. in an effort culminating in a ceasefire at Islamabad MOU. We continue to make efforts for a negotiated settlement of all outstanding issues for long-term peace and security. Repeated aggression against sovereign states and the failure to prevent it are deeply disturbing trends. The Makkah Joint Defense Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye, defensive in character and consistent with the UN Charter, aims to promote collective efforts for peace, security, and stability in the region and beyond. Chair, South Asia remains hostage to a doctrine of force. In May last year, India launched an unprovoked military assault against Pakistan. Our response in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter was precise and effective. India has since elevated that aggression into declared policy, the so-called "new normal". claiming the right to strike Pakistan at a time of its choosing on any pretext that it can manufacture. India continues to hold the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, a treaty that provides no right of unilateral suspension, converting the water of 240 million people into a weapon of coercion. India is engaged in the largest military buildup in our region, intercontinental range, sea-based and hypersonic systems, enabled by discriminatory exemptions of export controls. Meanwhile, it evades dialogue. Our last formal talks on nuclear and conventional CBMs were held in 2012. Pakistan does not seek an arms race. but we have the capacity to defend ourselves, as evidenced by our response in May 2025. We will therefore maintain full-spectrum deterrence within the framework of credible minimum deterrence. The notion that a limited conventional war can be fought and contained under a nuclear overhang is a dangerous delusion. Pakistan's preference is not war, but diplomacy. We remain ready for a meaningful dialogue on all outstanding issues, including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. Our proposal for a strategic restraint regime in the region remains on the table. Shared at the global level, Pakistan is concerned that arm control is being dismantled, nuclear weapons are being modernized, the doctrines are being revised to expand their role across new territories, and now there's an open talk of returning to nuclear testing. In outer space, the line between militarization and weaponization is being erased, while PAROS negotiations remain blocked. The introduction of artificial intelligence in theaters of close entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems is fraught with serious risks and must be subject to effective guardrails. We believe the decision to employ nuclear weapons in all circumstances must remain in human hands. Chair, a durable and equitable international peace and security architecture must rest on four principles. One, universal and consistent application of the UN Charter and UN Security Council resolutions. Two, implementation of the assurances of the SSOD-1. Three, upholding and fulfillment of arms control and disarmament obligations by respective states. And four, reinvigorating conventional arms control at regional and subregional level. In the Conference of Disarmament, Pakistan supports the immediate start of negotiations on a legally binding instruments on negative security assurances and a treaty on the prohibition of placement of weapons in outer space. A treaty banning only production of fissile material with respect to the FMCT, while excluding stocks sufficient for thousands of new weapons, is a cost free for its proponents and will remain a non-starter. The recent announcement by some nuclear weapons states to increase their warheads without resuming fissile material production vindicates our position. As a responsible nuclear state committed to global nonproliferation, Pakistan, Mr. Chair, maintains a comprehensive export control regime. Our national control list was revised in October 2025 and is now fully harmonized with NSG MTCR and Australia Group. This year, our Parliament enacted the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Act, giving full domestic legal effect to our obligations under the BWC. Chair, as the President of the 2026 session of the CD, Pakistan will also introduce the draft resolution on the report of of the conference. And finally, Pakistan has decided to contribute to the efforts towards rationalizing the work of the First Committee by biennializing two of our four resolutions. As a result, Pakistan will table three resolutions this year. We look forward and count on the continued support of the member states for their adoption. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative to CD of Pakistan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Morocco.

Mr. Chair, allow me at the outset to convey to you, Chair, Ambassador Lok Bhadautapa, my the warm congratulations of my delegation following your election to the chair of the First Committee. Your vast trajectory and Nepal's constant commitment to multilateralism and peace assure us that our work will be successful. You can count on the full support of my delegation. We also wish to congratulate the members of your Bureau, Chair. Our committee is meeting in a geopolitical context which is particularly critical in nature. It is marked by wholesale and rapid change to the international order, an erosion of the multilateral consensus and the shrinking of the space devoted to the rule of law, dialogue and diplomacy at a time when trust, the most crucial component of any security architecture is growing rarer than weapons themselves, alarm bells are ringing out one after the other. The 11th Conference of the Parties to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, concluded without an outcome document. At the same time, the increasing number of Malevolent activities in cyberspace, as well as growing risks in outer space and the ever quickening integration of AI into the military domain are redrawing the security landscape quicker than our norms are proving able to adapt. In view of these challenges, increasing isolation and withdrawal cannot be our response. It is precisely at such junctures that multilateralism must prove its relevance. Our committee must prove it is useful. Chair, Morocco remains profoundly convinced that lasting security is built through dialogue, mutual trust, and the respect for the sovereignty of States, as well as their territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of disputes. conviction is something that Morocco has translated into tangible action. Over recent years, our country has chosen to back responsibility as a concept by taking on the chairmanship and presidencies of several major disarmament fora. In November 2025, we presided over the sixth session of the Conference on the Creation of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. That was a forum of several firsts. These included a joint statement issued on of its members. As the work continues, we wish every success to the Sultanate of Oman, that brotherly country, for the seventh session next November. This same desire to reconcile differing positions guided the Moroccan presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. That was marked by the holding of a high-level segment last February. Today, that same desire continues to The Hague, where, since May 2026, and for the second time, we have presided over the Executive Council of the OPCW. Disarmament and non-proliferation have as their logical counterpart the promotion of the peaceful uses of the atom. That is something whose flag we are flying high in close partnership with the IEA in Rabat, the National Oncology Institute is the hub for the raise of hope initiative under the IEA. That institute trains radiotherapists, medical physicians and technicians for the benefit of African patients, the patients. The National Centre for nuclear energy sciences and techniques is recognized by the AEA as an international training center. We open its facilities to more than 40 brotherly African member states. This dynamic continues through the Moroccan presidency of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, AFRA. Rabat last June hosted the meeting of its national coordinators. This continent-wide commitment has just been consolidated in Addis Ababa. through Morocco's election unanimously as commissioner to the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, AFCONE. Our term will be three years long. Morocco's action can also be seen on the ground in view of the risk of non-state actors accessing weapons of mass destruction. Rabat last February hosted the second plenary meeting of the Global Forum for the Prevention of Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism. Almost 200 representatives from 57 countries met together at that meeting. A simulation exercise was the climax of that meeting. It made it possible to turn international cooperation into operational savoir-faire. In the chemical domain, last September, Morocco hosted the Atlas exercise on chemical terrorism. That exercise brought together the OPCW and around 10 African countries. They were all asked to consider tangible response scenarios. Moreover, a workshop on the implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and Chemical Security in Africa concluded yesterday in Rabat. The goal of the meeting was to adapt national legislations to scientific developments and to the risk of diversion by non-state actors. All of these actions, Chair, are based on a consistent national dead rock. In 2025, we created the National Commission for the Management of Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, and Chemical Risks. That platform brings together a wealth of national actors behind an integrated approach that covers everything from prevention to response, and the goal is to serve national and regional security. We are aware that emerging technologies are redrawing security balances. As such, my country continues to actively contribute to the work of the Global Mechanism on in the context of international security. Here we hail the leadership of El Salvador. The delegation was able to give this new standing body the inclusive and constructive momentum that cyberspace security demands. In the sphere of artificial intelligence, we have played a pioneering role. The recommendations of the first global conference on the role of artificial intelligence in the implementation on the Chemical Weapons Convention held in Rabat in October 2024 continues to enlighten the work of the OPCW. To conclude, Chair, the major treaties that today protect humankind were born at a time when tensions were raging because at a decisive juncture, member States chose to prioritise what united them over what divided them. It is in this spirit that we are embracing the work of this session with clear-sightedness and the conviction that every resumed dialogue, every confidence-building measure adopted and every consensus preserved brings our Committee closer to making the security of each individual the guarantee of our collective security. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Morocco, and now I give the floor to the distinguished Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperations of Sierra Leone.

Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. Chair, I congratulate you on behalf of the Sierra Leone delegation and the members of the Bureau on your elections to chair the work of the First Committee for the for the 81st session of the General Assembly. Sierra Leone aligns itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group and wishes to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Sierra Leone recognizes that the Committee's substantive discussions during the 80th session of the General Assembly helped to advance consensus on key disarmament and international security issues in support of global peace and security. We therefore commend the leadership provided by His Excellency Mosario Massari of Italy and the Bureau of the 80th session. The gradual erosion of international norms and the rise in military expenditures to unprecedented levels have weakened global stability and diverted resources from the development priorities. True international peace and security can only prevail where all member states respect international law, uphold the Charter, commit to dialogue, and work earnestly to collective security. Sierra Leone remains firmly committed to engagement in disarmament and non-proliferation, including nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, emerging technologies, and conventional arms, such as small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. These efforts are indispensable to strengthening global peace and security, and we look forward to consensus outcomes that reflect the diverse realities and priorities of member states. Sierra Leone reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. While we join other nations in welcoming progress, we are equally concerned about the pace of the nuclear disarmament obligations. We therefore call for a balanced and comprehensive implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. The total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. We urge all nuclear-armed states to renew their commitments to nuclear disarmament. Sierra Leone will continue to advance the conversation on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of nuclear war around the globe. Sierra Leone will also continue to raise its voice on non-proliferation of SALWs which was adequately discussed during the tenure as chair of the open-ended technological group few months ago. Our prioritization of the issues of the SALW and the Security Council a year ago and as chair of the OETG reflects our recognition of the grave threat posed by SALWs to international peace and security and our call for concrete national measures to curb illicit transfers and trade. Sierra Leone is proud to have discussed through bilateral and multilateral engagements on key regulations of conventional weapons. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas and compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty and the Ottawa, Main, Mine, Ban and Oslo cluster munitions are key to these treaties for which violation poses great, great and grave humanitarian and ethical challenges. We believe that compliance with these treaties will provide renewed impetus towards ending the long-standing deadlocks in disarmament, including the negotiations on arm race in the outer space. Chair, Sierra Leone remains concerned about the diverse implications of emerging technologies in the military domain, including artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems for global peace and security. While the rapid evolution of AI technologies promote transformative development in sectors such as agriculture and health, yet it poses increasing risk when applied to warfare. These technologies must be aligned with international norms governing peace and security. Sierra Leone calls for responsible state behavior in cyberspace compliance with international norms governing cyber conduct, which is essential to prevent malicious activities that threaten global stability. We urge all Member States to pursue peaceful means of revolving cyber-related dispute. In closing, Sierra Leone acknowledges the invaluable contributions of civil society, international partners, and women's organization to global disarmament, peace, and security. We continue to advocate for women's leadership and participation in disarmament processes and for the universalization of the PTNW. I thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sierra Leone. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden.

Thank you, Chair. Let me join others and congratulate you on your appointment as Chair of the First Committee. You can count on our full support. Sweden aligns itself with the statement by the EU and the statement by Finland on behalf of the Nordic countries. The following remarks are made in a national capacity. Chair, our disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has been weakened in the latest years. including through increasingly high tensions and a resurgence of nuclear rhetoric. Aggression, together with low levels of trust and growing uncertainty, has led to a new era of rearmament. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is well into its fifth year. It strikes at the heart of the very principles upon which the United Nations was founded. Sweden condemns the aggression in the strongest possible terms and reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. Russia's actions, including its recurring attacks on civilians and civilian objects, are flagrant violations of international law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. Russia and its leadership must be held accountable for its war of aggression, for other crimes under international law, and for its breaches under the Chemical Weapons Convention, both on and off the battlefield. Chair. The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains appalling. Safe, rapid, and unhindered humanitarian access is urgently needed. The comprehensive peace plan must be implemented in accordance with international law, including UN Security Council Resolution 2803. A two-state solution remains the only viable way for Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side in peace, freedom, and democracy. Sweden renews its call on DPRK to abide by the resolutions of the UN Security Council. The DPRK's persistent development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities violate multiple resolutions and is done with the active and passive consent of some permanent UN Security Council members. Furthermore, we have for many years expressed our concern with Iran's nuclear program and its lack of transparency. Reduced access for the International Atomic Energy Agency has seriously undermined international oversight. Iran must never be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, and it must immediately return to full cooperation with the Agency, in accordance with its NPT and safeguard obligations. In addition, China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenals contributes to the complex situation and to our concerns. We encourage China to take further steps towards enhanced transparency and risk reduction. Given this situation, it is even more important to push forward and strengthen the norms and instruments we already have. The NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Despite the absence of a consensus document at the review conference this spring, state parties expressed their continued commitment to the treaty. Sweden's current role as co-president, together with the Philippines, of the Article 14 process of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a testimony to our firm belief in the treaty. The CTBT has already achieved a lot, but its current normative strength cannot substitute for the legally binding prohibition that will be established upon its entry into force. Further verification measures will then also be available, including on-site inspections. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation already gathers 145 States sharing information and notifications on test launches. This is an important confidence-building instrument, and Sweden calls on others to join. We welcome the growing cross-regional support for risk reduction measures. Such measures are pressing and should be in the interest of all, with the aim of improving trust and decreased tensions, thus creating possibilities for concrete progress on disarmament. Measures to reduce risks are also urgently needed in space. societies rely heavily on space for essential services, but space is becoming increasingly congested and contested. We urge all states to uphold their international obligations, including under Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, not to place in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction. Emerging technologies is developing at a rapid pace, influencing all ways of life, also in our field. Sweden therefore welcomes the successful conclusion of the GGE on LOS, agreeing on a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature. The agreement on inter alia, the characterization, the application of a need to ensure compliance with IHL, and the control and human judgment is encouraging. The illicit flow, accumulation, and misuse of arms and ammunition, particularly small arms and light weapons, require our ongoing attention. These weapons cause the most deaths and suffering, perpetuating gender-based violence. The universalization and full implementation of key instruments like the Arms Trade Treaty are therefore essential. Chair, let me conclude by highlighting the importance of inclusivity. Opposition to gender equality is on the rise, including in matters of peace and security and disarmament. Rights once gained can be lost. It is up to us to protect them. For us to be effective, we must also engage with younger generations and allow the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including civil society, industry, and academia, in our work. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium.

Thank you, Chair. Belgium aligns itself fully with the statement delivered by the European Union. I wish to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Mr. Chair, eight decades ago, the founders of the United Nations emerged from a world devastated by war. Confronted with destruction on an unprecedented scale, they chose cooperation over confrontation, law over arbitrariness, and dialogue over the use of force. Their achievement was not merely the creation of an institution, it was the establishment of a framework through which nations could pursue security and prosperity through common rules and shared responsibilities. Today, that legacy is being tested. Across multiple regions, we witness armed conflict and instability. In Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and elsewhere, the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, principles that have underpinned international peace and security for generations, are being challenged at a moment when they are needed most. Too often, contemporary conflicts are viewed solely through the prism of geopolitical rivalry. Yet, the principles at stake are universal and indivisible. Their defense is therefore a responsibility shared by all Member States. Neutrality is not an option when the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state are openly violated. Nor can we remain indifferent when civilians and humanitarian actors are deliberately placed at risk and humanitarian assistance is obstructed. It is equally important to confront disinformation and denial. Years of false narratives by the previous regime regarding Syria's chemical weapons program have been refuted by the rigorous, independent, and impartial work of the OPCW. The facts are beyond dispute. The Assad regime retained a clandestine chemical weapons capability and used chemical weapons against its own population. Evidence gathered by the IAEA has likewise confirmed the existence of undeclared nuclear activities. We should therefore reject misinformation and remain guided by facts established by competent international bodies. The same principle applies to Russia's repeated denials regarding its use of chemical agents in Ukraine. Similarly, we should not accommodate persistent non-compliance with the obligations that underpin the multilateral system. Iran should heed the calls of the international community and resume full implementation of its safeguards obligation and cooperation with the IAEA. The cases of Syria and Iran also offer a broader lesson. The Additional Protocol should become the verification standard of the international community. Effective verification is indispensable to confidence building and the strengthening the global nonproliferation architecture. That architecture can be further reinforced through practical and achievable measures. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be universalized and brought into force. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should commence without delay. Further progress on nuclear risk reduction should also remain a shared priority. Countless lives and limbs have been saved through humanitarian disarmament, with the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions at its core. In the face of growing international tensions, we must not abandon these achievements. On the contrary, we should reaffirm the lessons learned from past conflicts. Weapons whose humanitarian consequences clearly outweigh any military utility have no place in responsible security policies and should remain prohibited. Mr. Chair, developments in artificial intelligence on the battlefield are advancing far more rapidly than our deliberations. The need for guardrails is immediate. More than a decade of discussions within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has generated a substantial body of common understanding and agreed language. Belgium believes the time has come to move from exploration to negotiation. We therefore call on the Review Conference to provide the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument, potentially in the form of a Protocol VI to the CCW. Such a step is not only the logical continuation of years of constructive work and the consensus achieved on the elements of an instrument. It is also necessary if the CCW is to remain relevant in addressing one of the defining security challenges of our time. Mr. Chair, the work of this committee is often conducted against the backdrop of conflict, division, and uncertainty. Yet, history demonstrates that periods of instability do not diminish the importance of dialogue. They make it all the more necessary. Belgium remains convinced that the overwhelming majority of member states continue to believe in a world governed by law rather than force, by cooperation rather than coercion, and by shared responsibility rather than unilateral action. Let us therefore approach our work with ambition, determination, and a renewed commitment to the principles that unite us. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brunei Darussalam.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Brunei Darussalam aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Philippines on behalf of ASEAN. Mr. Chair, this year's theme, Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation, a United Nations that Delivers for All, is both timely and relevant. In today's complex security environment, restoring trust is essential to strengthening multilateral cooperation, upholding international law, and maintaining international peace and security. Against this backdrop, the First Committee plays an important role in advancing disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. We remain fully committed to the treaties and conventions which we have signed or to which we are a party to, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Prohibition of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Anti-Personal Mine Ban Convention. We reaffirm the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and remain committed to its full and balanced implementation. We urge nuclear weapons states to advance their disarmament commitments while strengthening safeguards, nuclear safety and security, and access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Following the 2026 NPT Review Conference, we encourage continued constructive dialogue and efforts to build on areas of convergence, mindful of the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate our support for the early entry into force of the CTBT and urge all remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the treaty, as well as call for the early commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effective variable fissile material cut-off treaty. Bruni Darussalam recognizes the importance of the peaceful, safe and secure use of nuclear science and technology, supported by strong national implementation, regional and security cooperation and capacity building. At the national level, through the Safety, Health and Environment National Authority, we are strengthening our regulatory and institutional capacity. In June 2026, China hosted the International Atomic Energy Agency Advisory Mission on the regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear security, supporting national efforts to further develop our national regulatory framework in line with the international standard. We also remain committed to working closely with IAEA and international partners in this regard. At regional level, Bona Dosa reaffirms the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zone as practical confidence-building measures that contribute to regional and international peace and security. The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone reflects our commitment to keeping Southeast Asia free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Chair, Brunei Darussalam recognizes the growing impact of artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies on international peace and security. We support the responsible development and use in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, and underscore the importance of ensuring that technological advancement contribute to international peace, stability, and security. In this regard, we welcome the commencement of the global mechanism on development in the field of ICT in the context of international security and responsible state behavior. Mr. Chair, As we seek to realize the theme of this session by restoring trust and managing transformation, it is important that our commitments are matched by our action, our dialogue by cooperation, and our expression by meaningful implementation. Brunei Darussalam remains committed to the work of the First Committee and to contributing, together with all Member States, to a safer, more peaceful, and secure world. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Brunei Darussalam. And now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, I would like to express His Excellency, Ambassador of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, my congratulations on his election as chair of the First Committee during the 81st session of the GA. would also like to congratulate all Bureau members, especially the representative of brotherly Sudan, wishing you all the success in conducting your work. Mr. Chair, Iraq expresses its deep concern over the slowdown of international efforts aimed at complete disarmament and the continued failure to achieve any tangible development and progress in the field of nuclear weapons. We've also failed to ensure the universality of the NPT. while the development and production of nuclear weapons continue along with their stockpile. At a time when the international security landscape is witnessing increased tensions and conflicts, we stress once again the need to ensure urgent and tangible collective measures to achieve the total nuclear disarmament as follows. First, to ensure the universality of disarmament treaties and conventions, especially the ones pertinent to the WMDs, foremost nuclear weapons. We must fully commit to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT by nuclear weapons states. The latter continue to develop and modernize new types of such weapons. Iraq stresses that those countries must meet their obligations pursuant to the 1995, 2000, and 2010 Review Conferences. In this vein, Iraq regrets that the 2026 NPT Review Conference failed to reach a consensual outcome document. This underlines the need to double our effort to ensure the credibility of the Treaty and promote the implementation of the commitments of its three pillars, particularly nuclear disarmament. Second, Iraq expresses its deep concern due to the expiration of the New START Treaty in February of this year. Thus, there are no legally binding rules to oblige the nuclear -- the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the federal -- the Russian Federation. We call for a resumption of dialogue and negotiation urgently to reach new arrangements that will ensure control over such strategic weapons and reduce nuclear danger. Third. We have to start negotiations to reach a legally binding instrument that is non-discriminatory on safeguards to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used and there will be no threat of their use against non-nuclear-weapon States. parties to the NPT. Third, we have, under the umbrella of the Conference on Disarmament, start early negotiations with a clear mandate to reach a non-discriminatory international treaty that is verifiable on the FMCT. Fourth, ensure the universality of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons through encouraging the remaining eight members or states on Annex 2 to ratify it so that it can enter into force. Fifth, to continue being seized by the nuclear disarmament issue and keep it on the priority of the international community until we achieve its final objective and ensure the total and complete elimination of such weapons. Mr. Chair, establishing regions free from nuclear weapons is a positive step to promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation internationally. Iraq warns once again from the negative repercussion of the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution on the nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons and the credibility of this treaty and ensuring its universality. Thus, we call for the establishment of an East zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the establishment of six sessions of the conference on establishing the East free from nuclear weapons, which is a parallel and supportive path to the efforts to establish such a zone. However, it is not an alternative to 1995 Middle East resolution or what has been agreed upon in the 2002 2010 review conferences we call all parties concerned to continue um their active participation and work to ensure the success of the seventh round of this conference under the challenge the presidency of the sultanate of Oman which will be held next month we renew our position calling on the Israeli entity to exceed to the NPT as a party that is not possessing nuclear weapons, it has to subject all its nuclear facilities to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. This will ensure the universality of the treaty and the establishment of Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons and other WMDs. Turning to the safety of ICTs and their use internationally, Iraq welcomes the start of the operationalization of the global mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs. in the context of international security and the responsible state behavior in their use in 2026. This is a framework that allows to continue dialogue and cooperation internationally in this domain. We stress the need to build upon the outcome of the open-ended working group of 2021-2025 and promote the rules and standards agreed upon while focusing on international law, measures to build trust and build capacities in the interest of developing countries to promote the safety and stability of the outer space. To conclude, we wish all the success and achieving the desired goals.

Permanent representative of Iraq. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Oman.

Mr. Chair, the delegation of the Sultanate of Oman wishes to extend its sincere congratulations to you on your election as chair of the First Committee at its 81st session, along with the members of the Bureau. We wish you all the luck, and my delegation is ready to cooperate with you and all delegations in achieving our shared objectives. My delegation aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council. on the Arab Group. Mr. Chair, the work of our committee this year is taking place amid escalating tensions and confrontations, declining trust among states, and growing arms races and risks associated with the use of WMDs. This underscores the important role of this committee in advancing disarmament, nonproliferation, arms control, confidence building, and common security. The Sultanate of Oman firmly believes that dialogue is the most effective way of overcoming differences and building trust and mutual understanding. Security cannot be achieved through the logic of force and confrontation, but rather through diplomacy, peaceful and consensual solutions, adherence to the Charter of the UN and international law, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Thus, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts should contribute in building balanced and sustainable security that takes into account the concerns of all states. Developments in our region this year have demonstrated that the consequences of military escalation do not remain confined to their parties directly involved, but rather threaten security and stability of the region at large. Accordingly, we call for restrained prudence, the primacy of dialogue and diplomacy, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This would lead to sustainable understandings that safeguard the security of the states and peoples of the region. Mr. Chair, current global developments once again confirm that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continued reliance on them in security doctrines constitute a threat to humanity at large. My country believes that the complete elimination of such weapons is the only genuine guarantee against their use or threat of use. In this regard, My country regrets that the 2026 review conference of the NPT was unable, for the third consecutive time, to reach agreement on a consensus final document. We call upon all state parties to preserve the credibility of the treaty and to implement its three pillars in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, and to fulfill the commitments and undertakings agreed upon at previous review conferences. particularly those relating to nuclear disarmament. The Sultanate of Oman also reaffirms the inalienable right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with their international obligations and relevant safeguards agreements. It's important to ensure access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and supportive development, particularly in the fields of health, energy, agriculture, and scientific research. In light of developments witnessed in our region over the past two years, my country iterates the inviolability of nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes. We reject any attack or threat thereof against them, regardless of their location or the party concerned, given the grave consequences that could extend beyond the targeted state and threaten human beings, the environment, and regional and international security. My country further emphasizes that issues relating to nuclear programs and safeguards should be addressed through diplomatic means and through the competent international institutions, foremost the IAEA. Mr. Chair, the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remains a long-standing strategic objective. Its realization would contribute significantly in strengthening security, stability and confidence among the states of the region. In this context, the Sultanate of Oman is honored to chair the seventh session of the UN Conference on the Establishment of the Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, scheduled to be held in New York in November. My country regards this responsibility as an opportunity to build upon the achievements of previous sessions, narrow differences and promote dialogue among the states of the region. The Sultanate of Oman, under its presidency, will work in a transparent and balanced manner and cooperate with all member states to create conditions conducive for practical progress in the work of the conference. From this rostrum, we renew our call upon all invited parties, without exception, to participate and engage constructively in the conference. We stress that the establishment of the zone should be an inclusive process that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of all states of the region. Ultimately, it aims at concluding a legally binding treaty that enhances security and stability for all. In this regard, the Sultanate of Oman reiterates its call for Israel to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and to place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards system of the IAEA. The rapid development of AI, emerging technologies, and cybersecurity presents new challenges to the international security architecture. The Salt Lake statement stresses the importance of ensuring that the development and use of these technologies is consistent with international law, preserving human responsibility and control in decisions relating to the use of force. and prevent cyberspace from becoming an arena of conflict. My country also underscores the importance of preserving the peaceful and sustainable use of outer space, preventing an arms race in outer space, and supporting international efforts aimed at developing frameworks and measures that promote confidence and transparency and ensure that all states benefit from the peaceful uses of outer space. Mr. Chair, the challenge we face today lies not only in developing additional rules and mechanisms, but also in ensuring the political will necessary to implement existing commitments and restore confidence in multilateral action. The Sultanate of Oman believes that the security of states is interconnected and that building sustainable security requires dialogue, cooperation, and respect for the legitimate interests of all. Thus, my country will continue to support disarmament and nonproliferation effort and to work with the international community towards a and more stable world in which the language of dialogue and understanding prevails over confrontation and escalation. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Oman. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Chair. I would like to congratulate the chair of the First Committee for presiding over our work. We'd also like to congratulate his vices and members of the bureau. We fully trust in your ability to ensure the success of the work and achieving the desired objectives. We align ourselves to the statement presented by Libya on behalf of the Arab Group and the statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain on behalf of the GCC states. and would like to present this statement in our national capacity. The Kingdom stresses that it is fully committed to the NPT and the need to ensure a balance between all three pillars, disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Kingdom was one of the very first countries that acceded to the NPT. We've contributed in its universality. We stress the need for a complete elimination of nuclear weapons in line with Article VI of the treaty. because we believe that peace and security is achieved through dialogue and cooperation. The Kingdom underlines that the priority should be to build human beings, invest in human capacities, promote economies, support technology, innovation, and education to counter the global challenges that have exacerbated economic crises and led to inflation and unemployment. This necessitates promoting international cooperation to ensure stabilizing stable and prosperous communities while ensuring conflict prevention and settlement and directing resources to address these crises and achieve SDGs. Historic and humanitarian experiences prove that international political disputes are only resolved through dialogue and negotiations, far from the use or threat of use of force. In this vein, we stress the need for collective action to reduce tensions, address conflicts and dangers of nuclear weapons and to address the root causes of differences. We said there is a dire need for an internationally legally binding instrument to ensure that nuclear weapons states are committed to the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. We believe that We have taken important steps to totally eliminate nuclear weapons and WMDs, and the 1995 resolution on establishing a Middle East free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is still valid and in effect until all its objectives are achieved. We stress the importance of the outcomes of the 2010 review conference to free the Middle East from nuclear weapons. In this vein, we underline the invitation of the NPT review conferences to Israel as the only country in the Middle East not party to the treaty, the need for it to accede without delay to the conference and subject all its nuclear facilities to the IAEA comprehensive safeguard regime in line with Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981. Such steps will promote international peace and security. It will ensure stability and establish conditions conducive for peace for all peoples of the region. The Kingdom also welcomes the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to conclude their consideration of the Syrian nuclear safeguards dossier. We commend the transparent and constructive cooperation of the new Syrian government. The Kingdom is proud to have contributed, along with other brotherly Arab countries, to table the draft resolution and facilitate its adoption with consensus. Mr. Chair, the Kingdom strongly condemns and deplores the continued targeting of economic and civilian object by the Houthi terrorist initiatives in the Kingdom and the Republic of Yemen, as well as the repeated and flagrant aggression against Islamic sanctities and the Saudi vessels south of the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. To conclude, we regret that the NPT Review Conference has failed to reach an outcome document for the third year in a row. We stress the need for concerted effort to ensure the success of the upcoming Review Conference through adopting a comprehensive and balanced outcome document that will include practical procedures to implement the agreed upon commitments, especially the ones relevant to ensuring the total elimination of nuclear weapons, promoting the universality of the treaty, and establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. The Kingdom looks forward to addressing this failure in the upcoming review conference through developing the mechanisms of the NPT review conference and developing rules and procedures of the review conferences to achieve a minimum that safeguards the main pillars of this treaty, thus maintaining its legal framework. The Kingdom will support all international efforts aimed at developing the review conference mechanisms, as well as the rules of procedures of its review conferences. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Qatar.

Mr. Chair. Allow me to congratulate you and the members of the Bureau on your election to chair the First Committee for the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly. We affirm our support for your efforts to ensure the successful work of the committee. We also align ourselves with the statements delivered on behalf of the GCC and the Arab Group. Mr. Chair, we would like to emphasize the importance of the full compliance with the commitments contained in disarmament treaties and agreements. We also express our support for international efforts aimed at preventing nuclear testing and halting the development and modernization of nuclear arsenals and other lethal weapons. This is to contribute to peace and security and safeguarding future generations and ecosystems from the dangers posed by the proliferation of such weapons. In this regard, we regret that the 11th Review Conference of the NPT held from the 27th April to 22 May of this year, was unable to reach an agreement on a consensus final document. The State of Qatar attaches great importance to the UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other WMDs, convened pursuant to UNGA Resolution 74/546. In this regard, Qatar expresses its support for the presidency of the sisterly Sultanate of Oman during the conference's seventh session, the presidency of which concludes in November of this year. We look forward to the cooperation of all countries in the region to ensure the success of this conference. and the achievement of its objectives in strengthening peace and security at both the regional and international levels. Qatar also looks forward to assuming presidency of the Conference's eighth session. In a related context, the State of Qatar affirms that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy constitute an inalienable right of States Parties to the NPT. Mr. Chair. As part of the State of Qatar's ongoing efforts to contribute to the elimination of chemical weapons, we note the adoption by the Executive Board of the OPCW during its 112th session held in The Hague on the 9th of July, 2026, of the draft resolution submitted by Qatar concerning the restoration of the rights and privileges of the sisterly Syrian Arab Republic within the organization. This was with the support of 66 state parties that co-sponsored the resolution. The adoption of the resolution crowned Qatar's diplomatic efforts through a series of consultations and initiatives that helped build broad consensus among state parties, which paved the way for the adoption of this resolution. Mr. Chair, in light of the sensitive circumstances facing our region, the state of Qatar has condemned the attacks carried out since the 28th of February this year, including the use of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. These attacks targeted our sovereignty, territorial integrity, and territorial waters at the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of sisterly states. Qatar considers these attacks a flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law, and the UN Charter. We reiterate the need to comply with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2817, including those relating to rights and freedoms of navigation under international law, in particular with regard to vital maritime routes. The state of Qatar prioritizes containing the escalation and creating space for diplomatic efforts. Accordingly, we continue to engage with partners to bridge differences, build common ground among parties, and reach a peaceful solution that preserves comprehensive and sustainable security, peace, and stability in the region. We also note Qatar's condemnation of the targeting by the Houthi group of Abha International Airport and King Khalid International Airport in the sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the 7th of October this year. This attack resulted in deaths, injuries, and material damages. Qatar considers this attack a serious violation of Saudi Arabia's sovereignty and a direct threat to regional security, civilian safety, civilian infrastructure, and air navigation. The State of Qatar renews its full solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Qatar. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kyrgyzstan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ladies and gentlemen, we live in a world with complex challenges, and these challenges need to be settled jointly and through cooperation. As Kyrgyzstan prepares to assume its membership at the Security Council, we approach the work of this committee with the same principle: security must be built through dialogue, mutual respect, and practical cooperation. Our President has also reaffirmed Kyrgyzstan's readiness to contribute to international mediation efforts. Central Asia itself offers a valuable example of how even the complex interstate difference can be resolved peacefully through political will and dialogue. This conviction has relevance to the work of First Committee. Mr. Chair, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must remain at the center of our work. Unfortunately, the 11th NPT Review Conference concluded without a substantive consensus outcome. The NPT nevertheless remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The absence of consensus should not become an excuse for inaction. It should call all States Parties to renew efforts across the all three main pillars of NPT. The expiry of the New START Treaty in February without the successor framework in force is another reminder of the urgency of sustained strategic dialogue and the new verifiable arms control arrangements. This year, we mark 30 years since the CTBT was opened for signing, 35 years since the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and 20 years since the signing of the Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan strongly supports the early entry into the force of the CTBT and the preservation and strengthening its verification regime. Our contribution is also practical. The Alashcha seismic station in Kyrgyzstan forms an integral part of the international monitoring system. Last year, Kyrgyzstan signed the TPNW. which has complemented our long-standing commitments under the NPT, the CTBT, and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The Central Asian Zone is the result of the collective political will of all five states. It demonstrates that regional security can be strengthened through legally binding commitments, verification, and cooperation. Kyrgyzstan, as a depository of the treaty, remains committed to its full and effective implementation. We thank the Kazakhstan for its facilitating resolution on the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We also believe that the next stage should be the further institutional development of the treaty. Kyrgyzstan proposed to strengthen the rotation of the chairmanships, make consultative mechanisms more regular, preserve institutional memory, and deepen practical cooperation with other nuclear-weapon-free zones and international organizations. We also see an opportunity to move from dialogue to more structure, practical cooperation among the nuclear weapon-free zones. Building on our growing partnership with AFCON and OPANAL, Kyrgyzstan proposed exploring regular interregional dialogue among the zones. Such dialogues could facilitate the exchange of experience best practices on verification, confidence building, environmental rehabilitation, and the implementation of treaty commitments. Mr. Chair, new and emerging technologies are rapidly changing the international security landscape. Artificial intelligence, increasing autonomy in weapons systems, and other digital technologies offer opportunities, but they can also generate risk of miscalculation and escalation. Kyrgyzstan supports the practical, inclusive, and evidence-based multilateral work on these issues. We are ready to engage constructively in the First Committee and the other relevant multilateral formats on the military application of AI and lethal autonomous weapons systems. The same balanced approach is needed in outer space. Kyrgyzstan supports the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the preservation of outer space for peaceful purposes only. We welcome the continued work within the open-ended working group on PAROS Transparency and confidence-building measures, responsible conduct, and work toward effective implementation, international arrangements should reinforce rather than exclude one another. Kyrgyzstan supports international efforts aimed at ensuring the peaceful uses of outer space. In the field of the conventional weapons, Kyrgyzstan supports the practical cooperation to curb the illicit trafficking of small arms and the light weapons. We also support the practical steps to improve safe and responsible through-life ammunition management, considering national capacities, national ownership and the importance of international assistance. Mr. Chair, disarmament cannot be sustained without public understanding and participation. The International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness, initiated by Kyrgyzstan and adopted in this very room four years ago by the full support of the Member States, Today, we annually observe the International Day, which creates an important platform for bringing these issues closer to young people, academia, civil society. We will continue to promote disarmament education as an investment in culture, peace, responsibility and dialogue. As a practical step, Kyrgyzstan invites all Member States to consider organizing at least one national educational or public awareness activity to mark the 5th of March by involving schools, universities, and young people. We also invite the States to voluntarily share their experience and successful initiatives, thus helping to build a global network of knowledge and good practices. We also fully support the resolution on disarmament and nonproliferation education facilitated by Mexico. Mr. Chair, the challenges before us are serious, but the logic of cooperation must prevail the logic of confrontation. Kyrgyzstan will continue to support the practical multilateralism, regional confidence building, and international security architecture based on international law, dialogue, and shared responsibility. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kyrgyzstan for his statement. And now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, for Kazakhstan, nuclear disarmament is not an abstract aspiration. It's a responsibility born in national experience. 35 years ago, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, where 456 nuclear explosions had left a devastating legacy for our people and environment. After independence, Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced the nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the Soviet Union. That historic choice did not diminish our sovereignty or security. It strengthened both through international trust and cooperation. Our experience demonstrates that even in an uncertain world, security can be pursued through dialogue, cooperation, and responsible choices. Today, the international security environment is moving in a dangerous direction. New start has expired. The 11th NPT Review Conference ended without consensus on a substantive outcome. Nuclear arsenals are being modernized. Arms control engagements are weakening, and geopolitical tensions are increasing the risk of miscalculation and escalation. It is precisely in such circumstances that dialogue becomes indispensable. President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev has called for the relaunch of high-level dialogue among nuclear powers. Kazakhstan stands ready to host such a dialogue, including informal and inclusive exchanges that could help rebuild confidence, reinforce the NPT and support progress toward the CTBT. The absence of agreement does not diminish existing obligations. Nuclear weapons states bear a particular responsibility to prevent a new arms race, reduce nuclear risks, and pursue disarmament in good faith. As Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdyn emphasized during this year's UN General Assembly High-Level Week, The erosion of trust among nations is reshaping the international order. Restoring that trust requires sustained dialogue, respect for international law, and concrete action. Mr. Chair, Kazakhstan has sought to translate these principles into practical work throughout 2026. At the 11th NPT Review Conference, Kazakhstan chaired Main Committee II, contributing to efforts to bridge differences on nonproliferation, safeguards, and regional issues. Despite the absence of an agreed substantive outcome, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends on progress across all three mutually reinforcing pillars. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Three decades later, its entry into force remains unfinished business. Kazakhstan calls upon all remaining Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay and will continue to support its verification regime. This year also marked 35 years since the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site and 29 August, the International Day Against Nuclear Tests, established by the United Nations at the Kazakhstan's initiative. The enduring legacy of nuclear testing reminds us why the world must end such tests once and for all. On September 1st, Kazakhstan and Kiribati co-chaired the International Meeting on Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation at the United Nations Headquarters, bringing together states and international organizations, experts, civil society, and affected communities to address the human environmental legacy of nuclear weapons use and testing. Together with Kiribati, Kazakhstan is advancing work under Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons towards establishing an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation. Those who continue to bear the consequences of nuclear testing must not remain at the margins of our deliberations. Their experience must help shape the decisions we take. The first review conference of the TPNW, to be held later this year, offers another opportunity to advance the humanitarian imperative of nuclear disarmament and translate commitments into practical action. This year also marks the 20th anniversary of the Semipalatinsk Treaty establishing the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Asia. As the chair of the zone, Kazakhstan is working with our four regional partners to strengthen its implementation and deepen cooperation among nuclear-weapons-free free zones worldwide. Mr. Chair, the challenges before this committee extend beyond the nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan continues to advance President Tokayev's initiative to establish an international agency for biological security and supports stronger international mechanisms to address biological risks and strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Rapid technological change also demands attention. Artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies are creating new risks for international peace and security. Kazakhstan believes that meaningful human control must be preserved over the decisions involving the use of force, particularly where nuclear weapons are concerned. Ultimately, the challenges before us are not only the ones of arm controls. It is also one of trust. The trust cannot be restored by deliberations alone. It is rebuilt when states honor their commitments, engage across differences, and translate dialogue into action. Kazakhstan's own history shows that security and disarmament need not to be opposing choices. Kazakhstan will continue to work with all member states to reduce nuclear risks, uphold international law, strengthen the multilateral disarmament architecture, and advance our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan for his statement. And now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Bangladesh.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to extend our warm congratulations to all members of the Bureau, and you may count on the fullest cooperation from my delegation. 81 years ago, the world witnessed a nuclear catastrophe which still haunts mankind. We are aware that its aftermaths led to the formation of this universal body, the United Nations, to seek peace. Yet eight decades later, we find ourselves speaking of nuclear escalation and expansion of nuclear arsenals. Technology had made us reach an unimaginable height. Weapons have become faster, more precise, increasingly autonomous. In the name of national security, military expenditure continues to grow every year. All these are coming at the cost of erosion of peace-related initiatives. This brings us to a fundamental question: Are we building a world that is more secure, or simply a world that is more heavily armed? Mr. Chair, in Bangladesh's view, diplomacy, multilateralism, and renewed commitment to disarmament are the key to strengthening peace. Bangladesh believes that the only absolute guarantee against the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is their total, irreversible, and verifiable elimination. We remain firmly committed to the NPT, TPNW, and CTBT. We continue to regard the NPT as a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. We look forward to the first review conference of the TPNW later this year. The treaty has brought renewed urgency to the humanitarian imperative of nuclear disarmament. Likewise, the CTBT must finally enter into force. Pending complete nuclear disarmament, Bangladesh reiterates its call for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. Nuclear-weapon-free zones demonstrate that security can also be built through confidence and regional cooperation. We remain committed to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and support efforts towards nuclear-weapon-free arrangements in other regions, including South Asia. The map of nuclear-weapon-free zones, not of nuclear arsenals, should expand. Mr. Chair, the experience of the UN Disarmament Commission in 2026 also deserves reflection. Its substantive deliberations did not continue through the usual formal process. Unfortunately, most of the deliberations continued in informal mode. Bangladesh therefore believes that revitalizing the UN disarmament machinery does not necessarily require creating new processes or more processes. It requires us to make the processes we already have work better. Institutions and treaties, however, alone cannot guarantee peace. We must address the mistrust and intolerance from which conflicts often begin. This conviction lies behind Bangladesh's longstanding leadership on the culture of peace through its flagship resolution. At a time of growing polarization, its message is particularly relevant to the work of this committee, that peace must be built before conflict begins. Mr. Chair, Disarmament does not stop at nuclear weapons. The illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons continue to fuel conflict, organized crime, and human suffering. Bangladesh supports the balanced and effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. We also support stronger cooperation on through-life conventional ammunition management. Artificial intelligence is making warfare more dangerous, as autonomous systems can now identify and track targets with much ease and less accountability. However, technology is not our enemy. The question is, who remains responsible when technology is used to wage war? Bangladesh supports meaningful human control over weapons systems and continued multilateral work on lethal autonomous weapons system consistent with international humanitarian law. Military applications of AI must also be addressed through an inclusive, transparent, and UN-led process. Outer space and cyberspace must similarly remain domains of cooperation rather than of confrontation. Bangladesh supports efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and to strengthen responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. Mr. Chair, for Bangladesh, disarmament is not simply vocabulary. It is a commitment to world peace and to humanity. The measure of our security should not be how much destructive power we can accumulate, but rather how much of it we can give up for peace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Bangladesh for her statement. Distinguished delegates, I shall now call on delegations who have requested the floor, the right of reply. May I remind members that the statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I'll begin by first giving the floor to delegations who were unable to exercise their right of reply or their right to a second intervention yesterday due to time constraints. I now call the representative of Japan for the second intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In this second right of reply from yesterday, I will also address the remarks by the Russian Federation today. I will not repeat in detail what I said yesterday. Japan has regarded the facts of history with humility. Our defense capability is minimum necessary to ensure the security of Japan in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Under the Constitution, Japan has adhered to the basic policy of maintaining the exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries. Japan will never change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation. The allegation of militarization is entirely groundless. The government of Japan observes three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines. Japan, as a staunch supporter of the NPT, has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This, of course, includes compliance with its own obligations under the NPT, and Japan continues its cooperation with the IAEA in a transparent manner. Regarding the so-called enemy state clauses in the UN Charter, I would like to recall the two UN General Assembly resolutions that I explained yesterday, namely Resolution 50/52 of 1995 and Resolution 60/1 of 2005. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the second intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Yesterday, the representative of the Israeli regime read from the middle of the book. Today, I wish to read from the very first page. He accused Iran of attacking certain countries with ballistic missiles. But the first page tells us that the United States and the Israeli regime committed acts of aggression against Iran in June 2025 and February 2026. Iran did not initiate hostilities. It exercised its inherent right to self-defense in response to aggression by the United States, the Israeli regime, and those who enabled it. The Israeli regime must not delude itself into believing that it can commit acts of aggression with impunity while expecting Iran to remain passive in the face of such aggression. Iran has never done so, will never do so, and will resolutely exercise its right to defend itself against any act of aggression. The representative also repeated allegations concerning Iran's support for resistance groups. Here, too, the first page matters. Palestinian resistance movements emerged in response to the Israeli regime's occupation and oppression of Palestinian people. They predate the Islamic revolution in Iran and were not created by Iran. Their emergence can continue. Their emergence and continued existence cannot be understood in isolation from the occupation and the denial of the Palestinian people's fundamental rights. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

For first intervention today, I call on the representative of DPRK.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. It was not our intention to exercise whatever reply in response to the absurd and useless allegations made by Latvia and Sweden. However, we decided to make intervention because the distinguished delegations who sit here should know why they have to waste precious time here. As we already clarified, the DPRK's nuclear deterrent is the absolute might and the irresistible force designed from A to Z to safeguard our sovereignty, security, and peace against aggression and threat from outside. The status of the DPRK as a nuclear-weapon state that has been uncompromisingly and permanently fixed both physically and legally, with absolutely no turning back, can never be reversed in any circumstances or by any means, no matter how hard and loudly the hostile forces may deny in chorus with all sorts of rhetoric. Those who gathered here to argue for trying to change the present status of the DPRK should realize what a pipe dream they have dreamed of and what a useless thing they are doing. In fact, if there were no hostile forces behaving badly toward the DPRK, many countries would probably not need to waste time with empty talk but live in a safer and peaceful world. Let us be clear. The sovereignty, the security interests, and the territorial integrity of the sovereign states are ruthlessly trampled upon, and international law and order feebly collapse due to the unilateral high-handedness and tyranny of the hegemonic state. Such a grim reality of the international relations teaches us a serious lesson. A lesson is that fair advocacy and honest desire for compliance with international law and order alone can hardly defend anything. The DPRK has already stated that our national sovereignty and security have firmly been ensured by the virtue of the great strength so far and will invariably be so in the years ahead. Chair, once again, the DPRK delegation emphasizes that the friendly cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation is just and legal, which completely meets the words and spirits of the Treaty of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation, as well as the international laws. Thank you.

Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belarus.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been compelled to exercise our right to reply in connection with the insinuations thrown out, addressed to us about the role of Belarus in the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. We will not take up much time insofar as we delivered an exhaustive statement about this matter in this chamber the day before yesterday, but like to recall that just a few components having to do with our contribution to normalizing the situation. Number one, prisoner exchange. Number two, return of the dead. Three, repatriation of civilians. And four, accommodation for refugees. That's number one. Number two, today and yesterday, my country was mentioned in the context of the placement on our territory of Russian nuclear weapons. In this connection, we should to state the following. Amid the escalation of military-political tensions in the region, with the reckless militarization of NATO states and their scaling up of military capabilities, as well as the intensification of military activity directly in proximity to our borders, Belarus has to react to threats to our national security. And in so doing, we are undertaking additional measures to strengthen our military defense of our state, and this is jointly with the Russian Federation as well. We would like to pay attention to the fact that we will not engage in a reckless arms race, radically increasing military expenditures, such as what is being done by Western colleagues. In this connection, we proceed from the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Our response is commensurate with the growing threats and challenges to national security, as well as the level of escalation of the situation in the region. This response is exclusively defensive in nature, and it is conducted strictly in accordance with international law, which includes the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. I wish to also recall the fact that the practice of joint nuclear missions has long been soundly part of NATO's existence, and this is something which our colleagues from NATO... NATO colleagues mentioned repeatedly, including here in this hall, on the territory of five European members of non-nuclear weapons states. They have American tactical weapons deployed. The aircraft is being used as part of this arrangement. There are said to have been nuclear deterrence-related exercises conducted, if some think these are legitimate, which then do not undermine security. the corresponding actions of Russia and Belarus as a part of the union state cannot be interpreted in any other way. Thank you.

Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Chair, I am unfortunately compelled to take the floor, considering the repeated false and misleading accusations about U.S. policies and efforts. Russia continues to insist that our statements about its counter space weapons are baseless. I want to assure everyone that the United States does not make these statements lightly and that these statements are based on facts. In November 2021, Russia launched a direct ascent anti-satellite missile that struck a satellite in space, creating over 1,500 pieces of trackable debris and tens of thousands of pieces of lethal but untrackable debris. and threatening the International Space Station. Prior to that test, Russia argued that the United States claims about it having an ASAT missile were baseless too. We also have evidence that Russia placed weapons in outer space in 2007. As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, Russia has already placed weapons in outer space. Russian military doctrine and authoritative writings clearly articulate that Russia views space as a warfighting domain and that achieving supremacy in space will be a decisive factor in winning future conflicts. Our adversaries are prioritizing the development of extensive counter space capabilities, cyber tools, jammers, directed energy weapons, co-orbital systems, and ground-based missiles. These are all designed to blind, disrupt, or destroy U.S. and allied space systems. To defend against these threats, the United States must develop and field capabilities that deter attacks on our space assets, defend our systems if deterrence fails, and if necessary, deny adversaries the use of space for hostile purposes. The United States seeks practical steps to reduce the risk of conflict in space. We seek transparency and to avoid reckless behavior. We seek behavior-based approaches to stability, observable, confirmable, and conducive to the security of the United States and our allies. Chair, let me be clear. The United States remains fully supportive of the IAEA. Our record is proof of itself. Iran's nuclear program, however, enriched at a level for which there was no credible civilian justification. Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA, abide by its safeguards and obligations required under the NPT, and fully comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. President Trump is committed to ensuring that Iran never develops or acquires a nuclear weapon, and his longstanding preference is diplomacy. Chair, on the UN global mechanism, we strongly encourage partners to participate in the global mechanism and reject any attempt to derail or distract from it. Supporting the chairs, and only the chairs, UN First Committee resolution keeps us focused on making actual progress. We should not be entertaining any alternative resolutions, especially when those resolutions ignore consensus. By Russia proposing its own resolution, it undermines the global mechanism as the First Committee's dedicated subgroup mandated to discuss and resolve ICT issues by consensus. It is counterproductive and reflects continued bad faith. Chair, the NATO Alliance is a defensive arrangement designed to prevent aggressor states from conducting nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks on U.S. allies. NATO nuclear burden-sharing is critical to maintaining peace and security in Europe. The NATO Alliance's goals are clear: to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. NATO's nuclear alliance and the U.S. extended deterrence commitments in general contribute to our collective nonproliferation objectives by providing allies with the confidence that they can address strategic threats and remain secure without the need to develop their own nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the NATO alliance has never stood in the way of the United States' ability to engage in or secure arms control agreements with Russia. Indeed, the United States and many NATO Allies have reaffirmed their commitment to, and encouragement of, Russia and China to engage in arms control with the United States. We stand ready for Russia and China to engage with us constructively in this effort. Thank you, Chair.

Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Chairman, it is with regret that we note the ongoing brandishment by the United States of unacceptable, invalid, and utterly unsubstantiated allegations against Russia and China about the conduct of nuclear tests, which violate zero-yield standards. We repudiate and condemn the unacceptable statements. which have been heard in this regard, which were heard yesterday in this hall, we view such smears by the U.S. delegation as setting the stage for Washington itself resuming full-fledged nuclear tests. In so doing, the United States is seeking to undermine the CTBT, which is yet another important component both for Russia and other states parties to the treaty, an important component of the international architecture for arms control agreements. We underscore that the Russian Federation is continuing to comply with the nuclear test moratorium, which was introduced under the USSR in 1990. Russian President Mr. Putin, on 5 November 2025, categorically stated, and I quote, "Russia always strictly complied with and continues to comply with obligations under the CTBT. We have no obligations to depart from this. Nevertheless, if the United States or other states to the treaty conduct a live nuclear test, then the Russian Federation will also have to accordingly undertake adequate reciprocal action. We continue to adhere to this approach. We underscore that the complicated situation around CTBT is a result not of the actions of our country. The main responsibility lies with the United States. Since 1999, successive U.S. delegations have been using fabricated pretexts to refuse to ratify the CTBT, and it is as a result of Washington's inaction, that for 30 years there have been no prospects of the entry of this treaty into force. Russia remains a state signatory to the CTBT. We continue to adhere thereto. And in December of 2023, we concluded construction of our world's second largest national segment for the international monitoring system. 32 facilities have been certified and are operational. This is a real evidence, not in word, but indeed, of Russia's commitment to this treaty. We call upon states to undertake measures for the prompt entry of the CTBT into force. When a treaty becomes operational, then it will be possible to introduce inspections, operations on the ground to corroborate or refute, on the basis of evidence, nuclear tests. The spread of deliberate misinformation makes this all difficult, and a legitimate question arises. Why is the U.S. refusing to is this not why the U.S. objecting to the entry into force of this treaty? Thank you.

Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Mr. Chair. In this week's general debate and right of reply statements, the U.S. representative and some allies of the U.S. made groundless accusations against China's nuclear policy and development of its national defense, spreading the false narrative of the so-called nuclear threat from China. China firmly rejects these and wishes to briefly respond in the following points. First, China's determination to firmly follow the path of peaceful development brooks no distortion or smearing. China firmly follows a defensive nuclear strategy and the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and always keeps its nuclear strength at the minimum level required by national security. It has not and will not take part in any nuclear arms race. China has always adhered to its commitments of the moratorium on nuclear testing, strives to uphold the international consensus on the nuclear test ban, and has never carried out any activity in violation of the CTBT. China's nuclear strategy and nuclear policy have remained highly stable, consistent, and predictable, which in itself is a major contribution to the cause of international peace and security. Second, China firmly rejects any attempt to shift the responsibility of nuclear disarmament onto China. Facts speak louder than words. The following basic facts are indisputable. As the only country that has used nuclear weapons in actual combat, the U.S. refuses to abandon its policy of first use of nuclear weapons, constantly lower the threshold for their use, openly announced the resumption of preparations for testing nuclear weapons, invest close to $100 billion annually in building its nuclear forces, develops tactical nuclear weapons for actual combat, and openly seeks the most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile, The U.S. has long refused to ratify the CTBT, seeks pretext to resume nuclear testing. The U.S. also let the New START treaty expire, and is the country that has withdrawn from the largest number of relevant treaties and organizations in the nuclear field. The U.S. has become the greatest source of problems and creator of risks in the field of strategic security. The U.S. should abandon the Cold War mentality and hegemonic mindset, and effectively fulfill its special and primary responsibilities in nuclear disarmament instead of fabricating false narratives, putting forward hypocritical initiatives, and seeking pretext and diverting attention to maintain its own nuclear hegemony. Some allies of the U.S. should also stop the absurd practice of discarding facts and acting without principles to beat the drum for the U.S. Third, the so-called U.S. claim that China only supports arms control when others are the ones doing it doesn't square with facts at all. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China actively upholds the authority and effectiveness of the international arms control regime. has always constructively taken part in multilateral arms control processes in the nuclear domain, conscientiously implements the NPT and other international arms control treaties, and has made positive contributions to the international arms control cause. China has always been advocating that all nuclear weapons states conclude a legal instrument on the complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons, calling upon nuclear weapons states to conclude a treaty on mutual no first use of nuclear weapons, and proposing the prompt negotiation conclusion of the international instruments on NSA, we expect positive responses from the U.S. In response to the right of reply statement by the representative of Japan, China must point out that on nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, Japan preaches one thing and practices another, and its position is hypocritical and self-contradictory. There are serious discrepancies between the statement by the Japanese representative and the rhetoric of Japanese politicians on nuclear armament. We hope that Japan will completely abandon its attempt at remilitarization and the attempt at possessing nuclear weapons and gain the trust of the international community through concrete actions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Now I call on the representative of Israel.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, we have requested the floor today to react to some statements regarding the situation in our region. Israel has been engaged for the three years in a war against terrorist groups that populate the Middle East and undermine its stability, a war that was imposed on us. after the abhorrent terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Israel has acted in fulfillment of its rights and indeed obligation to defend its population and territory. It has said to eliminate the continuous threat upon its cities and communities in the face of increasing threats against our peace and security and our mere existence

as demonstrated not only by the unprecedented attack in October 7, but also by the open calls for our annihilation.

We therefore regret the statements by some delegations that disregard or rather choose to ignore the underlying strategic threats in the Middle East. What is the value of one-sided portrayal of the complex situation in the Middle East, especially if it fails to acknowledge the needs of a member state to confront continuous threats to its security and to right to protect its citizens. Chair, colleagues, there's only one desired solution to the situation in Gaza, namely the dismantling of Hamas government and military capabilities and the formation of a new peace-seeking government in

Gaza.

This is the only plan that can provide security to the parties involved. In this regard, and in response to calls we heard today from some countries in the region about imposing certain unconsensual processes, we reiterate that, in the light of the events that took place in the Middle East since October 7, it is clearer than ever before that unrealistic processes cannot substitute a real change in the security architecture of the region.

Mr. Chair,

As for the outrageous statement by the Iranian representative, we do not take classes on history or ethics from extremist dictatorships. Countries in the world, and especially in the Middle East, know exactly what these regime intentions are and plans are, and what threat they pose to the security and stability of the region. No amount of words can obscure that.

One day,

and it may be no far away, the Iranian people will be free.

Their murderous regime will be toppled by its lies, its corruption, and its cruelty.

We salute the brave people of Iran who were slaughtered earlier this year and ruled viciously by their own regime for decades, just for seeking liberty and justice. I thank you, Chair.

Now I call on the representative of Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish to exercise my right to reply in connection with the allegations from Kuwait. And this is inadequate information which needs to be qualified and corrected. The Republic of Iraq reaffirms our position concerning concerning the rejection of any attacks against the sovereignty of states and their stability and regional stability. Peace and stability in the region need to be based upon dialogue and coordination, as well as the fight against all any errors in assessment into with the trust of countries in the region. Iraq understands the concerns that were voiced by Kuwait pertaining to the attacks which Kuwait was subjected to. We reaffirm that investigations have been or conducted by the Iraqi entities have confirmed that no attack was launched from Iraq. The Republic of Iraq reaffirms that we will not accept having our institutions or our land being used for attacks perpetrated against other countries. And we respect all principles of international law and good neighborly relations. Iraq has already stated that we stand ready to cooperate with other fraternal states and to shed light on the truth, as well as to identify perpetrators in accordance with international law and international diplomacy. Thank you.

Now I call on the representative of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation has repeatedly explained before this committee and in other international forums the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. The IAEA's findings concerning the non-diversion of even one gram of Iran's nuclear material from peaceful activities underscore the importance of addressing this issue on the basis of facts and objective evidence, rather than repetitive political allegations. I will therefore not revisit this matter further. Instead, I wish to address a particular refrain repeatedly echoed in the statements of certain Western countries, including the US and France, that Iran must not and cannot acquire nuclear weapons. The persistent repetition of this hollow slogan is both striking and revealing. Iran was among the earliest states to accede to the NPT, and four decades ago took the initiative in proposing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, a goal it continues to pursue. Despite the heavy price Iran has paid for its peaceful nuclear program, including the consequences of recent acts of aggression, its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy has never wavered. Repeatedly declaring that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons is like repeatedly announcing in the broad daylight that it is daytime. When a claim is repeated despite the facts being clear, one must question not only the claim itself, but also the credibility of those advancing it. These countries persist in repeating allegations against Iran while remaining dead silent on unprovoked massive aggressions against Iran and its peaceful nuclear program by U.S. and Israeli regime acts they have not even had the courage to condemn. We therefore suggest that these countries abandon their hollow and factually unfounded slogan and replace it with a statement grounded in fact, law, and the NPT itself, that Iran must and can pursue a peaceful nuclear program. Let me also briefly respond to the representative of Belgium, who invoked the principle of the rule of law. If that principle were genuinely upheld, Belgium, along with more than 30 other Western countries, including Sweden, Iceland, Latvia, Denmark, Canada, and Estonia, would be held accountable before this committee for years of flagrant violations of Article 1, 2, and 6 of the NPT through the stationing of US nuclear weapons. on their territories and their participation in nuclear sharing arrangements. Unfortunately, what we witness is not the consistent application of the rule of law, but the selective invocation of it. These double standards allow certain countries like Belgium to evade scrutiny over their own conduct while leveling all unfounded accusations against others. That is precisely how the law of force prevails over the rule of law. In response to the statement just delivered by the representative of the Israeli regime, I see no need to dignify those remarks with a detailed reply. Nevertheless, I must call on him to stop shedding crocodile tears for Iran. The world has already seen the true face of their regime. I suggest they reserve their so-called sympathy for themselves. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Distinguished delegates, the interpreters have granted us 10 minutes additional for this meeting, and for this, I thank them sincerely. Now, I give the floor to the representative of India.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good afternoon, distinguished colleagues. India exercises its right of reply to the remarks made by one delegation. However, in doing so, we will remain brief and will restrict ourselves to the issues raised. Mr. Chair, as you are aware, India's actions in May last year followed a grave provocation. India acted in self-defense after Pehalgam terror attack where 26 civilians were killed. These actions were measured, targeted, and designed to be non-escalatory. Mr. Chair, the Indus Water Treaty, when it was signed, rested on good faith and goodwill. A state cannot undermine those foundations of trust and cooperation, and at the same time insist that the privileges flowing from the relationship remain untouched. On proliferation, India refers to the history of AQ Khan network, which contributed to the Security Council Resolution 1540 almost two decades back. This is relevant in the context of demands for unquestioned nuclear cooperation and transfer of advanced weapons and military capabilities. We urge all states and all responsible suppliers to exercise the highest degree of vigilance, not because of India, but for their own security. Mr. Chair, on India's capabilities, I want to underline that these are defensive in nature. They are shaped by our own security environment and are not directed against any state. Mr. Chair, we heard concerns about escalation. These are legitimate concerns. However, these are best judged by conduct over time. Nuclear weapons must not be treated as routine instruments of statecraft. A posture that relies on nuclear overhang to limit the consequences of sub-conventional activity raises the risk of escalation and not the prospect of restraint. Mr. Chair, in India's experience, crises in the region have tended to follow a recurring pattern. First, provocation, second, denial of responsibility, And third, appeals for restraint once a response has been made. Where those in power are neither elected by people nor accountable to them, their decisions carry no risk and impose no cost for those who take them. That is how crisis becomes an instrument of power. That is how instability becomes useful. And that is how the cycle keeps on repeating. Mr. Chair, the use of force by states under the garb of non-state actors does not erase the state's responsibility. India's right of self-defense remains intact. India has therefore drawn three clear lines. First, any terrorist attack against India will receive a fitting response. Second, India will not bow to nuclear blackmail. Third, India will make no distinction between those who sponsor terrorism and those who mastermind it. Mr. Chair, Jammu and Kashmir is an integral and integral part of India. We call for India's illegally occupied territories to be vacated and returned back. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, let me underscore that India does not seek conflict. India has always stood for peace and continues to seek peace with one and with all. However, if there is no accountability for reckless actions, then peace merely becomes a pause between crises. I thank you.

Now I call on the representative of Kuwait.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to exercise the right of reply to what has been stated by the representative of Iraq. At the outset, we are keen to support the brotherly Republic of Iraq to regain their role and position regionally and internationally, proceeding from our belief that a stable, secure, and prosperous Iraq is in the interest of the state of Kuwait and the region at large. At the same time, we call upon the government of Iraq to take all the necessary measures in line with its responsibilities to counter any aggressive acts from its territory and take all the legal measures against the perpetrators of such attacks. The state of Kuwait has already documented a number of missiles and drones that were launched from the Republic of Iraq. We have documented that in a number of letters sent to the Security Council. We reiterate our rejection and condemnation of such dangerous attacks against our territories from the territories of Iraq, which is considered an aggression against Kuwait and its sovereignty. It is also a violation of the rules and principles of the UN Charter and international law. It undermines peace and international peace and security. The state of Kuwait stresses its inherent right to self-defense in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter to counter such attacks. We also have our sovereign right to take any measures that will preserve our sovereignty, security, and safety in case of a repeat of such aggressions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Now I call on the representative of Belgium.

Belgium wishes to exercise its right of reply

to the honorable delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its critique on the nuclear sharing arrangements in the framework of NATO. NATO is a defensive alliance. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements are a key component of the alliance and exist for over 60 years. It relies on U.S. nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe. U.S. maintains full custody and control over these nuclear weapons. Belgium would like to remind the honorable delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran that these sharing arrangements were well known to all negotiating parties and accounted for in the NPT negotiations. In conformity with the NPT, These nuclear sharing arrangements do not imply the transfer of nuclear weapons from US to other allies. Belgium remains committed to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and disarmament architecture. I thank you.

Now I call on the representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Chair. My delegation is compelled to respond to the statement of the Indian delegation. We have heard the familiar Indian repertoire once again, an aggressor posing as a victim, a sponsor of terrorism lecturing others on terrorism, and a state developing destabilizing capabilities while presenting itself as the guardian of restraint. Chair, on the issue of restraint, We have just pointed out what has India done in recent times. It has canisterized its missiles, raising their launch readiness. It has put nuclear weapons to sea. It is developing hypersonic systems. It has used dual-capable missiles in conflicts, generating new risks. And it continues to extend the range of its missiles far beyond any requirement in the immediate neighborhood. The so-called accidental launch of a hypersonic missile into Pakistan's territory in 2022 also raises serious questions on its command and control system. This should be alarming for the international community. Chair, for decades strategic stability between any two nuclear armed state has relied on mutual risk awareness, restraint, and crisis communication. India's emerging military doctrine seeks to dismantle this equilibrium, imagining a new normal where conventional strikes against a nuclear armed neighbor can be treated as cost-free adventures. Wars do not follow scripts. The belief that one can initiate hostilities on any pretext control escalation and dictate the terms of peace is delusional. The events of May last year proved it when India launched an unprovoked assault and after suffering losses, sought a ceasefire. Chair, on terrorism, India should look into the mirror. The truth is that India's invocation of the terrorism bogey conceals a darker design. It is a tool to advance its hegemonic ambitions and justify the use of military force as a coercive policy instrument. A serving Indian naval officer has been convicted in Pakistan of terrorism and espionage. An Indian national pleaded guilty in a U.S. court this year to an assassination plot directed by an Indian government employee. This is the record of a state that has made extraterritorial violence an instrument of its policy. Pakistan has lost nearly 100,000 lives to terrorism. India has yet to condemn a single attack on innocent Pakistanis. It never will, because one does not condemn its own proxies. Chair, let me turn to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Jammu and Kashmir never was, neither is, never will be an integral part of India. It is an internationally recognized disputed territory under India's illegal occupation in gross violation of international law and numerous resolutions of Security Council. Chair, regarding the threats from proliferation, I would draw attention to recurring incidents of theft and illicit sale of nuclear and other radioactive materials in India. Just in one incident in 2024, a gang of individuals were found in illegal possession of a highly radioactive and toxic substance, Californium, worth 100 US million dollar in quantity. In another incident, five individuals with a radioactive device reportedly stolen from Bhabha Atomic Research Center were also found. These recurring incidents suggest the existence of a black market for sensitive dual-use and radioactive materials inside India. Chair, let me conclude by saying that Pakistan does not seek an arms race or conflict, but we will never be coerced and we will not allow India to manufacture space for war under the nuclear overhang. We continue to believe that peace lies not in posturing and propaganda, but in dialogue, diplomacy, and mutual respect. Until India chooses that path, responsibility for instability in South Asia rests squarely with New Delhi. Thank you.

Now I call on the representative of the United States.

Comments made by the distinguished delegates of Russia and China. With high confidence, the United States assesses that on June 22, 2020, China conducted a nuclear yield-producing test at its nuclear test site. We've shown additional data yesterday at our side event. We've asked China for an alternate explanation, to which we receive only stony silence. We've therefore called upon the world to conduct its own analysis from sovereign national seismic assets. Through such yield-producing tests, Russia and China are presumably fueling their well-noted continued rapid and opaque development of modernized and destabilizing theater nuclear forces. This type of development is the very antithesis to the purpose and vision of the CTBT, and we call upon states to continue to be seized with this matter. Chair, China's claim that its nuclear policy is stable, consistent, and predictable is simply not credible. For example, the number of ground launchers for ICBMs, as noted yesterday in my opening statement, exceeds the number of U.S. ground-launched ICBM launchers. This is not a small nuclear force. Additionally, China is developing theater nuclear weapons with no credible role except as first-strike weapons. Regarding China's comment that the United States allowed NST New START treaty to expire New START treaty could not be extended it was not legally possible the US did not let it expire meanwhile the United States is the nation pushing hardest for meaningful nuclear arms control chair the US stands ready to explore deploying, explore with an eye to deploying additional highly technical and effective verification mechanisms with China and Russia to confirm and assure the world that yield producing tests are in fact not occurring at any of our national nuclear test sites. Thank you, Chair.

Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available for this meeting. The next meeting of the Committee will be held on Monday at 3 p.m. in this conference room. I appeal to all delegations to be punctual to enable us to proceed with our work in a timely manner. The meeting is adjourned.