First Committee, 6th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. The sixth meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly.

Is called to order.

Distinguished delegates, the committee will continue this afternoon with its general debate and all disarmament and international security agenda items allocated to it. Before proceeding further, I would like to request delegations conducting consultations in the conference room to kindly to do so outside the room so that a speaker can be heard clearly. I understand that it has been particularly disruptive for delegations seated at the back of the conference room. We'll now turn to our list of speakers for today. And I urge all delegations taking the floor to kindly keep in mind the suggested time limit for the statements. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Sri Lanka.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow me to congratulate you and the other members of the Bureau on your election. Sri Lanka assures you of its fullest support. Mr. Chair, the effects of conflict are not confined to its territorial bounds. Sri Lanka has continued to experience this firsthand. when turmoil elsewhere in the world causes higher cost of fuel and fertilizer, higher shipping and transport costs, eventually leading into increased cost of living for the people. Whether we are discussing conventional arms, weapons of mass destruction, or new technologies, the risks created by conflict and militarization concerns us all. Mr. Chair, nowhere is this shared risk cleaner than in the nuclear field. The 11th Review Conference of the NPT ended without consensus on a substantive outcome document, following two previous failures. And nuclear arsenals continue to be modernized, while the role assigned to nuclear weapons in security doctrines remains deeply worrisome. Sri Lanka remains convinced that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. Until that goal is achieved, tangible steps to reduce nuclear risk are urgently needed, including through dialogue, arms control and fulfilment of disarmament obligations. We look forward to the first review conference of the TPNW and to engaging constructively towards the shared objective of a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, we reaffirm the right of every State to the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology, without discrimination and in accordance with IAEA safeguards. Mr. Chair, the verified destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles stands as a major achievement of multilateral disarmament. It should give us confidence in what cooperation and effective verification can accomplish. But the failure of the last two review conferences of the Chemical Weapons Convention to agree on outcome documents reminds us that past achievements must not be taken for granted. Sri Lanka continues to support the resumption of multilateral negotiations toward a non-discriminatory and legally binding mechanism that strengthens the Biological Weapons Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Mr. Chair, outer space is the common heritage of humanity, and we support work toward a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race. Space technology helps us forecast weather, prepare for disasters, monitor climate change, and connects people across the world. These benefits must remain accessible to all States on an equitable basis and must not be placed at risk by competition or conflict in outer space. For many communities, however, the most immediate dangers still come from conventional weapons. as a country that has fulfilled its obligations under the CCM. Sri Lanka is committed to supporting its universalization and achieving a cluster munitions-free world. Sri Lanka is cited as a success story in humanitarian demining due to its commitment to stockpile destruction, gender-responsive victim assistance, risk education, and mine clearance. Sri Lanka's Mine Action Strategy is aimed at achieving a mine-free country in the coming years. Mine clearance returns land to communities and allows people to move safely through places once marked by conflict. This is why disarmament is so important. It allows people to lead their lives free from the fear of weapons. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons likewise continues to fuel conflict and instability. Sri Lanka welcomes the work undertaken at the Ninth Biennial Meeting of the States and supports stronger international cooperation and assistance, particularly for developing countries implementing the Programme of Action. Mr. Chair, technology is rapidly changing the security landscape. Sri Lanka welcomes the commencement of the United Nations Global Mechanism on Developments in the Field of Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security. We hope it will remain an inclusive forum for all states to address threats in cyberspace, build capacity, and advance responsible state behavior. We remain concerned by the lethal autonomous weapons systems. International humanitarian law applies fully, regardless of the technology through which force is delivered. As AI becomes more capable, human judgment and control must remain clear throughout the lifecycle of the weapon. We welcome the renewed calls by the UN Secretary-General and the President of the ICRC to commence negotiation of a legally binding instrument on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Mr. Chair, I began this statement by noting a simple reality: conflict does not remain confined to the place where it is fought. That is why the work of disarmament matters equal to all of us, living in different parts of the world. Reducing nuclear risk clearing minefields, stockpile destructions, engaging in multilateral discussions on verification protocols, or negotiating new rules for emerging technologies may each seem like small steps to address the challenges before us. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of United Kingdom.

Thank you, Chair. As we meet in the 81st year of the United Nations, we are reminded that the international security architecture built over generations cannot be taken for granted. As my Prime Minister said in his recent statement to the UN General Assembly, this is a dangerous, turbulent age. Strategic competition is intensifying. We are witnessing industrial-scale assault by hostile actors like Russia on the information environments in the UK and many of our allies. Rapid technological change is creating new security challenges. At such a moment, we must recommit ourselves to the principles that have underpinned international peace and security for decades. respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and adherence to international law. The United Kingdom will remain a steadfast defender of those principles and of the international system that sustains them. We will be proud in standing up for our values and the rule of law, raising the cost to Russia of its illegal and senseless war against Ukraine. challenging Iran's non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations and the DPRK's unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Yet, Mr. Chair, even in a challenging security environment, progress remains possible. Last month, after more than a decade of debate over lethal autonomous weapon systems and under the outstanding chairmanship of Dutch Ambassador Robert in den Bosch, the Group of Government and Experts on Laws agreed a set of elements for a possible future instrument. A set of recommendations for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention is within our reach, including the establishment of mechanisms that strengthen international cooperation and assistance, and states' ability to respond to the threats and opportunities of emerging technologies like frontier AI. Mr. Chair, In New York in May, states parties gathered for the 11th NPT Review Conference. While we regret that the conference was unable to achieve a consensus outcome, the absence of a final document does not diminish the value of the treaty, nor the enduring commitment of states parties to its implementation. The Review Conference demonstrated that there remains significant common ground across all three pillars, including on transparency, risk reduction, safeguards, peaceful uses, and the shared objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, the United Kingdom's priorities are clear. We will keep investing in our defence, meeting our NATO commitments and strengthening European capabilities, not because we seek confrontation, but because in the face of hostile state threats, we must be unflinching in defending our people and our allies. We will continue to support the institutions and mechanisms that underpin the international non-proliferation regime. This includes strong support for the IAEA and its safeguard system, the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear technology, and support for nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United Kingdom remains committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Progress towards that goal must be practical, realistic and capable of commanding broad international support. During the UK chairship of the P5 process, we worked to advance engagement on transparency, risk reduction, and strategic stability. In a difficult international environment, such dialogue remains crucial. We will work around the world to uphold, promote, and implement the chemical and biological weapons conventions to reinforce the global ban and hold to account all those who use such weapons. The OPCW plays a vital role in keeping us all safe. We commend the work they are doing to support the Syrian government's determination to eliminate the remaining elements of the Assad regime's chemical weapons program. We will work tirelessly to manage the risk of conflict in outer space through practical measures that strengthen transparency, build confidence, and reduce risks. Our support for the mandate of the OEWG on PAIRS in all its aspects remains steadfast, even as some states seek to mischaracterize that mandate, risking a return to the competing tracks of the past. We will defend the norms of humanitarian arms control in the face of growing conflict across the world. Chair, frontier AI is one of the most significant challenges and opportunities of our age. As His Majesty King Charles said at his recent meeting with leaders of the world's largest AI companies, the task before us is, and I quote, "not merely to advance technology, but to ensure that it remains firmly in the service of humanity." That is why the United Kingdom will put AI at the heart of our G20 presidency next year, delivering on the potential of AI for good and dealing with the risks. As we mark more than eight decades of the United Nations, The United Kingdom reaffirms its commitment to the UN Charter, international law and effective multilateralism. We will continue to work constructively with all partners, in a spirit of pragmatism and dialogue, to strengthen international peace and security and address the challenges before us. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on the Dismantlement of the United Kingdom. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Lithuania.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Lithuania fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. In our national capacity, I would like to add the following remarks. The Committee meets once again at a time of heightened international insecurity. The disarmament and non-proliferation architecture is under growing strain due to ongoing wars and conflicts, proliferation challenges, non-compliance with arms control obligations, and the erosion of confidence-building measures. For more than four years, we have called on Russia to end its unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. We condemn Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, its weaponization of nuclear facilities, the use of chemical weapons, and its continued attack on Ukraine's civilian and energy infrastructure. Like the Holodomor of 1932-33, which sought to break the Ukrainian nation through hunger, today's campaign seeks to break it through cold. We are deeply concerned that Belarus, the DPRK, Iran, and China continue to contribute to Russia's war effort through military, technological, and other forms of support. Such actions undermine international security and prolong a war with devastating global consequences. We also strongly condemn the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. Mr. Chair, The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime and the foundation for pursuing nuclear disarmament. While we regret that 2026 review conference was unable to reach consensus, the discussions demonstrated the continued commitment of state parties to the treaty and its objectives. Lithuania supports efforts to reduce nuclear risks and strengthen strategic stability. We welcome the transparency measures undertaken by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and support the call for multilateral strategic stability discussions. We encourage Russia and China to engage constructively in these efforts. At the same time, NATO continues to make an essential contribution to international security and nonproliferation. For almost eight decades, NATO's nuclear deterrence has preserved peace, prevented coercion, reduced incentives for proliferation, and has helped prevent nuclear war. The universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains a priority. Russia's withdrawal of its CTBT ratification sends a deeply troubling signal. The UN urges all states to refrain from nuclear test explosions and to uphold existing moratoria. We also underline the importance of the Hague Code of Conduct and call on all states to provide timely notifications of ballistic missile launches in order to reduce the risks of miscalculation. Mr. Chair. Lithuania remains a strong supporter of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and we commend the work of the OPCW. We unequivocally condemn Russia's use of chemical weapons in Ukraine and against opponents of the Russian regime. These actions represent a serious violation of international norms and further undermine confidence in the global nonproliferation architecture. We also wish to highlight the growing risks posed by chemical munitions dumped at sea. As aging stockpiles deteriorate and hybrid threats intensify, this issue requires greater international attention. Russia's occupation and militarization of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant continue to endanger nuclear safety and security. We reject any attempts to restart the facility under current conditions and reiterate that it must be returned to Ukraine's full control. We support the continued presence and work of the IAEA. We remain deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear program. Iran continues to fall short of its safeguards obligations and has not provided full cooperation to the IAEA, raising serious proliferation concerns. We call on all states to fully implement and comply with the obligations arising from the reinstated UN sanctions. Lithuania is equally concerned by the DPRK's continued nuclear and ballistic missile programs, also by expanding military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to cease its destabilizing activities and take credible steps towards the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Amid an otherwise difficult security environment, we welcome Syria's continued cooperation with IAEA and OPCW and encourage further progress. Mr. Chair, Lithuania reaffirms the importance of the Arms Trade Treaty and multilateral export control regimes. Effective export controls are essential to preventing military and dual-use items from reaching aggressors and terrorist groups. We also emphasize that lethal autonomous weapons systems and other emerging technologies must be developed and used in full compliance with international humanitarian law. We support continued work within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Lithuania remains firmly committed to addressing the humanitarian consequences of armed conflict, including those caused by mines and explosive remanent of war. Our joint leadership with Iceland of the Demining Capability Coalition for Ukraine reflects this commitment, and we welcome additional contribution to this effort. Lithuania remains strongly committed to advancing arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, and to preserving and strengthening the international security architecture. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Lithuania. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Germany.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on your appointment as Chair of this Committee and assure you of the full support of my delegation. Germany fully aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. We meet in difficult times, or to quote the Secretary-General, "during a grave moment for international peace and security." While we debate matters of international security here at the United Nations, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues unabated and is now in its fifth year. At the same time, we have a fragile situation in the Middle East and two unresolved proliferation crises, Iran and the DPRK. All these crises unfold at a time of deep mistrust among major powers and of rapid technological changes. Tension is rising around the globe. Alongside, artificial intelligence comes around the corner and is challenging us across the board. It falls upon all of us to understand AI's implications, also in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. I hope that this year's first Committee will also offer an opportunity to gain greater understanding of the risks as well as the opportunities associated with AI. Nowhere else the world and governments come together closer to discuss these important issues than here in New York. We need strong international organizations such as the UN where, with respect and in a cooperative spirit, we discuss each other's views and perspectives and search for common ground. Germany is a strong supporter of UNGA's First Committee, and where there is room to strengthen it and make it more effective and efficient, we should discuss and engage. In this spirit, we are interested to receive further comments on the Franco-German non-paper on the First Committee working methods we released at last year's session. Chair, the multiple crises challenge the global arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament architecture. It matters to all of us when a nuclear power plant is illegally seized in a conflict and nuclear safety and security are at risk. It matters to all of us if two of our strongest and almost universal norms, the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention, are blatantly violated. It matters to all of us when aggressive nuclear rhetoric comes to the fore with the objective of deterring support for a country which was heinously attacked and invaded, and is seeking to defend itself against foreign aggression. Distinguished colleagues, Iran and the DPRK represent two unresolved nuclear proliferation crises with no tangible progress over the last years. Let us not forget that Iran's nuclear ambitions lie at the origin of the massive military confrontation we witness today in the Middle East. And let us not forget that Iran had ample time to address open safeguards issues and to provide the world with credible assurances about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Unfortunately, Tehran has chosen another path, a path of confrontation and of noncompliance with the legitimate demands of the IAEA and the international community. This is why the dossier is now with the UN Security Council. We call on Iran to urgently change course, to return to compliance with its legally binding obligations, and to address the international community's concerns about its nuclear activities. The DPRK likewise shows no willingness to comply with its international obligations regarding its nuclear and ballistic missile program. Even worse, DPRK's illegal weapons programs have been benefiting from Russia's political cover and technological assistance in blatant violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions which demand the complete, verifiable, and irreversible termination of all nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the DPRK. Let us not forget, all these UN Security Council resolutions remain in force and Russia, a permanent member of the Council, agreed to these resolutions. These two proliferation crises, in our view, show that we must not gradually accept the situation as it is. On the contrary, they should make us firmer in our belief that existing arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and export control instruments are worth fighting for, not just as a noble cause, but as essential for our security. Syria is a positive example where the nuclear file could be closed at this year's IAEA Board of Governors. We are engaging with partners in helping destroy the remnants of the Assad regime's clandestine chemical weapons stocks. We must stand up for the NPT, the CTBT, the BTWC, the CWC, and all the instruments that make our world safer and our lives better. While the Ottawa Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the Arms Trade Treaty remain cornerstones of the humanitarian conventional arms control architecture, the global framework on ammunition next year will hold its important first meeting of states. Germany remains a strong proponent of these instruments that show their relevance every day in preventing injury and death and in making the lives of millions safer. Wherever possible, we need to improve existing instruments. We hope that the CCW in November will be able to build on the consensus elements reached on laws at the GGE last month. We hope that we can make further progress in universalizing the CTBT. We would welcome if countries where seismic data suggest man-made explosions on a nuclear test site chose to open up and actively and voluntarily engage to clarify the situation. As a friend of the CTBT, Germany advocates for global adherence to the test ban norm. It makes our world safer and helps both our nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. In this vein, greater attention of us all is needed regarding a nuclear weapons state that, according to credible sources like SIPRI, is relentlessly increasing its arsenal by amassing roughly plus 100 warheads every year. Like many countries, we believe that greater transparency and dialogue within the P5 and with non-nuclear weapons states of the NPT would help avoid false assumptions and come to the right conclusions. It is simple. Opaqueness makes our world less safe. Transparency makes it safer. With this, I wish us all a successful meeting here in New York. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Germany. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Croatia.

Mr. Chair, Croatia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. The work of this committee has real consequences for people affected by conflict, landmines, and nuclear risks. Russia's war against Ukraine, nuclear threats, and violations of arms control commitments continue to undermine international security, while conflicts in the Middle East further underscore the need to protect civilians and uphold international law. The treacherous experience of war reminds us that peace requires diplomacy, respect for international commitments, and a shared responsibility for security. reduce risk, prevent escalation, and strengthen international security. Disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control remain key to translating these objectives into practice. Mr. Chair, the 2026 NPT Review Conference concluded without a consensus outcome, for the third time in a row. Nonetheless, it demonstrated the broad and enduring support the Treaty enjoys, and its obligations remain fully in force. We should build on that support to safeguard the Treaty's authority and to advance its universality and full implementation across all three pillars. Croatia remains committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons through effective and verifiable disarmament with undiminished security for all. Getting there requires all nuclear weapons states to engage in good faith and dialogue on strategic stability, transparency, and nuclear risk reduction. We call on Russia to end its dangerous nuclear rhetoric, to honor its international commitments, and to engage constructively in nuclear arms control. We are also concerned by China's expanding nuclear arsenal and the lack of transparency surrounding it, and urge China to engage meaningfully in these efforts. Alongside this dialogue, Croatia supports the entry into force of the CTBT and the continued development of its verification system to ensure its effectiveness, as well as negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. These are concrete steps towards curbing nuclear weapons development and strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Effective nonproliferation also depends on credible verification and compliance. The IAEA's independent and impartial safeguards work is essential to these efforts. We support diplomatic efforts to address concerns over Iran's nuclear program and call on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missiles programs and arms transfers to Russia. in line with relevant Security Council resolutions. Greece also underlines the importance of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation, calls on all subscribing states to fully implement their commitments, and encourages China to subscribe to the code. The prohibitions established under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions must be fully upheld. Efforts to strengthen their implementation and effectiveness remain essential. Where chemical weapons are used, credible investigation and accountability are indispensable to defend a prohibition and deter further use. Mr. Chair, this year marks a significant milestone for Croatia. In March 2026, Croatia became mine-free, having fulfilled its mine clearance obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. For our citizens, this means safer communities and land that can once again be used without fear. This achievement reflects almost three decades of sustained effort and international cooperation. We remain committed to sharing our expertise with other mine-affected countries, including Ukraine. Yet completing clearance does not end our responsibility towards mine survivors and their families. We will continue to support comprehensive mine action, as well as universalization and full implementation of the convention. Our experience also shows why the consequences of weapons must be considered throughout their lifecycle. Preventing illicit transfers and diversion, managing ammunition safely, and clearing explosive remnants of war all help to protect communities. precious support, practical cooperation in these areas, including through the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and a global framework for through-life conventional ammunition management. Ultimately, these efforts must translate into greater security for people. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas can leave communities without functioning hospitals, schools, or water supplies long after hostilities end. Implementing the relevant political declaration means taking these foreseeable consequences into account in military planning and operations, while also providing assistance to those affected. As new technologies change the way military operations are conducted, we must carefully consider their potential benefits and risks while ensuring that their use remains consistent with international humanitarian law. Creusier supports continued dialogue on the responsible use of artificial intelligence in the military domain, as well as the ongoing work on lethal autonomous weapons systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. As this work advances, human responsibility and accountability must remain at its center, with particular care taken to preserve human control over decisions involving nuclear weapons. The same care is needed as technological developments open new avenues for confrontation. In cyberspace and outer space, crucial support, practical cooperation, responsible behavior, and implementation of agreed international norms. Our goal is to reduce the risk of conflict and ensure that technological progress goes hand in hand with responsibility. To conclude, our work here should amount to more than the record of our disagreements. Croatia remains committed to working with all partners to find common ground and achieve concrete progress while upholding international law and our shared commitments. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Croatia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. Chair, I congratulate you on entering the functions as the President of the First Committee, and I assure you of Bulgaria's full support in this task. Bulgaria allies itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and would like to make several remarks in national capacity. Mr. Chair, we once again meet in a time of serious deterioration of the security environment, marked by heightened geopolitical tensions, armed conflict raging in Europe, Middle East, and Africa, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation risks. For Bulgaria, this is precisely the moment when multilateralism, international law, and the principles of UN Charter matter the most. Russia's continued full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a direct challenge to the principles of UN Charter and to the international security architecture. We remain deeply concerned by the permanent risk to the nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and the wider region emanating from Russia's invasion. We strongly support the work of the EAA and its director general in monitoring the situation on the ground and providing assistance to Ukraine. Russia must withdraw its military forces, equipment, and other personnel from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and return the plant to the sovereign control of Ukraine. Bulgaria reiterates its call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and stands in steadfast solidarity with Ukraine in the pursuit of a just and lasting peace based on the UN Charter and international law. Mr. Chair, Bulgaria remains fully committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The outcome of the 26th NPT Review Conference was regrettable. The absence of consensus on a substantive final document must not weaken the Treaty or diminish the legal obligations undertaken by its States Parties. We must continue to implement all three pillars of the NPT and to preserve the integrity of the review process. We support a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that is realistic, effective, verifiable, and irreversible, grounded in the Article VI of the NPT and taking into account the prevailing international security environment. 26 March marked the 30th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a key element of the step-by-step approach. Bulgaria, as an Annex 2 state, has signed and ratified the treaty and call once again on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. We also call on Russia to re-ratify the CTBT, to stick to its commitment to the treaty, and to refrain from any actions incompatible with it. Likewise, we urge DPRK to return to full compliance with all its NPT and EAA safeguards obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to engage in meaningful dialogue aimed at complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We also reiterate our firm stand that Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon and must comply with its legally binding obligation under the NPT and the Security Council resolutions that return to full and effective implementation and verification activities by EIA. We continue to support all diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a viable nuclear deal with Tehran that could provide assurances that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful under the IAEA's strict verification. Mr. Chair, Bulgaria remains committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Toxin Weapons Convention as indispensable pillars of the global nonproliferation architecture. We are deeply concerned by confirmed findings concerning the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine. Such use is prohibited under the CWC and must not be normalized or left without accountability. We also welcome constructive international cooperation aimed at addressing Syria's remaining chemical weapons obligation and support OPCW efforts towards the complete and verified elimination of all remaining elements of the Syrian chemical weapons program. With regard to conventional weapons, Bulgaria reaffirms its strong support for the Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We also welcome the global framework to life conventional ammunition management and look forward to its effective implementation. Equally, Bulgaria remains committed to the humanitarian disarmament and to the objective of the anti-personal mine ban convention and the convention on cluster munitions. As new and emerging technologies are rapidly transforming the security environment, we support responsible international engagement on artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons systems, and other emerging military technologies. In this regard, we welcome the adoption by consensus of the final report of the Group of Government Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. We look forward for the review conference of the convention of certain conventional weapons to adopt a negotiating mandate for the GGE to take forward in its work on the multilateral instrument on laws. Mr. Chair, Bulgaria will continue to work constructively to preserve and strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We support efforts to make the UN disarmament machinery more effective, responsive, including practical steps to improve the efficiency of the First Committee. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Bulgaria. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Italy.

Thank you, Chair.

Italy aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. And I will now add some remarks in my national capacity. We meet at a time of growing international polarization, with conflicts and tensions deepening, first and foremost, as a result of Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. The international disarmament and nonproliferation and arms control architecture is under pressure. The 11th NPT Review Conference once again highlighted the importance of sustained dialogue and convergence, even where consensus remains elusive, in order to advance to full implementation of the treaty across its three pillars. This makes our responsibility particularly heavy. At a time when confidence in multilateralism is being tested, we must preserve existing instruments, strengthen their implementation, and continue seeking areas where progress is possible. Chair, emerging technologies are transforming our societies, our economies, and the way wars are fought. Their military application and artificial intelligence, in particular, have become one of the most pressing challenges. Technological progress cannot be stopped, nor should it be feared in itself, but innovation risks to outpace our capacity to establish rules, responsibilities, and safeguards. Human beings must remain responsible for decision concerning the use of force, and international humanitarian law must remain fully applicable regardless of the technologies employed. Again, this background, the consensus reached this year by the GGE on laws is an important and encouraging signal. We should build on this achievement and transform convergence into progress, approaching the next stage with openness and pragmatism. Chair, Geneva is one of the world's principal diplomatic hubs for disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. We need to address the long-standing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, the world's single multilateral forum specifically.

Mandated to negotiate agreements in this field.

Italy's presidency of the Conference in 2025 sought to demonstrate that progress remains possible through extensive and inclusive consultations. The lesson remains valid today. When delegations engage in dialogue and genuinely search for areas of convergence, results can be achieved, even in a difficult political environment. Against this background, developments in 2026 are particularly regrettable. Russia's repeated exclusion of observer states and its use of the consensus rule as a de facto veto have further constrained a body the CD already struggling to fulfill its mandate. Consensus is an instrument for building agreement, not for preventing the CD from functioning. Progress on the core issues of the conference remains essential. Italy continues to attach the highest importance to the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT, 30 years after its opening for signature, bringing The CTBT into force remains an unfinished task that the international community must address. We, Italy, also continue to support the immediate commencement in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the Shannon mandate.

And FMCT remains an indispensable next step.

Chair, the same responsibility applies to BWC. Italy hopes that a working group on the strengthening of the convention will reach consensus on a meaningful package of measures. Strengthening the BWC is particularly important as scientific and technological developments open extraordinary opportunities but also may generate new risks. Outer space is another domain where rapid technological development and growing strategic competition make preventive diplomacy indispensable. And Italy strongly supports efforts to preserve outer space as a peaceful, safe, secure environment and to reduce the risks of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and conflict. We therefore attach great importance to the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of Arms arrays in outer space. We hope that the same strategic approach will also prevail during the present session of the FES Committee. Chair, humanitarian disarmament remains an essential component of the international disarmament architecture. The Anti-Personal Mine Ban Convention and the CCM have established strong humanitarian.

Norms and produced tangible results for the affected communities.

Recent developments, including withdrawals from the APMBC, make preserving their integrity and strengthening their universalization more important than ever, and Italy remains firmly committed to both conventions, to their full implementation, and to the assistance to affected states. We must ensure that difficult security circumstances do not lead us to lose sight.

Of the humanitarian principles on which these instruments were built.

These instruments are not relics of a long lost geopolitical era. The deterioration in the international security environment makes the rules, institutions, and safeguards more necessary than ever. The challenges before us are therefore considerable, from nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, to conventional weapons.

They cannot be addressed by weakening the institution and instruments we have collectively built. At a time where weapons.

Appear to speak louder than words, our responsibility is to ensure that diplomacy finds its voice again and its results.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the CD of Italy. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you on your election and to extend my congratulations to the other members of the Bureau. And you know that you can count on the full support of Colombia in supporting your stewardship. We are reaching this session, Mr. Chairman, in a year which continues to put to the test commitments on which the non-proliferation and disarmament regime are based. International commitments are worth as much as the willingness of states to comply with them, and good faith requires that they become effective conducts, especially when everyone's security depends on that. The difficulties to negotiate new agreements or review the existing ones and organizing our work has been extended to a good part of the system. The Conference on Disarmament has taken years without negotiating a treaty. The MPT Conference concluded for the third time without an outcome document. The biennial Program of Action meeting had to submit to the vote for the first time, a result which usually is adopted by consensus, and the same committee had to adopt its work programme through a vote. But if there's something that continues, Mr. Chairman, it's... But obligations don't disappear because consensus fails or because what we agreed on had to be subject to a vote. This shows that there's a much more deep crisis marked by a strategic mistrust and a growing distance between the ability to exercise force and its limits, controls and responsibilities which must govern its use. This distance appears when arsenals are subject to verifiable restrictions, when arms and explosives reach terrorist and criminal organizations, and when the incorporation of artificial intelligence in military functions advances more rapidly than controls. But my government is trying to recover and preserve the legitimate monopoly of force in accordance with our constitution and with law in order to protect the population. In the light of organizations whose trafficking, arms trafficking networks and financing exceed borders, national security is inseparable from hemispheric security, and every state must act on the networks which operate within their jurisdiction and cooperate with the others to interrupt them. That is why Colombia defends multilateralism in terms of disarmament and international security, which establishes verifiable limits to weapons, which strengthens cooperation against the illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and explosives, and which preserves human control over new military capabilities. In the nuclear field, Colombia is concerned to see the growing dependency of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines, which is worsening the tensions that are raised to justify its maintenance. We cannot accept that the worsening of the strategic environment become a permanent justification to defer disarmament, nor that the absence of mistrust is an argument to abandon the mechanisms that make it possible to build it. Article VI of the NPT has an obligation to negotiate in good faith when it comes to nuclear and the International Court of Justice pointed out in 1996 that this obligation means carrying negotiations to the conclusion. Colombia will continue to defend a balanced approach that combines rigorous compliance with the non-proliferation obligations with effective advances towards nuclear disarmament. The effectiveness of the commitments are put to the test in conventional weapons in terms of small arms and light weapons. The illicit trade and the right of states to provide for their own defense are not the problem. The problem begins when arms are diverted from authorized circuits and end up in ends in the hands of terrorist and criminal organizations. Preventing this diversion means establishing where they come from, who is transferring them, who is keeping them, and when do they escape our legitimate control. Commitments on marking, tracking, transfer control, and the management of munitions offer the tools, but its effectiveness depends on states implementing them and cooperating. That is why Colombia will present once again, along with South Africa and Japan, a resolution on the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. Anti-personnel mines, Mr. Chairman, especially those which are improvised, are a particular need for Colombia. Fighting them requires preventing access from terrorist groups to explosives and precursors and components. And we regret the fact that some states have decided to move away from the Ottawa Convention, to reconsider their commitments When a humanitarian norm is weakened by those who subscribe to them, we also weaken the will of those who have respected it. The needs for security, the elimination of pollution, access on a predictable international cooperation for the affected states complying with their obligations under the convention requires technical assistance and sustained financing, both for demining as well as care for the victims. And this cooperation should not give way to competition. Lastly, artificial intelligence raises an additional challenge. Its incorporation in military functions offer opportunities, but also risks that we still don't fully understand. As artificial intelligence-based systems acquire greater levels of autonomy, it could lead to results that nobody predicted and could reach a speed that would escape human control. The risk is that that this would escape effective human supervision. That is why Colombia believes that human responsibility and control over the use of this should be preserved throughout the life cycle of the systems. The report adopted this year by consensus by the group of government experts on lethal autonomous systems has particular value. The states managed to agree on a set of common elements. This result does not only resolve the differences on the scope and the nature of these rules, but it shows that it's possible to build understandings. Now, I would have to conclude by saying that, something that our societies depend on, they need to identify those who are impede. These activities could paralyze hospitals, electrical systems or financial systems. The global mechanism has the opportunity to translated to the responsible conduct of states in concrete measures of implementation and cooperation. Colombia knows what happens when these terrorist and criminal organizations aim to challenge the legitimate authority of the state. This experience has shown us that force cannot be contained with declarations, but with rules that are complied with and responsibilities that are effective. That is why what we need is to comply with what we've already agreed on and act where rules are not enough. Multilateralism cannot replace the will of states, but must lead to clear obligations effective cooperation. It's now time to move from reiterating positions to the adoption of concrete measures which reduce risk and protect the population. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Liechtenstein.

Thank you so much for the floor, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, the proliferation of armed conflicts, particularly international armed conflicts, reflects a dangerous erosion of the prohibition of the use of force, one of the foundational principles of the UN Charter. As this fundamental norm is increasingly challenged, global insecurity deepens and disarmament efforts are set back.

This is why military preparedness is once again gaining prominence.

Not only in our region, but around the world. Yet, military spending has not brought us more security, but the opposite. This global insecurity has led us to adopt our first ever national security strategy. This strategy reflects a heightened awareness of our vulnerability to the effects of armed conflict and geopolitical instability.

Against this already fragile security environment, we are deeply alarmed by the recurring threats to use nuclear weapons. Such rhetoric weakens the norm against the use of.

Nuclear weapons and undermines decades of progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. If nuclear threats become a feature of international relations, the risk of miscalculation and nuclear escalation will only increase. We are similarly concerned by the erosion of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The failure of the recent NPT Review Conference to reach consensus outcome comes at a time when nuclear weapon states continue to modernize and expand their arsenals.

Rather than advance disarmament.

This further undermines the strength of the NPT and moves us.

Further away from the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We must therefore redouble our efforts to nuclear disarmament. Mr. Chair, Liechtenstein remains extremely concerned by the situation in Iran. We reiterate our firm opposition to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon, which is illegal under the NPT. This pursuit is to the detriment of the security of the people of Iran, with considerable knock-on effects for nuclear proliferation. Liechtenstein calls on Iran to fully implement its obligations under the NPT.

Relevant Security Council resolutions, and its legally binding comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

We felt the regret that vetoes cast against the renewal of the mandate of the panel of.

Experts supporting the 1737 Iran sanctions committee have weakened the international community's ability to monitor and assess compliance.

With relevant sanctions measures put in place by the Security Council. These developments increase proliferation risks at a time when the global non-proliferation architecture is already under significant pressure.

As a positive.

Development, we welcome Syria's cooperation with the IAEA as an important step towards strengthening the international non-proliferation architecture. We commend the Syrian government for this course of action and reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA's indispensable work. Mr. Chair. We continue to regret the withdrawals from key legal instruments for the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

We recognize that these withdrawals happened in response to a changing security environment in Europe.

Liechtenstein reiterates the importance of adherence to international law and the protection of civilians, including through respect for international humanitarian law. The organization of armed conflict and the use of weapons with high explosive force.

With the capability to affect large areas has devastating impacts on civilians and particularly children. Children are disproportionately affected by these weapons, which remain the leading cause of child casualties in armed conflict. Beyond the immediate loss of life and injury, The use destroys schools, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure on which children depend. Liechtenstein therefore calls upon all states that have not yet done so to sign the political declaration on the.

Use of explosive weapons in populated areas and to fully and effectively implement it.

The growing integration of artificial intelligence into military operations is reshaping the battlefield. These technologies are accelerating the pace of warfare and are raising difficult accountability questions.

As machines assume a greater role in identifying and selecting targets, the risk grows that human responsibility is diminished or disappears altogether. Life or death decisions must remain under meaningful human control.

Liechtenstein supports the development of international rules and safeguards governing the military use of artificial intelligence, including the prohibition of fully autonomous weapon systems.

As a high contracting party to the CCW, Liechtenstein welcomes the progress achieved on the regulation of lethal autonomous weapon systems.

And we encourage to build on the substantial work already laid and.

Move towards a robust regulatory framework at the seventh CCW review conference. Mr. Chair, at a time of growing instability and rapid technological change, disarmament remains a necessity.

Neither disarmament nor international peace and security can be advanced while the rules and institutions that underpin them continue to be undermined.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Liechtenstein. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I join other, since this is my first time taking the floor, I join other speakers in congratulating you on your.

Election as chair of the First Committee.

I also congratulate all other members of the Bureau. You can count on Niger's support and cooperation. Niger aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group, and wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity.

Mr. Chair, this session takes place against the backdrop of heightened geopolitical tensions.

Continuing conflicts, and growing pressure on the international disarmament and nonproliferation architecture. We reiterate our conviction that dialogue, diplomacy, and multilateralism remain indispensable to international peace and security. Nigeria remains deeply concerned by the lack of tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

The conclusion of the 11th Review Conference.

Of the of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in May 2026 without a substantive income uh outcome underscores the urgent need.

To rebuild trust and translate long-standing commitments into concrete action nuclear weapons continue to pose an existential threat to humanity.

We therefore call for definite, transparent, verifiable, and irreversible measures towards their total elimination, particularly by nuclear weapon states.

Risk reduction measures are important, but are not substitutes for disarmament. Nigeria underscores that human control and judgment must be maintained in all decisions concerning nuclear weapons, particularly.

As artificial intelligence and emerging technologies become increasingly integrated into military systems.

As an early signatory and state party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear.

Weapons, we are convinced that the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against their use.

We therefore.

Look forward to the first.

Review conference of the TPNW under the presidency of South Africa and call for the broadest possible participation.

In reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty of Pelindaba, Nigeria calls for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and underscores the inalienable right of State Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We remain firmly committed to combating the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Through our National Center for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Nigeria continues to strengthen implementation of the UN Program of Action and International Tracing Instrument and relevant regional instruments. We call for stronger international cooperation to address diversion, illicit trafficking, and emerging weapons technologies.

In the field of ICT security.

Nigeria welcomes the operationalization of the global mechanism and supports a single, inclusive, and state-led process under United Nations auspices.

With particular attention to international law, confidence-building measures, and sustained capacity building for developed countries.

Nigeria attaches commensurate priority to addressing the challenges posed by autonomous weapons systems. After over a decade of discussions, we reiterate the urgent need for a legally binding instrument containing clear prohibitions and regulations. Human judgment and meaningful human control must be preserved in decisions involving the use of force and the taking of human life.

Systems whose effects cannot be sufficiently understood, predicted, or controlled.

Raise profound legal, humanitarian, and security concerns.

Indeed, in complex and rapidly.

Changing operational environments, no level of technology sophistication can remove the need for human responsibility and accountability. We are equally concerned by the proliferation risks associated with increasingly accessible autonomous technologies. Their relatively low cost, availability, and ease of replication could facilitate acquisition by non-state armed groups, including terrorist groups. Establishing clear international rules before such capabilities spread further is undoubtedly in the collective security interest of all states. Nigeria looks forward to the seventh review conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to provide the necessary mandate for negotiations to commence. Mr. Chair, Outer space must remain accessible to all states for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of humanity. That is why we reiterate our support for preventing an arms race in that sphere, including through the negotiation of a legally binding instrument. We remain committed to working constructively with all delegations to strengthen the multilateral disarmament machinery and advance our shared objective for a safer, more peaceful and secure world.

In this connection, we have submitted two draft resolutions, one on disarmament and the other on.

Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, on behalf of ECOWAS member states, and call on delegations to support them.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Ireland.

Thank you, Chair. Ireland aligns with the statement of the European Union and the New Agenda Coalition. We congratulate you on assuming the chair and offer you our full support. Chair, ongoing conflicts, severe and complex humanitarian crises, and growing threats posed by emerging technologies continue to shape and challenge our collective disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation architecture. Almost five years since the unjustified and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia's continuing violation of international law, including through the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, its nuclear rhetoric and threats, and illegal occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, is reckless and unacceptable. Ireland unequivocally condemns Russia's actions, calls for an immediate end to its aggression and for meaningful negotiations to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace that respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and is based on international law, including the UN Charter. Ireland is deeply concerned by conflicts and humanitarian crises around the world that are leading to death, destruction and despair. We are particularly concerned by the ongoing and dire humanitarian situations in Palestine, Yemen and Sudan. Restrictions on access to aid and violations of international law, including international humanitarian law, corrode the structures and undermine the pillars that protect our common humanity. We again call on all UN members to do more. Chair, Ireland reiterates that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons. We call on Iran to fulfill all of its legal obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to restore cooperation and engage fully with the IAEA, and to address the legitimate concerns of the international community regarding the nature of its nuclear program. The effects of the conflict in the Middle East and the Gulf are detrimental not only for regional peace and security, but also have global impacts on shipping and supply chains, energy and commodity prices, and on food security. We call for a permanent end to the conflict. Ireland has also been clear that the DPRK can never be recognised as a nuclear weapons state. We call for an end to its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile activities and for urgent steps towards the complete and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Ireland pledges its full support for the IAEA and recalls its seven pillars of nuclear safety and security and five concrete principles. Nuclear safety and security apply in all circumstances, including in armed conflict. Attacks and threats of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities that we have seen in recent years are unacceptable. We call on all States to adhere fully to international law. We reiterate that the norm against nuclear testing must be upheld. On its 30th anniversary, Ireland renews its call for long overdue progress towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to advance its effective implementation. Chair, addressing all these challenges requires a real commitment to peace and security, accountability, and, crucially, sustained political will. The NPT and its three independent and mutually reinforcing pillars remain the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Nevertheless, the failure of the 11th Review Conference to reach consensus for a third consecutive time is a matter of regret. We note indications from the conference that the nuclear weapons states intend to work together on elements such as strategic risk reduction and doctrinal transparency. Such efforts are long overdue and must be progressed without delay. Ireland urges the nuclear weapon states to make urgent progress on disarmament and meaningful risk reduction measures through dialogue and action. Looking towards the first review conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Ireland recalls why the treaty exists. the unacceptable lack of progress on advancing nuclear disarmament, given the catastrophic and lasting humanitarian and ecological impacts of nuclear weapons. In that regard, we note that the independent UN scientific panel to study the effects of nuclear war will produce its final report next year. We anticipate that it will remind this committee what the UN agreed by consensus in the pact for the future in 2024, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Ireland is of the firm view that the vital work of international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW need to be supported now more than ever in response to growing needs and demands for their impartial expertise. Ireland welcomes and encourages ongoing dialogues on artificial intelligence in the military domain and supports calls for a clear pathway towards a dedicated, universal, and inclusive process for comprehensive discussions. We also draw attention to growing international calls for a legally binding instrument on lethal autonomous weapons systems, which we support. We welcome the recent agreement at the GGE on laws on a set of elements of an instrument. While not fully reflective of the depth and breadth of discussions and understandings developed over the last decade, these agreed elements are a basis to proceed to negotiations of an instrument. We urge High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to seize this opportunity. Chair, humanitarian disarmament instruments and their implementation save countless lives. Ireland is a firm and consistent champion of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Fully and properly implemented, these treaties and their respective action plans represent concrete steps forward towards a world free from the threat of these indiscriminate weapons. We call for all States Parties to uphold their commitments and condemn the use of these weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstance. Ireland is appalled at the unconscionable and increased loss of civilian lives over recent years, including many children, arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Ireland encourages all States who have not yet endorsed the OEWPA political declaration to do so urgently. Ireland reiterates the importance of realising gender equality and ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all our efforts, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments are strengthened and made more effective and sustainable when gender-responsive policies are pursued. The invaluable contributions of civil society, academia, and most importantly, victims, survivors, and affected communities must likewise be defended and promoted. Chair, we collectively built the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture for a reason: to bolster peace and security. Ireland reaffirms its commitment to that architecture and calls on all states to do likewise. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Ireland. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Moldova.

Mr. Chair, the Republic of Moldova aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. We meet at a time when the international security environment is becoming increasingly complex and unpredictable. The erosion of armed control, continued armed conflicts, increased military capabilities, and the emergency of the new form of warfare are placing further pressure on the multilateral system. For my country, these developments are not abstract. As a country bordering Ukraine, we are directly exposed to the consequences of Russia's war of aggression and a growing range of hybrid, cyber, and information threats. The Republic of Moldova reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and an essential framework for pursuing nuclear disarmament. We regret that the 2026 NPT Review Conference was unable to reach consensus on a substantive final document. This must not weaken our collective commitment to the Treaty or to the obligations undertaken by each State Party, including the obligation to pursue effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The expiry of New START has further weakened strategic predictability and transparency. We therefore support the efforts to reduce nuclear risks, prevent arms races, and preserve and strengthen effective arms control arrangements. We also reaffirm our support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. and call for its universalization and entry into force, as well as for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile and material cut-off treaty. My country remains firmly committed to the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical and biological weapons. We support the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, and stress the importance of accountability for any use of these weapons. The international community must remain vigilant against the erosion of the norms prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. Existing verification, investigation and accountability mechanisms must be preserved and strengthened. We support the preservation of outer space as a safe, secure, stable and sustainable environment for the benefit of all States. We affirm the importance of full compliance with international law, including the Outer Space Treaty and support the development and implementation of responsible behavior in outer space. The Republic of Moldova supports strengthening international instruments regulating conventional weapons and preventing their illicit transfer and diversion. We reaffirm our commitment to the Arms Trade Treaty and to effective measures against the illicit trafficking and diversion of small arms and light weapons. At the same time, technological developments are changing the nature of warfare. Artificial intelligence and increasingly autonomous weapon systems raise important legal, ethical, and security questions. The Republic of Honduras supports continued international discussion aimed at ensuring meaningful and fully functional human control and responsible use of emerging military technologies. Mr. Chair, the security environment is also changing beyond traditional weapon systems. Cyber attacks, information manipulation, and the malicious use of emerging technologies can disrupt critical infrastructure, democratic institutions, and public trust. We have been experiencing this evolution firsthand for many years. Our experience shows that security today also means protecting the integrity of information and the ability of citizens and institutions to make free and informed decisions. Foreign information and manipulation, interference, coordinating disinformation and cyber operations with employment of modern IT technologies can be used together to weaken democratic resilience. We therefore welcome the establishment of a global mechanism on development in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. We believe that emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, require continued international attention, and the objective should be to harness their benefits while ensuring that they do not become instruments for destabilization, manipulation, or acceleration. Mr. Chair, for my country, regional security is inseparable from the security of our neighborhood. Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine continues to threaten European and international peace and security. The Republic of Moldova strongly condemns Russia's aggression and reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. As a neighboring country, we have Experience the direct spillover effects of the war, including increased security risk and intensified hybrid cyber and information threats. The Republic of Moldova also continues to face the unresolved conflict in the Transnistria region. We remain committed to its peaceful, comprehensive, and sustainable settlement based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders. The continued illegal presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory remains a source of instability, and it is incompatible with the Republic of Moldova's neutrality and with its security interests. We therefore reiterate call for the complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from their territory and for the demilitarization of the Transnistrian region. Finally, we affirm our support for an effective, inclusive, and credible multilateral disarmament architecture. Existing instruments and mechanisms remain essential. Their effectiveness, however, depends on political commitment, full implementation, and respect for international law. We believe that security requires respect for international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity, effective arms control and disarmament, responsible conduct in new domain, and stronger resilience against hybrid threats. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Moldova. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Myanmar.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, at the outset, I wish to congratulate you and the other members of the Bureau on your election. You can count on our delegation's full support and cooperation throughout the sessions. Myanmar aligns with the statement of ASEAN and NAM. Mr. Chair, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity. Myanmar reaffirm our firm position that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this context, Myanmar is tabling the resolution entitled Nuclear Disarmament at this session. Myanmar has also decided to biannualize the presentation of resolution to the General Assembly as part of our efforts to contribute to improving the efficiencies of the First Committee. We kindly request all member states for their continued support and co-sponsorship of the resolutions. Mr. Chair, after nearly 60 years, NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The consecutive failure to adopt an outcome document at the ninth, 10th, and 11th review conference is seriously undermining the credibility and integrity of the NPT. Myanmar attaches great importance to the universal adherence to the CTBT and calls upon all States that have not ratified the CTBT, especially the remaining Annex II States, to do so without delay for its entry into force.

We are of the view that.

TPNW complements NPT and contributes to advancing our shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is unfortunate that our subsequent plan to ratify the TPNW was disrupted by the 2021 illegal military coup in Myanmar.

We also reiterate the need to resolve.

Differences to commence negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty under the Conference on Disarmament. As a state party to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, Myanmar believes the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones can contribute to further strengthening global norms against nuclear weapons. On the issues of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Myanmar calls on the DPRK to abide by all relevant Security Council resolutions. As a state party to the CWC and BWC, Myanmar underscores our commitment to upholding international norms against the existence and use of chemical and biological weapons. Myanmar strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstance and call for holding all perpetrators accountable. Mr. Chair, the vast majority of civilian casualties and destructions are attributed to conventional weapons. The suffering and death of civilians are exacerbated when such weapons are transferred and sold to malicious actors, including terrorists and dictators, in conflict setting. Unfortunately, the people of Myanmar are experiencing this phenomenon firsthand on a daily basis. Since the coup, the military junta has been perpetuating indiscriminate attacks against civilians as a form of collective punishment for the nationwide resistance movement against the military dictatorship. Over 8,500 people have been brutally killed by the military junta. Over four millions are internally displaced. The most recent independent investigate mechanism from Myanmar report reveal a pattern of aerial attacks by the military deliberately targeting civilian objects, including villages, schools, religious and cultural buildings, IDP camps, and medical facilities. Civilian casualties are further aggravated by the military's.

Increasing use of area attacks, by which the military conducts an initial attack, followed by additional area attacks.

To target first responders or those attempting to flee to safety. Just a couple of weeks ago, the military carried out a deadly airstrike on a local market in the Chawta, Rakhine State. killing at least 49 people, including women and children, and injuring many. Mr. Chair, in addition to the use of conventional aircraft, the military hunter is increasing its operational reliance on non-conventional aircraft, including recreational paramotors, gyrocopters, and UAVs. Such operation has made attacks harder for civilians to detect, limiting their ability to flee or seek shelter. It is reported that the military hunters and broker in Myanmar had procured electric motors to divert them into UAVs in the Middle East. At any given opportunity, the military junta and its affiliates would divert, misuse, and weaponize dual-use items for their widespread terror campaign and systematic subjugation of civilians. Against this backdrop, we are greatly concerned with the military junta's so-called nuclear power plant and their potential misuse for non-peaceful purposes, including its military applications. Any cooperations from the international community, including a nuclear energy program, should be extended to Myanmar only when the military dictatorship is eradicated, democracy is restored, and the military is under civilian oversight. Mr. Chair, it is well established that the military's atrocities and heinous crimes against civilians have been fueled by the sales and transfers of arms, weapons, fighter jets, munitions, and dual-use items from certain Member States to the military junta. At the same time, hasty and warranted attempts to engage bilaterally or regionally with the military junta have emboldened the military to further perpetrate and intensify violence and atrocities against the people of Myanmar. We are of the view that any engagement with the military junta should not be facilitated or extended at the expense of protections of civilians and their lives. Taking this opportunity, I appeal to all member states to cease the sales and transfers of arms, weapons, jeff, jewel, other dual use items and related technologies to the military hunter to save the lives of the people of Myanmar. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Myanmar. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Rwanda.

Thank you very much, Chair, for giving me the floor. Chair, you and your Bureau, we are in good hands, and you can count on Rwanda's support. Chair, we align ourselves with the statement delivered on behalf of the African Group, and we offer a few remarks in our national capacity. Chair and colleagues, like most have said, we meet again at a profound time of evolving challenges for international peace and security. Persistent conflicts, eroding trust among states, mounting pressure on disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture demand a renewed collective action. Emerging technologies are also creating complex security risks faster than our norms and institutions can handle. Colleagues, therefore, building on its longstanding contribution, the FASTI Committee must respond to these realities and translate commitments into tangible progress. This is a call for responsibility. Chair and colleagues, nuclear disarmament remains our highest priority. We regret again that the 11th NPT Review Conference concluded without an outcome for the third consecutive time. This pattern risks leaving nuclear disarmament an aspiration rather than an actionable goal, weakening our cornerstone of international security. Continued modernization of nuclear arsenal and insufficient progress under Article VI further erode the treaty's credibility. Restoring trust requires political will and concrete, measurable implementation of long-standing commitment. Nuclear disarmament is also a humanitarian disaster. A single detonation, whether intentional, accidental, or caused by miscalculation by any member state, would have devastating and irreversible consequences for human life. Its effects would cross borders and generations, overwhelming any national and international response we have ever seen. Rwanda strongly, therefore, believes that total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat to be used. We call on all states to commit to this objective. Nuclear weapon-free zones demonstrate how regional commitments advance global disarmament and non-proliferation objective. Rwanda reaffirms its support for the Treaty of Pelindaba which establishes Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and embodies our continent's aspiration for peace and security. We equally affirm that all states have an inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under Article IV. We commend the agency's technical support and cooperation in harnessing science and technology for socioeconomic development, particularly health, energy, agriculture, and for advancing our development goals. Chair and colleagues, emerging technologies require us to cooperate responsibly while competing on the shared foundations on which we all depend. We welcome the first substantive plenary session of the Global Mechanism on ICT, and we thank the leadership that shared that mechanism. The dedicated thematic groups offer a timely opportunity for focused discussions that complement the plenary and inform practical recommendations, particularly on the capacity building. The global mechanism should identify priorities, including safety standards and shared principles, and advance shared infrastructure models and cooperative mechanisms beyond individual countries' capability. Chair and colleagues, the proliferation and unregulated flow of small arms and light weapons continue to fuel conflict, undermine peace and stability, and obstruct development, particularly on our continent. We welcome the successful 9th biannual meeting of the states on implementation of the program of action to prevent the light weapons and its proliferation. We must build on this momentum through practical, technically informed discussions and processes that can support implementation of both instruments and strengthen international cooperation. Chair and colleagues, in closing, Rwanda reaffirms its strong support for the first committee and its firm commitment to global disarmament and nonproliferation. Let us build on our achievements with renewed purpose and unity, ensuring that our institutions, treaties and political commitments meet the challenges before us and the hopes of the people we serve. Thank you very much, Chair and colleagues.

I thank the representative of Rwanda. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria.

Chair, congratulations on your election. Austria aligns with the EU statement. Chair, it would be easy to be pessimistic. The NPT Review Conference failed to agree an outcome for the third time in a row. Wars are fought with drones and algorithms faster than we agree on rules for them. But crisis is often where diplomacy begins. The Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed less than a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The NPT was negotiated at the height of the Cold War. and the CTBT was open for signature 30 years ago. Multilateral diplomacy is not a fair-weather instrument. It was built for storms like the one we are in. Nowhere is the gap between technology and regulation wider than in autonomous weapons systems. Weapons that select and strike targets without meaningful human control are a reality on today's battlefields. The warnings could not be clearer. The Secretary-General and the ICRC President renewed their joint call for binding rules, a call we echo. The High Commissioner for Human Rights joined calls for the urgent prohibition of weapons that can take lives without human involvement. The Emergency Relief Coordinator warned that humans are losing control of weapons. And last month, the heads of leading AI companies asked the Security Council for international safeguards. When those who built the technology ask for rules, Diplomacy must catch up. The consensus adoption by the GGE on laws of a set of elements of an instrument is a real achievement, even though important elements and safeguards were removed at the final stage. The CCW Review Conference in November must now take the next step: a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument with urgency. Austria, with a cross-regional group, will again introduce the resolution on autonomous weapons systems that was supported by 164 States last year. It aims to keep up momentum towards regulation, build capacity, and address aspects not addressed in the CCW. We invite all delegations to co-sponsor it and to join our side event together with UNIDIR and UNITAR on 21 October on the risks of proliferation of laws, including to non-state actors. Chair, nuclear risks are rising. Arsenals are growing and doctrines are expanding. Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which we condemn in the strongest terms, has compounded these risks. And artificial intelligence may be entering nuclear command and control. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, human control and oversight over these systems must be real, not nominal, as demanded by the General Assembly last year. We are alarmed about the increase of strident and unacceptable nuclear rhetoric. We condemn any nuclear threats, whether explicit or implicit, and irrespective of the circumstances. These risks are built into a security paradigm that rests on the threat of mass destruction. Nuclear deterrence asks of all humanity to accept the risk of catastrophe as the price of security for a few. This is a legitimate security concern for the vast majority of States. 101 States have now signed or ratified the TPNW, more than half of the UN membership. Austria is proud to have contributed as the universalization co-chair. The Treaty has also driven new evidence on the cascading humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons and new approaches to verification. We invite all States to support our joint resolutions on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the TPNW. Chair, 30 years on, the CTBT has built a near-universal norm against nuclear testing, backed by a monitoring system that exceeds expectations. But many monitoring stations are reaching the end of their lifespan, and we hear allegations of non-compliance and talk of resuming tests. Both need active answers, including possible new technologies. Our side event last Friday examined the origins of the zero-yield standard and the technical questions involved. Any nuclear test explosion, by anyone, would be a grave step backwards. Chair, the NPT Review Conference and the IAEA General Conference have showed how urgently we must address attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. Radiation knows no borders, so this concerns all of us. It must be addressed on a factual, non-politicized basis, grounded in international law and the expertise of the IAEA. Austria co-hosted a side event at a General Conference last month on the legal, normative and scientific dimensions of the issue. Peaceful nuclear facilities have special protections that must be respected. Chair, when explosive weapons are used in populated areas, around nine in ten of those killed or injured are civilians. Children pay a terrible price. Hospitals, schools, water and power systems are destroyed, and the harm continues decades after the fighting ends. The Diviper Declaration is a core instrument to prevent and mitigate this harm. 92 states have endorsed it, and we call on all others to join. What is needed now is a change in military policy and practice on the ground. Austria continues to focus on implementation, such as through the EWAIPA military workshops in Geneva and Aquadiscia. The Anti-Personal Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions have brought remarkable achievements in saving lives and assisting victims, bringing economic prosperity to affected communities. This success is now in danger of being reversed. We must engage urgently to ensure that the strong stigma against these inherently discriminate weapons is being upheld. As President of the 14th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Austria will work with the CCM community to bring the Vienna Tiana Action Capital Action Plan to life, universalize and implement the CCM effectively, and engage survivors in all activities under the Convention. January, Austria joins the Security Council. We'll carry the concerns of this committee into the Council, the protection of civilians and upholding IHL, the engagement, the risks of new technologies, and a strong disarmament and non-proliferation regime. And we will bring more of Vienna to New York and vice versa. Chair, 30 years ago, the world chose to end nuclear weapons. Today, we can choose to keep humans in control of the use of force, to protect civilians in urban warfare, and to move away from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. These are urgent choices on our agenda today. They will have effects for decades to come. Diplomacy must not wait for calmer seas. Austria is ready. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Austria. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Senegal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to extend my warmest congratulations for your election at the head of this committee and to assure you of the full support of the Senegalese delegation. My delegation would also align itself with a statement made by Namibia on behalf of the African Group, and would like to say the following in our national capacity. Mr. Chairman, there is no need to come back to the context in which the work of this Committee is taking place this year. There has been no notable progress in the seven thematic areas of this Committee. Nuclear disarmament has become once again a wishful thinking, where the constant plea of non-nuclear weapon states and civil society come up against the resistance of nuclear weapon states who justify the non-respect of their commitments by reasons as simplistic as the international security environment. On conventional weapons, technological developments, both in the perfecting and the increasing automization of these weapons, as well as a growing integration of artificial intelligence in military functions, are threats which are added to longstanding concerns over the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Deliberations on weapons of mass destruction are also underpinned by excessive politicization and a disturbing trend to withdrawing these control instruments at a time when new risks are appearing, especially those of a biotechnological nature, which require special attention. Though there has been progress in the governance of cyberspace, recent incidents show that artificial intelligence is capable of escaping human control, as well as the intensive use of drones and electronic tools in conflicts. This has simply confirmed all of our fears on the impact of new technologies on international peace and security. On outer space, basic differences have been halting progress in securing this space, which is vital for humankind. And what can we say about the international environment, marked by a continued erosion of the collective security global architecture, as well as a questioning of multilateralism and of international law, as well as a dangerous trend to replace traditional security mechanisms by unilateral conflict resolution initiatives. Chairman, while more than 110 armed conflicts are raging throughout the world, states continue to devote almost $3 trillion in military spending, and this has grown constantly for 11 years. In this context, Senegal strongly condemns the lack of action in disarmament authorities. Besides the three successive failures of the review conference of the NPT, the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament for more than two decades, obstacles to the holding of the 2020 succession of the Commission on disarmament we observe with great regret that there have been obstacles to the holding of the this work in the 81st session of the first committee the sessions to organize the process where we have usually have consensual determination of working methods they are increasingly used up by states to impede the conditions to properly hold this work The consensus, which was a means of political legitimacy of our decisions, has become an impediment to deliberations. Politicization has affected all of the thematic areas of the Committee. The room for dialogue has diminished and that of confrontation has increased. Trust between States is eroding. Trust in disarmament instruments and authorities is crumbling. And we are... powerless in witnessing the weakening of our collective peace and security architecture in contempt of the disastrous reasons which justified their creation in the first place following the Second World War. Given this collective amnesia, it is time to sound the alarm. It is our collective responsibility to recall that peace must be the founding principle which guides our action, and that diplomacy is the beating heart of this committee in charge of that peace. Chairman, for my delegation, it is urgent in this 81st session of the First Committee to focus on confidence-building measures. We must restore faith in multilateralism. in the spirit of dialogue, in compromise, and in good faith negotiations to strengthen trust among states, as well as with collective security mechanisms. We have to urgently go beyond our differences to find a true consensus around the major challenges when it comes to international security. More than ever, we must replace the logic of blocks and confrontation by that of cooperation and mutual respect in order to favor pragmatic discussions for the preservation of international peace and security. We must strengthen the commitment of young people and women, as well as that of civil society, in our efforts to maintain peace and security so that their prospects may be taken into account and that their ideas and energy can be enriched. That is a condition to building an international government which is credible and legitimate. To conclude, Senegal reaffirms its unswerving commitment to an international order based on peace, on international law and cooperation. It is in the spirit that my country has accepted the chairmanship of the Commission on Disarmament for the 2026 session. to recall that bringing positions closer together, overcoming differences, and improving trust is a collective responsibility that requires everyone's commitment. My delegation would like to thank States for the trust they have placed in Senegal to carry out this work. My country remains fully committed to playing an active role in the fruitful discussions and exchanges on each of the thematic areas of this Commission. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Senegal. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Burkina Faso. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, first of all, I would like to congratulate you, you and the members of your bureau, on your election. Rest assured, you have the support and total cooperation of the delegation of Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso aligns itself with the statements made, respectively, by the Republic of Namibia and the Republic of Uganda on behalf of the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. Mr. Chair. The work of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly takes place in a context that is marked by geopolitical tensions and profound crises, which raise questions for the international community as regards our vulnerabilities and the multifaceted challenges that humanity must face: nuclear weapons, constitute a threat to the survival of all of humanity as a result of the multifaceted consequences that would result from an accidental or voluntary intentional detonation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, is the cornerstone of our collective security system. Its universalization and the balanced implementation of its three pillars must be a priority for all. My delegation therefore regrets the failure of the 11th NPT Review Conference. As regards the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for my delegation, it is helping to bring about a world without nuclear weapons. The first conference of the States Parties to that treaty, from 30 November to 4 December 2026, will certainly allow States to examine the implementation of this important treaty. Regarding nuclear weapons-free zones, my delegation calls for such zones to be created in other regions. as Africa has already done. What's more, Burkina Faso reaffirms the importance and usefulness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is an integral part of the non-proliferation regime, and regrets the non-entry into force of the CTBT three decades after it was adopted. Mr. Chair, The non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a genuine source of concern for Burkina Faso and the countries of the Sahel. These weapons are the primary source of threats to peace, security and stability in that region. They are fueling many conflicts. transregional criminal organizations and terrorists, causing the deaths of thousands of people and massive population displacement. In addition to conventional weapons, improvised explosive devices are also being increasingly used by terrorist groups. As regards anti-personnel mines. My delegation calls for the universalization of the 1997 Ottawa Convention and invites all States as well as the relevant institutions to pool their efforts with a view to providing assistance to countries affected by mines. Regarding cluster munitions. Just like anti-personnel mines, they continue to prohibit access to and exploitation of vast exploitable areas in many parts of the world, thus delaying the achievement of the SDGs relating to food security. My country therefore calls for the universalization of the Oslo Convention of 2008. Mr. Chair. Burkina Faso reaffirms its commitment to multilateralism as the legitimate and essential framework for an inclusive dialogue to achieve tangible progress in the area of disarmament. However, my country notes with concern that despite a shared awareness of the existence of the threat, profound disagreements continue to hinder the emergence of a constructive compromise. It is therefore important to overcome our various disagreements and to show flexibility and openness to address the many challenges, including the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons, the arms race in outer space, the new cyber and IT attack capabilities or the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Mr. Chair, at a time in which we are engaged in an effort for inclusive development through the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, we feel it is important to recall the close link that exists between security and development. Therefore, it is important that the international community engage firmly in a process of genuine disarmament that would make it possible to mobilize financial resources for the sake of development. The international community must also work more alongside states to combat terrorism and combat the financing of terrorism. trafficking and transnational organized crime, which is conducive to the circulation of weapons through sharing information and strengthening capacities and capacity building while totally respecting the sovereignty of those states. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic.

Thank you, Chairman. On behalf of the Dominican Republic, I would like to express our congratulations for your election to chair the work of the First Committee. And we would also like to congratulate the other members of the Bureau. We wish them every success carrying out your responsibilities. Likewise, my delegation would like to align itself with the statement made by Uruguay on behalf of CELAC. Chairman, the Dominican Republic has the honor of speaking to this committee in an international context which is marked by deep transformations and growing challenges to international peace and security. Given this reality, we reaffirm our conviction that lasting security does not only depend on military capabilities of states, but also on respect for international law, the strengthening of institutions, conflict prevention, and the promotion of dialogue, cooperation, and mutual trust. For the Dominican Republic, multilateralism is still a crucial tool to tackle these challenges. And that is why we reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations and to the multilateral mechanisms for disarmament, armaments control, and nonproliferation. Chairman, the Dominican Republic reaffirms its firm commitment to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, as a fundamental instrument to move towards the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. The NPT Review Conference of 2026 revealed deep differences that persist among States Parties. The impossibility of achieving a substantive final outcome document should be a motive of concern, but not of resignation. As a result, we must step up our efforts to preserve dialogue and to rebuild areas of understanding. The Nepalese Republic reaffirms the need to move forward in complying with the disarmament obligations of Article VI, guaranteeing both the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the support of the AIE safeguards as an essential instrument to strengthen trust and to ensure its use exclusively for peaceful purposes. But the Dominican Republic acknowledges as well the important contribution of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, its contribution to the international effort to eliminate this risk represented by these weapons. This treaty reflects the commitment of many states to a world free of nuclear weapons and with the prevention of its catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. In this respect, the Dominican Republic welcomes the first review conference of this treaty, which will be held from the 30th of November to the 4th of December of this year at the United Nations here in New York. Chairman, our country reaffirms the importance of making progress with the entry into force of the CTBT Treaty. Broad international support reflects the commitment of the international community to its objectives and encourages us to continue promoting, through dialogue and cooperation, the conditions which are necessary for its full implementation. The elimination of nuclear tests is a concrete and verifiable measure in order to limit the qualitative development of arsenals, and so we encourage States who have not yet done so to complete their ratification process without delay. Latin America and the Caribbean have shown that dialogue and cooperation can transform common aspirations into lasting commitments. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is one of the firmest expressions of this collective will and a historic legacy which reaffirms our determination to preserve the region free of nuclear weapons. As a result, the Dominican Republic reaffirms its conviction that the efforts within the framework of the TPNW, the NPT and the CTBT and nuclear weapon free zones must continue from their respective fields to work towards a common objective, and that is reducing nuclear risks and moving towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Chairman, within the framework of conventional weapons, the Dominican Republic places particular importance on the fight against the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and capacity building to effectively implement the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, including the marking, registration, identification and tracking of arms and ammunitions, as well as strengthening ballistic and forensic laboratories as tools for identifying and tracing these instruments. and also the forensic examination of munitions. International security is also being transformed by rapid technological process, especially in areas such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and cybernetic technologies, which are changing the nature of these strategic risks. The Dominican Republic acknowledges the enormous potential of these technologies to promote the development and to improve the lives of our societies. At the same time, we must prevent its use from giving rise to new sources of instability, especially when they can affect a critical infrastructure, essential services, or decision-making processes related to international peace and security. And lastly, the Dominican Republic will continue to work constructively with all the Member States to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to preserve the central role of the United Nations. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Tunisia. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, I would like to extend my congratulations to you on assuming the chairpersonship of the First Committee for this year, and I assure you and the Bureau members of our support for a successful committee's proceedings in this session. My delegation aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Arab Group and the African Group. Mr. Chair, Tunisia expresses its appreciation for the crucial role played by the Committee in supporting efforts to disarm weapons of mass destruction and prevent their proliferation, thereby contributing to the preservation of international peace and security. In times of disarmament decline, marked by intensification of conflicts, including armed ones, augmentation of military spendings, and continuous amplification of lethal autonomous weapons systems, The international legal order must not be discarded. Rather, international community should work on restoring trust through multilateral actions. In this context, my delegation regrets that for the third consecutive time, this year's review conference of the NPT was unable to reach consensus outcome, nor was the UN Disarmament Commission able to do so. On the other hand, my delegation stresses the need to strengthen international efforts to put an end to the illicit trafficking of arms of all kinds and to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring them. Mr. Chair, the increase in investment in instruments of war and destruction at a time when budgets for peacekeeping and sustainable development are shrinking represents a dangerous indicator that threatens international peace and security. Accordingly, Tunisia calls for investing in peace and development, rather than in warfare. We consider that activating the United Nations disarmament mechanisms and ensuring their effectiveness requires serious and responsible engagement and genuine political will. It also requires all parties to commit to implementing non-proliferation agreements and to the prohibition of nuclear tests, as well as to ensure the application of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones with a view to eliminating these weapons. In this context, Tunisia reaffirms the necessity of establishing, without delay, a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It calls on all parties to engage in this process. Mr. Chair. Tunisia reaffirms the right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly in the scientific, medical, industrial, and environmental fields, and in advancing the implementation of sustainable development. In this regard, it calls on international organizations, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency, to further strengthen their support to states in developing their expertise in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On another note, Tunisia calls for unifying international efforts aimed at keeping the outer space free from arms or freeing it from these arms. In conclusion, Tunisia reiterates its steadfast and principled support for the right of the Palestinian people to recover their legitimate, inalienable, and imprescriptible rights, foremost among them the right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state with full sovereignty over all Palestinian land, with Al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Tunisia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Romania. Excellency, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Romania aligns with the EU statement. As this committee is in session, the degradation of the security environment continues. International peace and security are continuously and seriously tested, while long-established principles and norms supporting them are profoundly shaken. Beyond conflict borders, a sophisticated spectrum of hybrid actions, including nuclear rhetoric, airspace and maritime insecurity, disinformation, cyber attacks or sabotage, impact our societies. It's unfortunate that I speak for a country that has direct experience from our immediate neighborhood. Since the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, there have been too many instances of irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and broader hybrid actions that undermine regional and global security. Since the early days of the aggression, safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine were jeopardized, increasing the risk of a nuclear accident or incident with potential severe consequences for our region and beyond. The situation at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains deeply concerning. We recall the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the IAEA's General Conference and Board of Governors demanding the Russian Federation to withdraw from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and to return its full control to Ukraine. The need to address manifold threats on freedom and safety of navigation in the Black Sea were prominently stressed during the UN General Assembly High-Level Week just recently across the board. The link with international security is undeniable. Continued and intensified strikes on Ukraine's ports and commercial shipping on the Danube and the Black Sea cause serious disruptions to global food supply chains and directly impact food prices, particularly in Africa and in the Middle East. Drone breaches of national airspace are unacceptable and must stop. Freedom and safety of navigation in the Black Sea must be restored, and Romania urges a moratorium on attacks against merchant ships and port infrastructure in the Black Sea. We urge an immediate cessation of the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian Federation must choose diplomacy over escalation, change course towards peace, and accept a ceasefire. We reiterate our support for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in line with international law and the UN Charter, and in full observance of the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders, with robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine. Chair, the disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control architecture is under unprecedented pressure. Nuclear proliferation challenges continue to impact the security landscape and to undermine the non-proliferation regime established under the NPT. The DPRK continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. DPRK must engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards obligations remains a matter of grave concern for the international community. Iran must reverse course, return to full compliance with its obligations under the NPT, and fully cooperate with the IAEA. Alongside our partners, we have always made clear that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. Efforts to promote solutions through dialogue and diplomatic means remain essential. DPRK's and Iran's arms transfers with the Russian Federation, fueling the war of aggression, concern European and global security. Enabling the aggressor is equally illegal, as it is a violation of Security Council resolutions and UN Charter. Mr. Chairman, Romania reaffirms its strong commitment to the NPT and to the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. Even if no consensus has been reached on the substantive final document of the 2026 NPT Review Conference, The treaty remains the cornerstone and our most effective instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, advancing disarmament, and enabling the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT. The IAEA's role in safeguards, safety, security, and peaceful uses remain essential. Romania will continue to strongly support the IAEA's indispensable role for peace and development as a member of the Board of Governance for the term 2025. 2027. Multilateral export regimes remain an asset for both nonproliferation and cooperation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And Romania continues to support a realistic, pragmatic, and progressive approach to nuclear disarmament, one that prioritizes reducing risks, preventing the use of nuclear weapons, and strengthening global nonproliferation. I would also want to highlight on this particular occasion our joint reflection with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to support responsible and sustainable use of nuclear energy, leading to the elaboration by Carnegie of a set of principles promoting responsible nuclear energy conduct. These principles, available online, recognize the centrality of trust in the responsible handling of nuclear energy and technology and may inspire refreshing points in support of existing institutions, norms, and frameworks. Chair, other areas also require our highest attention. The outer space domain must remain accessible and peaceful, and we remain committed to developing norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior to reduce space threats. Efforts towards responsible use of AI in the military domain is a timely and necessary discussion. We favor a layered governance approach based on gradually developed national strategies. The responsible integration of AI in the military domain must be contingent upon compliance with applicable international law, the maintenance of human control on decision-making points, and the assurance that the technological process contributes to strengthening international peace and security. Finally, Mr. Chairman, Romania will continue to support the efforts of streamlining and enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee's programme. and working methods for future sessions, also in line with resolution 79/327 on revitalization of the work of the General Assembly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Armenia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Albania. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Allow me to congratulate you and the members of the Bureau on the election and wish you every success in guiding our work. Albania aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add a few remarks in its national capacity. We meet at a time of profound strain for international peace and security. Conflicts are multiplying, often accompanied by serious violation of international law and international humanitarian law. while geopolitical tensions, military capabilities and mistrust among states continue to grow. Albania remains firmly committed to the UN Charter, international law and effective multilateralism. Preserving and implementing existing disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation frameworks while adapting them to emerging security challenges is essential. Mr. Chair. Russia's continued war of aggression against Ukraine remains a grave threat to international peace and security. The continued occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant also poses serious risks to the nuclear safety and security of Europe and beyond. Albania condemns Russia's aggression and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and calls for diplomatic efforts towards a just, lasting peace in accordance with the UN Charter. The broader escalation in the Middle East also raises serious security and nonproliferation concerns. Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons and must fulfill its safeguards obligations and cooperate fully with the IAEA. Albania supports diplomatic efforts towards a comprehensive and verifiable resolution of concerns surrounding Iran's nuclear program. The DPRK must likewise abandon its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. Mr. Chair, the treaty on the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime and an essential framework for nuclear disarmament. While regretting the absence of consensus on the 2026 Review Conference, Albania stresses that this does not diminish the treaty or the obligation of its state parties. Progress towards implementing Chapter VI remains essential. On the 13th anniversary of the CTBT, Albania calls for its universalization and entry into force, including through ratification by the remaining States. We reaffirm our support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, and for preventing weapons of mass destruction from reaching non-state actors. We also support the Arms Trade Treaty and international efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking and division of small arms and light weapons. Mr. Chair, emerging technologies are rapidly reshaping the security environment. Albania supports continued work on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to address lethal autonomous weapon systems and promote responsible approaches to artificial intelligence in military applications. Human responsibility, international law must remain central as these technologies evolve. We also support preserving outer space as a secure, stable and sustainable domain in full respect of international law. Cybersecurity is another critical dimension of international peace. and security. Having experienced serious cyber attacks against government infrastructure and public services, Albania attaches particular importance to international cooperation, national resilience, and responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Our commitment is reflected in the signing by the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania, His Excellency Mr. Ferit Hoxha, of the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime on the margins of this year's High-Level Week. Albania continues to face sophisticated and persistent cyber threats, including activities associated with advanced persistent threat groups and state-sponsored actors, targeting government institutions, critical infrastructure, and essential services. We therefore welcome the Global Mechanism on ICTs and support capacity building to strengthen states' technical, institutional, and human capabilities to prevent and respond to such threats. Albania also remains committed to the meaningful and safe participation of women and youth in peace and security processes. Their contributions are indispensable to building sustainable peace and addressing evolving security challenges. At this critical moment, Albania will continue working with all partners to strengthen multilateral cooperation, uphold international law, and advance practical progress on disarmament and international security. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Albania for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Ukraine. On behalf of a group of countries, Excellency, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair, Ukraine's delegation would like to congratulate you and the members of the Bureau on the election and wish you success in your important mission. I have the honor to deliver a version of a statement on behalf of the following countries: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, European Union, and my own country, Ukraine. Russia's war of aggression. against Ukraine is a blatant violation of international law, including the United Nations Charter, and poses a threat not only to Ukraine, but also to international peace and security, the rules-based international order, and the global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's actions, including its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine, which further demonstrates how Russia's repeated conduct undermines international commitments, peace, and security. Russia continues to contravene the principles of the Helsinki Decalogue and disregard security assurances it provided in the Budapest Memorandum. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, including territorial sea, as well as for Ukraine's inherent right to self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter against Russia's ongoing illegal war of aggression. We stress that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force may be recognized as lawful. We strongly condemn Russia's continued attacks, killing civilians and destroying civilian sites, including critical energy infrastructure. We stress that Russia's repeated attacks seriously undermine the energy security of Ukraine and its people, especially regarding the approaching winter. Such attacks, carried out against the backdrop of international efforts aimed at restoration of comprehensive, just, and lasting peace for Ukraine, reveals Russia's real goals and intentions, demonstrating no genuine interest in ending its war of aggression. We urge Russia to agree to a complete and unconditional ceasefire as a first step towards restoring a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace, which must respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized border, including territorial sea, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. We reiterate our demand that Russia cease its war of aggression against Ukraine and ensure the full, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all its forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized border. Mr. Chair, we strongly condemn the continued military support provided by Belarus, Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which enables Russia to sustain its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, Russia's seizure, occupation, and militarization of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, combined with its repeated large-scale strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure, have significantly increased risks posed to nuclear safety and security with potential consequences far beyond Ukraine. In this regard, we condemn the forcible seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and would like to recall the UN General Assembly resolution, safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, as well as relevant resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference and Board of Governors, which demand that the Russian Federation urgently withdraw its military and other unauthorized personnel from the nuclear power plant of Zaporizhzhia and immediately return the plant to the full control of the sovereign and competent authorities of Ukraine to ensure safety and security, and in order for the agency to conduct safe, efficient, and effective safeguard implementation. We firmly reject any attempts to restart the reactors at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant while it remains under Russian occupation and the necessary conditions for safe and secure operation based on well-established nuclear safety principles are not met. The nuclear safety and security situation at the plant remains extremely fragile. Repeated losses of off-site power, equipment degradation, maintenance constraints, Unreliable water supply and shortages of qualified personnel continue to increase the risk of a severe nuclear accident. The ability of nuclear personnel to carry out their duties professionally, safely, and free from undue pressure is fundamental to the safe and secure operation of any nuclear facility. Reports of detention, intimidation, coercion, and reprisals against Ukrainian employees of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are therefore deeply troubling and raise concerns about the conditions under which nuclear personnel are expected to perform their duties. We therefore call for the immediate release of all Ukrainian personnel of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant who have been arbitrarily detained. The safe operation of a nuclear power plant depends on experienced and qualified staff, continuity of expertise, and the preservation of institutional knowledge. We stress the importance of ensuring the mission's standards and access of the agency throughout the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant site. We reiterate our demand that Russia immediately cease all military activities affecting nuclear facilities and related civilian infrastructure, withdraw its military equipment and other unauthorized personnel from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The full control over the plant by the competent Ukrainian authorities must be restored immediately. We remain steadfast in our commitment to accountability for serious violations under international law, including alleged crimes committed in the context of the aggression against Ukraine and for the extensive damage caused by Russia's illegal actions. We urge the international community to use all its influence and intensify pressure on Russia to end its war of aggression against Ukraine and restore a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace for Ukraine. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Ukraine for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ghana. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, at the outset, allow me to extend my delegation's warm congratulations on your election, as well as other members of the Bureau, and assure you of Ghana's full support and constructive cooperation. Ghana aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the African states and non-aligned countries, and wishes to make the following remarks in his national capacity. Mr. Chair, against the backdrop of the 81st session theme, restoring trust, managing transformation, global military expenditure has edged to an unprecedented 2.9 trillion. This staggering allocation highlights a critical security paradox. Massive investment in arms have not fortified collective stability, but rather intensified geopolitical frictions while starving sustainable development. For Ghana, disarmament is not an abstract ideal, but a practical imperative for the protection of human life. To translate this imperative into action, my delegation will focus on three core priorities, restoring trust in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, protecting people from the weapons that cause daily loss of life, and managing the security implications of emerging technologies. Mr. Chair, nuclear disarmament remains vital to international peace and security. My delegation views the erosion of the global arms control architecture, the expiration of the New START treaty limits, and the resurgence of nuclear rhetoric with profound concern. Mr. Chair. The NPT remains a cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Ghana, therefore, calls upon the nuclear weapons states to reaffirm their unequivocal undertaking under Article VI of the treaty and to implement the full commitments agreed at the various review conferences. As a state party to the TPNW, Ghana was honored to host the regional conference on nonproliferation in Accra in January this year. Ghana considers the TPNW to complement the reinforced NPT. We look forward to a successful first review conference of the treaty in December. Mr. Chair, in West Africa, human security is acutely threatened by illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons, and IEDs. To prevent insecurity from spreading from the Sahel to coastal states, Ghana acts through the Accra Initiative and its National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Notably, our recent gun amnesty program secured over 4,000 unregistered firearms, leading to the public destruction of 2,000 arms in January 2026. Ghana stands ready to share this experience in support of the African Union's Silencing the Guns Initiative. While the national measure remains vital, they must be underpinned by robust international cooperation. Ghana calls for the enhanced implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its international tracing instruments, alongside the universalization of the Arms Treaty. We also urge all full execution of the global framework for through-life conventional ammunition management, supported by sustained international assistance and capacity building tailored for African states. Mr. Chair, on emerging technologies, Ghana maintains that decisions over life and death must never be delegated to machines. My delegation supports the negotiation of all legally binding instruments on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Ghana reaffirms the international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies in cyberspace, and welcomes the commitments of this year's global mechanism on ICTs. For developing countries, capacity building remains fundamental on an open, secure, stable, and peaceful ICT environment. Ghana further supports the legally binding measures for prevention of an arms race in outer space. Mr. Chair, as the President of the General Assembly underscored at the opening of this session, trust can merely be sought. It must be earned through action. Ghana therefore remains committed to engaging constructively with all partners to build consensus and advance the meaningful outcome. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ghana for his statement. I shall now call on delegations who have requested the right of reply. I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right to reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I now call on the representative of Sweden. You have the floor.

Thank you. Thank you, Chair. Sweden would like to exercise its right of reply in response to claims made by the Islamic Republic of Iran. I have three brief remarks. Firstly, there are no nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. Secondly, Sweden recognizes the compatibility with the nuclear sharing arrangements of NATO and the NPT as they were in place and well known to all negotiating parties at the time of the treaty's entry into force, also contributing to the aim of nonproliferation. Thirdly, Sweden remains in excellent standing with the NPT, fulfilling all its obligations and continuing to support the treaty as the cornerstone of the nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. We invite the Islamic Republic of Iran to join us in this spirit. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the representative of Sweden. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the floor. My delegation condemns the statements made by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Germany, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and some other countries who urged the DPRK to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, accusing it as in contradiction with the UN Security Council's so-called resolutions. As mentioned before, the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons is inalienable and unquestionable sovereign right of the DPRK to defend itself. My delegation categorically rejects the sophism of those delegations as an unpardonable infringement upon the sovereignty of the DPRK. My delegation, my country, has never recognized but totally rejected the UNSC sanctions resolutions, which are political product fabricated by the hostile forces in pursuit of sinister political purposes in clear contravention of the principles and mission of the UN Charter. Resolute and clear is the DPRK's stand that nuclear deterrence is the ultimate shield for national sovereignty and the supreme guarantee for defending sovereignty and that sustained bolstering of the nuclear deterrence is the most responsible and correct option for ensuring regional peace and security. Whatever others may say, the position and significance of existence of the DPRK as a responsible nuclear weapons state to keep the balance of strength and ensure the geopolitical security in and over the Korean Peninsula are final and irreversible. No state or force can ever compel my country to withdraw from defending the national sovereignty and the core interests. The futile attempts of those states to deny and infringe upon the constitutional rights of the DPRK can never affect the new security landscape of the Northeast Asian region built around the current position of my country. The urgent issue to be addressed by the international community is the present geopolitical crisis being created across several parts of the world. The reckless acts of the confrontation forces posing a destructive threat to the world's security mechanical structure give a realistic justification to the renewal and expansion of the physical deterrent to confront them. This proves once again that the national security is an absolute important matter that can never be entrusted to others. And we would like to say quite a few more words about the groundless accusations of the relations between the DPRK and the Russian Federation. The DPRK-Russia cooperation is a legitimate exercise of the sovereign right in full conformity with the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries, as well as with the UN Charter. And my country remains unchanged in its view and stand that the Ukrainian crisis was obviously caused by the confrontation policy of the US and the West, which violated Russia's reasonable and legitimate security interests and escalated NATO's eastward advance. The better future of Europe cannot be realized apart from the core interests and will of the Russian Federation. We think that uprooting the cause of the conflict is the main solution to putting an end to the Ukrainian crisis and ensuring sustainable, endurable peace in the region. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, we are forced once again to exercise our right of reply in connection with statements by a number of delegations concerning the situation around the Korean Peninsula that distort the actual situation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a close neighbor, a comrade and a long-standing partner of Russia, with whom our relations have deep historical roots. We proceed from the understanding that the steady expansion of this cooperation, which is based on a solid legal, political and economic foundation laid over previous decades is in the interests of our states and helps to strengthen peace and security in the Northeast Asia region. The signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2024 during the Russian-Korean summit in Pyongyang was largely driven by the profound evolution of the geopolitical situation globally and regionally. The document enshrines the basic principles for the further development of bilateral ties with the aim of deepening partnership and strategic cooperation across a broad range of priority areas for the two states, and aimed at building a just multipolar international system. The treaty does not pursue the aim of creating a military alliance along Western models. At the same time, it provides for mutual military assistance in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the legislation of the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. thus, in particular, on the basis of Article 4 of the Chitty. Units of the Korean People's Army joined the operation to expel Ukrainian armed groups and bands of foreign mercenaries from areas of Russia's Kursk region that they had temporarily occupied. The goal of denuclearization, and I emphasize this, of the entire Korean Peninsula and not only the DPRK, as some colleagues have asserted, was established in 1992 by the DPRK itself and the Republic of Korea. And it always had two main elements. The first is Pyongyang renouncing its nuclear ambitions, and the second is the US de-escalating military tensions on the peninsula and stopping its threats against the DPRK. For Washington, fulfilling its part of the agreement seemed to be an insurmountable task. Together with its regional allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, the USA regularly conducts large-scale provocative military exercises that rehearse various offensive scenarios including the possibility of the use of a nuclear weapon against the DPRK under the policy of so-called extended deterrence in essence the United States is moving toward the creation of military alliances with a nuclear component in Northeast Asia which only further is exactly aggravating the already tense situation in the region recent developments show that the provocative nature of these actions are well understood by Washington itself. This is confirmed by President Donald Trump's acknowledgement that the previous course of escalation around the Korean Peninsula was misguided. Joint military exercises with Seoul were described, and I quote, as sending a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile. We hope that this reflection on past mistakes will become the first step toward a complete abandonment of a confrontational policy towards the DPRK, including by South Korea. For the time being, however, the irresponsible escalatory and provocative policies of the United States and its allies pose a real and extremely serious threat to regional security and also violate UN Security Council resolutions as regards the importance of easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, they undermine the fundamental principle of equal and indivisible security, which, in turn, is driving Pyongyang toward possessing its own missile and nuclear capabilities as the principal means of ensuring its independence and security. Under these circumstances, it is entirely evident that there can be no talk of the objective of denuclearization in principle. For us, this issue is closed. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I now call on the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation has explained during the last week's general debate the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. I will therefore not revisit this matter. Instead, I wish to address the non-compliance of those very countries that level political allegations against Iran with their own obligations under the NPT. If compliance with the NPT is indeed their concern, they must be held accountable for their own violations of the treaty. Germany, together with more than 30 other Western countries, including Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Albania, must be held accountable for their long-standing violations of Article 1, 2, and 6 of the NPT through the stationing of United States nuclear weapons on their territories or their reliance on NATO's nuclear deterrence. Sweden, as a NATO member that also relies on the Alliance nuclear deterrence framework, is no exception. Their selective invocation of the NPT is further underscored by their response to the aggression against Iran. While persistently leveling baseless allegations against Iran, these countries have remained dead silent in the face of unprovoked and

large-scale acts of aggression against Iran, including attacks on its peaceful nuclear program. They have not even dared to condemn these unlawful acts.

This is not a genuine commitment to international peace and security. It is hypocrisy and a blatant double standard that undermines the international order based on international law. Germany provides a particularly clear example of this double standard. I would therefore like to briefly respond to the representative of Germany. What we are witnessing is a troubling combination of hypocrisy, the selective invocation of international law, and a willingness to disregard it when political interests so dictate. Germany has invoked international law forcefully in the context of Ukraine, yet its silence and complicity in the face of atrocities in Gaza, as well as its position on Venezuela and Iran, reveal a deeply troubling inconsistency. Indeed, Germany's own chancellor portrayed Israel's attack against Iran as Israel doing Europe's dirty work. Such remarks go beyond silence.

They are an outright endorsement of an

illegal act of war and reveal Germany's lack of commitment to the very principles of international law it so frequently invokes.

Germany's recent failure to secure

an elected seat on the Security Council is a reflection of the hypocrisy and double standards that increasingly characterize its approach to international law and should prompt serious reflection on the credibility and consistency of its foreign policy. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I now call on the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation had not intended to take the floor today, but we feel compelled to do so in response to the groundless allegations made by the Russian Federation delegation. The Russian Federation has misrepresented the cause of the situation. We reiterate that the ROK-U.S. combined defense and deterrence posture is a response to the DPRK's ever-growing military threats. The DPRK has continued to develop its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. In this situation, as our security is threatened, the ROK is maintaining the ROK-U.S. combined defense and deterrence posture, including the conduct of combined trainings and exercises. This posture constitutes a legitimate and defensive response to protect the lives and safety of our people and to contribute to regional peace and stability. Regarding the Russian Federation and DPRK cooperation, it is evident that the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, including its dispatch of DPRK troops, constitutes a violation of international norms, including the UN Charter, the relevant Security Council resolutions, including Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2270. Such cooperation seriously undermines peace and stability in the international community. We therefore urge Russia and the DPRK to immediately cease their unlawful military cooperation. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council that adopted numerous resolutions on the DPRK and one of the countries that led the efforts to build a global non-proliferation regime, Russia has a significant responsibility to uphold the integrity of the international non-proliferation architecture. We urge them to promptly put an end to such illegal activities. Regarding the DPRK's denuclearization, The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not a closed issue, but an ongoing one that must be addressed through dialogue and cooperation. The Korean government remains committed to achieving tangible progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula and the resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council that adopted the UN's resolution, as I repeated, as I have already stated, on the DPRK and one of the countries that was involved from the outset in the efforts to build a global nonproliferation architecture, Russia has a responsibility to uphold the integrity of the international nonproliferation architecture. In this regard, we expect Russia to join our efforts to the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. Taking this opportunity, I'd like to remind once again that our current government's policies toward the DPRK. The ROK government seeks to promote peaceful coexistence and shared growth on the Korean Peninsula. Our government has taken proactive steps to reduce military tensions and build trust with the DPRK by suspending loudspeaker broadcasts against the DPRK, dismantling the loudspeakers installed in the front line areas, and calling on relevant entities to halt the dissemination of leaflets. We underscore that the ROK government has been consistently pursuing the inter-Korean relations based on reconciliation and cooperation. As ROK government has reiterated on numerous occasions, we respect the DPRK system, will not pursue unification by absorption, and will not engage in any hostile acts toward DPRK. Furthermore, President Lee Jae-myung presented three blueprints for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula on the address for the general debate on 81st session of the UN General Assembly, aimed at promoting mutual respect and cooperation between the ROK and the DPRK, restoring inter-Korean communication, and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. We hope the DPRK respond positively to our honest efforts. I thank you.

I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the second intervention. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation is compelled to take the floor again in response to the groundless and misleading accusations made by the ROK. The U.S. and ROK's hostile policy toward the DPRK has remained unchanged, and the U.S. and the ROK are now frantically conducting hostile military activities against the DPRK. This year alone, the U.S. and ROK have persistently conducted joint military exercises without any space-time gap. such as massive joint drills of the Freedom Shield, Ulchi Freedom Shield, and combined large-scale air drills of Freedom Black, Hercules Guardians, and Buddy Squadron. In addition, the U.S. has approved the sale of various kinds of lethal military hardware to the ROK.

Even though the U.S. and ROK argue that those

drills are annual and defensive in nature, the obvious confrontational nature of the high-intensity, large-scale war drills staged jointly by the most hostile entities at the doorstep of the DPRK will never change. The dangerous escalation of the war drills staged by the U.S. and its followers is posing a more serious threat to the security of the DPRK, and this will lead to the further deterioration of the situation of the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. No physical conflict has occurred in and around the Korean Peninsula, a hot spot of the world, and the security index is being maintained at a higher level than any other part of the globe. We owe it to the fact that the DPRK has a war deterrent in place powerful enough to break anyone's will to start a war of aggression against the DPRK. And our position on the ROK is clear. Nothing remains in the relations with the ROK, and if there is anything, it is only a cool-headed calculation and strict response for our national interests. The ongoing confrontational acts of the ROK which takes issue with and violates the inviolable sovereignty and constitutional rights of the DPRK will never be tolerated any longer. We want ROK not to make any more provocative moves anymore on the doorstep of a nuclear weapons state. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. for a second intervention. Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available for this meeting. Before we adjourn, let me remind delegation that the deadline for submission of draft resolution and decisions on all agenda item is this Friday at 12 noon. And the list of speakers for the thematic debate also closes this Friday, 16 October at 6 PM. All delegations intending to take the floor during the thematic debate should inscribe on the list. Likewise, as agreed last week, delegations with mere technical updates in their draft proposal are encouraged to submit their proposal today, 12 October. I now give the floor. The next meeting of the First Committee will be held tomorrow afternoon at 3 PM sharp in this conference room. We shall continue with the general debate and appeal to all delegation to be punctual to enable us to proceed with our work in a timely manner. The meeting is adjourned.