Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea - Security Council, 10147th meeting

The 10147th meeting of the Security Council is called to order. The provisional agenda for this meeting is non-proliferation, Democratic Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The agenda is adopted. In accordance with Rule 37 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, I invite the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan and the Republic of Korea to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. In accordance with Rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefer to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary Di Carlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Mr. James Byrne, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of Open Source Center. It is so decided. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item two of the agenda. I now give the floor to Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo.

Mr. President, This year marks the beginning of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's five-year military development plan for 2026-2030. The DPRK's ninth party congress held from 19 to 25 February noted that under this plan, the DPRK will introduce new secret arsenals and special strategic assets, including the ICBM complexes of ground and underwater launching. Throughout 2025 and into early 2026, the DPRK has continued to conduct ballistic missile launches. This includes short-range ballistic missiles, multiple launch rocket systems, long-range strategic cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles. In the past month, the DPRK has also tested ballistic missiles equipped with what it calls cluster bomb and fragmentation mine warheads. This month, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency warned of a very serious increase in the DPRK's fissile missile material production capacity at the Yongbyon nuclear site. These developments have been accompanied by statements from the DPRK leader reiterating the country's commitment to further advancing its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities through qualitative modernization and the diversification of delivery systems. Mr. President, the DPRK's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions remains a matter of serious concern. These activities undermine the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We reiterate our call on the DPRK to fully comply with its international obligations, including the NPT and IAEA safeguards, and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. At this critical juncture, it is essential to underscore the urgent need to reduce nuclear risk, prevent any use of nuclear weapons, and bring about their total elimination. Mr. President, the Security Council last met on this issue in May 2025, one year after the end of the mandate of the panel of experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874. While the panel's mandate was not renewed beyond 30 April 2024, the committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 continues to oversee the sanctions measures, which remain in place. As the Secretary-General has stated, all countries must abide by the relevant Security Council sanctions in their relations with the DPRK. Mr. President, the broader security landscape on the Korean Peninsula remains tense. with heightened military activities, limited avenues for inter-Korean and regional dialogue, and growing concerns over the potential for miscalculation. The only way to durably reduce tensions and alleviate these concerns is to achieve sustainable peace and the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Dialogue and diplomacy are indispensable to achieving this objective, and we welcome any efforts in this respect. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank Ms. Di Carlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. James Byrne.

Mr. President, distinguished members of the Security Council, I appreciate the opportunity to brief you here today. My name is James Burt. I am the CEO and founder of the London-based Open Source Centre, and I'm a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. For several years, my team has generated open source evidence on North Korea's illicit trade. Some of this work has focused on the procurement of illicit petroleum. and the export of coal and iron ore conducted in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions. Last year, the Open Source Center presented evidence to the council of six vessels loading prohibited cargo within North Korean territory, establishing a clear pattern of activity in violation of these resolutions. These resolutions, including 2371 and 2397, specifically prohibit any type of transfer and export of North Korean coal and iron ore. They also state the revenues generated from the exports of coal and other commodities directly contribute to the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs. What we will show you here today is clear evidence that this pattern persists. evidence supported by a methodology that integrates high resolution satellite imagery, AIS transponder records and vessel specification databases. This approach allows for the definitive identification of vessels loading coal and other commodities in contravention of these UN Security Council resolutions. From November 2025 to April 2026, the Open Source Center has observed at least five additional vessels conducting eight journeys into North Korea to load cargo such as coal and iron ore. As can be seen in this overview slide, these are the Orion, the Peaceful Eight, the Ostrov and Siferova, the Dream Wave, and the Furunda One. Three of these vessels were recently deflagged by their respective flag states. Two, the Orion and the Ostrov Antiferova continue to sail under a Russian flag. One, the Dreamwave was recently flagged to Tanzania. The evidentiary standard for inclusion today is high. we have not included a number of additional vessels that we believe have likely visited to load coal and other commodities. The first case and the most recent of these vessels is a 130 meter long cargo ship named Orion, loading coal at the North Korean port of Songnim in mid-April, 2026. The Orion started its journey in Sakhalin, Russia, on 6 April. From here, it sailed around the Korean peninsula and through the Yellow Sea. AIS data from the ship's transponder showed the vessel was transmitting inside North Korean territorial waters and the port of Songnim on 16, 18 and 20 April. Over this period, we collected imagery of different kinds from three different commercial providers, Satellogic, Umbra, and Vantel, using different kinds of satellite sensors. These sensors independently show the same thing, the Orion loading coal in North Korea. These images, are available for anyone that cares to subscribe to these services and clearly show the vessel at the location where the ship's transponder was openly transmitting on 18 April at 8:36 UTC. These images also clearly show large piles of coal at the loading berths next to the Orion. In particular, an image on 19 April clearly shows coal being loaded into the hold of the vessel, which has its cargo hatches open. The images show the coal piles decreasing in size over time, in addition to trucks and excavators moving coal towards the feeder belts, which are being used to load the Orion. It's very clear in this image. The Orion is the latest instance of a foreign flag vessel sailing into North Korea to load these commodities. However, since November 2025, the Open Source Center has identified an additional four vessels also loading commodities such as coal and iron ore in North Korea. In our last presentation to the Security Council in May 2025, we detailed some of the deceptive shipping practices that these vessels undertook to disguise their activities. These practices have continued, but in recent months we have seen increasingly complex and coordinated scheme designed to disguise these activities. In one such instance, as you can see here, a 130 meter long vessel named the Peaceful Eight, also known as the Runder Eight, spoofed an extended trip into the Russian Far East in order to disguise its illicit activities in Vonsan. in North Korea on 17, 19 and 20 March. Although the vessel was transmitting its position as sailing towards Russian waters, satellite imagery shows there was no vessel at these locations. As you can see here in this image taken by Planet Labs, what do you see over those coordinates? Open ocean. There is no vessel there. Instead, high resolution images taken by Planet Labs, taken by high resolution images taken on the same day show that the vessel was in one sun. And as you can see here, loading coal. As in the case of the Orion, in these images, we can see the cargo hatches are open and coal is being loaded into the hold. But there are other vessels as well. This is the Ostrov Ansiferova. In February, March and April 2026, a 97 meter long cargo vessel named Ostrov Ansiferova was observed across three separate trips to the North Korean port of Chongjin. On the first trip, on 13 and 15 February, the vessel was observed with its cargo bays open at the coal terminal. On 15 February, In this image, coal piles were observed next to the vessel with its cargo hold open again with cranes on the pier in use. On the second trip on 12 and 13 March, the vessel was observed back in Chongjin again with its cargo hold open next to piles of commodities on the pier. And there is a third trip as well. This on the third, you can see the vessel was observed again on 10 April back in Chongjin, once again berthed with its cargo hold open. This is the Dream Wave. In November 2025, the Dream Wave, a 99 meter long vessel, was anchored outside the port of Tancheon, North Korea. Subsequent imagery shows the vessel sailing into port towards coal stored on the pier. And this is can be seen in these two images that we have here today. One last vessel we are going to present on is the Furundar 1. This on the other side of the country in February 2026, the Furunda one was observed leaving the North Korean port of Nampo after birthing at the coal terminal. In these two images we have here today, you can clearly see it in the port and then you can clearly see it leaving with cargo coal in the hold and its cargo hatch open. Mr. President, taken together, this evidence confirms that at least five cargo vessels, the Orion, the Peaceful Eight, the Ostrov Amziferova, the Dream Wave, and the Furunda One have continued to load sanctioned commodities in North Korean ports for delivery abroad. This is not a series of isolated incidents. It is an ongoing pattern of UN sanctions violations. Several of these vessels have visited repeatedly. and these presented here today is not an exhaustive list. This evidence we will publish later on the Open Source Centre's website. This methodology that we use to identify these vessels integrates commercial high resolution satellite imagery, transponder logs, vessel databases and a range of other open sources. It is consistent with the rigorous standards established by the UN panel of experts. These findings represent a factual record of ongoing violations that directly fund North Korea's prohibited weapons program. We submit this record to the Council and we remain at your service and disposable for further inquiry. Thank you, Mr. President, for your time.

I thank Mr. Byrne for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make a statement. I give the floor to the representative of United States.

Thank you, Mr. President. I want to thank Under Secretary General DiCarlo and Mr. Byrne for their briefings today. Colleagues, nearly two years ago, a Russian veto eliminated the 1718 committee panel of experts with China standing silently by robbing this Council and UN member states of independent credible reporting on sanctions violations Russia did this for one key reason to hide its own violations from scrutiny The United States is grateful to independent experts like the Open Source Center for stepping into the breach and keeping the spotlight on UN sanction evasions and violations. Mr. Byrne briefed the work of his team to us on May 2025, and he is back today because these violations continue. The information presented to us today is not speculative. The evidence is irrefutable. Vessels are loading DPRK origin coal and iron ore at North Korean ports and sailing to destinations, most notably to China, in direct violation of this council's resolutions. Let me be crystal clear about what this means. In 2017, this council passed resolution 2371 explicitly prohibiting the export of DPRK coal iron and iron ore. The revenue from these exports directly fund North Korea's unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Every ton of coal loaded onto these vessels, every shipment that reaches a foreign port, every dollar or yuan that flows back to Pyongyang brings the DPRK one step closer to threatening the world with nuclear catastrophe. This is not an abstract concern. This is one of the gravest threats to international peace and security today. The Open Source Center's findings confirm what the United States has been tracking for months. We have identified these vessels. We know their routes. We know their operators. And we will not stand by while they operate with impunity. In December 2025, the United States nominated seven vessels for designation in the 1718 Committee. Those seven nominations are still under review months later, despite being supported by the same irrefutable evidence that we saw here today. This briefing shows additional vessels now engaged in the same prohibited activity. In the coming days, the United States will nominate the vessels identified in today's briefing for designation in the 1718 Committee. We call on the Committee to act without delay to designate all of the vessels involved in these smuggling operations, including those we nominated months ago. The 1718 Committee has a mandate. to oversee the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK, including by designating violators. This is not optional. This is the committee's responsibility. UN sanctions exist as a peaceful lever for addressing threats to international peace and security. They are the alternative to military action. The evidence presented today leaves no room for doubt, and it is drawn from readily available commercial satellite imagery and standard vessel tracking software accessible to anyone. If some members of this Council choose to ignore these violations, they are making a deliberate choice to enable the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. The United States will not make that choice. We will continue to identify violators, nominate them for designation, and work with our partners to ensure that they face consequences, whether through this council or through other means. Mr. President, the DPRK's unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs are a threat to the Korean Peninsula, the Indo-Pacific, and to the entire world. This Council was created to address exactly these kinds of threats. It's time we did our actual jobs. Thank you.

I thank the representative of the United States for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Denmark.

Thank you, Mr. President. And let me also thank Under-Secretary-General Di Carlo and Mr. Byrne for their briefings. In the unfortunate absence of a panel of experts, these presentations are highly valuable. As we've heard, the DPRK's continued unacceptable and illegal behavior clearly constitutes a threat, not only to regional peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, but globally. Mr. President, just this week in the General Assembly Hall, the state parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are meeting for the review conference. Sadly, in the midst of this strong push to protect the world from the curse of nuclear war, the DPRK continues its quest for nuclear weapons. Earlier this month, the IAEA's Director General concluded that the DPRK has made a very serious increase in its capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA also documented a worrying expansion of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, including a suspected new uranium enrichment facility. Just this year, we've also witnessed six ballistic missile launches, three of which took place this month. So let us face the facts. The DPRK is evidently and brazenly continuing to develop both its nuclear program and its ballistic missile programs. These acts are not only ongoing, they're escalating. That is why Denmark jointly called for this meeting to shine a light on these deeply concerning developments. Mr. President, the DPRK and all UN member states without exception must abide by the resolutions of this Council. Denmark is deeply worried by the illegal military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow. The DPRK's armed deliveries and troop deployments in support of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine are dangerous and escalatory. In return, Russia provides military support, including missile-related technology, to the DPRK. Such actions flagrantly violate Security Council resolutions, including the two-way arms embargo. This is a prime example of how the DPRK's actions do not just concern the countries of its region, but gravely impact peace and security across the globe. The sanctions against the DPRK remain fully in effect. However, implementation oversight has been severely over hampered for the past two years following Russia's veto of the extension of the mandate of the panel of experts. As a result, it has become easier for the DPRK and others to violate and circumvent sanctions. Mr. President, Denmark supports the use of sanctions against the DPRK as a legitimate tool to pressure the regime to end its illegal actions. In a world already torn by conflict and insecurity, we cannot allow such reckless behaviour to continue. At the same time, we recall that sanctions are not intended to negatively impact the lives of civilians. To this end, We support the swift approval of all legitimate humanitarian exemption requests in accordance with applicable sanctions. We remain deeply concerned about the dire humanitarian and human rights situation in the DPRK. We call on the DPRK to start prioritizing the well-being of its citizens over its dangerous weapons programs. We also urge the DPRK to allow the return of the UN and humanitarian organizations into the country and to engage seriously with the UN human rights mechanisms. In closing, we welcome all efforts to build positive momentum into inter-Korean relationship. The Republic of Korea has publicly announced that it stands ready to resume dialogue. We strongly encourage the DPRK to do the same. to engage constructively and to return to dialogue. Denmark fully supports all efforts towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. To reach this goal, the DPRK must abide by its international obligations. This means returning to compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and abandoning its ballistic missiles program and its existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Denmark for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of France.

Thank you, Mr. President. I wish first and foremost to thank the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, Madam Rosemary DiCarlo, as well as Mr. James Byrne, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of Open Source Center. Their briefings serve as a reminder of the need for the Security Council to keep its attention focused on the North Korean proliferation crisis and to see to it that its resolutions are implemented. For this reason, France joined five other members of the Security Council in calling requesting the conduct of this meeting, including South Korea and Japan, as they requested in the 24 April last letter. Mr. President, since Monday, the 11th Conference on Non-Proliferation was held, and this is a virtually universal treaty which represents the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation disarmament regime, and now more than ever before this needs to be preserved and upheld by Addressing during addressing the review conference, the debate, the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Abbaro, recalled that one of the major threats to this regime. the non-proliferation regime and the threats to international security remained, the ongoing pursuit by North Korea of its nuclear and ballistic programs, illegal nuclear ballistic programs for the past 20 years, flouting its international obligations, including the resolutions unanimously adopted by the Security Council, North Korea conducted six nuclear tests. It continued to develop nuclear weapons and has enshrined this in its constitution, It has engaged in fine tuning ballistic capabilities since 2022, for example, engaging in more than 100 missile, uh, test strikes of various… ranges. These violations undermine the authority of Security Council resolutions. They undermine the non-proliferation regime, and it is in our interest, our common interest, to uphold this. They constitute a threat to regional stability and the security of neighboring states. France reaffirms our solidarity with South Korea and with Japan in the face of these North Korean provocations. Our President to recall the solidarity during his visit to those two countries early in the month of April. On that occasion, France extended our support for the efforts of South Korea as they seek to rekindle inter-Korean dialogue and to build confidence-building measures and measures for de-escalation. And we regret the fact that Pyongyang failed to reciprocate in this willingness to engage in dialogue by initiating further ballistic missile tests five during the month of April alone. We remain concerned, Mr. President, by the fact that a permanent member of the Security Council continues to provide its protection and even is complicit in North Korean violations of the resolutions which this permanent member supported. The Russian Federation and North Korea have been engaging in illicit nuclear cooperation, which has included arms transfers between the two countries and the deployment of North Korean soldiers on the Ukrainian front. This North Korean support for the war of aggression against Ukraine is a violation of the UN Charter and a violation of Security Council resolutions. This cooperation remains close. There have been recent visits of Russian senior officials, which are a reflection of this. To avoid accountability, Russia alone cast a veto on the extension of the POE mandate, whose mandate concluded exactly two years ago. The non-renewal of the panel of experts is a significant obstacle to the work of the committee and obstructs the right of all member states to have independent impartial information about implementation of security council resolutions. Amid these dangerous circumstances, Mr. President, we need to continue to remain mobilized to ensure implementation of Security Council resolutions and the attainment of the goals set out thereunder. We reiterate our messages consistently, including during the work of the NPT Review Conference, and we hope to be able to take that opportunity to bring together a large number of supporters for the declaration on North Korean nuclear challenge prepared jointly with South Korea. First and foremost, France calls upon the Security Council to resume work with a view to reconstituting the panel of experts whose work is of critical importance in providing support for the 1718 committee and the implementation of its mandate. And in order to provide information to member states pending a restoration and reconstitution of the panel, France will continue to -- with 10 partners, including South Korea and Japan, to contribute to a monitoring team to produce reports on violations of the sanctions regime related to North Korea. If -- this is not a substitute for the panel of experts, but the initiative helps to bridge the gaps thereunder in this initiative is in accordance with Security Council resolutions. Paragraph 41 of Resolution 2270 explicitly calls upon member states to share all information in their possession about noncompliance with resolutions relating to North Korea. Next, we encourage the committee to continue its efforts to ensure effective implementation of Security Council resolutions. France stands ready in this regard to consider the proposal of the United States to designate seven vessels that were identified in sanctions violations. North Korea, lastly, we call upon North Korea to revert back to compliance with its international obligations, to engage in the path towards diplomacy and to conduct discussions with a view to complete verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. Thank you.

I thank the representative of France for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Latvia.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Di Carlo for her briefing and Mr. Byrne for his useful contribution in providing the council with facts. Let me reiterate the council's strong condemnation of the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic weapon programmes, which violate multiple Security Council resolutions. We express our regret that it has been two years since the 1718 committee has been unable to function properly, due to the disbandment of its panel of experts. The veto used by Russia was an example of its deliberate efforts to undermine the work of this Council. It was also an early precedent of backing regimes that are willing to support its own brutal aggression against Ukraine, even if it means obstructing the work of this Council and its subsidiary organs. The absence of a panel of experts for the 1718 committee effectively means that the most thorough of UN Security Council sanction tools has been weakened through a lack of access to vital information. Fortunately, due to the joint efforts of states who have contributed to establishment of the multilateral sanctions monitoring team, the international community continues to receive verified and reliable information that helps to bridge the present information gap. Mr. President, it is critically important to remain informed about the situation surrounding the DPRK sanctions, especially considering the various efforts by the DPRK to evade and circumvent them. The state remains one of the main threats to international peace and security. The DPRK continues to develop its illegal nuclear ballistic missile programmes, growing its illegal arsenal and testing new weapon systems. including cluster munitions, as recently reported. And we affirm our robust commitment to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In this regard, we appreciate the efforts made by the Republic of Korea to advance dialogue, and we call on the DPRK to reciprocate in good faith and to comply with its obligations under international law. The DPRK has also provided significant support to the aggressor Russia, both in armaments, from munitions to missiles, as well as in manpower, with thousands of North Korean soldiers deployed in support of Russia's imperial ambitions. This unlawful cooperation must cease, and the DPRK must bear full accountability for its participation in this. Mr. President, We must emphasise another illicit practice in common between Russia and the DPRK, which is the use of old and unsafe vessels flying a flag of a different nationality altogether, the shadow fleet, to evade sanctions. As expressed by many delegations earlier this week in the open debate on maritime security, shadow fleet vessels risk ecological disasters wherever they go, with no accountability. The DPRK is using such vessels to circumvent the sanctions imposed by this Council, using fraudulent documentation, masking movements of ships, engaging in illicit ship-to-ship transfers in order to finance its illegal weapons programme. This is unacceptable, and we must be resolute in upholding this Council's binding decisions. Latvia supports the listing of seven vessels for violating the DPRK sanctions regime as proposed by the United States in late 2025, and we are open to consider additional listings if necessary. Finally, we reiterate the urgent need to re-establish the panel of experts of the 1718 Committee for this Council and the Committee to carry out their full mandates. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Latvia for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of United Kingdom.

Thank you, President, and thank you, Under Secretary-General De Carlo and Mr. Byrne, for your evidence-based and detailed briefings. Their insights shine a spotlight on the current situation and underline exactly why we were pleased, alongside several other Council members, to call for this meeting today. This Council is entrusted with responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet two years ago, Russia deliberately undermined that mandate by vetoing the DPRK Panel of Experts, an act that has hollowed out our collective ability to respond to the clear and growing threat from the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programme. That veto was not an isolated procedural decision. It was a calculated move to obscure the DPRK's unlawful pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and to conceal Russia's own systematic erosion of the UN sanctions architecture, which, as with all UN member states, it is duty bound to uphold. Since Russia's veto, the DPRK has carried out approximately 80 ballistic missile launches and expanded key facilities, funded by an increasingly sophisticated cybercrime. Without the panel, we have been deprived of crucial Security Council resolution violation monitoring, analysis, and oversight. In vetoing the panel, Russia also cleared a path to expand its military relationship with the DPRK. Pyongyang has supplied more than 11,000 troops to Russia's illegal war against Ukraine, along with munitions and missiles. In return, the DPRK has enjoyed Russia's patronage, provision of critical goods through arms for oil exchanges, and gained increased technical and military capabilities from its combat experience. Russia has also recklessly called DPRK's denuclearization a closed issue. we reaffirm our full commitment to non-proliferation obligations. At this year's NPT Review Conference, we are calling on all UN members to encourage the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, to reengage in meaningful dialogue, and to return to full NPT compliance. We urge Russia to recommit to our collective non-proliferation obligations. Mr. President, as we have heard today, the DPRK continues to be innovative in circumventing sanctions, utilizing emerging AI technology, advanced maritime spoofing techniques, and ship-to-ship transfers to transport coal and iron ore. We must remain equally agile in our response, drawing upon the breadth of our collective responsibilities and capabilities. We welcome ongoing Member State efforts to fill the monitoring and implementation information gap, including through the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team reports. We call on the DPRK to refrain from further provocations, to engage meaningfully in dialogue, and to take concrete steps towards complete denuclearisation and peace on the Korean Peninsula. And I call on Russia and all Council members with influence on the DPRK to allow this Council to reunite on this vital issue of peace and international security, and let us get back to work.

Thank you. I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Panama.

Thank you, President. Madam Chair, I was grateful for the convening of this briefing and for the briefings provided by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under Secretary General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and by Mr. James Byrne of the Open Source Center. Both briefings confirm that this file continues to demand technical rigor and political consistency. We also recognize the efforts made by the Republic of Korea to keep channels of communication open, to build bridges, and to provide an environment that is more conducive to dialogue. At an international time marked by polarization and mistrust, any initiative aimed at reducing tensions warrants our support. President, Panama notes with concern that, according to the most recent public findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to develop its nuclear program. The most recent report points to activities that attest to the expansion of enrichment capabilities, the continued operation of sensitive facilities, and other disturbing developments. At the same time, the agency continues not to have access inside the country to carry out independent verification work. This reality should lead us to a simple conclusion. When there is no transparency, uncertainty increases. When there is no verification, mistrust grows. And when mistrust grows, the space for diplomatic solutions shrinks. For this reason, Panama calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return in good faith to the negotiating table. At the same time, we urge it to resume its engagement with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The populations on the Korean peninsula deserve to have real prospects of peace, stability and the certainty for lasting security. This call is all the more relevant since the 11th review conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is currently being held in New York. In this context, any step towards renewing engagement with multilateral frameworks for trust, accountability and international oversight would be welcomed by the international community. We must also be clear on another fundamental aspect. No unilateral declaration can alter the legal realities established by international law or by the relevant resolutions of this Council. The decisions of this body are legally binding and must be implemented consistently, seriously and non-selectively. Panama further believes that the loss of technical monitoring and reporting capacity following the dissolution of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts in March 2024 has eroded collective trust. The effective implementation of any regime of measures requires credible supervision, objective data, and reliable technical mechanisms. In the absence of a mechanism keeping this Council constantly updated, it is increasingly difficult to assess the development of the situation on the ground. Reactivating the panel of experts would serve not only the objective of non-proliferation but also any future diplomatic process. Mr President, we must not lose sight of the human dimension of this file. The civilian population should not be confused with the decisions by authorities. The measures taken by this Council should coexist alongside effective humanitarian access with safeguards that avoid imposing unnecessary suffering on the population. Panama is convinced that acting firmly and with resolve and promoting dialogue and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive. They are, on the contrary, essential preconditions to reach a sustainable and peaceful solution. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Panama for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Russian Federation.

Mr. President, we listened attentively to the Under Secretary General Rosemary DiCarlo, who has demonstrated, highlighted the heightened military activity in the region. However, we expect that the Secretariat will provide a more thorough analysis of the repercussions that this may have when it comes to security and stability in the region. We listened to the remarks of the representative of the Open Source Center, James Byrne, And we call upon members of the council not to be misled. There's an attempt to present this briefer as a voice of independent civil society. However, in reality, he represents a structure which is deeply embedded in the British military political establishment. Expecting constructive and objective assessments from such a biased expert would be reckless at the minimum, if not to say laughable. Mr. President, today, at the initiative of a group of countries led by the United States, the Council once again has been drawn into discussion which does not bring the region closer, but rather moves it further away from the long-anticipated stabilization in the Korean Peninsula. The pretext for this was chosen as being the following: the second anniversary of the expiration of the mandate of the 1718 panel of experts. of the sanctions committee. We understand how sensitive this event was for Washington and its allies, for the group was an important component for the information warfare that they were waging against Pyongyang. Suffice it to recall that instead of introducing -- instead of bringing about recommendations for the renewal of the sanctions regime and verification of data received, the experts have stooped to -- stooped to spreading biased information from Western media outlets in the conduct of propagandistic initiatives. The question today put forward has nothing to do with international peace, the maintenance of international peace and security. We did not hear initiators of the meeting creating any, establishing any requiem or even proposing a discussion of the work of similar panels of experts on other country-specific files. History clearly has shown that the sanctions regime against South Korea of the Security Council is counterproductive. At present, the situation in the region is fundamentally As a result, Security Council sanctions have also lost relevance. Nor does the following situation withstand any criticism, this situation where certain sanctions measures of the Security Council are subject to revision on an annual basis, if not more frequently, and others are set in stone, and any attempts to update them are fundamentally rebuffed. There's a need to recall that the Council made a grave error placing the sanctions regime regarding making the DPRK sanctions regime open in nature, thereby paralyzing its capabilities under the charter. It is within our power to make this error not a fatal error for regional and global security. Two years ago, when the mandate was under discussion of the panel of experts, Russia invited members of the Council to engage in a substantive and an objective discussion about the reconsideration of international sanctions against Pyongyang in favor of their being brought up to date and mitigated. Our proposal remains on the table. An important reason for the adoption of urgent measures regarding sanctions remains the humanitarian fallout and repercussions of the sanctions regime for the North Korean population. Russia supports the presentation of one of humanity -- the initiation of one of humanitarian exemptions under the 1718 committee. However, that is entirely insufficient. The mitigation of sanctions-related Council decisions on humanitarian grounds as a first step would help to create a conducive atmosphere for seeking diplomatic solutions, taking into account the legitimate interests of all countries in the region, including the DPRK. There is a need to, frankly, acknowledge present-day realities where there simply are no alternatives to the negotiations process. The time is ripe to fundamentally reconsider approaches to resolving problems and to begin to move towards the resumption of dialogue. And what Warren's separate mention is something which was established in circumvention of the UN. charter, that is the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, which has been proposed as a replacement for the Panel of Experts. The MSMT does not have any legitimate international mandate. Any products of this body are entirely illegitimate. They are nothing more than a fabrication and disinformation. For those who are particularly interested in bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and DPRK, we wish to recall the fact that Pyongyang is our close neighbor and partner with whom we have been building a relationship in all areas in accordance with the charter of the UN. Our cooperation in the military and other spheres is not directed against third countries, nor does it pose any threat to states in the region nor the international community. Russia naturally will continue to develop this cooperation and It does not run counter to our international obligations. The participation of the North Korean military personnel in operations for rejecting -- in resisting the aggression of Ukrainian fighters and foreign mercenaries on the territory of Kharkiv Oblast was conducted in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the DPRK. Mr. President, today's meeting is a clear example of the misuse and abuse of Security Council resolutions with the aim of diverting its attention away from the real root causes of the escalation on the Korean Peninsula. Chief among them, naturally, is the ratcheting up of the military presence of NATO states on the Asia-Pacific space, which is systematically destroying prospects for building non-block architecture for collective security in the region. On the 24th of April, the latest full fledged US and Korea air exercises, the Freedom Flag exercises were brought to an end and these exercises including a large, included a large number of personnel and military equipment. This bilateral format was already proclaimed using NATO as an example, as a nuclear alliance, and it can bring in Japan as well, which is already developing algorithms for their participation in American schemes of expanded nuclear deterrence and allowing for the revision of the three non-nuclear principles. This factor is particularly significant in light of the remilitarization of Japan, which is gaining which is gaining ground, and this was reflected in a sharp increase in military expenditures. Before our very eyes, we see the revision by Tokyo of the basis of its previous pacifist policy. The consequences for international peace and security have yet to be assessed. And I wish to turn to the French delegation, which has been waxing poetic today about nuclear nonproliferation. Was it not your president who Last month made a statement about the intention to engage in non transparent stepping up of the French nuclear arsenal, and last week he initiated joint air exercises with Poland during which. There will be studies with imitation of nuclear strikes on Russian territory. Such a step is astoundingly provocative. All of the above-mentioned trends are significantly ratcheting up the degree of tension and the risk of military provocations. In the context of the NPT Review Conference, we cannot but note that the operations of all three Western states, the U.S., France and Japan, which have nuclear weapons, run directly counter to themes of preventing a nuclear weapons arms race. Two have already announced the increase in their own arsenals, and the third has deliberately shedded limitations under the treaty and for years has rejected the treaty on the prohibition of the nuclear weapon, on prohibition of the CTBT, and announced a willingness to immediately engage in military capability building and the resumption of full-fledged nuclear tests at any moment at the first nod from the military leadership, the head of state. In the context of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, we wish to underscore that we are talking about three countries, the U.S., the Republic of Korea, and Japan, who are among the 10 states with the largest military budgets, and they have militarily capable, cutting-edge, and devastating military equipment. which is most devastating in the world, amid such -- against the backdrop of such animosity, the independent, sovereign DPRK leadership has been compelled to take decisions for their own security. Pyongyang's adversaries can speak as long as they want about their actions not being prohibited under Security Council resolutions. However, this is not in alignment with the Security Council demands about the need to resolve the problems in the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy exclusively. In fact, we are bearing witness to direct and persistent violations by a group of countries of their international obligations. To conclude, we call upon the members of the Security Council to fundamentally review outdated approaches in order to help to bring about the long-anticipated breaking of the dangerous deadlock instead of further exacerbating the situation. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Russian Federation for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Somalia.

Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, I thank USG DiCarlo for her comprehensive briefing. We also take note of Mr. Pernice's remarks. Developments on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw international attention and once again underscore the importance of preserving stability and fostering conditions conducive to peace in the region. In this regard, I will make the following points. First, my delegation reaffirms the utmost importance of the global non-proliferation architecture. The treaty on the number of operation of nuclear weapons and the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty are essential to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, constrain destabilizing activities, and reduce the risk of escalation. We stress that full respect for an implementation of this instrument is in both letter and spirit. are incumbent upon all states and are fundamental to building the mutual confidence necessary for meaningful dialogue. Second, the Security Council has repeatedly underscored that sustained diplomacy is the only way forward and the importance of implementing relevant Security Council resolutions. the complexities before us. My delegation calls on all parts to engage in constructive dialogue and negotiations, address security concerns, and pursue tangible confidence building measures. Third, we reiterate our call for all parts to exercise the utmost restraint, Refrain from provocative acts and inflammatory rhetoric, and take concrete steps to reduce tensions and promote stability. Fourth, the humanitarian situation in the DPRK remains deeply concerning. While sanctions are aimed at addressing the nuclear issue, we must mitigate unintended harm to civilian populations. We therefore urge a balanced, pragmatic approach that protects ordinary people from unintended harm and suffering resulting from the sanctions measures we impose. In conclusion, Mr. President, Somalia reaffirms its commitment to denuclearization to renewed substantive engagement and to concrete measures to achieve lasting peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Somalia for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of China.

Thank you, President. First, I'd like to thank USG DiCarlo for her briefing. The global security situation keeps worsening at present, with intractable regional hotspot issues and conflicts persisting. A peaceful and stable Korean peninsula is in the interest of all countries in the region. and is also what the international community collectively desires. The parties concerned should set their sights on the greater good, stay calm, exercise restraint, move in the same direction, and join in the quest for a political solution to the peninsula issue. I wish to highlight three points. First, war and upheaval on the peninsula must be prevented. Peace and stability serve the interests of all nations and all peoples. Tensions and, still worse, instability spell disaster for them. Currently, The pall of war is still hanging over the Middle East, undisbursed as we speak. And certain countries keep beefing up their network of military alliances in Northeast Asia with explicitly targeted joint military exercises and furthering, quote unquote, extended deterrence, thus keeping hostility among the parties at a heightened level. Should this situation continue, we may see on the peninsula a confrontational spiral of mutual posturing and one-upmanship, fueling continual escalations. China calls on the parties to avoid saying or doing anything that may aggravate the tensions and antagonism, to prevent the situation from getting even worse, and to move towards de-escalation. Two, efforts are needed to move the political settlement process forward. The Korean peninsula issue is essentially about security, And central to the issue is the dynamics between the US and the DPRK. The parties should draw useful lessons from history, be rational and pragmatic, and stay on the right path of dialogue and consultation to steer this issue back to the right track towards a political settlement. The current state of the peninsula situation is inseparable from what the US has been up to. If the US genuinely wish to break the current deadlock and solve the peninsula issue, it should do some soul searching and profoundly acknowledge its historical liability. It should change course, modify its hostile DPRK policy in real terms and pivot away from its obsession with sanctions and pressurization. It should abandon provocative moves such as military exercises. It should preserve unity and stop leveling unjustified accusations against other countries. Three. We must ensure the Security Council works towards constructive results. Given the current situation, the way this Council deals with the Peninsula issue should help ease the situation and enhance mutual trust and unity of purpose, instead of doing nothing other than pointing the finger and exerting pressure. There's more to the DPRK-related Council resolutions than mere sanctions and pressurization, in addition to the elements on supporting a political solution and avoiding negatively impacting the DPRK's humanitarian and livelihood conditions. They also contain reversibility language whereby sanctions are to be modified as may be needed. All these provisions must be implemented in a comprehensive and balanced manner and to the letter. It behooves this Council to encourage the parties to show goodwill and send positive signals in the context of prioritizing humanitarian considerations, thereby creating conditions for bringing the situation around. President, Security is indivisible. Building a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture to achieve common security for all is the only durable solution to the peninsula issue. As a close neighbor, China's consistent position is one of fairness and justice, and we've stayed the course. We were and are committed to peace, stability and prosperity on the peninsula and to the process aimed at political settlement. As a permanent member of the council and a responsible major country, China has consistently and in good faith fulfilled her international obligations. China is ready to continue engaging closely with the parties concerned and along with the international community play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement of the peninsula issue in the quest for lasting peace and stability on the peninsula that cannot come soon enough. Thank you, President.

I thank the representative of China for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Liberia.

Thank you, Mr. President. Liberia thanks Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Mr. James Byrne for their briefings. We welcome the distinguished representatives of the People's Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to this meeting. We appreciate the opportunity for this exchange at a moment when the credibility of this council's non-proliferation architecture is under quiet but serious strain. Liberia aligns itself firmly with the legal framework governing this file. The obligations established under resolution 1718, 2371, 2375, and 2397 are binding. They reflect the council's settled judgment that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and related technologies constitutes a threat to international peace and security. That legal position is not in dispute. What is in question today, however, is whether the system we have constructed still persuades, whether it still deters, or whether through gaps in implementation and example, it is slowly teaching the wrong lessons. Mr. President, we meet in an altered enforcement landscape. The non-renewal of panel of experts has left the council without its independent and technical compass. The absence of monitoring has not reduced allegations of non-compliance. It has reduced our collective capacity to test them credibly. In sanctions regimes, perceptions unchecked by verification does not produce clarity. It produces doubt. politicization and erosion of authority. Therefore, Liberia thanks the Open Source Center for its efforts as we have heard to fill in this gap. Mister President, Liberia submits a simple proposition. A sanctions regime without verification becomes simultaneously weaker and harsher. Weaker in enforcement, harsher in humanitarian consequence. Reports of continued missile activity, nuclear advancement, cyber enabled revenue generation, and alleged military cooperation in active conflict environments are deeply concerning. If verified, Such conduct would constitute clear noncompliance. But Liberia stresses, allegations must not substitute for evidence. Enforcement without proof weakens law. Denial, on the other hand, without scrutiny weakens trust. This brings us to a larger question. one the council cannot and must not avoid. Non-proliferation is not sustained by prohibition alone. It is sustained by disincentives that are credible, consistent, and universal. If those who possess the most destructive weapons are seen rightly or wrongly to be insulated from the consequences of their use or protected in ways in ways others are not, then we must ask what lesson does the system teach those who do not have them? Allow me to make this point. We have not raised this question to assign blame. We raise it because non-proliferation is as much about example as it is about enforcement. Disarmament obligations, restrict doctrines, and responsible conduct are not optional accessories to the non-proliferation regime. They are in truth part of its persuasive power. Liberia therefore submits that there is a corresponding duty on those who possess nuclear weapons a duty to conduct themselves in ways that do not threaten international peace and security and that do not by action or posture incentivize others to seek the same means of survival. Mr. President, against this backdrop, Liberia offers three concrete actionable proposals. First, This council should establish within six months an interim independent verification arrangement mandated by the council and supported by the secretariat to bridge the current monitoring gap. This mechanism need not replicate the former panel immediately, but it must have technical capacity, protected reporting lines, and authority to consolidate information from member states, UN entities, and credible open source organizations. Second, Liberia calls for the creation of a structured reporting clearinghouse under the secretariat with standardized formats and timelines, enabling member states to submit and assess rather access verified information in a transparent and depoliticized manner. This will reduce selective disclosure, improve consistency, and restore confidence in council deliberations. Third, humanitarian exemptions must function not as favors, but as rights embedded in the regime. Liberia proposes clear processing timelines, public guidance, and periodic review of exemption implementation by this council to ensure that civilians do not bear the unintended cost of enforcement failures. Mr. President, in closing the question before us is not whether the council has spoken loudly enough it is whether we are being heard and believed credibility is not asserted it is earned through consistency Authority is not preserved by repetition, but by example. And non-proliferation will endure only if restraint is seen to be mutual and law is seen to apply to all without exception. In that spirit, Liberia urges renewed council attention to implementation, verification, and good examples. We call on all member states, those with capabilities and those without, to meet both the letter and the spirit of their obligations under the charter and the non-proliferation regime. And I thank you for your kind attention.

I thank the representative of Liberia for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Colombia.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Colombia is grateful for the convening of this meeting, and we would like to thank the briefers for their valuable briefings. The situation regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to exacerbate tensions within the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, which was already being undermined by the repeated violations of international obligations and an erosion of trust among states. This discussion is of particular relevance given that this same week saw the start of the 11th review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is beginning with a worrisome lack of political will to forge agreements. In this context, the Council is also facing a significant structural limitation. for two years now the 1718 committee has not had a panel of experts in the absence of this support the council finds it increasingly difficult to follow up on and understand the means used to circumvent the sanctions regime means that have become increasingly sophisticated in particular the The maritime environment has become increasingly used to elude the measures taken by this body through the use of ships, ship-to-ship transfers, and the use of intermediary companies and transport chains to conceal the origin and the final destination of shipments. All of this is happening in a context in which the DPRK continues to strengthen its military program and carry out launches of ballistic missiles that jeopardize regional stability. While we no longer have a panel of experts, this does not reduce the central feature nor the binding nature of the sanctions regime. On the contrary, it demands renewed commitment to the effective rigorous implementation of this regime by all member states, ensuring at the same time that this implementation preserves and effectively applies the provided humanitarian safeguards in order to avoid unintended humanitarian impacts on the civilian population. Mr. President, for Colombia it is vital to have a clear direction towards diplomacy. The only sustainable way to address the situation is through dialogue, without any preconditions, with a view to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. This requires the DPRK to return without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to fully comply with its international obligations, and to halt the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. At the same time, it's essential that the actions of this Council and the implementation of the Council's decisions should contribute to preserving a credible diplomatic path oriented towards dialogue and de-escalation. For my country, Mr. President, the combination of ensuring firm compliance with resolutions and ensuring openness and promotion of dialogue remain essential to ease tensions and to move towards a sustainable solution. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Colombia for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Greece.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to thank Under Secretary General Di Carlo for her briefing and Mr. Byrne for his presentation. Greece remains deeply concerned by the continued development of the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which continue to pose a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. Recent ballistic missile launches by DPRK, including the latest short-range ballistic missile tests and reported testing of upgraded payload configurations, represent yet another destabilizing development. Combined with the steady expansion of nuclear-related activities, They further erode the credibility of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture with the NPT as its cornerstone. At the same time, as the latest report of the Director General of the IAEA from last August confirms, the DPRK's nuclear activities continue to be a cause of serious concern. The Agency has not been able since 1994 to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the NPT safeguards agreement, and its inspectors have not been present in the DPRK since 2009, while there are indications of expanded operation of uranium enrichment facilities and possible construction of an additional enrichment facility. In other words, Mr. President, the DPRK continues to expand sensitive nuclear activities in direct contradiction to relevant Security Council resolutions. Against such actions, which further escalate tensions in a security environment already aggravated by regional conflicts, this Council must continue to defend the integrity of its own decisions and of the wider non-proliferation regime. It is against this background that Greece, as former and hopefully future chair of the 1718 committee, reiterates the importance of full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1718 and all subsequent relevant resolutions. Sanctions remain an essential instrument aimed at peacefully encouraging the DPRK to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile activities and to return to meaningful diplomatic engagement. In this regard, we regret that the panel of experts has still not been restored. Its absence weakens the committee's and therefore the Council's technical monitoring capacity, precisely at a moment when increasingly sophisticated sanctions evasion patterns continue to emerge. Mr. President, allow me to stress that sanctions are not an end in themselves. Their purpose remains clear, to create conditions conducive to dialogue and to the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. At the same time, Greece remains concerned by the humanitarian situation in the DPRK. The continued allocation of major national resources to military and nuclear development while humanitarian needs remain acute raises serious concerns. We therefore reiterate our call on the DPRK to facilitate humanitarian access, ease restrictions on aid delivery and allow international humanitarian personnel to operate without unnecessary impediments. Moreover, allow me to reiterate our concern regarding the military presence of the DPRK in Russia's war against Ukraine, which also includes transfer of ballistic missiles, ammunition and other military materiel. Such actions not only violate relevant Security Council resolutions, but also directly link proliferation concerns on the Korean peninsula with serious threats to European security. In conclusion, Mr. President, at a time when the IAEA confirms a continued expansion of nuclear activities by DPRK, when ballistic missile testing persists, and when proliferation risks increasingly intersect with other major conflicts, unity within this Council remains indispensable to safeguarding regional and international peace and security. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Greece for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Mr. President, the Democratic Republic of the Congo welcomes the convening of today's meeting on the situation in the DRC. the DPRK. We thank the Under Secretary General, Madam Rosemary DeCarlo, and Mr. James Byrne, founder of the Open Source Center, for their comprehensive briefings. Mr. President, the DRC has been closely and attentively monitoring developments of the situation in the Korean Peninsula. We remain concerned. by the ongoing nature of nuclear and ballistic activities, and which run counter to the relevant Security Council resolutions and constitute a violation thereof. Since the adoption of Resolution 1718 in 2006, the Council continued to adapt its mechanism in order to reflect developments in 2025 to 2026. That period was marked by intensification activities in the area of nuclear, in a nuclear area, in a context where the monitoring mechanism has been coming up against persistent difficulties. Discussions underway on the designation of chairs of subsidiary bodies reflect the challenges with which the Security Council faces when it comes to providing for the smooth operations of the mechanisms. In this context, the recent ballistic missile tests, including those in April of 2026, as well as technological developments that have been observed, are contributing to heightened tensions. These developments serve as a reminder of the need to remain vigilant for the international community to heighten its vigilance, while at the same time stressing the need to maintain and preserve channels of dialogue. We wish to underscore the crucial role of the interest national non-proliferation architecture, which is rooted in the non-proliferation treaty and the CBT comprehensive test ban treaty. This is in this context, we We align with this and we believe there's a need to advance collective efforts for the maintenance of international peace and security. Compliance with these instruments is not merely legally necessary, but it also is a critical foundation when it comes to rebuilding trust. This helps to prevent risks associated with proliferation, helps to create a conducive environment for lasting de-escalation. The robustness and relevance of the non-proliferation regime hinge on the steadfast commitment of all states when it comes to ensuring full compliance with the agreements. In light of the complex nature of the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the DRC believes that the diplomatic path is the most appropriate way to address issues, we encourage stakeholders to exercise restraint, to avoid any verbal escalation, and to engage in constructive dialogue. Mr. President, my delegation also wishes to draw attention to the humanitarian situation in the DPRK and to the need to ensure that the measures that have been established, that they, these measures do not have a disproportionate impact on To conclude, we wish to reaffirm our readiness and willingness to work together with the entire membership of the Security Council in order to advance the non-proliferation regime as well as to promote. elastic peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and beyond. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Democratic Republic of the Congo for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. President. I thank U.S. G. DiCarlo for the insightful briefing on the evolving situation in the region. We also take note of the remarks delivered by Mr. Byrne. The situation in Northeast Asia continues to remain a matter of concern for the international community. Coercive or provocative actions, as well as threats and heated rhetoric, must come to an end. These developments are detrimental to regional and international peace and security. Pakistan is concerned on the tensions in the Korean Peninsula that continue to pose a serious challenge to regional peace and international stability. Pakistan supports the objective of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and the goals of global non-proliferation and disarmament. Mr. President, the challenges confronting the Korean Peninsula should be resolved through diplomatic engagement and dialogue. It is incumbent on all parties to refrain from actions that escalate the situation, to exercise restraint, and respond positively to constructive proposals. We strongly support the calls for revival of talks amongst the relevant parties. Recent overtures may be reciprocated and followed up with the resumption of diplomatic engagement to address underlying disputes through peaceful means. The Security Council has a responsibility to act with unity and clear purpose to promote peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. The Council must find ways to contribute to stabilizing the situation in the region through supporting a robust political process and exploring all possible confidence-building measures. Unfortunately, the Security Council's important work, including within the 1718 Committee, is being hampered by the lack of agreement on the chairs of subsidiary bodies. We hope that with the agreement on the chairs of the subsidiary bodies at the earliest, The normal functioning of all subsidiary bodies of the Council will resume without further delay. One of the critical functions of the 1718 Committee is the processing of humanitarian exemptions. We believe that humanitarian exemptions should continue to be processed in accordance with humanitarian principles and humanitarian requirements on the ground and without political considerations. We will continue to support the Committee's efforts to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the DPRK through a robust exemptions mechanism. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Pakistan for the statement. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as a representative of Bahrain.

I'd like to begin by expressing my thanks to Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. And my thanks also to Mr. James Byrne of the Open Source Center. I thank them both for their very complete briefings as we see continued challenges in non-proliferation. and direct threats to international peace and security. The Kingdom of Bahrain is following with grave concern the developments in the field of non-proliferation in a context marked by multiplying crises and conflicts and their repercussions on international peace and security. In this context, we are particularly concerned regarding the violations of Council resolutions by the DPRK, particularly through the pursuit of its nuclear and ballistic programs. These actions represent a violation of the obligations under international law and significantly weaken the non-proliferation regime. The continued conduct of these activities notwithstanding Security Council resolutions reflects persistent challenges with regard to respecting obligations and undermines the credibility of the rules-based international order. This calls for intensified efforts within the Security Council to ensure the effective implementation of these resolutions, this in parallel with support for diplomatic efforts. In this context, we call on the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. We further underscore the importance of strengthening international cooperation and information sharing among member states, as well as supporting efforts aimed at enhancing maritime monitoring and national capacities in order to ensure full compliance with Security Council resolutions and prevent any activity that might undermine the sanctions regime. We further stress the need to strengthen monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, particularly by supporting the work of relevant committees and panel of experts to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions regime and to prevent any activities that may contribute to the development of prohibited military capabilities. It is essential to ensure that the implementation of Security Council measures be fully taken into account humanitarian considerations and do not adversely affect the delivery of essential humanitarian assistance. We call for facilitated humanitarian exemption procedures while also enhancing transparency and coordination with UN agencies and humanitarian organizations. this to ensure continued provision of humanitarian aid, particularly in food security and healthcare, in accordance with humanitarian principles. The challenges related to non-proliferation cannot be addressed in isolation. Rather, they require a comprehensive approach based on international law and Security Council resolutions in all contexts. These threats largely exceed their immediate geographical scope. They affect regional and international stability. They further erode trust in the non-proliferation regime and its associated legal and security frameworks. It calls for strengthened collective efforts and a comprehensive and balanced approach. In this regard, we cannot overlook the worrisome developments in our region, in particular the recent attacks carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran against states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. These acts represent a flagrant violation of international law and international humanitarian law. while also undermining regional security and stability. The international community has clearly expressed its rejection of these actions, particularly through Security Council Resolution 2817. This resolution condemns these attacks and calls for their immediate cessation. It further stresses that they pose a serious threat to international peace and security. We call on the Islamic Republic of Iran further to fully comply with its international obligations, including through close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, and by addressing all outstanding issues with transparency. Maintaining the credibility of the non-proliferation regime requires a consistent and non-selective application of international decisions, a lack of impunity and strengthening confidence in the Security Council's ability to discharge its responsibilities. We reaffirm our support for all efforts aimed at assuring de-escalation and promoting peaceful solutions while strengthening sustainable security and stability. In conclusion, we reiterate our firm commitment to the non-proliferation regime and to working with the international community to strengthen international peace and security in fulfillment of our people's aspirations for a safer and more stable world. Thank you.

My function as a president of the council, The representative of France has asked for the floor to make further statement. I give them the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. I will be very brief, and I wish to respond to the observations made by the Russian representative concerning our deterrence. I would like to state three points. First of all, these remarks are emanating from a country which has several thousand strategic warheads and several thousand tactical war nuclear warheads. It's the only country in the world with an arsenal, specifically in the tactical area, of that magnitude, particularly in the context of the arms race. And this is also emanating from a country whose president has threatened nuclear war as part of the illegal war which it has been waging against Ukraine for years now in a completely reckless and irresponsible way. And this is emanating from a country which has allowed itself to engage with alleged allegations about supposed arms transferred from us to Ukraine, which was very formally rebuffed. And I would like to recommend that the Russian Federation, specifically DPRK and Iran, for them to adopt a stature which is in accordance with Security Council resolutions concerning non-proliferation. Thank you.

I thank the representative of France for the statement. The representative of Russia has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I give them the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to note that Western countries, including France, have over the course of all of these years have been funneling various forms of weapons into Ukraine, including missiles. The level of escalation has now been exceeding all imaginable levels insofar as they need at all costs to deter -- to maintain Ukraine at the position of a viable geopolitical battering ram that is capable of inflicting, with comprehensive Western support, inflicting significant damage to the security of the Russian Federation. In this vein, as you rightly mentioned, we are particularly concerned by the fact that the Russian special services received information, intelligence received information that London and Paris are considering the possibility of transfer to Kyiv of elements of nuclear weapons. We are not surprised at the fact that you have taken this opportunity and you are repudiating this information. It would be difficult to imagine any other response. However, the members of the international community do need to understand that these countries clearly, London and Paris, clearly have an opportunity, have an opportunity, motivation, and the means to carry out such a crime. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the representative of Russian Federation for the statement. I now The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I give them the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr President. I didn't want to get into this back and forth, but since allegations have been made, I wanted to make clear that, as the United Kingdom and France clearly stated in our letter to the Security Council on 27 February, we are not providing and would not provide nuclear weapons or related capabilities to Ukraine. Both our countries remain fully committed to our obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of United Kingdom for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Mr. President. Today's meeting called at the request of the United States and certain UN member states is no more than a memorial service for the 1780 Committee panel of experts whose mandate was terminated two years ago by the fair judgment of history. The United Nations is already piled high with pressing issues. awaiting as immediate action. Just at this time, such a meaningless meeting has convened. This clearly shows the current address of the UN Security Council, which all dances to high-handed and arbitrary tunes of a hegemonic state. I condemn in the strongest terms UN Security Council for convening another unreasonable meeting aimed at justifying its illegal sanction and pressure against DPRK. The 178 Committee panel of experts is politically motivated conspiracy group to the core, the serving United States hostile policy toward DPRK. It has deceived and played on the international community by spreading all sorts of false information and misleading public opinion. The panel quite deserved to be given the judgment of disbandment for its nature as the instrument of the hegemony of the United States and the West in their bid to deprive sovereign states of their right to existence and development. As for UN Security Council's sanctions resolution against DPRK, they are illegal document running counter to principles of sovereign equality and respect for right to self-defense which are stipulated in the UN Charter. We will neither recognize nor be bound at all by those resolutions which deny our state legitimate right to self-defense. The United States is now expanding and strengthening its extended deterrence and military alliance system while pushing ahead with the hegemonic Indo-Pacific strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, including Korean Peninsula, in pursuit of the bloc confrontation and a new Cold War. The United States, Japan, and ROK continue military drills with the use of the nuke as established fact. Under such circumstances, United States is showing from last year, expanding the operational theater of the US troop in ROK in the more offensive way to include neighboring country. and giving light to the ROK's position of the nuclear submarine. We owe it to strong self-defensive deterrence built by the DPRK that peace and security on the Korean Peninsula are being maintained despite grave geopolitical landscape of today. The world is now returning to the era of the Jang-gu law. It knows of neither international law no international relation order following the gangster-like logic, power is justice. Declaring no need for international law, the United States remain unhesitant about armed invasion and terrorist act against sovereign states. Its indiscriminate and unilateral coercive measures have wreaked unprecedented havoc on international economic relation. However, United Nations is yet to publish a statement of the concern, let alone take immediate actions to address global security and political economic crisis caused by high-handed and arbitrary practice of United States. Instead, it has played into the left of the hands and questioned legitimate exercise of the sovereign right of sovereign state. Today's meeting is a stark example of the status quo of dysfunctional United Nations that has failed and its mission enshrined in the UN Charter. If UN Security Council is to regain its reputation as an organization of the ensuring international peace and security, it should not be questioning sovereign country on the exercise of legitimate right. should be focusing on its mission based by UN Charter on the principle of impartiality, objectivity and equity. The DPRK will as ever continue to exercise for just and legitimate sovereign right to cope with all sorts of the challenges and threats posed by hostile forces. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this critically important meeting. I also thank U.S. Judge Carroll and Mr. Byrne, the CEO and founder of the Open Source Center, for their respective important and very alarming briefings. At the outset, let me express once again our deepest regret that the panel of experts which has been playing a critical role in monitoring the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions was forced to terminate its vital activities due to Russia's veto two years ago. I would like to take this opportunity to make three points. First, We have seen a series of intensive launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea, including this month. These launches will help advance its ballistic missile technology, to enhance the capacity of carrying WMD, including nuclear warheads, and to achieve practical operational capabilities, such as the ability to break through missile defenses. These developments pose grave threats not only to neighboring countries in the region, but to international non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, we have to address its malicious cyber activities, which fund its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Second, we also have to keep in mind what is happening behind these provocations. Russia, a permanent member of this council, is engaged in military cooperation with the DPRK, receiving assistance for its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine in violation of the UN charter, and in exchange, backing Pyongyang's behavior. Any transfer from the DPRK of assistance related to missile is clearly prohibited in the Security Council resolutions that Russia itself supported. The international community cannot just remain silent. It is on the shoulders of the UN member states to take action and guard the relevance of this council. Third, we have to prevent water from leaking from the bottle as sanctions regimes against North Korea cannot be effective with loopholes. In this context, Japan is ready to cooperate with all concerned member states to prevent any loopholes through raising awareness and strengthening monitoring. As to raising awareness, we have conducted a regional workshop on the deceptive vessel behavior at sea for maritime agencies in Southeast Asia in cooperation with UNODC, as well as a maritime industry symposium on countering North Korea's illicit maritime activities. We look forward to continuing our cooperation with the UN and member states to this end. As to strengthening monitoring, even though the panel of experts no longer exists, we must all remain vigilant in complying with this Council's sanctions measures, and we call on all Member States to make individual or multilateral efforts to support implementation. The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, MSMT, is one such effort, and its activities are in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. For example, the resolution 2397 calls upon all member states to cooperate with each other, particularly with respect to detecting items, the transfer of which is prohibited by the resolution. Japan looks forward to the forthcoming third MSMT report and is ready to share the information therein with fellow member states once it is available. Mr. President, this week marked the beginning of the NPT review conference. DPRK's unlawful nuclear and missile activities are flagrantly challenging the credibility and integrity of the NPT. Japan believes the review conferences should send a robust message to North Korea and calls on the DPRK to respond to the international community's call for dialogue. I'd like to reiterate Japan's strong commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. As some member states in the council today touched on the Japan's defense policy, I'd like to clarify a couple of points. First, with regard to the joint exercise participated by Japan, North Korea's I would like to point out that North Korea's nuclear and missile development is clear violation of a series of UN Security Council resolution that decide North Korea's abandonment of its all nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. It is erroneous to equate such a violation of Security Council resolutions with Japan, US, ROK joint exercises, which are completely lawful under international law. Not only Japan, but also the international community, including the U.S. and the ROK, has repeatedly called on DPRK to engage in dialogue. The essence of this problem lies in North Korea's refusal to respond to these calls and its continued advancement in nuclear and missile development, thereby posing a threat to the regional security. Some countries touched on the Japan's so-called three non-nuclear principles. The government of Japan observed three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines. Japan as a staunch supporter of the NPT has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This includes compliance with its own obligations under the NPT. Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, will continue to work closely with the international community to realize a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue to advance realistic and practical efforts to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime. Also, some, there was a reference to our extended difference, deterrence strategy. The real issues rise with the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and the continued increase of nuclear capabilities without enhancing transparency. We need to recognize this reality. Based on that, we, while security threats to Japan, including those by nuclear weapons are present, Extended nuclear deterrence is necessary in order to address these threats. This policy serves defensive purposes to deter aggression and maintain peace and stability for Japan and the region. It is fully consistent with the NPT obligations. Finally, I would like to touch on Japan's approach to to Japan's basic approach to the in our defense policy. The Japan will continue its path as a peace loving nation, a path it has followed since World War II. Japan's constant contributions to international peace and stability are widely recognized, and Japan will continue to such contribution as a responsible member of the international community. Japan has firmly upheld the purposes of principles of the UN charter and championed the rule of law. Japan accepts peaceful settlement based on international law under the statute of the International Court of Justice and UNCLOS and opposes to unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. These are the principles of our defense and diplomatic policy and I'd like to reiterate these principles. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Japan for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, I express my sincere appreciation to the President for convening today's meeting. I also thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Mr. James Bourne for their comprehensive and substantive briefings. It has been nearly one year since the Council last convened a briefing on the DPRK, marking the first anniversary of the dissolution of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Committee. While informal consultations have continued regularly, we highlight a notable decline in formal council meetings under the DPRK non-proliferation agenda. Regretfully, however, this does not reflect any progress in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On the contrary, as underscored at the ongoing NPT review conference, The international community continues to urge the DPRK to cease its nuclear and missile activities in line with this Council's resolution. Indeed, in defiance of its international obligation, the DPRK has persistently developed its nuclear and missile programs. Furthermore, as underscored at its recent Ninth Party Congress, It now asserts itself as a nuclear weapons state, a status the international community cannot and will not accept. This year alone, Pyongyang has conducted six rounds of ballistic missile launches in clear violation of Security Council resolutions, including three just this month. Most recently, It tested SRBMs equipped with cluster munition warheads, posing an overt threat to the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Mr. President, compliance with international law, including the full implementation of Security Council resolutions, remains the essential foundation for addressing this situation. However, the present reality falls short of this imperative. Unlawful military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia continues unabated, including the transfer of significant amount of artillery and missiles, with over 16,000 North Korean troops having been deployed to the war in Ukraine. In addition, the dissolution of the Panel of Experts following Russia's decision to veto the extension of the Panel's mandate in March 2024, has significantly weakened the Council's collective monitoring and enforcement capacity. In response, some member states, including the Republic of Korea, have sought to bridge these gaps through voluntary mechanisms, such as the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team. Also, while proposals were made last year to designate additional vessels involved in sanctions violations, It is noted that the 1718 committee has not been able to reach a decision on any additional designations on vessels since 2018. Some might argue that sanctions have failed to prevent DPRK from developing nuclear weapons. However, It is undeniable that these measures adopted unanimously by this council have slowed its progress by constraining financing and access to key resources. Ultimately, the effectiveness of sanctions depend on how faithfully and universally they are implemented by member states. We must guard against any attempts to exploit loopholes or weakening existing measures. It is regretful that Pyongyang has still not allowed the return of UN agencies and continue to refuse most humanitarian assistance from the international community, which has made significant contributions to improving the livelihood of North Korean people. We hope to see that the well-functioning humanitarian exemption mechanism in the 1718 Committee will lead to increased and transparent humanitarian activity in the DPRK. Mr. President, against this challenging backdrop, allow me to highlight two key elements of my government's policy toward the DPRK. Our commitment to peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. Since the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration last year, the Republic of Korea has consistently pursued a vision of peaceful peninsula built on reconciliation and cooperation rather than built on hostility and confrontation. While Pyongyang cites so-called hostile policies toward the ROK, to justify its nuclear armament, we remain committed to respecting DPRK's system, pursuing neither hostility nor unification by absorption. In this spirit, the Republic of Korea has taken proactive steps to reduce tensions and build trust with DPRK. including dismantling loudspeaker broadcasting systems along the military demarcation line. Second, our unwavering commitment to denuclearization. The international community reaffirmed once again at the NPT review conference that the DPRK cannot have the status of nuclear weapon state in accordance with NPT. We recall that the permanent members of this council bear a special responsibility as nuclear weapons states under the NPT, and we call on them to faithfully uphold the NPT in regard to DPRK nuclear issue. Abandoning the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would lead to serious adverse implication for both regional and global non-proliferation efforts. In this regard, the Republic of Korea is taking pragmatic and paced approach to North Korean nuclear issue. Recognizing current realities, we are pursuing a step-by-step progress toward denuclearization that begins with stopping DPRK's nuclear and missile programs through dialogue and negotiation. followed by reduction and ultimately complete dismantlement. Let me take this opportunity to also reiterate the Republic of Korea remains fully committed to fulfilling its obligation under the NPT. As our foreign minister underscored recently in an op-ed, non-proliferation is our strategic imperative, as no country can guarantee its security or well-being of its people solely through nuclear weapons. North Korea itself stands as the clearest proof of this fact. Mr. President, despite the absence of reciprocal engagement from Pyongyang, we remain committed to a peaceful diplomatic solution as stipulated in relevant Security Council resolutions and will continue to act with patience and resolve to this aim. In closing, the Republic of Korea calls on all Council members to unite and take concerted action to bring DPRK back to the negotiating table. We also urge the DPRK to reciprocate to our sincere efforts toward reconciliation, cooperation, and meaningful dialogue and fulfill its obligation under the international law as a responsible member of the international community. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Republic of Korea for the statement. The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I give them the floor.

Thank you, President. The Chinese delegation did not intend to make a further statement at this meeting. However, in light of the pale justification made by the representative of Japan with regard to its intention to possess nuclear weapons, we are of the view that it is necessary to make a further statement on this issue. According to Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation, and the capitulation letter of Japan of the Second World War, as well as other instruments that have international legal effect, Japan should be completely disarmed. Japan is not allowed to maintain any industries that will allow its remilitarization. This, of course, includes the fact that the possession of nuclear weapon by Japan is strictly prohibited. Japan is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. Japan is obliged under NPT not to possess, manufacture, or produce nuclear weapons. This is an international obligation of Japan. The status quo is that Japan is widely known by the international community as a nuclear threshold state. Japan possesses post-processing technologies, reprocessing technologies. Japan is capable of obtaining weapons-grade plutonium. Japan has operational reprocessing facilities. For a very long time, Japan has been manufacturing and stockpiling nuclear materials that far exceed its need for civilian purposes, maintaining a stockpile of plutonium that far exceeds civilian purposes. which means that in a very short time window, Japan will be capable of breakthrough the nuclear threshold. At the same time, over the recent years, on the question of nuclear weapons, Japan has made many negative statements over the recent years. Japanese officials, government officials openly discussed the possibility of amending the three non-nuclear principles. In November 2025, Japanese Prime Minister, at her statement at the Diet of Japan, indicated that it was not possible to confirm whether the three non-nuclear principles would remain unchanged in the process of amending the defense policy of Japan. This is a fact. In December 2025, a senior official of the office of the prime minister openly suggested that Japan should possess nuclear weapons. This statement was also a fact. Those remarks exposed the nuclear ambition of the right-wing forces of Japan, which is in defiance of the red line set by the international community. I believe if the Japan is committed as it claims to the peaceful path, then Japan should use history as a mirror. Japan should make a clear severance from the new type of militarism and uphold its peace constitution and the NPT. Japan should cease its efforts and intention with regard to remilitarization and the ambition to possess nuclear weapons. Japan has made many negative statements with regard to nuclear weapons, which caused serious concern from China and other members of the international communities. The Japanese government should make clarifications in a formal manner and at the highest level of its leadership. Only by doing so, Japan will be able to address the concerns of the international community. Thank you, President.

I thank the representative of China for the statement. The representative of Japan has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I give them the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. I was Stand. I was amazed by the. The remarks just made by the representative of China. Today. First of all, I think that many of the Member States here still remember that. In my intervention, I clearly mentioned that Japan will. the will be in full compliance of NPT and also Japan observes our three non nuclear principle as policy guidelines. I made it very clear but I listen to the intervention by representative of China. That is a totally I I I don't think that his remarks did not based on was not based on the my today's remarks as well as our fundamental policies, defense policy of Japan. So totally unfounded and very misleading. So I just want to mention a couple of points. First of all, I with regard to our nuclear policy, the government of Japan observed three non nuclear principles of policy guidelines. Japan's staunch supporter of the NPT has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This includes compliance with own its our own obligations under the NPT. That is one point and also it China referred to the our the position of plutonium and the usage of this plutonium Japan has been limited Japan has been limiting its research, development, and use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes under the Atomic Energy Basic Act. Therefore, such today's claims are baseless. Moreover, all nuclear materials in Japan, including plutonium, are subject to exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguards, as evidenced by verification mechanisms. the area subject to inspection and its frequency. As a result, the IAEA has been drawing the conclusion that all materials remain in peaceful activities. Japan continues to uphold the principle of non-possessing plutonium without specific purposes and uses most of its plutonium stockpile for nuclear fuel of power plants, the remaining amount used as a material for peaceful nuclear research. Also, Japan has declared the policy to reduce the amount of plutonium stockpile in 2018, and the amount has decreased since then. Under the policy, Japan will continue to take appropriate measures. Moreover, As our own voluntary measures, Japan has secured the transparency of nuclear material through its efforts such as publishing information on its plutonium management, which is more detailed than the one required in the international guidelines. And also the representative of China touched on our kind of the course, the path my nation is following. But I'd like to counter argue with the following by pointing out the following fact. China has continuously increased its defense budget at a high level with a lack of transparency, 27 fold over the past 30 years. Also, China has unilaterally expanded its arsenal, including ballistic missiles, and furthermore, it exports arms at a rate more than 400 times that of Japan. We are also concerned about the rapid and significant increase of nuclear arsenals in a non-transparent manner. Japan's fundamental defense policy is a posture of passive defense strategy, which is exclusively defense-oriented. Therefore, We consider that China is no position to criticize Japan for its defense stance and it's outrageous to mention that our militarism, which is totally unfounded. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Japan for the statement, the representative of Democratic People's Republic of Korea has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I give them the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. I'm taking for the comment, the remark made by Japanese delegation. As I mentioned in my statement, the United States, Japan, and ROK continue military drill with use of the nuke. It is real fact. And then we know that Japan is on the list of UN charter as a terms of enemy state. Japan, as you know, is a class criminal state that invaded many Asian countries, including DPRK in the past century. During the colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula, Japan committed crime against humanity such as forcible abduction of 8 million Korean people, massacred 1 million, and sexually enslaved 100,000 Korean women and girls for Japanese army. But Japan beautify the history of the aggression. Instead of the Shinshin apology, Shinshin apology is a first step. to acknowledge wrongdoing in the past and promise that crime not to be repeated. But Japan beautify has history of the aggression and is now moving toward their military power by devising so-called peace constitution. So it is mockery that they like country Japan sitting here and talk about non-proliferation and international peace and security. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the statement. There are no more names inscribed in the list of speakers. The meeting is adjourned.