Democratic Republic of the Congo - Security Council, 10232nd meeting

The 10,231st meeting of the Security Council is called to order. The provisional agenda for this meeting is the question concerning Haiti.

The agenda is adopted. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional.

Rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Haiti, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic to participate in this meeting. It is so decided.

I welcome the representatives from Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item 2 of the agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the letter dated 10 September 2026 from the Secretary-General. document S/2026/732, addressed to the President of the Security Council. Members of the Council have before them document S/2026/761, submitted by Panama and the United States of America, the text of a draft resolution.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote. Will those in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/2026/761 please raise their hand? Those against the draft resolution, please raise your hands. Those abstaining, please raise your hands. The result of the vote is as follows: 12 votes in favour, 0 votes against, 3 abstentions. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 28/29/2026. I now give the floor to the.

Members of the Council who would like to make an explanation after the vote.

And I give the floor to the representative of Panama.

Thank you, Mr. President. Before beginning this statement, unfortunately, we have to express our deep condolences to the families and loved ones of around about 11 people who were violently murdered yesterday in Atibonite. Actions such as these make us realize the importance of this force. Resuming the process today, we would like to thank our co-draftor, the USA, for the close coordination and co-leadership maintained throughout these negotiations. Also, we would like to thank all members of the Council for their constructive participation during negotiations. Their preparedness to bring positions together and to recognize international solidarity with the Haitian people made it possible for this renewal to take place, providing the Gang Suppression Force and their support office the continuity and predictability necessary for them to continue to implement their respective mandates with the guarantees and protections necessary. We also recognize the firm support expressed by the states of our region, reflected in the recent joint declaration of the Organization of American States in support of the renewal of the Gang Suppression Force. President, behind each decision that we adopt in this Council are the lives of millions of people. When it comes to Haiti, we're speaking about girls and boys that have the right to live without the fear of being recruited by the gangs, women who should not have to live under the threat of sexual violence, families that have been forced to leave their homes and communities, entire communities, which simply aspire to recover normal life, a dignified daily life. This adoption reminds the Haitian people that they are not alone. The decision that we take today should give fresh impetus to the deployment of the contingents that the Force needs in order to achieve its full operational capacity. This force should move forward with initiatives as recently established for the Peace Dividend Fund in Haiti, aimed at reducing violence and providing alternatives, particularly to young people in the face of recruitment by gangs. It's only through complementary actions that address the multidimensional aspect of the crisis that we'll be able to, once and for all, make progress towards lasting peace and stability in the brotherly Republic of Haiti.

Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Panama for your statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you to our COPE and in particular, Panama, for their close collaboration on this effort. Colleagues, for decades, the international community has watched Haiti cycle through crisis after crisis. Missions have come and gone. Billions of dollars have candidly been spent by many of the countries in this room. And we have to ask ourselves for what? valiant efforts, well-meaning efforts to be sure. But now we have a situation where the gangs have taken over, they've gotten stronger, Haitian institutions weaker, and everyday people in Haiti and in the region, and even in our own countries, have paid the price. And you've probably heard the old line, the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a much different result. And I think that line could certainly have applied to much of the world's strategy towards Haiti for the better part of my lifetime. And colleagues, today marks the next stage and a new chapter in Haiti, where I'm proud to say we're trying something genuinely different. And we certainly, along with our co-pen, appreciate your support in trying a new model and a new approach. And we've done this in solidarity with the entire membership of the Organization of American States, the OAS, with CARICOM, and most importantly, with the government of Haiti. We have voted to reauthorize the Gang Suppression Force and its UN support office in Haiti. And just last year, it's worth remembering that we were talking about what this new force might look like and what it could do. And we certainly knew what it couldn't be. Now it exists, and better yet, it is beginning to work. And thanks to the mandate and resources this council has given it, the gang suppression force is taking the fight to the gangs. They're clearing roads and neighborhoods. They're liberating what has been no-go zones for the Haitian National Police. They are shutting down illegal tolls. that serve as a revenue source for the gangs, an illicit revenue source, and keeps them fueled for their terror. Colleagues, there's four things that make this model, this approach different, and we would argue will give it a chance to work. One, it has teeth, serious soldiers with an offensive mandate. There would obviously be no taking the fight to the gangs without this. We argue the UN is not biting off more than it can chew. Instead, it's doing what it is uniquely equipped to do, providing the logistical backbone through the newly established support office. The entire effort, number three, is designed around the ultimate objective that Haitians themselves take back control of their own security and their own future. And this cannot and will not become an endless mission and for countries are actually sharing the burden to staff and support this mission over the last year. Notably, we have received more than 17,000 personnel pledges for 5,500 authorized billets. And we should think about that for a second. We have more than three times as many personnel pledged as positions authorized and available. There are now more than 1,500 troops on the ground as we speak, and 4,000 more are slated to come in the coming months. Colleagues, Look, this is, um, this is an effort that we are grateful for support in particular to the troops and police from Chad, from El Salvador, from Guatemala, from Jamaica, Mongolia, and Sri Lanka that have already served on the ground again on, behalf of our Copan and the Haitian people, we thank you. They've left their homes and their families to take on some of the most violent gangs in our hemisphere, and that certainly takes courage. We also want to thank Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and the Bahamas for their daily work through the standing group of partners. Your work getting soldiers from pledge to billeted in the field is indispensable. And to the Dominican Republic, thank you for opening your territory to critical logistics operations, treating wounded personnel, and contributing resources to this effort. And I also want to extend gratitude to Germany and other countries for stepping forward with funding, equipment, strategic airlift, and other support. Finally, to Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Peru, who have pledged resources that are forthcoming. Colleagues, we now have to keep the momentum. Troops are still arriving. We've only just begun. There's more work to do. And the gangs are certainly not just melting away. And their terror over the people of this region continues. We believe, as Secretary Rubio said last year, that this was a real test of whether the UN could adapt its old models Six, maybe seven missions have been dedicated to Haiti over the previous decades and obviously to limited success. We do believe, the United States does believe the UN can deliver on missions like the Gang Suppression Force and it can be great again. And this is what getting back to basics, back to peace and security looks like. Finally, for the Haitian people, They've defeated Napoleon, some of the greatest militaries in the world. They have fought natural disasters. They have recovered from earthquakes and hurricanes. Together with them, we can take back the second oldest republic in our hemisphere. They can win back their streets and their lives and their futures for their families. And it's not hard to believe that Haiti can be great once again as well. Thank you, colleagues, and thank you for your support in this endeavor.

I thank the representative of the United States for this statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China.

President, China has abstained on the draft resolution on the mandate extension of Haitian Gang Suppression Force just adopted, let me explain the position of China's vote. First, China is deeply concerned of the dire security situation in Haiti and supports countries in the region and international community to provide support to Haiti. Having said that, as to whether resorting to external military force to suppress or even neutralize gangs is the right way to solve the security plight in Haiti. China has always had its doubts and concerns, and this position remains unchanged. The crisis in Haiti is not a simple security question, but rather deep-seated problems of state governance. At present, The Haitian state presence is woefully absent. Gang forces keep relocating and regrouping. Corruption and collusion between the police and gangs are very prominent, and many people, including children, have joined gangs out of economic desperation. Under these circumstances, Resorting to military force to fight violence with violence is unlikely to be effective. On the contrary, it may make the already difficult situation even more intractable and bring more harm to the Haitian people. According to the resolution just adopted, the GSF's mandate will be extended by six months. The Security Council should keep a close watch and strict oversight over the GSF. ensure strict compliance with international law, operational transparency, timely reporting, and full accountability in order to effectively protect the safety and security of the Haitian people, especially children. Second, China always maintains that Security Council should use every opportunity available to focus on addressing the underlying problems and prominent challenges in Haiti, send a clear signal, and take targeted actions. The ultimate objective of international support is for Haiti to be able to rely on itself in maintaining security. The Security Council should urge the Haitian authorities to take effective measures, strengthen capacity building, and assume its primary responsibility for protecting its people and national governance at early date. Haitian gangs still holding their possession large quantities of arms and ammunition, posing a grave threat to the security situation. The Security Council should take advantage of mandatory renewal of sanctions regimes, among others, as opportunities to further beef up the implementation of the arms embargo and stem the flow of arms and ammunition into the hands of gangs. To be truly effective, Council actions must be grounded on rigorous analysis and for and thorough deliberations and be subject to timely assessment, review, and adjustments in light of the dynamics in the process of the implementation. China supports a comprehensive review of the latest situation in Haiti, the security response of the Haitian authorities, and the effectiveness of the GSF and other international support in order to inform decision-making by the Council for the next step. Regrettably, the draft resolution just adopted did not fully take on board the views and suggestions by China mentioned above. We will continue to uphold our constructive position on this matter and make sure that the Security Council can take a more comprehensive, responsible, and effective approach in dealing with the Haitian file. Lastly, I wish to underscore that the key to solving the problems in Haiti is ultimately held in the hands of the Haitians themselves, but that does not mean the international community will stand by and do nothing. But rather, the international community should bear in mind the special national conditions of Haiti and the lessons learned from the past to help Haiti find the right way out of this crisis. What the Security Council needs to discuss has never been whether to support Haiti, but how to support Haiti. China recognizes the efforts made by countries in the region to this end. We stand ready to work with all members to continue to uphold a responsible attitude and play our constructive role in helping the Haitians to achieve peace, stability, and development at an early date. Thank you, President.

I thank the representative of China for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. President, Russia abstained from voting on the U.S.-Panamanian draft Security Council resolution on the extension of the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti's mandate. A year ago, we didn't stand in the way of the creation of the mission and did so, first of all, at the request of the countries of the region and the Haitian authorities themselves. At the same time, the model of the GSF itself, as well as the mechanisms for their financing and staffing, left us with many questions. And 12 months down the road, we cannot say that all of these concerns have been fully allayed. Yes, the mission has been established and has begun deployment. And we cannot fail to recognize the active efforts of both of its initiators, including the standing partners, as well as the United Nations Secretariat, which has essentially flawlessly implemented the Council's decision regarding the deployment of the United Nations Support Office in Haiti. At the same time, the implementation of this initiative has faced essentially the entire range of problems that were well known in advance. This includes the difficulty in finding and training the contingents needed, ensuring sustainable funding, and the unclear legal status of this newly formed mission. As a result, the deployment of units has been delayed, which in turn delays the country's preparation for the long-awaited general elections. And crime continues to reign on the streets of Port-au-Prince and other cities. Even more questions remain about the parameters of the use of force the GSF within the framework of a very vague mandate, which, because of the technical rollover, we have not been able to revise. The contingents sent to participate in the GSF are geared towards carrying out traditional peacekeeping tasks. But in Haiti, they will have to face the reality of street confrontations with an unprincipled enemy that does not obey the rules of conventional warfare, the Haitian gangs. And until this happens, it is difficult for the Council to assess their effectiveness and their contribution to ensuring security in the country. Regardless of the further development of events with the JSF, it is clear that even the most active military actions will not lead to a solution to the problem and will not allow Haiti to get out of the current deepest crisis. Only if statehood and its own capacity to maintain law and order are strengthened, the country will be able to return to the constitutional path and ensure progressive socio-economic development. It is in the hands of the international community, or rather its specific members, to stop the external supplies of Haitian criminals with weapons and money, and not to interfere in the internal political processes in the country, including within the framework of the current electoral process.

I thank you for your attention.

I thank the Russian Federation for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Colombia.

Thank you, Mr. President. We particularly like to greet the permanent representative of Haiti, as well as other

delegations joining us today at this meeting.

well, the penholders, the United States and Panama, and welcomes the adoption of the resolution 2793 of 2025. The job is not yet done. And it will be certainly risky to end it before time. In addition to that, and Dominican Republic and Jamaica knows this very well, Their national security is also compromised. In the region, there is a new finacement of the gangs that is related to drug trafficking. And as such, moving at this moment the gang suppression force will be certainly a mistake. The technical rollover of the mandate of the GAN operation force for six months provides the necessary continuity for advancing towards the deployment and will allow this Council in March to consider any adjustments that may be necessary on the basis of more comprehensive information regarding the deployment and the operation performance. We might need more information as how things are going, but it's clear that the mission must continue and the situation in Haiti has several problems that could lead to the escalation of other type of phenomenons that has not been considered as forced migration, drug trafficking, and the national security of the neighboring countries.

Mr. President, the security situation in Haiti continues to be a source of concern for Colombia. The growing violence of the gangs against the civilian population, as well as their expansion into new areas of the country, requires a firm response. The resolution addresses this response, and therefore the restoration of security is a fundamental condition in order to move towards peace, strengthen justice and the rule of law in Haiti, to fully restore its democratic institutions and create logical, necessary and viable conditions for development and the prosperity of the Haitian people. In this context, Colombia believes that the Gang Suppression Force is playing an essential role, and it, of course, requires support for the rollover of the mission. And also other supervisory mechanisms are needed to protect the civilian population and, once again, protect the neighboring countries. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Colombia. I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

I thank the United States and Panama for presenting the resolution extending the mandates of UNSO and the GSF in Haiti. We appreciate U.N. Department of Operational Support and the Standing Group of Partners for their work in operationalizing the mandate accorded by Security Council Resolution 2793 last year. We particularly commend the United States for keeping the Council members, as well as the wider membership, abreast of the developments subsequent to the adoption of resolution 2793. President, Haiti's multifaceted and deep-rooted political, security, economic, and humanitarian challenges merit a holistic response, one that is nationally owned and executed. While resolution 2793 is designed to address the acute security challenges that Haitians face, long-term stability will require concerted efforts from domestic political actors. The resolution just acted upon by the Council is a technical rollover of the mandate given to GSF and UNSO last year, on which Pakistan had also abstained. We remain supportive of all regional and international efforts to assist Haiti in overcoming its long-drawn challenges. We remain hopeful that the security and support mechanism put in place by resolution 2793 and extended today for another period of six months would be deployed fully with adequate and sustainable funding arrangements and eventually lead to the desired results. The success in Haiti hinges on collective efforts by all relevant stakeholders. We commend the countries who have committed troops to the GSF and hope that their efforts will succeed in bringing necessary security and stability to Haiti. To conclude, Mr. President, we reaffirm our full respect for Haiti's sovereignty and territorial integrity and its political choices. Pakistan will continue to stand in solidarity with the Haitian people and support their quest for stability. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Greece.

Welcome the adoption of this resolution and thank the co-sponsors, Panama, and the United States for their work. Greece voted in favor, reaffirming its unwavering support for the Gang Suppression Force and the United Nations Support Office in Haiti. The international community must ensure that the GSF is provided with necessary time, support and resources to complete its deployment and achieve full operational capability. This is essential for the GSF to respond effectively to the security challenges on the ground, combat gang violence and dismantle criminal networks. Last month's developments in Kanskov underscore the urgency of the situation. At the same time, the GSF must have the necessary legal protection to effectively carry out its mandate. In this regard, we welcome the agreement between the Government of Haiti and the GSF confirming its legal personality, privileges and immunities. Mr. President, our vote also reflects the strong regional support for the GSF and TONSOH. Greece will continue to stand by the GSF, UNSOH, BINUH, and the Haitian authorities in their efforts to combat gang violence and restore security and stability in Haiti. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Greece for their statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Latvia.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The United States and Panama for their dedicated leadership in bringing this resolution on the renewal on GSF mandate forward. Latvia voted in favor of this resolution and with today's vote, we are entrusting the GSF with two precious assets, time and necessary conditions to deliver fully on its mandate. We encourage the GSF, Haitian authorities, and all international partners to make full use of this window of opportunity to advance deployment, strengthen security, and help create conditions necessary for Haiti to move towards the elections. Likewise, we recall that the GSF is authorized to carry out its mandate in strict compliance with international law, including international human rights law, and we expect the GSF to ensure the highest standards of transparency, conduct, and discipline among their contingents. We do recognize and commend the valuable contribution of countries participating in the GSF. As the GSF and international partners continue their efforts to improve the security situation, we encourage Haitian authorities to advance in parallel and with renewed determination the measures that fall beyond the GSF's mandate, including DDR, development of the comprehensive national security strategy, effective implementation of sanctions, and action to address structural causes of instability, including impunity, corruption, and illicit flows. The international community can help create the necessary conditions, but key to sustainable progress ultimately depends on strong action by Haitian authorities for the benefit of the Haitian people. And Latvia's support to restoring security in Haiti remains unwavering.

I thank you.

I thank the representative of Latvia for her statement and I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom remains committed to supporting a Haitian-led solution to the crisis in Haiti, a crisis which continues to take a terrible toll on its people. The success of the Gang Suppression Force is key to this. The GSF must be able to fully deploy to address instability and turn the tide against the gangs. That is why the United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution. We commend the efforts of Panama and of the United States in leading this work. The United Kingdom is fully committed to the success of the mission, and we have contributed $7.5 million to its human rights compliance mechanism. We condemn all perpetrators of gang attacks, including the use of civilians as human shields, hostage taking, sexual violence, and the deliberate targeting of vulnerable communities. Humanitarian and medical workers must be protected, allowed to operate safely, and without obstruction. We hope that the Gang Suppression Force can bring about the security and the stability that the Haitian people deserve, and pave the way to credible elections, allowing Haitians to choose their next leaders. I thank you.

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for her statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Denmark.

Mr. President, Denmark welcomes the adoption of the resolution renewing the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti, and we thank the penholders for their efforts. Denmark strongly supports the GSF and its goal to address the dire security situation in Haiti, to free the Haitian people from violence and terror of the gangs. The GSF, supported by the UN Support Office, has a robust mandate to counter gang operations and support the Haitian authorities in establishing the rule of law. We commend Member States who have pledged their support to the GSF, and we call for expedited deployment of contingents on the ground. The restoration of democratic institutions through free, fair and inclusive elections is imperative once security conditions are met. We reiterate, as does this resolution, that the GSF must act with highest standards of transparency, conduct and discipline, and in strict compliance with international law. We further recall the protections that must be afforded to children in all counter-gang operations. Cutting off the gang's supply to arms and ammunitions remains critical in the fight to establish security and quell the violence. We reiterate the need for the full implementation of the UN arms embargo and sanctions regime. Establishing security is only one part to ensure lasting stability in Haiti. We call on the Government of Haiti to redouble its efforts for establishing a functional justice and prison system to address systemic impunity and dangerous overcrowding. We also call for the continued advancing of nationally owned DDR efforts. In closing, Haiti is at a critical juncture. The GSF deserves the backing of the UN and international community to put Haiti back on the track to security, peace and prosperity. Denmark remains committed to working with all partners to this end. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Denmark for her statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Bahrain.

We welcome the adoption of resolution 2829, which renews the Gang Suppression Force for six months. We thank the United States and Panama for their efforts. The adoption of this important resolution reflects the support of the international community to Haiti, as developments remain troubling. and as humanitarian and security challenges persist, especially regarding protecting children from recruitment and from use by armed groups and ensuring the integration of children and provision of psychological care. The extension, the renewal of the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force is important. We must ensure continued deployment, we must ensure that it fulfills its aims to serve security and stability. The Kingdom of Bahrain expresses its support to the people and the government of Haiti, and we stress the importance of cooperating with the United Nations and international community to overcome the challenges and to build a more stable and more secure future for the brotherly Haitian people. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain for their statement. I now will make a statement in my quality as representative of France. The adoption of this resolution is a new stage in restoring security in Haiti, and we'd like to thank the United States and Panama for conducting the negotiations. By renewing the Gang Suppression Force mandate and the United Nations Support Office, this Council confirms the strategy adopted a year ago, responding to the appeal of Haiti and the region for resolute international support to face the gangs that are a gangrene in this country and have been for a long time. The atrocious crimes committed on a daily basis by the gangs remind us that it's up to us collectively to speed up the implementation of the GSF, to provide them with logistical support of the United Nations. The troop-contributing countries are answering the call, redoubling their efforts to enable the Force to begin its operations as soon as possible in order to meet the expectations of the people. The decision taken today in our resolution to be implemented, as well as the strengthening by Haiti of its security capacity, opens the path to a return to stability and for the holding of elections under satisfactory conditions. Through this resolution, the Security Council is facing up to its responsibilities. France would like to express its thanks and expresses our support for the force, to the support office, to the troop contributing countries. We have active cooperation with Haiti to help them to restore the state and to normalize the situation. And we owe this to Haitians who must be freed from the violence of the criminal gangs. I thank you. I now give the floor to the representative of Haiti.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to, first of all, applaud the very fruitful presidency of the French over the Security Council in this month of September. And I also give my warm greetings to His Excellency, Ambassador Jerome Bonafon. And we thank him for the way he's been conducting our deliberations this month. We welcome the adoption of resolution, which renews the mandate of the effort of the GSF only a few days after the call for renewal and further deployment launched by the prime minister during his speech in the general debate. We thank the pen holders, the United States and Panama. And we thank all the members of the Council for the spirit of consensus which reigned during the negotiation on this text. We also thank the members of the Council who abstained, and their comments will be conveyed to the Haitian authorities. My government attaches great importance to respecting this international commitment alongside Haiti. Mr. President, the renewal of the mandate will consolidate the progress already made, will accelerate the build-up of the force, and, above all, will translate the commitments of the international community into concrete and lasting results for the Haitian people. As was mentioned by the Prime Minister, His Excellency Mr. Alex ditia Fisseme, during his address to the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, The security objective is clear. It is to enable the Haitian state to gradually and sustainably regain control of the areas under the control of armed criminal gangs, to secure critical infrastructure, to restore the authority of the state, and to create the security conditions which are essential for the return to the constitutional order and for the organization of elections. Mr. President, GSF is still in a phase of deployment and positioning in the field, and we hope that the renewal of their mandate will be accompanied by the necessary staff, equipment, and operational capabilities to enable it to fully carry out the tasks entrusted to it by the Council. The Republic of Haiti expresses its deep appreciation to the states that contributed or are preparing to contribute to the JSF. In particular, we welcome the commitments undertaken by Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Canada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mongolia, Peru, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Chad, as well as those of all partners supporting the JSF. We encourage the expeditious finalization of the legal, administrative, and operational arrangements still underway to facilitate the effective deployment of the announced capabilities. To those who are already standing alongside Haitian institutions, as well as to those who are preparing to join them, my government expresses its gratitude. Their commitment is a direct contribution to the efforts of the Haitian people to restore security and stability. Mr. President, the success of the GSF will also depend on the quality of its coordination with national institutions. The force must act in complementarity with Haitian institutions and not replace them. Permanent operational coordination between the GSF, the Haitian National Police, and the Haitian Armed Forces is essential from the viewpoint of planning of operations and the sharing of information, all the way to the securing and stabilization of the recaptured territories. It is not enough to take back territory from the gangs. It must be possible to hold it, to reestablish in a lasting fashion the authority of the state, to allow the return of public services, and to prevent criminal groups from reestablishing themselves. And this requires a clear articulation of responsibilities and close coordination amongst all of the forces present on the ground. Such coordination must be based, in particular, on secure, reliable, and interoperable communication tools. Members of the JSF, the national police, and the armed forces must be able to exchange information quickly and effectively before, during, and after operations. And the strengthening of joint operations centers and information sharing mechanisms must, in this regard, remain a priority. Mr. President, security remains an essential condition for the success of the political and electoral process in Haiti. It is therefore essential to secure the main roads, urban centers, critical infrastructure, and areas which are necessary for the deployment of the electoral system in order to guarantee that we have free and credible elections. Haiti is seeking international support aimed at strengthening its national capacities, without replacing its sovereign responsibilities. The Gang Suppression Force must contribute towards creating the conditions for the Haitian National Police and the Armed Forces of Haiti to carry out their security missions in the long term. The Government thanks the Council for renewing the mandate of the GSF and stands ready to work with the High Command of the Mission to ensure that concrete results can be attained on the ground, including a lasting improvement in security, the reduction of gang control, restoring state authority, and the holding of inclusive and peaceful elections.

Let me conclude, Mr. President, before thanking once again all of those who are here around this table and who want to help Haiti. I would like to thank this standing group of partners, including Canada. And I also welcome the presence of the representative of CARICOM and the Dominican Republic here.

I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of Haiti for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Jamaica.

Thank you, Mr. President. I do have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the 14 member states of the Caribbean Community. CARICOM is grateful to you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting, and to the entire Security Council for the decision just adopted to renew the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force. We thank the co-penholders, in particular the USA and Panama, for their consistent efforts. We see this outcome as a critical reaffirmation of the international community's continued support for the people of Haiti. Mr. President, this important decision comes at a critical juncture for Haiti and for the region. We believe that there has been some discernible progress as a result of the initial rollout of the GSF, even though the pace of deployment has been less than optimal. However, Haiti continues to face serious challenges, particularly in the areas of security, socio-economic development and humanitarian assistance. The assurance of the continued deployment of the Gang Suppression Force is therefore an important step. It is now critical that the Force moves towards full operational capacity as soon as possible. Mr. President, we remain deeply concerned about the continued impact of violence on women, girls, and young people. Their vulnerability has been heightened by sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation, and recruitment by criminal groups. Limited economic opportunities further compound these challenges. Greater attention must therefore be given to young people. including through context appropriate DDR and community violence reduction initiatives that provide meaningful opportunities. We therefore urge sustained international support for the Gang Suppression Force, the Haitian National Police, and its armed forces. This support must include the financial, logistical, and operational resources necessary to concretize the gains that have already been made, restore security, and create the space for sustained humanitarian relief, developmental, and economic progress. Security must also create the conditions conducive to political stability, the holding of elections, and the full restoration of democratic governance in Haiti, led and owned by the Haitian people. For those countries who wish to assist, we call in particular for contributions of airlift for troops and personnel, air and sea monitoring equipment and technical support, as well as language training and translation, in addition, of course, to financial contributions. Mr. President, today's decision by this Council to support the renewal of the mandate of the GSF sends an unequivocal message. Armed gangs will not be allowed to determine Haiti's future, nor indeed that of the Caribbean region. CARICOM takes this opportunity to recognize the important roles being played by the Haitian National Police and Armed Forces, the Standing Group of Partners, the OAS, the United Nations, the Eminent Persons Group, and other regional and international partners in supporting a Haitian-led process. Continued cooperation among these partners will remain essential. We pledge our continued collaboration with all stakeholders in this endeavor. with the aspirations of the Haitian people guiding our collective efforts. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Jamaica for his statement on behalf of CARICOM, and I now give the floor to the representative of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. President, the Dominican Republic welcomes the adoption of this resolution. We express our appreciation to the United States and Panama for their leadership and perseverance as penholders, and to the members of this Council whose commitment made it possible to renew the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force. This extension is not an end in itself. It provides a period that must be fully utilized to enable the Force to complete its deployment and exercise to its full capacity the mandate entrusted to it under resolution 2793. to free Haiti from the grip of criminal gangs and to restore to its people the peace and stability of which they have been deprived for far too long. Six months is a short period in light of the scale of the challenge, and there is no time to waste. A fully deployed force will make it possible to restore security, enable free, legitimate and inclusive elections to be held, and allow the Haitian people once again to control their own destiny, with authority over their territory, peace in their communities and a voice at the ballot box. We welcome the fact that the resolution reaffirms full respect for international law, pays particular attention to children robbed of their childhood by the gangs, and recognizes the primary responsibility of the Haitian authorities, including with regard to the illicit flow of arms. Mr. President. The authority of this decision will depend on the resources that accompany it. We call upon all States and international partners to translate their commitments into effective support for the deployment of the Force, whether through personnel, equipment and capabilities, in-kind support or contributions to the trust fund that sustains it. Security. opens the way, but security alone is not enough to keep that path open. Every area recovered must be consolidated through institutions capable of administering justice and through disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration programmes that offer Haiti's young people a future other than one defined by violence. The Dominican Republic has done its part through concrete action, a proportional contribution to the trust fund, medical care and evacuations for mission personnel, and logistical support provided from our territory. The Haitian people are not waiting for more promises. They are waiting for results. May this renewal mark the transition from commitment to its full realization. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of the Dominican Republic. for their statement. There are no more names inscribed on the list. The meeting is adjourned. The 10,232nd meeting of the Security Council is called to order. The provisional agenda for this meeting is: The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The agenda is adopted. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Rwanda to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. In accordance with Rule 39 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. James Swan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Ms. Nene Bintou Iragi, President of the Coordination Bureau of Civil Society in South Kivu. It is so decided. And I would like to welcome the invited Member States and the briefers. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item 2 of the agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, published in document S/2026/748. I now give the floor to Mr. James Swan.

Mr. President, distinguished members of the Council, thank you for the opportunity once again to brief the Council. Since my last briefing in June, sustained diplomatic efforts to address the conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have continued under the Washington, Doha and African Union-led processes. As part of the Washington process, The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced in July the establishment of a voluntary disarmament and cantonment process for the Force Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda, FDLR, to be undertaken over the course of the coming year. Over the past weeks, MONUSCO has been engaging closely with the Government to assess ways in which this initiative can best be supported, in line with the mission's mandate and existing resources. In coordination with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, MONUSCO is working with both Congolese and Rwandan authorities to address the FDLR presence in line with the commitments made by the signatories to the Washington Accords. Since September, MONUSCO has repatriated 122 former FDLR elements and their dependents from the mission's transit camp in Sake to Rwanda. In parallel, progress continued under the Doha process with discussions between the government of the DRC and the Alliance Fleuve Congo, Mouvement du 23 Mars, AFC M23, resuming in Switzerland in August. These discussions resulted in the adoption of a roadmap setting out the way forward for the next phase of the discussions. The Doha process has also been supported by important confidence-building measures, including the release and transfer of 15 detainees by the International Committee of the Red Cross from the government of the DRC to the AFC M23 on 7 August. Mr. President, the deployment of the first two missions of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus to Minembwe, South Kivu, from 24 to 25 August, and to Masisi, North Kivu, from 10 to 12 September, represents a key milestone in support of a permanent ceasefire. MONUSCO conducted reconnaissance missions to the designated locations and provided logistical, communications, medical, and other support for the conduct of the EJVM+ missions. including the required ground and air transport to each location. Based on security assurances received from the conflict parties, MONUSCO has been able to safely operate helicopters from Goma Airport into areas of North and South Kivu, and to conduct ground convoys from Sake into areas of North Kivu. The EJVM+ has shared its reports with the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism established under the Doha process, following which the next locations of EJVM+ missions will be determined.

At the same time, the African Union's diplomatic engagement has continued through the mediator and the five co-facilitators. in order to support efforts to advance peace and security in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. A planning meeting held in Gaborone in July made it possible to develop a roadmap aimed at harmonizing the African Union's efforts and adopting a six-month action plan. In coordination with the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, MONUSCO remains in close contact with the African Union and its mediator, President Faure Gnassingbe, and stands ready to support the implementation of this roadmap at the request of the AU. Despite these diplomatic advances, developments in eastern DRC underscore the scale of the challenges that remain. In North Kivu, fighting between the AFC M23 and its allies, supported by Rwanda on the one hand, and the FARDC supported by their allies on the other, has continued over recent months. The AFC M23 maintains the extensive control over a large part of North Kivu, whereas the main fighting is concentrated in Masisi and Walikali. Both parties have continued to use heavy weapons and drones in the conduct of hostilities, contributing to the continued deterioration of the security situation. In South Kivu, in the highlands of Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira, Particularly around Minembwe, the FARDC and Wazalendo groups have continued to confront the AFC M23, supported by Twirwaneo and other allies, in several localities. In several localities, the increasing use of heavy weapons continues to cause population displacement and disrupt essential services, as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Mr. President, While attention remains largely focused on the conflict involving the AFC M23 with the support of Rwanda, other centres of insecurity continue to threaten the protection and security of civilian populations in the eastern part of the country. In Ituri, the situation remains fragile, particularly around displacement sites, along economic corridors and in agricultural areas. The Allied Democratic Forces, the ADF, affiliated with the Islamic State, have intensified their activities in the territory of Mambasa, as well as along the border between Ituri and North Kivu, notably by targeting mining sites. The ADF continue to carry out deadly attacks against civilians and make extensive use of abductions, including as far as Uele, beyond the area of responsibility assigned to MONUSCO under its mandate. Alongside the Congolese authorities, the Mission has strengthened its patrols and deployed mobile operating bases in the areas most exposed to ADF attacks, particularly in Mambasa, where a base was established in June. Since my last briefing, MONUSCO and the FARDC have conducted 3,115 joint patrols, while the mission's police component has carried out 1,139 patrols.

The human rights situation also remains deeply concerning. Since my last briefing to the Council, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, UNJHRO, documented 1,537 human rights violations and abuses across the country, 88% of which occurred in the east. These included conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated both by armed groups and by members of the defence and security forces, which affected 382 victims including 257 women and 122 girls. In this regard, I wish to echo the public debate held by this Council in July under the presidency of the DRC on conflict related sexual violence. I urge member states to sustain their engagement to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and to ensure justice and reparation for victims. Mr. President, These human rights violations are occurring in a humanitarian context in which conflict, population displacement, food insecurity, and the Ebola outbreak intersect, with severe consequences for women and children. Approximately 26.5 million Congolese are facing acute food insecurity, and 6.1 million people remain internally displaced. The revised humanitarian response plan seeks $2.13 billion to assist 10.7 million of the people most in need. However, as of 28 September, it was only 50.5% funded. I encourage member states to sustain and increase their support. In addition, the Ebola outbreak is further aggravating the situation. As of 28 September, 8,067 confirmed cases and 3,901 deaths were reported across seven provinces. While Ituri remains the epicenter of the outbreak, the number of cases is also increasing in North Kivu, where insecurity continues to hamper response efforts. MONUSCO continues to support the response led by the Congolese authorities and coordinated by the World Health Organization including through our logistical support. I call on all parties to ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access.

Mr. President, in addition to the security and humanitarian crises that continue to affect the country, political differences persist on certain issues related to governance and institutional reforms. In response to this situation, a broad consensus is emerging within the country on the need to launch a national dialogue. In this context, I welcome the announcement made in August by President Tshisekedi regarding the launch of a process aimed at organizing this dialogue. I encourage the establishment of an inclusive dialogue that guarantees broad participation. which relies on facilitators who enjoy the confidence of all stakeholders and allows for an in-depth discussion of the country's most urgent national priorities. Furthermore, I encourage all Congolese actors to engage in good faith in the search for consensus and to prioritize dialogue in overcoming their differences. I urge the authorities and all Congolese citizens to preserve civic space, guarantee fundamental freedoms, and demonstrate restraint and political tolerance in order to create conditions conducive to inclusive participation in political and peace processes. To conclude, Mr. President, I would urge all parties to remain fully engaged in the Washington and Doha peace processes, as well as in the efforts led under the auspices of the African Union. I also encourage them to continue their efforts so that the commitments made are translated into concrete and tangible progress capable of sustainably improving the living conditions of all Congolese women and men. MONUSCO remains fully committed to standing alongside the Congolese people in their pursuit of lasting peace, security and development. Thank you.

I thank Mr. Swan for his briefing and I now give the floor to Madame Nene Bintou Iragi.

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, Members of the Security Council, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first to express my deep gratitude to the French Republic and its permanent mission to the United Nations for facilitating this briefing and enabling civil society from eastern DRC to address this Council directly. Mr. President, I would like also like to acknowledge a historic moment for my country. Since January 1, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has once again held a seat on this Council as a non-permanent member, following an absence of over 34 years, with a mandate for 2026-2027. In the DRC, and particularly in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, Our people welcome this election with immense hope. The hope that this election would finally enable the DRC to restore its national unity and territorial integrity, and to demonstrate that international peace and security begin with the safety of every child in the Congo. Now, security situation. It is a collapse fueled by our minerals. The East is no longer in crisis, it is in collapse. In areas of North and South Kivu controlled by AFC M23, a parallel administration illegally taxes and exhorts our compatriots at gunpoint and commits targeted abuses. What is happening in Kanyola, Luntukulu, Kabare, Walungu, Kale, Bukavu and Goma is not an isolated incident. It's methodical. It's a modus operandi. Assassinations, arson, collective punishment and death trap detention centers where prisoners are denied family visits. This is a deliberate strategy to terrorize and suppress the local populations. And yet, Mr. President, it is impossible to understand this war without addressing what fuels it: our minerals. The war in Kanyola, Minembwe, Karembo, Lomera, Luhi, Lwinta, and Rubaya is not ethnic in nature. It's an economic war. Specifically, in concrete terms, in these areas, artisanal miners extract cassiterite, coltan, and gold under the coercion of armed groups. This ore is taxed at the mine site, then transported to Bukavu or Goma, mixed with so-called clean ore to mask its origins, and then exported through trading houses. Every ton of coltan that leaves the country illegally finances the purchase of weapons and the recruitment of our children. Some gold, cassiterite, and coltan bypass Kinshasa entirely. They leave country through illicit channels, losing all traceability in opaque supply chains, and then they reappear as cash used to purchase lethal weapons. And these are not vague allegations. These networks are known to this Council and have been extensively documented, verified, and debated for years. And this is where international responsibility comes in. Resolution 2773, which this Council adopted, is not being implemented with respect to the withdrawal of foreign troops. and OECD principles require every company purchasing Congolese minerals to verify their origins. But on the ground, many buyers look the other way. They buy from trading houses that cannot establish a clean, traceable origin of the minerals they export. And this irresponsible purchasing is the fuel which is currently setting North and South Kivu ablaze. As long as people can kill to control a mine and sell its output internationally without facing consequences, the war will never end. Now, the humanitarian situation, which is a forgotten catastrophe. Last year, the conflict caused nearly 10 million forced displacements, which is about a third of all conflict-related displacements worldwide. In South Kivu, for example, 800,000 internally displaced persons have been without assistance for six months. They can be found in Numbi, Minembwe, Kanola, Itombe and Mwenga. And it is because access is blocked and weaponized and used as a tool of war. Now, the human rights defenders' situation. We are being killed in silence. Defending lives in the East is a death sentence unto itself. Human rights defenders are threatened, arrested, and abducted for documenting massacres and denouncing aggression mass graves, illegal taxes, extortion checkpoints, and more. Journalists are silenced. They are jailed and disappeared for speaking the truth. The 2023 law on protection of human rights defenders is not being enforced. And we call for increased support for human rights defenders and everyone seeking to expose the realities lived by civilians in the east. Some, feeling threatened, fled to other government-controlled provinces of the DRC, while others sought refuge in Burundi, in Uganda and Tanzania. Those who remained in the occupied areas are traumatized and are keeping a low profile. All of them deserve proper assistance. Fourth point. Civil society position. Four actions. What are we asking for? In addition to the urgent implementation of Resolution 2773, we make the following requests. First, protection of civilians. unconditional humanitarian access in accordance with the latest resolution of the Paris Conference of 30th October 2025, and a clear civilian protection mandate for MONUSCO in areas posing high risk to civilians, with particular attention to human rights defenders. Now, on inclusive dialogue and peace processes. Luanda and Nairobi failed because decisions were made about us without us. The Washington and Doha agreements are being violated. The ceasefire declared in Washington and Doha remains only on paper. Support a genuine dialogue that includes civil society, especially women and youth, in order to preserve the DRC's national unity social cohesion and territorial integrity in the face of any attempt at balkanization. Now, economic justice and accountability. And this is the core of our demands. Strengthen the UN group of experts and the International Commission of Inquiry already at work in the DRC and expose the supply chains purchasing blood minerals from Rubaya, from Luweinj, Lomera, Karembu, Luhigi, and elsewhere. Sanction not only the leaders of armed groups, but also the economic networks and trading houses that finance them. And then require multinational companies that purchase our 3T minerals and gold to publish their due diligence audits. Consumers must know whether their phones contain the blood of the people of Rubaiya. Support a resilient economy. Do not fund only humanitarian aid. Fund women's and youth organizations, agricultural recovery, and any initiative that keeps our young people away from recruitment into armed groups and instead help them have the opportunities to be Congo's future leaders that will put our country on the path to peace. In conclusion, I thank France for building this bridge between the bloodied eastern part of the DRC and this Council. Thanks to its facilitation and the DRC's historic presence on this Council, alongside France, Their cry of Kivu and Ituri is no longer being stifled. It is now part of the UN's record. We are counting on you to ensure that this act of listening finally translates into protection. We are counting on you to continue to listen to local truth-tellers. And if you fail to protect the eastern part of DRC today, History will remember that you watched while holding to your ear a phone that financed its destruction. I thank.

You.

I thank Ms. Iragi for her statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Rwanda.

Mr. President, Thank you for giving me the floor. And I thank France for the leadership of the UN Security Council business for the month of September. I thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MONUSCO, Mr. James Cisswan, for his briefing, and the representative of civil society. Mr. President, for close to three decades, the security crisis in eastern DRC has remained on the agenda of this Council. as a matter of regional peace and security. Since 1999, the United Nations has committed more than $30 billion through MONUC and MONUSCO. Yet the core security challenges that repeatedly brought this regional crisis before the Council remain unresolved. Rwanda welcomed the diplomatic momentum generated by the Washington and Doha processes. and recognizes the efforts of the United States, Qatar, and African Union, the AU mediator, and other partners. Rwanda remains committed to the Washington Accords and their implementation in good faith. We continue to participate in the Joint Oversight Committee, JOC, and the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, JSCM, The JSCM provides the agreed mechanism to assess implementation of the security arrangements, including the neutralization of the FDLR and Rwanda's lifting of defensive measures. In this regard, Rwanda has taken steps to lift its defensive measures and has reported those steps through the Washington mechanisms. We have also proposed a verification mechanism under discussion comprising Rwanda and DRC and the United States as a mediator. This points to one central proposition. Claims should be verified, commitments should be measured, and all parties should be held to the same standard. Mr. President, when we apply that standard, a serious implementation gap becomes evident. The FDLR Its neutralization and the cessation of collaboration between FARDC and FDLR are not peripheral issues. They are central security commitments under the Washington Process. Yet, the Secretary-General's report confirms that FDLR remains operational in Ruchuru, Masisi, Nyiragongo and Walikale. More concerning information available indicates continued operational collaboration involving FARDC FDR, Wazarendo, and other allied forces throughout the year 2026. Let me cite only a few examples, Mr. President. On the 10th and 11th of February 2026, according to information available, the Faradese helicopter and military trucks transported 13 tons of small calibre ammunition to Pinga and Kibua, with six tons subsequently distributed to FDR and other armed group commanders. On 8 March 2026, information available indicates that FARDC helicopter airlifted 12 tonnes of ammunition and food rations to Untoto, which were subsequently distributed among FARDC, FRDL, Pareco and APCSS elements. On 31 March, information available confirms that FARDC helicopters delivered weapons 693 rifles, 6 tons of ammunition, and cash incentives destined for FDRR and other armed groups. This pattern continued through April, June, and July, and as of recent as 15th of August 2026. Information available indicated FARDC operating alongside CNRFD, FLN, FDRR, and Wazarendo Nyatura in Warungu territory. The significance is not any single incident. It is the continuity of the pattern from January to August, during the very period in which the neutralization of FDLR was supposed to be advancing. All the above information was shared through the Joint Oversight Mechanism and Joint Security Coordination Mechanism in real time for verification. Mr. President. Let me also be clear about the arrangements being advanced between the DRC government and the FDLR. Rwanda cautions against any attempt to shift the goalposts. Such an arrangement does not constitute the neutralization of the FDLR agreed under the Washington framework, nor was it part of the Washington Accords. Indeed, within the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, the parties have already identified and mapped FDLR locations, including, most importantly, the whereabouts of its political and military command structures. Furthermore, the DRC Government has, on several occasions, concluded protocols with leaders of FDLR and its affiliated armed groups, most recently on 29 August 2026. The Washington Peace Agreement, together with the agreed CONOPS and OPORD, already establishes clear obligations, operational arrangements, sequencing, verification mechanisms, and implementation timelines. These commitments cannot be unilaterally or selectively reinterpreted, subjected to new preconditions, or substituted with separate bilateral arrangements with the very armed groups that the DRC has committed to neutralize. We view this as an attempt to substitute a separate arrangement for clear commitment already undertaken as a delaying tactic that risks prolonging rather than resolving the security threat. Obligations are clear. The FDLR must be neutralized, and that neutralization must be effective, complete, and verifiable. Mr. President, the continued presence of FDLR in eastern DRC Its genocidal ideology and the continued collaboration and support it receives from the DRC government constitute a direct and existential security threat to Rwanda. That is how Rwanda understands this threat, and that is how we must treat it. It is an immediate threat. It is not distant. Allow me to put that proximity into geographical perspective. Rwanda is a small country, roughly comparable in scale to the state of Maryland. Eastern DRC is not a distant theater for Rwanda. Goma and Bukavu lie immediately across our western frontier, and they are only three to five hours by road from the capital of Rwanda, Kigali. Yet, the same cities are approximately 1,500 kilometers from the capital of the DRC. The Democratic Republic of Congo, by contrast, is geographically vast, approximately equivalent in area to Texas, California, Montana, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada combined. That geography matters. An armed group with a genocidal ideology, organized militarily with the structures and a history of attacks against Rwanda, operating immediately across our border and alongside forces of a neighboring state, cannot reasonably be treated as a remote security concern, merely because it operates far from that state's capital. For Rwanda, the continued military presence of FDLR in eastern DRC is as immediate a security concern as a comparable armed threat operating within Rwanda itself. This is precisely why the neutralization of FDLR is not a secondary issue, nor a matter that can be indefinitely deferred. It is a core security commitment under the Washington Process and an indispensable condition for durable peace between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mr. President, there is another matter on which the Council cannot remain silent: the protection of Congolese citizens facing violence because of their identity. United Nations reporting itself has documented the troubling attacks affecting Banyamulege and other Congolese Rwandan communities. Reports describe civilians killed, villages burned, populations forcibly displaced, cattle systematically raided, and sustained hate speech targeting Banyamurenga, Congolese Tutsi, and Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, including rhetoric attributed to public officials. We have also witnessed incidents of public humiliation, lynching, cannibalism of Congolese troops because of their identity by known perpetrators without any accountability whatsoever. Information available in the public domain indicates that over nearly a decade, since 2017, more than 650 villages have been destroyed or burned in the South Kivu Highlands. More than 700,000 cattle have been looted and sold in the public markets. And at least 147 schools and 57 health facilities have been destroyed. More than 80% of the Banyamulenge and the other Rwandophone population have been forced into exile over successive waves of violence. If there is any question as to who is being targeted, the pattern of displacement is telling. United Nations reporting found that the Mikenge IDP camp hosted almost exclusively Banyamulege civilians, despite the area being home to several other communities. Since 2017, Banyamulege communities in the South Kivu highlands have also faced repeated restrictions on access to public markets, farmland, and essential supplies, with recent reporting again indicating blocked routes. around Minamue. This cannot be ignored when assessing the ethnic dimension of the violence. The blockade in Minamue stands among the most prolonged blockades imposed on civilians without effective international intervention. This pattern is too big to be fabricated and too visible to be concealed. For once, the Security Council should summon the courage not to look away. Mr. President, in addition to the concerns outlined above, the reported reinstatement of Major General Sylvain Kenge as FARDC spokesperson is evidently not an isolated personnel decision. After his suspension for inflammatory remarks targeting Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, his return to a prominent military position without any public, renowned accountability process raises serious questions about the DRC government's posture towards ethnic incitement. The Secretary General's report refers to some armed actors fighting alongside FARDC as self-defense groups, yet attributes 143 human rights abuses to Azarande groups and records children associated with Azarande affiliated armed groups. This terminology deserves scrutiny. The United Nations reporting has documented that DRC government armed and financed Wazalendo and other allied armed groups for joint operations with FARDC, including offensives against Kinyarwanda-speaking communities. The relationship goes beyond collaboration. Under the DRC's own law, Wazalendo formations have been incorporated into the armed defence reserve established to reinforce the FARDC. When a group is armed and financed by the state, fights alongside its army, and it's incorporated into military reserve structures, on what basis is it still described simply as a self-defence group? Many formations now operating under the Wazalendo umbrella also existed previously as armed groups under different names and structures. If self-defense is an analytical category, then objective criteria must govern its use. Those criteria must apply equally, including when assessing Twirwanaho in the context of Minenge and the security concerns of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities. Our point is, all armed groups must be assessed according to the same standards, their conduct and impact on civilians. The choice of language should be based on objective evidence and evidence-based criteria. Mr. President, to conclude, Washington and Doha offer an opportunity to change the trajectory of this conflict. But agreements alone will not bring peace. Implementation will. That means implementing the commitments between Rwanda and DRC through the Washington Accords and sustained dialogue in the Doha process. The Washington Accords were conceived as a framework of mutual obligations between Rwanda and DRC, with the mediator playing a central role in facilitating the process and ensuring the monitoring and implementation. However, there has been a growing concern that accountability has become increasingly focused on Rwanda, subjecting it to public criticism and pressure, while the DRC failure to fulfill its own commitments has not attracted comparable scrutiny. or consequences. Rwanda maintains that public scrutiny, pressure, and accountability must be applied equally and consistently to both parties. The success of the Washington Accords depend on holding both parties equally accountable for the timely and verifiable implementation of their respective commitments. Rwanda is implementing its commitments and is prepared for those steps to be taken to verify. We ask for the same from all parties. Rwanda remains committed to a lasting peace based on implementation, verification, dialogue, and the legitimate security of all communities in the region. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of Rwanda for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Mr. President. Excellencies, I wish to express my delegation's appreciation to France for inviting us to this meeting, and to Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MONUSCO, as well as to all briefers, for their comprehensive and insightful updates on the recent developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo. We commend the Secretariat for its continued engagement under difficult circumstances. Sir President, Tanzania continues to follow with deep concern the persistent insecurity and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the eastern part of the DRC. We are particularly alarmed by reports of continued civilian casualties, large-scale displacement and the worrying increase in cases of sexual and gender-based violence. The protection of civilians, in particular women and children, must remain at the center of all of our efforts. International humanitarian law and international human rights law must be fully respected by all parties. The humanitarian situation is equally concerning, with the Ebola outbreak, the most severe of the 17 outbreaks in the history of the DRC, further complicating the situation in Ituri, where it hit the hardest, and to the North Kivu as well. My delegation joined the Secretary General to call for unhindered access for the Ebola response in accordance with the international humanitarian law. We equally call upon the support behind the revised 2026 humanitarian needs and responsive plan, which is only half funded. The lack of funding should question our conscience. Mr. President, my delegation is of the firm view that there is no military solution to the crisis in the eastern DRC. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through inclusive political dialogue, diplomacy, and confidence building. In this regard, we welcome the ongoing diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts, including the Doha process, as well as continued engagement of the African Union. We wish also to remind this Council that there already exists a solid, regionally agreed pact on security, stability and development of the Great Lakes region, with protocols that address the very situation we are grappling with. We believe that coordination, coherence and complementarity among these initiatives are essential to avoid duplication and strengthen their impact. Mr. President, the key element of de-escalation is the full respect for ceasefire agreements. My delegation welcomes MONUSCO at the Nairobi First Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mission in Minembwe, South Kivu, and Masizi, North Kivu. We call upon all parties to respect their commitment and to cease hostility. The issue of disarmament The mobilization, the integration of former combatants, as well as comprehensive security sector reform, remains central to long-term stability. We support community-based approaches to DDR and the importance for addressing the socio-economic dimension that contributes to recruitment into armed groups. On MONUSCO, my delegation takes note of the mission's continued efforts in implementing its mandate tasks, including the protection of civilians, support to stabilization, and contribution to ceasefire monitoring efforts. We underscore the importance of continued dialogue between mission and the host government regarding its presence and future configuration in line with the relevant Social Security Council resolutions. Finally, Mr. President, Tanzania will continue to support all efforts aimed at promoting dialogue, de-escalation, and lasting peace in the region. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Tanzania for their statement.

I now give the floor to the representative of Burundi.

Thank you, Mr. President. We would like to thank France for having organized this meeting, and we also thank the Secretary-General for his report on the situation in the DRC and for the ongoing efforts of MONUSCO in support of civilian protection and the peace process. We wish to underscore the regional dimension of this crisis. In paragraph 5, the report notes the engagement of the President of Burundi, His Excellency Evariste and Achime, chairperson of the African Union, alongside other regional and religious actors, to reduce the risk of confrontation in the Congolese political context. In paragraph 28, it refers to exchanges between the special representative of the Secretary-General and the authorities of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda as part of his good offices efforts in support of the peace processes. These elements demonstrate that resolving the crisis in eastern DRC requires a coordinated regional approach. For decades now, the Great Lakes region, particularly eastern DRC, has experienced devastating cycles of violence. The causes of this instability are well documented and solutions have been proposed. The Security Council has adopted several resolutions in this regard, notably Resolution 2773 in 2025, whose full implementation Burundi calls for. The question now is the effective implementation of decisions already adopted. We cannot wait for another outbreak of violence to adopt a new resolution while previous commitments remain insufficiently implemented. civilian populations cannot continue to bear the cost. It is time to move from reaction to prevention, implementation and accountability. This was also the purpose of the extraordinary summit of the African Union held in Luanda on 30 August 2026, dedicated to strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms in Africa. Its guidance must be translated into early action, improved regional coordination, and rigorous follow-up of commitments undertaken. Mr. President, Neighbouring countries directly bear the consequences of the crisis. Burundi, in particular, continues to host a significant number of Congolese refugees. This solidarity places a heavy burden on a country with limited resources and on the communities that host these families. This reality must be fully taken into account in international efforts for regional peace and stability. The situation in South Kivu, particularly around Minembwe and Uvira, is a reminder that instability in the DRC cannot be separated from its regional environment. The protection of civilians, forced displacement, and cross-border risks require close cooperation among the DRC, neighboring countries, and regional mechanisms. In this regard, the African Union's IREC platform, dedicated to interregional knowledge sharing on early warning and conflict prevention, can contribute to the exchange of experiences among the African Union, regional economic communities, and regional mechanisms. We encourage the mobilization of these capacities in support of more effective prevention in the Great Lakes region. Burundi welcomes the initial ceasefire verification missions conducted under the expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus in Menemwe and Masisi with the support of MONUSCO. They constitute an encouraging step forward. However, the continuation of hostilities shows that these initial gains remain fragile. We call on the parties to honour their commitments, cooperate fully with the verification mechanisms, and allow the deployment of additional field missions. We would also like to draw the Council's attention to developments concerning the disarmament of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the FDLR. The report indicates that one faction signed a protocol on disarmament demobilization and cantonment. It also notes that the DRC presented a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan within the framework of the Washington Process, while observing that differences do remain between the parties regarding its implementation. These efforts must continue in good faith and lead to verifiable measures. We call for the cessation of all support to armed groups and for the implementation of commitments undertaken. to address security concerns in the region, in full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. MONUSCO has a practical role to play in this effort. The report highlights its contribution to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, particularly in the processing and repatriation of former FDLR combatants. It notes the repatriation to Rwanda on 8 September of 120 foreign ex-combatants, including FDLR members, and their dependents. These capacities must be preserved and taken into account in discussions concerning the renewal of the Mission's mandate. Mr. President, the protection of civilians must remain at the centre of our action. The report documents new civilian casualties, forced displacement and serious human rights violations in eastern DRC. It also highlights difficulties of access faced by MONUSCO and humanitarian actors. We call on all parties to protect civilians, ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access, and to respect the mission's freedom of movement. The Ebola outbreak further aggravates humanitarian needs and complicates operations on the ground. It requires a coordinated response equipped with the necessary resources, as well as cooperation from neighboring countries to facilitate the movement of health personnel and medical supplies. We also welcome efforts aimed at organizing a national dialogue in the DRC to contribute sustainably to peace. This dialogue must be inclusive, credible, and transparent, and must allow for meaningful participation of women and young people. The peace process must respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the DRC. It must also leads to the withdrawal of any foreign force illegally present on its territory. We call for credible and transparent monitoring of commitments undertaken, involving the relevant regional and international actors, and building upon existing verification mechanisms. Burundi further wishes that future reports of the Secretary-General continue to provide a precise and balanced account of the contribution of regional actors to peace efforts, mediation, ceasefire verification, and civilian protection. As the renewal of MONUSCO's mandate approaches, the Security Council must ensure that the mission has the necessary means to protect civilians, support ceasefire verification, and contribute to disarmament and stabilization efforts. We call on the Council to make implementation of its own decisions a priority. Our common objective must be to prevent the next cycle of violence, rather than having to acknowledge its consequences in another resolution. And finally, we reaffirm the importance of close coordination among the United Nations, the African Union, regional mechanisms, and the states of the region in order to transform political commitments into concrete results. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of Burundi for that statement. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has asked for the floor before we move to consultations.

You have the floor.

Mr. President, the Democratic Republic of the Congo thanks the Secretary-General for his report of 21 September 2026 on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO. He'd also commends Mr. James Swan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the mission. We thank him for his comprehensive briefing, and we pay tribute to the continued commitment of the United Nations in this regard. We are speaking today at a pivotal moment in the history of our country, a moment when the Democratic Republic of the Congo is simultaneously pursuing the defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity the consolidation of its internal political process, and its active contribution to the search for peaceful solutions at the international, regional, and subregional levels. But it is also a moment of truth and responsibility. The persistence of insecurity in the east of the country cannot leave this Council indifferent. In the face of the manifest bad faith of its aggressors, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to defend with determination its territorial integrity and the inalienable right of its people to live in peace. These security requirements are vital and they're not negotiable. No obstacle will be able to deter us from them. Mr. President, Having made the resolute choice of multilateralism to resolve the crisis in the east, the DRC strictly respects its commitments contained in the resolutions of the United Nations, the African Union, and in various peace agreements. My country is fully committed to the Doha process and is committed to promoting the functioning of the expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus. as evidenced by the first verification missions in Minimwe in South Kivu and Masisi in North Kivu. In addition, in order to definitely void the FDLR's alibi brandished by Rwanda, the DRC is assuming its responsibility within the framework of the Washington Process. In addition to the voluntary repatriations already facilitated by MONUSCO, my government signed on 30 May 2026 a protocol on the disarmament, demobilization and cantonment of the FDLR Foca. Under the terms of this protocol, these combatants undertake to lay down their arms in cantonment sites designated by the Congolese authorities with a view to their return to Rwanda, their country of origin. This process is going through concrete steps. On August 29, 2026, the CNRD-Uviryunge FNL group, FPP Abiyareju-Guramba, and Rude Urunana group formally acceded to this voluntarily laying down of arms process. And the Council was officially informed of these measures by the letter by Her Excellency Ms. Therese Kaykwamba Wagner, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was published as S/2026/633. And we call for this transparent and verifiable effort to be actively supported by the Security Council and MONUSCO in the context of its next mandate. And this good faith was put to the test on the 20th September, when a TB2 drone strike attributed to the Rwandan Defense Forces targeted a Congolese position in Pinga. killing five people and seriously injuring eight others. We condemn this new violation of the ceasefire, of our sovereignty and our territorial integrity. It comes at a time when the DRC is preparing for the operation to neutralize the FDLR in the AI-1 area in accordance with the commitments undertaken under the Washington process, and it risks jeopardizing its implementation. We call for this incident to be swiftly verified by the relevant competent mechanisms, including the EJVM+, with the support of MONUSCO. And we call for the Council to strongly condemn it and demand that such attacks not be repeated. On the other hand, The implementation of the disengagement of the Rwandan forces and the lifting of their so-called defensive measures cannot be objectively assessed with precision as regards the number and exact location of the said defensive forces or measures. Mr. President, and this issue brings us to the heart of our concern. The Security Council cannot demand commitments without ensuring that they are strictly implemented by all parties. Resolution 2773 is unequivocal here. The M23 must cease hostilities and withdraw from the area it controls, while Rwandan forces must cease all support for the M23 and withdraw unconditionally from Congolese territory. It is clear that these obligations remain largely unfulfilled by Kigali. And in the light of the above, the Democratic Republic of the Congo reiterates its request for the suspension of any new participation, deployment or rotation of a Rwandan contingents in United Nations peace operations. until the verified withdrawal of their forces from Congolese territory. The Council cannot tolerate, in its peacekeeping operations, members who act simultaneously as firefighters and arsonists. The very authority of this Council and the credibility of its decisions are at stake. Mr. President, another dimension, more silent but also extremely dangerous, deserves the full attention of this august Council: the administrative, territorial, and criminal demographic management of the areas under the occupation of the Rwandan army and the AFCM 23. Resolution 2773 strongly condemns the establishment of parallel administrations. The DRC calls on the Council to ensure that no illegal structure replaces the institutions of the Republic. In addition, we are particularly concerned by the consistent reports of the displacement and transplantation of Rwandan populations in Congolese localities emptied of their inhabitants, followed by repeated massacres perpetrated by the RDF and the AFC M23. This forced change in the demographic reality is unacceptable. and constitutes a risk of major conflagration that must be addressed immediately. The Democratic Republic of the Congo calls on the relevant United Nations mechanisms to examine the situation with utmost rigor and encourages the UNHCR to strengthen the coordination of the voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation of refugees within the framework of tripartite cooperation between the DRC, UNHCR, and the Commissioner for Economic Cooperation. Mr. President, on the internal level, His Excellency, Mr. Felix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshisekemb, President of the Republic, Head of State, announced on August 27, 2016, the convening of a national dialogue for peace, cohesion, and the rebuilding of the state. The establishment of its preliminary organizing committee on September 13 is a new step towards the consolidation of peace and strengthening of national cohesion. The assessment presented in Secretary-General's report S/2026/748 highlights a human tragedy that my government can no longer tolerate. Behind every line of this document are millions of shattered lives, mothers, children, and entire families condemned to wander as a result of the assault. In addition to the security crisis, there is a major humanitarian emergency. More than 7.4 million Congolese are now internally displaced, while more than 24 million others face food insecurity. This human tragedy is dramatically compounded by the recent outbreak of the Ebola virus. Beyond the bombs, Rwanda, and its AFC M23 proxies impose illegal restrictions on entry and movement of international agencies personnel, requiring visas and travel permits to cross the front lines, which are completely illegitimate. Taking millions of distressed civilians hostage in this way constitutes a flagrant war crime under international humanitarian law.

But even more seriously.

We are now witnessing targeted massacres against humanitarian personnel. My government salutes the sacrifice of these martyrs of solidarity. This Council can no longer remain a spectator. It is time for the perpetrators of these war crimes to be held accountable for their acts before international justice. Mr. President, it is precisely here that MONUSCO remains relevant. The mission plays an essential role in the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers, in supporting peace processes, and verifying the ceasefire. And we call for its new mandate to expressly allow it to accompany, verify, and monitor the implementation of the FDLR disarmament process. Regarding the future of MINUSCA, while stressing the glaring lack of its financial resources, the Government of the Republic has begun in-depth consultations. And the purpose of these consultations is to produce a strategic framework note, which will determine precisely the objectives, priorities, and the formulation of the future resolution of this peacekeeping mission. In conclusion, The Democratic Republic of the Congo is ready to continue down the path of peace. But it calls on this Council to ensure that this path is taken by all. Let us finally turn commitments into action, this ceasefire into lasting peace, and regional cooperation into true stability. Only then will we be able to offer the Congolese people what they have legitimately been demanding for far too long: the right to live in peace, freely, and in total security on their own territory. Mr. President, please allow me to react very briefly to this statement made by the representative of Rwanda.

It deliberately confuses the armed forces of the DRC with what he calls the FDLR in Mwasalendu. Please allow me to explain that FDLR that he talks about are not Congolese. These are Rwandese who left their country in the wake of the intolerant conditions in their country. There are two tribes in Rwanda only, and they do not manage to exist. The FDLR are the Hutus. They were in power before 1994, and then they fled the country when the Tutsi, who are in power now, took the power in Rwanda. And they live in the areas of the DRC in clandestine fashion. And Rwanda is claiming that there is a cooperation between them and the Congolese army. This is completely false. They cannot prove it. Mr. President, what I can say is that we have started a process which aims at having FDLR return to Rwanda. But you will notice that every time that we make progress in this area, Rwanda creates obstacles. The other time, and this is reflected in the report of the United Nations experts, the FDLR who went back to Rwanda were recycled, retrained, reworked, and sent back to the territory of the DRC to fight against the DRC army. And this is a general practice. You heard Rwanda say earlier that they do not trust the process that's currently underway. In other words, the process of cantonment of DLR, because they agreed to lay down arms. When we're saying that there is a protocol that exists, this means they accepted to lay down their weapons and go back to their country. But the Rwandans do not want to have them back. Those who are taken back, then they are retrained to come back to the Congo and find our army. or they want to have them physically eliminated. What kind of the world is this? Your own people want to go back to your country, and you want to eliminate them completely. This may be the tradition in your country, but not in ours. But, Mr. President, we are going to continue with the disarmament process according to the Washington agreement. Now. They also were talking about the protection of the Rwanda phone.

I will have to reduce your right of response as a president.

Congo. Yes, just the last thing, Mr. President, I simply wanted to say. that the Rwanda-speaking, Rwandophone population who live in the DRC are Congolese. And if they have issues, these problems, these problems will be resolved by the Congolese authorities and the Rwandan one. In addition, Rwanda cannot ask us to appoint the officers that they designate. This makes no sense. The general they mentioned is an officer of the army who was and then we have Rwanda object to that. You're very interested in what's happening to us. Can we do the same about you? We know that our wealth is a natural resources, but we will not allow them to be looted and pillaged. I thank you very much, Mr. President. I'm sorry for having taken so much.

Your time, and I give the floor back to you.

I thank the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their statement. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. Before adjourning the meeting, as this is the last scheduled meeting of this Council for the month of September, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of France to the members of the Council as well as to the Secretariat of the Council for all the support they have given us in this busy month. In this busy month, we've been able to rally consensus on several important issues within our purview, and we couldn't have done it alone without the hard work of all delegations, the Secretariat, as well as the technical support team for the meetings, interpreters, translators, verbatim reporters, and security staff. And as we end our presidency, I know I speak, we would like to express our support to the delegation of Greece and wish you all good luck in the month of October. I thank you. The meeting is adjourned.