Non-proliferation - Security Council, 10253rd meeting Security Council Date: 27 October 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/sc/10253 Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- Greece · President of the Security Council [17:53]: The 10,253rd meeting of the Security Council is called to order. I give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation. Russian Federation [18:11]: Thank you, Mr. President. We are compelled to take the floor on the point of order, having to do with yet another attempt to violate the rules of procedure of Security Council and to have a meeting on a non-existent agenda item, regardless how much people are trying to convince us otherwise. Nonetheless, in line with item 8 of Security Council resolution 2231 of the 18th of October 2025, the Security Council has concluded the discussion of the issue about the Iran nuclear program and the non-proliferation item was included from the list of items to be considered by the Security Council. Now, as regards the statement about the reinstatement of a Security Council resolution prior to 2015, well, Russia and other like-minded countries have stated on many an occasion they were null and void, legally speaking. No attempts to use a flawed and partial assessment by the Secretariat of the UN about this cannot change this fact. And we must point out that in the run-up to the meeting today, Russia and China did propose to the Presidency the way out of the situation, which would have allowed the conducting of the briefing requested without violating the procedure. Our countries spoke in favor of changing the agenda item to threats to international peace and security, because these, the threats, are expressed in the strikes against peaceful nuclear facilities in Iran, which are under IAEA safeguards. We also ask that in the report by the Agency reflect the assessment of such acts. Nonetheless, the Presidency did not avail itself of this opportunity and decided to follow the lead of bad-faith members of Security Council and decided to convene a meeting specifically on this agenda item, non-proliferation. We reject actions by the colleagues, which is casting a shadow on the Presidency of the Council this month. Given the above, we categorically object having a meeting of Security Council on a non-existent of agenda item and would like to put the agenda item for the briefing today to put this to a procedural vote, and we ask everyone who is of similar mind to vote against this. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [20:55]: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China. China [21:05]: Thank you, President. China echoes what was said by the Russian Federation. Security Council Resolution 2231 already expired and terminated on the 18th of October last year. The Security Council and the IAEA should no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear file. Certain Council members, in disregard of this fact, pushes the Council to convene under an agenda item that has already been terminated. Such a practice undermines the authority of Council resolutions, stokes disputes and confrontation, aggravates divisions within the Council, and stands in the way of seeking a political solution to the Iran nuclear issue. China registers its serious concerns in this regard. China calls on Council members to implement the provisions pertaining to the termination date of Council Resolution 2231, safeguard the authority of the Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy, and create favorable conditions for a political settlement of the nuclear issue of Iran. China also urges certain members to earnestly play a constructive role for diplomatic efforts and create new barriers in this regard. Thank you, President. Greece · President of the Security Council [22:15]: I thank the representative of China for this statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [22:25]: Thank you, Mr. President. Two brief points. First, today's meeting is fully in line with the decisions and procedures of this Council. Security Council resolution 2231 remains in force. And the item non-proliferation remains on the Council agenda, as it has done since 2006. Second, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors has a mandatory obligation under the IAEA Statute to report findings of non-compliance with safeguards obligations to all IAEA member states and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. On 9 September, the Board was clear in its decision to report Iran to the Security Council for continued non-compliance with her nuclear safeguards obligations. As the Board has highlighted that this is a matter of proliferation concern, which warrants this Council’s attention, we should now hear from the IAEA about Iran’s continued non-compliance. The United Kingdom will vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda under the agenda item “Non-proliferation”. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [23:42]: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for this statement. I now give the floor to the representative of France. France [23:52]: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, once again on this subject, because it's not the first time that we're having this discussion, France would like to support the comments just made by the representative of the United Kingdom and would like to briefly respond to what was said by the representatives of Russia and China. In August 2025, in response to Iran's continued failure to comply with its nuclear commitments, France and its E3 partners triggered the procedure for the re-establishment of Security Council sanctions on Iran. That procedure was conducted in time, in full legality, and with full respect for paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 2231. This procedure had the direct consequences of the re-establishment of the resolutions adopted by this Council between 2006 and 2010 to restrict the Iranian nuclear programme. The Secretary-General himself took note of this in his note of 28 September 2025. This is now an objective reality that is incumbent upon all United Nations Member States, and it also results from this that the non-proliferation agenda item was kept on the agenda of this Council because the conditions were unfortunately not yet in place to consider the Iranian nuclear question as having been definitively resolved. This item is appropriate for the meeting today, which aims to focus on Iran's failure to comply with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT. France will therefore vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda and invites all of the members of this Council to support it. Thank you very much. Greece · President of the Security Council [25:24]: I thank the representative of France for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States. United States of America [25:32]: Thank you. We strongly reject the assertions made by the representatives of the Russian Federation and China, and fully support the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France in support of moving forward with this meeting. The Russian and Chinese efforts to deny this Council’s decision of September 2025 are baseless, self-serving, and counterfactual. On numerous occasions since snapback, this Council has decided to hold meetings under the nonproliferation agenda item. On September 9th, 23 member states at the IAEA Board of Governors voted to report Iran to the Security Council for noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement. We urge all of you to vote yes to adopt the agenda and allow this Council to proceed with its work. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [26:26]: I thank the representative of the United States for the statement. In view of the request and the comments made by members of the Security Council, I intend to put the provisional agenda to the vote. Accordingly, I shall put it to the vote now. Will those in favour of the adoption of the provisional agenda on non-proliferation please raise their hand? Those against? Abstentions? The result of the voting is as follows: 11 votes in favour, 2 votes against, 2 abstentions. The provisional agenda has been adopted. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item 2 of the agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi. IAEA · Director-General [28:47]: Good morning, members of the Council, Mr. President. The global non-proliferation regime forms an indispensable part of international security, and it depends on the impartial, technical verification provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Last year, the IAEA's inspectors spent more than 14,000 calendar days in the field, conducting verification activities in more than 1,400 facilities and locations outside them. Around 250,000 significant quantities of nuclear material are under IAEA safeguards. As a result of our inspections, We were able to draw safeguards conclusions for 179 states for which safeguards were applied. Where there have been unanswered questions, we have been firm, fair, and steadfast in our efforts of engagement. And this has been the case with Islamic Republic of Iran. As set out in Resolution GOV/2026/61, passed by the IAEA Board of Governors on 9 September of this year, I have already reported to this Council and to the General Assembly. In accordance with the IAEA's Statute, this latest resolution and the previously adopted IAEA Board of Governors resolutions containing Gov 2025/38 and 40, as well as the Director General's report contained in Gov 2026/50. The Agency continues diligently to engage with Iran, seeking avenues to encourage it to clarify all remaining safeguards issues. These issues have now been outstanding for more than five years. In June 2025, at the commencement of military attacks, the Agency could not continue conducting verification activities in Iran, and by the end of that month, we had to withdraw all of our inspectors from the country for safety reasons. Inspectors have been available to return for many months now. As I reported in my remarks last week to the General Assembly, we have not been idle. In the context of different mediation efforts, the necessary preparatory technical work has advanced and the foundations on which a diplomatic agreement could be achieved so that inspectors can return to Iran are clear. Any path forward with regards to Iran’s nuclear program must include the IAEA’s indispensable verification role, without which no solution is verifiable and, as a consequence, sustainable. Our work with the United States negotiating and technical team has been thorough. Many Member States, including Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, and Egypt, have undertaken important efforts to find a way to re-engage Iran so that an acceptable arrangement can be reached. On 9 September 2025, under the auspices of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and with the indispensable assistance of Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Latif, I signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr. Abbas Arakchi, on practical steps on safeguards implementation in Iran pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement following the armed attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities. The Cairo agreement represented a practical approach to addressing Iran's security concerns and to facilitating the conduct of necessary verification activities in Iran following the attacks. Revisiting this agreement could help us address practical matters related to the implementation of safeguards pursuant to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in particular, to nuclear facilities affected by military strikes and their associated nuclear material. Included are the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and the Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, a number of facilities at the Esfahan complex and the KONDAP heavy water research reactor. Mr. President, legal obligations in this regard cannot be unilaterally suspended under any circumstances. This is a basic principle of international law. Maintaining continuity of knowledge is crucial in any verification and monitoring process. Iran has not provided the requested information and access so that the IAEA can verify previously declared nuclear material at Iran's facilities and the safeguards, both those that have been affected by military attacks and those that have not. The one exception is the Bushehr nuclear power plant, where our inspectors are currently undertaking verification activities. In the context of the BNPP, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has engaged constructively with the IAEA to arrange for the delivery of safeguards equipment required for the verification of spent fuel prior to its transfer to a new dry storage facility. The transfer is expected to take place early next year. While communications between the IAEA and Iran continue at a technical level, normal inspection activities have not resumed. I have urged Iran to work with us, to give us all the required information and to facilitate all the necessary safeguards activities planned by the IAEA to verify Iran's previously declared nuclear material as required under the CSA, this is the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, of course. I also wish to reiterate that in the implementation of its inspection activities, the Agency remains open to considering legitimate safety and security concerns that Iran may wish to express. The spirit of the Cairo Agreement was precisely aimed at addressing such concerns, fully in line with the provisions of the CSA. As stated in my reports to the IAEA Board of Governors, As of today, the IAEA has not been able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under Iran's CSA. This can and must be rectified. And we know from our past work with Iran that constructive engagement is possible. One area of particular concern is Iran's previously declared nuclear material, which includes 440 kilograms of high enriched uranium. The Agency has been unwavering in its efforts to engage with Iran so that Iran provides the necessary information and grants IAEA inspectors access to facilities to verify the status of this material, as is required under the NPT safeguards agreement. Information on and access to the Isfahan fuel enrichment plant declared by Iran immediately before the attacks, the military attacks of June 2025, is necessary so that our inspectors can verify the status of the facility for safeguards purposes and whether it contains nuclear material. Iran had agreed back in 2025 to allow our inspectors to access this facility. The commencement of the attacks prevented our inspector from going to the site, and since then, Iran has not accepted the agency's repeated requests for access. As stated in my reports to the Board of Governors, the IAEA continues to monitor activities at Iran's declared nuclear facilities and locations associated with its past undeclared nuclear program. Also, and since June, June 2025, we have not identified any activity to repair or reconstruct any of the facilities damaged in the military attacks of 2025 and 2026. However, nothing replaced access to the facilities to verify the actual situation. I invite Iran to work with the IAEA without any further delay to clarify outstanding SAFER questions and to give the IAEA the information and access the agency requires so that it can verify all relevant facilities and material, as is Iran's legal obligation. I encourage Iran to consider technical and gradual measures by which conditions are achieved that allow for the return of our inspectors to Iran. Such gradual, technical, incremental steps could pave the way to normal safeguards implementation in Iran while contributing to a confidence building atmosphere conducive to a wider agreement. Excellencies, Mr. President, sorry. In closing, let me thank you for this opportunity to brief you and assure you of the IAEA’s continued commitment to fulfilling its indispensable mandate impartially, steadfastly, and effectively. Only diplomacy underpinned by IAEA verification can prevent nuclear proliferation in the long term, in Iran, and in the world. The IAEA stands ready. Let us seize the opportunity. Thank you very much. Greece · President of the Security Council [39:16]: I thank Mr. Grossi for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. I give the floor to the representative of France. France [39:29]: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, I would first of all like to thank Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for his briefing. I would also like to pay tribute to the Agency. and to its teams, which professionally and impartially play an absolutely essential role in the service of the international non-proliferation regime. Mr. President, France, with several partners, asked the Council to meet today because the IAEA Board of Governors referred to it its serious and persistent concerns surrounding the nuclear program of Iran. It is therefore that program that I'm going to focus on in my statement. On the 9th of September, the Board of Governors of the IAEA, by a large majority, adopted a resolution referring Iran to this council. because of persistent violations of its international obligations, and in particular the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that the country concluded under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That referral followed the Board of Governors’ adoption in recent years of several resolutions urging Iran to resume respect for its commitments. Here I would like to recall some of the main concerns documented by the Agency. that the Director General has reminded us of. First of all, the Agency is not able to verify the situation of nuclear material located in Iran and to make sure that it is not being diverted towards proliferation uses and activities. It is urgent to clarify the situation of the 440 kilograms of 60% highly enriched uranium amassed by Iran without any credible civilian justification. Such a quantity of material would potentially be enough for around 10 explosive nuclear devices. As the IAEA Director General has repeatedly recalled, Iran is the only non-nuclear weapons state to enrich uranium to such levels. Second, The IAEA is no longer able to verify that Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as required of it by the resolutions re-established by the Security Council in September 2025 to restrict the Iranian nuclear program. These grave and documented violations by Iran of the NPT safeguards weaken the international non-proliferation regime. They are also driving instability in the Middle East. just like Iran's ballistic activities, as well as Iran's support for armed militia fighting in its service in the region, including in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The Council must now fulfill its role to respond to this proliferation crisis. First, it must demand that Iran immediately comply with its international obligations. It is, first of all, urgent for Iran to resume effective cooperation with the Agency to allow the Agency to carry out its verification of the status of the entire Iranian nuclear programme at all of the sites in question. Second, the Security Council must fully implement its own resolutions on Iran. Those resolutions were legally re-established in September 2025 following a procedure carried out in accordance with resolution 2231. France reiterates its support for the work of the 1737 Committee, which was re-established to monitor the implementation of these resolutions. It is regrettable given the importance of the issue, regrets the veto used by two members of the Council on 17 September on the renewal of the mandate of the Committee’s Panel of Experts. Despite that veto, France, with its partners, intends to continue to study ways to document violations of the Council’s resolutions. Finally, France reaffirms its conviction that only a long-term diplomatic solution can resolve the Iranian nuclear question. To this end, it is crucial that Iran commit to a negotiation in good faith and consents to real concessions with a view to a credible framing of its nuclear programme. France, together with its European partners, has been constantly engaged for more than 20 years in the pursuit of a lasting diplomatic solution. We remain ready to contribute to efforts to achieve a robust, verifiable agreement that guarantees the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [44:11]: I thank the representative of France for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation. Russian Federation [44:21]: Mr. President, we regret that some members of the Security Council continue to indulge a group of unscrupulous states which are abusing the procedure of this body so as to exert political pressure on Iran. And they are responsible for all the negative consequences for the work of the Council that we have experienced for more than a year. We have listened very carefully to the report of IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. As we have already noted today, there are no procedural grounds for discussing the issue of the Iranian nuclear program in the Security Council. It was formally closed in October 2025. But still, for almost a year and a half now, we have been forced to observe events that oblige us to keep this topic in the focus of our attention. However, let me clarify here: it is by no means those events that our Western colleagues are talking about. In June 2025, Israel and the United States launched the first series of strikes on Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure under IAEA safeguards. Russia and a number of other members of the Council already then condemned these gross violations of international law, the UN and IAEA Statute, Security Council resolutions, and the Agency General Conference. In February 2026, the situation took on an even more dangerous turn. Washington and West Jerusalem chose the path of full-scale aggression against Iran, including by carrying out a number of new strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. And today, we are again forced to hear threats of the resumption of such illegal actions. Nevertheless, they do not receive a proper assessment from a number of members of the Security Council. More than that, our European colleagues, who talk so zealously about their commitment to finding a diplomatic solution around the Iranian nuclear program, they essentially supported them at that time. And now they very absurdly prefer to ignore the elephant in the room. Today, we have already heard another portion of fabrications about the lack of IAEA verification activities in Iran. Should we recall here that problems with the implementation of the Agency safeguards at Iranian facilities arose exactly in June 2025, after the first series of U.S.-Israeli strikes? But Western countries are doing their best to pretend that problems in the context of verification activities arose out of nowhere, as if Tehran woke up one fine morning and decided to refuse to cooperate with the IAEA. And these same states prefer not to notice that even in the face of U.S.-Israeli aggression, Iran continued to cooperate with the Agency, including on the issue of inspections at unaffected facilities, unaffected by strikes, including the Bushehr nuclear power plant. But this creation of an alternative reality on the Iranian issue is, in principle, a longstanding tactic of the United States and European countries. They also blame the crisis in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Tehran, despite its obvious root causes, namely the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the failure of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to fulfill their part of the obligations. And these self-same countries twist, distort, and take out of context the conclusions from the IAEA reports. in order to reinforce the risks they themselves have contrived to create in terms of non-proliferation. And this is despite the fact that the Agency’s inspectors, as part of their regular verification activities, have not recorded any signs of diversion of nuclear material to unauthorised purposes. Nonetheless, In August 2025, the European Troika, based on their own fabrications, unsuccessfully tried to launch a mechanism for restoring the UN Security Council resolution on Iran, the so-called snapback. And now, we are faced with another unconstructive step. Western countries, having pushed through the adoption of yet another non-consensus resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors on Iran, present its provisions as a kind of transfer of the safeguard issue to the UN Security Council. Legally and procedurally, this is completely wrong, because there is no such notion, there is no such concept of transferring of the safeguards issue to the Security Council. It does not exist. It would be a very good idea for everyone to study the background for their citizen and countries who are trying to do this. Mr. President, whatever goals the United States and its allies pursue by such actions, they do not affect the work of the Security Council. The only thing that the persistent promotion of unilateral, politicized initiatives in the Security Council platform can lead to is an even greater increase in tension against the backdrop of an already fragile situation around Iran, as well as the creation of a new far-fetched pretext for renewed aggression. Once again, we urge our Western colleagues to abandon their destructive course towards Iran, to stop using the UN Security Council and the IAEA to settle political scores with Tehran, and to engage in genuine efforts to find a negotiated solution. There is no alternative to a political and diplomatic settlement. The Security Council must create favorable conditions for this process, and not to provoke further escalation. We do hope that common sense will ultimately prevail. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [50:43]: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China. China [50:53]: Thank you, President. At present, the situation in the Middle East remains tense, with spillover effects spreading constantly and severely impacting peace and stability in the region and the world at large. The negotiations between the U.S. and Iran are in a deadlock, while relevant rhetoric suggesting consideration of a new round of military strikes against Iran has further escalated tensions and is deeply concerning. The Iranian nuclear issue, as one of the points of contention between the U.S. and Iran, was put on the negotiating table several times, yet those opportunities were missed repeatedly. The parties should draw lessons from history, adhere unswervingly to true multilateralism and the overall direction of political settlement, work to stop the fighting and promote talks, and revitalize diplomatic efforts. I wish to stress the following points. Objectivity and impartiality should be followed to get a clear understanding of the merits of the matter. The U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, resumed and constantly intensified unilateral sanctions against Iran, resorted to maximum pressure, and violated the agreement that itself worked to reach. These are the root causes for the current predicament. The E3 failed to fulfill their obligations under the JCPOA, yet joined the U.S. in imposing unilateral sanctions against Iran. Their so-called “snapback” is legally and procedurally flawed, and has severely undermined the unity and credibility of the Security Council. The U.S. and Israel carried out military strikes on Iran’s IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facilities twice. which is the direct cause for the inability of the IAEA to carry out safeguards for relevant Iranian nuclear facilities. Some countries, in disregard of the aforementioned basic facts, pushed through the resolution on Iran's safeguards at the IAEA purely out of political motivations, which undermined the cooperative relations between the IAEA and Iran and further escalated the crisis. This practice of abusing the IAEA is extremely irresponsible. Second, double standards must be abandoned to seek a comprehensive solution. The experience of the JCPOA and Security Council Resolution 2231 is proof that political and diplomatic means are the only solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The core objectives and purposes established in relevant documents shouldn't be discarded, and important principles such as step the step by step approach, reciprocity, and the balance between rights and obligations should continue to be upheld. It's important to balance the objectives of nuclear nonproliferation and the peaceful use. of nuclear energy, Iran should fulfill its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, and all parties should also respect Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy as a state party to the NPT. We need to objectively view Iran's difficulties in aspects such as restoring safeguards and verification. and support the IAEA Secretariat and Iran in resolving relevant issues through strengthened dialogue and cooperation. The U.S. should commit not to use force against Iran again to ensure that safeguards activities will be carried out effectively in an environment free from coercion by force. Third, the use of force must be firmly opposed to resolve the difficult security situation in the Middle East through dialogue and negotiation. At present, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is struggling, the foundation of the two-state solution has been severely eroded, the dark clouds of conflict between the U.S. and Iran have yet to be dispersed, the shipping lane in the Strait of Hormuz suffers from disruption, and the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea continues to escalate. all impacting global energy security, the geopolitical landscape, and the international order. Renewed fighting between the U.S. and Iran will only bring a greater catastrophe to the Middle East, run counter to the shared desire of countries in the region for peace, dialogue, and justice, and further exacerbate global economic, energy, and food challenges. In the face of such situations, The Security Council must act with reason and resolve, put an end to the threat of force and unilateral military actions, speak with one voice and take concrete steps to promote the dialogue and negotiation process and build momentum for political settlement and make unremitting efforts and take concrete steps to restore peace and tranquility in the Middle East and Gulf region at an early date. President, as a permanent member of the Security Council, China will actively implement the series of initiatives and proposals dedicated to peace and stability in the Middle East put forward by President Xi Jinping and make China's contributions to achieving lasting peace and stability, development, and prosperity in the Middle East. As a participant in the JCPOA, China will continue to take concrete actions that defend the authority of the Council and fairness and justice, and work tirelessly to promote the political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue and uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. I thank you, President. Greece · President of the Security Council [56:32]: I thank the representative of China for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Bahrain. Bahrain [56:42]: President, at the outset, I wish to thank the Presidency of the Security Council, the delegation of the Hellenic Republic, for convening this important meeting. We extend our appreciation to the IAEA representative, Director General Rafael Grossi, for his valuable briefing on the latest developments on the Iranian nuclear program. as well as relevant safeguards and verification questions. Our meeting convened today in the wake of the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2026 on Iran's non-compliance under the Safeguard Agreement. which was referred to the Security Council in document S/2026/765. This is a development that requires the Council's attention, as it raises serious concerns on the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime, as well as ensuing repercussions on international peace and security. Seven years later, Iran has not honored its obligations to cooperate with the IAEA to address issues pertaining to undeclared nuclear activities and material, despite repeated resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors. This raises concerns over the fact that the IAEA, for more than one year now, has been unable to verify the status of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile and its sites. This sparks serious concerns over risks of nuclear proliferation in our region. Iran's ongoing circumvention of its obligations is unacceptable. It is called upon to fully and immediately comply with its obligations. President, we wish to reiterate the following three messages. First, compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation obligations is not optional. It is a fundamental pillar for confidence building and the safeguarding of collective security. The Kingdom reiterates that Iran must fully and transparently cooperate with the IAEA and provide necessary information and facilities to enable the IAEA to exercise its mandate in regards to safeguards and verification to address outstanding issues without delay. Second, the Kingdom reiterates its full support to the central, independent technical role of the IAEA as the body mandated to verify state compliance with nuclear obligations. Confidence cannot be built on mere pledges, but rather on transparency, cooperation, and effective verification of implementation of obligations. Third, the concerns over the Iranian nuclear program cannot be separated from the wider security environment in our region, which witnessed wanton Iranian attacks against sovereign states, civilian objects, and vital facilities. They were condemned by the Security Council in resolution 2817. The Council called for their immediate cessation. These developments demonstrated that lack of confidence and persistent escalation jeopardize the security and stability of the region, demonstrating growing need to abidance by and a clear commitment to international law and relevant Security Council resolutions. The Kingdom of Bahrain believes that diplomacy and dialogue remain the best path to address the Iranian nuclear file. on the basis of effective compliance, transparency, good neighborliness, respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. We stress that states of the Gulf Cooperation Council must be engaged in any negotiation or arrangement that pertains to their security and interests. Those must also address all of the security concerns of the GCC states. President, we reiterate that accountability and diplomacy are complementary pathways. Safeguarding the credibility of the non-proliferation regime requires enabling the IAEA to perform its functions and also requires that the Security Council shoulder its responsibilities in guaranteeing compliance and protecting peace and security. I thank you, President. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:01:59]: I thank the representative of Bahrain for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:02:08]: Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting, and thank you, Director General Grossi, for your briefing. The United Kingdom is grateful to the International Atomic Energy Agency for your tireless efforts to fulfil the Agency’s verification and monitoring mandate in Iran. Last month, the IAEA Board of Governors took a decisive step in reporting Iran to the Security Council for continued non-compliance with her nuclear safeguards obligations. It was the first time for two decades that the Board has made such a referral. That reflects the gravity of the concern faced by the international community. This referral followed the Board’s determination in June 2025 that Iran was non-compliant with its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran has had every opportunity to address that non-compliance. Iran has amassed a stockpile of over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. Iran remains the only state without nuclear weapons to enrich to this level. which there is no credible civilian justification. For more than a year, the stockpile of highly enriched uranium has remained unaccounted for. Iran has denied the IAEA the access needed to conduct inspections at Iran’s most proliferation-sensitive nuclear sites. This should concern us all. As a result of Iran’s refusal to engage, The IAEA reported in June 2026 that it was unable to draw a safeguards conclusion on this nuclear material and made clear that this is a proliferation concern. Despite repeated opportunities to change course, Iran's refusal to remedy her non-compliance has left the international community with no choice. As a result, the Board was compelled to report Iran to the Security Council. Colleagues, there remains a clear path forward. The IAEA has repeatedly made clear, as Director General Grossi has again this morning, that it is fully prepared to resume safeguards activities in Iran at short notice. As a first step, Iran must allow the return of IAEA inspectors to all nuclear sites. Verification is essential to rebuilding international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. And we urge all Member States to remain seized of the seriousness of Iran’s continued non-compliance, and to call on Iran to fulfil her safeguards obligations and to cooperate fully and in good faith with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United Kingdom remains committed to a lasting and sustainable diplomatic solution that ensures that Iran never develops or requires a nuclear weapon. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:05:21]: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Latvia. Latvia [1:05:30]: Thank you, Mr. President. Allow me to thank the Greece Presidency for promptly convening this meeting, and also to thank Director General Grossi for the informative briefing today. The recent decision by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors in Vienna to refer Iran’s long-standing non-compliance with its international nonproliferation obligations to this Council underscores the gravity of the situation we face. The Iranian nuclear program endangers regional and global peace and security, and undermines international nonproliferation norms. Iran has repeatedly failed to meet its international obligations, most notably under the JCPOA, the NPT, and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. These concerns are compounded by the agency's repeated statements that it has lost the continuity of knowledge regarding Iran's stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. This is particularly troubling, given previous reports of uranium enrichment to the levels up to the 60%, which are wholly incompatible with any credible claims of exclusively peaceful nuclear purposes. Iran has denied IAEA inspectors the necessary access to sites related to the country's nuclear program. In response to Iran's continued non-compliance, the UN sanctions against Iran were reimposed, and the 1737 Sanctions Committee was re-established. The Council took this measured step after repeated diplomatic efforts. and through the appropriate and legally binding snapback mechanism. Unfortunately, certain members of this Council have persisted in advancing legally unfounded claims against these sanctions, obstructing agreement on committee reports and new listings under the sanctions regime, and even vetoing the extension of the committee’s Panel of Experts mandate. This selective interpretation of international law has affected the functioning of the Council's subsidiary bodies and their ability to carry out the mandated tasks effectively. Mr. President, the IAEA is a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation architecture, carrying out its mandate impartially and effectively. If Iran is serious about finding a peaceful long-term solution and securing the eventual lifting of sanctions, It must fully cooperate with the Agency. To date, however, the Agency’s outstanding verification concerns remain unresolved. Full cooperation with the IAEA is essential to creating conditions for a sustainable diplomatic solution. Furthermore, its neighbors continue to face unprovoked attacks. Its proxy forces are undermining regional security and conflict resolution efforts. Iran’s efforts to hold the global economy hostage by using a vital international waterway as leverage, in flagrant disregard of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, has severely disrupted crucial supply chains and put millions of lives around the globe at risk of food insecurity. As previously noted, Iran's actions have implications beyond the region. We strongly condemn Iran's support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, causing harm to Ukrainian civilians, including through the use of the same types of weapons that Iran has deployed against its neighbors in the Gulf. Mr. President, Iran must seize its reckless regional actions and escalatory nuclear program. We call on Iran to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations and resume full cooperation with IAEA, including by ensuring its inspectors unrestricted access. We remain steadfast supporters of a comprehensive diplomatic solution to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. I thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:10:05]: I thank the representative of Latvia for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Panama. Panama [1:10:14]: Thank you, Mr. President. We thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Rafael Grossi. We thank him for his comprehensive and timely report provided to us at this emergency meeting. We recognize the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany, who honor us with their participation. We voted in favor of holding this meeting because we consider that the facts outlined in the most recent report, as well as the decision of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, regarding the Iranian nuclear question merit the attention of the Security Council. The Iranian nuclear question transcends the borders of a single state. Its implications are testing the solidity of the international nuclear non-proliferation architecture and the credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Over the course of years, the difficulties that the IAEA has faced in some cases to fully exercise its verification and monitoring functions have made it clear that cooperation with the Agency cannot be selective. The effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime depends in large part on the commitments taken on by States being transformed into concrete actions. Hence then, the importance of Iran fully cooperating with the IAEA, facilitating the access needed for it to carry out its functions, and timely and transparently addressing unresolved questions, as it has in some occasions in the past offered to do. Mr. President, we acknowledge that the efforts undertaken by this Council have not yet made it possible to turn the concerns of the international community into sufficient progress, and those concerns have in fact grown. This highlights the fact that the effectiveness of international action does not only depend on the measures that this Council adopts, But it also, and above all, depends on the disposition of States and their readiness to comply with the commitments that they have made. Faced with this situation, in order to avoid an escalation of tensions, we believe it is essential to keep diplomatic channels open and to promote a constructive dialogue with Iran, which, in accordance with the criteria the briefer has outlined, may be possible. That dialogue should be accompanied by effective cooperation with the IAEA, which would make it possible to move ahead with verification and monitoring work and also to clarify questions that remain pending and that are still of concern for the international community. In that regard, we believe that The Iranian nuclear question should be kept under the Security Council's attention, both in terms of its implications for international peace and security, and also because of our responsibility to ensure the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime. Thank you very much. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:14:00]: I thank the representative of Panama for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Denmark. Denmark [1:14:07]: Thank you, Mr. President. And I also thank Director General Grossi for his briefing and for the report to the Council. Denmark’s position remains clear: Iran must never be allowed to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, it remains crucial that the international community can receive and engage with the findings and conclusions of the IAEA. Against this backdrop, Iran’s continued non-compliance with its safeguard obligations is deeply concerning. For more than 16 months, the IAEA has been unable to fully discharge its verification responsibilities, including with regard to the status of Iran’s nuclear facilities and nuclear material. The lack of information about Iran’s previously declared stockpile of enriched uranium, combined with the lack of access, leaves the IAEA unable to provide the assurances about the exclusively civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear program needed by the international community. This is a deeply troubling trajectory and must be addressed with the utmost urgency. We call on Iran to immediately resume full cooperation with the Agency, including by providing the necessary information and access. Mr. President, we are once again witnessing the unwillingness of some Council members to face the facts: the fact that the snapback mechanism was activated in full accordance with Security Council resolution 2231, and that the relevant sanctions measures were consequently reinstated. We deeply regret that this unwillingness prevented the Council from extending the mandate of the Iran Sanctions Panel of Experts due to the use of the veto last month. Despite what we have heard on several occasions, the sanctions against Iran remain in force. They are in place due to Iran’s persistent refusal to fully cooperate on its nuclear programme. Denmark strongly supports a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We urge Iran to return to negotiations in good faith, without preconditions, and to engage seriously in efforts to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, including through effective international verification. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:16:36]: I thank the representative of Denmark for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Democratic Republic of the Congo [1:16:45]: Mr. President, the Democratic Republic of the Congo would like to thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Rafael Grossi, for his briefing and for the information that has been communicated to the Council on the Iranian nuclear file. part, the DRC reaffirms its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remains a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and to the central role played by IAEA in the verification of compliance with the safeguards, the commitment by Member States. We are, however, concerned by the consistent absence of verifiable information regarding the materials and declared nuclear facilities in Iran, as well as by the difficulties encountered by the Agency in trying to ensure the continuity of knowledge and fully conduct its verification activities. In this regard, the DRC encourages Iran to fully cooperate with IAEA in line with its international obligations, in particular by providing the information that is needed and allowing access to the facilities in question so that the Agency can verify the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. We also underscore that the verification activities need to be conducted impartially, professionally, and independently on the basis of applicable agreements. The Democratic Republic of the Congo considers that the situation needs to be viewed from the viewpoint of multilateralism and respective responsibilities of institutions. We take note of the Board of Governors of the Agency decision to transfer to the Security Council this issue. We nonetheless think that this development needs to be an opportunity to strengthen the diplomatic efforts and not to further widen divisions within the international community. And in this context, we underscore the importance of preserving the unity of the Security Council and avoiding any initiative which could undermine the prospect for dialogue. The divergent views regarding the earlier resolutions of the Council and the mechanism on the JCPOA should not be an impediment to finding a peaceful and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear file. The DRC recalls here that non-proliferation and the rights of Member States to develop peaceful nuclear energy, in line with the NPT treaty, have to be viewed comprehensively and consistently. My delegation, Mr. President, is also concerned by the deterioration of the security environment in the Middle East. and the danger or risk of a new military confrontation, which worsens the environment surrounding the Iranian nuclear program. We recall that attacking nuclear facilities which are under the Agency’s safeguards give rise to serious concerns as regards the safety and security there, and can undermine the conditions which are needed for effective verification. The DRC calls on all of the parties to display the utmost restraints, abstain from any action which can lead to a new escalation, and to promote dialogue. To conclude, Mr. President, I would like to say that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is of the view that the issue of the Iranian nuclear dossier cannot be lastingly resolved simply by exerting political pressure or using force. It requires a balanced approach. bringing together compliance with international obligations, cooperation with IAEA, regional de-escalation, and a candid and sincere political commitment. And we encourage the Security Council to continue shouldering its responsibility in the spirit of dialogue, collective responsibility. and looking for consensus, so as to preserve the credibility of the international nonproliferation regime and to contribute towards peace and stability in the Middle East. I thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:21:20]: I thank the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Liberia. Liberia [1:21:30]: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President. Liberia thanks the Director-General for his important briefing. Although the Council is procedurally divided on this important matter of global concern, it borders on the incontrovertible that the longer verification is interrupted, the harder it becomes to rebuild much-needed confidence. Liberia believes this Council must focus on restoring the facts on which a peaceful settlement can rest. Uncertainty is dangerous enough. We must not allow it to become a reason for further distrust and war. We reaffirm our commitment to all three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear activities must be respected in conformity with the treaty, and its safeguards obligations must be fulfilled. The credibility of this framework depends on consistent implementation by all States Parties. The IAEA Board’s resolution of 9 September reaffirms findings of Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Agency’s inability to verify previously declared nuclear material is a serious proliferation concern. Liberia calls on Iran to provide the access information, and cooperation necessary to resolve outstanding safeguards issues and enable credible verification. Verification gives diplomacy something essential, and that is a shared basis of fact. Supporting the agency's independence and technical judgment should therefore be common ground, even in a divided council as we are. Its findings must guide our decisions, and its inspectors must be able to work safely and effectively. The immediate task, therefore, is to establish a practical sequence for restoring access, accounting for nuclear material, and reporting verified progress. We encourage Iran and the Agency to resolve the arrangements required without further delay. Compliance with safeguards should not await agreement on every wider political dispute. At the same time, Mr. President, military escalation places both people and verification at further risk. Liberia urges all parties to exercise restraint, respect international law, and pursue a negotiated settlement. Attacks on nuclear facilities risk radioactive consequences beyond national borders and can make essential verification more difficult. Diplomacy needs both access for inspectors and conditions in which they can and must do their work. The consequences of escalation also reach the sea and affect global trade. As at 22 October, the IMO had confirmed 24 seafarer fatalities. The damage to the Liberian-flagged tanker, Lipsea, on 4th October brings that danger close to home. Liberia calls for the protection of civilian seafarers and freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. Crews carrying the world's trade must not be made to carry the burden of its conflicts. The Council should encourage immediate, verifiable steps that reduce uncertainty and open space for sustained negotiations. A durable settlement must address proliferation concerns, some of which the Director-General briefed about earlier, while respecting lawful, peaceful nuclear activities and the security of the wider region. In conclusion, Mr. President, our responsibility is to make the next verified step possible and the next escalation less likely. Liberia stands ready to to support that work, and I thank you for your kind attention. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:28:27]: I thank the representative of Liberia for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of Colombia. Colombia [1:28:34]: Thank you, Mr. President. This is a legal case that should remain in history because it defines many others. Either we have international law or we don’t. So for Colombia, the legal case here is abundantly clear, and the path comes from the UN Charter to the resolutions of the Security Council and the determinations and decisions of the agency's board of directors. Colombia cannot accept the premise that states' obligations on non-proliferation are subject to the military or the political circumstances of the moment. This is not how international law should work and does not work. The Treaty of Nonproliferation is abundantly clear. Article 3 imposes on Iran specific obligations to cooperate and collaborate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it's not doing that. And when it does not that, and how we know that doesn't, is because the record of non-compliance is large, extend, and historic. It starts in 2019. And if you read all the reports of the International Energy Atomic Energy Agency are clear. Incorrect information, denial of access to inspectors, persistent inability to clarify discrepancies. So the unwillingness of Iran to attend the request of the agencies after this has been approved and request several times over and over again, is what triggers Article 19 of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation, which is the review or the request to review by the Security Council. And here we are. Colombia was part of that decision of the resolution of September. as member of the Agency's Board of Governors, and following the reports, decide to move the file with the other members to the Security Council. Now here, we understand that we ask for an exemption based on the safeguards agreement that the State of Iran signed voluntarily. Unfortunately, that agreement does not provide exception in international law. And it does not because this is a treaty, and there is a treaty law with provisions for two agencies that are the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council. And we understand also the underlying yet unacceptable premise of national ownership, of course, within the territory, the right to develop for peaceful purpose and use nuclear energy is established in the treaty. However, the violation is not about national ownership. The violation is about the requests of the agency and the reports that shows over and over again incorrect information, denial to access for the inspectors, and the persisting ability to clarify all the discrepancies between the agency of what Iran is reporting. So that is international law. It must be reminded to all of us that the very reason we are here is in Chapter 1 of the United Nations that tell us about the principles and purposes of this institution. And the very first sentence of that charter is, international peace and security. So we care about this because we care about the security of all of us, not just Iran. So as such, from the perspective of international law, speaking only about national ownership, the right of self-determination, or using the state sovereignty concepts to elude international obligations is a clear violation of international law. And as I said from the outset, either we have international law or we don’t. Thank you, Mr. President. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:33:23]: I thank the representative of Colombia for this statement. I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan. Pakistan [1:33:30]: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I thank Director General Grossi for his comprehensive briefing. Pakistan remains concerned that the situation regarding the Iran nuclear file has sharply deteriorated, negatively impacting the consideration of the issue, including in the Security Council. On the one hand, the ground situation in the past few months has been marked by deep tensions and continued hostilities. On the other, profound mistrust and difference of opinion has led to a breakdown of consensus within the Council on this matter. As recent developments have once again illustrated the fragility of the situation and the risk of escalation, a diplomatic settlement of the issue has become more critical than ever. There is a need to revive the spirit of cooperative multilateralism and mutual understanding to break the deadlock. We hope that the Council will act with unity of purpose and back efforts towards a pacific settlement. Pakistan urges all sides to exercise restraint, Refrain from irresponsible and destabilizing rhetoric, actions, and postures that could escalate tensions and increase the risk of conflict, and choose a path that delivers peace, security, and stability for all. Mr. President, We reaffirm our support for the resolution of all outstanding issues through peaceful means, diplomatic engagement, and sustained dialogue. We must pursue a negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance with the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the parties concerned, in a manner that upholds the non-proliferation regime while ensuring regional and international peace and security. We have consistently maintained that any issues of non-compliance must be addressed through competent technical bodies like the IAEA. without politicization and consistent with the relevant parties’ rights and obligations. The IAEA must be enabled to carry out its work without any hindrance and within its technical mandate. On its part, Pakistan has been undertaking constructive diplomatic engagement to promote de-escalation, ceasefire, and the broader pursuit of stability in the region. We have consistently sought to encourage dialogue, facilitate the exchange of messages, and help create the requisite space and conditions conducive to the conduct of meaningful negotiations. The Islamabad MOU signed in June is a successful manifestation of this approach. It demonstrates that progress on the diplomatic track is possible. We thank the parties for their confidence and positive engagement. and also appreciate the support of our partners, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, China, and others for this endeavor. We believe that diplomacy can once again deliver results in paving the way for settling contentious issues peacefully. To that end, earnest and painstaking work is required. As we speak, our leadership continues these efforts with sincerity, determination, and conviction. I thank you very much. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:36:57]: I thank the representative of Pakistan for this statement. I give the floor to the representative of Somalia. Somalia [1:37:07]: Thank you, Mr. President. I thank Director General Groves for his briefing. Somalia reaffirms its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the preservation of international peace and security. We take note of the letter dated 11 September 2026 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Somalia reiterates that the indispensable and independent role of the IAEA in verification and monitoring, nuclear safety, and the preservation of international stability. We underscore the importance of ensuring that the Agency can carry out its mandate independently, impartially, and effectively in accordance with safeguards agreement and applicable international obligations. Mr. President, Somalia reiterates that a negotiated settlement remains the only viable and sustainable path to resolving outstanding nonproliferation concerns. We therefore urge all parties to engage seriously and constructively in sustained, meaningful, and result-oriented diplomacy. Mr. President, we reiterate our long-standing call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We call upon all States in the region, without exception, to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to fully comply with international obligations. To conclude, Mr. President, The challenges before us require a collective, measured response. Somalia stands ready to engage constructively with all Council members and relevant parties to chart a peaceful, diplomatic path forward that upholds the UN Charter, respects international law, strengthens the non-proliferation regime, and supports the independent work of the IAEA, and contributes to international peace and security. I thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council [1:38:59]: I thank the representative of Somalia for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of the United States. United States of America [1:39:08]: Thank you, President. The United States would like to thank the Board of Governors of the IAEA for reporting Iran’s noncompliance with its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the required safeguards agreement, to the Security Council. In particular, we thank Germany, France, and the United Kingdom for being our indispensable partners in our years-long effort to hold Iran accountable to its safeguards obligations. We also thank the other 13 IAEA Board members who joined us in co-sponsoring the resolution in Vienna. The Board found Iran to be in non-compliance in June 2025 because Iran failed to credibly address critical safeguard concerns that were outstanding for more than six years. The Board could have also reported this non-compliance to the Security Council at that time, but delayed in doing so, preferring to give Iran time to rectify its non-compliance. Instead, Iran only doubled down on its stonewalling. For more than a year now, it has been delaying the IAEA access to its most sensitive nuclear facilities and refusing to provide required information about or access its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. It also has failed to engage the IAEA on questions that form the original basis for the noncompliance finding. This is inexcusable. Last month, the Board rightfully decided the time had come to report Iran’s noncompliance to New York. In doing so, the Board is telling the regime in Iran and telling the world: Enough is enough. Enough of the refusal to answer the IAEA’s questions about the presence of undeclared nuclear material at undeclared locations. Enough of the denial of access for IAEA inspectors to multiply nuclear facilities. Enough of the lack of accountability for, and the full transparency on Iran’s uranium stockpile, enriched far beyond the level needed for any credible peaceful use. Enough of the continued noncompliance with its obligations. The Iranian regime’s response to this resolution was to say that any future verification or cooperation would need to be tied to a broader diplomatic agreement. But we already have that agreement – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran signed in 1970, under which Iran is obligated to place its nuclear material and facilities under IAEA safeguards. Regardless of progress towards any new, broader diplomatic agreement, Iran has existing NPT obligations that it is currently refusing to uphold. All who value the NPT should be deeply concerned by this and commit to working together to hold Iran to account, including through the 1737 sanctions regime. I must note that two members of this Council have turned a blind eye toward Iran’s significant noncompliance with its obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement and the relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Their actions are consistent with a broader campaign over the past several years to subvert UN panels and the sanctions regimes that they are mandated to bolster. These two members also voted against the appointment of individual experts for the Central African Republic and Yemen panels. They eliminated the panel for the DPRK and the Mali sanctions regimes entirely. And last month, of course, these two members vetoed a resolution to extend the mandate of the panel of experts that supports the 1737 committee. In view of the persistence of such threats to the 1737 sanctions regime, the United States will work together with other interested members to advance an independent, multilateral mechanism to monitor and report on global implementation of the 1737 regime. We look forward to working with partners on and off the Security Council to realize this initiative. Fundamentally, these instruments, sanction regimes, committees, panels, are all conceived to address threats to international peace and security without resort to further conflict. We urge the representatives here today from the Security Council and the General Assembly to help us support this architecture of accountability to improve the viability of an enduring peace. Thank you. Greece · President of the Security Council; Representative [1:43:55]: I thank the representative of the United States for the statement. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Greece. I would like to thank Director General Grossi for his briefing and the IAEA team for its work. We have taken careful note of the documents transmitted to this Council by the Secretary General following the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 9 September, which reaffirmed its earlier findings on Iran’s non-compliance. The findings before us are serious and require the Council’s continued engagement in so far as they affect regional and international peace and security. I wish to stress the following points. First, Greece reiterates its unwavering commitment to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT and the IAEA as its indispensable cornerstones. Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. Its nuclear program must be exclusively peaceful. Preserving the credibility of this regime is essential for regional and international peace and security. Second, we are deeply concerned by the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear program, as well as by the Director General’s findings and the Board’s reaffirmation of Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. The Agency has been unable to verify the current size, composition or whereabouts of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile. Its last estimate in June 2025 included more than 440 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%. More than a year later, the agency cannot establish the current status of this material or verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded. The Agency also cannot verify the suspension of enrichment-related activities as required by relevant Council resolutions. Outstanding questions regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities remain unresolved. This is a proliferation-related matter of grave concern and must be addressed without further delay. Full, effective and constructive cooperation with the IAEA must be restored by Iran, with complete information and full access for the Agency to fulfil its verification mandate. Iran must also respect its NPT safeguard obligations and the Additional Protocol. Third, Greece fully supports the IAEA's professional, independent, and impartial work. We reiterate that the relevant Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1737, restored following the activation of the snapback mechanism, must be fully implemented. At the same time, we remain convinced that there is no sustainable alternative to dialogue and diplomacy. We urge Iran to engage seriously and constructively in meaningful negotiations. We encourage all relevant parties to work towards a comprehensive, lasting, and verifiable agreement capable of restoring confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. A further escalation of the conflict is in no one's interest. In this respect, we acknowledge the positive role of third countries willing to mediate and help bring the parties back to the negotiating table. In conclusion, the security situation in the region makes restraint and a peaceful settlement all the more urgent. All parties must respect the UN Charter and international law, protect civilians, and avoid any further escalation. The stakes are simply too high for global security and the global economy. Verification, compliance, and diplomacy must guide our collective efforts. Greece will continue to advocate a peaceful solution and stands ready to contribute constructively to that end. I thank you. I resume my function as President of the Council. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:49:04]: In the name of Allah, the most compassionate and most merciful. Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, we thank Russia and China for their reaction to this illegal meeting. We also thank Pakistan and Somalia for their abstention vote to the convening of this meeting. We support the position expressed by Russia and China and categorically reject the convening of this meeting, which lacks any valid basis. Iran’s position is clear, consistent, and has been officially communicated to the Security Council. Resolution 2231 expired on 18 October 2025. bringing the Security Council’s consideration of the nuclear issue under the resolution to a definitive end. The legal effects are unambiguous: as of that date, resolution 2231 ceased to have any legal effect or operative mandate. The agenda item non-proliferation was accordingly removed from the list of matters before the Council in this context. There is therefore no basis whatsoever for convening this meeting under the agenda item non-proliferation. Mr. President, 18 months have passed since the aggression by two possessors of nuclear weapons against Iran, which was met with appalling indifference and inexcusable inaction of this Security Council. The principal aggressor is itself a permanent member of this Council. Eighteen months have passed since the betrayal of diplomacy by the United States, which twice resorted to military aggression against Iran in the midst of the diplomatic negotiations. Eighteen months have passed since the United States and the Israeli regime launched a multifaceted campaign of terrorism and coercion against the Iranian people, from armed aggression and war crimes to internal sabotage, to waging media and economic warfare. The collective punishment of a nation of 19 million through deliberate infliction of economic hardship on the entire civilian population constitutes the latest chapter of this sustained, relentless 18 months of aggression. More than 4,000 civilians, including 254 children and 251 women, have lost their precious lives in these brutal wars. They are human lives destroyed. Each of them was a life. Children are robbed of their futures, and families are forever shattered. The massacre of 168 students and teachers in Minab, The attacks on Lamarr Stadium, the bombing of homes in Keshm, and the deadly strike on wedding in Queshtak Sirik are only a few examples of these heinous crimes. These are war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Security Council's indifference in the face of these threats to annihilate The S-civilization threats to use weapons of mass destruction against Iran and threats to destroy civilian infrastructure have been astonishing, particularly in light of all crimes that were actually committed by the aggressors during this period. There seems to be an attempt to excuse, normalize, or render lawful deliberate targeting of civilian and civilian objects, as well as threats to use prohibited methods or means of warfare. The most fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, including the core principle of non-aggression, have been flagrantly violated throughout these 18 months by the US and the Israeli regime. Mr. President, Since the United States and the Israeli regime launched their wars of aggression against Iran on 13 June 2025 and 28 February 2026, Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards have been repeatedly attacked. In their war of aggression on Iran, the aggressors continued these attacks. On 13 June 2025, uranium conversion facility and the fuel plate fabrication plant were attacked. On 18 June 2025, centrifuge production sites in Tehran and Karaj were attacked. On 19 June, the Arak heavy water research reactor was attacked. On 21st June 2025, the President of the United States declared that Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated. On 1st March, Natanz nuclear facility was attacked twice. On 17 March, a structure just 350 meters from the operational Bushehr nuclear power plant was attacked. On 21st March, several locations within the Natanz nuclear facility were bombed. On 24th March, a projectile strike within the wider perimeter of the Bushehr nuclear power plant site. On 27th March, the Bushehr nuclear power plant site was attacked for the third time. On 27th March, the heavy water production plant At Khondab, Arak was attacked. On 27 March, the Arak-Yazd, the Ardakan-Yazd uranium processing site was bombed. Repeated attacks near the operational Bushehr nuclear power plant are particularly alarming. Such strikes create a grave risk of radiation release, with potentially devastating consequences. These attacks flagrantly violate Security Council Resolution 487, relevant IAEA decisions and resolutions, and the fundamental principles of the rules of international humanitarian law. What then has been the Security Council’s response to these grave violations? It has been silence. Silence in the face of aggression. Silence in the face of threats of mass destruction, silence in the face of threats against civilian infrastructure, and silence in the face of attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. These atrocious crimes demand accountability, not silence. The Western members of this Council remain silent. The answer is, why do Western members of this council remain silent? The answer is simple. The perpetrators and aggressors are their allies, and political loyalty takes precedence over accountability. To be fair, however, the Western members of the council have not been entirely silent. Since Israel typically carries carries out their dirty job, they have chosen to direct their accusations at Iran rather than the Israeli apartheid regime or the United States. Mr. President, today's meeting is yet another instance of hypocrisy that has become an integral feature of this country's foreign policy. Today's meeting is an illustration of an established double standard. in which the aggressor is shielded with impunity, the victim is replaced under criticism, and the language of nonproliferation is cynically appropriated to advance geopolitical objectives. The central issue of today’s meeting must be the United States’ unlawful use of force and ongoing aggression against Iran, the attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities, and the continuing U.S. and Israeli threats to destroy Iran's civilian and critical infrastructure. These attacks pose a grave threat to the international peace and security. The U.S. President's repeated threats must be taken seriously. It must be assessed and addressed in the context of the U.S. and Israeli wars of aggression against Iran. and their deliberate attacks on civilian and critical infrastructure. Threatening to terrorize a population and deliberately destroy infrastructure indispensable to civilian survival is not legitimate political rhetoric. It constitutes grave violations of international humanitarian law, severe, potentially long-lasting humanitarian and environmental consequences, and engages further responsibility of the United States. The United States and the Israeli regime have repeatedly demonstrated disregard for their obligation under the international law, including the four Geneva Convention of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law. In view of gravity and urgency of these threats, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in its letters and communications, called upon the Security Council and the Secretary-General to condemn these threats to international peace and security and take immediate and appropriate measures within their respective mandates. Regrettably, the Council continues to respond with inaction, deafening silence. in the face of explicit threat against entire nation and its civilian population. Mr. President, today's meeting is a politically orchestrated attempt to construct a pretext for pressure against Iran, distort the factual record, and divert attention from the aggression committed against it. At the very least, the Western members of the Council are well aware that Iran’s nuclear program has never posed a threat to international peace and security. They know very well that the nature and essence of Iran’s nuclear program has always been peaceful. Therefore, these politically motivated allegations have no bearing on Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities, which have been conducted entirely within the framework of the NPT and its applicable safeguards obligations. No one should be deceived any longer by these crying wolves. If you have genuine nonproliferation concern, just look slightly to the west in our region. The Israeli regime, possessing approximately 200 nuclear warheads, remains outside the IAEA safeguards and bears a record of committing all major international crimes, should be the real cause for concern. Israel possesses nuclear weapons, yet your concern is the absence of inspectors in Iran. Israel maintains clandestine programs for developing all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. While it is party to none of the disarmament conventions, yet your concern, western members of the council, is the lack of inspections in Iran. As President Pesheskin stated in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September, and I quote, "The atomic bomb is in Israel, but the inspectors are in Iran. Israel kills, yet Iran is sanctioned. That is the tragedy.” End of quote. What kind of nonproliferation policy is this? What kind of legal consistency allows the rogue regime in our region to possess nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework, evade meaningful international scrutiny and accountability, while Iran, a responsible NPT state party, is subjected to relentless political pressure? This is precisely the question that Council members should first ask themselves, and put to the IAEA and its Director General as well. If you are unable to stand on the right side of history, at least do not stand on the wrong side. If you do not dare to defend the United Nations Charter and international law, at least do not support their violators. Courage to support the victim of aggression, at least do not defend the aggressors. Mr. President, for over five decades, Iran has been a responsible party to NPT and has championed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and continues to advocate for this noble objective. Guess who has consistently opposed this establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East? The Israeli regime and the United States, the misuse of the Security Council to advance geopolitical objectives under the pretext of non-proliferation concerns is regrettable. The politicization of the IAEA and its Secretariat and the distortion of the non-proliferation regime to advance geopolitical objectives is equally deplorable. The credibility of the Security Council cannot survive such blatant double standards. The legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime cannot be preserved through politicization. The Security Council is not an instrument for legitimizing aggression, manufacturing allegations, or applying political pressure against the victim of aggression. Mr. President, The IAEA is not a vehicle for scoring geopolitical goals. We call upon the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities impartially, to confront the threats and act of aggression directed against Iran, and uphold the Charter. The choice before this Council is straightforward: uphold international law universally, or further undermine the credibility of the very international legal order it was established to protect. Thank you, Mr. President. Greece · President of the Security Council [2:05:12]: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the statement. The representative of the United States has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I give him the floor. United States of America [2:05:27]: Thank you, Mr. President. I take the floor today, colleagues, after just speaking out against one oppressive regime, the Cuban regime, and now I get to address another brutal dictatorship that shamelessly massacred 40,000 of its own citizens just this year, with this Council and the entire world watching. Well, that was until the regime instituted an internet blackout to hide its atrocities. You all have heard a lot of discussion about attacks on civilian infrastructure. Of course, what you didn't hear was the Iranian regime hitting hotels and restaurants and tourist sites and civilian neighborhoods, airports, civilian shipping across the Middle East. In fact, sir, The representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain is right here. Do you want to apologize to him for attacking his country? I'll take that as a no. Colleagues, we've heard tired allegations against the United States. What we have not heard, what we have not heard today, is an explanation for Iran's continued failure to satisfy its safeguard obligations as laid out before this council. It's important to note, these obligations are not contingent on the conduct of any other country, can't blame others, nor can they be suspended or paused or ignored until Tehran secures some type of agreement on its terms. So the Iranian representative can continue to direct accusations at other countries, but those accusations cannot substitute for the access for the data, for the information, and the cooperation that the IAEA and this Council, through resolutions, have repeatedly requested. Today, the IAEA, the Director General, Rafael Grossi, is right here in this room. asked Iran for answers, not speeches. We are here today because Iran was referred to this council by the IAEA. So my suggestion to the Iranian representative, and maybe start by providing some answers. But sir, look, your lies are no good here. You can argue about agenda items, you can argue about logistics, or who gets to speak or not speak, but the hard truth is this. And the world needs to hear it. The United States and our partners will never let you obtain a nuclear weapon to terrorize the world. Period. End of story. Thank you, Mr. President. Greece · President of the Security Council [2:08:23]: I thank the representative of the United States for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany. Germany [2:08:34]: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I would like to first of all thank Director General Grossi for his report and briefing today, and him and his team for their continued professional and impartial work. And I would like to reiterate Germany's full support for the IAEA. The Director General's latest report from September 1 is clear that IAEA continues to lack the information and access necessary to verify important aspects of Iran's nuclear program. and the status of its nuclear material. And on September 9, the Board of Governors underlined that this proliferation concern needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency. And in accordance with its statutory obligations, the Board decided to report Iran's non-compliance to the Security Council and the General Assembly, but this step was neither taken lightly nor hastily. It followed more than a year during which Iran was given repeated opportunities to return to compliance with its legally binding obligations. Mr. President, while, and we have recognized that, the Agency's access to affected facilities has been impacted due to safety concerns, these circumstances do not provide legal grounds for Iran to suspend the implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, nor do they explain Iran's failure to provide legally required information over the course of the years. Our main message today is therefore this, and it's very clear: Iran must fully comply with its legally binding safeguards obligations. Mr. President, there is a broader principle at stake here, and this is about the integrity and credibility of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT remains the cornerstone of that regime under which all non-nuclear weapon states, such as Iran, are required to accept IAEA safeguards. to verify compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. Iran itself has repeatedly emphasized this principle and reaffirmed both its rights and obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement, and has stressed the importance of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty. Germany recognizes the inalienable right of all State Parties, including Iran, to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT, but both rights and obligations are integral parts of the Treaty and must be upheld. Mr. President, Germany, together with France and the United Kingdom, has invested considerable diplomatic efforts over many years in finding a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We have sought to preserve diplomatic channels, and we continue to believe that diplomacy offers the only sustainable path forward. Full cooperation with the IAEA would help rebuild the confidence necessary for a meaningful solution. Germany, together with its E3 partners, remains committed to working towards such a solution. Thank you very much. Greece · President of the Security Council [2:11:41]: I thank the representative of Germany for the statement. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I give him the floor. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:11:55]: Thank you, Mr. President. The representative of the United States failed to offer any credible arguments or justifications for his country’s blatant act of aggression against Iran. Instead, he resorted to recycle lies and base these allegations about Iran and its peaceful nuclear program to conceal the truth and facts and evade responsibilities. Let us speak on facts, not fabricated allegations. The facts are clear. The United States and the Israeli regime have committed act of aggression, including repeated military attacks against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards. Iran is victim of war, not aggressor. The aggression – the aggressors are the U.S. and Israel, which committed war crimes against Iranian people. Residential areas, schools, hospitals, bridges, airports, energy facilities, sport facilities, cultural heritage sites, railway transportation, and other vital infrastructure have been deliberately targeted and struck. These attacks constitute flagrant violations of UN Charter and international law, and the international humanitarian law, and the US and Israel are responsible for these severe violations. No amount of propaganda can reverse the facts, erase the suffering of the Iranian people, or absolve this responsibility of their international legal obligations. Those who ordered, carried out, and enabled these heinous crimes must face accountability, not impunity. The United States cannot commit aggression, inflict mass civilian casualties, and then abuse this Council to portray itself as a victim. Together with Israel, the United States has carried out devastating attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure. They have committed war crimes and sooner or later will be held accountable for the commission of all atrocities, crimes against the Iranian people. They cannot evade their responsibilities. The U.S. representative asked about the attacking the civilian sites, maybe in allegedly in neighboring countries. But he cannot answer why they killed these innocent children. This is Mahya Salari, killed by US and Israeli attacks. This is Niyash Salahi, killed by US and Israeli regime. All of them in a school. were playing in the playground of a school. They were attacked by bombs by United States, and nobody here even questions this massacre. Zahra Behrouzi, killed by U.S. and Israeli. Mohammad Shahdostipour, killed by U.S. and Israeli regime. Ahmadzadeh Halavani, killed by US and Israeli regime. Benyamin Jangjoo, killed by US and Israeli regime. Mahna Bahrami, killed by US and Israeli regime. Sanar Salari, killed by US and Israeli regime. Mahna Zarei, still with a schoolbag, killed by US and Israeli regime. Rahaz Zarei, killed by US and Israeli regime. This is only a few. photos of the children killed out of 254 children killed by the US and Israeli regime. This is the responsibility of the Security Council to address. Thank you, Mr. President. Greece · President of the Security Council [2:16:31]: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the statement. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on this subject. The meeting is adjourned.