Emerging technologies and maritime security: implications for peace and security - Security Council, 10256th meeting
Security Council
Date: 29 October 2026
Language: English
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/sc/10256/2
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations.

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Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [19:12]:

The 10,256th meeting of the Security Council is called to order. I would like to warmly welcome the Ministers and the distinguished high-level representatives present in the Security Council chamber. Your presence today underscores the importance of the subject matter under discussion. The provisional agenda for this meeting is: Maintenance of international peace and security, emerging technologies and maritime security, implications for peace and security. The agenda is adopted. Before each of you is a list of speakers who have requested to participate in accordance with rules 37 and 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, as well as the previous practice of the Council in this regard. We propose that they be invited to participate in this meeting. There being no objections, it is so decided. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item two of the agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2026/818/Revision 1, a letter dated 13th October 2026 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary General, transmitting a concept paper on the item under consideration. So, I’d now give the floor to Mr. Courtenay Rattray.


UN · Chef de Cabinet of the SG [20:54]:

Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Maritime spaces are fundamental to our shared security and prosperity. They carry more than 90% of global trade in goods, More than 99% of the global flow of data travels through submarine cables. The maritime sector supports millions of jobs, connectivity, food and energy security, and the well-being of our planet. Disruption at critical maritime choke points can amplify these impacts unpredictably. Emerging technologies are already embedded in how we monitor maritime activity, communicate, navigate risks and respond to crises, including those before this Council. Increasingly, technologies developed for one objective can be repurposed and combined with others. This can create entirely new opportunities, but also entirely new risks. Non-state actors have demonstrated both the capability and the intent to use these technologies in asymmetric ways. Their growing accessibility also enables actors with limited conventional capabilities to generate significant effects. Artificial intelligence is central to this transformation, but it is not alone. Autonomous and remotely operated systems, unmanned aerial and surface vehicles, advanced sensing, satellite imagery, and cyber technologies are changing both the opportunities available to us and the threat environment at sea. These technologies can improve maritime domain awareness, detect suspicious activity, enable faster, better-informed decisions, make navigation and ports safer, and protect shipping, seafarers, and critical infrastructure, including marine cables. At the same time, greater connectivity and autonomy create new vulnerabilities. Cyberattacks, or other forms of interference affecting navigation, communications, vessels, ports, and related infrastructure can disrupt maritime operations, even without a physical attack. The growing speed and autonomy of technological systems may also increase the risk of error, miscalculation, and unintended escalation. These risks ultimately have human consequences. That is why seafarers and affected communities must remain at the centre of our response. Our starting point, therefore, must be human agency. Technology must serve humanity, not the other way around. This requires meaningful human oversight, clear accountability, and appropriate safeguards. It also requires sufficient transparency, testing, and evaluation so that we can understand how these systems operate and where their limitations lie. The Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Maritime Organization Conventions, and other applicable international law provide the foundations for our response. Inclusion, Human dignity, non-discrimination, sustainability, and equitable access should guide how these technologies are designed, used, and shared. The Secretary-General has consistently emphasized that artificial intelligence must serve humanity, and that its governance must be human-centered and grounded in human rights. The Global Digital Compact provides a shared framework for an open, safe, secure, inclusive digital future, focused on the non-military domain. The Independent International Scientific Panel on AI strengthens our common evidence base. The Global Dialogue on AI Governance offers an inclusive space for Member States and stakeholders to consider policy responses. These efforts complement and support the respective mandates of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Maritime Organization, and other relevant bodies. International cooperation must connect three pillars: science, policy, and capacity. Science gives us the evidence base needed to understand capabilities, opportunities, risks, and uncertainty. Policy enables Member States to make legitimate choices establish safeguards and build interoperability across different approaches. And capacity enables countries to assess, procure, adapt, and govern technological systems, or to reject those unsuited to their needs or obligations. Capacity is not only a development imperative. It is also a security and a governance imperative. A world in which only a handful of countries can evaluate the misuse of emerging technologies, detect vulnerabilities, or implement safeguards, is not a resilient world. It will also be crucial to ensure that seafarers have the capacity to work with emerging technologies without eroding the traditional skills on which maritime safety and security depends. The Security Council could consider how these changes affect issues already on its agenda, including maritime security, terrorism, and other threats posed by non-state actors. The Council can help connect evidence to policy, policy to capacity, and innovation to established international norms. At the same time, it can encourage stronger cooperation among states international and regional organizations, industry, the scientific community, and civil society. Only through such cooperation can we harness the benefits of emerging technologies while managing their risks, preserving human agency, and strengthening peace and security in the maritime domain. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [27:24]:

Thank you, Mr. Ratay, for your briefing. And let me now give the floor to Mr. Fareed Zakaria, who is joining us through video link. Fareed, you have the floor.


Journalist and writer [27:37]:

Prime Minister, let me just begin by asking if people can hear me.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [27:41]:

Yes, we can hear you.


Journalist and writer [27:44]:

Excellent. Prime Minister, I thank you for this opportunity. Your Excellencies, it's an honor to be with you. Let me begin by just making a few general remarks about AI. I think there is a tendency to be somewhat confused or perplexed by what AI represents. And I think it is important to understand that this is really like nothing we have ever experienced as human beings before, because we are taking sand, which is what silicon chips are, and bursts of electricity, and turning that sand and electricity into human intelligence. So when we talk about how this is like previous technological revolutions, keep in mind that a general purpose technology like electricity, which is the closest possible comparison, which then diffuses widely through the economy, is in fact utterly transformative to the world. But electricity did not get exponentially better every six months. Electricity by itself could not solve Fermat's theorem or a hundred year old mathematical problem that people had literally spent thousands, if not tens of thousands of hours of human brainpower trying to solve. So we are in a new world, and we are all trying to understand and adapt to how that changes the particular domains we are looking at. Now, when I consider how AI adapts itself to the issue of maritime security, for decades, maritime supremacy was a simple, brutal equation. It was measured by tons of displaced steel, the thickness of the armor, the range of the munitions. If you wanted to secure a sea lane, you parked a heavy, massive, crude warship in the middle of it. That doctrine is obsolete. We are now witnessing a fundamental rewriting of the rules of maritime security. The defining weapon of the next decade is not a hypersonic missile, it is the algorithm. It is artificial intelligence. And our naval reality is shifting from a competition of platforms and ships to a competition of data. So take a look at what's happening. The maritime domain has never been more crucial or contested. 90% of the global trade, as pointed out, floats on the surface. 95% of global digital communications, the backbone of the modern economy, travel through a very fragile network of subsea cables resting on the ocean floor. Yet the people tasked with protecting these vast expanses are drowning in noise. Right now, on the bridges of patrol ships and in the dimly lit rooms of our command centers, human operators are staring at half a dozen different screens. They're trying to reconcile radar returns, acoustic sonar pings, visual feeds, commercial shipping trackers. In other words, they're trying to find a needle in a haystack, and the adversary is actively dumping more hay on top of them. So when a rogue state wants to smuggle sanctioned oil, or a syndicate wants to illegally strip mine a protected fishery, they all do something very simple. They turn off the transponder. They become part of the shadow fleet. To the human eye staring at a traditional screen, they have vanished. Artificial intelligence strips away that invisibility. The AI system does not blink. It can ingest millions of data points simultaneously and synthesize them instantly. So when a vessel turns off its transponder, AI flags the anomaly. It instantly cross-references the ship's last known location with commercial satellite imagery, thermal signatures, local weather patterns. It identifies vessels that are loitering too long over critical subsea infrastructure. It allows us to stop looking for the needle and simply ask the machine to clear away the hay. But the implications for us as government leaders go far beyond that, for you as government leaders, I should say. We have to rethink where this processing happens, because in the future, the adversary will not allow the luxury of clean, uninterrupted satellite communication. They will jam signals. They will sever digital lifelines. If a patrol ship in the South China Sea or the Red Sea has raw video feed that it needs to send back to a server farm to the homeland just to figure out what he's looking at, the ship is effectively useless. This is why we will all have to start thinking about the idea of edge AI, the deployment of AI to the edge. The brain can no longer live just in the cloud; it must live in the hull. We're already seeing this shift. Marines are beginning to deploy advanced AI computer vision systems. These edge computing systems process data in real time. The camera spots an uncrewed explosive boat approaching in the dead of night. The AI classifies the threat. The commander has the information he needs to defend the ship, all without needing a satellite uplink. You have to deliver speed to decision, and in naval warfare, speed to decision is the difference between success or failure. AI is the vital perception layer that makes the Ghost Fleet a reality. We are facing a mathematics problem we cannot solve with traditional shipbuilding. We cannot build multi-billion dollar ships fast enough. We cannot recruit sailors to man them. So the solution is autonomy. AI is enabling the mass deployment of uncrewed surface vessels and autonomous submarines. We're seeing the beginnings of fleets of robotic ships that cost a fraction of traditional warships. These autonomous vessels can be deployed for months at a time. They don't sleep, they don't need provisions, they don't put human lives at risk. They act as massive distributed sensor nets, pushing our line of sight thousands of miles over the horizon. They allow us to protect the entire ocean rather than just the patch of water where the flagship happens to be sitting. So what do you need for this transformation? You need to embrace AI, but you also have to confront its vulnerabilities. A machine learning model is only as good as the data that feeds it. And as we rely more on algorithms, they will become the primary targets of cyber warfare. Adversaries will not try to sink the ships, they will try to poison our data. tricking the AI into ignoring a hostile submarine, classifying a civilian ferry as a threat. We have to build infrastructure, AI infrastructure, that is hardened, resilient, and inherently deeply secure. We also have to use AI to solve one of the oldest bureaucratic problems, sharing intelligence with allies, like-minded nations, community of nations. The oceans are frankly too vast for any one nation to secure. It was highlighted in recent UN Security Council debates just weeks ago. Securing the maritime domain requires unprecedented international cooperation. But historically, we've been paralyzed by classification rules. We can't share raw data or sonar data with partners because it reveals the capabilities of sensors. Well, AI solves this. Through a process called federated learning, you can train algorithms locally. using classified data, and then share only the resulting algorithmic improvements. We share the lesson without exposing the secret that allowed you to learn the lesson. This allows a coalition of allied nations to build a unified global threat detection network that's based on trust and mutual defense. So ladies and gentlemen, we are standing at the precipice of the most significant shift in maritime security since the transition to steam. The nations that cling to the old ways will find themselves overwhelmed by cheap autonomous swarms of naval drones blinded by adversaries hiding in digital noise. The answer is to integrate trusted AI at the edge, aggressively expand our own uncrewed fleet, and build federated intelligence networks with allies, with like-minded nations. If we adapt to this new era, we will own it, and the terrorists and the lawbreakers will be on the hunt and be easy to find. We will ensure that the global commons remains free, open, and secure for generations to come. The technology is there. The ocean is waiting. What we need is the political will to implement this. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [36:45]:

Thank you, Farid, for this fascinating briefing, and let me now give the floor to Mr. Michalis Vletsas.


Greece · Governor of the National Cybersecurity Authority [36:53]:

Mr. President, distinguished members of the Security Council, it is a profound privilege to address this chamber on behalf of the Hellenic Republic. More than 80% of global trade by volume moves across our oceans. Maritime security is not merely a regional concern; it is a fundamental prerequisite for global political stability, economic security, and uninterrupted supply chains. Yet, ocean governance is undergoing a profound shift. A 21st-century commercial vessel is a hyperconnected system of systems, a floating computing hub. This technological transformation demands a coherent, global framework for security. That framework begins with a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the rulemaking authority of the International Maritime Organization. Fragmented or unilateral national regulations cannot protect an inherently international industry. A global fleet requires global standards. For decades, we assumed that seaport operation technology, the physical machinery controlling propulsion, steering, navigation, and safety valves, was protected by the natural air gap of the open sea.

That air gap no longer exists.

According to Honeywell's 2026 Operational Technology Cybersecurity Benchmark Report, an alarming 87% of maritime organizations experienced a significant operational technology cybersecurity incident over the past 12 months. This ranks shipping as the second most exposed critical infrastructure sector globally, trailing only energy and utilities. What makes this crisis acute is the profound gap between perceived maturity and actual operating readiness. 88% of maritime operators claim that their operational technology cyber programs are mature. Yet, Only 21% maintain a complete inventory of their onboard operation and technology assets. Only 33% have integrated their vessel operation and technology into a centralized security operation center, and just 20% continuously monitor connected operational technology devices. When an operational technology incident strikes, the operational downtime averages 16.2 hours, and financial losses can escalate up to half a million dollars per hour. This crisis is compounded by vulnerabilities deep within the maritime software supply chain, highlighted by recent high severity vulnerabilities discovered in legacy seaboard data gateways. If a data gateway bridging bridge IT (Information Technology) and vessel operational technology can be compromised remotely, the operational integrity of the entire vessel is lost. This is why GRIS calls upon the IMO and Member States to mandate rigorous software supply chain verification and pre-deployment code audits. Every navigation gateway and industrial control software must undergo standardized zero-trust verification before leaving the shipyard. These vulnerabilities manifest in severe real-world operational risk on active sea lanes. In August 2026, a Liberian-flagged very large crude carrier en route to the US Gulf Coast reportedly experienced a network incident resulting in a 30-hour communications blackout. The blackout was remediated by a United States interagency team that boarded the ship, that had to board the ship. Similarly, a liquefied natural gas carrier operating in the Mediterranean suffered an alleged control system disruption targeting steam pressure controls and cargo parameters, forcing the vessel to abort its scheduled terminal call of Rovigo, Italy. Furthermore, academic research shows that attackers can intercept radar video streams to inject false contacts or exploit steering gear automation to override rudder commands. For a 300-meter supertanker, a cyber intrusion can turn a commercial vessel into a physical threat to navigation, the environment, and port infrastructure. But maritime cyber risk extends beyond vessels to the critical infrastructures beneath the sea on which global connectivity depends. Uninterrupted electricity and data connectivity via submarine cables is non-negotiable. Subsea fiber optic cables carry over 95% of all transcontinental internet traffic. They lay exposed on the ocean floor, vulnerable to physical sabotage, dark fleet answer drugs, and digital traffic interception. To safeguard this lifeline under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Greece proposes a four-point international action plan. Number one, build on IMO's particularly sensitive sea area framework by developing appropriate designations for critical subsea cable corridors and landing approaches, supported by associated protective measures, including areas to be avoided where justified. Number two, integrate AIS data, the beacons from the ships, and synthetic aperture radar imagery to identify anomalous vessel activity near critical cable routes. Number three, support coastal states in deploying proportionate acoustic, optical, and other monitoring capabilities at critical choke points. And number four, develop voluntary multilateral coordination arrangements under UN auspices for notification, access, investigation, and rapid repair so that damaged infrastructure can be restored without diplomatic delay. Emerging technologies, chief among them artificial intelligence, are fundamentally reshaping the threat landscape. AI is a double-edged sword. On one hand, AI is a formidable threat multiplier. 99% of industrial leaders expect AI to impact operational technology security within the next two to three years. Threat actors are already leveraging AI to automate vulnerability discovery and manipulate autonomous decision support systems. Furthermore, as the industry moves towards maritime autonomous surface ships, Research shows that adversaries can execute adversarial waypoint injection attacks, tricking autonomous ships into deviating into hostile waters. We must accelerate the IMO's work on the MAS code, ensuring that human oversight, algorithm transparency, and AI safety controls are embedded into international law. On the other hand, AI is our most powerful defensive asset. When integrated into maritime security operation centers, AI-driven predictive algorithms analyze vast streams of telemetry, detecting subtle operational technology network anomalies hours before a human operator notices a hazard. To translate high-level principles into tangible defenses, we must look into regional mechanisms that foster real-world resilience. Following the joint commitment made by Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, our three nations officially launched the Maritime Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, MAR CCE, on February 25, 2026. Headquartered in Nicosia, Cyprus, MAR CCE serves as an operational engine delivering concrete results through four operational pillars. Threat intelligence, where it is going to be distributing quarterly reports, tracking active ransomware, critical industrial control vulnerabilities. Capacity building, it is hosting the CyberSAC3 simulation exercise on November 23 and 24 to test cross-border decision making on specialized cyber ranges. Policy and regulation, it is mapping already global frameworks into a single reference guide to harmonize compliance for international fleets, and innovation, integrating artificial intelligence, quantum-safe encryption, and whatever technology innovation comes next into vessel hardware. MARCC was designed from its inception as an open platform, and we welcome additional international stakeholders to join this framework. Mr. President, national legislative measures play a valuable role in securing domestic port facilities. However, piecemeal national mandates cannot secure a global fleet that operates across high seas and multi-jurisdictional supply chains. Our primary allegiance must remain with international institutions. We must reinforce the IMO as the sole universal regulatory authority for global shipping, anchored in the legal framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We cannot protect 21st century digital trade with 20th century physical rules. Let us commit today to auditing our vessel technology, protecting our subsea cables, harnessing artificial intelligence responsibly, and building regional centres of excellence across every ocean. Greece remains firmly committed to being a guardian of the freedom of navigation, both physical and digital.

Thank you.


Greece · Prime Minister; President of the Security Council [46:31]:

Thank you, Mr. Bletsas, for your report, and I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic. Excellencies, dear colleagues, let me begin by thanking you all for your participation in today's discussion. I would also like to thank our briefers for their excellent contributions. And I do believe that this is a particularly timely discussion, and it's a great honor as Prime Minister of Greece to be chairing today's debate. As we heard from our briefers, new technologies are transforming the way we navigate, the way we trade, the way we protect our seas. They offer remarkable opportunities, but they also create substantial new vulnerabilities. Yet, as we consider these developments, we must not lose sight of a more fundamental issue: respect for the rules that govern our seas. We have built a rules-based international order for a reason. Because we understand that the adherence to these common rules is a foundation of peace, stability, and shared prosperity. And nowhere is this more evident than at sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with 172 parties and fundamental provisions reflecting customary international law binding for all states. stands out, I believe, as one of the greatest achievements of multilateralism. It provides a comprehensive legal framework governing activities at sea, safeguarding freedom of navigation, protecting the sovereign rights of states, and enabling global maritime trade to flourish. But international law, ladies and gentlemen, cannot be upheld selectively. and the rules governing our seas cannot be rewritten to accommodate the ambitions of individual states. And this is particularly important at a time when we face threats to maritime security, not only from non-state actors, but also from states that openly disregard international law. Let me give you a concrete example from our own region, the Eastern Mediterranean. The so-called Turkey-Libya Memorandum on Maritime Delimitation is a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of international law of the sea. It is illegal, it is arbitrary, and it defies geography itself. Greece and Libya are natural neighbors with opposite coasts. They are entitled, under international law of the sea, to delimit their respective maritime zones through an agreement. By contrast, Turkey and Libya do not, I repeat, do not have opposite or adjacent coasts, yet they have attempted to establish an artificial maritime boundary between them. This is absurd. There is no precedent, let me repeat again, there is no precedent for such a diagonal delimitation. And allow me to illustrate this with a map. I would just like you to look at the geography. Turkey and Libya have attempted to essentially draw a maritime boundary between them, as if the Greek islands lying between their coasts simply did not exist. Many of you have visited these islands. Crete, my own ancestral homeland, is one of the largest islands in the Mediterranean. It has more than 620,000 inhabitants. Rhodes is home to another 125,000. The islands of Karpathos and Kasos have tens of thousands more. These are not uninhabited rocks in the middle of the sea. They are thriving communities. with centuries of history, with vibrant economies, with hundreds of thousands of people who call them home. And yet this memorandum simply pretends that they do not exist. But geography, ladies and gentlemen, cannot be rewritten, and sovereign rights cannot be erased by drawing arbitrary lines on a map. The Mediterranean is shared by 21 coastal states. Maritime boundaries are meant to delimitate neighboring states, not simply between friends. The maritime delimitation agreement concluded between Greece and Egypt in 2020 stands as a model of how neighboring states can reach mutually agreed solutions in full accordance with international law. Greece and Egypt have opposite coasts. Without respect for common rules, Our Mare Nostrum risks becoming a jungle of competing claims and self-serving arrangements. Imagine Greece and Tunisia deciding to delimit their maritime zones as if Sicily and Malta simply did not exist. Would anyone seriously consider such an arrangement as legitimate? International law is absolutely clear. Islands are entitled to maritime zones, including a continental shelf and an exclusive economic zone, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, whose relevant provisions, let me repeat, reflect customary law binding all states. No agreement between two states can deprive a third state of its sovereign rights, and no bilateral arrangement can override international law. The Turkey-Libya Memorandum unfortunately violates these fundamental principles. It has no legal effect on Greece's sovereign rights, and its recent ratification by the Libya House of Representatives cannot turn an illegal memorandum into a lawful agreement. And this is not merely Greece's position. The illegality of this memorandum has been clearly recognized by the international community, including all 27 member states of the European Union, some of which are represented around this table. And no matter how much time passes and how often unlawful claims are repeated, what is illegal remains illegal. And this is not simply a bilateral dispute. It goes to the very heart of our discussions around maritime security. It challenges the foundations of multilateralism, threatens regional peace and stability, and undermines the rules that protect the rights of states, whether they're large or small. And for more than four decades, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has been able to provide a common framework for peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and the settlement of maritime disputes. And we cannot allow our seas to become a jungle where states pick and choose which rules to respect and where arbitrary claims replace international law. And as the UN Secretary-General emphasized in addressing this very issue, we must ensure that the force of law prevails over the law of force. Because the alternative to a rules-based international order is not freedom, it is chaos, it is confrontation, it is instability. And this is precisely what the United Nations was created to prevent. The consequences of this illegal memorandum are not merely legal, they are very real. And under no circumstances can such a memorandum serve as a pretext to challenge legitimate activities at sea or obstruct strategic connectivity projects that our region urgently needs. And these are projects, especially when we talk about the Eastern Mediterranean, of enormous strategic and economic importance. They promise greater energy security, more affordable electricity, stronger regional cooperation, better data connectivity. Ultimately, they contribute to lasting peace. Yet, the development is being complicated by unilateral claims and attempts to challenge legitimate activities at sea. And this is precisely why maritime security matters. And we cannot, around this table, speak of building bridges between our nations while allowing others to prevent these bridges from being built. And we cannot allow arbitrary maritime claims to become instruments for holding back the economic development and prosperity of an entire region. Ladies and gentlemen, what is at stake in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of a much broader challenge, one that affects not only international peace and security, but also the prosperity and everyday lives of billions of people. It was mentioned by our briefers, more than 80% of global merchandise trade by volume travels by sea. Ships carry the energy that power our economies. the food that feed our populations, the goods that connect our markets. And it is an illusion to believe that alternative land routes could replace maritime trade at such a scale. This extraordinary system of global trade and commerce has been one of the greatest engines of global prosperity and technological progress. But its success rests on one fundamental condition. that maritime routes remain open, free, and secure. And today, unfortunately, that condition can no longer be taken for granted. From the Straits of Hormuz to the Red Sea, from the Black Sea to other critical maritime choke points. Just yesterday, another commercial cargo vessel, owned by a Greek company, was attacked and sank in the Black Sea. We strongly condemn this attack, targeted civilian commercial shipping, is completely unacceptable. It is yet another reminder for the urgent need for a global maritime truce, ensuring that commercial vessels can navigate safely and freely, even in times of conflict. Because the consequences of such attacks extend far beyond the seas. Threats to freedom of navigation disrupt global supply chains, they drive up shipping and insurance costs, They create uncertainty across international markets. Ultimately, it is our citizens that pay the price. At a time when households are already struggling with the cost of living, maritime insecurity adds further pressure on energy and commodity prices. It fuels inflation. It aggravates food insecurity. And as we heard from our briefers, these new technologies are making these challenges even more complex. The cost of disruption, unfortunately, has never been so low, and the potential economic consequences have rarely been so high. And this brings us also to Europe's responsibility. Europe cannot aspire to be a global economic power while remaining a spectator when the security of its trade routes are at stake. We must be prepared, as Europeans, to assume greater responsibility for security and stability in our wider neighborhood. And this means deploying hard assets, strengthening our operational capabilities, and being ready to act when freedom of navigation is threatened. The European Union's Operation Aspides in the Red Sea, in which Greece plays a leading role, is a concrete example of what Europe can and must do. But we must be more ambitious. Europe's economic strength must be matched by its capacity to act. We need a stronger European security presence in our wider region, working closely with our partners. Because protecting maritime security means safeguarding the prosperity of our citizens, the resilience of our economies, and ultimately the foundations of international peace and stability. Excellencies, while new technologies create vulnerabilities, they also, as we heard, offer unprecedented opportunities. Artificial intelligence, satellites, advanced sensors can transform maritime surveillance, improve early warning, and strengthen our ability to prevent and respond to threats. The technology alone, unfortunately, is not a strategy. We must turn information into intelligence, and intelligence into effective action. And this is precisely the approach, as you heard from Mr. Bletsis, that Greece is pursuing. We are a major maritime nation. We're investing in advanced surveillance and command and control capabilities. We're integrating satellite sensors and vessel tracking systems to build a comprehensive, real-time picture of maritime activity. But no country can safeguard the seas alone. We need stronger international cooperation between like-minded states. We need better information sharing, as we heard from Fareed. We need greater investment in maritime capabilities while ensuring that emerging technologies remain firmly anchored in international law. And as Greece prepares to assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second-half of 2027, maritime security will remain very high on our agenda. Let me conclude, ladies and gentlemen, by saying the following: The sea can connect us. But it can also divide us. It can be a bridge between nations, a source of prosperity, or an arena of confrontation and conflict. Which path we take is ultimately our choice. The choice begins with respect for international law. For Greece, a nation which is shaped by the sea, with thousands of islands, with the world's largest merchant fleet, this is a matter of vital importance. Freedom of navigation depends on maritime security, and maritime security depends on the respect for international law. They underpin global trade, prosperity, and peace. And as Greece approaches its end, the end of its term on the Security Council, let me reaffirm our commitment. Greece will remain a steadfast defendant of international law and freedom of navigation, working with all partners to keep our seas open, secure, and peaceful. Because what happens at sea shapes the future of all of us. Thank you. So, let me now resume my function as President of the Council and give the floor to Her Excellency Madame Éléonore Caroi, Minister Delegate for Francophonie, International Partnerships, and French Nationals Abroad, attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France. Madame la Ministre, vous avez la parole.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:02:23]:

Madame Minister, you have the floor.


France · Minister [1:02:26]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Prime Minister, I'd like to thank you for organizing this meeting, and I also thank the briefers for their interventions. This debate is very timely because the issue of protecting freedom of navigation is now a particularly acute issue, as you have just heard. In a context marked by the return to the use of force and an increasing number of conflicts, the diversification of threats, maritime spaces have become primary areas of confrontation. Mining, attacks with heavy weapons or drones, piracy, illicit trafficking, the sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, and cyberattacks are all undermining the security of trade routes, the safety of seafarers, and more broadly, maritime safety as a whole. These phenomena are a reminder of our collective vulnerability to any hindrance to freedom of navigation, and of the need to preserve the integrity of the treaty framework relating to maritime safety and security. Faced with these developments, emerging technologies, of course, offer considerable prospects, but they also, as we have heard this morning, pose many challenges. First of all, artificial intelligence could transform our approach to maritime security by improving our awareness of the maritime domain, data analysis, early warning systems. It makes it possible to more quickly detect suspect activities, secure navigation, and strengthen the resilience of our ports and critical infrastructure, including undersea cables. It also offers the chance for us to go from reaction to anticipation, which is extremely important. However, these capacities are a double-edged sword. The same technologies that can be very useful can also make it easier to manipulate data, carry out attacks, or disrupt essential systems. Autonomous maritime systems are a second issue. Their development is strengthening surveillance and naval projection capacities, and also increasing operational possibilities. However, the proliferation of these systems also brings with it risks: diversion by non-state actors, threats against civilian infrastructure, and these risks, ladies and gentlemen, call for a high level of regulation. Cyberattacks against ships, ports, and critical maritime infrastructure are disrupting logistics chains, undermining the safety of navigation, and threatening the continuity of international trade. We must therefore collectively look at cybersecurity as a fully-fledged component of maritime safety and security. Faced with these challenges, our response must be based on a fundamental principle: Technological innovation cannot develop to the detriment of or alongside international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines the legal framework covering all activities relating to the seas and the oceans. No instrument that aims to regulate new technologies can affect the unitary nature of it. The international community also has institutions that can support this transformation: the Security Council, first of all, which must be seized of all of the threats to international peace and security. The growing activity of this organ on the subject of maritime safety and security is the direct consequence of unacceptable attacks on the freedom of navigation. The International Maritime Organization, for its part, is essential, and it is working to produce necessary norms to adapt to new challenges. In May 2026, it adopted the first international code of safety for maritime autonomous surface ships, which is an important step towards safer, better regulated autonomous navigation. The IMO and competent bodies should continue to work on emerging issues in order to be able to effectively regulate them. Mr. Prime Minister, our collective responsibility is clear: anticipating risks, strengthening international cooperation, investing in resilience, and guaranteeing responsible governance of emerging technologies in the way that they impact seas and oceans. The Global Initiative on International Humanitarian Law, led by the ICRC, France, and 126 other states have joined it, has produced recommendations for better respecting the rules of IHL governing the means and methods of war that involve these technologies, notably uncrewed and autonomous maritime systems, as well as those that use artificial intelligence or spatial capacities. France, rest assured, will fully play its role in strengthening a collective framework that guarantees our security while also benefiting from the progress that these emerging technologies can provide. France is also, allow me to briefly recall this, carrying out several initiatives. In the Pacific Academy, based in New Caledonia, France is training UX-11 drone operators from partner countries to strengthen regional maritime security against natural disasters and illicit trafficking. France has also used its presidency of the Security Council last month to bring the subject of artificial intelligence to this body at a ministerial meeting, which for the first time gave the floor to officers from the different companies in this sector. Preserving maritime safety and security in the future will depend both on our ability to innovate and on our collective will to master the consequences of it effectively. Thank you very much.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:08:00]:

Merci, Madame.

Thank you, Ms. Carroux, for your statement.

I give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Chris Elmore, Member of Parliament and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State of the United Kingdom.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland · MP; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State [1:08:14]:

Thank you, President, Excellency, for convening this important debate. And my thanks too to our briefers for their valuable insights. President, the United Kingdom welcomes this opportunity to consider the implications of emerging technologies for maritime security. Emerging technologies are transforming our world. At sea, they offer immense opportunities to improve safety, strengthen maritime domain awareness, and protect the global trade on which all our countries depend. These technologies also bring new risks, and we have a collective responsibility to ensure that they are developed and used safely. The United Kingdom sees three priorities. First, as ever, states must uphold international law. Recent events have shown how threats to freedom of navigation can have far reaching consequences, disrupting supply chains, driving up costs, and affecting food and energy security. UNCLOS provides the legal framework within which all activities in the ocean and the seas, its primacy must be respected. States must also protect those at the heart of global shipping, seafarers. Second, we must ensure that emerging technologies strengthen our security rather than undermine it. In the maritime domain, these technologies can make ports and shipping more efficient while increasing situational awareness, resilience, and our ability to respond to threats. As shipping becomes more connected and more digital, the UK is working with International Maritime Organization partners and industry to ensure emerging technologies are adopted safely and securely. This year, the International Maritime Organization adopted the first global, goal-based regulatory framework for remotely controlled and autonomous commercial ships. UK's leading work to develop the Maritime Cyber Code, a globally agreed framework to secure the systems and processes connecting the modern maritime sector. But we cannot ignore the potential for harm. Technology advances are already changing the nature of conflict. Uncrewed weapon systems are increasingly accessible to state and non-state actors seeking to threaten shipping on, above, and below the water. As my Foreign Secretary said in this Chamber, if we are to realise technology's potentials for good, we must address its risks. That means rigorous testing and assurance, giving governments the information they need to assess emerging risks, stronger cyber defences, and resilient critical infrastructure. Third, none of us can address these challenges alone. When maritime networks are disrupted, the consequences are felt far beyond our seas. They threaten our shared security and prosperity, and hit the world's most vulnerable hardest. We need all countries to speak out against threats to the global maritime domain, wherever and however they occur. We must work together and with industry to ensure technological progress delivers for our people. In the maritime sphere, that also means strengthening cooperation through the International Maritime Organization, which the United Kingdom is proud to host. President, the art of technology change is not to retreat from innovation, but to shape it responsibly. As our Prime Minister said at the General Assembly, we need to embrace the extraordinary potential of technology to improve people's lives. The United Kingdom stands ready to work with Council members, the wider UN membership, industry and international organizations to ensure emerging technologies help deliver safer seas, more resilient societies, and greater security for all. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:11:41]:

Thank you, Mr. Amor, for your statement, and let me now give the floor to the representative of Latvia.


Latvia [1:11:49]:

Thank you, President. And allow me to begin by thanking Greece for organizing this debate on a topic of growing importance, as both seems emerging technology and maritime security have firmly established themselves on the Council's agenda. And we welcome the presiding of this meeting by His Excellency Mr. Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic, and thank the distinguished briefers, Mr. Kutner-Ratray, Fareed Zakaria, and Michael Bletts for their valuable contributions. President, we examine the issue of emerging technology in maritime domain against the backdrop of malign actors increasingly challenging international norms governing maritime trade and navigation. with the Black Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Red Sea serving as the most prominent examples. Russia continues escalating its unlawful strikes against civilian shipping and port infrastructure in the Black Sea, targeting civilian vessels, even those flagged and owned by third countries, and crucially, targeting grain supplies desperately needed around the globe. Russia has weaponized drones, uncrewed systems, and artificial intelligence-powered targeting systems to conduct strikes against civilian merchant ships. And we express our solidarity with Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, India, our fellow Council members Greece, Liberia, and Panama, and other countries affected by Russian attacks on civilian shipping, and with the millions of people around the world whose food security has been destabilized by the Russian attacks and naval blockade. Iran has been trying to restrict free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, an international waterway hosting crucial supply chains, striking commercial vessels just as it has been striking civilian infrastructure in its neighboring states in the Gulf and beyond, a direct violation of the Council Resolution 2817 and international law. Worryingly, we also see similar patterns reemerging in the Red Sea and around Bab el-Mandeb straits. And Latvia is committed to supporting allied efforts to restore freedom of navigation. These actions share a disgraceful strategy of trying to gain geopolitical advantage at the expense of vulnerable populations in other parts of the world, complete disregard of international law and the humanitarian and economic consequences. They affect the most vulnerable parts of our global community, especially in active conflict zones with humanitarian emergencies. And this means that millions more are facing acute food insecurity, and these consequences will last even after complete freedom of navigation is restored. Indeed, emerging and fast developing technologies present novel risks in the maritime domain when used for malicious purposes. They contribute to the growing asymmetric threat landscape by perfecting the tracking and targeting of vessels. and offering new unmanned weapons systems to carry out attacks. They can be instrumentalized for disrupting navigational systems and digital port infrastructures through unlawful cyberattacks. Yet simultaneously, these technologies also hold the promise of better defense against existing and emerging vectors of attacks. Tracking pirates, smugglers, and shadow fleet vessels at sea and through digital registries or improving early warning systems for industrial accidents or even natural disasters, emerging technologies can be a tremendous asset. They are also crucial in hardening our cyber infrastructure and may potentially help safeguarding our subsea cable infrastructure. Presidents, to ensure maritime security and navigational freedom and to decrease the likelihood of emerging technologies being used for causing harm at sea, we must take concrete steps. This includes strengthening the implementation of international law at sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and international humanitarian law. International waterways are governed by clear legal principles, and no political considerations or technological developments may be allowed to interfere with the freedom of navigation. Increased awareness raising and coordination at all levels is also needed. most notably within the IMO, but also ITU, regional organizations and other forums, while keeping the Security Council seized on threats that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. The developments in the maritime domain present an important and expanding dimension of the overall implications of new and emerging technologies for the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, our ability to adequately respond to maritime security challenges will depend on our overall adoption in light of technological developments. And we believe that the Council should remain actively engaged in these efforts. Last week, Latvia and Greece, together with eight other Council members, decided to convene an informal expert group on the Security Council members on technology and peace and security. And this group will seek to improve Council's ability to consider implications of emerging technologies for its work. This will help the Council to be better equipped in addressing emerging threats in all domains, including maritime. And to address both maritime disruptions and risks from emerging technologies, we must also work with the private sector to establish criteria, explore redundancies, determine alternatives, and identify regulatory gaps before the next crisis arrives. President, let me conclude with a call on two fronts. First, we reiterate the crucial need for an immediate cessation of attacks against lawful civilian shipping and port infrastructure. And second, we must cooperate on the safe and secure development of emerging technologies to maintain adherence to international law and support international peace and security in the maritime domain and beyond. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:18:12]:

Thank you. Let me give the floor to the representative of Liberia.


Liberia [1:18:17]:

Thank you, Mr. President. At sea, the distance between a false signal and a fatal decision can be measured in minutes. Our responsibility is to ensure that technological speed does not overrun human development. Liberia thanks the Greek Presidency for convening this timely debate, you, Mr. Prime Minister, for presiding, and the qualified briefers for their insights. We join in thanking and welcoming the many excellencies and distinguished colleagues for their presence and participation. Mr. President, As a major flag state, Liberia sees the promise of artificial intelligence, satellite imagery, and advanced sensing to detect threats earlier, support search and rescue, and protect shipping. But the same advances can enable attacks, compromise navigation, and accelerate miscalculation. Civilian seafarers bear the consequences, while shipping disruptions threaten food and energy supplies far beyond the sea. Liberia therefore proposes three practical priorities linked by one purpose. turning better information into better protection. First, connect early warning to early communication. A disrupted navigation signal or an unidentified unmanned vessel may leave intentions unclear. Where certainty meets mistrust, an incident can become a confrontation. The ability to detect danger must be matched by the ability to clarify it. A warning should trigger protection. It should not, by itself, be treated as proof of hostile intent. Flag states, coastal states, and shipping operators should strengthen incident reporting, maintain reachable emergency contacts, and exercise communication arrangements through existing maritime mechanisms. Second, preserve responsibility as autonomy grows. Human oversight must mean that responsible personnel understand a system's limitations and can intervene. Seafarers need training, reliable backup procedures, and warnings they can act upon. Technology providers, ship owners, and port operators should test safeguards share information on vulnerabilities, and maintain workable alternatives when digital systems fail. We must not automate decisions while leaving responsibility undefined. The United Nations Charter the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other applicable international law remain essential. Technological novelty does not diminish obligations to protect civilians during armed conflict. Third, make access to technology a capacity to respond. For African coastal states, Satellite information and digital tools can strengthen responses to maritime threats. Yet, a warning offers little protection without trained personnel, secure communications, and the means to act. Partnerships should therefore combine equipment and data with sustained training, cybersecurity support, and regional cooperation. Developing countries must also help shape the standards they will implement. Otherwise, technological progress risks widening the insecurity it promises to reduce. Mr. President, The Council should focus on risks that could trigger or intensify conflict, supporting the regulatory expertise of the International Maritime Organization and the work of regional bodies. Where relevant, briefings should explain how technological interference or misuse is changing maritime threats, what risks of escalation arise, and what safeguards can protect civilian seafarers and commercial shipping. For Liberia, the test of innovation is whether a crew returns home safely and an incident is resolved before it becomes a conflict. The seas connect our economies. Our cooperation must protect the people who keep them connected. I thank you for your kind attention.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:25:01]:

Thank you. The representative of Panama has the floor.


Panama [1:25:06]:

Gracias.

Thank you. Your Excellency Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece, we wish you the most cordial of greetings, and we thank you for your leadership in convening this important debate. We recognize the presence of the distinguished representatives of countries and delegations that are honoring us with their participation. We are grateful for the valuable briefings from Mr. Courtney Rattray, Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary General, Mr. Michael Bletsas, Governor of National Cybersecurity Authority of Greece, and from journalist and writer Mr. Fareed Zakaria. We also congratulate Greece and its delegation on their sustained efforts to keep maritime security among the priorities for discussion within the Security Council, thus contributing to strengthening international attention on the challenges faced in this area. Emerging technologies applied to various different sectors have proven to be able to automate complex processes, analyze large volumes of information, anticipate scenarios, and carry out tasks which just a few years ago seemed unimaginable. In the maritime domain, we have seen how the accelerated development of artificial intelligence has significantly expanded monitoring capacities, making it easier to detect suspect activities, to monitor maritime routes, and to protect critical infrastructure. Moreover, progress on smart sensors, early warning systems, and predictive analysis offers new opportunities for preventing accidents, optimizing maritime traffic management, improving search and rescue operations, and more quickly responding to emergencies. However, its growing availability and transformative potential is also something that could be taken advantage of by actors pursuing illicit ends. giving rise to new threats, facilitating criminal activities, and posing increasingly complex challenges to international maritime security. Recent reports on the use of these technologies for the navigation and guidance of missiles, the carrying out of cyber attacks, and the tracking of ships with the purpose of turning them into targets for attacks show that these threats are not hypothetical scenarios. On top of that are the risks associated with the manipulation of satellite signals, interference in communication systems. uncrewed maritime systems, the use of drones for hostile activities, and the use of digital tools capable of compromising control systems of ships and port facilities. This complex reality requires us to go beyond simply responding to known threats, and instead to strengthen our ability to anticipate, prevent, and mitigate those risks. The challenge consists of striking a balance that will allow us to make use of these capacities without generating vulnerabilities or running risks that would undermine maritime security and international stability. Mr. President, threats to maritime routes which are now being bolstered by the use of emerging technologies, could have significant repercussions on supply chains, strategic infrastructure, and connectivity among states. Therefore, we need mechanisms that allow us to identify risks, coordinate responses effectively, especially when the threats transcend national borders. As the administrators and owners of the Panama Canal, one of the main routes of international trade, and as the administering state of an important maritime register, we understand the importance of guaranteeing the security of maritime operations and promoting compliance with international standards. Our experience confirms that technology alone is not enough. It needs to be accompanied by institutions that are prepared, qualified personnel, and effective cooperation among relevant actors. In this regard, surveillance tools ship tracking tools and the secure exchange of information can help us to detect vulnerabilities, correct shortcomings, and prevent incidents. To fully make the most of this potential, we need to institutionalize cooperation among states, maritime authorities, port operators, ship owners, and the tech sector. Specialists from the Panama Maritime Authority have been certified in risk analysis offered by the International Association of Assistance to Maritime Navigation and Lighthouse Operators, which is going to help improve the evaluation of investment projects linked to maritime and coastal infrastructure. Moreover, we maintain our commitment to the standards of the International Maritime Organization on safety and security of navigation. Our national progress also reflects the importance of continuing preventive work. In the past year, the merchant fleet saw a reduction of 23% in maritime accidents in the framework of control and security work carried out by the Maritime Authority of Panama. Continuing down this path requires us to adapt our capacities to new realities and adapt responsibly. And the evolution of technology presents us with a shared responsibility, making sure that new capacities contribute to protecting the maritime environment and do not, on the contrary, become instruments that deepen their vulnerabilities. We must therefore strengthen international cooperation, develop capacities, and promote the responsible use of these technologies in accordance with international cooperation based on the principles of transparency, explainability, and effective human control. Thank you very much.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:32:42]:

Thank you. Let me give the floor to the representative of Bahrain.


Bahrain [1:32:48]:

Thank you, Mr. President.

We wish to take this opportunity to thank the Hellenic Republic for having convened this important open debate on emerging technologies and maritime security implications for peace and security, as well as a word of welcome to His Excellency, Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic, Mr. Mitsotakis. And we would like to welcome the ministers and various speakers and to thank them for their statements. Emerging technologies are promoting introducing new opportunities for development cooperation in various areas of human activity. And their repercussions are being felt, are widely felt both at land and at sea. In the maritime domain, AI-related innovations, innovations in autonomous systems and surveillance technologies. are opening up promising opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of maritime transport for greater safety and security of navigation, as well as for building capabilities of naval forces for early threat detection and response. However, these opportunities are also accompanied by challenges, challenges related to the diversion of these technologies, as well as the threats that they may pose to international peace and security. The Kingdom of Bahrain stresses that maritime security can no longer be viewed in isolation from other dimensions of international security. It is now closely linked to the three vital arteries upon which global interconnection hinges: sea, air, and cyberspace. Any threat targeting any of those arteries has repercussions on the other two, repercussions which affect trade, transport, supply chains, as well as energy and food security. This reflects the fact that protection of these domains constitutes a shared, indivisible international responsibility, as we stated in our intervention during the open debate organized by the Kingdom of Bahrain in April on safety and protection of waterways in the maritime domain. Maritime safety constitutes a shared responsibility, which requires robust international commitment and cooperation, a sustained commitment, as well as political will, guaranteeing freedom of international trade. Maintenance of international open, accessible maritime passageways advances the interests of all states, and this requires unstinting commitment without any selectivity. In our region, we have observed the way that modern-day technologies have been contributing to broadening prospects, opportunities for cooperation, and have been bolstering our collective capabilities in the maritime domain. For example, AI and autonomous systems, including uncrewed surface vehicles, are being used to develop maritime survey operations, which is fostering updating of charts, updating safe passageways, as well as greater cooperation and sharing of expertise. Emerging technologies likewise are contributing to improving awareness of these fields and broadening of partnerships with the use of unmanned surface vehicles, to provide support for manned surface vehicles, to supplement their capabilities in reconnaissance and surveillance missions. The use of these systems, as well as the exchange of information amongst partners, including through the a combined maritime forces coalition whose headquarters are located in the Kingdom of Bahrain, also facilitates the development of a shared understanding, a more precise understanding about the situation at sea, thereby bolstering our collective ability for the preservation of peace and security. Mr. President. What we have proposed for greater cooperation and greater security and peace is now being used by other stakeholders to threaten navigation, threatening maritime security in violation of international law and international norms, including Security Council Resolution 2817. Iran has been using on crude, remotely controlled, explosive-laden vessels, targeting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters. Likewise, Houthi terrorist groups have been employing these technologies as they seek to target navigation in the Red Sea and in areas near Bab el-Mandeb, thereby imperiling the lives of innocent seafarers as well as jeopardizing international trade and disrupting that. We reaffirm the fact that the protection of maritime Safety and security is not limited to safeguarding vessels and commercial passageways. This also encompasses protection of crews and seafarers, providing guarantees for their safety and protecting their rights, as well as facilitating their access to the necessary assistance and support in event of emergency in accordance with international law, as well as the relevant international instruments. This contradiction is clearly apparent in the Strait of Hormuz itself, as Iran is laying down mines and seeking to block a vital international trade artery. Our partners have been using unmanned surface vehicles to clear the mines and to reopen the passageway between the laying down of mines and the neutralization or the removal thereof. Therein lies the fundamental distinction between those seeking to undermine international trade and those who shoulder collective responsibility for the protection of the safety of navigation for all. Technological progress also needs to be a bridge between peoples, not a weapon to sever the arteries of trade or for the use for for for blackmail targeting the entire world. We cannot countenance maritime. pathways, which are vectors for shared prosperity to be transformed into tools of coercion and intimidation. Mr. President, for technological projects to usher in greater prospects for maritime transport while at the same time opening the door to new risks, our regulatory capabilities also need to evolve at the same pace as our technical capabilities are evolving. We need clear frameworks governing the use of emerging technologies, defining a responsibility in guaranteeing that each step towards technological progress guarantees safer, more secure navigation and more resilient navigation. Multilateral organizations play a key role in the establishment of this framework, beginning with the International Maritime Organization, the IMO, which has traversed an important threshold with the adoption May 2026 of the first international code the security code for maritime autonomous surface ships, the MAS code. This is a regulatory milestone to support commercial use of vessels with AI, operating with AI, or those that are remotely controlled in global maritime transport, while seeing to it that technological progress. goes hand in hand with robust guarantees which protect human lives at sea and security of vessels and safety of navigation. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:40:58]:

Thank you. Let me give the floor to the representative of the United States.


United States of America [1:41:03]:

Thank you. And thank you to Greece and the Prime Minister for convening this open debate, and thank you to the briefers for their presentations. Emerging technologies such as superintelligence and remotely operated and autonomous surface, aerial, and underwater systems offer opportunities to strengthen maritime security, improve situational awareness, and protect critical shipping routes. The United States supports innovations that advance security, economic prosperity, and freedom of navigation. At the same time, these technologies in the wrong hands can also pose significant risks. For example, Automatic identification system technologies intended to improve maritime safety can be misused to obscure ship locations. This may facilitate activities such as illegal and unreported and unregulated fishing, ship-to-ship transfers of illicit goods, trafficking, or even piracy. However, future ocean-based maritime domain awareness technologies may have the capability to create networks of observation platforms that enable disruption of these illicit activities. The United States welcomes the IMO's adoption of the non-mandatory Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Code. This establishes a goals-based framework for the safe operation of autonomous surface vessels. We support continued industry engagement and practical experience sharing to ensure future standards promote safety without unnecessarily restricting innovation. The IMO should remain the lead international body for developing technical standards governing commercial shipping, including autonomous vessels. The IMO should remain focused on those issues. It should, however, refrain from exceeding its core mandate, such as attempting to impose a global carbon tax that would create substantial, unnecessary costs on the global shipping sector, energy producers, and consumers worldwide. As we embrace these technological advances, we must not lose sight of the people who keep global commerce moving. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, The Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea have shown how quickly instability at a single choke point can affect global energy, food, and humanitarian supply chains. Maritime stakeholders must also prepare for cyber and electronic navigation threats. This includes GPS and other global navigation satellite systems jamming and spoofing, manipulation of automatic identification systems data, and attacks against vessel, port, and maritime transportation systems. These threats endanger mariners, disrupt commerce, and undermine confidence in the maritime transportation system. The United States strongly condemns these types of attacks. In the face of these continuing threats, President Trump directed firm action to safeguard maritime security and protect seafarers and commercial shipping. Beyond protecting those at sea, we must also strengthen the supply chains that underpin global commerce. Through initiatives such as Paxilica, the United States is working with trusted partners to strengthen secure technology supply chains, advance innovation, and promote economic security. Resilient supply chains and trusted technological infrastructure are essential to global maritime commerce and economic stability, not just for the United States, but for all of us. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:44:51]:

Thank you. Let me give the floor to the representative of Denmark.


Denmark [1:44:55]:

Thank you, Mr. President. And I thank Greece for convening this debate and commend you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your presence today and for your country's steadfast commitment to maritime security. Let me also thank our briefers for their insightful remarks. Mr. President, emerging technologies are rapidly reshaping all aspects of our lives. This includes maritime security, remotely operated drones, autonomous systems, And AI-enabled surveillance offers new tools, not only to improve operational efficiency, but to detect and respond to threats, thereby protecting seafarers. But as we've also heard this morning, these same technologies can also be used to undermine maritime security, to attack civilian objects, including commercial ships and civilian seafarers. This creates new challenges and raises the risk of new threats to international peace and security. Civilian seafarers have borne the brunt of these threats. Some have been trapped on board ships for months. Many have been on ships at risk of hitting mines or faced batteries of drones and missiles. Dozens have been reported killed in direct attacks by deadly autonomous weapons. We deplore such heinous attacks. Denmark insists that AI-enabled weapon systems must always operate under human control to ensure oversight and accountability and guard against misuse. International law applies equally to emerging technologies. Mr. President, since 2022, the Black Sea has become a major theater of conflict in Russia’s unprovoked and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That same year, the Secretary General brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative to limit the increase in global food insecurity. Russia, regrettably, withdrew from the agreement after just one year. Since then, there have been repeated drone strikes on vessels transporting grain and cooking oil. Grain storage sites and commercial port infrastructure have also been hit. The Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa have all felt the consequences, with tens of millions facing growing food insecurity, humanitarian suffering on a huge scale. The toll on seafarers in the Black Sea has been acute. In the last year, around 50 seafarers have been reportedly killed and over 100 injured. Denmark supports the proposed double moratorium that aims to ensure, among other things, that Ukrainian and Russian grain can cross the Black Sea to reach the world market. Regrettably, Russia has so far shown no interest and has only escalated the war further. Mr. President, the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab are critical chokepoints in the global supply chains, where emerging technologies threaten maritime security. Iranian and Houthi drones have been reported hitting tankers and container ships with ever greater accuracy. In the last eight months, at least 100 vessels were attacked, with dozens of seafarers reportedly killed. Ships have been rerouted, resulting in long delays for critical goods and higher freight costs. negatively impacting global growth and development. Since 28 February, the world's energy flows from the Gulf have been disrupted, significantly increasing global prices. Once again, the world's poor have borne the heaviest burden. A major knock-on effect has been the shortage of fertilizer. Without this vital commodity, many farmers across the world are unable to achieve their normal crop yields, resulting in increased and more acute food insecurity. This trend must be urgently reversed. Mr. President, this Council needs to better understand how emerging technologies affect maritime security. Denmark welcomes the recent launch of an informal expert group on technology, peace, and security, which provides a possible forum for such discussions. These technologies are not only risks, but also opportunities. More responsible innovation, information sharing, practical cooperation, and international oversight grounded in international law could lead to greater maritime security. UNCLOS and international humanitarian law must remain the legal anchor for our use of the seas. Freedom of navigation, also during armed conflict, is enshrined in international law precisely because this common good is vital to our collective security. Parties to a conflict must respect the freedom of navigation of non-belliter state and adhere to international humanitarian law. The international community must stand together in defense of these principles and against those who use emerging technologies to undermine them. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:49:50]:

Thank you. And let me give the floor to the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.


Democratic Republic of the Congo [1:49:58]:

Thank you, Mr. President. The Democratic Republic of Congo thanks the Hellenic Republic for having organized this high-level debate, and we welcome the presence of His Excellency Mr. Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece. It is an honor to have you preside over this meeting. We also welcome the participation of the ministers. And we thank speakers for their briefings. This discussion builds upon the considerations initiated in 2025 on maritime cooperation and emerging challenges. This is an opportunity to ponder an essential question: How is it that we can see to it that technological progress enhances maritime security and collective security rather than generating new vulnerabilities or heightening risks of confrontation? The response needs to lie in conflict prevention, respect for international law, and cooperation amongst states. This question is all the more significant in light of the fact that maritime domains are key to global trade, to energy supplies, to food security, and to economic development. And yet, piracy, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking, attacks on vessels, and threats to critical infrastructure compromise their security. AI, drones, satellites, and autonomous systems are generating new means to prevent these threats, but they can also amplify cyberattacks as well as strategic rivalries and risks of escalation. Mr. President, Emerging technologies can improve maritime surveillance and improve safety of navigation, as well as facilitate search and rescue operations, as well as accelerate detection of suspect activities. They, however, cannot. represent a real source of progress unless their use remains secure, responsible in nature, and is done in a manner that is in accordance with international law. Their duality means that they can be used for civilian or military purposes, both benevolent and malicious. aims being advanced, the fact that they can generate technical disruptions and difficulties, manipulation of data and opacity of certain systems gives rise to questions related to accountability, transparency, and human control. And automation-related incident or cyber-related incident can disrupt international trade as well as trigger escalation among states. In light of these risks, prevention must prevail over response. There's a need, therefore, to assess risks prior to the deployment of systems, to enhance their cybersecurity, to guarantee meaningful human oversight over decisions with grave consequences, as well as to establish reporting and investigation mechanisms in the event of incident. taking place. You would concur, Mr. President, that this kind of an approach requires a robust legal framework, which is why the DRC reaffirms our commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, specifically Articles 100 and 301 thereof. Furthermore, we stress the relevance of the 1988 Convention for the Repression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and and the 2005 Protocol thereto, technological developments cannot release states from their international obligations. For the DRC, these stakes are particularly tangible. Our Atlantic façade and our Matadi, Boma, and Banana ports are key for our trade and our development. To provide security for them and the resilience of our supply chains therefore represents a both economic and strategic priority. And yet maritime security is not limited to the protection of trade routes. This also requires efforts to combat those networks, which are illegally exploiting natural resources and fueling conflict. In the east of my country, this exploitation is resulting in financing being provided for armed groups and civilian suffering being prolonged, and some of these minerals are being used for the manufacturing of cellular phones, computers, as well as other electronic devices, which are supporting global technological developments. Therefore, there's a vital need for technological progress not to be done in a manner that includes a plunder of our natural resources and suffering of our population. This is a concern. which is reflected in the commitment of the DRC during our presidency of the Security Council in July 2026, addressing governance of natural resources and the links of this to insecurity, digital traceability for cargo, secure information sharing and customs-related and judicial cooperation can help to identify illicit networks and to dry up financing sources for armed groups. In accordance with the provisions of Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has an obligation to continue to undertake efforts for preventive diplomacy and inclusive cooperation And together with competent institutions, the challenge is not to undermine or to slow down innovation, but rather to make innovation help to advance, help innovation to advance peace. Technologies should help to achieve conflict prevention, to address and to end war, to protect people, and to guarantee that natural resources benefit the people to whom they belong. Meaningful technological progress is not only measured by what humanity can create, but the ability to prevent conflict, to sustain peace, to build, share, sustain sustainable and equitable security for all peoples. In order to make these principles a reality, tangible reality, there are a number of necessary measures that need to be adopted. First and foremost, adapting the legal framework to reflect technological developments by harnessing the work of the IMO, specifically developments related to autonomous vessel safety and security. Second, enhancement of early warning information sharing and incident prevention in Africa, the Yaoundé Architecture Resolution 2634 are key levers in order to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as to combat maritime terrorism, cyber threats, and illicit trafficking. Third, building capabilities of developing nations through training, skills transfer, technical assistance, as well as equitable access to technologies, while at the same time buttressing cooperation between states, international organizations, as well as technological stakeholders in order to advance shared norms and to protect critical maritime infrastructure. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [1:57:31]:

Let me now give the floor to the representative of Colombia.


Colombia [1:57:38]:

Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. Colombia welcomes your presence and would like to thank Greece for convening this important, crucial, necessary debate on the implications of artificial intelligence on maritime security and global peace.

Mr. President, Our country, Colombia in particular, is also a maritime nation. We have two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and islands in both oceans. And for us, the coastlines and the importance of protecting vessels, the population that lives in these areas, but also the issues that are concerned with the borders, international borders, between states are clearly at stake here. And it is so because the technological development poses different threats. For Colombia, however, from a risk management perspective, the triggering event of the risk here is not the hands that use the technology, either for good or for bad, That is the hands that design the technology in the first place. That is, we support the technological development of each nation, naturally those that have the resources. We understand it, support it, and that is part of national ownership. However, we ask to think of humanity and also for themselves about the boomerang effect. which I will explain both from a legal perspective, but also a technological perspective. Article 1 of the UN Charter remind us among all the goals and purposes of this institution and our role here today, is the one of adopting measures to prevent conflicts and maintain international peace and security. As Security Council, Article 39 remind us that we also have functions to prevent those threats, not just to react when they are. This is such case. Allow me to elaborate. We talk often here about the risk of artificial intelligence, but the type of artificial intelligence, it seems to be pre-quantum artificial intelligence, the one that we have today, We're about to move to the quantum era on what we call the final core, and the first chips have been produced, and the labs are working intensively in that technology. And that changed completely anything that we do in maritime security for a simple reason. Among the three pillars of quantum technology, quantum computing, quantum communications and quantum sensing. Columbia wants to call the attention on the ineluctable threats that come with quantum communication. In particularly, we call attention on quantum transduction, the ability to convert data a long distance without even present by long distance to physical computers and physical data. What it does, this technology, is the ability to intercept, interfere, and manipulate vessels' communications to the extent that they might know or not where they are, or not whether they cross an international border. This is not theory. This is coming. The second one is on quantum sensing. And this is one of particular concern because naturally is unregulated. Though we understand the importance of one element of quantum sensing, which is navigation and mapping, the benefits for oil exploration, the benefits to measure even and predict climate change, natural disasters, are understandable. However, this technology works without even a GPS, and also, again, the ability to manipulate data on physical systems that countries that do not produce this technology is there. Any type of manipulation on vessels, communications, means the potential of a conflict of nations that do not possess this technology, given that the technology can be used far, far away from the place where it happens. And the convention Any decision, any measure of the United Nations, of the Security Council, should take into account the risks that I have just enumerated when it comes to quantum communication, quantum sensing, and in particular, I repeat, navigation and mapping and quantum transduction of data. Mr. President, Colombia wishes to reiterate, as it has done in previous occasions before this council, that it is not a party of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, our country respects and applies international law in maritime matters, including those rules of customary international law that Colombia has recognized specifically. as well as the United Nations Charter in its entirety, and the provisions that I just enumerated, both Article 1 and 39. Additionally, Colombia shares the concern expressed in the concept note regarding the use of unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities. But again, what comes next, and really soon, the facts that quantum sensing and quantum communication will soon empower and transform the way artificial intelligence works. We do understand that in international context and international conference, we use the term emerging technologies, but we must not forget that these technologies are not really just emerging. In 1927, Albert Einstein and some of the most brilliant minds in the world were meeting together in MIT, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to celebrate the fifth symposium on quantum technology. That is a century ago. Really, it's not emerging. Artificial intelligence is a technology that has more than half century. And when it comes to comparing both technologies, please make no mistake. Artificial intelligence is a really old car, and quantum technology is the latest model. So as to which technology will control which technology, the answer really should not be hesitance. Quantum technology will take over. And the risks that we have enumerated to date are present, are ineluctable. Señor Presidente.

Mr. President, Colombia would like to draw this Council's attention to one element that deserves greater consideration, and that is the protection of undersea critical infrastructure, in particular telecommunications and data cables, those cables which sustain a large part of global financial and internet connectivity. These cables, together with other infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines are increasingly vulnerable to deliberate acts of sabotage as well as to accidental damage, with consequences that go beyond the strictly national maritime domain and which could impact economic stability and global peace and security. Referring once again to Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, Colombia calls upon the Security Council to take decisions in this regard to prevent risks to international security that unsupervised technological development poses, and, of course, while respecting the national ownership of those countries that develop those technologies. Colombia underscores the importance of capacity building and maritime technology transfer to developing countries, and the opportunity to participate, to understand, and to apply these systems is also a form of building peace and stability in regions that are not developing those technologies. Thank you very much, Mr. President.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [2:07:29]:

Thank you, and let me give the floor to the representative of Somalia.


Somalia [2:07:39]:

Mr. President, thank you. We welcome you, Your Excellency Prime Minister, to the Security Council and express our appreciation to Greece for convening this timely high-level open debate. I also want to thank Mr. Courtney Rattray, Farid Zakaria and Mr. Mikael, thanks for the valuable insights and practical recommendations. Mr. President, emerging technologies are changing the maritime domain in an extraordinary speed. Artificial intelligence, autonomous and remotely operated systems, advanced sensing technology, and cyber capabilities offer important opportunities to improve maritime safety and security, yet their misuse can endanger seafarers, disrupt international shipping and critical infrastructure, deplete marine resources, and heighten risk to international peace and security. We would like to emphasize four points. Mr. President, first, international law must remain the foundation of maritime security. The Charter of United Nations and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provide the legal framework for activities in the oceans and seas. International humanitarian law, international human rights law must also be respected when applicable. New technologies do not diminish existing obligations, nor do they remove human responsibilities. Their development and use must be guided by accountability, appropriate safeguards, and effective human oversight. Second, we must strengthen the resilience of ships, ports, and maritime infrastructures. Increasing digitalization and connectivity have improved efficiency, but they have also created new vulnerabilities. Cyber attacks, data manipulation, and interference with navigation and communication systems can cause serious disruption without physical attack. States, international organizations, and industry should cooperate to improve cybersecurity, share threat information, conduct risk assessments, and develop contingency plans that allow essential maritime operations to continue during a crisis. Third, emerging technologies should be harnessed for prevention and preparedness. Artificial intelligence, satellite imagery, remote sensing, and advanced surveillance can strengthen maritime domain awareness, support the detection of suspicious activity, and enable faster, better informed decisions. These tools can also improve search and rescue operations and help protect shipping, seafarers, and marine resources coastal communities depend. Their use must be supported by reliable data, secure systems, and safeguards against manipulation, error, and unintended escalation. Fourth, international cooperation and capacity building. must guide in dealing with the usage of these new technologies. Technological progress must not widen existing disparities, including further exacerbating and depletion of marine resources depended by coastal communities. Developing countries, including small island developing states, should have a meaningful access to training, expertise, and technologies suited to their needs. The advancement of these new technologies must also help these developing littoral states fight the illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing rather than contribute to their acceleration. Furthermore, the International Maritime Organization has a central role in developing global shipping standards, including through its work on maritime autonomous surface ships. The Security Council should complement rather than duplicate this specialized work by focusing on threats with clear implication for international peace and security. Mr. President, to conclude, technology alone will not determine the future of maritime security. That will depend on choices we make, whether we cooperate or act alone, whether we uphold international law or allow accountability gaps to grow. and whether we use these tools to protect people or place them at a greater risk. This Council must help turn technological progress into greater security, resilience, and trust. Mr. President, our delegation remains committed to working together to protect international shipping while preserving the oceans as shared space for peaceful cooperation and sustainable development. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [2:13:04]:

Thank you for your intervention. Let me give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation.


Russian Federation [2:13:12]:

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, we welcome your personal participation in today's open debate. We listened attentively to the statements delivered by the briefers. We view the topic proposed by the Greek Presidency as topical. Matters related to new technologies, specifically in the context of maritime safety and security, are front and center within the global stability architecture, and naturally, they warrant attention on the part of conscientious members of the international community. At the same time, we continue to believe that the issue of international information security, AI, including aspects of military application thereof and maritime security do not fall within the purview of the Security Council. They fall within the mandate of other UN bodies. For their substantive consideration, there are other specialized platforms. They precisely have the necessary expertise. to that end, the Russian Federation continues to be guided by the principle that achievements in technological progress, advanced scientific progress in and of themselves cannot be deemed to be bad or good. They are not sources of risk or threat to international peace and security. They only become that when they fall into the wrong hands, and we concur with the representative of Colombia on that point. We cannot allow for a scenario – preventing such a scenario is among the aims of governmental regulation tools for export control, which are designed to strike a balance between security interests and nonproliferation cooperation in the use of technology for peaceful purposes, and such measures at the same time should not transform into tools for political blackmail or bad faith economic competition. We support negotiations on the use of novel information communications technologies, including AI. We support the coordinating role of the UN. Matters of upholding international information security have been discussed at the United Nations with participation of all member states for more than a quarter century. And at this juncture, to the global mechanism on international information security, which has been launched this year, the issue of secure, and trustworthy AI is on the agenda of the global dialogue on AI governance. In this context, attention should be given to research which is being conducted by the scientific panel on AI, an effective and inclusive platform possessing a certain amount of groundwork on AI in the military domain, where relevant dialogue is possible, in our view, is represented by the UN Committee on Disarmament, as well as the Group of Governmental Experts and the Convention on Inhumane Weapons on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Turning to possible governance of military AI, our position remains unchanged. We proceed from the premise of the full applicability of international law, including international humanitarian law, vis-à-vis military capabilities and the use of AI. We see no persuasive justification for the conduct of preventive additional limitations and prohibitions vis-à-vis the above-mentioned capabilities. In the context of the proposed premise about the impact of new technologies, including on maritime safety, security, navigation, protection of port infrastructure, providing for safety of seafarers, as well as rapid growth in the use of uncrewed vessels. We wish to draw attention to the fact that even the concept note itself for today's debate notes that leadership here lies with the International Maritime Organization. Furthermore, we are surprised at the fact that the focus proposed by the organizer for the discussion in the context of maritime security and safety, for some reason, once again, in this, matters have vanished, matters pertaining to real and serious threats to stability of maritime navigation, which pose a genuine direct threat to international safety and security. These are precisely the issues that can be discussed at the Security Council. We are talking about the operations of European 21st century pirates who are openly intercepting and seizing vessels in the world's oceans, thereby egregiously violating the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea, which guarantees freedom of navigation and the right to peaceful and transit passage. Such utterly reckless actions undermine stability and predictability in supply chains, posing grave threats to global trade. the lion's share of which is done through using the seas and disproportionately affects the interests of the most vulnerable states. At the same time, they are cloaking their lawless acts with references to certain international sanctions. Effectively, these are unilateral coercive measures. These are unlawful a priori, and the imposition runs counter to international law. Nevertheless, this fact is not preventing from EU countries who are imposing them from referring to attempts to circumvent such utterly illegal measures to pin labels on vessels relating to affiliation with such a so-called shadow fleet. This term has no legal status. Under international law, in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, there is no notion of shadow fleet. Neither mention thereof nor references to UCMs are to be found in the strictly limited list of justifications for intercepting, disrupting, and inspecting vessels at sea. thereby, such actions have no legal justifications whatsoever. On the contrary, EU countries are trampling upon the fundamental norms of maritime law. They may generate a domino effect which may result in the halt to the global maritime trade system. I now turn, Mr. President, to something that was mentioned by a number of delegations, the situation in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, as well as the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea. We view as unacceptable their discussion in a separate setting from the root causes being addressed, that root cause being the U.S. and Israeli aggression against Iran. These actions resulted in assaults against a host of states in the region generating direct threats to safety and stability of maritime navigation. Let's recall that prior to 28 February 2026, there were no problems related to navigation in the above-mentioned arteries. The situation in the Black Sea is something which we discussed at length repeatedly, including in this chamber. Those who raise this issue either have gaps in their memory or they have selective blindness. Ukraine began this escalation, having stated this publicly. They have been using these vessels for transit of military cargo and now is reaping the fruits of this escalation. the Russian Federation repeatedly emphasized that we stand willing to engage in a constructive discussion of the matters. But I stress, under specialized structures, attempts to have these issues be discussed outside are counterproductive and they’re fraught with undermining decades of progress made in negotiations, the results achieved with the participation of a broad range of states. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [2:20:57]:

Let me give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.


Pakistan [2:21:00]:

Thank you very much, Mr. President. We thank Greece for organizing today's high-level open debate on a topic which has gained increasing relevance and significance for international peace and security. And we welcome your presence, Honorable Prime Minister, in the meeting today. We also thank the briefers, Chef de Cabinet Courtney Rattray, Mr. Zakaria, and Mr. Bletsas, for their valuable insights and analysis. President, Global maritime domain has morphed into a locus of intensifying geopolitical competition and intersecting challenges of the 21st century. The evolving maritime landscape, technological breakthroughs, and changing contours of armed conflict at sea have transformed it, more than ever before, into a determinant of international peace and security, and a driver of global trade and economic development. In the digital age, shaped by emerging technologies and AI, maritime security extends well beyond managing traditional threats. Maritime security now needs to factor in the transformative impacts of technological developments, including AI and machine learning, blockchain, and unmanned and autonomous vehicles. This technological marvel has revolutionized the maritime industry, but has also heightened risks and threats of miscalculation. The ease and affordability with which the new technology, particularly loitering munitions and drone swarms, can be acquired has accentuated sea denial capabilities to sabotage merchant vessels, maritime traffic, and critical maritime infrastructure. Furthermore, digitalization of navigation technology, port operations, and remote offshore installations have made these platforms increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. The challenge before us, therefore, is to seek ways to harness emerging technologies and AI for reinforcing maritime security and to plug loopholes for its misuse. An affordable and responsible use of emerging technologies and AI merits evolving an inclusive regulatory framework in a universal setting, anchored under the UN auspices, coupled with capacity building programs for the global south. Mr. President, Since its adoption, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has served as a cornerstone of international maritime order. The legal order established by UNCLOS and the larger body of the law of the sea must be protected and promoted universally. As we discuss the use and regulation of emerging technologies, we emphasize that it must be readily made available for providing humanitarian relief to seafarers, including those menaced by piracy. President, disruptions of maritime traffic and attacks on merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab have revealed how quickly such developments can imperil energy, food, and economic security. We reiterate our strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our brotherly countries in the region, which are impacted by the volatility in these vital waterways and maritime chokepoints. Pakistan strongly condemns the nefarious designs by Houthi militia to weaponize Bab al-Mandab, attacking merchant shipping and seafarers navigating the strait. These attacks undermine maritime security and threaten peace and development of regional countries, especially that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has faced blatant aggression by the Houthis. Pakistan reaffirms its unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom and stands in complete solidarity with its leadership and people. As one of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, with overwhelming reliance on seaborne trade, Pakistan attaches paramount importance to maritime safety and security. Global shipping should not become a casualty of conflict and strife; instead, it should remain a driver of global trade and economy. As a maritime state with unfailing faith in international law and a strong commitment to multilateralism, Pakistan would continue to engage with the United Nations and with all like-minded countries for turning our oceans into a zone of peace and cooperation, not a theatre of conflict and confrontation or military competition, free from traditional threats and risks posed by emerging technologies. This is our solemn, collective responsibility, and we cannot afford to fail. I thank you very much.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [2:25:46]:

Thank you. Let me give the floor to the representative of China.


China [2:25:51]:

Thank you, Mr. President. I welcome Your Excellency, Prime Minister, presiding over this meeting. I thank Mr. Ratrei, Mr. Zakaria, and Mr. Bletsas for their briefings. Currently, emerging technologies such as AI, low Earth orbit constellations, and unmanned systems are developing rapidly, showing broad application prospects in empowering maritime activities, developing blue economy, and maintaining maritime security. At the same time, its misuse and abuse, together with its growing governance deficit, pose new risks and challenges to maritime security. The international community should strengthen solidarity and cooperation, give equal emphasis on development and security, and push emerging technologies to better serve maritime security and people's well-being. I would like to emphasize four points. First, insisting on technology for good to promote its peaceful use. All countries should uphold a people-centered concept and guide emerging technologies to develop for good and to benefit humanity. We must comprehensively use technology tools to enhance maritime situational awareness, early warning, and emergency response capabilities, thereby supporting maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, and more effectively combating maritime crimes such as piracy, terrorism, arms and drug smuggling, and human trafficking. We must strengthen technical risk assessment and regulatory frameworks to prevent terrorist forces and criminal groups from abusing emerging technologies, guard against cyberattacks, data breaches, and loss of control over autonomous systems, and ensure that emerging technologies remain safe, reliable, and within control at all times. Second, strengthening dialogue and consultation to resolve hotspot issues. In recent years, some regional conflicts have dragged on and escalated, triggering tensions in surrounding waters and international waterways, and undermining global shipping security and supply chain stability. The parties concerned should uphold a common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security concept. Actively engage in dialogue and consultation, resolve disputes through diplomatic channels, and promote the early realization of lasting peace in the region. Regarding military application of emerging technologies, all parties must be highly vigilant, strictly abide by purposes and principles of the UN Charter and relevant international law, oppose any attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and avoid the abuse of technology that leads to humanitarian and escalation of conflicts. Third, advocating for openness and shared benefit to ensure fairness and inclusiveness. The development and progress of emerging technologies cannot be separated from international exchange and cooperation, and their security safeguards also need to be built by all countries together. We need to increase financial technical capacity building support for developing countries, promote equitable access to emerging technologies for people in all countries, and bridge the digital intelligence and development device. We must support multilateral institutions such as the IMO in playing its coordinating role, strengthen information sharing and standards alignment, and deepen global cooperation in maritime security. We must jointly foster an open, inclusive, beneficial, and non-discriminatory environment for technology development, avoid overstretching national security concept in the field of technology, and oppose efforts to incite bloc confrontation or force countries to take Fourth, upholding international rule of law to improve global governance. UNCLOS, alongside relevant international treaties and customary international law, collectively form the foundation of modern international maritime order. All countries must interpret and apply the Convention fully, accurately, and in good faith, and put an end to selective application and double standards. The important principles embodied in the Convention such as peaceful use, international cooperation, and inclusive development provide significant guidance for the application of emerging technologies at sea. China supports the UN in playing an active role to improve global governance in emerging technologies and oceans, while fully safeguarding the equal rights of developing countries to participate in the formulation of international rules. President, China is a major contributor to global technology progress and a staunch defender of international rule of law at sea. China is deeply engaged in UN Ocean Decade initiative and supports enhanced international cooperation in marine scientific research. To date, China has provided marine disaster prevention mitigation early warning services to over 130 countries, put to use the MaZu Smart Meteorology Early Warning System in 30 countries, and trained more than 100,000 marine professionals from over 50 developing countries. China has initiated the Global Framework for Sustainable Maritime Innovation and Cooperation at IMO to support capacity building of developing countries and enhance global innovation and collaboration. We're ready to work with the international community to harness emerging technologies for maritime security, empower and enhance global development, and jointly build a prosperous world with peaceful oceans and seas. I thank you, President.


Greece · President of the Security Council; Prime Minister [2:31:43]:

Thank you. Let me now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Oleksandr Karasevych, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.


Ukraine · State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2:31:53]:

Thank you, Mr. President, Your Excellency Prime Minister Mitsotakis. Before starting my statement, I would like to react briefly on the statement of the Russian delegation on the so-called escalation by Ukraine. of the maritime security situation in Black Sea. It's another piece of disinformation, unfortunately. What we see on the ground are the facts. The fact that since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, over 1,600 Ukrainian port infrastructure facilities has been damaged or partially destroyed. More than 260 civilian vessels damaged, and over 330 civilians affected. And recently, attacks on vessels have intensified dramatically. 25 attacks were recorded through 2025, compared with all the 95 attacks in June-September 2026 alone. Returning to my statement, let me first of all thank you, Mr. President, and the Greek Presidency for organizing today's important debate. We are also grateful to the briefers for their valuable insight. Emerging technologies are rapidly transforming the maritime domain. They offer new opportunities to strengthen maritime security, but they can also create new threats when used irresponsibly or as instruments of aggression. These challenges are particularly evident in the Black Sea. Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated how modern weapons and unmanned systems can undermine maritime security. Russia continues to deliberately attack Ukraine's port infrastructure and commercial shipping in the Black Sea with missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and uncrewed maritime systems, threatening civilian crews and port workers, and disrupting the movement of goods. Ukraine's maritime exports are essential to global food security. Disruptions to these exports threaten food supplies for up to 400 million people worldwide and risk driving up food prices, with particularly severe consequences for the most vulnerable populations. Protecting Ukraine’s maritime export routes is therefore not only a matter of regional security, but also a matter of global food security and economic stability. Mr. President, emerging technologies are also exploited to conceal illicit maritime activities. Russia's so-called shadow fleet uses deceptive shipping practices, including the manipulation or disabling of automatic identification systems and the transmission of false vessel position data to conceal vessel movements and obscure the origin and destination of shipments. These vessels are used for the illegal transport of Russian oil and petroleum products. while other vessels facilitate the illegal export of stolen Ukrainian grain from the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, allowing Russia to profit from its aggression. Such activities undermine sanction enforcement, compromise maritime transparency, and pose additional risk to maritime safety and the marine environment. The international community should take concrete and coordinated steps to address these threats. First, The call for the imposition, maintenance, and strengthening of targeted sanctions against individuals, entities, and vessels engaged in illegal maritime activities, including the circumvention of sanctions relating to Russian oil and petroleum products, and the illegal exports of stolen Ukrainian grain from the territory of Ukraine temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation. Second, we urge coordinated international monitoring, information sharing, and enforcement efforts to protect freedom and safety of navigation and prevent the concealment of illicit shipping activities. Third, the Russian Federation must be held accountable for its attacks against civilian vessels, including search and rescue vessels, and port infrastructure, as well as for the environmental damage caused by its war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, artificial intelligence, satellite imagery, And advanced surveillance technologies can improve maritime domain awareness, facilitate early warning, and strengthen the protection of vessels, port, and CFRs. Their use must be accompanied by appropriate safeguards and effective human oversight. The development and use of emerging technologies at sea must also comply with international law, including the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas. In situations of armed conflict, applicable international humanitarian law must also be fully respected. Technological advances do not diminish the responsibility of states for their conduct. Ukraine remains committed to upholding international law, strengthening maritime security, and promoting the responsible development and use of emerging technologies at sea. We call for stronger international cooperation to protect maritime infrastructure, safeguard CFRs, and ensure that technological progress strengthens international peace and security. Thank you, Mr. President.


Greece · President of the Security Council [2:37:04]:

I thank His Excellency Mr. Karasevich for the statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Edwin Tong, Minister for Law and Second Minister for Home Affairs of Singapore.


Singapore · Fiji, Jamaica, Malta and Singapore · Minister for Law; Second Minister for Home Affairs [2:37:20]:

I thank the Greek Presidency for convening this very timely briefing and the briefers for their invaluable insights. We thank the Prime Minister of Greece for his leadership on this very important issue. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of Fiji, Jamaica, Malta and my country, Singapore. Mr. President, the oceans connect people and cultures, and vital maritime arteries facilitate trade and prosperity around the world. For small maritime nations, safety and security in the oceans and seas is critical. Our countries actively contributed to the negotiations and conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, or UNCLOS. We remain committed to upholding it as the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out. Today, emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and autonomous ships carry both great promise and challenges for maritime security. Allow me to make three points. First, innovation, safety, and security should advance hand in hand. The international community must work together to harness new technologies to strengthen maritime safety and security, whilst at the same time upholding and respecting navigational rights and freedoms in accordance with UNCLOS. For example, AI can enhance maritime domain awareness by improving navigational, communications, and early warning systems for all States. These benefits must, however, be underpinned by robust safeguards that promote accountability, transparency and human oversight. Such safeguards will help to ensure that AI does not undermine maritime safety and security or international law, including UNCLOS. We therefore welcome the adoption of the IMO’s non-mandatory Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Code. and support continued efforts towards the development of a mandatory framework, ensuring the safe integration of autonomous and remotely operated commercial ships into global shipping. We also support broader international efforts to advance responsible AI governance, including through the Global Dialogue on AI Governance and Global Digital Impact Compact. Second, we must collectively guard against the weaponisation of new technologies. They can be deployed to disrupt or damage critical underwater infrastructure, including subsea cable networks. Drones or autonomous vessels can be used to interfere with the safe passage of ships. Recent attacks against civilian vessels have further highlighted the risks to maritime safety and the protection of seafarers. Cyberattacks pose real-world consequences for maritime security. including the disabling of critical board systems, compromising navigational safety, and disrupting port operations. Such technologies could also be exploited to take control of vessels for unlawful purposes. Third, the international community must guard against all actions that threaten international peace and security. We must reject unlawful restrictions on transit passage through straits, used for international navigation. These include actions that deny, hamper, impede, impair, or suspend the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation. Such actions would constitute violations of UNCLOS. The right of transit passage is also firmly entrenched in customary international law. It is therefore binding on all States, regardless of whether they are parties to UNCLOS, in times of peace and war. Therefore, developments in the Straits of Hormuz have wider implications for navigational rights and freedoms across the globe. When transit passage is disrupted, consequences reverberate across the global economy. Mr. President, this is why shared rules like UNCLOS matter. In defending them, we defend our collective interest. We stand ready to work with the international community to uphold the safety and security of our oceans today and for future generations. Thank you very much.


Greece · President of the Security Council [2:41:50]:

I thank His Excellency Mr. Tong for the statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Andreas Mofeld Kravik, State Secretary for the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway.


Norway · Nordic Group · State Secretary for the Minister for Foreign Affairs [2:42:05]:

Madam President, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. As coastal states with open, globally connected economies, the Nordic countries depend on safe shipping, resilient maritime infrastructure, and the uninterrupted flow of trade, information, and energy. For us, maritime security is fundamentally about the freedom to use the seas and oceans peacefully and sustainably in accordance with international law. The foundation for this is clear. The United Nations Charter and the Law of the Sea, as reflected in UNCLOS, remain our legal compass. Threats to maritime security remain a serious global concern. It is imperative to continue efforts to prevent and suppress these threats in line with international law, while maintaining effective, protective, and deterrent measures. All States have important responsibilities for safety and security at sea in accordance with their respective obligations under international law. Mr. President, emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, are transforming the maritime domain. New technologies can increase the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyberattacks, interference with satellite navigation systems, and the malicious use of autonomous systems. At the same time, they offer unprecedented opportunities to strengthen maritime security and resilience. Used responsibly, AI and other new technologies can improve maritime situational awareness, enhance the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, strengthen monitoring and early threat detection, and support safer and more secure global supply chains. The Nordic countries see particular potential in using new technologies to safeguard submarine cables and other critical undersea infrastructure. This requires innovation and close cooperation amongst governments, industry, and international organizations. International cooperation is indispensable. All states should be able to benefit from the peaceful use of emerging technologies. We therefore support common standards, capacity building, and inclusive governance. We welcome the International Maritime Organization's work in this field. including the new MAS Code, which helps ensure that innovation proceeds safely and responsibly. We also welcome the IAEA’s ATLAS initiative on safe, secure, and safeguarded maritime small modular reactors. Before concluding, President, I wish to underscore one key concern. As frontier AI models advance at unexpected speed, It is paramount to ensure that humans remain at the driver's seat. The Call for Control initiative, launched in September, has gathered more than 30 world leaders to call for enhanced international cooperation in ensuring that technology remains at the service of humanity and not the other way around. The call remains open for all UN Member States to join, and I know that many of the countries represented around this table have already joined, and again, we welcome all countries to be part of this important initiative. Technology changes, our commitment to international law and cooperation must not. Maritime security can benefit greatly from the application of AI and other emerging technologies. Let's make sure together that this occurs, and I thank you for your attention.


Greece · President of the Security Council [2:45:58]:

I thank His Excellency Mr. Kravik for the statement on behalf of the Nordic States, and I now give the floor to Her Excellency Ms. Katuna Tuktadze, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.


Georgia · Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs [2:46:11]:

Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished colleagues, let me begin by thanking Greece for convening this timely debate. Georgia allies itself with the statement to be delivered by the European Union, and I would like to add the following on my national capacity. For Georgia, a Black Sea coastal state connecting Europe and Asia, maritime security is essential to regional stability, international trade, energy security, and economic development. Russia's continued occupation of Georgia's Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, alongside its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, underscores the serious security challenges facing the Black Sea region. Threats to commercial shipping, ports, and critical maritime infrastructure affects not only regional, but also global supply chains and the safety of seafarers. At the same time, emerging technologies are fundamentally transforming the maritime security environment. Artificial intelligence, advanced surveillance systems, and unmanned technologies offer significant opportunities. However, these same technologies also introduce new vulnerabilities. Cyber attacks, interference with navigation systems, and the misuse of autonomous technologies can threaten maritime operations and international peace and security. Georgia recognizes both the opportunities and the risks associated with these developments, and is taking practical steps to strengthen its maritime security capabilities. With the support of international partners, Georgia continues to enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities through advanced radar systems, vessel identification technologies, and digital maritime monitoring platforms. Therefore, Georgia continues to deepen cooperation with NATO partners in maritime security, including through the Maritime Security Initiative of the substantial NATO-Georgia package. We are particularly grateful to them for strengthening the interoperability of Georgia's coastal guard. Greece was the first NATO ally to host Georgian Coast Guard boarding team aboard its naval vessels as part of NATO's Operation Sea Gorgon. Georgia's continued participation in this operation demonstrates our practical contribution to international maritime security and freedom of navigation. Mr. President, as emerging technologies become increasingly integrated into maritime operations, we must ensure that innovation is accompanied by appropriate safeguards, effective human oversight, and clear accountability. They must remain consistent with international law, particularly the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The UN can promote international dialogue and facilitate the development of common approaches to emerging maritime security challenges, while the International Maritime Organization can advance the appropriate regulatory frameworks to emerging maritime technologies, including autonomous shipping. Georgia remains committed to contributing to a secure, resilient, and rules-based maritime environment where technological innovation serves the interests of international peace, security, and sustainable development. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council [2:49:29]:

I thank Her Excellency Ms. Tladze for the statement, and I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Dunoma Umar Ahmed, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria.


Nigeria · Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [2:49:40]:

Mr. President, Nigeria thanks Greece for convening this debate and expresses appreciation to the briefers for their insightful presentations. In the Gulf of Guinea, emerging technologies are increasingly shaping the maritime security landscape. Organized criminal networks engage in piracy, kidnapping for ransom, crude oil theft, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, exploit satellite communications and falsified vessel identification signals to evade detection. At the same time, the effective deployment of technologies by states has contributed to reducing these threats. Nigeria’s Deep Blue project integrates unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime domain awareness systems, and advanced central command center to strengthen surveillance and combat maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea. Complementing these capabilities, Nigeria’s Separation of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences Act 2019 has strengthened legal frameworks for prosecuting offenders. Nigeria’s experience demonstrates that technology can deliver lasting maritime security benefits only when supported by timely information sharing and effective regional cooperation. However, many coastal states in our region lack the technological infrastructure, reliable data, and trained personnel required to maximize the benefits of innovation. Against this backdrop, Nigeria offers two recommendations: First, Promote a shared regional maritime picture. Building on resolution 2634 of 2022, the Council should encourage international partners, the International Maritime Organization, and UNODC to support the deployment of appropriate technologies and capacity building through the Yaoundé architecture. This would enable national surveillance systems to contribute to an interoperable regional maritime picture, guided by regional ownership and appropriate human oversight. Developing coastal states must also have equitable access to these technologies on fair terms, ensuring that innovation narrows rather than widens existing gaps. Second, ensure predictable financing for regional maritime operations. In April 2025, the African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the operationalization of the Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea, whose headquarters Nigeria is recommended to host. Sustaining effective maritime surveillance and joint operations requires sustainable and dependable resources. Resolution 2719 of 2023 provides the framework for adequate, sustainable, and predictable financing of African Union-led peace support operations authorized by this Council. Nigeria urges the Council to remain prepared to apply this framework as appropriate to support regional maritime security operations. Mr. President, Nigeria remains committed to working with the states of the Gulf of Guinea, ECOWAS, ECAS, the African Union, and this Council to ensure that emerging technologies serve as instruments of collective security, making our waters safer for seafarers, coastal communities, and international shipping. I thank you, Mr. President.


Greece · President of the Security Council [2:53:04]:

I thank His Excellency Mr. Ahmed for the statement, and I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Mohamed Nasir, Principal Secretary to the President on Foreign Relations of the Maldives.


Maldives · Principal Secretary to the President on Foreign Relations [2:53:15]:

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, for the Maldives, the ocean connects our islands to each other and our country to the world. For small archipelagic states, emerging technologies can help overcome the limits of distance and scale, strengthen national capacity, and give states greater ability to protect their maritime domain and make decisions for themselves. I would therefore like to make three points on how these technologies can strengthen the sovereign choices of small archipelagic states like the Maldives. First, emerging technologies can strengthen maritime domain awareness. vast maritime areas cannot be monitored by ships and aircraft alone. Satellite imagery, radar, vessel tracking systems, unmanned platforms, and artificial intelligence can be combined to provide a clearer picture of activity at sea. The Maldives has already begun putting some of this technology into practice. In 2020, 24, the Maldives introduced UAV surveillance of its maritime domain. That capability has since been used to detect vessels operating illegally in Maldivian waters. The Maldives has also introduced mandatory vessel tracking devices and a system of joint monitoring by relevant national authorities. International and regional cooperation can indeed help SIDS take this further. Shared satellite and ocean data platforms can allow states to detect IUU fishing, trafficking, vessels operating without reliable tracking signals, and other maritime threats. But access to data alone is not enough. SIDS need analytical tools and trained personnel to combine information for satellites, radar vessels, and other sources to turn into decisions they can act upon. Second, resilience must be built into these systems from the start. Emerging technologies can themselves create vulnerabilities. Navigation and vessel tracking signals can be jammed or spoofed. Ports and vessels can be targeted through cyber attacks. We know that AI systems themselves can be misled by manipulated data. and disruption into a submarine cable can affect communications and essential services across the archipelagic state. The response is not less technology, but more resilient technology. Maritime systems need verification across different data sources. stronger cyber protection, backup navigation and communications, and greater redundancy in critical infrastructure. Cooperation should also improve protection and mapping of submarine cables, information sharing on incidents, and arrangements for rapid repair. Third, access to technology must build national capability not technological independence. Capacity gaps in SIDS should not be viewed merely as a local challenge, but as a potential weak link in international security that can imperil vital sea lines of communication. The Maldives call for sustained technological support for SIDS, training, capacity building, SIDS need training, specialists, secure data systems, regulatory frameworks, and institutions capable of operating and maintaining these technologies over time. Investing in technology to SIDS will introduce to a broader maritime security domain awareness network. Is AI and autonomous system take on greater role at sea, human responsibility, oversight, and accountability must remain clear. And the development and use of emerging technologies at sea must remain consistent with the UN Charter and the UNCLOS. Freedom of navigation, protection of seafarers, and security of commercial shipping must remain paramount. For SIDS, the measure of technological cooperation should be simple. Does it leave states better able to see what is happening in their maritime domain, protect the systems on which they depend, and make decisions for themselves? Emerging technologies should expand sovereign choice, not create new forms of dependence. Thank you very much.


Greece · President of the Security Council [2:59:03]:

I thank His Excellency Mr. Nasir for the statement. I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than three minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. The flashing light on the microphone will prompt speakers to bring their remarks to a close after three minutes. I now give the floor to the representative of Kazakhstan.


Kazakhstan [2:59:32]:

Madam President, At the outset, allow me to congratulate Greece on its successful presidency of the Security Council this month and commend you and your delegation for its effective leadership. I also thank Prime Minister Mitsotakis for convening and chairing this timely and important debate. We are grateful to the briefers for their insights. Rapid advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and digital technologies are transforming maritime security, creating new opportunities while introducing serious risks to international peace and stability. Kazakhstan is particularly concerned about the misuse of unmanned systems against civilian vessels, commercial shipping, and critical energy infrastructure. Such attacks are unacceptable, especially when they affect states that are not parties to the conflicts concerned. The dangerous sea ferries disrupt international trade and threaten global energy supplies. We call for ensuring the international security of critical infrastructure, including civilian energy, transport, digital, and logistics systems, through a comprehensive approach to international infrastructure resilience. Maritime security is an integral part of the international legal order. The UN Charter and international law, including the Law of the Sea as reflected in UNCLOS, must guide the responsible use of emerging technologies with full respect for sovereignty and freedom of navigation. As the world's largest landlocked country, strategically located at the crossroads of Eurasia and bordering the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan attaches particular importance to secure transport and energy corridors. Our efforts aim to strengthen connectivity between Europe and Asia, the global North and South, and East and West. We continue developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and welcome the advancement of the TRAMP route for international peace and prosperity as a complementary initiative promoting regional connectivity and cooperation. On 15th of October, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan launched a 380-kilometer submarine fiber-optic cable across the Caspian Sea, strengthening regional digital connectivity. Through this digital trade corridor platform, digitalization of transit customs procedures has reduced processing times from eight hours to just 30 minutes. This initiative demonstrates how technological innovation can strengthen economic cooperation and transport resilience. At the same time, critical maritime infrastructure requires effective protection against physical threats, cyber attacks, and technological interference. Satellite monitoring, secure information sharing, and safeguards against navigation signal interference can improve maritime safety and threat prevention. My President recently proposed exploring a shared digital platform to monitor the Caspian ecosystem, supporting environmental resilience and safer navigation. Madam President, Kazakhstan has designated 2026 as the year of digitalization and artificial intelligence, and use large-scale digitalization, safe and responsible development, and use of AI as a national priority. At the same time, we should not let ethical norms fall behind this rapid progress. Emerging AI technologies in military domain must remain subject to meaningful human control and strict international regulation. We remain committed to responsible technological innovation and international cooperation that protects civilian shipping, strengthens critical infrastructure, and ensures that emerging technologies serve peace, sustainable development, and global connectivity. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council [3:03:24]:

I thank the representative of Kazakhstan for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.


Republic of Korea [3:03:36]:

Thank you, Madam President. I would like to thank Greece for convening this timely open debate. I also thank the briefers for their insightful briefings. Today, the rapid advancement of emerging technology is fundamentally reshaping the maritime security landscape. While these technologies offer immense opportunities to enhance safety of navigation, They also introduce new security challenges, including malicious misuse and cyber vulnerabilities. Against this backdrop, my delegation would like to highlight three key points. First, to address both traditional and non-traditional threats and safeguard critical sea lanes, it is necessary to ensure full compliance with all relevant obligations under international law, including those under UNCLOS. UNCLOS and Security Council resolutions. Regarding the persistent Houthi attacks and threats against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, the Security Council must ensure the full implementation of Resolution 2216 to prevent the Houthis from acquiring illicit weapons and funds. With proper operation of the UNVIM, All Member States must act in accordance with international law, in particular UNCLOS, to uphold freedom of navigation. We also support ongoing multilateral efforts to establish new frameworks for emerging technologies. In this regard, we welcome the IMO’s adoption of the non-mandatory MASS Code, along with related regulatory steps. regulatory steps. Second, we must enforce international cooperation and information sharing to address associated risks and transnational maritime crime. Enhanced information sharing based on satellite imagery, vessel trafficking data, and advanced surveillance assets.

Will allow us to identify disruptive activities at an early stage.

The Republic of Korea is developing a data-driven maritime domain awareness system supported by wide-area surveillance assets, including satellite technology.

We are willing to cooperate with partners in exchanging.

Assessments and strengthening early warning capabilities against any unlawful threat at sea. The Republic of Korea is contributing to enhancing capabilities to suppress illicit activities at sea, such as piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling. As part of these efforts, the very next year, we will launch our first ASEAN-Korean Coast Guard cooperation project, Korea-ASEAN Maritime Safety Academy, to provide practical and tailored support. It is significant in that the Republic of Korea is expanding its existing bilateral cooperation with individual Southeast Asia countries.

To the whole of ASEAN, and in that, this initiative will probably become the.

First cooperation project of the newly established ASEAN Coast Guard Forum. Our government is also strengthening capabilities for better detection and attribution to respond to illegal ship-to-ship transfers occurring near the Korean Peninsula. Such unlawful maritime activities in violation of Security Council resolutions must be rooted out without delay. Mr. President, Madam President, Maritime security is a shared responsibility critical to international security and sustainable development. As a peninsular nation depending on 99% of its trade through maritime transport, and a responsible member of this Council, the Republic of Korea stands ready to actively contribute to international efforts to ensure the safe, secure, and peaceful use of emerging technology at sea. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council [3:08:06]:

I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland.


Switzerland [3:08:16]:

Madam President, Switzerland thanks Greece for organising this debate on emerging technologies and maritime security. In October 2024, under the Swiss presidency, the Council adopted Presidential Statement PRST/2024/6. In it, the Council committed to more systematically considering scientific advances that could affect international peace and security where relevant to the exercise of its mandate. Today's debate gives concrete effect to this commitment. Switzerland wishes to emphasize three points. First, the security of maritime routes is in our common interest. Although Switzerland is a landlocked state, we also have a major interest in the safety of maritime trade. The resilience of supply chains, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the security of strategic routes are economic concerns as much as they are matters of peace and security. freedom of navigation and the rights of passage provided for under international law must be respected. Artificial intelligence can enhance the safety of navigation, for example, by improving the analysis of positioning data and the detection of obstacles. It can also assist maritime authorities in processing surveillance data and detecting suspicious activities. However, The increasing use of digital, autonomous, or remotely operated systems creates new vulnerabilities. Cyberattacks or the manipulation of navigation systems can disrupt ports and maritime traffic, damage vessels, and endanger seafarers. Second, the development and use of emerging technologies must comply with international law and with applicable rules and standards. When it comes to artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, transparency, appropriate human oversight, and clearly established responsibilities are particularly important to prevent risks, ensure safe use, and enable innovation that serves humanity. We must anticipate these developments rather than react to them. This is why, third, the Council must have access to the necessary expertise to anticipate the consequences of scientific and technological developments for its work. The speed of these developments and the complexity of their effects require regular attention. The Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator contributes to such foresight by identifying scientific advances and their possible implications. The Secretary-General's Scientific Advisory Board provides independent scientific advice to the leadership of the United Nations. Switzerland also welcomes the launch of the Informal Expert Group on Technology, Peace and Security. This new framework can help members of the Council assess the risks associated with situations on its agenda. Finally, the Geneva AI Summit 2027 will provide a platform for collectively advancing efforts in this regard. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council [3:11:39]:

The representative of Switzerland for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile.


Chile [3:11:48]:

Madam President, Chile thanks Greece for convening this open debate and would like to thank Mr. Michal Bletsas for his contributions. For Chile, a country with an extensive coastline on the Pacific, strategic projection towards the Antarctic, and an economy that is closely linked to international trade, maritime security is a strategic national interest. Freedom of navigation, the protection of trade routes, and the security of port infrastructure are essential for our economic stability and development. Threats to international navigation have direct consequences on supply chains, our exports, and the well-being of our population. Madam President, the accelerated technological development is transforming the maritime environment. Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and satellite technologies offer opportunities to improve the security of navigation, detect illicit activities, strengthen search operations, and increase port efficiency. However, these technologies also generate new vulnerabilities and challenges. Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, interference with navigation systems, and the use of uncrewed vehicles for hostile purposes all represent growing threats to maritime security. Attacks on commercial shipping demonstrate that these threats go beyond national borders. undermining the security and safety of crews and disrupting international trade. Chile condemns attacks on commercial ships and strategic maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. We reaffirm the importance of guaranteeing the security of navigation and the protection of seafarers in accordance with international law. I would like to highlight three priorities in this regard. First, strengthen international and regional cooperation, as well as technical assistance and capacity building, particularly in developing countries. That requires the improvement of information exchange, coordination between maritime authorities, and the use of new technologies to combat drug trafficking, illicit trafficking, and other manifestations of transnational organized crime. Second, strengthening the security and resilience of critical maritime infrastructure. The digitalisation of ports and logistics systems requires a strengthening of cyber-attack threat prevention and response capacities. Cooperation with the maritime industry, port operators, and the tech sector is essential in order to identify vulnerabilities and develop innovative solutions. And third, make sure that the development and use of emerging technologies is in line with international law, particularly the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Autonomous systems must have adequate human oversight and accountability mechanisms that allow for the prevention of incidents and reduce the risk of escalation. We also firmly believe that the Security Council should continue to consider threats to international navigation which would compromise peace and security, thus complementing the work of specialized international bodies. Finally, Madam President, Chile believes that maritime security and technological innovation should contribute to international security, economic growth, and sustainable development. Chile will continue to promote effective international cooperation that is rooted in respect for international law, the defense of its national interests, and commitment to an international order based on rules. Thank you very much, Madam President.


Greece · President of the Security Council [3:15:49]:

Representative of Chile for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Portugal.


Portugal [3:15:55]:

Thank you, Madam President. I would like to start to commend the Greek Presidency for convening this timely debate. As Greece, Madam President, we are also a maritime nation. with a particular interest in maritime security. But security at sea concerns all nations, including landlocked countries, all served by lifelines of economic chains. This is reflected by data flowing by submarine cables or supplies transported by sea, notably food and energy products. Preserving these trade networks must be a priority for all countries. Portugal would like to highlight three priorities. First, uphold international law. The UN Charter and UNCLOS remain our compass. Technological innovation cannot dilute obligations concerning freedom of navigation and protection of commercial shipping. Seafarers must be protected from attacks and coercion. Second. Turn innovation into prevention through human responsibility. Artificial intelligence, satellite observation, and unmanned systems improve maritime awareness and protect shipping lanes and submarine infrastructure. But autonomous systems require effective human oversight, clear accountability, and safeguards against miscalculation. We must strengthen information sharing and cybersecurity preparedness. Maritime and technology industries should embed security into design, report vulnerabilities, and cooperate with public authorities through joint risk assessment. Third, ensure that security is shared. Portugal supports deeper cooperation between states, regional organizations, and the private sector to enhance operational preparedness. The Atlantic Center is a good example of how to build capacity in maritime security. and exchange knowledge in maritime governance. Our approach combines commitment to international law with practical cooperation at sea. This is translated through the participation in the European Union naval operation Atalanta as command of the force, Irini and Aspids. I also highlight the capacity building program SWIMS implemented by Portugal in West Africa. Developing countries must have access to expertise that's strengthening their own maritime capabilities. Madam President, we cannot afford to address maritime security only when threats have already turned into crisis. As emerging technologies reshape security landscape at sea, our collective response must become more coordinated and firmly anchored in international law. Portugal advocates for strongly stronger early warning, closer cooperation with regional organizations and specialized bodies, including IMO, and more effective prevention action to safeguard freedom of navigation and critical maritime infrastructure. Our ambition is clear: to ensure that technological innovation becomes an instrument of peace rather than another source of instability, and that the Council acts not only to respond to the next crisis at sea, but to help prevent it. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council [3:19:24]:

I thank the representative of Portugal for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.


Egypt [3:19:33]:

Madam President, maritime security is a vital lifeline for international economy. Therefore, any damage to this lifeline would impact stability of countries and the livelihoods of their peoples by impacting the flow of energy and food supply chains, and this will eventually adversely affect security and stability of the international order. Current developments have reaffirmed that the security and freedom of navigation go hand in hand with geopolitical crises, therefore addressing them would require a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of tensions that respect the purposes of the UN Charter and the rules of international law, notably UNCLOS. Egypt was one of the first countries that ratified the UNCLOS in 1983. Given that we have the responsibility to manage the Suez Canal, one of the most important strategic pathways in the world. Furthermore, emerging technology applications impose challenges and concerns linked to increasing threats to the security of navigation at the qualitative and quantitative levels, in addition to the fact that non-state parties are taking advantage of these applications to target the sovereignty of countries and the security of their peoples. This dangerous development should be dealt with decisively. In this regard, Egypt expresses its full solidarity and support to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We condemn the attacks that targeted the strategic infrastructure, energy, and food supplies. and damage the security of maritime navigation in the waterways in the region. Madam President, Egypt believes in the following themes as principles that govern maritime security: First, the sanctity of the security and freedom of navigation in the international waterways, and we reject any measures or threats to navigation or those that jeopardize the safety of civilian vessels. Second, the main responsibility for arrangements of waterways falls on the shoulder of littoral countries. Pursuant to international law, we reject any arrangements that run counter to their sovereignty or the participation of non-state parties in their management. Third, The peaceful nature of these waterways must be protected. We must avoid any militarization or internationalization of these waterways. Non-state parties should not acquire any weapons or benefit from technological applications that could threaten the sovereignty of countries or the security of navigation. In conclusion, Egypt remains a reliable partner in strengthening the security of international navigation because we believe that addressing the root causes of tension tensions, strengthening the respect of international law, abiding by the UN Charter, including by preventing the access of non-state parties to weapons or AI applications in the military domain. These are all important determinants to create a stable environment to guarantee the freedom of navigation and the sustainability of the lifelines of global trade. I thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council [3:23:46]:

I thank the representative of Egypt for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.


Israel [3:23:56]:

Madam President, I'd like to thank GRIS for convening this debate and for its leadership in advancing maritime security. Secure sea lanes are essential to global stability. Threats to shipping jeopardize freedom of navigation, global supply chains, and energy and food security far beyond the water where attacks occur. The growing use of emerging technologies in maritime terrorism and their potential proliferation to criminal groups poses an acute threat to vessels and their crews and international security. Iran exemplifies this growing threat to maritime security, both through its own actions and its support for armed proxies. Iran's threats to navigation and the laying of mines in the Strait of Hormuz, alongside Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, endanger vital trade routes and undermine freedom of navigation. Iran's continued supply of advanced weapons to these groups violates UN Security Council arms embargoes, including those established under Resolution 2140 and 2216, as well as the prohibition of Iranian arms exports reinstated under Resolution 1747. Madam President, this nexus between rogue states and terrorist organizations is dangerous and systematic. Precision-guided missiles, armed drones, Unmanned surface vessels and cyber capabilities provided by Iran to its terror proxies enable the disruption of global commerce and threaten maritime security at critical choke points. Alongside piracy originating from the Horn of Africa, these threats undermine the route connecting Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, including the Mediterranean. They endanger seafarers, disrupt supply chains, and expose coastal communities and marine ecosystem to grave risks. The Security Council must address not only the perpetrators, but also the networks supplying the weapons, financing, and expertise. Coordinated enforcement and sanctions are essential to prevent advanced technologies from reaching terrorist groups and to hold accountable states, such as Iran, that enable their proliferation. The Council must also reaffirm its commitment under Resolution 1540 to preventing non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Madam President, emerging technologies can amplify these dangers. On the other hand, they can also strengthen our collective ability to prevent them. Israel bring the strong innovation ecosystem and proven experience in protecting critical infrastructures. Our expertise in cybersecurity, AI, autonomous system, and advanced surveillance can strengthen maritime domain awareness, enable early threat detection, and enhance the security and resilience of ports and shipping, while upholding international law and accountability. We call for stronger international maritime cooperation focused on three priorities: real-time intelligence sharing, protection of critical maritime infrastructure, and joint training among governments, maritime operators, and tech providers. Israel's close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus within the International Maritime Organization and other maritime bodies demonstrates how shared interest can translate in practical coordination and mutual support. The Mediterranean connects our peoples, economies, and shared future. Together, we must safeguard shipping and seafarers, strengthen research and rescue, and protect the marine environment. Israel stands ready to contribute its expertise and innovation to our shared goal: open and secure maritime routes and stronger regional stability. Thank you.


Greece · President of the Security Council [3:28:01]:

I thank the representative of Israel for the statement. There are still a number of speakers remaining on my list for this meeting. I intend, with the concurrence of members of the Council, to suspend the meeting until 3:00 PM. This meeting is suspended.