Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea - Security Council, 9912th meeting

The 9912th meeting of the Security Council is called to order. The provisional agenda for this meeting is: Non-proliferation, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The agenda is adopted. In accordance with Rule 37 of the Council Provisional Rules of Procedure, I invite the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. In accordance with Rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Khaled Khayari, Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific; and Mr. James Byrne, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of Open Source Center. It is so decided. The Security Council will now begin the consideration of item two of the agenda. I will now give the floor to Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Khaled Hiyari. Please.

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, members of the Security Council, I have been requested to brief the Security Council today on non-proliferation Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This year marks the final year of the DPRK's five-year military development plan, 2021-2025. Throughout 2024 and early 2025, the DPRK has continued to conduct launches of ballistic missiles, including what it characterized as the Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles in October last year and an intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile in January this year. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the DPRK has continued its open displays of undeclared uranium enrichment facilities located in Yongbyon and Kangsan. These events have been accompanied by statements reiterating DPRK's intention to further develop nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities including tactical nuclear warheads, military reconnaissance satellites, and the construction of a nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine. Mr. President, DPRK's persistent pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions continues to undermine the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that underpins it. At this critical juncture, it remains as important as ever to continue to highlight the urgent need to reduce nuclear risk, prevent any use of a nuclear weapon, and bring about their total elimination. We continue our strong calls on the DPRK to fully comply with its international obligations, including the NPT, and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The panel of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 supported efforts to monitor the implementation of the resolutions established in response to the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. From 12 June 2009 until 30 April 2024, the panel gathered and analyzed information from member states, relevant United Nations body, and other interested parties regarding the implementation and non-compliance of the relevant resolutions and made recommendations. The panel of experts issued two reports annually, and its last report was released on 20th of March, 2024, well over one year ago. While the Security Council did not renew the mandate of the panel of experts beyond 30 April, 2024, the Security Council committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 continues to oversee the sanctions regime. We recall the obligation of all member states to implement the relevant sanction measures. As the Secretary General has stated, any relationship that a country has with the DPRK must entirely abide by the relevant Security Council sanctions. Mr. President, the broader security landscape on the Korean Peninsula remains tense with heightened military activities. limited avenues for inter-Korean and regional dialogue, the presence of nuclear risks and growing concerns over the potential for miscalculation. The Secretary-General has consistently underscored that sustainable peace and the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula must be anchored in dialogue and diplomacy. We welcome any efforts in this respect. Mr. President, separately, the Council must also remain attentive to the humanitarian situation in the DPRK. We reiterate the call on the DPRK to facilitate the return of the UN country team, to strengthen support for its people and advance the 2030 Agenda. Thank you.

I thank Mr. Kyari for his briefing, and now I give the floor to Mr. James Byrne, please.

Mr. President, distinguished members of the Security Council, Your Excellencies, my name is James Byrne and I am the CEO of the London-based Open Source Center. I'm concurrently also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute on Whitehall in London. For several years, My team and I, both at RUSI and now at the Open Source Center, have tracked and investigated North Korean UN sanctions evasions and wider procurement and proliferation operations by the country's networks and by their vessels. A number of our recent reports have been published on our website. focusing both on the North Korean movement of munitions and in other cases the procurement of petroleum, refined petroleum, once again in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Today, however, I am here to talk very briefly about a report we are releasing today, which will again come out on our website, focused on the movement of North Korean commodities such as coal and iron ore in violation, we believe, again, of UN Security Council resolutions. For several since October 2024, we have tracked a number of non-Korean flagged vessels, foreign flagged vessels engaged in the lifting and moving of North Korean coal. and North Korean iron ore from their ports to other ports in countries abroad, including China. These vessels, which I will show you pictures of very soon, are called the Armani, the Cartier, the Casio, the Sophia, the Yiliwan and the Anyu. On our website you will soon see a number of images of these vessels. This is the Armani. There is another picture of the Armani loading coal in North Korea. a picture of the Sophia and a range of others. Now, these vessels, as historically have done previously, we tracked many North Korean shipments of coal and iron ore abroad loaded by these vessels, and then they are moved often whilst totally dark and not transmitting on their AIS transponders. In many cases, these vessels have started engaging in sophisticated spoofing techniques such that they present their transmissions as if they're in other countries, when in fact, satellite imagery shows them loading in North Korea. This obfuscatory activity has become increasingly sophisticated and it has allowed a number of vessels to obviously load these things and not be detected to move these commodities abroad. My team and I have developed these techniques, tracking techniques over many years. We do so by taking high resolution images from satellites, from layering it with AIS data, from doing sophisticated, in many cases, photogrammetry of the vessels and identification in many ways very similar how to the UN panel of experts conducted its work previously. It is also noteworthy that some of these vessels are connected through their networks, their operator and ownership networks to other networks that have been involved in these illicit activities, who and in some cases vessels that have themselves been detained and whose operators have been sanctioned. This activity is also of significant interest. For many years we saw during COVID a very quiet period obviously because of the shutdown globally of ports and other infrastructure and borders. But today we are seeing increased movement of these commodities in and out of North Korea, what we believe to be in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. And it underpins, obviously, this activity continues. The evidence will be presented online. you will be able to see it online and that I believe is the end of my presentation thank you very much.

I thank Mr. Byrne for his briefing and now I give the floor to those council members who wish to make statements I give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you to Assistant Secretary General Khaled Khayari and to Mr. James Byrne for your briefings. Colleagues, one year ago, Russia vetoed the mandate renewal of the 1718 Committee panel of experts, with China's tacit support. depriving all UN member states of crucial objective information that helped them implement their obligations under DPRK-related Security Council resolutions, all of which remain in effect. The United States is grateful that independent and well-regarded experts from organizations like the Open Source Center continue to investigate and provide credible reporting on violations and evasions of the DPRK-related Security Council resolutions. Today's briefing shows the Council will continue to ensure Member States are aware of sanctions violations and evasion activity that generate revenue for the DPRK's unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. despite Russia's veto. Mr. President, the United States thanks the Open Source Center for systematically examining hundreds of satellite images and building out innovative three-dimensional models of vessels, containers, and munitions to calculate the billions of dollars worth of artillery shells, rockets, and other munitions that Russia continues to import from the DPRK in violation of Security Council sanctions. The DPRK continues brazenly to violate the Council's resolutions by exporting coal and iron ore to China, the proceeds of which directly fund its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. Colleagues, resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2270 collectively prohibit UN member states from receiving arms and related material, training, or assistance from or providing them to the DPRK. The DPRK and Russia have flagrantly violated these resolutions in both directions. Since September 2023, the DPRK has transferred over 24,000 containers of munitions and munitions-related material and well over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine. The Open Source Center's independent findings corroborate what we have seen in press reporting and other open source analysis. It is clear from evidence presented today that Russia is cynically obstructing the Council on DPRK sanctions implementation in order to try to escape reproach for its own violations. Meanwhile, China insists that it fully implements the Council's resolutions, but we have just seen evidence of Chinese authorities looking the other way as PRC companies import DPRK coal and iron ore in violation of this Council's resolutions. Colleagues, this Council needs to address these egregious violations of Security Council resolutions despite Russia's and China's efforts to obstruct the Council from updating the 1718 sanctions list. The United States urges all states to ensure their flag registries deflag vessels for which there is evidence of involvement in sanctions evasion activities, even if they are not formally designated on the UN's 1718 sanctions list due to the obstruction of these two committee members. Indeed, we recall the obligation set out in resolution 2397 operative paragraph number nine, which requires all UN member states to seize, inspect, and impound any vessel in their ports if the member state has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities or in the transport of items such as DPRK origin coal and iron ore. that are prohibited by certain DPRK-related resolutions. Mr. President, we call on all UN member states to fulfill their obligations to implement relevant Security Council resolutions. In the coming days, we plan to nominate for designation in the 1718 Committee vessels clearly identified in the briefing to which Mr. Byrne referred for violations of UN sanctions restrictions. We also call on the 1718 Committee to facilitate the implementation of the Council's sanctions on the DPRK consistent with its mandate by updating, for the first time since 2018, the list of vessels designated under this regime. The United States stands ready to work with the rest of the Security Council to reinstate the 1718 Committee panel of experts. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of the United States for her statement. And now I give the floor to the representative of Denmark.

Thank you, Mr. President. Let me also thank A.S.G. Chiari and Mr. Byrne for their briefings. It is clear that the DPRK remains in widespread and systematic violation of UN sanctions. Mr. President, since this Council last convened in late February, the DPRK's ballistic missile launches have continued unabated. Let there be no doubt, launches such as those on 10 March represent a clear and serious threat to regional and international peace and security. They must stop immediately and without any preconditions. These are, in fact, the very missiles tested by countless North Korean launches that are now raining down on Europe, bringing misery, destruction and death to civilians across Ukraine. Just as troubling are the four to six million artillery shells estimated to have been shipped by the DPRK to Russia since September 2023. Transfers on this scale have, at the very least, prolonged Russia's illegal war against Ukraine. They clearly violate the two-way arms embargo imposed by the Council on the DPRK. Furthermore, and despite months of denials, last week we finally received confirmation of what we have already known and seen for months, that Kim Jong-un has sent thousands of troops to fight in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. This represents a deeply troubling escalation with serious consequences for European and global peace and security. Colleagues, given North Korea and Russia's willingness to ignore UN sanctions, how long until we see North Korean weapons or troops in other conflicts around the world? These flagrant violations of UN sanctions are absolutely not just a concern for the DPRK's neighbors or for Europe. Mr. President, for all these reasons, Denmark supports the continued use of sanctions against the DPRK as a legitimate tool to pressure its regime to stop its destabilising actions. The DPRK must fulfil its international obligations, including under multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Let me be clear, the Security Council has already decided the DPRK must suspend all aspects of its ballistic missile programme. Resolution 1718 also decided that the DPRK shall abandon its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately return to the Non Proliferation Treaty as a non nuclear weapons state and be in full compliance. The Council created the panel of experts as a vital source of information for the 1718 Committee to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed against the DPRK. Denmark deeply regrets that just one year ago, after a Russian veto, the mandate of the panel was not renewed. Unfortunately, it has now only become easier for North Korea and others to circumvent the sanctions that the Council unanimously decided to impose on it. Denmark's strong preference remains for the panel to be restored. North Korea's actions require this. Failing this, however, we have to rely on other independent sources of information, including the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team and Open Source Centre, for information that can be discussed freely and shared widely. Finally, Mr President, I want to recall that sanctions are not intended to negatively impact the lives of ordinary people. And we remain concerned by the dire humanitarian situation and human rights record in the DPRK. That is why all genuine requests under the humanitarian exemption mechanism should be reviewed and approved. The responsibility for this lies, of course, with the regime in Pyongyang, which prioritizes acquiring advanced weapons over its people's welfare. Denmark urges the DPRK to allow the return of the UN and other humanitarian organisations and to engage seriously with the UN's human rights mechanism. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Denmark for her statement. I now give the floor to the Permanent Representative of France.

Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, I would like to thank the Assistant Secretary General, Mr. Chiari, and I also would like to thank the Director of Open Source Center, Mr. Byrne. I think them for their presentations in the absence of the panel of experts of the presentations are more needed than ever. Mr. President, this week here in New York we have the Preparatory Committee on the NPT and the deliberations of the Committee call on us to discharge our collective responsibility to preserve the international non-proliferation regime, the regime with which North Korea has to comply. The Security Council has a special responsibility and has to lead by example. It has to react to proliferation crises which risk endangering international peace and security. The fact that North Korea continues with illegal nuclear and ballistic programs, calls for us to react in determined fashion. North Korea violates the Security Council resolutions but continue, but continue with nuclear programs. It already conducted six tests and there may be another one coming. The IAEA has noticed activities in several undeclared uranium enrichment sites in the country. To that, we need to add the worrying statements by Pyongyang and the inscription of the nuclear arms possession in the constitution in 2023. North Korea is also in breach of Security Council resolutions when they develop their ballistic programme. Since 2022, more than 100 ballistic launches have been conducted and these provocations are a threat for regional security. We are asking North Korea to cease violating resolutions passed by the Council unanimously and to follow the path of complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearisation. Mr President, because of the veto placed by Russia, the 1718 Committee no longer has the support from the panel of experts which used to professionally and objectively report on the implementation of resolutions regarding North Korea. The reports were an impartial source of information for the entire international community. None of the pretexts put forth by Russia to justify their veto withstand scrutiny. Russia provoked the dismantlement of the panel, at the same time receiving illicit military support from North Korea in its war against Ukraine. There is overwhelming evidence there is a transfer by South Korea of weapons and munitions towards Russia, which they used in their war against Ukraine. Several days ago, Russia and North Korea themselves recognized the participation of North Korean troops in operations conducted within the framework of Russian aggression in Ukraine. This support has direct consequences for European security. We strongly condemn this fresh violation of international law by these two states. When it comes to North Korea, we call on Russia to associate themselves with the decision to restore the panel of experts in line with responsibility under the charter. with its capacity as a permanent member of the Security Council and the role it plays in the non-proliferation regime. Mr. President, generally speaking, the situation calls this Council of ours to stay more vigilant in four areas. First of all, the resolutions of the Council are binding resolutions and have to be upheld by all Member States, including members of the Council. And I I am referring more specifically to the sanctions regime. Next, the Council has to make sure those resolutions are implemented and in this regard, restoring the panel of experts is necessary. In the meantime, we will continue working on the information mission that used to be discharged by the panel. Third, the Security Council has to provide all of its supports to the IAEA, who continue monitoring and verifying the North Korean nuclear program. And finally, the Security Council has to continue demanding that North Korea fulfill its international obligations, including under the NPT, and that it chooses dialogue for the purpose of having lasting peace and security on the Korean peninsula. I thank you.

I thank the Permanent Representative of France for his statements.

Thank you, President.

Panama would like to thank the Presidency of the Council for organising this meeting and we would like to recognise the valuable contributions of Assistant Secretary General Khalid Khari and Mr James Byrne of the Open Source Centre. We thank them for their brief introductions. In the light of the growing violations of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in addition to the contravention of global non-proliferation mechanisms, Panama expresses its profound concern with regard to these ongoing practices which undermine the authority of this organ and the multilateral framework overall. To this we must add the perceived weakness of the weakening of the sanctions committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 following the dissolution of the panel of experts, a decision which has negatively affected the technical capacity and independent monitoring of the committee. In this context, Panama recognizes the value of the non-proliferation treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. and as the cornerstone for maintaining international peace and security, and also for ensuring the effective implementation of resolutions adopted by this Council, Panama historically has supported a clear position with regard to implementation of these resolutions in order to ensure the integrity of the sanctions regime. It's important to stress, I think, the findings of the final report of the panel of experts prepared under resolution 2680 that contained information of a highly operational and strategic value. That report documents worrying advances in the military capabilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the development of tactical nuclear weapons. the entry into service of submarines with the ability to launch ballistic missiles, as well as systematic behavior for maritime evasion. Also, coastal vessels are being used without IMO markings, evading identification and deliberately manipulating satellite information, fraudulent registrations and successive flag changes to hide illicit activities. Given the growing sophistication of the technology used by the DPRK to avoid sanctions, we believe it is essential that we extend the capacity for monitoring and technical cooperation available to the international community. As a state that administers one of the largest vessel registries As a Group A member of the IMO Council, Panama is concerned to see the increase in illicit activities related to maritime traffic. The recent trends show a worrying development in the host of criminal activities using states that have been sanctioned to avoid obligations and conduct illicit activities, which represents a challenge for the process of monitoring, control and implementation of corrective measures. In response to these challenges, Panama has adopted innovative initiatives to counteract the impact of these practices. As a founding member of the Registries Information Sharing Compact, which is a shared database of maritime registries, our country attempts to limit the strategic changing of vessel flags. And we have reported more than 135 vessels linked to illicit activities in this regard. More recently, Legal framework was further strengthened through a government decree number 512 of October 2024, which establishes concrete tools to protect the integrity of the Panamanian flag. At a time when multilateralism is facing increasing pressure, Panama reaffirms the importance of the sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and we reiterate our willingness to cooperate technically and constructively in this mission when we have evidence that the measure will contribute effectively to achieving our common goal. In the light of all of this, Panama would like to express our deep concern at the recent joint declarations where the link was recognized between the DPRK and the provision supplying of arms and troops to the Russian Federation in the context of the Ukraine conflict. This active collaboration in direct contravention of multiple resolutions of the Security Council is despicable and is to be condemned. Because it not only prolongs a war with devastating humanitarian consequences, but it also seriously weakens the multilateral architecture designed to preserve international peace and security. States which play with war, be it through military operations, armed invasions, extra territorial maritime incursions, threat to the sovereignty of other states and alliances that only serve the specific goal of destabilizing the international system that is already teetering. The arms race and alliances that feed into the conflict only contribute to its expansion and making things worse. Mr President, Panama, as an essential partner in global trade and as a responsible country in the area of maritime security, advocates for an international system that is strengthened and focused on prevention, deterrence, disarmament and non proliferation. Panama would like to offer its cooperation to ensure that the supervision mechanisms are strengthened. as well as stressing the importance of driving forward efforts that will lead to a general de-escalation of tensions in order to bring about disarmament based on firm political willingness, effective international cooperation, and the participation of everyone involved. Thank you very much.

I thank the Permanent Representative of Panama for his statement. And now I give the floor to the representative of Guyana.

Thank you, Mr. President. I thank ASG Kari for his briefing and have listened carefully to the presentation by Mr. Byrne. I welcome the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan in this meeting. Mr. President, Guyana remains concerned about the continued launching of ballistic missiles and the ongoing nuclear expansion program by the DPRK in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions. These actions not only aggravate the already tense situation on the Korean Peninsula, but also weaken the global non-proliferation regime. Guyana condemns these ongoing violations calls upon the government of the DPRK to comply with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. We also call upon the government of the DPRK and all other concerned parties to act in good faith to engage in diplomacy and to resuscitate dialogue. Guyana reiterates the need for all relevant parties to exercise restraint and and avoid exacerbating the already heightened tensions and the security situation on the Korean peninsula. We firmly believe that with strong political will, progress towards a peaceful and sustainable solution is possible. We underscore the importance of the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and urge the government of the DPRK to return to the treaty and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to reestablish its presence in the country. This is critical for confidence building and ensuring the credible verification of nuclear facilities in DPRK, as well as strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Guyana also underscores the need for divestment of the ballistic missile program while simultaneously prioritizing human development in the country. In this context, we remain concerned about the dire humanitarian situation and encourage DPRK to allow the return of the UN country team and the international community to the country. We reiterate our support for the 1718 Sanctions Committee's humanitarian exemption mechanism in facilitating humanitarian assistance to the population in the DPRK. Guyana once again emphasizes that the 1718 Sanctions Committee must maintain its mandate of overseeing the implementation of the measures outlined in the Council resolutions related to the DPRK. We urge all UN Member States to comply with and fully implement the relevant Council resolutions related to the DPRK. In the absence of the Committee's Panel of Experts, we stress that a continuous flow of information on the implementation of the DPRK sanctions regime remains critical to the work of the Committee. We also express support for the reinstatement of the Panel of Experts and commit to engaging with fellow Council members in this regard. Finally, Mr. President, Guyana reiterates its belief that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is through their total elimination. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is critical to achieving this objective and for promoting international peace and security. Guyana reaffirms its commitment to advancing the global non-proliferation and disarmament agenda and calls on states that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We also reaffirm our commitment to the Council efforts to bring about compliance with its resolutions related to the DPRK. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Guyana for her statement. And now I give the floor to the permanent representative of the Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting. I would also like to thank ASG Qari and Mr James Byrne for their briefings. Today's meeting recalls the deeply disappointing moment a year ago when one permanent member of the Council wielded its veto against the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Committee, an essential mechanism that had faithfully served this Council for 15 years. Indeed, that veto deprived the U.N. member states of a vital mechanism that -- to offer guidance and monitor the implementation of U.N. sanctions on the DPRK. Mr. President, one year later, let us assess where we now stand. In the absence of the panel, North Korea has brazenly accelerated its illegal activities to support its nuclear and missile programs. These include illicit exports of coal and iron, arms transfers, a recent cryptocurrency theft totaling $1.5 billion, overseas dispatch of workers, and even the deployment of troops abroad. Most notably, the illegal military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, based on their so-called comprehensive strategic partnership has severely undermined the Security Council sanctions regime on North Korea and threatens regional and global peace and security. North Korean arms and troops have prolonged and intensified the war in Ukraine, while in return, Russia's potential military and technological assistance to DPRK poses a direct threat to the security on the Korean Peninsula. Colleagues, as you all know, after months of denial, the two parties now openly acknowledge the deployment of North Korean troops with an inept attempt to justify it as being consistent with international law. However, no amount of far-fetched or strained reasoning can obscure the truth. The massive transfer of arms, and other forms of military cooperation, including the deployment of 15,000 North Korean troops, constitute a flagrant violation of international norms, including the UN Charter and multiple resolutions adopted by this Council with the backing of Russia itself. In addition, Russia is promoting the false narrative that sanctions on Pyongyang have been ineffective and should therefore be revised. Yet sanctions are only effective when fully and faithfully implemented. In particular, countries with substantial trade and economic ties to North Korea need to play a major role in enhancing the effectiveness of the sanctions. Mr. President, amid the absence of the panel to monitor and report on sanctions noncompliance, Eleven UN member states, including the Republic of Korea, came together last year to establish the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, MSMT, to help all UN member states fulfill their obligations under the UN Charter. Furthermore, if any revision to the DPRK sanctions regime is to be considered, It should aim to enhance it in accordance with OP28 of the Security Council Resolution 2397 of December 2017. This resolution authorizes the Council to strengthen, modify, suspend, or lift sanctions in light of DPRK's compliance. As Pyongyang's actions clearly and continuously defy the Council's decisions, the Council should consider strengthening existing sanctions, not weakening them. Mr. President, emboldened by active Russian support and its first participation in a modern war, North Korea is not only pursuing the advancement of its nuclear and missile programs, but also revitalizing its relatively stagnated and obsolete conventional arms industry. Kim Jong-un has recently ordered that lessons learned from modern warfare in Ukraine be incorporated into the military. And just yesterday, during his visit to a munitions factory, Kim praised the expansion of production capacity and modernization. highlighting the exponential increase in shell production, now four times higher than the average annual level. As such, Pyongyang is now accelerating the development of a range of conventional weapons, including reconnaissance and suicide attack drones, advanced tanks and armoured vehicles, as well as a as well as a newly unveiled 5,000-ton multi-mission naval destroyer with a view to realizing its nuclear armament, the largest warship ever produced in North Korea. These developments have ushered in a new and alarming phase of security risks on the Korean Peninsula with serious implications for regional and global stability. Mr. President, even in the face of these renewed existential threats, the Republic of Korea remains steadfast in protecting its people and the country in full compliance with international law and NPT. However, one permanent member of this Council appears to have chosen a different path. Particularly concerning is the reversal of its longstanding position in defense of the global non-proliferation regime. The shift in its narrative, framing North Korea's denuclearization as a closed issue, directly contradicts the decisions of this Council, which unequivocally called for North Korea to immediately abandon all nuclear and missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. And it is especially alarming that this is not just an isolated remark by its foreign minister last year, but a line that continues to be vocally repeated by its officials. At last week's BRICS high representatives meeting, skepticism toward the UN sanctions was once again voiced by the top security official. Moreover, attempts were made to justify North Korea's nuclear buildup and threat by blaming the ROK-U.S. extended deterrence cooperation. I'd like to take this opportunity to reiterate the fact that ROK-U.S. extended deterrence cooperation, which is defensive in nature, is a legitimate response to protect the lives and safety of the Korean people in the face of North Korea's growing nuclear threat. It is also fully, fully consistent with the NPT and further promotes regional peace and security. Mr. President, two days ago, at the NPT PrepCom held here, 81 states parties to the NPT unanimously reaffirmed in the joint statement that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapons state and urged North Korea to return to the NPT. This council must not allow further erosion to the global non-proliferation regime, which has been painstakingly built through decades of collective effort. Turning a blind eye to North Korea's persistent and blatant violations risks triggering a dangerous domino effect that could irreparably damage the NPT regime and the very integrity of the global non-proliferation framework at large. This may entail broader and deeper security ramifications for the region and beyond. In closing, Mr. President, I take this opportunity to call on all responsible members of this council to recognize the gravity of this moment and to work collectively to restore and safeguard the non-proliferation regime that is essential for maintaining international peace and security. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement. And now I give the floor to the representative of Slovenia.

Thank you, President. I would like to begin by thanking A.S.G. Chiari and Mr. Byrne for the briefings. Mr. President, well over a year has passed since Russia's veto prevented the mandate renewal of the 1718 Panel of Experts. So for over a year, The Council has had no tool for independent and professional monitoring of sanctions implementation, no objective and comprehensive updates about the latest sanctions contravention techniques, no impartial assessment that could guide Council's activities regarding the DPRK sanctions regime. Maybe a mere coincidence, but the resolution was vetoed exactly when the panel commenced its investigation into Russia's violations of the arms embargo against the DPRK. If that was the reason for the veto, then this is really deeply disturbing. The recent public acknowledgement of military cooperation between the two countries, including the presence of the DPRK troops in Europe, raises serious concerns about the extent of the arms embargo violations. Publicly available information suggests armed transfers at a significant scale. This must be thoroughly investigated and these blatant violations of the Security Council resolutions must cease immediately. Mr President, Slovenia is gravely concerned with the trajectory of the DPRK nuclear programme. For years, the DPRK has been violating Security Council resolutions through testing nuclear weapon delivery systems. These systems are reportedly being used in attacks on Ukrainian cities, thus being field tested for future use. elsewhere. This is alarming. Equally troubling are the recent statements about the presumed obsolescence and redundancy of the DPRK sanctions regime and statements on the DPRK's nuclear status. Slovenia remains convinced that sanctions must remain focused on their core objective, creating conditions conducive to the DPRK abandoning its illegal WMD and ballistic missile programs. It is our responsibility to ensure that existing measures achieve this goal. We are ready to support readjustments of the sanctions regime in order to maintain its relevance and fit for purpose. However, we are not ready to endorse any broader revisions or reforms of it. The DPRK has demonstrated far too little willingness to engage on nuclear disarmament to justify such measures. Mr President, North Korea needs to be denuclearised, and this can only follow if the Council can find unity and employ all diplomatic means to make the DPRK cease with its provocations and bring it back to dialogue. For Slovenia, this remains the only legitimate option. I thank you.

I thank the representative for Slovenia for her statement, and now I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, President. I thank ASG Kiari and Mr. James Byrne for briefing us today. Analysis from organizations like the Open Source Center has become even more vital in the wake of the expertise gap left by the 1718 panel of experts. One year on, the UK deeply regrets Russia's decision to veto the mandate renewal of the 1718 panel of experts. This was a deliberate act used to obfuscate and embolden the DPRK's unlawful pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and to conceal Russia's own erosion of the UN sanctions architecture, which it has a responsibility to uphold as a permanent member of this council. The panel's credible, objective and independent reporting enabled this council and the international community to effectively monitor the implementation of UN sanctions on the DPRK. Most importantly, the panel helped prevent DPRK's unlawful and dangerous development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Since Russia's veto last year, there have been over 40 missile tests, including one intercontinental ballistic missile test and one intermediate range ballistic missile test. This escalation represents multiple breaches of UN Security Council resolutions for which we've been deprived of further analysis. Colleagues, it's obvious that Russia's objective was to clear the path for the expansion of their military relationship with DPRK. The DPRK is believed to have supplied 20,000 containers of munitions to Russia and its artillery and mortar shells account for 60% of those used in Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. And as we've heard in the past week, Russia and the DPRK publicly flaunted their agreement to use DPRK troops as mere cannon fodder in that war. Let me be clear. We cannot allow this brazen disregard towards UN sanctions to become normalised. The UK will continue to work closely with partners to monitor sanctions evasion, to hold both Russia and the DPRK to account, and to call out those complicit in the DPRK's violations of UN Security Council resolutions. As we've heard over the course of the NPT PrepCom, this Council should stand firm in its defence of the global non-proliferation regime. The UK remains steadfast with partners in our shared goal for the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. I thank you.

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement. And now I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr President. I thank ASG Khalid Khairi for his valuable briefing and take note of the remarks by Mr. Byrne. Escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain a huge source of concern to us. Regrettably, the situation has further deteriorated in the recent past, posing negative impact on regional and international peace and security. Pakistan seeks peace and stability in our region and other regions of the world. We support the global non-proliferation norms and the objective of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula within the framework of Security Council resolutions. We oppose resumption of nuclear testing anywhere in the world. Pakistan sees with concern violations of UN Security Council resolutions by any member state without exception. Mr. President, it is our firm belief that challenges confronting the Korean peninsula could be resolved through diplomatic engagement, dialogue, and mutual respect. We therefore call on all concerned to take measures conducive to the revival of talks among the relevant parties. It is also incumbent on all concerned to exercise restraint and not escalate existing tensions or take any action that is detrimental to peace and security. The Security Council must take the lead in finding ways to lower tensions in the region and encourage confidence and security building measures. There is an urgent need for collective action to realize the common objectives of non-proliferation and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, we oppose any actions or interventions that could further destabilize the Korean Peninsula and add to existing tensions in the region. Mr. President, Pakistan remains committed to working within the framework established by the United Nations resolutions to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. We hope that the Security Council will demonstrate unity in reviving the dialogue and playing its due role in reducing tensions and threats to peace and security in the region. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement. And now I give the floor to the permanent representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. President, We would like to welcome the participation in our meeting of the permanent representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Kim Son. The Council today has become involved in yet another discussion on the initiative of a number of Western countries. This discussion on the situation on the Korean peninsula does not bring us to stabilization in the region, but takes us away from it. But there is a difference with previous requests for such meetings. It used to be that a meeting was called for every time when DPRK would undertake measures to react to military provocations from the United States and their allies. Well, today, what we have on the agenda is the issue of a one year mark since the panel of experts under the sanctions committee 1718 stopped working. The group had discredited itself completely. because they were involved in collecting biased information from Western mass media and also looking to purchase expensive purses from expensive small boutiques. In other words, the issue having to do the organizational aspects of one subsidiary body is on the agenda, but not an issue having to do with maintaining international peace and security. We have never heard those who called for a meeting today ever suggesting a memorial service or even a discussion of the work of similar expert groups in other countries. This way, what we are seeing here is an open abuse of the Council's resources so as to turn its attention away from the root causes of the escalation on the Korean peninsula. Instead of listening to yet another series of speculations from pseudo-independent experts who openly state on their website that their work is to promote the UK security interests. Instead of that, the Council should turn to the immediate factors which are destabilizing the situation in the region. And the main factors there is a growing military presence of NATO countries in Asia and the Pacific, where this presence is systemically destroying the prospects of building a collective security architecture outside of the alliance there. On the 24th of February, the three-week full-scale military exercises between U.S. and Republic of Korea, Kalpaks, came to an end. They included 2,000 troops, 150 units of military material, including a nuclear submarine. There was some maneuvers which took place 25 kilometers from the DMZ, which could very well have been read by Pyongyang as a military provocation. And the recent months, Washington's appetite to increase the military presence in the region continue growing. According to leaks in the mass media, the Ministry of Defense of the United States continues considering the possibility of deploying in South Korea of 20 nuclear-capable F-35A Lightning II fighter jets. Let me recall that they used to be used on a temporary basis in the course of joint exercises. In case this decision is made, then the allies will have a far greater operative capability, taking into account that Seoul has 40 F-35As. At the same time, there are plans to increase the number of F-16 Fighting Falcons, whose objective is containment. And altogether, this can provide for a critical air supremacy in the first hours of hypothetical conflict by striking deep inside the opponent's territory. And this makes me underscore the fact that the United States, Japan, and Korea, the countries I'm referring to, are amongst the 10 states with the largest military budgets and who have the most advanced, most destructive battle-ready equipment. This, uh, very well equipped and coordinated alliance is literally trying to corner one independent sovereign state, which then is trying to find solutions to ensure its own security. Pyongyang opponents can talk about the fact that their actions are not prohibited under Security Council all they want, but such cynical statements do not square with the Security Council requirements to resolve the Korean Peninsula issues using dialogue and diplomacy only. What we are witnessing in actual fact are direct and consistent violations by a group of countries of their international violations. Let me make a separate mention here of something that is in direct contradiction with the UN Charter, namely a decision by 11 countries to establish the so-called Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Group on DPRK, which is suggested as a replacement for the Panel of Experts under 1718. Let me underscore here that this mechanism was used by circumventing the Security Council and therefore does not have a legitimate international mandate. And everyone understands that whoever pays for something determines its outcome. Therefore, any product which came, would come out of this format will have no legitimacy and we doubt this not at all, they will be fraudulent disinformation. Russia, in turn, has on several occasions proposed initiative to de-escalate and to strengthen mutual trust on the basis of taking into account the legitimate security interests of all parties involved into account. Furthermore, on April last year, the Security Council had on its table the Russian draft resolution to extend the mandate of the panel. that the Western countries are now shedding crocodile tears over. Together with this proposal, we'll also propose that we have a candid dialogue, in the course of which there would be a regular review of restrictions and looking for political solutions, which is something that's an inalienable part and parcel of Security Council resolutions on DPRK. As an outcome of this, the United States and allies essentially rejected this and on their own stopped the mandate of the panel of experts. Well, what's done is done, and you only have yourselves to blame. When it comes to cooperation with Russia and Pyongyang, well, we have voiced our position on many previous occasions. DPRK is our neighbor and partner, and we are developing our relationship in all areas. This is our sovereign right. The Russian interaction with DPRK is in line with international law and is not against third parties and is not a threat for states in the regional international community. And Russia will, of course, continue developing such cooperation. The DPRK units participated in the liberation of Russian, let me underscore, Russian territory. And at the same time, Moscow and Pyongyang was acting fully in line with international law, in particular Article 4 of our Strategic Partnership Treaty between these two countries, which provides for an immediate assistance in case there is an armed attack on one of the parties to the treaties. And we're very grateful to our Korean brothers for the assistance they've extended to us then. The Security Council should drastically review its approach to make sure that we take the situation out of this dead end instead of compounding it further. We have stated many times which areas we should first start normalizing. But in order for this to happen, the Western capitals should change their mindset, which continues being based on the Cold War paradigm. And the sooner the West ends this outdated outlook, the sooner the Council will be able to exert a positive influence on the situation in the region. I thank you.

I thank the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation for his statement. And now I give the floor to the representative of Sierra Leone.

Thank you, Mr. President. I thank ASG Khaled Kheira for his briefing. I also take note of the contribution of Mr. James Byrne of the Open Source Center. One year has passed since the non-renewal of the mandate of the panel of experts under the 1718 Committee concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This has created a noticeable gap in the Security Council sanctions regime, with potential implications for the broader international efforts aimed at addressing the enduring challenges posed by the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The POE played an indispensable role as a mechanism for monitoring, analyzing, and supporting the implementation of the Council sanctions. Its reports, recommendations, and tracking of violations contributed to upholding the global non-proliferation framework. Mr. President, at a time of growing global insecurity, particularly in the Northeastern Asian region, it is important that the Security Council and where appropriate, the General Assembly consider options to ensure continuity in the oversight and analytic functions previously carried out by the POE. Restoring such capacities remains essential to strengthening international non-proliferation efforts and to preserving the credibility of the Council sanctions regime. In this regard, Sierra Leone notes the steps taken by the 1718 sanctions committee to ensure continued implementation of its mandate. We therefore further note its engagement with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Financial Action Task Force, and the Office for the Coordination of Human Rights Affairs. These collaborations are noted to be enhancing the committee's understanding and work, and we look forward to further engagements from other relevant institutions. We also take note of the establishment of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding the DPRK. Its stated objective to assist in the comprehensive implementation of sanctions through rigorous inquiry into violations and evasion tactics is well noted. Sierra Leone reiterates its longstanding support for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, underscoring its importance in curbing further nuclear development and proliferation, both vertically and horizontally. The CTBT remains a critical pillar in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In conclusion, Mr. President, We reaffirm the need for comprehensive and objective assessment of the DPRK's nuclear program. Such assessment should be firmly anchored in the broader international non-proliferation framework and contributes meaningfully to peace and security in the region and beyond. Sierra Leone remains steadfast in its commitment to the principles of disarmament, non-proliferation, and international peace and security. We reiterate our full support for diplomatic dialogue and engagement aimed at achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK and the Korean Peninsula. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Sierra Leone for her statement. I give now the floor to the representative of China.

President, I thank S.G. Kerry. for his briefing and welcome the presence of the permanent representatives of DPRK and Japan. President, the current situation on the Korean Peninsula remains complex and tense, ridden with uncertainties and destabilizing factors. I wish to make four points. First, All efforts should be made to maintain stability and prevent turmoil. A peaceful and stable peninsula is in the common interest of the countries of the region and meets the general expectations of the international community. We call on all parties concerned to take a long view, see the bigger picture, exercise calm and restraint, avoid any actions and words that can exacerbate tensions and aggravate contentions, work hard to prevent deterioration and de-escalate the situation. For some time now, certain countries have continued to conduct military exercises on the peninsula, featuring new and innovative manoeuvres and an array of strategic weapons. This has heightened animosity between the parties and the risk of accidental clashes, so much so that the slightest imprudence may lead to mishaps. China strongly urges an early halt to such dangerous actions. Second, Dialogue and engagement should be promoted. Historical experience has shown that if all parties intend to receive dialogue and stay engaged, the situation on the peninsula would remain largely stable. The political process would make positive headway without much difficulty. Otherwise, the situation would tense up and technicism and confrontation would intensify. We have noted some positive signals from a relevant party about dialogue and engagement. China calls on all parties, the parties concerned, to seize this opportunity to move towards each other, engage actively, build mutual trust, and work together to bring the issue back to the track of dialogue. In this regard, the United States should take the lead to show goodwill and put its purported commitment to dialogue into action. Third, enabling conditions should be created. Given the current situation, the international community, including the Security Council, should strive to create an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of dialogue rather than unduly focusing on sanction and pressure. China has always maintained that sanctions are a means, not an end, and should always serve the political process. Security Council resolutions related to DPRK are not only about sanctions, but also about political settlement and minimizing negative humanitarian impact. These provisions should be implemented even-handedly, not selectively. We support the international community using humanitarian issues as an entry point, taking active steps to create conditions and build momentum for the parties concerned to enhance mutual trust and resume contacts. Fourth, Cold War mentality should be abandoned. The current situation on the peninsula derives from the vestiges of the Cold War. To advance a political settlement on the peninsula, we must rise above the perversity of zero-sum game and foster a right security philosophy. In recent years, certain countries, the United States, Under the pretext of peninsula question pursued Indo-Pacific strategy, covert together military alliances beefed up extended deterrence, scaled up deployment of strategic forces on the peninsula and its vicinity intended for block competition and a new cold war. This does not help with the political settlement of the issue. Instead, it seriously jeopardizes the security interests of countries in the region, including China, and will only lead to an even more serious security conundrum. We urge the US to immediately stop such dangerous acts and stop using the peninsula issue as a pretext and a tool for advancing its own geostrategies. President, as a permanent member of the Security Council and a responsible major country, China has always been striving for political settlement of the peninsula issue and maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula. China has always underscored that the question of peninsula is in essence a security issue rooted in the absence of a peace mechanism and the lack of mutual trust among the parties concerned. We hope that relevant parties will commit to the general direction of a political solution, respond positively to China's efforts to maintain stability, prevent chaos, and facilitate peace talks, build mutual trust through dialogue, strive for an early conversion from amnesties to a peace mechanism. are ready to continue close communication with the parties concerned and to work with the international community to play a constructive role in seeking political solution and an early realization of lasting peace and stability on the peninsula. Before concluding, President, I wish to express our categorical rejection to the accusations and the smearing by the US representative. I wish to underscore that China has always been strictly implementing DPRK-related council resolutions, having shouldered over 90% of international obligations and associated costs. We have overcome many difficulties, made tremendous sacrifices, and sustained immense losses. We hope that the US representative before speaking can get their facts straight. We hope that US will stop their accusation diplomacy at the council, which undermines international cooperation on the peninsula issue. Thank you.

I thank the representative of China for his statements. I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to thank Assistant Secretary General, Mr. Khalid Hyari, for his valuable briefing. We have listened carefully to the representative of the civil society. We adopt a balanced and careful perspective on the delicate situation in the Korean Peninsula. It is underpinned on the respect of international law provisions. At the same time, we give the sovereign concerns of states their deserved importance. It is no secret that the recent developments will want our full attention and great care. Proceeding from that perspective, our position stands on four critical principles. They are as follows. First, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are two important international commitments and no one is exempt from them. Second, security concerns are actually tightly intertwined to a great extent. It must be stressed that the military escalation by different parties would only lead to fueling tension and creating a destructive vicious circle. Third, the complete verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is part and parcel of our common objective for a safe, peaceful world free from nuclear weapons. This noble objective cannot be achieved in any way except through peaceful means and constructive dialogue. Fourth, sanctions must never be an obstacle hindering access to the vital humanitarian assistance or to meet the basic needs of civilians. Based on the above, we call for immediate and effective action, including the following: military de-escalation by all parties concerned and adopting effective confidence-building measures; second, initiating unconditional dialogue and diplomatic engagement, including the activation of inclusive regional dialogue mechanisms without exception or exclusion; Third, strengthening and intensifying humanitarian assistance provided to those in need. In this regard, it would be a remiss not to emphasize the human dimension, which cannot be disregarded or overlooked. The sad reality is that the civilians in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea face enormous challenges and huge difficulties. While we oppose any actions that would undermine the resolutions of the Security Council, we stress at the same time the need to address the root causes of this crisis. The desired peace can only be achieved through constructive dialogue and mutual respect. We must comprehensively address the security concerns of all parties on equal footing instead of just imposing sanctions or threatening to use military force. Thus, the Security Council is required to speak with one unified voice despite the divergent views at times. Reaching common ground is an imperative necessity to maintain international peace and security. To conclude, we call upon all parties to prioritize dialogue over confrontation, diplomacy over force, and to put the interests of the peoples of the region above any other consideration to achieve stability and prosperity for all peoples. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. President.

At the outset, I wish to also thank Assistant Secretary General Khayati for his comprehensive briefing. We also take note of the contribution of the civil society briefer. Mr. President, the Security Council convenes at a time where we continue to closely observe developments affecting the Korean Peninsula. These developments, which have drawn considerable international attention, underscore again the importance of preserving stability and fostering conditions that are conducive to peace in the region. In this context, I wish to stress the enduring role of the global non-proliferation architecture. Built upon the foundation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, this framework remains central to our collective efforts to maintain international peace and security. Respect for these instruments is not just a matter of legal obligation, but a cornerstone of trust, helping to reduce the risk associated with the spread of nuclear weapons and fostering an environment where dialogue and cooperation can flourish. The credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime depend on the steadfast commitment of all states to uphold these agreements in both letter and spirit. The Council has time and time again highlighted the value of dialogue and importance of implementing relevant Security Council resolutions. We believe that a climate of constructive engagement and clear communication among all concerned parties is essential not only for managing tensions but for building mutual confidence and trust. Given the complexities before us, my delegation supports a balanced approach, one that addresses legitimate security concerns while creating space for cooperation and constructive dialogue. We urge all relevant parties to exercise restraint and to avoid actions that could further heighten tensions, while focusing instead on measures that promote stability and peace. In conclusion, Mr. President, we reaffirm our commitment to supporting denuclearization, cooperation, and practical steps that encourage peace, stability, and the well-being of all people in the Korean Peninsula. I thank you.

thank the representative of Somalia for his statements. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Greece. I would like to thank Assistant Secretary General Khaled Khairy for his briefing. I also thank Mr. James Byrne for his presentation. Colleagues, Greece has already expressed on several occasions, including previous Council meetings, its firm condemnation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea weapons of mass destruction ballistic missile programmes Especially numerous ballistic missile launches and its six nuclear tests, which constitute a flagrant violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, I would like to reaffirm Greece's commitment to the work of the committee established under resolution 1718 of 2006, mandated to implement the sanctions regime on DPRK. The implementation of the sanctions regime is a vital instrument in order to peacefully convince the DPRK to abandon its nuclear activities, cease missile launches, and resume dialogue with a view to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Allow me to highlight three points on the subject matter of our meeting. Firstly, Greece regrets that last year the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution on the annual renewal of the mandate of the 718 Committee Panel of Experts. In an area where a collective security mechanism are under strain, the failure of the Council to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts was another step towards further undermining the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. As we have reached the one year anniversary of the Panel's dismantling, we have to remember that for 15 years it has provided fact-based, objective, independent assessments, analysis and recommendation on the implementation of UN sanctions to the DPRK. Throughout these 15 years, the panel has examined evidence, exchanged views, found consensus, and delivered objective and independent reports. The panel's reporting has been a critical source of information for all UN member states and the greater public looking to better understand the DPRK sanctions evasion and violation activities so that they can help prevent proliferation and implement Security Council resolutions. Secondly, we are ready to engage with all relevant partners and promote diplomatic solution providing for the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. To this end, we call on DPRK to de-escalate and engage sincerely in dialogue with the Council and the United Nations system with a view to finding a diplomatic solution as the only path to sustainable peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Thirdly, we remain also concerned by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in DPRK. We wish to repeat our call upon DPRK to ease any restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid and to open its borders to international humanitarian personnel. To conclude, the sanctions remain in place and must continue to be fully implemented by all Member States in the interest of regional and global peace and security. Greece reiterates the crucial importance of the unity of the Council on this matter. I thank you. I resume my functions as the President of the Council. And I now give the floor to the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Mr. President. This year marked the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and founding of the United Nations. In this meaningful year, The voice is growing loudly, calling for United Nations reform into genuine center of multilateralism, the meeting original ideal of its foundation. However, in this UN Security Council, principal organ of the United Nations, illegal acts are being openly perpetrated against universal aspiration of international community. It completely runs counter to the fundamental principle of UN charter with sovereign equality, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs as its core. This meeting proves once again that UN Security Council will never be able to remain committed to its intrinsic mission as long as United States and its followers who are resorting to high-handedness and arbitrariness while sowing the seed of war and discord worldwide are holding U.N. Security Council permanent seat. I express my strong disapproval and also denounce and reject another unlawful and unreasonable U.N. Security Council meeting today convinced by outrageous demands of some member states to make issue of DPRK's exercise of sovereign right. Over the last year, ceaseless military buildup by United States and its allies targeting the DPRK has entered the stage of mastering practical actions far beyond level of demonstration. past the leading security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula closer toward a more dangerous phase of conflict. Last year, United States developed its alliance into nuclear-based military bloc and war alliance. At the stage, all sorts of aggressive joint military drill on the largest ever scale all year round, including Ulchi Freedom Shield, Freedom Age, Iron Mace, and Freedom Flag. Current US administration, which came into office this year, keeps predecessor's hostile policy toward DPRK, escalating risky political and military provocations against us. Even in this last three months, since January 20, US strategic assets, including nuclear submarine Alexandria, B-1B strategic bomber, and nuclear aircraft carrier Carl Vinson made their appearance on Korean Peninsula. Worse still, the launching drill of the ICBM Minuteman III was conducted. In March, United States conducted Freedom Shield 2025, the largest scale joint military drill for integrated operation of American nuclear weapons and ROK's conventional weapon under the new operational plan 2022. By doing so, it has made preemptive nuclear strike against DPRK a fait accompli. Against this backdrop, it has revived and restructured the UN Command, illegal ghost body into the actual war command like NATO. This means that moves to frame up the Asian version of the NATO in Asia Pacific region are already in full swing. These facts clearly prove that military confrontation of the United States and its partner forces to ignite nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula and the region are reaching the most parallel stage of action. It is indispensable sovereign right of DPRK that cannot be yielded under such a grave situation to maintain and improve strong deterrence for safeguarding national dignity and security interest and guaranteeing its peaceful development. There is no reason for this issue to be on the table of UN Security Council. As for DPRK-Russian military cooperation, it entirely conforms to the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership signed by two countries and the international law, including UN charter. It is not for anyone to meddle in. United States and West claim that their alliance of aggressive nature is legitimate and peacekeeping, whereas normal relations of friendship and cooperation between sovereign states are illegitimate and disturbing peace. They should stop insisting such extremely double dealing and brazen claim and get accustomed to the new reality of cooperative relation between the DPRK and Russia. No matter what others may say, the DPRK in the future too will continuously exercise its sovereign right to defend its right to existence and development and its security interests from all sorts of the threat posed by hostile forces and reliably safeguard the peace and security of the region and the rest of the world. The United States and the West are attempting to force one side and hegemonic order while hindering legitimate and normal exercise of sovereign rights by sovereign states and their development of friendly relations. The international community should never tolerate such high-handedness and arbitrary practice of the United States and its followers oriented toward interfering internal affairs and others, and make strenuous efforts to realize genuine international justice. I thank you.

I thank the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. I now give the floor to the Permanent Representative of Japan.

Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this critical meeting. I also thank A.C. Kihari and Mr. Byrne for their respective informative briefings. First of all, I would like to take this opportunity to once again express my deepest regret that the Panel of Experts, which had been playing a critical role to monitor the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, was forced to terminate its vital activities due to Russia's veto one year ago. The intention behind Russia's use of the veto and North Korea's clear alignment with it was obvious. It was to paralyze the work of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee. This intention is now even clearer. Last month, Pyongyang confirmed its troops deployed to Russia have engaged in combat against Ukraine, and Russia did the same, even though they had previously denied this in this chamber. This constitutes a clear violation of international law, including the UN Charter, and now they publicly admit this unabashedly. Their bilateral treaty can never justify this violation of the Charter. An invader can never justify their aggression with Article 51 of the Charter. The Security Council has been leaked by a permanent council member in its hope to veil its unlawful military cooperation with the DPRK. This is totally unacceptable behavior for a responsible permanent council member and should never be tolerated. Mr. President, even so, vigilant monitoring of violations of Security Council resolutions continues. Like-minded countries, including Japan, established the multilateral sanctions monitoring team last year with a view to filling the significant gap that panel of experts has left behind and to assist assisting with the effective implementation of relevant council resolutions. Together with those efforts, we truly appreciate the efforts by civil society to complement the work of the UN and its member states. Much information detailing unlawful transfers of materials from North Korea and other instances of sanctions violations and evasions has been given to us at the Security Council, including through today's briefing by the Open Source Center. We will continue to engage in this endeavor to fully implement the sanctions measures. Japan, as a responsible UN member state, strongly opposes any attempt to undermine the effective work of the Security Council and the esteemed principles of the UN Charter. No country has a right to criticize the legitimate activities of member states and civil society, especially when that country itself breaches its obligations under relevant Council resolutions. We will continue to demand accountability under the UN Charter. Those who engage in violations of Security Council resolutions must and will bear the consequences of their actions. As the saying goes, sunlight is the best disinfectant. And our message is clear, malicious deeds will be exposed. Mr. President, the advancement of the DPRK's nuclear and missile activities is an imminent threat to the entire globe. I call on all UN member states to uphold the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the very foundation of peace and security for the international community. I also would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our consistent and steadfast commitment to nuclear non-proliferation as the third preparatory committee for the 2026 NPT review conference is underway here at the UN. Japan once again reiterates the strong voice of the international community urging Pyongyang to reverse course and to take concrete steps towards dismantling all its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and related programs in a complete, verifiable, and reversible manner, as has been expressed throughout the Preparatory Committee. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the Permanent Representative of Japan for his statement. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The meeting is adjourned.