7th meeting, 12th Session of Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations
Human Rights Council
Date: 15 October 2026
Language: Floor (Original)
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/es/asset/k1j/k1jdol96wg?lang=floor
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations.

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OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [0:04]:

Buenos días,

Distinguidos delegados, distinguidos representantes, declaro abierta la 7.ª reunión del 12.º periodo de sesiones del grupo de trabajo Intergubernamental de composición abierta sobre las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas con respecto a los derechos humanos. Antes de continuar, quisiera explicar brevemente la manera en que procederemos con las tres propuestas de reformulación relativas al artículo tres, en vista de la estrecha relación que existe entre sus párrafos. En primer lugar presentaré de manera consecutiva todo lo que concierne a la propuesta 20 relativa al artículo 31 a la propuesta 21 relativa al artículo 32 y a la propuesta 22 relativa al artículo 33. En segundo lugar, daré la palabra a los expertos jurídicos para que puedan efectuar unos comentarios de carácter general sobre la totalidad del artículo tres, de manera complementaria a los antecedentes contenidos en el documento CRP2 con las propuestas de reformulación, así como a la explicación brindada el día de hoy al respecto. Estas explicaciones no impedirá que, si el tiempo lo permite, luego de las intervenciones de los Estados y de los demás actores relevantes, los expertos jurídicos tengan una oportunidad final para responder a las preguntas planteadas durante el diálogo sobre las propuestas de reformulación. Luego de ello y finalmente abriré la palabra. de manera sucesiva a los estados y a los demás actores relevantes. Primero respecto de la propuesta 20 sobre el artículo 31. Luego respecto de la propuesta 21 sobre el artículo 3.2. Y por último respecto de la propuesta 22 sobre el artículo 3.3. A continuación entonces abordaremos la 20.ª propuesta relativa al artículo 3.1 sobre el ámbito del instrumento. Como es bien conocido por todas las delegaciones El ámbito de aplicación subjetivo ha sido uno de los temas que más interés diálogo y propuestas ha suscitado a lo largo de las sesiones de este grupo de trabajo. Reconozco que el grupo de trabajo cuenta en la actualidad con un número considerable de insumos, elementos y reflexiones, y confío en que las delegaciones disponen de numerosas herramientas numerosas herramientas para reflexionar acerca de diferentes alternativas y propuestas de lenguaje, que permitan avanzar en plena conformidad con el mandato establecido por la Resolución 26 IX, y en línea con el desarrollo progresivo de las sesiones de este grupo de trabajo durante estos últimos 12 años. Por ello esta propuesta de reformulación ofrece dos alternativas de redacción, con el único fin de continuar facilitando la identificación de posibles convergencias. En su redacción actual, que mantiene la del tercer proyecto revisado, este párrafo dispone que el instrumento se aplicará a todas las actividades empresariales Incluidas las de carácter transnacional. Cabe recordar que esta redacción se mantiene desde el segundo proyecto revisado y que va acompañada en el artículo 3.2. de la posibilidad de que los Estados partes establezcan obligaciones diferenciadas en función del tamaño el sector y el contexto operativo de las empresas, y de la gravedad de los impactos. Durante la 9.ª sesión, en octubre de 2023, las delegaciones expresaron una diversidad de posiciones. Algunas delegaciones apoyaron la redacción actual, subrayando, entre otros elementos, que una víctima mantiene esta calidad aún cuando la empresa opere únicamente dentro de un estado. Que toda empresa que opera en una jurisdicción debe registrarse conforme al derecho interno. Y que conviene centrarse en las actividades empresariales transnacionales más que en la forma o naturaleza jurídica de las empresas. Por otra parte, un número importante de delegaciones propuso que el instrumento se aplique a las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas. De carácter transnacional en algunos casos. a lo largo de su cadena de valor, en estricta consonancia con el mandato de la Resolución 26/9, destacando la mayor capacidad económica de estas empresas y las dificultades que enfrentan las víctimas para obtener reparación frente a ellas. Asimismo, se presentó una fórmula intermedia referida a todas las actividades empresariales de carácter transnacional cito y otras actividades empresariales. Concebida como un lenguaje flexible que pudiera atender ambas preocupaciones. Además, durante la 9.ª sesión, delegaciones de distintas regiones coincidieron en la conveniencia de de dedicar tiempo y espacio a la discusión de este artículo durante el período interseccional con el apoyo de expertos. Precisamente en ese espíritu, en la segunda consulta temática interseccional de este año 2026, se presentaron diferentes formulaciones posibles y casos prácticos, y se reiteró que centraron que centrar el ámbito en la forma o naturaleza jurídica de las empresas podría resultar complejo. Dadas las dificultades para definir jurídicamente a las empresas transnacionales, y la evolución de las estructuras de los grupos empresariales y de las cadenas de valor. Mientras que centrarlo en la naturaleza de las actividades podría ofrecer un enfoque más adaptable. En esa consulta se desarrollaron aproximaciones y se formularon preguntas sobre la inclusión de las empresas estatales y sobre la manera de evitar cargas, desproporcionadas para las pequeñas y medianas empresas. Al respecto, cabe recordar que los instrumentos internacionales sobre la responsabilidad de las empresas generalmente se han abstenido de definir las empresas transnacionales o multinacionales. Aunque reconocen que es la actividad de un grupo empresarial, que opera a través de las fronteras, la que reviste carácter transnacional. Quisiera subrayar que la resolución 26/9 encomienda a este grupo de trabajo la regulación cito de las actividades de las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas. Fin de la cita. Como referencia se consideraron además entre otras fuentes, el comentario al principio rector 14, la declaración tripartita de principios sobre las empresas multinacionales y la política social de la OIT, las líneas directrices de la OCDE para empresas multinacionales y las guías interpretativas de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de 2012 y 2020. Sobre esa base la presidencia y relatoría pone a consideración del grupo de trabajo dos opciones, cada una de las cuales está basada en lo sustancial en propuestas presentadas por los estados durante la 9.ª sesión. Opción I. El instrumento se aplicará cito a todas las actividades empresariales de carácter transnacional y otras actividades empresariales. Fin de la cita. Esta formulación presentada en la 9.ª sesión como un lenguaje que podría atender distintas posiciones, se centra en primer lugar en la dimensión transnacional de las actividades, apoyándose en las definiciones de los artículos 1.4 y 1.5. Y abarca las actividades transnacionales a las que se dirigen en particular los artículos 689 y 11. Sin excluir al mismo tiempo otras actividades empresariales que puedan resultar perjudiciales para los derechos humanos. Opción dos. El instrumento se aplicará cito a todas las actividades empresariales de las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas. Fin de la cita. Retomando la formulación del mandato de la Resolución 26/9 Y muy cercana a la propuesta apoyada por un número importante de delegaciones durante la 9.ª sesión. Ambas opciones colocan la dimensión tras transnacional en el centro del ámbito del instrumento. Si bien difieren en su punto de partida. La primera opción parte de la naturaleza de las actividades y la segunda de los sujetos que las realizan. Quisiera reiterar no obstante que estas opciones no tienen valor jurídico ni sustituyen al texto actual del artículo 3.1. ni a las propuestas textuales presentadas por los estados. Y que su único propósito es contribuir a identificar una posible base de convergencia en una cuestión que como todos sabemos puede resultar determinante para el cumplimiento cabal del mandato del Consejo de Derechos Humanos. Y para asegurar la coherencia del futuro. instrumento jurídicamente vinculante. Pasamos ahora a la 21.ª propuesta relativa al artículo 3.2. Que permite a los Estados partes establecer en su legislación una base no discriminatoria para diferenciar la manera en que las empresas cumplen. las obligaciones de prevención en función de su tamaño, sector, contexto operativo o la gravedad de los impactos. Durante la 9.ª sesión se presentaron varias propuestas textuales sobre este párrafo, incluyendo, entre otras, la de vincular expresamente este artículo con las obligaciones de prevención previstas en el artículo seis. Propuesta que recibió el apoyo de delegaciones de distintas regiones. Adicionalmente se propuso incluir una referencia a la responsabilidad de respetar los derechos humanos. En lugar de a las obligaciones. Además de circunscribir la diferenciación únicamente a las empresas trans transnacionales y mencionar expresamente a las pequeñas y medianas empresas con una regulación que sea sensible a sus características. Sobre este último punto, se subrayó la importancia de no imponer cargas desproporcionadas a las pequeñas empresas, incluidos los pequeños comerciantes que operan a través de las fronteras. En la segunda consulta temática interseccional se solicitó aclarar si la referencia al tamaño al sector y al contexto operativo, permitiría exenciones para las pequeñas y medianas empresas en relación con la debida diligencia. Y se subrayó la necesidad de evitar cargas indirectas desproporcionadas para ellas. Varias delegaciones apoyaron mantener esta flexibilidad. Y se planteó si la disposición debería trasladarse a otra parte del texto para ajustar mejor a su lógica. Al respecto se observó que el artículo seis establece el deber de adoptar medidas legislativas. y de y de otra índole para prevenir los abusos. Y que las demás disposiciones del proyecto se dirigen a los estados sin exigir directamente una conducta. específica a las empresas. En ese contexto ubicar esta disposición en el artículo seis permitiría aclarar los aspectos respecto de los cuales los estados. podrían diferenciar de manera no discriminatoria la debida diligencia y otras medidas preventivas. En cuanto a las pequeñas y medianas empresas. Una mención expresa ampliaría la referencia actual al tamaño, por lo que los Estados podrán considerar si esta ya las abarca. Como fuentes especiales y referenciales, se tuvieron presentes el comentario al principio rector 14 y la guía interpretativa de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de 2024. En consecuencia, y recogiendo la propuesta formulada en la 9.ª sesión de vincular esta disposición con el artículo seis, la presidencia relatoría sugiere lo siguiente. Primero, trasladar la disposición al final del artículo seis, identificando la preliminarmente como artículo 6.7. Segundo. Simplificar su redacción, de modo que los Estados partes puedan establecer en su legislación una base no discriminatoria para diferenciar cito el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de prevención previstas en el instrumento. Fin de la cita. En función del tamaño el sector o el contexto operativo de las empresas o de la gravedad de los impactos adversos en los derechos humanos. Esta formulación permite cumplir la obligación por distintos medios y abarca diferentes tipos de empresas, incluidas las pequeñas y medianas empresas, así como las empresas estatales. Mientras que la referencia a la no discriminación asegura que no se establezcan diferencias por el hecho de que una empresa sea nacional o extranjera. Con esta introducción paso a continuación a la 22.ª y última propuesta de reformulación relativa al artículo 3.3 sobre el ámbito material del instrumento es decir los derechos humanos que este abarca. En su redacción actual este párrafo dispone que el instrumento abarcará todos los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales internacionalmente reconocidos que vinculen a los estados partes. Cabe recordar que en el proyecto actualizado de instrumento jurídicamente vinculante, este párrafo fue objeto de ligeros ajustes respecto del tercer proyecto revisado precisamente con el fin de recabar el apoyo de un mayor número de estados. Durante la 9.ª sesión, este párrafo dio lugar a propuestas que reflejan aproximaciones distintas. Algunas delegaciones propusieron suprimir el calificativo internacionalmente reconocidos. Por considerar que impone un umbral que podría derivar en cierta subjetividad de aplicación y referirse en términos generales a todos los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales. Otras delegaciones. insistieron en mantenerlo subrayando que, para tener carácter universal, los derechos humanos deben estar reconocidos y consignados en instrumentos internacionales, evitando así interpretaciones divergentes por parte de cada estado. En la misma línea se propuso referirse a los derechos universalmente reconocidos. a la luz de la declaración y programa de acción de Viena de 1993. También se propuso circunscribir el ámbito material, a los tratados de derechos humanos ratificados por cada estado con el fin de aportar certeza jurídica sobre las obligaciones asumidas. Finalmente. se propuso referirse a todos los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos, incluidos los no vinculantes, o añadir referencias expresas al derecho internacional de los derechos humanos al derecho internacional humanitario al derecho internacional consuetudinario y al derecho internacional ambiental. En la segunda consulta temática interseccional, varias delegaciones expresaron su preocupación porque la formulación actual pudiera extenderse a las obligaciones de los estados más allá de los tratados en los que son parte. Y otras delegaciones y organizaciones advirtieron que vincular el ámbito material a las obligaciones convencionales. de cada Estado podría crear vacíos de protección y reducirla a un mínimo no deseable. Asimismo, se preguntó si las empresas que operan a través de las fronteras, deberían respetar los derechos reconocidos en los tratados que vinculan el estado de origen, al estado receptor o a los estados en los que se desarrollan actividades a lo largo de las cadenas de valor. Al respecto se observó que este párrafo es particularmente relevante para el instrumento en especial para las obligaciones de prevención del artículo 6.ya que determina qué derechos deberán considerar las empresas en sus procesos de debida. diligencia. En ese sentido es importante tener en cuenta lo siguiente. Primero eliminar el calificativo internacionalmente reconocidos sin añadir precisiones adicionales podría tener un efecto ampliatorio hacia derechos reconocidos únicamente en el derecho interno. Segundo, limitar el ámbito material a las obrigações convencionais asumidas por cada Estado, podería dar lugar a diferencias importantes en el contenido de los derechos protegidos. En vista de la ratificación desigual de los instrumentos de derechos humanos, cuestión que puede examinarse a la luz de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados. Tercero, en cuanto al derecho internacional humanitario y al derecho internacional ambiental, los Estados podrán considerar, si una referencia específica en este párrafo añade elementos, que no se encuentren ya presentes. O si resulta más conveniente integrar elementos específicos de ambas ramas en los artículos seis o 16. Y respecto del derecho internacional consuetudinario y de los principios generales del derecho, cabe recordar que operan con independencia de su mención en un tratado. Con estos elementos, la presidencia relatoria pone a consideración del grupo de trabajo dos opciones, elaboradas teniendo en cuenta las distintas preocupaciones expresadas desde la 9ª sesión, entre ellas, la certeza jurídica sobre las obrigaciones efectivamente asumidas por los Estados, la necesidad de evitar umbrales subjetivos y la conveniencia de una base común en el derecho internacional. Ambas sustituyen la fórmula actual por una referencia expresa a los derechos humanos. Humanos cito que vinculan a los estados partes fin de la cita. Y que difieren en la manera de identificar las fuentes de esas obligaciones. En la opción I los derechos humanos reflejados cito en los tratados en los que dichos estados son partes, en el derecho internacional consuetudinario, en los principios generales del derecho y en el derecho interno de los estados partes. Fin de la cita. Esta opción enumera las distintas fuentes de obligaciones en línea con las consideradas en la 4.ª propuesta de reformulación presentada durante la 11ª sesión respecto del artículo 6.1. La opción dos más concisa, los derechos humanos que vinculan a los estados partes en virtud del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Que remite a una base común de derecho internacional sin enumerar. sus fuentes. Cabe precisar que en ambas opciones se suprime el calificativo internacionalmente reconocidos y la referencia a las libertades. fundamentales, en la medida en que su contenido quedaría comprendido en la referencia a los derechos humanos que vinculan a los Estados partes. Al igual que en la propuesta relativa al artículo 3.1, estas opciones buscan únicamente facilitar el diálogo sobre una cuestión que ha suscitado posiciones diversas a lo largo del proceso. proceso. Sin sustituir el texto actual ni las propuestas textuales presentadas por los estados. Luego de esta Introducción de las propuestas alternativas a los tres párrafos del artículo tres. Y como había anunciado previamente, cedo la palabra a los expertos jurídicos para que nos compartan unas reflexiones de carácter general sobre esta disposición. Adelante por favor.


Experto jurídico [25:27]:

Thank you very much chairperson rapporteur good morning colleagues colleagues today marks the 59th day that this. intergovernmental working group has been meeting in a regular session since 6th July 2015. It is therefore particularly significant to go back to one of the main questions raised by this instrument, the content of Article three on the scope of the LBI. Since the beginning of the negotiation, a key aspect has been defining which human rights should be covered by the LBI. There are several options, as the chairperson already presented, all internationally recognized human rights, internationally recognized rights in addition to those that may have been recognized domestically or on account of regional treaties, rights established in treaties to which states are parties to. Or, in addition to those with a treaty basis, those that have acquired the status of customary international law or that constitute general principles of law. As mentioned in the second intersessional consultation in April this year, this appears to be one of the most legally complex complex provisions in the LBI, on account of the varying levels of ratification of international human rights law instruments. And yet it is also important to look at the statistics. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has 196 state parties. The Convention on the Rights of persons with disabilities has 193 state parties. The convention on the elimination of discrimination against women has 189 state parties. The convention on the elimination of racial discrimination has 182 state parties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has 175 state parties. The Convention Against Torture also has 175 state parties. The Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has 174 state parties. The Convention on Enforced Appearances has 78 state parties. And the Convention on Migrant Workers and their Families, 60 state parties. In general terms, there is a significant degree of ratification of treaties recognizing specific rights for certain groups, which acts as a common basis for state action. This complements the twin covenants, which encapsulate the general recognition of all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and which both enjoy a large degree of ratification by numerous states. And as we are aware, and as was already mentioned as well by the chairperson rapporteur, this is without prejudice to the direct application of customary international law and general principles of law, as noted by the International Law Commission in its draft conclusions on identification of customer international law, and in its draft conclusions on general principles of law. As the intergovernmental working group has progressed in the detailed analysis of the LBA, LBI, it has become clearer that certain provisions encapsulate specific duties that act independently from other provisions in the text or that don't have a cross cutting effect. But more pressing question, especially at this stage of treaty design and negotiation is the function that Article three in general and 3.3 specifically performs in relation to the rest of the operative sections of the treaty. For this reason, we consider important to reflect on how the paragraphs of Article III interact with the rest of the LBI. Article four, as you can see in the screen, is a case in point. With the exception of Article 4.1, which acts as a chapeau in the provision, the specific content of including the rest of Article four denotes a series of rights that would operate on their own, regardless of the provision in 3.3. The same can be mentioned regarding Article five on protection of victims, which focuses on state parties obligations under the LBI. And it would act also independently from other international commitments states have agreed upon. Article seven has a similar function containing different measures that state parties to this LBI would have to adopt to facilitate access to judicial and nonjudicial remedy, specifically with regards to this instrument. Article eight, also does not necessarily have a strict relationship with Article 3.3, although it would interact directly with the provisions under Articles 4 to 7. Articles nine, 10, 11, and 12 follow relatively the same path that is, they establish specific duties under this instrument that would operate independently of Article 3.3. What remains is the role that the phrase all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms binding on the state parties of this LBI, plays in relation to Article six on prevention. Arguably, more than focusing on the ratification of human rights instruments by states, the central focus of considering all internationally recognized human rights is the material basis that companies should consider while undertaking human rights due diligence processes. It is in this aspect it is this aspect which, in our view, merits further consideration. If you review Article 6.2 b and c of the updated draft, it reads as follows state parties shall adopt appropriate legislative, regulatory, and other measures to be ensure respect by business enterprises for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. And C, ensure the practice of human rights due diligence by business enterprises. The first paragraph already contains an equivalent phrasing that recognizes the obligation of third parties to take measures to ensure respect of all internationally recognized human rights. It is in this regard where some of the conversations from yesterday become relevant. States may integrate in that material scope rights that have gained international recognition, and also those that may have been developed at the regional or domestic level. An argument could be raised, however, to refer to the fact that if certain states have not ratified specific treaties, they would not have a duty to adopt those obligations in their domestic jurisdiction, which could potentially then not be required in human rights due diligence processes. At this point, it is relevant for states and other stakeholders to consider the potential role that Article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could play in this regard. Article 35 of the VCLT reads as follows. An obligation arises for a third state from a provision of a treaty. If the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation, and the third state expressly accepts that obligation in writing. This article could give states that have not ratified a particular human rights instrument an opportunity to accept a specific obligation in writing for the purpose of Article 6.2 B and C, which could serve to create a more uniform standard in terms of the material basis of human rights that businesses would have to uphold in their transnational activities. We submit this views respectfully for your consideration as a process moves forward towards a new stage with the aim of finding avenues that could facilitate building bridges in terms of which human rights should be considered the material scope of the instrument. And with this, I pass over the floor to my colleague, for an intervention on Article 3.2. Thank you.

Thank you, and good morning delegates and colleagues. Thanks Chair for giving us the opportunity to share some thoughts. So i'm going to address article 3.2 as a way of just contextualising. what I am going to say, it is clear that the drafting of this provision, both in the current draft text as well as the chair's suggested language, cross references to the prevention obligation. We see that this article on prevention, article six, would be a natural place for this provision. And the change of the placement to article six will already help clarify that this provision is meant to address the means of, implementation of the prevention obligations. So we have heard several states in the last few days raise points related to SMEs. This has been the case as well in previous sessions, particularly noting that the legally binding instrument should not impede the economic function of SMEs, and that the impact on SMEs should be carefully addressed when designing the LBI. If you want to consider the issue of burdensomeness on SMEs, we can see that it arises specifically in the context of the implementation prevention the implementation of prevention obligations. Because if we revise the other sections of the legally binding instrument, we can note that the burdensomeness or potential burdensomeness of implementation generally concerns the implementation by the states thus moving the provision 3.2 to article six. will further help positioning this provision in relation to sme related concerns, as also the chair has indicated. So in in this taking this context into consideration, I would like to highlight two points, building on what the chair already shared, and share three propositions for members considerations. In terms of the two elements, the first is how we read it. This provision would not provide grounds to carve out certain entities from the scope of the legally binding. instrument because they are considered nationals of the implementing state, such as state owned enterprises or companies that are majority owned by nationals of the implementing state. And the reference to non discriminatory basis, as the Chair has pointed out, would help ensure that the measures taken on the basis of this provision do not differentiate between business entities depending on whether they are considered domestic or national or foreign. So in this sense, this provision would not raise concerns pertaining to discrimination in in this kind of discrimination. The second point I want to raise, also building on what the chair pointed out, is that the provision would provide grounds for states to implement the prevention obligation in ways that account for what the Guiding Principles refer to as proportionality. of the means of implementation in reference to size as well as other factors which are addressed under guiding principle 14 and its related commentary. For example, recent practice in relation to due diligence and corporate sustainability applies the obligations in reference to the size of the companies and their turnover. This would be one example of the interventions or measures that would be justified under the discretion given by article 3.2. besides these two elements, the three propositions that I would like to share are the following. One is that states might want to consider adding further language to explicitly connect or contextualise this provision in relation to concerns pertaining to SMEs. For example, states may consider language at the beginning or the end of the provision that refers to addressing implementation burdens on small and medium sized enterprises as they are defined by domestic law. And the importance of reference to domestic law here, is because SMEs are defined under domestic law of different jurisdictions, and the definitions do vary across jurisdictions based on various. economic conditions. So if you look, you can see that generally SMEs are defined as non subsidiary independent firms which employ less than a given number of employees. But the definition often varies in relation to the number of employees referenced, the turnover referenced, and in some cases, the capital investment referenced. So this is one proposition. The second proposition is that states might want might want to consider the utility and the implications of the wording at the beginning of the article, referring to notwithstanding article 31. because this reference might be read as grounds to carve out certain entities from the scope of. the LBI because article 3.1 refers to scope. But as explained by the chair and as members have discussed, article 3.2 over the years this provision is not meant for the purposes of carving out certain entities but is meant to provide grounds for aligning the means of implementation in relation to size. operational context, and other factors. So this is the second proposition. And the third relates to the importance that the discretion discretion granted to states under this article 3.2 or 6.x does not undermine the effectiveness or should not undermine the effectiveness of. the preventive measures required by Article six. For those purposes, one consideration could be considering wording that pertains to positive action that could be taken to support SMEs in relation to indirect implications that might arise, Such as trickle down effect from large entities in a value chain, onto SMEs or smaller entities such as suppliers or other service providers in this chain, I mean, which would arise in the context where the entities which have the obligation are trying to basically undertake certain assessments. or collect certain data, etc. And these kind of trickle down effects could arise in the context of transnational activities clearly, because the big firm, or the big company that would have the obligation in relation to due diligence or other preventative measures, could be located in a jurisdiction different from where the SME is located. So such kind of language could address the role of the companies undertaking due diligence of or other preventative measures, their role in supporting the SMEs within their value chains or within other business relationships they might hold, with a view to fulfilling those prevention and due diligence obligations without adding undue burdens on. the SMEs. So these are three proposals for your consideration, and we hope this will be helpful. Thank you.

Good morning colleagues i will now share some thoughts on article 31 since. this working group was established in 2015, one of its central debates has been the subjective scope of the instrument, which actors and which activities it should address and how a legal instrument can effectively address business activities in a globalised economy. To this end, several options have been proposed, referring to as Human Rights Council resolution 269 does to the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, attempting to define what a transnational corporation is, focusing on business activities of of a transnational character, also worded as transnational business activities. Other proposals have used the formula that cover all business activities of a transnational character and other business activities. Some of these options are not new. They have all been debated at the United Nations and in other international organizations. organisations for a while. article 3.1 thus addresses the question of whether the scope of the lbi should include transnational corporations especially considering historic historically the concerns around ensuring accountability for human rights abuses, particularly where complex corporate structures, cross border operations and jurisdiction barriers may make access to justice difficult as stated in resolution 269. it is thus an accountability gap that prompted the draft of article 3.1. in the first place for example the difficulties in attributing responsibility across corporate groups, accessing information and evidence, establishing jurisdiction and obtaining effective remedies in cases where business activities extend across several states. A first question for states is whether it is necessary or helpful to rely on a concept. that has proven hard to define. The definition of the transnational corporation was one of the points on which no agreement was reached in undergovernmental negotiations in the 70s and 80. Nevertheless, in legal terms, a transnational corporation is generally understood as a group of companies operating in a coordinated way across jurisdictions under the general direction of a parent company. It is more accurately described as a transnational corporate group. Such groups are vertically integrated at varying degrees with particular entities responsible for particular functions. They work with suppliers and contractors in different jurisdictions under commercial contracts that make up their supply chains or value chains. It is this variety of legal entities across many jurisdictions, each with separate legal personality, what makes the concept hard to capture in law, at least if the group is treated as a single entity, which it is not. The development of business and human rights over the past two decades offers relevant experience. For example, on legislation several jurisdictions have chosen to place duties on the parent companies of corporate groups regarding their subsidiaries, including those abroad, to take preventative measures, notably through human rights. due diligence. Depending on the functions of the entities within the group, these duties may extend beyond the ultimate parent company. Some of these laws also recognize honorism risk based approach that that abuses in supply chains may need to be addressed by entities in the corporate group. On case law, courts in several jurisdictions have held that the parent company may in principle be liable under civil law, depending on how far it is involved in an overseas subsidiary and on its actual or constructive awareness of the risk of harm. Case law has also recognized possible civil liability in supply chains, for instance, where a dominant customer fails to use its leverage over a supplier. In other cases, due judicial oversight has followed prosecutions for failures to oversee and implement human rights policies within supply chains. These experiences show that business activities rather than the form or structure of the legal entity, are increasingly the basis for determining legal liability. International instruments on the responsibilities of business enterprises have generally avoided defining transnational or multinational enterprises. Several of them do recognize that the transnational character lies in the activities of a corporate group operating. across borders examples are the commentary to UNGP 14 paragraph six of the ILO tripartite declaration and paragraph four of the OECD guidelines. resolution 269 mandates the working group to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. its footnote describes describes other business enterprises as those with a transnational character in their operational activities. The second part of the footnote excludes local businesses registered in terms of, relevant domestic law. So states may wish to to bear in mind and consider that many jurisdictions require every business enterprise, foreign ones included, to register under domestic law before operating. So states may wish to consider this to avoid loopholes that would let entities argue that they fall outside of the instrument. Wordings. such as business activities of a transnational character or transnational business activities would reflect the mandate's focus on operational activities. It would cover parent companies, entities within, a corporate group and supply chains for both prevention and access to remedy, including through transnational litigation. I will not repeat here the comments that I have made yesterday about global value chains, but they are of course part of this discussion. The formula all business activities of a transnational character and other business activities focuses on on the transnational dimension. relying on the definitions in articles 1.4 and 1.5. it could cover the different forms of transnational business activity that articles six, eight, nine, and the address while leaving room to regulate other business activities that may harm human rights. Whatever states decide on the subjective scope, it will interact closely with the definitions in Article one, particularly the concepts of business activities, business activities of a transnational character, and business relationships. Consequently, decisions on Article three point 3.1 should be reflected carefully there. Thank you Chair. I now give the floor to my colleague Richard Meeren.


Experto jurídico [49:55]:

Thank you Chair, good morning Chair and good morning colleagues and friends. The purpose and scope of the instrument, as set out in Articles two and three, are articulated in the provisions of the treaty. And I've been asked by reference again to a hypothetical case example involving a business of a transnational nature. to consider how the provisions, the various provisions of the treaty might apply to the case that I'm going to describe. So here's some background facts. We have a lead mine operating in a country in the global south. It has caused pollution for many many years, and tens of thousands of local people have been poisoned. There's been little or no enforcement of local laws. The mine says that it's operating on the margins of profitability and that community complaints are threatening the future stability of the mine and jobs. As a result of this, the community are afraid to take action locally and are subjected to intimidation when they complain. They can't afford local lawyers. They can't afford lawyers at all. And the other point to add into the mix is that the country in question has a three year limitation period for bringing claims, otherwise they become time barred. Now, local public interest lawyers who have been assisting the the communities, realize that the mine is is a subsidiary of a large transnational corporation. Which is incorporated in a tax haven. However, it has its central administration and assets in a state in the global north, which has ratified the treaty and passed domestic legislation in accordance with its obligations under the treaty. So the local lawyers right to the the company, where it's headquartered, and ask it to bring a halt to the lead emissions, to carry out a cleanup of the environment, to provide monitoring and treatment for young children and pregnant women, who are especially vulnerable to the effects of lead. The parent company, however, denies any responsibility and says, we're just an investor we've got no involvement in or control over the mine. And the community and its local lawyers don't have any hard evidence to prove the contrary. And the the parent company, in addition to this, says, well, you're all living in an area where lead naturally occurs, and that's most probably the cause of any problems that you are suffering from. So that's the scenario. Now let's just think about what the under the provisions of the treaty the community might be able to do about this in relation to the parent company. First of all, if one looks at the provisions on jurisdiction, which are in article Article nine one can see that these provide in Article 92 that a legal person is considered domicile. domiciled in any territory or jurisdiction in which it has and then it has four options. But one of them is central administration or management, and another is assets or operations. So based on that provision, the the courts of the country where the parent company has its asset assets or its central administration would have jurisdiction in a case. And the state in question would also have a responsibility of over a bid, business which is within its jurisdiction. So if we then turn to the preventative section of the treaty, which is Article six, We can see that under that under those provisions which the state in question has endorsed, The state is required to ensure that the company carries out human rights due diligence. And in particular, if one looks at six four, measures to achieve the ends referred to in Article 62 shall include legally enforceable requirements for business enterprises to undertake human rights due diligence as well as such supporting or ancillary measures, as may be needed to ensure that the business enterprises, while carrying out human rights due diligence and then lists a series of specific measures, that would apply to the parent company. And in addition to that, it says in 65, each state party shall take necessary measures to ensure that business enterprises take appropriate steps to prevent human rights abuses by third parties where the enterprise controls, manages, or supervises the third party, including through the imposition of a legal duty to prevent such abuse in appropriate cases. So applying that to the current scenario, what one might expect the state to ensure happens in relation to this parent company is that it investigates and evaluates exactly what's happening in the the among the community where the mine is based. And that in the end, what it will do in order to mitigate the risk to the community is to require its subsidiary to clean up. It will implement a system for blood lead screening for children and women. And make sure that further operations of the mine do not, infringe the rights of the local community. Now, turning to then questions of the the communities themselves seeking justice for the harm that they have suffered. Well, that depends on them having access to justice in the courts of the parent company against the parent company. Because as as explained in the facts, this is not something that's feasible in the host. state. Well, the first issue is limitation, because I said in the facts that there was a three year limitation period. And if one looks then at Article 1010, of the treaty, which deals with statute of limitations, and in particular Article 102, because that's the provision that deals with situations which don't constitute war crimes or the the most serious human rights violations. What 102B requires is that the state parties, so this would be the the state where the parent company is domiciled, will ensure that the limitation measures are not unduly restrictive in light of this context and circumstances, including the location where the relevant human rights abuse took place or where the relevant harm was sustained. So in this instance, one would expect the three year limitation to be disapplied and a more relaxed limitation provision to apply. Now, The next issue which has been discussed frequently at these meetings, the next hurdle that claimants would invariably encounter in cases where they are trying to bring a parent company to book in the home state is forum nonconvenience. So this is the doctrine that many common law countries, apply, in which the courts declined to exercise jurisdiction in a case where it is felt that there is a more appropriate venue, namely the host state courts. So that's a very serious obstacle. And here, then, what we need to look at, we need to consider Article 42 C, read in conjunction with 93a. So if one looks at 4 to C, what we see there is that victims should be guaranteed the right to fair, effective, prompt, non discriminatory, appropriate and gender sensitive access to justice. And that read in conjunction with 93 a

That the state

Parties should take such measures as may be necessary. And this is to in relation to the discontinuation of legal proceedings on the grounds that there is another more convenient or more appropriate forum with jurisdiction. over the matter. So that is a measure which is designed to relax the application of the forum non convenience. rule in those states which apply it very stringently. For instance, in North America, the rule is applied very stringently in relation to foreign claimants. Now, if we then turn to access to justice, access to remedy, this is Article seven. There are some important measures here that will affect the ability of the claimants in this or the communities in this hypothetical case to get access to justice. As Article seven begins, the the the obligation on states is to progressively reduce legal and practical barriers to justice. And refer there in particular to 72 b, progressively reduce the legal and practical and other relevant obstacles that individually or in combination hinder the ability of a victim from accessing an. effective remedy. And there are a series of important measures in Articles seven three and seven four. So if one looks at seven three b. And this is critical to a case where the parent company says it was nothing to do with me, and the communities are unable to access information about the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary from public sources. And what 773 b says is that the policies that state parties should implement will ensure that victims have ready ready access to reliable sources of information, and then down, towards the bottom of 73 b, including by facilitating requests for disclosure of relevant information of business related activities or relationships, linked to human rights abuse. So absolutely crucial from the the victims perspective in cases against transnational parent companies. And then in 74 d, to assist claimants further, there is a provision for the reversal of the burden of proof. So if the parent company fails, to provide the information which would enable a claimant to evaluate the relationship. Well, the burden is on the parent company to show that it wasn't in control rather than the other way around. around. 73 a allows for states to provide legal aid for cases. Now this is, again, particularly crucial in cases where involving complex technical and medical evidence, as a case like this would be, would be very costly for claimants or even claimants lawyers to afford on their own. 74 F, ability to bring group actions. Now that ability to bring class actions is also, I think, in Article Article four under rights of victims. And that's absolutely crucial in a case where, as in this scenario, you have thousands of claimants. They can't possibly bring 1000 thousands of individual claims that would be administratively impossible and hugely expensive. So the availability of class actions or group actions absolutely crucial. and then here again in this case 73 d requires the states to address the risk of reprisals to claimants. So in this instance, where claimants are fearful of their safety, if their opposition to the mine is is publicized locally, having proved having provisions, for instance, for anonymity or very restricted divulging of the identity of claimants is hugely important. Now, moving on to the questions of liability. Well, first of all, there's the question of the applicable law, because liability will be determined in accordance with the applicable law, In this situation, Article 11 to be stipulates that the law of the domicile of the defendant could apply. And then turning to the liability provisions themselves, this is Article eight, and the important point to make about that is that states are required, in 81, to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish a comprehensive and adequate system of liability of legal and natural persons conducting business activities within their territory jurisdiction, or otherwise under their control for human rights abuses that may arise from their business. activities or relationships, including those of a transnational character. So I think we heard we've heard about cases in the UK where the law has been developed to enable a parent company to be held to account legally, circumventing the corporate veil. But that isn't the case in other states. So this provision provides for that to to happen. I think I better leave it there. I hope that has given some indication of how the various provisions of the treaty could work together in a case which, although hypothetical, is not unusual.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:08:05]:

Agradezco a los expertos jurídicos por sus muy útiles reflexiones, sobre los el artículo tres y sus tres párrafos. Así como El ejemplo hipotético en donde se puede e apreci se podría apreciar e la interacción de las diferentes disposiciones del instrumento jurídicamente vinculante. Bien. Luego de esto entonces como había indicado al inicio de la reunión voy a ceder la palabra para las intervenciones en primer lugar de los estados párrafo por párrafo del artículo tres. Invito entonces a los estados que deseen intervenir sobre Sobre las propuestas alternativas del artículo tres, párrafo uno. Ofrezco la palabra al Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo.


GCC · Representante [1:09:48]:

فيما يخص المادة ثلاثة

نود إعادة التأكيد على أهمية الالتزام بالولاية المحددة. في قرار مجلس حقوق الإنسان ستة وعشرين على تسعة، وضمان اتساق نطاق التطبيق مع التعريفات الواردة في المادة واحد. وفيما يتعلق بالفقرة 3.1 نرى أن الخيار الأول قد يمتد إلى أنشطة محلية بحتة، بما فيها أنشطة المنشآت الصغيرة والمتوسطة التي لا تحمل طابعا عابرا للحدود. وعليه نقترح البناء على الخيار الثاني مع توضيح أن عبارة غيرها من مؤسسات الأعمال تعني المؤسسات. ذات الطابع العابر للحدود في أنشطتها التشغيلية بما يتفق مع حاشية القرار 26 على 9. ويستبعد المؤسسات المحلية التي لا تتسم أنشطتها بهذا، الطابع. وبشأن الفقرة ثلاثة فاصلة ثلاثة نقترح قصر الحقوق المشمولة على الحقوق المقررة في المعاهدات التي تكون الدول. المعنية طرفا فيها. دون المساس بالتزاماتها المستقلة بموجب القانون الدولي العرفي. ونؤكد ضرورة اتساق هذا الضابط مع تعريف الأثر السلبي على حقوق الإنسان في الفقرة 1.2. بحيث لا تؤدي الصياغات إلى تحميل الدولة التزامات تعاقدية لم تقبل بها. ونتطلع الى انعكاس هذه المقترحات في الصياغات المنقحة بما يضمن تعريفات دقيقة ونطاقا واضحا وحماية فعالة للمتضررين، وشكرا للسيد الرئيس.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:11:45]:

Muchas gracias a GCC el estado de Qatar tiene la palabra.


Qatar · Representante [1:12:03]:

Thank you for giving me the floor. Thank you Chair, good morning colleagues. For Qatar's side, our delegation considers article 12. 3.1 to be among the most significant provisions under the discussion, given its direct implication for the interpretation interpretation and implementation of the LBI as a whole. We note that the Chair rapporteur has presented two draft alternatives. In this regard, we would appreciate clarification of the substantive legal difference between these options, particularly whether the second alternative is intended to narrow the scope of application or simply to identify more explicitly the business entities covered. We recall, as the GCC, the Human Rights Council Resolution 269 specifically concerns transitional cooperation and other business enterprises. We therefore consider it important to examine carefully how the proposed scope relates to the mandate and to the transitional dimension. of the activities that the LBI seeks to regulate. At the same time, we recognize the importance of prevent preventing regularity gaps that could undermine effect effective human rights protection. Our delegation believes that the final formulation should clearly identify the activities and entities covered, while ensuring consistency with the provisions and prevention. liability, jurisdictions and international cooperation. We would therefore welcome a more detailed explanation of the legal consequences of each option before expressing preference for either formulation.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:13:46]:

Muchas gracias al estado de Qatar La Unión Europea tiene la palabra.


EU · Representante [1:13:56]:

Good morning. Thank you for giving us the floor. Concerning article 3.1, neither option appears to fully address our concerns regarding the personal scope. As we have said previously, limiting the LBI to transnational corporations or business activities of transnational character would neither reflect the universal nature of human rights nor the approach of the United Nations guiding principles. Option two would be difficult to reconcile with our view, therefore, that the LBI should cover domestic as well as transnational business activities. Option one could offer a more suitable basis for further consideration, as its reference to all business activities leaves room for domestic activities to be covered. However, such broader scope would need to be reflected consistently throughout the instrument where, on the contrary, currently, several provisions continue to focus on transnational activities or enterprises.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:15:06]:

Thank you. Filipinas tiene la palabra.


Philippines · Representante [1:15:23]:

Excellency and good morning colleagues we thank the chair rapporteur for these two options, as well as to the legal experts for the very valuable clarifications on the relationship of this article with relevant articles of the provisions of the LBI. We understand, that this is an effort. The proposals you have presented is an effort to prove to move the process forward. We note, however, that both options are a substantive expansion of the scope of the draft legally legally binding instrument beyond its original founding mandate. We recall that the Philippines voted in favor of HRC 26/29 in 2014. And it has been our consistent understanding that the LBI is intended to apply strictly to transnational corporations and other enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities. While the Philippines supports robust corporate, accountability and recognizes the importance of responsible business conduct for all enterprises, expanding the LBI scope, risks creating and manageable administrative and legal burdens on domestic micro, small, and medium enterprises, which constitute over 99% of registered Philippine businesses. They are covered under our Magna Carta for Small Enterprises and MSME Development Act. Domestic businesses in the Philippines are regulated through domestic legislative, administrative, and judicial frameworks. Philippines statutory and regulatory mechanisms require business enterprises to identify prevent, mitigate, and account for human rights and environmental risks across their operations and value chains. For instance, we have a special constitutional remedy, such as the wreath of Kalikasan, allowing citizens and public interest groups to seek immediate judicial relief and injunctions against harmful environmental activity by a business entity and other actors. In closing, we note the positive intent of the proposed proposals. And in conjunction with the proposed new provision at the end of Article 66.7, we understand that this is an effort to prevent legal loopholes that could undermine the purpose of the envisioned LBI. And we will take this into consideration in our domestic interagency discussions on this matter. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:17:48]:

Muchas gracias a Filipinas. Islandia tiene la palabra.


Iceland · Representante [1:18:02]:

Extend my thanks to the legal experts for providing the very valuable clarification, especially when it comes to reading the articles that we are discussing here today, in conjunction with other important articles. important articles of this legally binding treaty, I think that perhaps we may be forgetting the overall context of this LBI. Having said that, on Article three 3.1, we will continue to reflect on the options presented by the chair. But also we do want to note that it is really important to choose an approach that avoids protection gaps, and also difficulties that are related to definitions introduced by a scope based on the legal structure of enterprises. So with respect to the two options the chair has presented, we suggest that the formulation would be simplified to avoid repetition and suggest the formulation among along the line lines of all business activities, including in particular those of a transnational character, but would be open to review other other kinds of formulation as well. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:19:21]:

Muchas gracias a

Islandia. Arabia Saudita tiene la palabra.


Saudi Arabia · Representante [1:19:38]:

شكرا سيدي الرئيس، ونشكر للسيدات والسادة الخبراء الذي تقديمه، السيد الرئيس يود وفد المملكة أن يضم صوته لبيان مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية، فيما يخص المادة 3.1 تدرك المملكة أهمية معالجة الآثار السلبية على حقوق الإنسان الناشئة عن الأنشطة التجارية، وتؤكد في الوقت ذاته ضرورة الإلتزام بالولاية المحددة في قرار مجلس حقوق الإنسان 26/9 التي تتمثل في معالجة التحديات القانونية، والتنظيمية، الخاصة مرتبطة بالأنشطة التجارية ذات الطابع العابر للحدود، بما يستوجب قصر أحكام الصك على الشركات عبر الوطنية وغيرها من مؤسسات. الأعمال ذات الطابع العابر للحدود في أنشطتها التشغيلية، دون المؤسسات التجارية المحلية. وتلاحظ المملكة أن الخيار الأول المقترح يمد نطاق الصك صراحة إلى الأنشطة التجارية الأخرى، في حين يستند الخيار الثاني إلى عبارة مؤسسات الأعمال الأخرى دون تعريف لها. بما قد يفهم منه شمول جميع مؤسسات الأعمال، ومن شأن مد الصك إلى الأنشطة التي تمارس حصرا داخل الولاية الوطنية، أن يوسع نطاق تطبيقه توسيعا كبيرا، وأن ينشئ إلتزامات دولية في مسائل تنظمها الأطر التشريعية والتنظيمية والتنظيمية الوطنية، بما يمس حق الدول السيادي في تنظيم الأنشطة التجارية داخل ولايتها وفقا لقوانينها الوطنية الداخلية والتزاماتها الدولية ذات الصلة. وترى المملكة أن الخيار الثاني يمثل أساسا أفضل لاستناده إلى الصيغة الواردة في القرار 26/9 ذاته، وتقترح استكماله بالتعريف الوارد في حاشية القرار، بحيث ينطبق الصك على جميع الأنشطة التجارية للشركات عبر الوطنية وغيرها من مؤسسات الأعمال التي لها طابع عابر للحدود في أنشطتها، التشغيلية، ولا ينطبق على المؤسسات التجارية المحلية المسجلة وفقا للقانون الداخلي ذي الصلة. ولا ينشأ السيد الرئيس عن ذلك أي ثغرة، إذ إن العبرة بالطابع العابر للحدود للنشاط التشغيلي لا بمكان التسجيل، بما يعالج الشاغل الذي اثارته خلفية مقترح الرئيس المقرر في هذا الشأن. كما تقترح المملكة تبعا لذلك حذف عبارة مع مراعاة المادة 3.1 من الفقرة الجديدة رقم 6.7 مع احتفاظ المملكة بموقفها بشأن ما يلزم من موائم في المواد التشغيلية، الأخرى مثل المادتين 6.1 و8.1 عند التفاوض عليها في سياق ضمان إتساق النص. وتؤكد المملكة أيضا أهمية أن يميز الصك بوضوح بين الأنشطة التجارية والأعمال التي تؤديها الدول في ممارسة السلطة الحكومية، بحيث تخضع المؤسسات المؤسسات المملوكة للدولة، لأحكامه متى كانت أنشطتها التجارية مشمولة بنطاقه، دون أن يمتد إلى ما تؤديه من أعمال في ممارسة تلك السلطة، وهو ما سوف تتناوله المملكة في مقترحها بشأن إضافة فقرة جديدة برقم عند نقاشنا للمادة 33 وشكرا السيد الرئيس.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:23:41]:

Muchas gracias Arabia Saudita. Japón tiene la

Palabra.


Japan · Representante [1:23:53]:

And good morning, the floor. Regarding Article 3.1, we would prefer option two presented in the Table Apporteurs Proposal 20. This is because while option one focuses on the transnational character of business activities themselves, option two focuses on the entities conducting business activities, which is in line with the UNGPs that cover activities undertaken by business enterprises. However, since option two is based on the definition of business activities in Article 1.4, which we consider lacks clarity, we cannot support the current formulation of option two unless the definition in Article 1.4 is appropriately refined. Also, we understand that the definition in option two derives from Human Rights Council Resolution 269. But we believe that the definition of transnational cooperation and other business enterprises excludes local businesses registered registered in terms of relevant domestic law, and therefore is not in line with the UNGPs, which require business enterprises to protect human rights, regardless of the size of those enterprises and the sectors in which they operate. However, with a view to respecting the objectives objective of the aforementioned resolution, which is that option to be revised as follows. This LBI shall apply to all business activities of business enterprises including transnational cooperations.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:25:29]:

Thank you Muchas gracias al Japón. Brasil tiene la palabra.


Brazil · Representante [1:25:40]:

Thank you Mr. Chair for the floor and thank you also for the helpful input from the legal experts on proposal 20. Brazil reaffirms it stands. that this LBI must cover all business activities. In our view, restricting the scope only to TNCs would create unacceptable protection gaps, allowing enterprises to evade international accountability through domestic registration or complex corporate restructuring. At the same time, Brazil stresses that a universal scope must never impose a disproportionate burden on smaller economic actors. It's a Very important point for us. SMEs, family farming, corporate cooperatives and solidarian initiatives, important engines of employment, social inclusion, and local development, which is why we would also prefer to retain the proportionality provision on Article three, but we will get to that on our following discussion. So our preference would be to retain the scope as it's currently reflected in the draft. However, given the need to advance the process, in particular on a point that's been on a deadlock for so long and our commitment to constructing engagement, we could be flexible to accept option two, if we understand that other business activities means also not only TNCs, but we appreciate your efforts, Chair, in trying to bridge this gap and encourage further efforts for us to find common ground on this point. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:27:08]:

Muchas gracias al Brasil el Estado de Palestina tiene la palabra.


State of Palestine · Representante [1:27:20]:

3.1, we welcome that both options in your proposal put the transnational dimension at the center. We believe that the scope must target the actors that truly exercise control over and derive benefit from transnational operations. and accountability must not be avoided through corporate structuring. Scope and definitions must work together. So the scope should refer expressly to the definitions in Article one. We therefore support a scope that would read as follows. This legally binding instrument shall apply to natural and legal persons undertaking business activities of transnational character, as defined in Article one of this convention. Such a scope would be in line with the objectives of the LBI that focuses on international cooperation in relation to regulating business activities, where multiple jurisdictions are involved. And in line with the framing of resolution 26/9, which explicitly mandates the IGWG to regulate in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. In addition, this proposed language refers to the actors undertaking the activities. We note that the reference to natural and legal persons, is already utilized in the text to focus the scope of certain articles like liability. Anchoring the scope in this way would prevent the fragmentation of liability and capture where actual decision making. power and control reside. Adopting such an approach would require rethinking the framing under certain operational sections, particularly that on prevention, including to clarify that in implementation, states cannot differentiate between business entities depending on whether they are considered domestic slash nationals or foreign actors. and that the prevention obligation under the LBI would apply in relation to all business activities in line with existing obligations of states under international human rights law. In other words, focusing the LBI on transnational activities would not undermine in any way the existing obligation of prevention that states already have under international human rights law. I thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:29:46]:

Muchas gracias al Estado de Palestina. Cuba tiene la palabra.


Cuba · Representante [1:29:57]:

Muchas gracias, señor presidente. Quisiera comenzar mi intervención agradeciendo a los expertos jurídicos la guía certera en este proceso y la claridad que nos ofrecen en un tema que es bien complejo, que es el que tratamos en este grupo de trabajo. Y también quisiera agradecer al presidente por los esfuerzos para buscar convergencias con varias opciones en este tema que como ya bien dije es bien complejo. De nuestra parte coincidimos que el artículo 3.1 es un artículo crucial para el futuro instrumento. Sin una definición clara en este punto, resulta muy difícil avanzar y conocer exactamente a qué nos estamos comprometiendo con el instrumento legalmente vinculante. Nos parece entonces que una manera factible de avanzar, es trabajar sobre el lenguaje que ya fue acordado por el Consejo de Derechos Humanos en la Resolución 26/9, y que además creó este grupo de trabajo. En esta posición coincidimos con varias delegaciones en la sala. Sabemos que el lenguaje de esta resolución no es perfecto, pero es el mejor que ya hemos acordado. Ampliar demasiado el alcance de este documento podría ayudarnos a adoptar un instrumento es verdad. Pero un instrumento débil con obligaciones vagas que debe ser aplicable a un rango mayor de actores y adaptable a una mayor cantidad de. legislaciones nacionales. Por otra parte, un instrumento con un alcance bien delimitado contribuiría a promover una mayor responsabilidad de las empresas transnacionales, entidades históricamente asociadas a algunas de las mayores violaciones de derechos humanos. La comunidad internacional no ha podido legislar ningún documento que regule las actividades de empresas transnacionales en el marco del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Estas entidades continúan evadiendo sus obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos. Con este propósito, con el propósito de poner coto a este fenómeno, surgió el grupo de trabajo. Cuba continúa comprometida con este propósito. Por ello, mantenemos nuestra propuesta de tener un artículo 3.1 que exprese que este instrumento debe aplicarse a corporaciones transnacionales y otras empresas comerciales con la nota al pie que aparece en la resolución 26 nueve.

Muchas gracias.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:32:31]:

Muchas gracias. Costa Rica tiene la palabra


Costa Rica · Representante [1:32:41]:

Gracias señor presidente. Relato. delegación apoya la formulación actual del borrador para el artículo 3.1. Aunque en términos de las opciones que están en pantalla preferimos la opción one. En tanto centra el ámbito de la aplicación del instrumento en la naturaleza de las actividades empresariales y no en la caracterización de una empresa como transnacional o nacional. No consideramos que esto sea parte del mandato. Por el contrario, precisamente lo enfoca y lo determina con precisión. Y justamente para esto es este ejercicio de clarificación y negociación. Y aprovecho para agradecer las extensas explicaciones de los expertos legales. que están en línea con nuestra posición. Este enfoque es fundamental para garantizar una protección efectiva y evitar vacíos de responsabilidad y protección, como también lo señalará la estimada colega delegación delegación de Islandia. Los derechos de las víctimas y las obligaciones de los estados no deberían depender de la estructura corporativa, el lugar de constitución o la nacionalidad de la empresa responsable del impacto. sino de la naturaleza de la actividad empresarial y de sus efectos sobre los derechos humanos. Además, como fue explicado, las actividades empresariales contemporáneas pueden desarrollarse a través de cadenas de valor, relaciones contractuales y estructuras corporativas complejas. Limitar el instrumento únicamente a determinadas categorías de empresas podría generar distinciones artificiales y dejar situaciones comparables sujetas a niveles distintos de protección. Por ello consideramos que el criterio adecuado de la naturaleza de la actividad y sus impactos, particularmente cuando esta presenta un carácter transnacional, no le etiqueta jurídica de la empresa que la desarrolla. Este enfoque fortalecería la efectividad del instrumento evita lagunas de protección y asegura que situaciones equivalentes reciben una protección equivalente. Gracias.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:34:44]:

Muchas gracias a Costa Rica. El Reino Unido tiene la palabra.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland · Representante [1:34:56]:

Chair on proposal 20 since we're intervening on points of principle it's perhaps worth making clear that our basic position is that this instrument should apply to the business activities of all business enterprises. including those of a transnational character. And the drafting could simply say that if the point of this instrument is to protect those whose human rights are impacted by business activity. The starting point should presumably be universal protection that includes but is not limited to transnational corporations. We recognise the specific challenges that transnational corporations can present. And indeed, as our legal experts have noted, UK courts have allowed the corporate veil to be pierced in certain circumstances. Resolution 269 imposes some sort of limitation. But as many delegations have noted, the language is unclear. We do accept that the means through which a business enterprise discharges respect for human rights will be proportionate to, among other factors, its size as the un guiding principles do and as envisaged in draft article 6.7. However, we reiterate that excluding excluding whole categories of business clearly creates protection gaps and misses an opportunity to effectively address business related human rights abuse. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the EU that neither of the drafting options resolve the concerns that we have with the drafting. Like Brazil, we would compromise on the original drafting, and we could also consider Japan's drafting too. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:36:42]:

Muchas gracias al Reino Unido. Uruguay tiene la

Palabra.


Uruguay · Representante [1:36:51]:

Buenos días muchas gracias presidente. relator, reafirmamos la importancia de preservar un ámbito de aplicación amplio que compreenda todas las actividades empresariais incluidas aquellas de carácter transnacional. Ao mesmo tempo consideramos que el énfase particular en la dimensión transnacional no debería dar lugar a interpretaciones que permitan excluir determinadas actividades unicamente en función de la forma jurídica organización o lugar de registro de la empresa. En tal sentido, la formulación debería permitir abarcar adecuadamente las distintas formas que pueden asumir las actividades empresariales de carácter transnacional. Incluidas aquellas desarrolladas a través de grupos empresariales y relaciones comerciales. comerciales que transcienden las fronteras nacionales. En este marco, agradecemos las dos opciones presentadas por el presidente relator, pero entendemos necesario continuar trabajando en la redacción con el fin de reflejar adecuadamente la relevancia específica de la dimensión transnacional prevista en el mandato sin perder de vista el alcance amplio de la disposición ni introducir criterios que puedan generar lagunas de protección. Muchas gracias.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:38:01]:

Muchas gracias a Uruguay China tiene la palabra.


China · Representante [1:38:11]:

谢谢 主席 先生 呃 中方 对 三点 一条 做 一个 非常 简短 简短 的 评论 呃 我们 同意 古巴 同事 所说 呃 认为 文书 的 适用范围。 应当 遵循 呃 人权 理事会 269 号 决议 的 授权 谢谢 主席 先生。


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:38:36]:

Muchas gracias a China. Japón tiene la palabra.


Japan · Representante [1:38:47]:

Thank you for giving me the second floor just briefly chair. we would like to say that we can also support the comments made by the delegate of the UK, which suggests that this instrument should apply to the business activities of all business enterprises. Thank you.


South Africa · Representante [1:39:10]:

You chair, we appreciate the very useful guidance provided by the legal experts on the proposals under article three. South Africa considers that the scope of this instrument should remain anchored in resolution 26. 269, which mandates this working group to regulate in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. Chair we therefore favor option two under Article 3.1, read together with the resolution's footnote that other business enterprises have a transnational character in their operations. operational activities. We would however welcome further refinement of option two to make more explicit its relationship to the footnote in resolution 269. And we recognize the concerns expressed by delegations favoring broader coverage, particularly the need to avoid gaps in protection and ensure that businesses cannot evade accountability through their corporate structures. These are concerns that South Africa shares. Our preference for a focused scope does not diminish the responsibility of all businesses businesses to respect human rights, or of states existing obligations to protect against business related abuses. Those whose activities are wholly domestic should remain subject to domestic regulation, consistent with states existing human rights obligations. Our efforts chair in this working group reflects the particular contribution that this instrument can make in addressing prevention and accountability gaps arising from the business activities of transnational corporations. Chair, we believe that fidelity to the mandate and effect of protection can be achieved together. The reference to transnational corporations and other business enterprises must be applied with regard to the substance of the operations. An incidental or remote international link should not bring a wholly domestic business within the RBI's scope. We therefore consider that articles one, two, and three, should be read and developed together, providing sufficient clarity for states, enterprises, courts, and affected persons, while preventing corporate arrangements from being used to circumvent the. instrument. Our objective, Chair, is a scope that is faithful to Resolution 269, workable across different legal systems, and effective in addressing the protection gaps that prompted this process. I thank you Chair. Muchas gracias


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:42:10]:

A Sudafrica. Pakistan tiene la palabra.


Pakistan · Representante [1:42:19]:

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman Pakistan notes that neither of the options in the conference room paper aligns completely with the mandate entrusted by resolution 269. although we do note that option two is closer. Pakistan would favor a third formulation that tracks the mandate of the resolution establishing this working group and excludes purely domestic and local enterprises. the contribution of which to human rights abuses or adverse human rights impacts is covered by applicable domestic law and is therefore not subject to the gaps that this LBI is mandated to close. Nevertheless, we've also listened to the range of views expressed in the room. We also noted South Africa's suggestion just now to look at possible ways of developing provisions in Articles 3.12 and three together to see if we can better achieve that closure. Chair, I would also request your indulgence and that of colleagues in the room to go back to previous proposals that have been discussed. in the room with your permission. Thank you. On article two, the statement of purpose, of course, we support the amendments making the transnational focus explicit. In subparagraphs B and C, While we do not have any specific objection to the enumeration of qualifiers to access to justice in subparagraph D, we do wonder if this is exactly strictly necessary for, the purposes of this article. In the preceding set of articles under definitions, we would support deletion of draft article 1.10 as And and we would, yeah, on 1.4. We note that this definition requires particular attention because as drafted, it could extend the scope indirectly of this draft legally binding instrument. We therefore request that the definition of business activities in Article 1.4 be expressly stated to be read subject to Article three. So we would propose that Article 1.4 open with the words subject to Article three, comma, so that the limitation applies. And then Articles 1.5 In article 1.5, we could support the three limb structure and the refinement made to sub paragraph B. And in article 1.6, we note that we we support the inclusion of financial institutions, investment funds, and transnational corporate groups. We note, however, that this definition can be a vector for expanding the scope of the LBI and would therefore necessitate, again, the qualifier that we requested in Article 1.4 to apply. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:45:17]:

Muchas gracias Pakistan. Algún otro Estado desea intervenir en este momento sobre las propuestas alternativas de 3.1. No parece ser el caso. Pasamos entonces ahora a las intervenciones de representantes de la sociedad civil y de otros actores relevantes. Cedo la palabra a International Federation for Human Rights.


FIDH · Representante [1:45:58]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. So I delivered this statement on behalf of FIDH. We support a broad personal scope for the LBI, which nevertheless places the focus on business activities of a transnational character and prioritizes these activities for state regulatory and enforcement action. While still requiring requiring some work, this approach is already reflected in the draft LBI. Many of its key operative clauses apply in the context of transnational business activities or deal with challenges and gaps that arise specifically in these contexts, while other principles and provisions apply more broadly to all business activities. We believe that option one best reflects this approach, how However, we would recommend reversing the proposed wording as follows. This legally binding instrument shall apply to all business activities with a particular focus on business activities of a transnational character. Finally, regarding the concerns for small and medium sized domestic companies, these can be managed by states parties through the flexibility provided by Article 3.2, now being proposed as 6.7. And this introduces the principle of proportionality, or differentiation and it allows states parties to tailor the due diligence obligations imposed on business enterprises based on considerations of size among others. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:47:44]:

Muchas gracias Cedo la palabra a International Collective in Support of Fish Workers.


ICSF · Representante [1:47:57]:

Speak on behalf of the ICSF a member of the global campaign. Scope has always been one of the most controversial aspects of this treaty. Nevertheless, resolution two 269 is clear. The subjective scope, meaning who the treaty applies to, is transnational corporations and other businesses enterprises of transnational character. The shift in the drafts to extend the scope to all business was made despite the objection of more than 60 countries in the previous sessions. Furthermore, during this very session, numerous states have once again strongly reaffirmed in their statements that the mandate of the resolution must be respected in Article 3.1. The global campaign has consistently defended the legitimacy of this resolution and the need to keep the scope on TNCs and other businesses and enterprises of transnational character. Several several arguments have been raised, to expand the scope to all business enterprises, we would like to address the main ones. Firstly, we strongly disagree about the claim that focusing on TNCs and other business enterprises of transnational character is discriminatory between businesses. Purely domestic companies are generally already well regulated by domestic systems. It is transnational corporation transnational corporations that obtain profits preferential treatment. They use the corporate structure and the fragmentation of production to evade obligation of preventions and rules of jurisdictions. And they gain competitive advantages doing so. This is precisely the gap that LBI is meant to fill. And it must therefore address these specificities through joint and cerebral liability and specific prevention prevention obligation, among key other measures. It is telling that those business representatives among them who argue that focusing on transnational corporation is discriminatory, are the very same ones who warn that this obligation will be too burdensome for SMEEs. That is why purely domestic SMEEs should not fall within the scope of this instrument. Regarding the concern that a focus scope could leave loopholes for TNCs to disguise themselves as domestic entities, the global campaign offers a concrete textual solution. Building on previous states amendments and Palestine proposal at the 2026 intersectional, our proposal links Article 3.1 to the comprehensive definition of business activities of transnational character in Article 1.4, thereby clearly establishing the objective scope of the treaty, and closing any corporate loophole based on the formal structure or registration. Finally, our proposal aimed to remain faithful to the mandate scope of resolution 269 while adding an objective criterion to qualify this transnational character. This ensures that business registered as domestic but operating within transnational value chains are not left outside of the scope of the LBI, ensuring that transnational corporation at the top of the chain is held accountable for them. Therefore, our text proposed for Article 3.1 reads as follows. These open bracket legally binding is instrument close bracket shall apply to transnational corporations and other business enterprises that undertake business activities of a transnational character Thank you Chair.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:51:50]:

Muchas gracias cedo la palabra a la Organización Internacional de Empleadores.


IOE · IOE and USCIB · Representante [1:52:01]:

Thank you, Chair, and thank you as well to the legal experts for their explanation. I speak jointly on behalf of IOE and USCIB. We cannot support either option as drafted. Transnational activities are by definition, already covered by reference to all business activities. Singling them out adds nothing but ambiguity as to the true scope of this instrument. As the legal experts themselves recalled, and as this working group has come to realize, a definition of transnational corporations has never been achieved, and business activities rather than legal form are increasingly what determines duties. The proposed wording would leave companies and uncertain as to whether they they fall within scope. Chair, the nature of a company is irrelevant to victims. What makes the difference on the ground is whether existing laws are effectively enforced for all. companies alike. We have been hearing hearing that the focus on transnational corporations is needed to close a so called accountability gap. Any such gap, however, is the product of lethal enforcement of local law and corruption, not of the type of company involved. The case presented this morning started from precisely that situation, yet under the current draft, the response would largely lie in proceedings before courts abroad with relaxed rules and jurisdiction. This only moves responsibility away from the host state rather than strengthening its capacity to enforce its own laws where the harm has occurred. As we stressed under Article two, a two tier system will not address these root causes, and the persistent focus of this of this draft on transnational companies regrettably continues to overlook pillar one of the guiding principles. We therefore favor the clearest formulations this legally binding instrument shall apply to all business activities. Most of human rights deficits arise in the domestic economy, not in global supply chains. Lastly, the scope must respect must respect the limits of each state's jurisdiction. Through the concept of value chains retained in Article 1.6, responsibility could extend to a wide range of entities located in states that may not have ratified this instrument. This raises clear concerns of legal certainty and sovereignty. I thank you.


Speaker 43 [1:54:23]:

Muchas gracias. I speak on


ITUC · Global Labour Movement · Representante [1:54:34]:

Behalf of the Global Labour Movement. In line with our comments, on the statement of purpose, we believe that both options for Article 3.1 address the main focus of the LBI. Again, chair, we commend this hybrid approach of balancing the focus on cross border activities of business enterprises, while also applying its principal provisions to other business enterprise that do not operate across borders. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:55:04]:

Muchas gracias.


Representante [1:55:16]:

Manos Unidas, CCFD, Tersolidaire, Broderick Delon, and Trokra. In Article 3.1, we appreciate the chair's efforts to establish the scope by giving two options. However, we feel that neither reflects what the legal experts suggested during the intersession intersessional consultation, which was focusing on the nature of business activities rather than the enterprise's legal form, as this can help prevent regulatory gaps, while nevertheless prioritizing those activities of a transnational character. In this context, we are unclear as to the meaning of other business activities in option one and recommend adding language that clarifies this matter as has been suggested elsewhere. In addition, we would like to reiterate the importance of reading the scope together with the definitions of business activities, transnational business activities, and businesses business relationships as discussed, as well as with the operative provisions of the LBI. These provisions need to work together to ensure comprehensive coverage of complex corporate structures, global value chains, and cross border impacts. Finally, Mr. Chair, we note with interest, but also puzzlement the position of the European Union in favor of broad personal scope, which is in line with the UN guiding principles, but stands in marked contrast to the highly restrictive scope of the corporate sustainability due diligence directive as adopted in 2024, and which was further restricted by the first omnibus process last year. We are of the view that a broad scope with an explicit focus on transnational business activities could help to resolve these inconsistencies and close the existing normative gaps that contribute to corporate impunity. And so, encourage the EU and other states to support such an approach. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:56:47]:

Muchas gracias cedo la palabra a ESCRNet.


ESCR-Net · Indigenous People's Pact · Representante [1:57:03]:

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I speak on behalf of ESR and represent the Indigenous People's Pact. Article 3.1 should focus scope on transnational cooperation and extend to all businesses enterprises of a transnational character across value chains. This encompasses transnational, operation and businesses relationship, including in decision making, ownership, control, financing, technology, data flows, or other exercise of corporate power. The scope of the treaty must capture the modern manifestation of transnational business activities and corporate power. This is essential not only for the traditional transnational corporation and enterprise, such as as extractive companies, but also for digital platforms, AI companies, financial institutions, institution, data infrastructures, perestatals, civilians company, charities, development agencies, and other tax exempt or nonprofit organizations causing or contributing to cross border violation of human rights through global value chains. Transnational corporation and other businesses enterprises have lost, long violated the collective rights, rights to self determination, and the rights of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed concern. Communities are constantly affected by the extraction, agribusinesses and climate injustice. And this is in many cases addressed falsely as an issue of individual rights. On the other hand, accountability is severely restricted, and major legal impediments exist domestically and particularly across borders, to actively prevent communities from seeking remedy and injustice. It is a time to regulate transnational corporations and the scope should clearly be defined to make this. possible. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [1:59:26]:

Muchas gracias. Fue el último orador de la lista. Agradezco a todos quienes han intervenido. en este intercambio. Pasamos entonces a la consideración de la propuesta 21 para el artículo 3.2. con la sugerencia de insertarlo como una nueva disposición al final del artículo seis como nuevo 6.7. Ofrezco la palabra, en primer lugar, a los estados que deseen intervenir.

Brasil tiene la

Palabra.


Brazil · Representante [2:00:33]:

Thank you chair. Regarding the placement of this provision we would prefer to maintain 3.2 within article three, the scope itself, rather than transferring to Article six, as we see, proportionality as an overarching foundational principle for this treaty. And since Article three sets the parameters for the application of the instrument. We don't think it's just a detail pertaining to Article 6, due diligence procedures, but an interpretive principle that should inform the scope and implementation of the treaty as a whole. Also placing Article 3.2 along 3.1, it's important because since we advocate for a universal scope covering all business activities, maintaining 3.2 within the same article would reassure states and market actors that universal coverage does not equate to a rigid one size fits all regime. And conversely, relocating this rule exclusively to Article six risks restricting the application of proportionality strictly to article six measures. We could, however, look favorably on language that suggests additional legal safeguards for small and medium enterprises, as the legal expert has indicated, particularly for those operating in developing nations. And so for these reasons, Mr. Chair, we would urge to retain Article 3.2 within Article three, the scope. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:02:03]:

Muchas gracias al Brasil. La Unión Europea tiene la palabra.


EU · Representante [2:02:12]:

Thank you. As regards the proposal to relocate Article 3.2 to Article 6.7, we would like to flag that it is not entirely clear to us whether the revised wording would also allow for the exemption of companies of a certain size from the due diligence duties. This question is of importance given the different capabilities, resources and leverage of companies of different sizes, and thus the proportionality of any obligations imposed on them. Related to this point is the question of how to ensure that business partners of in scope companies that do not themselves meet any required thresholds are protected against unnecessary and excessive the indirect trickle down. effects for instance from information requests as part of human rights due diligence. Such safeguards or even support measures as provided for. in the eu's CSDD directive are particularly important with respect to business partners that are SMEs.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:03:31]:

Muchas gracias a la Unión Europea. Costa Rica tiene la palabra.


Costa Rica · Representante [2:03:41]:

Gracias, señor presidente. breve, nada más para apoyar en todos los extremos la postura del colega de Brasil. Es básicamente lo que nosotros también queríamos decir sobre la preferencia de mantener el artículo 3.2 por separado y las razones que el colega expresó Gracias.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:04:02]:

Muchas gracias a Costa Rica Algún otro estado desea intervenir? Islandia tiene la palabra.


Iceland · Representante [2:04:18]:

On Article 3.2, Iceland wants to emphasise that an inclusive scope has to go hand in hand with proportionality, and in that context we would be supportive of the proposed article 67 and the text. guarantees on a non discriminatory basis. On this note, we want to underline the importance of the instrument preserving the flexibility for states to design proportionate measures. suited to their national circumstances. And when applying proportionality, we also want to encourage the chair to take into consideration That the text ensures that placing disproportionate indirect burdens on small and medium sized enterprises that form part of the value chain. of larger companies are avoided. As as such enterprises are often required to carry out due diligence requests passed on to them by their business. partners partners without having the resources to do so. And when when when underlining the importance Iceland underlines the importance of this, because As we said, we want the instrument to preserve the flexibility for states to design these proportionate measures so that it allows the consideration for small and, medium sized enterprises as well in that same context. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:06:08]:

Thank you


State of Palestine · Representante [2:06:09]:

Mr.

Chair. On article 3.2 we support moving the provisions the provision to Article six, we can support the views expressed by the legal experts, including adding further language to explicitly address concerns regarding implementation burdens on SMEs as they are defined by domestic law, removing the wording notwithstanding Article 3.1 at the beginning of the paragraph, and finally adding words wording that pertains to positive action that could be taken to support SMEs in relation to indirect implications that might arise, such as trickle down effects from large enterprises in a value chain, and to address the role of the of the companies that are undertaking due diligence or other preventive measures in supporting the SMEs, with a view to fulfill these obligations without adding undue burdens on the SMEs. I thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:07:18]:

Muchas gracias. Algún otro Estado desea intervenir? Bien, si no es el caso entonces eh pasamos a los representantes de la sociedad civil y otros actores relevantes. Cedo la palabra a International Trade Union Confederation.


ITUC · Global Labour Movement · Representante [2:07:53]:

Thank you Chair. I speak on behalf of the Global Labor Movement. Chair, we are comfortable with the redrafting of Article 3.2, which gives states the discretion to differentiate on a non discriminatory basis, house business enterprises discharge prevention obligation commensurate with their size, sector, operational context, and disability of impacts on human. rights. This differential treatment would only affect the modalities of implementation, not the obligation. Such an approach can be beneficial for the purpose of effectively regulating small thank you. Muchas gracias.


IOE · Representante [2:08:42]:

We welcome that the redrafting retains the possibility. retains the possibility for states to differentiate the discharge of prevention obligations commensurate with the size, sector, and operational context of business enterprises and the severity of impacts consistent with the UNGP 14. and essential for MSMs. We also welcome the clarification that the reference to non discrimination ensures that no differentiation is made on the basis of whether a company is domestic or foreign ensuring fairness of treatment. The provision should add explicit language on micro, small and medium sized enterprises to allow state parties to exclude them from legally binding due diligence obligations, to avoid undue administrative burdens and support SMEs against trickle down effects. In practice, SMEs are very often affected not by their own obligations, but by the requirement passed down to them by larger companies in their value chains. In line with UNGP 14, the differentiating factors should also include the ownership and the structure, as these two elements are included in UNGP 14 and do have an important impact on the scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. We also take note of the expert view, that this provision is not meant to cover out state owned enterprises, and we welcome that. Lastly, the provision retains the focus on prevention obligations, whereas the UNGP call for a process oriented approach to addressing adverse. impacts. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:10:31]:

Muchas gracias cedo la palabra a Center for Constitutional Rights.


CCR · Representante [2:10:41]:

Staff of the Center for Constitutional Rights and their client and partner, the Descendants Project in the United States. I am speaking in solidarity with frontline communities in Louisiana's river parishes, also known as Cancer Alley, where descendants of those enslaved on that land continue to pay the price of over industrialization with their health and with the health of their children and grandchildren. With respect to the chair's proposal to move Article 3.2 into Article six as a proposed Article 6.7, placing differentiated obligations within the prevention frame prevention framework, we could be supportive of that. We would just add that front line communities worldwide, such as those in Louisiana's river parishes, face cumulative impacts from the concentration of multiple facilities and business activities in one place. Therefore, assessing each business in isolation can over understate the severity of harm experienced by a community subjected to over industrialization. While different businesses may may need different prevention measures, those measures must still effectively protect affected communities. A business's size alone does not determine the severity of its impacts, nor its contribution to cumulative harm. We therefore recommend clarifying that states must always consider the severity of actual or potential harm, including each business's contribution to cumulative impacts on affected. communities when differentiating prevention obligations.

Thank you.


CITCE · CITCE and its member organizations · Representante [2:12:40]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm speaking on behalf of CITCE and its member organizations, Manos Unidas, Miserios, SFD Solidaire, brotherly, Velen, Trucker, Fast and Action, and CAFO. We take note of the trust proposal allowing states to differentiate how business enterprises discharge prevention obligations according to factors such as size sector operational context and the severity of impact. We understand the rationale for ensuring that prevention obligations can be implemented in a proportionate and non discriminatory manner. In this sense, we welcome your proposal, as it has been already done by Palestine and other states, to move this obligation to Article 6.7. At the same time, any differentiation should not weaken the substantive obligations or create gaps in protection all along the value chain. The approach should therefore ensure that proportionality in implementation does not become a basis for exempting businesses from meaningful prevention responsibilities. We encourage states to ensure that differentiation remains consistent with the overall, objective of effective prevention and accountability. I thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:13:50]:

Muchas gracias.


Representante [2:13:57]:

Gracias señor presidente. Me llamo Silvia Yanes e intervengo en nombre de UDAD Amigos de la Tierra Ecuador y CETIM miembros de la campaña global. Como saben el caso de Texaco Chevron en Ecuador fue uno de los disparadores para abrir estas negociaciones. Para elaborar un tratado vinculante sobre empresas transnacionales y derechos humanos. Hace ya varias décadas que nuestras comunidades están sufriendo por los impactos de la contaminación petrolera causada por Chevro. Pero hasta ahora no hemos podido tener justicia y reparación por esas violaciones. Logramos hacer condenar a la empresa en Ecuador. Pero luego Chevron hizo uso de la arquitectura internacional de impunidad. Apoyándose en particular sobre los acuerdos bilaterales de inversiones y tribunales privados asociados para poder escapar de esta condena. Necesitamos un tratado ambicioso que se enfoque en eliminar esos vacíos legales para desarmar esta arquitectura. de impunidad que beneficia a las empresas transnacionales e impida que las comunidades afectadas. Tengamos acceso. a la justicia. Por lo tanto tal y como ha señalado anteriormente la campaña global el ámbito de aplicación debería centrarse exclusivamente en las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas que desarrollen actividades empresariales de carácter transnacional. Además la campaña global ha defendido sistemáticamente la inclusión de obligaciones directas para las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas de carácter transnacional en el artículo six. Estas obligaciones directas una vez claramente establecidas tendrán en cuenta la capacidad de las empresas a lo largo de toda la cadena de valor. Siendo la empresa matriz la que asumirá la mayor carga. Por lo tanto al adaptar el artículo three para respetar el ámbito de la aplicación de la resolución 269. Y al establecer obligaciones específicas para las empresas en los otros artículos que reconozcan la responsabilidad responsabilidad mayor de las casas matrices y empresas contratistas. Especialmente en el artículo six. El artículo three point two pasa a ser innecesario Las obligaciones más pesadas serán suficientemente específicas para enfocarse no sobre las pequeñas y medianas empresas sino sobre las casas matrices y empresas. contratistas. Que son las que concentran el poder y el control. Y que una vez más son las que actúan en total impunidad. Muchas gracias.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:17:25]:

Muchas gracias. Agradezco a todos quienes han participado en este intercambio. Con esto paso esto pasamos entonces a la consideración de la propuesta 22 artículo 3.3 que tiene también dos opciones. Cedo la palabra en primer. lugar a los Estados que deseen intervenir.

Costa Rica tiene la palabra.


Costa Rica · Representante [2:18:15]:

Gracias señor presidente. Nuestra intervención versa sobre dos puntos uno sobre la jurisprudencia internacional y otro sobre el derecho internacional ambiental. Costa Rica considera importante que este artículo reconozca expresamente la jurisprudencia relevante de las cortes y tribunales internacionales, incluida la Corte Internacional de Justicia, como parte del marco jurídico que debe orientar su interpretación y aplicación. Las decisiones judiciales son un medio jurídicamente reconocido para determinar el contenido de las reglas del derecho internacional. Y cuando existe una sentencia obligatoria para las partes, el estado concernido está jurídicamente vinculado por ello. El artículo 38.1 d del Estatuto de la Corte Internacional de Justicia reconoce expresamente las decisiones judiciales como fuentes subsidiarias para determinar las reglas del derecho internacional. Por consiguiente, la jurisprudencia internacional no debe entenderse como una consideración meramente doctrina o política, sino como un medio jurídicamente reconocido para identificar interpretar y determinar el contenido y alcance de las obligaciones internacionales aplicables. Incluidas aquellas. derivadas del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Esta referencia es particularmente pertinente respecto a la jurisprudencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Sus decisiones en casos contenciosos jurídicamente vinculantes para los estados partes en el litigio correspondiente. Y su jurisprudencia, incluida la desarrollada en sus opiniones consultivas, desempeña una función fundamental para terminar y esclarecer el contenido de las normas de derecho internacional. El hecho de que una decisión no constituya presidente vinculante erga omnes, no disminuye su relevancia jurídica como medio para determinar cuáles son las obligaciones internacionales vigentes. En consecuencia, proponemos que el artículo hago referencia expresa a las decisiones y opiniones consultivas pero pertinentes de la Corte Internacional de Justicia y de otras cortes y tribunales internacionales. En cuanto contribuyen a determinar e interpretar el contenido y alcance de las obligaciones de, los estados en virtud del derecho internacional. En segundo lugar resulta esencial incluir expresamente el derecho internacional ambiental. Una parte significativa de los impactos adversos sobre los derechos humanos vinculados a las actividades empresariales puede producirse precisamente a través del daño ambiental. Y agradezco también aquí La explicación del experto Miran muy claramente dada hace ya algunos minutos. Esta relación resulta particularmente evidente en casos como la minería y otras industrias extractivas, donde los impactos ambientales pueden estar estrechamente vinculados con afectaciones a las personas y comunidades. El propio grupo de trabajo de las Naciones Unidas sobre empresas y derechos humanos. En su informe sobre el sector extractivo y la transición justa recomienda realizar debida diligencia ambiental y de derechos humanos. Y aborda expresamente el derecho a un medio ambiente limpio saludable y sostenible. No existe una separación entre la protección ambiental y la protección de los derechos humanos. La propia Corte Internacional de Justicia declaró que el disfruto de un medio ambiente limpio, perdón, del derecho humano a un medio ambiente limpio, saludable y sostenible es esencial para el pleno disfrute de una amplia gama de derechos humanos. Excluir el derecho internacional ambiental produciría por ello una separación artificial entre dos ámbitos jurídicos que en la práctica están profundamente interrelacionados. Nuestra propuesta entonces, concretamente es que el artículo diga de conformidad con el derecho internacional, incluido el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, el derecho internacional humanitario, el derecho internacional consuetudinario y el derecho internacional del medio ambiente. Teniendo debidamente en cuenta las decisiones y opiniones consultivas pertinentes de la Corte Internacional de Justicia y de. otras cortes y tribunales internacionales. Gracias, señor presidente.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:22:53]:

Muchas gracias a Costa Rica. Arabia Saudita tiene la palabra.


Saudi Arabia · Representante [2:23:01]:

سيدي الرئيس، ترحب المملكة بحذف عبارة المعترف بها دوليا من المادة 3.3 وبربط نطاق الحقوق المشمولة بما هو ملزم للدولة أو للدول الأطراف. غير أن المملكة تلاحظ أن الخيار الأول المقترح يدرج صراحة إلى جانب المعاهدة، المعاهدات، القانون الدولي العرفي، والمبادئ العامة للقانون، والقانون الوطني الداخلي، وهي صيغة سبق أن أبدت المملكة ملاحظاتها عليها خلال مشاورات المشاورات السابقة، وأن الخيار الثاني بإحالته إلى القانون الدولي لحقوق الإنسان بوجه عام يشمل بدوره القانون الدولي العرفي، كما أن الإشارة إلى الدول الأطراف بصيغة الجمع قد تفهم على أنها تلزم الدولة بحقوق إلتزمت بها دول أطراف أخرى، دون أن تلتزم بها هي، وتكتسب هذه المسألة أهمية خاصة، لأن المادة 3.3 هي التي تحدد الحقوق التي يتعين على مؤسسات الأعمال احترامها بموجب المادة 6.2. والحقوق التي يتمتع بها الضحايا بموجب المادة 4.1. لذا تجدد المملكة موقفها بأن يقتصر الصك على الحقوق المقررة في المعاهدة. المعاهدات التي تكون الدولة المعنية طرفا فيها، وتقترح على أساس الخيار الأول أن تنص الفقرة على أن يشمل هذا الصك جميع حقوق الإنسان المقررة، المقررة في المعاهدات الدولية لحقوق الإنسان التي تكون الدولة الطرف المعني طرفا فيها، بالقدر الذي تنطبق به عليها، ولا يجوز تفسير أي حكم في هذا الصك على أنه يفرض على دولة طرف إلتزامات تتعلق بحقوق مقررة في معاهدات ليست طرفا فيها، أو على أنه يوسع الإلتزامات التي قبلت بموجب المعاهدات، التي هي طرف فيها، ولا تخل هذه الفقرة بالالتزامات المترتبة على الدول الطرف بموجب القانون الدولي العرفي التي لا يوسعها هذا الصك ولا يعدلها. ويحدد هذا المقترح السيد الرئيس مصدر الإلتزامات وحدودها معا، فمصدرها المعاهدات التي انضمت إليها الدولة وحدودها النطاق التي قبلت به تلك الإلتزامات وفقا لقواعد قانون المعاهدات، كما يؤكد هذا المقترح بأن المملكة لا تنكر الإلتزامات العرفية القائمة، وإنما تحرص على أن لا يتخذ الصك أداة لتوسيعها أو لإنشاء إلتزامات لم تقبلها الدول. كما تحتفظ المملكة بموقفها بشأن الموائمة اللازمة في المادتين 4.1 and 6.2 بي اللتين لا تزالان تشيران إلى الحقوق المعترف بها دوليا. كما تجدد المملكة موقفها بعدم تأييد إدراج المسائل البيئية ضمن نطاق هذا الصك، إذ تنظم المسائل البيئية اتفاقيات دولية متخصصة وتحدد وتحول الصياغة التي تقترحها المملكة دون إدراج أي حق لا يستند إلى معاهدة ملزمة للدولة المعنية. وختاما السيد الرئيس، تقترح المملكة فقرة جديدة 3.4 حيث تؤكد المملكة أهمية أن يتضمن الصك ضمانة سريحة تحفظ الطبيعة الخاصة لأعمال الدول وممتلكاتها. فالصك فالصياغات المقترحة تشير في أكثر من موضع إلى الكيانات الحكومية، وتتضمن حكما جديدا بشأن تنفيذ الأحكام الأجنبية، في حين لا يتضمن الصك حكما يستبعد الأعمال التي تؤديها الدول في ممارسة السلطة الحكومية، ولا يكفل صراحة الحصنات المقررة للدول وممتلكاتها في سياق أحكام المسؤولية والإختصاص والتنفيذ، ولا يضمن المساواة في المعاملة بين مؤسسات الأعمال بصرف النظر عن طبيعة ملكيتها، بحيث لا تخضع المؤسسات المملوكة للدولة لإلتزامات أو تبعات أشد بسبب ملكيتها. وعليه تقترح المملكة إضافة فقرة جديدة تنص على أنه لا يسري هذا الصك على الأعمال التي تؤديها الدولة أو أي كيان يتصرف نيابة عنها في ممارسة. السلطة الحكومية، ولا يمس الحصنات التي تتمتع بها الدول وممتلكاتها بموجب القانون الدولي، وتخضع مؤسسات الأعمال لأحكام هذا الصك على قدم المساواة، بصرف النظر عن كونها مملوكة ملكية عامة أو خاصة. وشكرا السيد الرئيس.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:27:58]:

Muchas gracias a Arabia Saudita. Japón tiene la palabra.


Japan · Representante [2:28:12]:

We prefer option two to option one, presented in the Che Reporter's Proposal 22, because option two covers the human rights recognized human rights recognized under the international human rights law, binding on the state parties, which provide clear criteria and predictability and ensure legal certainty. In order to clarify this intent, we propose the following formulation. This LBI shall cover all human rights under international human rights treaties to which each state party is a party. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:28:50]:

Muchas gracias al

Japón La Unión Europea tiene la palabra.


EU · Representante [2:29:03]:

Thank you very much

For giving us the floor with respect to article three point. 3.3, dealing with the coverage of the LBI, neither of the two options appear to resolve fully the need for a clear common baseline. Under option one, reliance on treaties binding on each state and in its domestic law could perpetuate variable geometry. Option two, on the other hand, raises the question as to what will be the human rights binding on state parties under international human rights law. What rights would be covered by this formulation through customer international law and general principles of law. Would these sources provide a sufficiently complete and predictable baseline? In the EU we have opted for a catalogue contained in the annex to the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. Such a catalogue could perhaps provide legal certainty but agreeing on a common catalogue across prospective parties to the LBI could prove difficult. Therefore, one could consider perhaps an approach drawing on UNGP 12 by referring at a minimum to the International Bill of Human Rights, and the principle concerning fundamental rights in the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles. and rights at work informed by core ilo conventions. With respect to comments that were made by Costa Rica to the human rights to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, I would like to stress and emphasize that the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive takes a holistic approach to the obligations and duties of due diligence and related liability which therefore cover respect for human rights, labour rights and the protection of the environment. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:31:27]:

Muchas gracias a la Unión Europea. El Reino Unido tiene la palabra.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland · Representante [2:31:39]:

As we've already stated, we recognise the importance of proportionality and we reserve our position on the drafting for now. In that regard, however, we also note the point from the Centre for Constitutional Rights that size alone does not determine severity of impact or contribution to cumulative harm. Turning to 3.3, like other delegations, we do welcome the deletion of the phrase internationally recognized human rights, which lacks legal precision and the greater clarity of this drafting. However, we concur the EU's concerns on both drafting options, so we think that the language could be further refined to make it clearer whether the relevant ratifications are those by the home or host state or something else more cross cutting. As we know ratifications of treaties are variable. We are open to drafting options here. though, but perhaps adapting option two to say binding on each state party as applicable could go some way to clarifying this. We could also consider the EU's and Japan's drafting proposal. proposals here. Thank you.


State of Palestine · Representante [2:33:03]:

Thank you Mr. Chair. On 3.3 we prefer option one because it includes customary law general principles and domestic law. However, we emphasize that domestic law must be in line with or more protective than international human rights law. In addition, we propose to also express express reference to declarations most relevant here on indigenous people, on peasants and other people working in rural areas, and on human rights defenders. The right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment and the right of people to self determination and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. I thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:33:49]:

Muchas gracias. Cuba tiene la palabra.


Cuba · Representante [2:33:59]:

Muchas gracias señor presidente muy brevemente para expresar que Cuba prefiere la opción uno. No obstante, podemos ser flexibles en este asunto y nos ponemos en las manos del presidente para buscar la opción que mejor favorezca el consenso y el avance del. proceso negociador. Muchas gracias.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:34:21]:

Muchas gracias a Cuba. Islandia tiene la palabra.


Iceland · Representante [2:34:29]:

Mr. Chair, as we understand the material scope, it seeks to determine the rights states must take into account. And the measures that they must think of, and as a result, which rights business enterprises must consider when carrying out the due diligence. So in that context, we want to highlight a couple of considerations we hope will be had in mind when formulating the final version of this article. And first is legal certainty and predictability which is important for states, business enterprises, but most importantly, victims. In that light, a text that provides a single common baseline anchored in international human rights law may be more inclined to provide such certainty. Secondly, regarding the nature of treaty obligations, it's important for the text to not reduce the scope to the lowest common denominator. And perhaps the reference binding under international human rights law in option two would capture these considerations, as it also covers customary international human rights law, which binds all states. So in light of the points mentioned above, we do think that option two, or a formulation that captures the same intention, offers the most balanced approach. In contrast, we feel that option one would result in a variable geometry as the material scope of the instrument would differ from one state party to another. And while we do understand that option one seeks to capture higher domestic protection, we respectfully point out that the non regression clause in proposed article 16.7 would address that concern. And we point this consideration also out as it's relevant for global value chains, which sometimes span multiple jurisdictions and the common baseline under international human rights law would avoid this to our understanding. So having said that, we support option two but remain open to alternative formulations that would achieve the same objective.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:36:54]:

Thank you Muchas gracias a Islandia.


Malaysia · Representante [2:37:08]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding Article 3.3, Malaysia would appreciate clarification on whether the formulation under international human rights law in option two, is intended to limit the scope of the provisions to international human rights obligations or in the binding on the respective state parties, particularly under treaties to which they are parties or whether a broader scope is. envisaged. This request for clarification is without prejudice to Malaysia's position on the proposed LPI. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:37:43]:

Muchas gracias a Malasia. Brasil tiene la palabra


Brazil · Representante [2:37:51]:

Chair, quickly, just to welcome, like others, the deletion of internationally recognized, and to mention that we could look favorably on Costa Rica's proposal to include international environmental law, alongside international humanitarian law, customary international law, and international human rights law. I believe that's how it was phrased. Thank you..


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:38:16]:

Algún otro estado desea intervenir en este momento.


China · Representante [2:38:31]:

呃 谢谢 主席 先生 呃 中方 简单 评论 一下 中。 中方 同样 认为 呃 为了 确保 人权 保护 的 这种 实际 的 效果 法律 的 确定性 可预测性 呃 是 至关重要 的。 呃 目前 初步 看 中方 呃 更 倾向 于 呃 保持 原有 的 这个 表述 当然 也 会 进一步 的 考虑 这个 主席 提出 的 呃 第二个 选项 谢谢。


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:39:01]:

Muchas gracias a

China. Suda Sudáfrica tiene la palabra.


South Africa · Representante [2:39:18]:

Thank you, Chair. On Article 3.3, South Africa favors a formulation that secures the highest level of human rights protection. protection. We therefore assess these options by their capacity to provide effective protection and access to remedy, as well as legal certainty. At this stage, Chair, we consider we continue to consider both options for the implications and would be open to receiving further drafting proposals. Thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:39:51]:

Muchas gracias, Sudafrica. Uruguay tiene la palabra.


Uruguay · Representante [2:39:56]:

Gracias señor presidente relator. Tomamos nota de las dos alternativas presentadas y entendemos que ambas contienen el elementos que pueden contribuir a precisar el alcance material del instrumento. La primera tiene el mérito de identificar expresamente distintas fuentes jurídicas pertinentes, incluidos los tratados aplicables, el derecho internacional consuetudinario, los principios generales del derecho y el derecho interno, lo que entendemos puede contribuir a evitar una lectura exclusivamente basada en los compromisos convencionales asumidos por cada estado. Por su parte, la segunda entendemos que ofrece una anclaje más directo en el Director Internacional de los Directos Humanos, en línea con el marco jurídico en el que se inscribe el mandato de este proceso y presentaría una formulación más general y sintética. Dicho esto, entendemos que ninguna de las dos alternativas consideradas de manera aislada, parece recoger plenamente todos los elementos que sería deseable preservar. En particular entendemos que sería necesario continuar examinando como asegurar un marco suficientemente amplio y claro. Preservar niveles más elevados de protección reconocidos por el Derecho Interno y abordar adecuadamente la referencia a human rights binding on the state parties. Teniendo en cuenta los distintos compromisos jurídicos de los estados. Muchas gracias.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:41:18]:

Muchas gracias a Uruguay. Bien si no hay más solicitudes de la palabra por parte de los estados. Entonces pasaríamos a las intervenciones de representantes de la sociedad civil y otros actores relevantes. Cedo la palabra a la Organización Internacional de Empleadores.


IOE · IOE and USCIB · Representante [2:41:52]:

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of IOE and USCIB. At the outset, Chair, we would like to recall the importance of ensuring that specific companies are not named in this forum in line with due process and the courtesy expected in United Nations meetings. We kindly ask you to ensure that this is respected. Now on Proposal 22, We have important concerns with both options, as they both delete the reference to internationally recognized human rights, creating further legal uncertainty, and opening the scope to rights recognized under domestic law, but not at the international. level. Option one by referring to treaties, customary law, general principles and the domestic law of each state party is particularly worrying as states diverge widely, even on the basic concept of discrimination, for example, this will create confusion and a variable geometry and extend states obligation beyond the treaties to which they are party. Chair, this provision determines which rights businesses will have to consider in their due diligence under article six. Companies operating across several countries need a single clear reference point, not one that changes with the treaties each state has ratified. as this will translate into different due diligence requirements from one jurisdiction to another and make it impossible to implement. Such a reference point already exists and is widely used by companies, the international, recognized human rights referred to in UNGP 12. A clear and predictable material scope is what will allow this instrument to gain broad support. Internationally recognized human rights should therefore be clearly indicated in this provision in line with the UNGP 12, providing a common baseline under international international human rights law. To that regard, option two referring to human rights binding on state parties under international human rights law provides greater legal certainty provided international internationally recognized is returned. Lastly, we welcome the deletion of fundamental freedoms, a concept that lacks a common legal understanding across jurisdiction.


society for threatened peoples, global policy forum europe, and women engage for a common future · Representante [2:44:18]:

Thank you Mr. Chairman for giving me the floor. I am speaking on behalf of the society for threatened peoples global policy forum europe. and women engage for a common future. we regret we cannot fully support the proposed redrafting of article 33. while we welcome the addition of customary international law in option one. Other important references are still missing. However, a broad material scope is necessary to ensure the best and broadest protection of victims and affected communities. This should be reflected both in the preamble and also in this article. Consequently, we propose the deletion of the qualifier to which those states are parties. Instead, as mentioned before, by Costa Rica, Brazil, and Palestine, and many CSO colleagues, including in the discussion of Article 1.3, the LBI needs an explicit reference to international environmental law, like the right to the human like the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. We also recommend explicitly referencing the core human rights conventions, the fundamental ILO ILO conventions, plus ILO convention 90 on Harassment and Violence, and ILO Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as international humanitarian law. Thank you very much.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:45:45]:

Muchas gracias cedo la palabra a DKA Austria.


DKA Austria · DKA Austria, EKIPAS International, and the Human Rights Clinic of UFMG and PUC Paraná · Representante [2:45:56]:

Thank you Mr. Chair. I speak on behalf of DKA Austria, EKIPAS International, and the Human Rights Clinic of UFMG and PUC Paraná. We appreciate the chair's efforts on redrafting this article and proposing different options in clarifying the sources of international law covered by this instrument. We could support the adoption of option one, since it broadens the scope of human rights comprehended in this LBI by referring to customary international law and general principles of law. However, we believe there is still room to expand protection, which is why we fully support the suggestion made by the delegation of Costa Rica to include the Con consult consultative opinions made by international human rights courts and by International Court of Justice. We also support the suggestion made by Costa Rica, Brazil and Palestine. The LBI needs to expressly mention international environmental law, also due to the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment by the human rights council in its resolution number 48/30 and the by General Assembly in its resolution number 6076/300. This right is particularly significant in light of the well documented adverse environmental environmental impacts of business activities across various sectors. From a children's rights perspective, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is fundamental to the effective enjoyment of a broad range of other rights, taking into account that children are particularly vulnerable to adverse environmental impacts. I thank you.


OEIGWG · Presidente-Relator [2:47:41]:

Distinguidos delegados distinguidos participantes hemos llegado al final de la reunión de esta de esta mañana. Reanudaremos la sesión a las 15:00 en la cual continuaremos con la lista de oradores de representantes de la sociedad civil y otros actores relevantes. Muchas gracias por su participación. Se levanta la sesión.