Asamblea General, 25ª sesión plenaria, 81° período de sesiones
Asamblea General
Date: 23 October 2026
Language: English
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/es/ga/81/25?lang=en
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations.

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GA · President [20:11]:

Good afternoon. The 25th plenary meeting of the General Assembly is called to order. The Assembly will continue its consideration of agenda item 91, entitled Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to continue the debate on the item. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.


Japan [21:19]:

Madam President, at the outset, Japan reaffirms its full support for the IAEA and comments Director General Rafael Grosses for his leadership. Madam President, The need for nuclear energy is rapidly growing in both electric and non-electric sectors, and the IAEA's role in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy is gaining momentum. Meanwhile, the world faces unprecedented turmoil marked by deepening divisions and deteriorating security environment. At this juncture, the agency's non-proliferation mandate is also of the utmost importance. At the recent IAEA General Conference, Member States could not adopt certain resolutions on Agency's core mandates. Japan is seriously alarmed by these exceptional circumstances. We must overcome divisions and promote cooperation. Japan will continue to support the Agency and dialogue among Member States therein. Madam President, the world faces pressing challenges related to nuclear nonproliferation, safety, and security. Let me highlight three in particular. First, North Korea. This year, more than 100 member states supported the IAEA's resolution on this issue, demonstrating their firm determination. Japan strongly urges the DPRK to take concrete steps toward achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. Japan also urges North Korea to fully comply with the NPT and to promptly cooperate with the agency to ensure full and effective implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement. All Member States must fully implement relevant UN Security Council resolutions.


GA · President [23:20]:

DPRK.


Japan [23:21]:

Japan again expresses this deep concern for the morass.


GA · President [23:25]:

DPRK is asking for point of order.


Democratic People's Republic of Korea [23:34]:

Thank you. The delegation of the DPRK wishes to raise a point of order because the representative of Japan has referred to our country by an incorrect designation. We request your attention to this matter. In the interest of maintaining proper decorum and ensuring due respect for the official names of the sovereign states in this Assembly, the official name of our country is Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We request that this name be used correctly in the proceedings in the General Assembly meetings. Thank you.


GA · President [24:17]:

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan to continue. Yes.


Japan [24:33]:

To ensure effective implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement, all member states must fully implement relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Japan again expresses deep concern over increasing military cooperation between Russia and DPRK, which clearly violates UNSC resolutions and undermine the international nonproliferation regime. Second, Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors requested the Director General to report Iran's noncompliance to the Security Council and the General Assembly. Japan reiterates its serious concern and urges Iran to cooperate with the agency to urgently resume full and effective implementation of its safeguard agreements. Japan's position, which places importance on resolving Iran's nuclear issues through dialogue, remains unchanged. Japan strongly hopes the United States and Iran will reach a final agreement at an early date, including the nuclear issue. Third, Ukraine. The safety and security of nuclear facilities in Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, remain a matter of deep concern. Japan continues to support IAEA's efforts to ensure the safety and security of these facilities and their operation and emphasize the importance of adhering the Director General's seven indispensable pillars and the five concrete principles. Madam President, In promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Japan has been contributing to the IAEA initiatives, such as Rays of Hope for cancer care and ATOMOS for food security. Specifically, Japan has provided robust financial and human resources to help establish sustainable cancer care system globally, drawing on Japan's advanced technologies and expertise in the radiological medicine. Japan will continue to promote nuclear science and technology worldwide. Lastly, the safety of the discharge of the Alps treated water has been continuously confirmed through the IAEA's ongoing reviews and robust monitoring with enhanced participation of analytical laboratories and international experts, including those from neighboring countries. Japan appreciates and respects the IAEA's commitment to this issue. Japan will continue to provide science-based and transparent information and full explanation to the international community and cooperatively the IAEA's reviews and monitoring. I thank you.


GA · President [27:14]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Uruguay.


Uruguay [27:37]:

Thank you very much, Madam President. Uruguay thanks the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi, for presenting the 2025 annual report and for his leadership of the agency in an international context marked by growing challenges to international peace and security. We recognize the fundamental role of the IAEA in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as in strengthening the international regime of safeguards, nuclear safety and non-proliferation. In this regard, we express our concern over the risks that armed conflicts pose to the safety of nuclear facilities, and we reiterate the importance of guaranteeing their protection in accordance with international law and the applicable safety standards. Madam President, Uruguay in particular values the technical cooperation provided by the IAEA, which allows for the benefits of nuclear science and technology to be used to improve the quality of life of persons and contribute to achieving the SDGs. We would highlight progress achieved during 2025 in initiatives such as Rays of Hope, ZODIAC, NuTEC Plastics and Atoms for Food. Moreover, we recognize the Agency's efforts to promote gender equality and to expand the participation of women in the nuclear sector, in particular through the Marie Sklodowska-Curie and Lise Meitner Fellowship programs. At the national level, Uruguay is grateful for the IAEA's support in priority areas such as radiation safety, the medical applications for the early detection of cancer, food safety, water resources management, and nuclear applications in the industrial sector. We also attach particular importance to regional cooperation, in particular, ARCAL, as a tool for capacity building and the exchange of knowledge among our countries. In this context, we wish to underscore that in March 2026, Uruguay hosted the first regional coordination meeting of the IAEA technical cooperation project on the strengthening of the availability of safe, good quality, and cost-effective radiopharmaceuticals to better deal with cancer. The meeting brought together representatives of 12 countries from Latin America and made it possible for us to exchange experiences, strengthen technical capacities and define joint actions to improve access to these medical technologies in the region. Madam President, to conclude, Uruguay reaffirms its commitment to the IAEA and to strengthening an international cooperation system, a system of security, safety and safeguards that guarantees that nuclear science and technology is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. for the good of sustainable development and international peace and security. Thank you very much.


GA · President [30:29]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Uruguay, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Greece.


Greece [30:52]:

Madam President, Greece aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add the following remarks in this national capacity. Greece reaffirms its long support for the International Atomic Energy Agency and its indispensable role in promoting atoms for peace and development. We commend Director General Rafael Grossi and the Agency's staff for their technical, independent, and impartial work, and we are pleased to support a composite resolution on the report of the IAEA for 2025. The 17th IAEA General Conference reaffirmed Member States' collective support for the Agency in a challenging international environment. As a newly elected member of the IAEA Board of Governors for 2026-2028, Greece stands ready to contribute constructively to the Agency's work and to engage with its Member States towards agreeable outcomes at next year's General Conference. Greece attaches the utmost importance to nuclear safety, security and safeguards. We support the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which together represent the current verification standard under the NPT. Nuclear safety and security are inherently transboundary. States which exercise the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy must uphold the highest standards of transparency and responsibility, particularly in regions exposed to natural risks. We remain gravely concerned about the risks to nuclear safety, security and safeguards from Russia's continued military attacks against Ukraine, particularly at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. We call for Russia's withdrawal from the ZNPP and the entire territory of Ukraine. We commend the IAEA's continued presence under exceptionally challenging circumstances and reiterate our support for the Director General's seven indispensable pillars and five principles. Developments in Iran and the broader Middle East remain alarming. Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We are gravely concerned by Iran's almost complete suspension of cooperation with the IAEA and call for its immediate return to full cooperation with the Agency and compliance with safeguard obligations. Greece supports diplomatic efforts towards a comprehensive and verifiable arrangement addressing international concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program. Greece supports the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We remain also concerned by the DPRK's continued nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, we support diplomatic efforts towards the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We welcome the resolution of outstanding safeguard issues relating to Syria's past clandestine nuclear activities and encourage continued cooperation with the Agency. We also encourage Syria to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol. Finally, Greece strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology and the IAEA's contribution to sustainable development. We reaffirm our long-standing commitment to the Agency's technical cooperation programme and its role in strengthening national capabilities. I thank you.


GA · President [34:10]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Greece. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.


Russian Federation [34:27]:

Madam President, the Russian Federation advocates expanding of the international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, strengthening of the international regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and improving of international mechanisms so as to counter nuclear terrorism and for nuclear safety and security. We fully support the technical mandate of IAEA enshrined in its statute, and which is solid basis for the Agency work in all of the statutory areas of its activity. Our country has been and remains a major intellectual and material donor to the IAEA and is making a significant contribution to its work. are for peaceful nuclear energy, the development of international cooperation in this area, and making sure that all interested countries have the full enjoyment of their legitimate rights in this regard. At the same time, we have to note that the Agency's activities, the prompting of a group of Western states, are increasingly going beyond the scope of its statute, and work on the substantive technical aspects of its mandate remains paralyzed. And the results of the 70th session of IAEA General Conference are a good example here. This year, the traditional substantive resolutions of the agency's General Conference have fallen victim to the irresponsible approach of Western countries and Western states were completely unprepared for the discussion of these. Instead, the UN-NATO countries continue to cynically use the IAEA platform to settle political scores with those members of the Agency whose policy and sovereign choices do not suit the Western camp. Contrary to their loud statements of support for this international organization, these opportunists are sowing discord and multiplying differences in the ranks of the IAEA. They are introducing politicized initiatives into the consideration of the Agency's decision-making bodies and push for their adoption by voting. I am referring here to the legally and politically null resolution called Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards in Ukraine, which goes far beyond the framework of the IAEA Statute, undermines its technical mandate, and essentially draws the Agency into the conflict on the side of Ukraine and Western countries. The lack of responsible approach on the part of individual countries leads over dangerous to a dangerous situation around the Zaporizhzhia NPP and its satellites, Sitov and Energodar. Over the summer, attacks on the infrastructure of the city and the plant have become more frequent. They've become essentially daily. And this is not just creating threats to the nuclear safety of the ZNPP. but it is also a deliberate campaign to destroy the plant's employees, their families and local residents. We have to state that the Kiev authorities did not limit themselves to becoming the first in history to identify the NPP personnel as deliberate target for liquidation. Unconditional protectionism on the part of the West has normalized the absence of a critical line in Kiev's mind. External patronage is driving the Ukrainian regime deeper into the illusion of complete permissiveness. Obviously, this cannot go on like this any longer because the risks to nuclear safety and people's lives have become critical, and we call on the international community to stop ignoring Ukraine's actions and unequivocally condemn any attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. We cannot overlook the politically harmful and destructive resolution on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, which completely ignores the fact that Western states are responsible for the escalation of tension on the Korean Peninsula, as they continue to regularly carry out provocative military exercises in the immediate vicinity of the DPRK. United States and its allies regularly hold large-scale military exercises within which various offensive scenarios are worked out, including, inter alia, the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the DPRK. We would like to reaffirm that in the situation that has developed on the Korean Peninsula through the fault of the United States and its allies, there can be no more talk of denuclearization in principle. This issue is closed for the Russian Federation. Hiding behind an imaginary concern for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, Western countries accuse Iran of allegedly failing to comply with its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, completely overlooking the unprovoked aggression by Israel and the United States against Iran in 2025 and 2026, during which Iranian peaceful nuclear facilities under the agency's supervision were attacked, amongst other things. unfortunately, the draft resolution of the 81st session of the UN.


GA · President [39:46]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. And I now call on the distinguished representative of Thailand.


Thailand [40:15]:

Madam President, Thailand thanks the Director General of the IAEA for his report and commends Kuwait as Chair of the Board of Governors for introducing the draft resolution, which Thailand is pleased to co-sponsor. We also welcome Timor-Leste as the newest Member State of the Agency. Thailand strongly supports the agency mandate across its core pillars, nuclear safety and security, safeguard verification, and peaceful application through technical cooperation. Madam President, in a time of heightened geopolitical tensions, Thailand is deeply concerned by ongoing armed conflicts that pose risks to nuclear facilities. Nuclear facilities must never be attacked or threatened under any circumstances. Such actions pose catastrophic risks to human life, civil infrastructure, and the environment. In the Middle East, Thailand reaffirms its support for the agency in carrying out its safeguards mandate in Iran professionally, independently, and impartially. We remain concerned by the loss of continuity of knowledge regarding previously declared inventory of enriched uranium. and stressed the importance of restoring it through mutually reinforcing diplomacy and cooperation. We urge all parties to exercise restraint, maintain dialogue, and build trust in the interest of regional peace and security. Thailand remain gravely concerned by the persistent security risks to nuclear facilities in Ukraine and urge all parties to adhere to the Director-General's seven indispensable pillars and five concrete principles. On the Korean Peninsula, Thailand reiterates its call on the DPRK to fully comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and support the continued execution of the Agency verification mandate. Thailand reaffirms its strong commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime, and fully supports effective IAEA safeguards through compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, with views that the NPT the TPNW and other disarmament instruments as complementary and mutually reinforcing. I look forward to contributing constructively to the first review conference of TPNW. Madam President, nuclear science, technology, and innovation are fundamental to Thailand's sustainable development. Thailand supports the Technical Cooperation Programme as an essential mechanism for capacity building and technology transfer. We have pledged to the 2027 Technical Cooperation Fund and proposed projects to SMR readiness, health, climate-smart, and green food systems. We also support the Atom4NetZero initiative and are strengthening our regulatory framework and capacity for the safe and secure deployment of SMRs. Regionally, Thailand remains committed to cooperation through ASEAN-TOM as we prepare to assume its chairmanship in 2028 We stand ready to advance regional cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety, emergency preparedness and response, and public communication. We are proud to host Southeast Asia's first Ray of Hope Anchor Center at Ramathibodi Hospital. We support cancer care and supply radiopharmaceuticals nationwide. We also look forward to strengthening the Anchor Center network to enhance regional capacity. Madam President, as the Agency approaches its 70th anniversary, Thailand commends its professionalism and leadership, and reaffirm our unwavering commitment to work with the Agency and fellow Member States to ensure that nuclear science and technology continue to contribute to global peace, security, and prosperity. I thank you.


GA · President [44:27]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lithuania.


Lithuania [44:46]:

Thank you, Madam President. Lithuania aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. We thank DG Rafael Grossi for presenting IAEA's annual report. We also thank Kuwait for leading this year's General Assembly resolution on the report, which Lithuania is pleased to co-sponsor. Lithuania reiterates its strong support for the Agency's mandate in promoting nuclear safety, nuclear security, safeguards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy worldwide. We commend the DG and the Secretariat for their continued efforts carrying out the Agency's important work. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors for 2025-2027 term, Lithuania remains committed to contributing to the effective implementation of the Agency's mandate. Madam President, This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, reminding us that nuclear safety and security can never be taken for granted. Against this backdrop, Lithuania remains deeply concerned by Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and its continued attacks against Ukraine's civilian energy infrastructure. Such actions create significant risks for the safe and secure operations of Ukraine's nuclear facilities and undermine regional and international nuclear safety and security. We strongly support the IAEA's continued presence and assistance in Ukraine. We reiterate the need for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to be returned to the full sovereign control of Ukraine and call on Russia to immediately cease all actions that endanger nuclear safety and security. Lithuania recalls that no sovereign rights can arise from aggression or attempted annexation. Madam President, radiation risks do not respect national borders. This is particularly evident in the case of Belarusian nuclear power plant at Ostrovets, situated only 50 kilometers from Lithuania's capital, Vilnius. Lithuania remains seriously concerned about unresolved safety issues, including a principal safety issue related to site selection and assessment. Belarus did not evaluate density and distribution of Lithuanian population, also did not establish someone called extended planning distance or EPD with radius of 100 kilometers from NPP as it is suggested in IAA's recommendations. Around 1/3 of the whole Lithuanian population situated within EPD could be affected in the case of beyond design basis accident. and implementation of the emergency response actions, including evacuation, could be very complicated or even impossible. Belarus plans to expand the plant with additional reactor and to develop radioactive waste storage infrastructure at the same site, with further concerns and underscore the importance of comprehensive safety assessments, transparency, and meaningful transboundary consultations. Lithuania therefore reiterates its call on Belarus to suspend the operation of the plant until all outstanding safety concerns have been comprehensively addressed, and to refrain from further expansion until the applicable nuclear safety and environmental requirements have been fully met. The safety of populations on both sides of the border must remain the overriding priority. Madam President, Lithuania welcomes progress achieved in addressing serious outstanding safeguards issues and encourages continued cooperation with the Agency. At the same time, we remain concerned by Iran's continued failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA and comply with its safeguards obligations. Full, timely, and technically credible cooperation with the Agency remains essential for restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. We stress that Iran must urgently fulfill its international commitments and cooperate fully with the Agency. Lithuania is also concerned by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's continued advancement of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to comply with its international obligations and take meaningful steps towards denuclearization. We are furthermore concerned by the growing military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, which risks further undermining the international nonproliferation regime. Madam President, Lithuania reaffirms its unwavering support for the IAEA and for the multilateral rules-based international order that underpins international peace, security and sustainable development. And we support the adoption of the resolution on the report of the IAEA. I thank you.


GA · President [49:33]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste.


Timor-Leste [49:50]:

Thank you, Madam President. Timor-Leste welcomes the International Atomic Energy Agency's report and thanks Director General Rafael Grossi for the Agency's continued contributions to international peace, security, and sustainable development. The importance of the IAEA lies not only in the nuclear risk it helps to prevent, but also in the development opportunities it enables. We therefore support the objectives of resolutions A/81/L/77 and call for sustainable international cooperation, adequate resources and practical assistance to enable the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities effectively. At a time of heightened geopolitical tension and growing nuclear risk, the credibility of the Agency's verifications and safeguard activities remain indispensable. States must fulfill their international obligations, cooperate with the Agency, and resolve their outstanding concerns through dialogue and diplomacy. Excellencies, Timor-Leste wishes to highlight three priorities arising from our considerations on the Agency's work. First, strengthen nuclear safety and security. The risk facing nuclear facilities during the armed conflict demonstrate how an accident can have devastating humanitarian, environmental, and economic consequences, and extending far beyond national borders. We support the Agency's efforts to monitor nuclear safety, provide independent technical assistance, and strengthen international cooperation to prevent such incidents. Protection of nuclear installations, civilian populations, and the environment must remain a collective responsibility, consistent with international law. Second, ensuring equitable access to peaceful nuclear technologies. The Agency's work demonstrates that nuclear science can contribute meaningfully to healthcare, agriculture, food security, water management, and environmental protections. However, many LDC and SIDS countries lack the specialized personnel, equipment, and institutional capacity required to benefit fully from these technologies. We therefore encourage stronger technical cooperation, scientific training, and technology transfer guided by national development priorities. Third, strengthen international confidence through effective safeguards. The Agency's independent verification role is essential to preventing proliferation and ensuring compliance with applicable nuclear obligations. Its technical assessment must remain credible, impartial, and free from political interference. At the same time, nonproliferation efforts must reinforce our collective commitment to nuclear disarmament. Timor-Leste continues to support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Madam President, Timor-Leste accession to International Atomic Energy Agency reflect our commitment to strengthen international cooperation and the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. Membership in this agency opens new opportunities to benefit from technical assistance, capacity building, scientific advances, and specialized expertise that can support our national development priorities. This Applications have practical relevance for our country. Improved cancer diagnosis and treatment, more resilient agricultural productions, and better water resources management can make a tangible difference to communities, particularly in rural areas. Excellencies, our common objective must be clear to ensure that nuclear science serves humanity, strengthen international security, and contributes to a safer, more peaceful, and sustainable future for all. I thank you.


GA · President [54:11]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kenya.


Kenya [54:35]:

Madam President, Kenya recognizes IAEA's indispensable contribution to international peace and security, sustainable development, and the advancement of scientific cooperation among nations. The IAEA annual report 2025 demonstrates the breadth of this contribution, from nuclear verification and safety to healthcare, agriculture, environmental protection, and energy development. For Kenya, they represent practical opportunities to improve livelihoods, strengthen national institutions, and expand access to essential services. we value the Agency's contribution to human health. Through the Rays of Hope initiative, IAEA's support has helped expand the therapy capacity in Nakuru and Mombasa, as well as the development of expertise in medical imaging. Kenya also welcomes the opportunities presented by nuclear science in food security agriculture, water resource management, and climate resilience. Madam President, our partnership with the Agency is also evolving in the energy sector. In 2025, Kenya hosted the IAEA's Small Modular Reactor School, providing an opportunity to deepen national understanding of the technical, economic, regulatory, and safety considerations associated with advanced nuclear technologies. In 2026, Kenya and the agency advanced their cooperation through an integrated work plan for technical cooperation for 2026 to 2028. The agency's ongoing review of Kenya's proposed nuclear research reactor, as well as radioactive waste and spent fuel management arrangements, are equally important. Madam President, Kenya underscores The development of nuclear energy should be underpinned by effective regulatory oversight, strong safety and security frameworks, safeguards, compliancy, emergency preparedness, and responsible reactive waste management. Lastly, we propose three priorities for corrective action. First, strengthen the AIEA's technical cooperation program through predictable funding, targeted capacity building, and enhanced access to peaceful nuclear technologies. Second, expanding training, research partnership, and regional knowledge sharing to deepen Africans' expertise and institutional capacity. Third, reinforcing IAEA safeguards, nuclear safety, and the nuclear security to ensure that the expansion of peaceful nuclear applications is accompanied by transparency, confidence, and responsible stewardship. We stand ready to work with our partners to advance the peaceful application of nuclear science. I thank you, Madam President.


GA · President [57:52]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [58:19]:

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim. Madam President, the agency's reporting must remain professional, objective, factual, and free from political influence. Its credibility depends on impartiality and technical integrity. Nuclear energy is indispensable to development and energy security. Article 4 of the NPT affirms the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with Article 1 and 2. Yet, certain States systematically demonize this right and weaponize proliferation concerns to pressure states into abandoning their national nuclear fuel cycle. The United States, an NPT depository, openly questions the very existence of states parties' right to pursue the full nuclear fuel cycle. Denying a state's access to this essential technology while claiming to uphold their right to peaceful nuclear energy violates Article IV. No state can unilaterally rewrite the treaty or impose its own political veto on the legitimate rights of other state parties. In response to Iran's resolute defense of its inalienable rights under the NPT, the United States and The nuclear-armed Israeli regime launched two wars of aggression against Iran in 2025 and 2026, massively targeting its peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. This aggression caused immense destruction and killed thousands, including our martyred leader, whose well-known fatwa rejects nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They have violated international law, the UN Charter, the Agency's Statute, relevant Agency's General Conference resolution, and Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981. Neither the Agency's General Conference and Board of Governors, nor the Director General, has condemned these attacks. The Security Council has likewise failed to do so. The Director General has once again failed to condemn these attacks in his statement today. Instead, pressure is directed against the victim, while the aggressors escape accountability. The hypocrisy of this approach is blatant. Iran, an NPT State Party since 1970, has consistently affirmed its commitment to its international obligations and diplomacy. Yet, its peaceful nuclear program and safeguarded facilities have been subjected to political pressure and military attacks, while the Secretariat's withholding of technical cooperation deprives Iran of benefits of peaceful nuclear program that the Agency is mandated to promote. Meanwhile, the Israeli regime, the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in the region with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, continues to enjoy impunity. This selective application of nonproliferation standards exposes the political motives behind the pressure on Iran and undermines the credibility of the international nonproliferation regime. These same delegations demand access for inspectors while military threats persist, disregarding the extraordinary circumstances created by aggression. Let us be clear. Iran has neither abandoned nor formally suspended its safeguards obligations. However, aggression has fundamentally altered the physical and security conditions for their implementation. The agency's own report acknowledged that verification activities ceased and inspectors were withdrawn for safety reasons. Those same safety concerns cannot be ignored when their return is demanded. No country can reasonably be expected to provide access amid military operations and persist threats without adequate safety guarantees. Responsibility for creating these circumstances lies with the aggressors, not the victims. I thank you, Madam President.


GA · President [1:03:17]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria.


Nigeria [1:03:40]:

Thank you, Madam President. We thank the Director General for presenting the Agency's annual report and also congratulate Kuwait on assuming the chairmanship of the Board of Governors and commend Australia for its leadership during the preceding term. Nigeria reaffirms its steadfast support for the Agency's mandate in advancing nuclear safety, security, safeguards and peaceful uses. We underscore the centrality of the IAEA safeguards systems to global nonproliferation efforts and call for the universalization and effective implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements consistent with relevant international obligations. Madam President, we also reaffirm the inalienable right of states to peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination and in conformity with international obligations. The Agency's technical cooperation programmes remain indispensable to sustainable development and capacity building, particularly in developing States. Nigeria therefore calls for adequate, predictable and sustained funding for technical cooperation, particularly in Africa, to ensure equitable access to benefits of nuclear science and technology. Madam President, our election to the IAEA Board of Governors for 2026-2028 provides an opportunity for constructive contribution to the strengthening of the Agency's effectiveness and responsiveness to Member States. Indeed, Nigeria's Country Programme Framework 2024-2029 prioritizes not only nuclear safety and security, but also food and agriculture, health and nutrition, water and environment, as well as energy planning. As we continue to make appreciable gains in these fields, we welcome the Agency's sustained support in advancing our national development priorities. Nigeria affirms its readiness to work with all Member States to advance the Agency's mandate and ensure that nuclear technology serves exclusively peaceful purposes for the shared prosperity of humanity. I thank you.


GA · President [1:06:02]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bangladesh.


Bangladesh [1:06:22]:

Thank you, Madam President. Bangladesh welcomes the International Atomic Energy Agency's Annual Report 2025 and appreciates Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and his team for their continued efforts in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We believe that nuclear technology has an important role in addressing energy security and sustainable development. In this regard, Bangladesh reaffirms the inalienable right of all States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT. Madam President, Bangladesh values its long-standing cooperation with the IAEA. We appreciate the agency's technical safety review mission in Bangladesh and the visit of its International Physical Protection Advisory Service team to the Roopur Nuclear Power Plant in 2025. We also acknowledge the agency's support under the COMPASS initiative to strengthen our national safeguards capacity. Bangladesh is nearing a milestone as the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant is expected to supply electricity to the national grid by the end of the year. In our endeavor of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Bangladesh became a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment. We recently signed the Country Programme Framework, CPF, for the period of 2026 to 2032 with IAEA. We also look forward to the IAEA's emergency preparedness review mission in November. Madam President, Bangladesh appreciates the IAEA's technical cooperation programmes, particularly in healthcare, agriculture and environmental protection. We encourage greater technology transfer and capacity building for developing countries. We also emphasize the importance of protecting nuclear facilities in conflict situations. We recognize the central role of the IAEA in promoting safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear applications while ensuring that nuclear materials and technologies are not diverted to non-peaceful purposes. I thank you, Madam.


GA · President [1:08:45]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Bangladesh, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mauritania. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Oh, he's here. Okay.


Mauritania [1:09:57]:

In the name of God, the most compassionate, the most merciful. At the outset, my delegation would like to thank Mr. Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and his team for their report, which reflects and presents the outcome of the Agency's continued effort to achieve the objectives of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This comes through a review of the Agency's activities in the fields of nuclear technology, technical cooperation, nuclear safety and security, and safeguards. It is a great opportunity to commend those efforts and reaffirm my country's position on the need for States to continue to respect their obligations in line with the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency without prejudice to the provisions of Article III of the NPT, particularly paragraph 3, which stipulates that the implementation of safeguards measures should not hamper international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, my country underlines our principled position on the inalienable and sovereign right of states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as one of the main pillars of nuclear non-proliferation. My country values and highly appreciates the fruitful cooperation it has enjoyed with the Agency since 2004. This came through the technical cooperation programmes that enabled our country to benefit from nuclear technology in a safe, effective and cost-efficient manner. Such cooperation has been utilized in pest control, the monitoring and measurement of radiation levels, and the protection of the environment and the people, particularly those working in the health sector and protecting them from radiation exposure. This cooperation was further strengthened through the signing for the first time of the country programme framework between Mauritania and the Agency in September of 2009. This made it possible to structure the use of nuclear technology in achieving national development objectives. We've also signed the second phase of the framework covering the period from 2014 to 2018, followed by third phase for 2020-2025. Several cooperation priorities were identified, including strengthening capacities in the management of cancer, expanding public access to high quality diagnostic and treatment services, enhancing capacities in the area of food safety monitoring, reducing environmental pollution, and increasing nuclear radiation safety and security. At the continental level, my country deposited in 2022 its instrument of accession of African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, or AFRA. with a view to enhancing the benefits derived from the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques provided for under the agreement and contributing to the achievement of national and regional development objectives in African states. Mr. President, while acknowledging the important role played by the agency in enabling member states to benefit from the vast development potential offered by nuclear technology and energy, my delegation considers that the Agency should also make an effective contribution to preventing nuclear proliferation through the implementation of the mandate established under the decision entitled "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East". Thereby, this would contribute to accelerating progress towards the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This was envisaged in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT and in the relevant UN resolutions, in particular General Assembly Resolution 73/546 of 2018. This is especially important in light of the failure of three review conferences of the NPT, namely the ninth and 10th conferences in 2015 and 2022, and the 11th conference held in May of this year, to agree on a final document supporting the objective of peaceful uses.


Interpreter [1:14:55]:

The microphone was cut off.


GA · President [1:14:58]:

I thank the distinguished representative. I thank the distinguished representative of Mauritania. I thank the distinguished representative of Mauritania. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.


Syrian Arab Republic [1:16:49]:

Thank you, Madam President. We are very proud to hear mentioned the name of Syria today, and it was talked We were talked about in terms of fulfillment of our international obligations as success stories, as reflected in Mr. Grossi's statements. This is after decades during which the outgoing regime tarnished Syria's name with chemical weapons, drug trafficking, destabilization, and making Syria into a pariah state. I would like, therefore, to begin by thanking the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Rafael Grossi, for his statement and for his praise of Syria's cooperation. President, for many years, the international community in Syria saw an approach based on attempts to avoid its commitments. The regime The old regime has turned the country into a source of drug trafficking, support for destabilization, the use of chemical weapons, and pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons. Complex files have accumulated at a time when international efforts were being made to achieve any progress to put an end to this behavior. Syrians and the people of the region paid a heavy price for this kind of an approach that which resulted in the fact that Syria was using confrontation and not cooperation, conflict, not partnership. With the birth of the new Syria following its liberation, this has changed and the state chose to act with responsibility and courage and to fight the old heritage. We are protecting our borders. We're fighting against terrorism and drug trafficking. And we are working on the chemical and nuclear files based on the belief that the security of the region is built on partnership, fulfillment of commitments. And these are the ways to restore confidence and consolidate stability. And this is the way to restore Syria to its rightful place in the international community. President, this shift is a major turning point. This is at a time when trust in the multilateral system is declining, conflicts and armed races are escalating. Syria has chosen a path that restores diplomacy, international law. Let's take the nuclear file, for example. It provides concrete evidence of the depth of transformation that Syria has underwent. in its cooperation with the agencies. This is a strategic choice that we made after 15 years when access to IAEA was banned. Now we are declaring nuclear materials that we didn't do yesterday, and we are submitting it to the safeguards regime. This resulted that the name of our country was removed from the list of non-compliant states. I cannot conclude, President, without recalling that at the time that the Director General, Mr. Grossi, was visiting Syria to follow up on efforts to close the nuclear file, Israel did not stop its violations and incursions into southern Syria. It even launched attacks against Syria when Mr. Grossi was in our country. We are engaging with the Agency transparently. We affirm our determination to fulfill our obligations. Israel continues to destabilize Syria. We in Syria have chosen to shoulder our responsibility with courage and to honor our international commitments so as to protect the international architecture. which is being tested by attacks against its credibility and effectiveness. We have done our part, and the international community has seen what's happening in southern Syria, the demonstrations by Syrians against that, and the international community has to shoulder its responsibility and support and protect our path. I thank you.


GA · President [1:21:30]:

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/81/L.7. For your information, the draft resolution has closed for e-sponsorship. I now give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.


UN Secretariat [1:21:49]:

I should like to announce that since the submission of the draft resolution and in addition to the delegations listed on the L document, the following countries have also become co-sponsors of A/81/L.7. Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, Botswana, Burundi, Chile, Ecuador, Eswatini, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Moldova, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zambia. If any other countries wish to co-sponsor A/81/L.7, please signify by pressing the microphone button. I see Equatorial Guinea, Comoros, Lesotho, Fiji, Gabon, the Dominican Republic, even though the Dominican Republic is listed on the L document. That will conclude the list. Thank you, Madam President.


GA · President [1:23:31]:

I thank the representative of the Secretariat. Before giving the floor for explanations of vote, before the vote, I propose that the time limits for statements and explanation of vote under this item be five minutes. Is there any objection to this proposal? I hear none. It is so decided. Accordingly, pursuant to rule 72 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly, when a representative exceeds her or his allotted time, The President shall call the speaker to order without delay, which will be done by means of automatic microphone cutoff. To assist delegations in managing their time, a countdown clock will be displayed on the screens. Members are also reminded that explanations of vote should be made by delegations from their seats. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.


Democratic People's Republic of Korea [1:24:53]:

Thank you. The measures taken by the DPRK to strengthen its nuclear deterrent constitute the legitimate exercise of its sovereign right to safeguard its sovereignty and security and constitute regional stability and preserve the world peace. Despite this clear fact, The IAEA adopts an interventionist and unlawful resolution against the DPRK every year, thereby exposing itself as a political instrument of the Western forces. The DPRK is neither a member state of the IAEA nor a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Therefore, the IAEA has absolutely no authority or competence to interfere in our internal affairs. Today, the most urgent and serious issues that the international community should address are the flagrant acts of nuclear proliferation by the United States and the unlawful nuclear activities of its allies who are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Our position is very clear. We will not tolerate any attempt to deny the DPRK's constitutional status or its legitimate rights. We will resolutely deter all the external challenges and threats through the overwhelming force, thereby safeguarding peace and security in the region and throughout the world. For these reasons, we will vote against the A/81/07 resolution. Thank you.


GA · President [1:26:43]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Democratic Republic of Korea. And I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:26:58]:

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim. Madam President. We have serious concerns regarding operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, which takes note with appreciation of the IEA annual report. A report deserves appreciation only when it meets the basic standards of objectivity, impartiality, legal accuracy, and balance. Unfortunately, this report falls short of these standards. The report contains unfounded allegations, misleading assessment, and questionable legal interpretations, particularly concerning Security Council Resolution 2231 and the alleged noncompliance with safeguards obligations. These claims have been firmly challenged on both factual and legal grounds. Iran's detailed legal arguments and objections are set out in INFIRC/1426, yet the report fails to give adequate consideration to these documented positions. A professional and credible report cannot selectively present allegations while disregarding documented legal arguments and objections. Such an approach seriously undermines its objectivity and credibility. More importantly, due to political pressure of certain Member States, the IAEA's General Conference, Board of Governors and Director General had failed to explicitly condemn unlawful military attacks against safeguarded nuclear facilities, despite their grave implications for nuclear safety, security and the integrity of the safeguards system. How can a report claim to provide a balanced account of nuclear safeguards while failing to clearly address one of the most serious threats to the very facilities under those safeguards? This is not a minor omission. It raises fundamental questions about the consistency, impartiality and the credibility of the Agency and its report. A credible report must apply the same legal standards to all relevant issues. Selective reporting cannot serve as a basis for institutional credibility, let alone the appreciation. For these compelling reasons, we request that operative paragraph 1 and the draft resolution as a whole be put to a vote. We will vote against operative paragraph 1 and abstain on the draft resolution as a whole. Thank you, Madam President.


GA · President [1:29:34]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.


Russian Federation [1:29:48]:

Madam President, unfortunately, we have to point out yet once again that the politicized in the draft resolution resolutions of the 70th session of the agency's General Conference are non-consensual. And a footnote included in the text with a reference to a multi-language collection of resolutions and decisions of the General Conference cannot be considered as an adequate substitute for a factual reference to which of them were put to a vote. And taking into account all of the above, the Russian Federation is forced to state that in the current situation, we cannot support the resolution, and we will vote against it. I thank you for your attention.


GA · President [1:30:37]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. And we have heard the last speaker and explanation of vote before the vote. The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/81/L.7, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy A separate recorded vote has been requested on operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. Is there any objection to this? I hear none. I shall therefore put this paragraph to the vote first. I now put to the vote operative paragraph 1. We shall now begin the voting process. Those in favour of operative paragraph 1, please signify. Those against? Abstentions.


UN Secretariat [1:31:56]:

The Assembly is now voting on operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/81/L.7. Will all delegations confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the screen? The voting has been completed. Please lock the machine.


GA · President [1:32:38]:

The result of the vote is as follows: in favor 137, against 6, abstentions 1. Operative paragraph 1 is adopted. A recorded vote has been requested on the draft resolution as a whole. We shall now begin the voting process. Those in favor of draft resolution A/81/L.7 as a whole, please signify. Those against and abstentions.


UN Secretariat [1:33:32]:

The Assembly is now voting on draft resolution L.7 as a whole, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Will all delegations confirm that their votes are accurately reflected on the screen? The voting has been completed. Please lock the machine.


GA · President [1:33:57]:

The result of the vote is as follows: in favour 150, against 2, Abstentions, one. Draft resolution A/81/L.6 as a whole has been adopted. The exercise of the right of reply has been requested. I propose that the time limits for statements in the exercise of the right of reply under this item be limited to five minutes. for the first intervention and to three minutes for the second intervention. Is there any objection to this proposal? I hear none. It's so decided. Accordingly, pursuant to rule 72 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly, when a representative exceeds his or her allotted time, the President shall call the speaker to order without delay, which will be done by means of automatic microphone cutoff. To assist delegations in managing their time, a countdown clock will be displayed on the screens. Members are also reminded that statements in the exercise of the right of reply should be made by delegations from their seats. I call on the representative of the Russian Federation.


Russian Federation [1:35:51]:

Madam President, we note with regret that a number of delegations today decided to impede the deliberations of the General Assembly by trying to politicize the discussion by mentioning extraneous topics that have nothing to do with the issue on the agenda. Russia is categorically opposed to this approach. We see no point in reacting to yet another provocative stories about alleged unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. We have repeatedly explained our position on this matter. Now, in connection with the comments made by some delegations regarding the Zaporizhzhia NPP, we would like to note the following. According to the results of the referendum held in the Zaporizhzhia region, held in full compliance with international standards, and this was confirmed by independent observers, this region became part of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, the ZNPP is now under Russian jurisdiction. and an organization has been created that will operate the plant. Units of the Russian Guard continue to protect the Zaporizhzhia NPP because such an important facility as a nuclear power plant cannot remain unguarded for a minute. At the same time, the main threat to the safety of the NPP remains the Kyiv regime demonstrating its terrorist nature, continues reckless attacks on the plant, and creates serious risks to nuclear security and safety at it, including the possibility of a large-scale accident with radiation emissions. Western countries are well aware of where the ZNPP is actually being shelled from. the territory of Ukraine can be seen through and through by Western satellite surveillance systems. Nonetheless, our Western colleagues continue to cover up for the Kyiv regime, thereby encouraging very dangerous actions. For our part, we continue doing everything in our power to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. I thank you.


GA · President [1:37:46]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, and I now call on the distinguished representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.


Democratic People's Republic of Korea [1:38:00]:

Thank you, Madam President. The DPRK delegation wishes to exercise its right of reply in response to the provocative and politically motivated remarks made by certain delegations which blatantly denied the DPRK's sovereign and legitimate right during the general debate. The DPRK once again categorically rejects in the strongest possible terms those groundless and illogical allegations. Let us be clear. First, the DPRK has enshrined the position of nuclear weapons in its national law, reflecting the unanimous will of all the Korean people. and continues to fulfill its obligations under the law. Those who argue so-called CVID must recognize that their demands openly disregard and violate the sovereignty of the DPRK. Second, the DPRK's nuclear deterrent serves as a reliable guarantee for safeguarding the sovereignty of the state, regional stability, and world peace against the hegemonic and hostile forces. Those who portray the DPRK's nuclear deterrent as a threat merely demonstrate their own hostility toward our state and the region, as well as their hegemonic ambitions. Third, the DPRK withdrew from the NPT a long time ago and is not a member of the IAEA. Therefore, it is illegitimate to dictate a position of our state or criticize its efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities. The DPRK's status as a nuclear weapons state does not require recognition by Western countries or the IAEA. It is backed by its actual nuclear deterrent and has been irreversibly and permanently enshrined in the supreme law of the state. Fourth, The integrity and legitimacy of the NPT are not undermined by the exercise of the rights of the sovereign state outside the treaty. Rather, they are eroded from within the certain state parties that arbitrarily distort the nature and the scope of the treaty's application. Those who are arguing over the CVIT should focus on the countries that are neglecting their nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT and engaging in proliferation-related activities, such as extending nuclear deterrence and transferring nuclear submarine technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Last, we want to address the fact that the representative of France referred to our country by an incorrect name. Calling the official name of a sovereign state is one of the most elementary principles at this chamber. If the French representative made this mistake intentionally, it demonstrates ignorance. However, if the reference was deliberate, it can be regarded as another grave provocation against sovereign state. The DPRK is firm and unshakable in its determination to control and counter with the nukes on the principle of ensuring security and defending peace by dint of the powerful strength, the nuclear threat by the enemy countries aimed to encroach upon its absolute and inviolable sovereignty and security. Thank you, madam.


GA · President [1:41:44]:

I call on the representative of Australia.


Australia · Australia, United Kingdom and United States [1:41:54]:

Thank you, President. I take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to address the misleading assertions which have been made in the preceding debate regarding ORCA's cooperation. President, Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program is proceeding in full compliance with AUKUS partners' respective international obligations, including under the NPT, Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. We remain committed to setting the highest possible non-proliferation standard and to transparency with the international community. Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and remains aligned with the treaty. As the Director General of the IAEA has repeatedly made clear, Article 14 of the IAEA's model CSA is the specific provision to support the right of states to use nuclear material in a non-prescribed military activity, including for naval nuclear propulsion. Australia is continuing its engagement with the IAEA to develop a safeguards and verification approach for its naval nuclear propulsion program, within the framework of Australia's CSA and additional protocol, including an Article 14 arrangement. As we have made clear, Australia's Article 14 arrangement will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight. Australia's conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine program will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures, enabling the agency to continue to fulfill its technical safeguards objectives for Australia at all times. We recognize that there are genuine questions amongst member states regarding naval nuclear propulsion programs in states maintaining a CSA. We remain committed to transparency and we continue to engage openly. As in previous years, Australia has delivered an update to this year's General Conference in Vienna on our program to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. ORCAS partners have also provided updates at every regular meeting of the Board of Governors since the ORCAS partnership was first announced. The Director General has made it clear that he will continue to keep Member States informed on developments in his engagement on naval nuclear propulsion programs. As the Director General last report on Australia's program confirms, Australia continues to provide the Agency with all information required under its safeguards agreements, and the Agency continues to conduct verification activities in relation to Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program. President, We regret efforts by some to cast doubt on the agency's clear authority to negotiate directly and in confidence with member states on safeguards and verification arrangements, including for naval nuclear propulsion under the CSA. As confirmed by the Director General's clear statements on this topic, the agency's engagement with Australia in this regard is entirely within its mandate under its statute and safeguards agreements approved by the Board of Governors. It is important that Member States continue to reject all attempts to undermine and politicize the IAEA's independent technical mandate on which we all rely. Thank you.


GA · President [1:45:29]:

I call on the representative of Belarus.


Belarus [1:45:40]:

Thank you, Madam President. First of all, we would like to note that For discussions of issues of nuclear safety, there are specialized international forums. However, Belarus has been forced to exercise its right of reply. In response to the criticism voiced in this room regarding the construction and operation of the Belarusian nuclear power plant, we wish to state that from the very beginning of the implementation of the national nuclear energy program, Belarus has transparently and responsibly and in cooperation with the IAEA and other foreign partners taken all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the nuclear power plant. There is ample evidence confirming the far-fetched and unfounded nature of any allegations that the Belarus NPP is supposedly unsafe. Belarus is a party to all international conventions concluded under the auspices of the IAEA and participates on a continuous basis in the review procedures. We have received all recommended IAEA review and advisory missions, and on a voluntary basis, Belarus has conducted stress tests of the Belarus NPP in accordance with the methodology adopted by the EU, as well as peer review of the results by experts from EU member states. We share Lithuania's view that nuclear safety belongs to no one nation. It has no nationality. We are convinced that the importance of ensuring nuclear safety cannot depend on which state owns a nuclear facility. For that reason, we would recall that issues of nuclear safety should be considered on the basis of professional assessments, facts and international standards. Regrettably, instead of a substantive expert dialogue, we continue to hear unilateral statements and accusations. We believe that this approach is unproductive. Specific technical issues should be discussed within the framework of the relevant international mechanisms, with the provision of well-substantiated information and an opportunity to examine it professionally. we confirm that, taking into account forecasted socio-economic development and the growth in electricity consumption, a decision has been taken to further develop nuclear energy generation in Belarus. Once this decision has been formally documented, we will notify interested parties in the established manner. We are open to constructive and professional cooperation with all interested states and relevant organizations on issues related to the safe and sustainable operation of the Belarus NPP. We call on parties not to politicize issues of nuclear safety and to make use of existing international forums for a substantive discussion of any well-founded concerns. Thank you for your attention.


GA · President [1:48:44]:

I call on the representative of Ukraine.


Ukraine [1:48:51]:

Madam President, the delegation of Ukraine is compelled to exercise the right of reply to the statement made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. Ukraine categorically rejects the misleading and unfounded allegations made by the Russian Federation. In his statement today, the Russian representative described the latest resolution entitled Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards in Ukraine, adopted at the 70th session of the General Conference, as politically and legally null and void. Let us be absolutely clear. If there is anything that is truly null and void, both politically and legally, it is Russia's sham referendums and also subsequent acts aimed at formalizing its attempted illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories. These illegal acts have no validity under international law and cannot alter Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. The General Assembly made this unequivocally clear in its resolution ES/11/4, adopted with the support of 143 member states. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is and will remain a Ukrainian nuclear facility. No amount of Russian propaganda, fabricated legal arguments, or attempts to impose Russian jurisdiction can change this fact. Madam President, Russia continues to accuse Ukraine of military activities, drone operations, and shelling in the vicinity of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and the occupied city of Enerhodar. These accusations are yet another attempt to reverse the roles of aggressor and victim and divert international attention from Russia's illegal occupation and militarization of Ukrainian nuclear facility. It was Russia that brought military forces, weapons, and equipment on the premises of Europe's largest nuclear power plant. It is Russia's continued military presence and activities in and around the facility that create unacceptable risk to nuclear safety and security. Ukraine has repeatedly drawn attention to the use of the occupied plant and its surrounding areas by Russian forces for military purposes, including drone operations against Ukrainian-controlled territory. Russia cannot occupy a nuclear power plant, use its premises for military purposes, endanger its personnel, and then lecture others about nuclear safety. The most effective and lasting way to eliminate these risks is clear. Russia must withdraw its military personnel and equipment from Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, return the facility to the full control of its legitimate Ukrainian authorities, and cease its war of aggression against Ukraine. Thank you, Madam President.


GA · President [1:51:16]:

I now call on the representative of Israel.


Israel [1:51:22]:

President, Madam President, I am compelled to respond to the remarks made by the representative of Iran. It is remarkable to hear a regime that has spent decades deceiving the international community lectures others about international law. Iran cannot violate its commitments, obstruct verification, and then present itself as the victim. The IAEA Board of Governors has repeatedly found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguard obligations and in September decided to report this noncompliance to the Security Council. The facts are well documented. Over nine tons of nuclear material, including 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, have been outside agency safeguards for more than a year. Iran has provided no information on its status and no access to the facilities. It has stockpiled 60% enriched uranium, which has no civilian justification. Iran's safeguards obligations are legally binding. They are not optional, and they are not subject to Iranian conditions. The same applies to the Security Council resolutions reinstated in September 2025. A country with peaceful intentions does not conceal nuclear material from inspectors and does not use negotiations only to buy time. Madam President, Israel acted to remove an existential and imminent threat in accordance with international law and will continue to do whatever is necessary to defend itself. A nuclear Iran is a danger to the entire world, and no amount of Iranian rhetoric will change the facts. I thank you.


GA · President [1:53:16]:

I call on the representative of China.


China [1:53:24]:

Thank you, Madam President. The Chinese delegation was not planning to take the floor again. However, we feel compelled to respond to the statement by the representative of Australia in defense of AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation. The Orcus will transfer metric tons of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium, which goes beyond the scope of the NPT and will cross the threshold of nuclear proliferation, posing a serious challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime as well as to international original strategic security and stability. Invoking applying Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to Orcus would inevitably break with existing practices under the IAEA safeguards system, set a significant precedent and have far reaching implications. An issue that is so highly contentious within the framework of the NPT and the IAEA. must be discussed and resolved by Member States through intergovernmental process characterized by equality, rationality, inclusiveness, mutual respect, and responsibility. In the last five years, to maintain international original peace, security, and stability, and to defend NPT and the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards system, China has worked hard to advance relevant intergovernmental discussion process within IAEA. Discussion among parties has gone deeper and deeper with more and more diverse input. China stands ready to continue working with parties to jointly advance intergovernmental discussion on all aspects of AUKUS cooperation. China also urges relevant countries to stop rejecting intergovernmental discussion process and instead should heed and highly value different input of countries. We also hope that IAEA will continue to provide necessary assistance to make contribution to defend NPT and the future development universality of IAEA safeguard system. I thank you.


GA · President [1:55:53]:

I call on the representative of Lithuania.


Lithuania [1:55:59]:

Thank you, Madam President. Lithuania takes the floor to exercise its right of reply to the statement made by Belarus. First, nuclear safety and the effective application of IAEA standards and review mechanisms are directly related to our discussion of the Agency's annual report. Lithuania has no intention of replacing technical dialogue with political rhetoric. Indeed, a month ago, on 22nd of September 2026, our nuclear safety regulator sent another detailed communication to its Belarusian counterpart, reiterating that site selection and assessment remain a principal nuclear safety issue, and drawing attention once again to two unresolved concerns. First, evaluation of density and distribution of Lithuanian population was not done. and corresponding IAEA safety standards were not taken into consideration during the site selection and assessment of for Belarusian NPP. And second, Belarus has not invited AIA seed mission with modules covering review of Belarusian NPP site selection and evaluation, including environmental impact assessment. Further, we fully respect the professional work of IAEA. However, Belarus cannot present the conclusions of missions with defined scopes as comprehensive certification of the plant's safety. The IAEA's 2017 SEED mission examined specific external hazards and design parameters. It did not constitute a comprehensive review of the initial site selection process or of cross-border population considerations raised by Lithuania. The report itself is explicit that the agency's findings do not replace a comprehensive safety assessment, which remains a national responsibility. Finally, concerns regarding transboundary environmental procedures are not merely bilateral assertions. The meeting of the parties to the Espoo Convention has found Belarus in non-compliance in relation to the Ostrovets project. As regards the proposed radioactive waste facilities, Lithuania has identified substantial deficiencies in the environmental impact assessment, including the examination of alternatives, potential transboundary impacts, and accident scenarios. We do not question the agency's expertise. We question the suggestion that participation in review mechanisms is enough to resolve safety issues that remain unanswered. We call on Belarus to provide verifiable information and address the concerns on their merits, rather than dismissing them as political. Madam President, and with regard to the statement just made by the Russian Federation, I feel compelled to reiterate what Lithuania has already stated. No sovereign rights can arise from aggression or attempted annexation. I thank you.


GA · President [1:59:10]:

I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:59:17]:

My delegation categorically rejects and condemns baseless and absurd allegations by the representative of the Israeli regime against Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The Israeli regime is the last entity on Earth entitled to lecture Iran or anyone else. A regime responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza has no moral authority to lecture others. A regime that has carried out unlawful attacks against Iran, including its peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards, has no credibility to lecture Iran on nuclear non-proliferation. As the only entity in the Middle East that has not acceded to the NPT, the Israeli regime is in no position to lecture Iran. a state party to the treaty since 1970, on compliance with or implementation of the NPT and safeguard obligations, and a regime that continues to obstruct the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, cannot lecture Iran, which initiated this historic proposal in 1974. The Israeli regime which has gone so far to weaponize even food and water against innocent civilians, has over the past eight decades carried out more than 3,000 terrorist operations, displaced over 7 million Palestinians, martyred and wounded hundreds of thousands, and imprisoned more than 1 million Palestinians, the Israeli regime burdened by such a dark record lacks any credibility to lecture other states on international law. Next time, before presuming to lecture others, they are urged to look in the mirror and reflect on the atrocities for which their own regime must be held accountable. Madam President, my delegation also categorically rejects and condemns the baseless and deceptive allegations made by representatives of certain Western countries, including the UK, France, Australia, and the EU. Regarding Iran's nuclear program, I must state the following with absolute clarity. Iran's nuclear program has always been, is, and will remain exclusively peaceful. This is not a matter of debate. It is a matter of fact, record, and verification. Those who pretended otherwise are deliberately spreading deception for political gain. These same countries, who lecture others on non-proliferation, watch silently as two nuclear weapon possessors launch a bombing campaign against Iran's safeguard nuclear facilities, targeting scientists and infrastructure under the IAEA oversight. To those certain Western countries, I have a clear message. Before pointing fingers at Iran, address your own violations of Article 1, 2, and 6 of the NPT. arising from your reliance on NATO's nuclear deterrence arrangements. Your selective invocation of international law, blatant hypocrisy, and double standards expose the hollowness of your accusations. Those who apply international law selectively have no credibility to lecture others on compliance. You cannot invoke international law against others while shielding yourselves and your allies from its obligations. I thank you, Madam President.


GA · President [2:03:05]:

May I take it that it's the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 91? It's so decided. And the meeting has been adjourned.


UN Secretariat [2:03:26]:

Thank you, Madam.