UN Transcripts — https://transcripts.un.org/fr/asset/k11/k117btyyv2
(Main Committee II) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — 4 May 2026
Language: en
Automatically generated transcript — may contain errors. Not an official United Nations record.

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Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [0:01]:

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I request you all to take your seats. Where to begin? Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, this meeting is called to order. I Declare open the first meeting of Main Committee 2 of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, we now turn to pillar two of the npt, including issues relating to non proliferation safeguards, export controls and nuclear Weapon free zones, as well as the regional issues to be dealt with in Subsidiary Body Tool. I urge all delegations to proceed in these discussions with discipline, mutual respect and to be mindful of the limited time that we have for these meetings. Let us now turn to the organizational work. This Committee will address the agenda items allocated to Main Committee 2 as indicated in Annex 5 of the document NPT CONF2026 1. Furthermore, at its first meeting, the Conference has decided to establish Subsidiary Body 2 under the Main Committee 2 to examine, and I quote, regional issues including with respect to the Middle east and implementation of the 1995 Middle east resolution as outlined in the draft program of work and indicative timetable which have been provided to you. It is my intention to first commence the meetings of this Main Committee with a general exchange of views consistent with the statement by the President of the Conference. Given the limited number of meetings, we will proceed with our work on Main Committee 2 and Subsidiary Body 2 on a rolling basis when the list of speakers for the general exchange of Views is exhausted. It is therefore my intention to proceed immediately to the meetings of subsidiary body 2. Please plan accordingly. Let us now move to the general Exchange of Views. Please allow me first to briefly share some guidelines for the conduct of our deliberations. First, inscription on the list of speakers on E delegate is required for the general exchange of views. The list of speakers will be closed at the end of this meeting in order to ensure that delegations can have advance notice of the speaking order. QR codes for the list of speakers can be found around the room. I note that there will be no list of speakers for subsidiary body 2 and therefore no need to inscribe in advance. Second, I wish to address the time limit for statements during the general exchange of views, as was advised by the President of the Conference. For the general exchange of views, there will be a timer shown on the screen indicating that one minute remains for the statement, followed by a strict microphone cutoff. Once the time limit has been reached, delegations will recall that the time limit for statements is 8 minutes for group statements and 5 minutes for national statements. Delegations that wish to do so are invited to provide longer versions of their statement to be posted on the website of the Review Conference. Third, delegations are kindly asked to provide their statements in advance for the interpretation services. They may do so by emailing an electronic copy of their statement to the email address estatementn.org the email should clearly indicate in the subject line NPT Review Conference Main Committee 2 and Delegation Name. In addition, delegations are kindly requested to email electronic versions of their statements to the secretariat@nptn.org as early as possible for posting on the website of the Review Conference. Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise a right of reply. Rights of reply will be heard at the end of the meeting. With that said, I now turn to the list of speakers we have for the general exchange of views. I currently have 76 speakers on my list. For the first speaker I have on my list is the representative of Indonesia to be followed on behalf Indonesia on behalf of Non Aligned Movement and followed by European Union on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. So Indonesia, you have the floor.


Indonesia · NAM [6:08]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair Mr. Chair, I'm honored to speak on behalf of the Group of Member States of the Non Aligned Movement States Parties to the npt. We stress the importance of ensuring that efforts aimed at nuclear non proliferations are parallel to simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. We reiterate our determinations to promote multilateralisms as the core principles of negotiations in the area of disarmament and non proliferations. In the view of the Group, any horizontal proliferations of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons sharing by State Parties constitute a clear violation of non proliferation obligations undertaken by those nuclear Weapons states under Article 1 and by those non nuclear weapons states under Article 2 of the treaty. The Group therefore urges the State Parties to put an end to nuclear weapons sharing with other States under any circumstances and any kind of security arrangements in time of peace or in times of war. Mr. Chair, the group reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of Article 3 of the Treaty to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear programs and provide credible assurances enabling State Parties to engage in the transfers of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article 4 of the treaty. Therefore, State Parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipments, materials and technology to State Parties, with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements being the universal standard for verifications. The Group is of the view that any such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Nuclear non proliferations and nuclear safety and security must not be misused to violate, deny or restrict peaceful uses. In this regard, the Movement reiterates that the responsibility of nuclear safety and security rests with the State concerned. We underline the importance of universalizations of the Treaty and call upon all non parties to the Treaty to exist to the Treaty without any conditions or further delay as a non nuclear Weapon State and place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA Full Scope Safeguards the Group underlines that multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Agencies is the most appropriate way to address verification of safeguard issues. IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifications of the fulfillment of safeguard obligations assumed by State Parties under the Treaty with a view to preventing the diversions of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At the same time, the Group emphasized that the work of the Agencies with regard to safeguards and verifications has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its Statute and Safeguards Agreements. The Group calls upon the Nuclear Weapon States to undertake full scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with its Statute for the exclusive purpose of verifications of the fulfillment of the Nuclear Weapons State's obligations assumed under the Treaty. The Group also support the development of appropriate legally binding verifications arrangements within the context of IAEA to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile materials from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this context, Groups call on the Nuclear Weapons States to implement their commitments in The Relations to Action 16 of the Actions Plan adopted in the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the placement of physical material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verifications. Mr. Chair, the group believes that the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones created by the Treaties of Tlateloku, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zones Treaty as well as Mongolia's Nuclear Weapon Free status represents significant positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non proliferations, underlining the need for enhancing the effectiveness of such zones. The Group calls for the ratifications by the Nuclear Weapons States of the relevant protocols to the above mentioned treaties, the removal of any and all reservations and interpretative declarations incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaties establishing such zones, as well as for the respect of the denuclearization status of these zones recognizing their contributions to the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world and the promotions of international peace and security, calling for the establishment of such zones where they do not exist. The Group once again expresses its long standing strong support for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle east in accordance with the 1995 resolutions on the Middle east, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without the vote that enabled the independent extensions of the treaty in 1995, the resolutions remains valid until its objectives are achieved. In this regard, the group welcomes UNGA decision 73 546, the convening of six successful sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of Middle East Zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their constructive outcomes, acknowledges its constructive contributions and calls upon the Committee to support its implementations. The Group stresses that the 1995 resolutions and other decisions on the subject adopted within the context of the NPT Review Conferences remain valid until the objectives are achieved and that the implementations of decision 70, 73, 506 is without prejudice to their validity and shall not also be construed as their replacement. The Group calls upon Israel to participate in the Conference and engage with us constructively and in good fit with a view to agreeing on arrangements freely arrived at by the countries of the regions. We acknowledge that two of the three co sponsors of the resolutions on the Middle east adopted by the 1995 reun extensions conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the other two nuclear Weapons States attend the Conference and support its important work and we urge the United States to act likewise. Mr. Chair, the group has submitted updated Working Papers on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, the Middle east and Safeguards, as well as on verifications. The members of the Group will refer to the positions outlined in the Working Papers while delivering further statements. The full versions of the statement will be submitted to the Secretariat. Thank you.

Mr.

Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [12:56]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for the statement on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement. The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of European Union on behalf of the European Union and its member States, to be followed by Libya on behalf of the Arab Group EU, you have the floor.


EU · EU [13:18]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries, Montenegro, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area as well as Monaco and San Marino, align themselves with this statement. Let me congratulate you on your election as Main Committee two Chair and assure you of the full support of the EU and its member states. The official full version of our statement will be made available online. The EU stresses the urgent need to address decisively the multiple existing nuclear nonproliferation challenges in order to preserve and strengthen the NPT's positive record. Mr. Chair, Russia's unjustified and illegal full scale war against Ukraine, in particular its illegal seizure and militarization of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, has severe implications for safeguards in Ukraine. We call on Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Ukraine's set NPP and return the plan to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders under these exceptionally difficult circumstances. The EU welcomes that the IEA has continued to implement safeguards in Ukraine. Its presence at all of Ukraine's nuclear sites is of utmost importance. Chair Developments in Iran and in the wider regions threaten both regional and global security. The EU calls for de escalation, maximum restraint, protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure and full respect for international law by all parties. We strongly condemn Iran's indiscriminate military strikes against countries in the region, express how solitary with countries affected and call for the implementation of UN Security Security Council Resolution 2817. Iran must never be allowed to seek, develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. The US always supported diplomatic efforts as the only way to bring about a durable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue which remains a key threat to international security. We support the resumption of talks between the US and Iran to achieve a robust and lasting agreement. They reinstated UN Security Council resolution after the completion of the snapback process, create obligations for all UN Member States and oblige Iran to suspend several proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. Iran's continuously escalating nuclear trajectory over the last six years and its non compliance with its Safeguards agreement constitute an urgent and profound nuclear proliferation crisis in the region. Iran is the only NPT non nuclear weapons state to have produced and accumulated highly enriched uranium for which there is no credible civilian justification. The IAEA has been unable to verify the stockpile of this material for almost one year. It therefore has been unable to exclude the diversion of nuclear material and to ascertain the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. This is a matter of compliance with Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement. We also condemn Iran's military support to Russia, including the delivery of ballistic missiles and drones which is a major threat to European and international peace and security. Chair the EU condemns the DPRK's unlawful and destabilizing actions that undermine regional and international peace and security. The DPRK will never be recognized as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT or have any other special status in that regard. The DPRK must return to full compliance with the NPT as a non nuclear weapon state. The TPRK must refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and sign and ratify the ctpt. The EU calls on the DPRK to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This includes the IAE's return to the DPRK. The EU stands ready to support any such efforts. We express our deep concern about Russia's disturbing shift of positions on the DPRK denuclearization. The this undermines international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. It is particularly disappointing for a permanent member of the UN Security Council to treat this matter so irresponsibly and inconsistently with its NPT obligations. We resolutely condemn Russia's continuing illegal military cooperation with the DPRK in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions and call on both countries to cease immediately these activities. We fully support the IAEA's engagements with Syria and the ongoing process to protect Clarify Outstanding Safeguards Issues Chair Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, together with the Additional Protocol represent the current IAEA verification standard under Article 3 of the NPT. The EU and its member States continue to call for their honorization without delay. Chair the IAEA safeguard system receives considerable support to the support programs of the European Commission and of EU member States. The EU recalls the importance of effective export controls which are fundamental to comply with obligations under Article 3 of the NPT. Export control regimes contribute to facilitating legitimate transfers of nuclear technology and scientific knowledge for peaceful uses to maintaining a predictable transparent framework and a well defined level playing field for international nuclear bonding trade. The proliferation of WMD capable ballistic missiles and missile technology is a destabilizing factor and remains a matter of grave concern to the European Union. The EU calls on all states that have not yet done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic missile proliferation. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [19:00]:

I thank the secret Representative of European Union for the statement on behalf of the European Union and its member States and for kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Libya on behalf of the Arab Group, to be followed by Egypt. Libya, you have the floor.


Libya · Arab Group [19:26]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the Outset, it is my honor to make the statement on behalf of The Arab Group. Mr. The Arab Group aligns itself with the statement of the Non Aligned Movement. We congratulate you, Ambassador Omarov, on assuming the Chairmanship of this Committee. Arab States attach great importance to the effective implementation of the nuclear non proliferation regime as the universalization of the Treaty and the full implementation of its provisions will lead to the goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. In this context, there is a need to ensure the effectiveness of the non prolific proliferation regime in preventing the transfer and development of nuclear technology for non peaceful purposes without adding any restrictions that undermine the inalienable rights of States Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its various applications. In this context, the Arab Group affirms that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is the legal requirement established by Article 3 of the NPT and the Universal Verification Standards. We stress the importance of achieving its universality as the only way to ensure the effectiveness of non proliferation, including in the Middle east region. The Group stresses the provisions of the Treaty and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement on Verification and Control Tools with regard to the obligation of non nuclear state Parties to the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs and we note the voluntary nature of the Additional Protocol and that the decision to accede to it is a sovereign decision of its State State Party. The Group stresses the right of State Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the importance of not impeding it through additional restrictions or obligations or artificial confusion with nuclear security and safety issues for which each State is considered responsible.

Mr.

Chair, the Arab Group follows with interest the emerging issues of the nuclear non proliferation regime. We stress in this context that nuclear navigational defense arrangements must be in conformity with the objectives and spirit of the Treaty and pursue policies that are transparent and consistent with international obligations, including the continuation of the constructive dialogue among all Parties within this regional framework, within the sessions of the IAA Board of Governance and the prevention of development of precedent affecting the coherence and effectiveness of non proliferation regime. In this context we see worrying challenges including attempts to develop terminology that would suggest and legitimize a new category of States under the name of Nuclear Weapons States or to turn a blind eye to the nuclear proliferation of friendly states. Although the Treaty recognizes only two categories, nuclear states and non nuclear states, 2 the existence of documented evidence confirming that the cooperation of some Nuclear Weapon States parties with Israel contributed to their development of nuclear capabilities in a clear violation and grave breach of Article 1 of the treaty and its objectives, bearing in mind that Israel's non accession to the Treaty as a non nuclear Party deprives the international community of relying on any mechanisms to verify the nature of its nuclear program, including through the International Atomic Energy Agency and reports referring to the ongoing expansion in the Daimona reactor. This is in light of total lack of transparency on the part of Israel in light of its policy of ambiguity towards its nuclear activities and capabilities, as well as the threat of its use of nuclear weapons against unarmed Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.

3.

Non compliance by nuclear and non nuclear States with no proliferation obligations.

4.

The continued non compliance of nuclear weapons States with their obligations under the provisions of treaty in particular article 6 in contrary to detriments and the philosophy and the grand bargain 5. The imbalance between the safeguard regime applied by the IAEA to States Parties to the NPT and those applied to States not parties to the treaty. 6. Some state parties have set conditions limiting the export of nuclear equipment, material information and technology to States Parties similar to any condition that goes beyond the legal obligations of non nuclear States under the provisions of Article 4 of the NPT, which has been clearly formulated and leaves no room for reinterpretation or conditions.

Mr.

Chair, in light of the foregoing, the Arab Group affirms the 1. The importance of further efforts by States parties in particular nuclear powers to achieve the universality of the Treaty. These efforts include compliance with their Treaty obligations and the outcomes of the Reykjaviu Conferences, including a complete ban on the transfer of all nuclear material and associated technology to non treaty states. 2. The need to implement Security Council Resolution 487 and 687 and the outcome documents of the Review Conferences, especially with regard to the request to States that have not yet joined the Treaty to accede to it as non nuclear weapons and to subject all their facilities to the safeguard system. Concerned about any further attempts to exempt the State non party to the Treaty from the strict Nuclear Supplier Group rules prohibiting nuclear experts to States not parties to the Treaty rejecting double standards when dealing with non nuclear weapon States and this undermines their regime the importance of strengthening the role of the IAEA in nuclear verification in a professional and impartial manner and to call upon States to make efforts and cooperate fully with the Agency in conformity with their legal obligations. The Group stresses the role for countries that could use AI to be part of the compliance of the safeguards regime within the IAA framework and to an international consensus on the principles and rules governing this matter. 5. To call upon Iran to abide by the resolutions of the Board of Governors regarding the question raised about the nature and risks of its nuclear program and to cooperate fully with the Agency 6 to immediately support efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In the Middle east through a binding international legal instrument to be concluded by the States of the region recognizing the priority of achieving universality of the Treaty on the npti. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [26:50]:

I thank the District Representative of Libya for the statement on behalf of the Arab Group and of course thank you for kind words. Address to the Chair the next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Egypt, to be followed by Mexico. Egypt, you have the floor.


Egypt [27:12]:

Say the Raees.

Mr. Chair, Egypt extends its congratulations to His Excellency Ambassador Khairat Omrov and to the Republic of Kazakhstan on assuming the Chairmanship of the Main Committee to In order to comply with the allotted time for delivering statements, I will read a shortened version of the Egyptian Statement while the full statement will be submitted to the Secretariat for circulation on the relevant website. Egypt reaffirms that it aligns itself with the statements delivered by the Non Aligned Movement and the African Group and the Arab Group. I would like to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Mr. President, the credibility of the Non Proliferation Pillar is fundamentally derived from the balanced implementation of all the obligations set forth in the Treaty. The Non Proliferation Pillar has undoubtedly achieved the greatest progress compared to the other Pillars in light of the fulfillment of by non nuclear weapons states of their obligations consistently confirmed by the reports. Mr. Chair, the main challenge facing this Pillar is that there is no reversality of this npt. Having countries with nuclear capabilities that are outside the NPT undermines the system and in this, Egypt calls for the NPT Review Conference to call upon the countries that have not yet joined the npt, mainly Israel, to join as non nuclear weapons States and to submit all their facilities immediately unconditionally to the Treaty and the Safeguards Agreements. Egypt affirms that the CSAs remain the global standard for verification and the sole legally binding requirement for verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear activities in accordance with Article 6 of the treaty. Accordingly, any attempt to impose additional obligations beyond this framework through efforts to render the Voluntary Additional Protocol mandatory constitute a clear violation of of the Treaty and represent a disruption of the delicate balance between rights and obligations upon which it was founded. Egypt therefore looks to this Conference reaffirming what has been established by the international consensus in previous Review Conferences as well as in the annual resolutions of the IAEA General Conference. Egypt further stresses that the development of Any additional verification concepts or methodologies must remain subject to the consensus among Member States and must not result either in practice or interpretation, in the imposition of standards or effects that exceed the existing legal framework or the special legal obligation of Member States, nor infringe upon the delicate balance of rights and obligations underpinning the safeguard system. Mr. Chair, the importance of establishing nuclear weapon free zones stands out as an effective tool for strengthening the non proliferation pillar in accordance with the provisions of of Article 7 of the treaty. International experience has demonstrated that the establishment of such zones represents a practical mechanism for building confidence, limiting arms race and supporting international efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and non proliferation. Egypt stresses the Centrality of the 1995 Middle East Resolution and its objective of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east, as well as the necessity of renewing the commitment to its implementation and ensuring its continued validity until its objectives are achieved. This is particularly important given that the Resolution constituted the basis for the indefinite extension of the Treaty without a vote. From the same perspective, Egypt underscores the importance of supporting the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Convened pursuant to UNGA Decision 3, 73, 546. The conference has demonstrated its seriousness and its ability to provide an inclusive platform for dialogue among States of the region with the aim of reaching consensus on arrangements for establishing the Zone 3 free will and without the exclusion of any party. In this context, Egypt stresses the necessity of maintaining the momentum achieved within the framework of the Conference and enhancing the positive engagement of all States of the region and observer states in its work. Mr. Chair, Egypt reaffirms its full support for the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the competent international authority responsible for verifying the implementation of safeguards obligations within the framework of neutrality, professionalism and technical mandate. It also follows with interest the ongoing deliberations regarding the development of State level safeguards concept and stresses the need to continue these discussions within a framework based on transparency and consensus among States. In light of the rapid developments of emerging technologies including AI applications, particularly in safeguards implementation. Egypt stresses its support for the responsible use of such technologies in a manner consistent with the legal obligations of States ensuring the protection of confidential information and preventing its misuse. Egypt expresses its concern regarding certain the microphone has been cut off.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [32:17]:

I thank the representative of Egypt for the statement and four kind words addressed to Chair in Kazakhstan. The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Mexico, to be followed by Kuwait, Mexico. You have the floor,


Mexico [32:40]:

Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. The non proliferation regime is the pillar of the npt which is a great had the most successful, particularly when compared with the disarmament pillar. The great majority of the NPT parties, particularly non nuclear weapons states, are complying with our obligations relating to non proliferation. In these 56 years of the life of the treaty, we have seen a contained number of declared nuclear weapons states, but not necessarily of their means of delivery. It's essential to maintain a balance between the non proliferation and disarmament agendas. These are two mutually reinforcing processes. Nuclear disarmament remains the best way of preventing proliferation. What does not exist, cannot be proliferated or cannot harm. Therefore, Mexico expresses great concern at the pending matters under the non proliferation regime 56 years following its adoption. Today, not only do we need to curb the increasing trend to vertical armament which runs counter to the npt, but also the growing rhetoric on the need to acquire one's own nuclear weapons recently heralded by the party to the Treaty. These appeals incentivise horizontal armament. We therefore appeal to the Conference to strengthen its commitment to the non proliferation objectives underpinning the NPT regime. Specifically, it's very important to remember that the Grand Bargain underpinning the Treaty is based above all on the link between containing the number of nuclear weapons States, the commitment to general and full disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful means. We reject terms such as friendly proliferation which run counter to the spirit and letter of the treaty. In light of this, we reiterate our recognition of the hard work carried out by the IAEA in verification through the implementation of safeguards, thus consolidating the non proliferation regime. And we reiterate the importance for all States parties, including nuclear weapons States to comply with their international obligations, in particular in cooperation with the IAEA and compliance with resolutions that have been handed down by the Agency and those under the Security Council so as to contribute to international peace and security. We thus reiterate that all cases where there is concern for in compliance with the NPT and its non proliferation transparency provisions should be resolved through dialogue, diplomacy and good faith actions. And the Conference should stress this particular appeal. The use of force cannot be considered a means of non proliferation. Mr. Chairman, as a proponent of the main zone free of nuclear weapons in a densely populated area, we firmly believe in establishing these zones as a specific step towards non proliferation and disarmament. The creation of these zones in any part of the world should be based on the agreement and free decision of the parties involved, as was agreed by the zones themselves and within the United States nations. While militarily nuclearized zones are not an end in themselves, they are an intermediate step of great interest to advance towards full disarmament under an effective international verification regime. We recognize the countries that are part of the five nuclear weapons free zones as well as Mongolia, which represents three quarters of one of these zones. Therefore, Mexico calls on all Nuclear Weapon States to review the validity of the interpreted statements that they have made and the additional protocols thereto, particularly with regard to the treaty which will mark an important anniversary next year. We welcome also calls for the zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east because this is an essential part of the commitments that they've made. We call on the Conference to recognize nuclear weapons free zones as a specific contribution to international peace and security to the non proliferation regimental in compliance with Article 7 of the NPT as well as measures to reducing nuclear risk. Thank you very much.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [37:38]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Kuwait, to be followed by Republic of Korea. Kuwait, you have the floor.


Kuwait [37:56]:

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, most merciful. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr.

Chair.

The state of Kuwait affirms that the Pillar of non proliferation represents one of the fundamental pillars upon which the NPT rests and the central element in preserving the stability of the international order built upon it. From this standpoint, my country renews its firm commitment to the provisions of the treaty and its dedication to implementing it in a balanced and comprehensive manner in a way that enhances international peace and security. In this context, the State of Kuwait has fully committed itself to implementing the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAA within a framework based on transparency and responsibility. However, the continued presence of certain states outside the treaty framework, foremost among them Israel, the occupying power and their ongoing development of nuclear capabilities without any international oversight, represents an unacceptable exceptional situation and that undermines the credibility of the non proliferation regime and limits its effectiveness in achieving its goals. Mr. Chair, at a time when non nuclear weapons states fulfill all their commitments, the credibility of the Treaty remains contingent upon all parties implementing their legal obligations without selectivity or double standards. The State of Kuwait also stresses the necessity of refraining from any practices that would undermine the existing legal framework, including the introduction of concepts, designations or arrangements not grounded in the provisions of the Treaty or the provision of forms of nuclear cooperation outside its control, something that would weaken the non proliferation regime and open the door to serious structural imbalances within it. Mr. Chair, regarding the Iranian nuclear file, the State of Kuwait stresses the importance of Iran's full compliance with its international obligations and the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the full and transparent cooperation with the Agency, including providing all necessary information and facilities to enable it to carry out its verification duties, thereby ensuring the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and contributing to building confidence and stability in the region. In this context, my country affirms that addressing outstanding issues requires an approach based on full transparency, constructive dialogue and adherence to international law enforcement in a manner that strengthens the credibility of the non proliferation regime and prevents the escalation of regional tensions. Mr. Chair, strengthening the pillar of non proliferation requires serious collective action and strict commitment to implementing the outcomes of the Review Conferences, foremost among them, achieving the universality of the treaty. In this framework, the State of Kuwait renews its call on the international community to assume its responsibilities and reaffirms the need for Israel, the occupying Power, to accede to the Treaty as a non nuclear weapon state. Israel must subject all its nuclear facilities to the IAA's Comprehensive Safeguards System, thereby ensuring the strengthening of the non proliferation regime and achieving security and stability at the regional and international levels. I thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [41:13]:

I thank you, distinguished representative of Kuwait for his statement. The next speaker is the representative of Republic of Korea, followed by Finland. Republic of Korea, you have the floor.


Republic of Korea [41:29]:

Thank you. Mr. Chair. At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your election as a Chair of Main Committee 2. My delegation assures you our full support for your leadership. Mr. Chair, nuclear non proliferation regimes remains a shared responsibility of all State Parties. Compliance with the obligations under the NPT is essential to upholding the integrity of the global nuclear non proliferation regime and maintaining international peace and security. The IAEA safeguards play an indispensable role in verifying States Parties compliance with the NPT and ensuring that nuclear materials and technology are utilized solely for peaceful purposes. As a country fully complying with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, the ROK considers that the CSA and AP as vital instruments for the effective implementation of the npt. In this regard, we reiterate the importance of the universalization of the CSA and AP and call on all State Parties to conclude and bring them into force without further delay. Mr. Chair, the DPRK's nuclear program is the most significant challenge to the NPT credibility and integrity that we are seeking to uphold through this Review Conference. It has been more than 40 years since the DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985, had it complied with its non proliferation obligations and cooperated with the international community, North Korean people would have been enjoying the benefits of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Instead, the DPRK chose a different path. It has pursued the development of its nuclear and missile programs, posing a significant threat to international peace and security as well as to the global non proliferation regime underpinned by the npt. The DPRK has been further emboldened to call itself a nuclear weapon state unilaterally, which the international community should never accept in order to safeguard the credibility and integrity of the npt. The international community should remain firm to prevent the re emergence of cases such as the DPRK that abuse the NPT regime. Standing United against Proliferators Indeed, as affirmed in the 2010 review conference final Document, we have collectively underscored the importance of complying with non proliferation obligations and addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and authority of the safeguard system. We are certain that those who wish to preserve the Treaty's integrity will not go against this united position. In this context, we call upon the Russian Federation to immediately cease all ill less in military cooperation with the DPRK in violation of Security Council resolutions and fulfill its responsibilities to uphold the global non proliferation regime. The Republic of Korea, in close cooperation with the international community, will continue to work towards the complete denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. We understand that this goal cannot be easily achieved, particularly given the realities on the ground. This is why we are pursuing a phased approach that begins with an immediate halt to the DPRK's nuclear ballistic missile programs through dialogue and negotiation, proceeds to reductions as a next step and ultimately leads to dismantlement in the long term. We call upon the DPRK to respond respond to our good faith efforts to engage constructively in dialogue and to return to full compliance with the NNPT and relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We sincerely seek the support of all States Parties in ensuring that this NPT Review Conference sends an unequivocal and united message that we are determined to safeguard the NPT regime. Mr. Chair, the ROK fully supports the IAEA's independence, impartiality and professionalism in addressing outstanding safeguards issues under Iran's international obligations, including its NPT safeguards agreement. Grounded in our full commitment to non proliferation regime, we strongly support all diplomatic efforts to make progress on Iranian nuclear issue. We urge all parties to exercise restraint and refrain from further acts of escalation that could jeopardize nuclear safety and Security in the region. Mr. Chair, along with the other two pillars, the nuclear non proliferation commitments enshrined in the NPT have played a vital role in protecting.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [46:31]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Republic of Korea for his statement. The next speaker is representative of Finland, followed by Costa Rica. Finland, you have the floor.


Finland [46:45]:

Thank you. Chair, Let me congratulate you on your election as the Chair of the Main Committee. Too you have Finland's full support in your important task. Finland aligns itself with the statement of the eu. Our priorities are also reflected in the working paper provided by the Vienna Group of Two. We meet at the moment of profound non proliferation challenges. At the times of weakening trust and growing tensions, the international community needs the NPT more than ever. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has severely undermined the integrity of the non proliferation regime. Russia's reckless nuclear rhetoric and the occupation of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant continue to cause grave risks to regional and international security. Finland commends the IAEA for its continuous presence at all Ukrainian nuclear facilities and reiterates that Russia must withdraw its forces and return the full control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to Ukraine. Chair the IIA safeguards system remains the backbone of the NPT's verification regime. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol to provides the most effective framework for detecting and verifying the diversion of nuclear material. Finland continues to provide extra budgetary support to the IAEA safeguards through the National Safeguard Support Program. We call on all states who have not yet done so to bring both the CSA and the Additional Protocol into force. Finland also strongly supports the state level concept which enables the IAEA to apply safeguards in a more efficient manner. Nuclear security is an integral element of global non proliferation efforts. The entry into force of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and strengthening its implementation are critical steps toward better security for all. For Finland, the global cooperation to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials do not fall into the hands of non state actors is also a priority. Finland is a member of the Steering Committee of the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism and we also support the work of the UN Office of Counterterrorism. We are actively involved in organizing exercises to build capacity to prevent nuclear terrorism. We also underscored the importance of the security council resolution 1540 which obliged all states to prevent non state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Chair Finland remains deeply concerned on the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs which are a clear violation of multiple Security Council resolutions, we urged DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and return to full compliance with its international obligations, including the npt. Iran's nuclear program has created a grave risk to international security and is undermining the global non proliferation regime regime. Iran's accumulation of highly enriched uranium and its unwillingness to cooperate with the IAEA is completely unacceptable. We highlight the importance of finding a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear issue and remind that it is a legal obligation for Iran to fully implement its safeguards Agreement. Chair the NPT remains the key shield against the spread of nuclear weapons despite the challenges and its norm against proliferation is still strong. Over the decades, the NATO's nuclear deterrence arrangements have been an important factor to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. NATO's nuclear policy is long standing and predates the NPT. It actively contributes to the Treaty's non proliferation objectives by having effectively reduced the incentive for non nuclear allies to seek their own nuclear weapons. Without this arrangement, more countries could have developed nuclear weapons. Finland stands ready to work with all States parties to strengthen the non proliferation regime, uphold the authority of the IAEA and ensure that nuclear technology is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. I thank you, Mr.

Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [51:05]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for the statement and kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker in my list is the representative of Costa Rica, followed by New Zealand. Costa Rica, you have the floor.


Costa Rica [51:25]:

Senor President Chairman, we congratulate you on your election and we wish you every success in your work. Costa Rica wishes to stress three points. First, the safeguards regime is only as strong as its weakest link and three factors erode it simultaneously. Some States maintain original small quantities protocols without rescinding them or have not yet concluded an Additional Protocol, thereby depriving the IAEA of the necessary verification tools to do its job. Others allow small modular reactors to advance toward deployment without safeguards by design, transferring that responsibility to industry or to the IAEA rather than establishing it as a condition of export. We call on states that have not yet done so to negotiate and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol and we urge supplier states to make the highest safeguard standards a condition of export support and to fully fund IAEA programs to help address this priority. Second, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintains a nuclear weapons program in open and flagrant violation of the NPT and multiple Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang is advancing towards the permanent consolidation of its arsenal and the explicit rejection of any denuclearization process. Its persistent pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs undermines the global proliferation regime and the very treaty that underpins it. This Conference must address the challenge with the same resolve with which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has disregarded its obligations. We urge that negotiations to halt and reverse its nuclear program resume without delay and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea return to full compliance with the treaty and grant the IAEA access to its territory. Third, rapid technological progress, the proliferation of dual use capacities and the growing intangible transfer of knowledge had transformed the environment in which non state actors operate who today exploit existing loopholes to access technologies available through legitimate suppliers. Security Council Resolution 1540 establishes binding obligations for all states precisely to close those pathways, and its full implementation is more urgent today than when it was adopted in 2004. The failure to adopt the 1540 Committee's program of work in 2025 due to procedural disagreements and the persistence of vacancies in its group of experts reflects a lack of political will that we must confront. We call on States to strengthen their national control frameworks to fully sustain and support the work of the 1540 Committee and to reaffirm that Resolution 1540 and the NPT are complementary instruments whose shared integrity all States have a duty to preserve. Nuclear weapons Free zone treaties represent the most significant regional contribution to disarmament and non proliferation. For more than half a century, we non nuclear weapons states have built a security architecture that today covers more than 100 countries and constitutes the most concrete instrument available to the regime for translating into legally binding commitments the promise that nuclear weapons will not be used nor threaten to be used against those who have renounced them. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [55:14]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Costa Rica for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair. Next on my list is the representative of New Zealand, followed by Oman. New Zealand, you have the floor.


New Zealand [55:38]:

Thank you. Chair. For decades the success of the NPT has in large part been built on the long term commitment of non nuclear weapons states to the Non Proliferation Pillar as part of the Treaty's grand bargain. For the NPT to have stemmed the spread of nuclear weapons for as long as it has is a remarkable achievement. As New Zealand observed in the general debate, non nuclear weapon states have long seen nuclear weapons as too costly to possess in all senses. Yet in a world marked by a worsened strategic environment, growing nuclear arsenals, explicit threats of use and suggestions of resumed nuclear testing, some non nuclear weapons states may now be revisiting their commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. This would be profoundly dangerous and undermine the very objectives of our treaty. Chair Central to ensuring nuclear Non proliferation is the iaea, which plays an indispensable role. New Zealand continues to have full confidence in the Agency's professionalism, independence and technical expertise in carrying out its safeguards responsibilities. At the core of this is the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement which together with an additional protocol, represents the global verification standard. Chair the international norm against nuclear testing exemplified by the CTBT is another remarkable non proliferation and disarmament achievement. Moreover, the Treaty's international monitoring system is a tangible demonstration of the CTBT's value, providing credible independent data that enhances transparency and builds confidence. New Zealand reaffirms the critical importance of the CTBT and strongly supports the continued strengthening, maintenance and resourcing of the ims. We urge all States to uphold their moratoria on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any actions that would undermine the Treaty or weaken the global norm against nuclear test. To this end, New Zealand joined the Joint Statement on this issue delivered by Austria during the general debate. New Zealand also reaffirms the importance of effective national export controls as a critical component of effective non proliferation efforts. Claims that such controls undermine development or peaceful cooperation are unfounded. Chair we have effective non proliferation architecture in place. New Zealand is committed to upholding it and others must do so too. New Zealand, alongside much of the international community, has for years expressed concern about Iran's nuclear activities. Iran accumulated highly enriched uranium to a level that has no credible peaceful use. Its actions have significantly stressed the non proliferation regime and Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA to resolve long standing issues related to its nuclear program remains unacceptable. We call once again on Iran to meet its legal obligations under the NPT and underline that these remain in effect. New Zealand also urges Iran to cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues. Doing so would help give the international community confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. We call on all parties to create the conditions to facilitate a return to dialogue and good faith to diplomacy. That is the only sustainable way to resolve these issues. Chair we are deeply concerned about the impacts of recent and ongoing armed conflict on nuclear facilities in Ukraine and the Middle East. We reiterate the IAEA Director General's message that a nuclear facility in surrounding areas should never be struck and support his call for the full respect of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security. Security during a conflict. Such attacks can pose a nuclear safety risk, including to civilians and the environment. Any comprehensive outcome of the Review Conference should reaffirm the prohibition of armed attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. Chair at this Review Conference we have joined statements condemning Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, including its occupation of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant plant and the DPRK's ongoing advancement of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. These actions undermine the NPT and pose a serious threat to regional and international security. New Zealand calls on Russia to end its illegal occupation of ZNPP and immediately and withdraw fully from Ukrainian territory. And we call on the DPRK to take concrete steps towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Finally, Chair, Nuclear disarmament and non proliferation are mutually reinforcing pillars of the npt. We reiterate our strong and unwavering support for the NPT and for its continued integrity, effectiveness and universality. During this Review Conference we must recommit to strengthening our non proliferation and disarmament obligation and advancing the shared goal of a world free of.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:00:39]:

I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for her statement. The next speaker on my list is Oman, followed by Nigeria. On behalf of the African group Oman, you have the floor.


Oman [1:00:58]:

Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

The Sultan of Oman affirms that the nuclear non proliferation regime constitutes a fundamental pillar in the promotion of international peace and security and that its effectiveness depends on strict adherence to the provisions of the Treaty. The Sultanate of Oman aligns itself to the statement of the Arab Group and NAM. Mr. Chair. Your Excellencies. The Sultanate of Oman reiterates that the effectiveness of the non proliferation regime depends on its strict adherence to the provisions of the Treaty, in particular those relating to the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons or the pursuit of their acquisition. In this context, the Sultanate of Oman underscores the importance of refraining from any practices or arrangements that could weaken those commitments or undermine the spirit of the Treaty. It also stresses the need to address developments related to sensitive nuclear technologies within a framework of transparency and dialogue in a manner that preserves the cohesion of non proliferation regime and prevents the creation of precedents that may affect its effectiveness. Mr. Chair, Oman emphasized the central importance of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement System as a primary tool for verifying the peaceful needs nature of nuclear programs. In this regard, it stresses the need to preserve the technical and independent character of the Agency's work and to enable it to carry out its mandate in accordance with professional standards free from politicization. Oman also is of the view that the credibility of the verification system depends on the objectivity of the Agency's reports Achieving the universality of the treaty remains an essential element in strengthening itself its effectiveness. Oman renews its call upon all states non parties to the treaty to accede to it as non nuclear states and to place their facilities under the comprehensive safeguards system. In this context, Oman affirms that the continued existence of nuclear capabilities outside the framework of the treaty represents a challenge and defiant to the credibility of the international system and lead to imbalances in the security economy equilibrium, particularly in regions experiencing ongoing tensions. Mr. Chair, the issues of the lack of universality of the treaty remains the principal challenge on the Middle East. In this regard, the Oman reaffirms that Israel's continued non accession to the treaty and the failure to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards constitute an ongoing challenge to the non proliferation regime and undermines international efforts aimed at at enhancing security and stability in the region. Oman also reiterates that the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east is a strategic necessity and that the 1995 resolution on the Middle east remains valid until its objectives are achieved. Oman welcomes the gradual progress achieved within the framework of the Conference on the establishment of such a zone and affirms in its capacity as President of the seventh Session its commitment to continuing work in a consensual spirit and through a practical approach that enhances dialogue and paves the way for the formulation of agreed arrangements. Mr. Chair, Oman affirms that strengthening non proliferation should not come at the expense of States inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Accordingly, it stresses the importance of supporting international cooperation and facilitating the transfer of technology and knowledge in a manner that achieved sustainable development without imposing restrictions beyond those stipulated in the treaty. Mr. Chair, the current challenges facing the NPT regime requires a balanced approach based on the respect of international law, the strengthening of multilateralism, confidence building and the avoidance of select selective and double standards. Selectivity and double standards. In conclusion, Oman affirms its commitment to constructive participation in the work of this Committee and to working with all States parties to strengthen non proliferation regime and safeguard the credibility of the treaty. Thank you


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:05:20]:

representative of Oman for other statement. The next speaker on my list is Nigeria on behalf of African Group followed by China. Nigeria, you have the floor.


Nigeria · Africa Group [1:05:36]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The group aligns itself with the statement delivered by non aligned movement and wishes to deliver a statement in this cluster as follow. The African Group reaffirmed the central role of nuclear weapon free zone in the consolidation of the npt. Indeed nuclear weapon free zone play an important role in preventing the proliferation, both vertical and horizontal of nuclear weapons. The African Group is of the conviction that the establishment of nuclear weapon free zone enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime and control toward realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament. It is therefore our firm conviction that the long overdue establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle east as mandated by the 1995 resolution must be pursued with renewed and stronger determination and concrete step, including through the work of the subsidiary body entrusted with this matter at the present conference. The Group reiterates its commitment to the Treaty on the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Africa, the Treaty of Pelendaba, which reaffirmed the proud status of Africa as a nuclear weapon free Zone and as a shield for the African territory, including by preventing the stationing of nuclear explosive devices and prohibiting testing of those weapons in the entire space that constitute the Africa continent. The entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty on 15th July 2009 is the realization of Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Africa adopted by the First Ordinary Section of the assembly of Head of State and Government of the then Organization of African unity held in July 1964 in Cairo, Egypt. This declaration born out of African deep concern with the effect resulting from dissemination dissemination of nuclear weapon and in particular the nuclear testing undertaken in the atmosphere and underground in Africa by a nuclear weapon State in the early 60s. Mr. Chair, the African Group asserts that horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapon and nuclear weapons sharing by State Party constitute a clear violation of non proliferation obligation undertaken by those nuclear weapons sharing state under Article 1 and by those non nuclear weapons state under Article 2 of the treaty and could have and could have serious consequences on the effectiveness, relevance and credibility of the Treaty. The Group therefore urges these States, this State Party to put an end to nuclear weapons sharing with other States under any circumstances and any kind of security arrangement, including in the first framework of military alliances, including true nuclear sharing and extended and forward nuclear deterrence due to their inconformity with the Treaty. In this context, the Group underlines the special responsibility of nuclear weapons State. The Group also expresses serious concern over the ongoing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapon through the continued nuclear arsenal modernization and arms raised by nuclear weapons weapon State, the expansion of their stockpile of nuclear weapons and the improvement and development of new type of this weapon and their delivery system by such countries, all of which are in clear contradiction with their legal obligation under the Treaty and therefore need to come to an end Mr. Chair, achieving universal adherence to the compressive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty remain a matter of the great great importance to the African Group. The Group firmly believes that the CTBC constitutes an indispensable instrument for halting the quantitative development of nuclear weapon and that is early entry into force will represent a decisive contribution to the global disarmament and non proliferation architecture. The Group underscores the particular responsibility borne by nuclear Weapons State in this regard and call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the ctbt. The Group in conclusion underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes the that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provision of its title Armed Safeguard Agreement. While noting that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement remains the universal standard of verification and the legal prerequisite under the npt, the Group strongly supports the objective of achieving the universality of the Treaty as well as the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement. Finally, the African Group reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to a world free of nuclear weapon. I thank you Mr.

Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:10:53]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for the statement on behalf of African Group. Next speaker is China, to be be followed by Germany. China, you have the floor.


China [1:11:10]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a core objective of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the context of a continuously deteriorated global strategic security landscape, a small handful of countries are applying double standards to nuclear non proliferation issues, severely shaking the confidence of the vast number of non nuclear weapon states in the authority of the NPT and the safeguards regime of the iaea. This Review Conference should take seriously these adverse developments in the field of nuclear non proliferation that violate the purpose and principles of the Treaty, clarifying the root causes of these problems and jointly exploring countermeasures. First, the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies must be reduced. Certain nuclear weapons States and their allies have continuously beefed up their nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements or forward deterrence cooperation. This trend of friendly nuclear proliferation is deeply concerning. The proliferation of nuclear weapons through nuclear sharing must be prevented. China calls on the relevant nuclear weapon States to withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed overseas back to their own territories and urges countries participating in nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements to cease upgrading or even replicating such arrangements in other regions. Meanwhile, efforts by relevant countries and regions to establish nuclear weapon free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction on the basis of consultations among themselves and voluntary agreements must be respected and supported. Second, we oppose placing geopolitical self interests above the international nuclear non proliferation regiment. The nuclear submarine cooperation among the us the UK and Australia involves the unprecedented transfer of nuclear submarine power reactors and a large amount of weapons grade highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapon states to non nuclear weapon states. This clearly violates the objectives and purposes of the NPT and deals a severe blow to the international nuclear non proliferation regime. The relevant safeguards arrangements should be thoroughly discussed by IAEA Member States through intergovernmental processes and decisions should be made by consensus. Third, nuclear non proliferation issues should be resolved through political and diplomatic means. Any military strikes unauthorized by the Council against another country's nuclear facilities that are under IEA safeguards severely violate international law and significantly increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. States Parties should abandon the Cold War mentality, fully respect each other's reasonable security concerns as well as the legitimate right of all countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, peacefully resolve concerns over nuclear proliferation through political and diplomatic means, rectify bullying behaviors that frequently resort to the use of force and eliminate the root causes of nuclear weapon proliferation. Fourth, open advocacy by high ranking government officials of certain countries for the acquisition of nuclear weapons severely undermines the authority and credibility of the Treaty. In recent years, Japan has engaged in a series of adverse words and deeds regarding the possession of nuclear weapons, pushing to revise its pacifist constitution and its three non nuclear principles while seeking to host allied nuclear weapons on its territory. The International Committee must remain on high alert to step up supervision and verification, address the severe imbalance between the production capacity and consumption regarding sensitive nuclear materials with utmost seriousness and resonantly curve the attempt of certain countries to possess nuclear weapons. Fifth, we must build a fair, reasonable and non discriminatory international non proliferation order. China values the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all countries. We support the Agency's efforts to make the safeguards regime more effective and efficient and to promote the universality of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. China supports further implementing security council resolution 1540 at the national, regional and international levels to prevent and combat the acquisition of sensitive items by non state actors. China resolutionally opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and advocates for the comprehensive, faithful and balanced fulfillment of all obligations under the Treaty. Taking this Review Conference as an opportunity, China is willing to work alongside the international community to make unremitting efforts to maintain and strengthen international nuclear non pollution regime underpinned by the NPT. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:15:34]:

I thank distinguished representative of China for the statement. Next speaker is the representative of Germany, followed by Saudi Arabia. Germany, you have the floor.


Germany · Thomas [1:15:47]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, first let me congratulate you on your election and assure you of the full support of my delegation. Germany aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. Chair the success of the NPT and the nuclear non proliferation regime it established are unequalled. The Near Universal Treaty is constantly reaping benefits which make our daily life safer, more secure and even more prosperous. The IAEA and its safeguards architecture are crucial in its endeavor and need to be strengthened wherever we can. The full implementation and universalization of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement is the bare minimum for all NPT non nuclear weapon states. We are advocating that the CSAs should be accompanied by the implementation of the Additional Protocol, thus becoming the verification standard of the 21st century. Only stringent verification can create and preserve the trust that the NPT's non proliferation norm is adhered to. Director General Crossy's relentless efforts to allow the Agency to fulfill the duties conferred upon it by the NPT and the work of all staff in particular inspectors deserve our full respect and are to be commended. In the same vein, the CTBT has played a significant role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons as CTBT in force would enable on site inspections. We therefore reiterate our call to states that have not signed or ratified the Treaty. Pending its entry into force. All States should refrain from any nuclear test explosions at any yield. Questions revolving around non compliance with the test moratorium should be clarified. Chair the future of the NPT hinges on how the world is able to address some key challenges where concerted efforts are required. Let me highlight a few key points. More than four years of Russia's illegal war of aggression against Iran have resulted in direct threats to the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, including through the illegal occupation of Ukraine's largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia, making the verification work of the IAEA even more challenging. We commend the IAEA on doing an outstanding job under these difficult circumstances. We are further deeply concerned about Iran's continued violation of its safeguard supply under the NPT in the past and at an unprecedented level over the past 10 months. Iran's decisions to curtail its cooperation with the IAEA, stop reporting to the Agency and to bear the IAEA inspectors from access entails substantial proliferation risks and challenges. The global non proliferation architecture Iran is the only NPT non nuclear weapons state to have produced and accumulated highly enriched uranium for which there is no credible civilian justification. At the same time, in June 2025, Iran ceased to provide mandatory reports and suspended the agency's access to proliferation sensitive nuclear facilities and its uranium stockpile pile. Iran must never be allowed to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapon. To this end, as part of these three, we continue to work towards a diplomatic solution which addresses the international community's serious concerns over Iran's nuclear program. We urge Iran to fully cooperate with the iaea, grant agency inspectors full access to all nuclear sites without further delay and provide credible objective guarantees to the international community that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Looking at the dprk, the expansion of its nuclear weapon program continues UNABABATED despite numerous UN Security Council resolutions calling for the complete, verifiable and irreversible discontinuation of all existing nuclear programs in the dprk. We urge the DPRK to comply with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, to refrain from any further nuclear tests and to sign and ratify the ctpt. Furthermore, we stress that the DPRK will never have any other status than that of an NPT non nuclear weapons state. Lastly, we commend the IAE's efforts to engage with Syria while we command the Syrian authorities stated readiness to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues stemming from the Assad regime. This must now be followed by concrete steps. Only then will the IAEA be in a position to state the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear program in line with the npt. To this end, we also call on Syria to swiftly conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol. Chair While the NPT was and is an overall success story in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, a number of challenges can clearly stand out. We must be united in addressing these challenges to preserve the centrality of the MPT within the non proliferation.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:20:54]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the statement and thank you Thomas for kind words Addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is Saudi Arabia, followed by the United States of America. Saudi Arabia, you have the floor.


Saudi Arabia [1:21:16]:

Thank you. Mr. Chair. Allow me at the outset to congratulate you on assuming the leadership of this Committee. We are fully confident in your ability to ensure the success of the Committee's work and to achieve the outcomes to to which the State parties aspire. We align ourselves with the statements delivered on behalf of the Arab Group and on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement. We believe in the importance of the NPT as a central pillar of the non proliferation regime and we believe in the importance of strengthening the Treaty, ensuring the full implementation of its provisions and achieving its universality. It represents the legal framework that guarantees the effectiveness of the non proliferation system, thereby contributing to the realization of regional international peace and security. We reaffirm the importance of the provisions of the Treaty in outlining the three pillars of this Treaty, including the Nuclear Non Proliferation Pillar. In this regard, the Treaty dedicated Article 3 to the comprehensive Safeguards System which constitutes the principal instrument for verifying State Party compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and for monitoring the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs. My country emphasizes the adequacy and sufficiency of the provisions contained in the Non Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, including verification and monitoring tools they set forth concerning the commitment of non nuclear weapons States to the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs. The Kingdom also affirms the voluntary nature of the Additional Protocol and that the decision to accede to it is a sovereign decision of each State. The Kingdom stresses the importance of not restricting the right of State Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to refrain from obstructing the economic or technological development of State Parties nor international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy by imposing restrictions or additional obligations on States that are in compliance with their obligations under the Treaty. We further emphasize that any such restrictions are unjustified and constitute a violation of the provisions of the Treaty which guarantees State Parties the inherent right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We appreciate the important role of IAEA and its Director General in monitoring and verifying the peaceful nature of the nuclear program programs of State Parties to the Treaty and their role in following up on compliance with the implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We reaffirm the importance of strengthening the role of the Agency and ensuring its independence and impartiality in carrying out its monitoring and verification activities in accordance with its Statute and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We reiterate the importance of the establishing nuclear Weapon free Zones in order to preserve international security and stability. Such zones represent an important step toward achieving the long awaited goal of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east as recommended by the Review Conferences of the treaty in 1995, 2020the year 2010. In this regard, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports all efforts to render the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by calling on non State Parties to accede to the NPT and to comply with all relevant international non proliferation resolutions. We stressed that addressing nuclear risks in the region is an essential and indispensable matter for the regional security and for preventing the region from sliding into a nuclear arms base. We call upon the sponsors of the 1995 Middle east resolution to make further efforts and take serious steps to achieve this goal, particularly in light of Israel's continued non participation in the Conference on establishing a Nuclear weapon free Zone in the Middle east and for the necessity of subjecting all Israeli nuclear facilities to the international to the Agency's comprehensive safeguards system. In conclusion, we look forward to the success of this Conference and to addressing the concerns of the State parties to the Treaty as well as those of States of the Middle east region and to achieving objectives to which we all aspire, particularly in the light of the international circumstances currently facing the international community. Thank you, Mr. Mr. Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:26:02]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia for the statement. Next on my list, United States of America, followed by Sweden, United States. You have the floor, John.


United States of America · John [1:26:17]:

Chair Umarov 56 years ago the NPT entered into force with the fundamental goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Since then the NPT has become a foundation of international peace and security security and nearly every country on Earth has signed and ratified the Treaty. A strong commitment to the non proliferation pillar by all NPT States parties is essential to furthering the other two pillars. The United States reaffirms its commitment to the global non proliferation regime with the NPT at its core. Preventing further spread of nuclear weapons serves the interest of all countries. All nations should reaffirm and strengthen the non proliferation principles of the NPT. At the center of the NPT's non proliferation commitment is the IAEA. Safeguards work. The assurances provided by the IAEA gives us all the confidence in the NPT's efficacy. On that note, I congratulate guinea and Somalia on the recent entry into force of their respective Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Only one country remains that has yet to enter into force its csa. And I am confident that with the collective support of the NPT community we can take this final step to achieve universalization of the CSA among NPT states. Non nuclear weapons States non proliferation obligations under Article 2 are at the heart of the NPT. The provocations of States such as Iran, which can never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon must concern anyone who values the NPT's integrity. This is a critical matter of international security. The verification measures available under the Treaty are inadequate to capture all the MBT non proliferation obligations in today's environment. The United States is therefore committed to ensuring that Iranian government abandons the bad faith actions that triggered the current hostilities. I'd also like to address Article 10. Article 10 was never intended to allow States to develop nuclear weapons under the COVID of MPT membership and then withdraw without consequence. States that violate their non proliferation obligations while party to the treaty must account for those violations even after withdrawal. We encourage States Parties to explore mechanisms to address this gap, including ensuring that nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired for peaceful purposes while an MPT member cannot be repurposed for weapons programs after withdrawal. The DPRK's announcement of withdrawal underscores the urgency of addressing this challenge. The United States reaffirms the critical role that multilateral export control regimes play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related materials, equipment and technology. We remain committed to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zenger Committee as essential mechanisms for ensuring that international nuclear commerce supports only peaceful purposes. We must, however, refute the fallacy that export controls hinder access to peaceful nuclear technology. There is no basis for this claim. On the contrary, robust export controls enable peaceful nuclear cooperation by building the confidence necessary for such commerce to occur. We encourage all NPT States Parties to participate in and adhere to these multilateral export control arrangements. As nuclear technology continues to advance and new suppliers emerge in the global marketplace, all States must implement vigorous export control systems that meet international standards. The United States stands ready to provide needed technical assistance to any and all States seeking to strengthen their export control capabilities. In addition to safeguards, nuclear safety and security are critical to ensure access to peaceful nuclear technologies while reducing the risk of proliferation, theft or misuse. To that end, the United States continues to prioritize the higher standards of nuclear safety and security and encourage all States Parties to join us in this endeavor. Falsehoods have also persisted about US Adherence to our NPT obligations, including on the issue of extended deterrence. To be clear, the United States remains the custodian of its nuclear weapons in full compliance with the NPT and with the highest safety and security standards. The NPT was negotiated with a clear understanding of such arrangements. In fact, such arrangements have strengthened global non proliferation by providing allies with the necessary security assurances to ensure they do not feel the need to develop national nuclear weapons capabilities. In sum, the United States reiterates its commitment to non proliferation and our commitment to take necessary action to uphold these principles. We call on all States parties to work towards strengthening the npt. Thank you, Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:30:44]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for the statement and the kind Words to address to the Chair. Next on my list is Representative of Sweden, followed by Turkey. Sweden, you have the floor.


Sweden [1:31:03]:

Thank you. Chair Sweden associates itself with a statement made by the European Union. Our general priorities for this Committee are also reflected in the working paper and statement presented by the Vienna Group of 10. Chair Sweden reaffirms its strong commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non proliferation regime and a vital pillar of international peace and security. Pillar two is essential to the credibility of the treaty as a whole and its effective implementation depends on robust verification, compliance with legal obligations and sustained international cooperation. The IAEA plays an indispensable role in implementing the npt. We engage closely with other Member States and the Secretariat on matters of relevance to Pillars two and three, and we look forward to taking up our seat on the Board of Governors in September this year. Sweden will constructively work with all Board members and observers to further the objectives of the IAEA in accordance with its statute. Sweden strongly supports the Agency's verification mandate and views comprehensive safeguard agreements complemented by the Additional Protocol as the current safeguards system pursuant to Article 3 of the NPT. Chair Sweden remains deeply concerned by cases of non compliance with treaty obligations. Russia's unjustified and illegal war of aggressions continues to challenge the implementation of IAEA safeguards. In Ukraine, for the first time, a nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia, has been illegally seized and militarized, posing serious challenges and risk to nuclear safety and security, such as the presence of military personnel and placement of military equipment within the plant, lack of licensed personnel, interrupted power supplies and a lack of proper repair and maintenance. Sweden recognizes the critical role of the IAEA in responding to unprecedented threats to nuclear safety, security and safeguards. In Ukraine. We strongly support the Agency's ongoing monitoring and assistance missions and have provided substantial extra budgetary contributions to this work. Chair Sweden has consistently supported international efforts to address the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK within relevant multilateral formats. Diplomatic engagement remains the only viable path to ensuring Iran's nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful. Iran must never be allowed to seek, develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. Binding safeguards obligations are non negotiable and cannot be suspended under any circumstances. With regard to the dprk, Sweden fully supports efforts towards complete denuclearization and return to compliance with the Treaty. We commend the IAEA's continued monitoring and we remain among the leading contributors of voluntary funding to support future verification. Chair There are other tools that we must deploy to ensure that non proliferation standards are Upheld export controls are one such tool as they facilitate the responsible exchange of civilian nuclear technology. These controls give States the confidence to transfer nuclear technology in support of economic growth and sustainable development while minimizing proliferation risks. Sweden is actively engaged in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Sanger Committee and urges all states to adhere to the NSG Guidelines. Chair Effective non proliferation requires vigilance, cooperation and respect for international law. Sweden will continue to defend these principles and to work with all partners to strengthen implementation of Pillar 2 and the Treaty as a whole. I thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:35:22]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for the statement. The next speaker is Turkiye, followed by Noi Turkiye. The floor is yours.


Türkiye [1:35:36]:

Thank you. Mr. Chair, let me congratulate you on your election and assure you of our delegation's full support. Turkey remains firmly committed to the ultimate objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons while also promoting the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy. As such, the Treaty is a vital element of international peace and security. Turkey advocates the universalization and full implementation of the Treaty and retrace its call for the states that have not yet joined the treaty to do so unconditionally as non nuclear weapons states. Mr. Chair, Turkey emphasizes the indispensable role of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Treaty's full implementation and in ensuring that nuclear energy is used for the benefit of humanity rather than for destructive purposes. Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and their additional Protocols are key tools that establish a strong verification framework. Turkey has implemented the CSA since 1982 and its additional protocol in 2001, and we continue to maintain close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The expansion of nuclear technologies inevitably increases the amount of material and facilities requiring safeguards. Therefore, all NPT State Parties share the responsibility to ensure that the IAEA can effectively carry out its verification duties. Member States must provide the Agency with sufficient resources to meet its growing and critical responsibilities. Mr. Chair, the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests constitutes an important step towards not only nuclear disarmament, but also for non proliferation. In this regard, Turkey emphasizes the importance of CTBT and calls on all states uphold and maintain moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions and other detonations. It is unfortunate that nearly three decades after being opened for signature, the CTBT has still not entered into force. We once again urge all states to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay. Mr. Chair, Turkey is gravely concerned with the developments in DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile program. We call upon DPRK to comply with its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and refrain from actions that may lead to further tensions in the region. We also emphasize the key role of export controls in fulfilling non proliferation obligations and urge all states to strengthen their legislation and practices in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent illicit procurement and access by unauthorized actors, including terrorists. Our firm position in support of a peaceful settlement of concerns related to Iran's nuclear program remains unchanged. We will continue to support all efforts in that direction. Turkey emphasizes its strong support to the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle east in accordance with the 1995 decision and 2010 action plan. The establishment of such a zone in the Middle east would also strengthen global nuclear, non proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Thank you Mr. Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:39:28]:

I thank the distinguished representative of for the statement and kind words addressed to me. The next speaker is Norway, followed by Australia. No, you have the floor.


Norway [1:39:46]:

Thank you Chair for giving me giving me the floor and congratulations on your election as Chair of this Committee. I will read a slightly shortened version of our statement and we will upload a full version version of it online. Non proliferation lies at the core of the Treaty and remains indispensable to international peace and security. The IAEA is the backbone of global nuclear verification regime. Norway underscores that full, timely and proactive cooperation with the IAEA is a legal obligation under the Treaty. Safeguards implementation is not optional or selective. Chair Norway considers a comprehensive safeguards Agreement together with an additional Protocol to be the current verification standard. The Additional Protocol significantly enhances the Agency's ability to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. We consequently strongly encourage all States that have not yet done so to conclude, bring into force and implement an additional Protocol and to update small quantities protocols where applicable. Effective verification depends on a strong and independent iaea. Norway supports efforts to ensure that the Agency has sufficient budget and is equipped to fulfill its growing responsibilities, including through establishing a member State support program for safeguards in 2023. Chair effective export control systems help prevent the spread of sensitive materials and technologies while improving and facilitating cooperation of for peaceful use. We encourage all States to strengthen national legislation and enforcement and to align with internationally recognized guidelines including those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangar Committee. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the serious risks to nuclear safety, security and non proliferation during armed conflict. Russia's attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure are putting nuclear safety and security under severe pressure Military activities affecting nuclear facilities, including the drone attack on Chornobyl nuclear power plant and the occupation of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, are unacceptable. Norway is increasing its support to Ukraine to prevent nuclear action accidents and safeguard electricity production for 2026. Approximately US$52 million has been allocated for this purpose. Norway strongly supports the IAEA's efforts to uphold nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. Chair Norway has long been deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear program, particularly its enrichment activities that go far beyond civilian needs, the erosion of IAEA access and the resulting loss of continuity of knowledge. Norway believes that the situation in Iran must be resolved through diplomacy, not force, and we stress that nuclear facilities must never be targeted under any circumstances as any military action endangering such facilities poses grave risks. We strongly condemn the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The DPRK must return to fully compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Statements made by the Russian Federation describing denuclearization of DPRK as a closed issue are not acceptable and contrary to the numerous Security Council resolutions. Chair Preventing non state actors from acquiring radioactive military material remains a shared responsibility. Norway underscores the importance of full implementation of Resolution 1540. In conclusion, the Review Conference must send a clear non proliferation commitments are non negotiation strengthen safeguards supporting IAEA addressing compliance challenges and reinforcement forcing national implementation are essential to preserving the confidence of the treaty. I thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:44:32]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for his statement and kind words. Next speaker is Australia, followed by by Canada. Australia, you have the floor.


Australia [1:44:48]:

Thank you. Chair the NPT's fundamental role in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is more vital than ever. The International Atomic Energy Agency plays an indispensable role in this. An effective IAEA is a must have. Australia continues to support the IAEA by upholding our obligations, bolstering its capacity and and protecting its independence mandate and technical authority. Chair this Conference could recognise that the combination of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol represents the modern verification standard. Through that combination, the IAEA is able to have confidence that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in a state. We are encouraged by recent progress on CSA universalisation and congratulate guinea and Somalia. We call on all states yet to conclude and implement a csa, an Additional Protocol and where applicable, a modified Small Quantities Protocol to do so without delay. As Chair of the Asia Pacific Safeguards Network, Australia is working closely with safeguards practitioners in the Asia Pacific to strengthen safeguards Expertise Australia has consistently supported the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to constrain the development and spread of nuclear weapons as part of a region that has experienced the consequences of nuclear testing. We urge all States to abide by the moratorium on explosive nuclear tests and to refrain from actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Chair Effective Export Controls helps US prevent proliferation Multilateral export control regimes provide the confidence, trust and assurance necessary to make trade in sensitive dual use items possible. We urge all States to adopt effective export controls over nuclear and nuclear related dual use goods and technology such as those published by relevant multilateral export control regimes. Chair we face significant proliferation challenges that this Conference must address. Australia strongly condemns the DPRK's illegal nuclear weapons program, repeated ballistic missile launches and growing military cooperation with Russia. We urge the DPRK to fully comply with UNSC resolutions, refrain from further nuclear explosive tests and sign and ratify the ctbt. The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapons state under the NPT. We reject all attempts to justify and normalise the DPRK's action which undermine decades of collective effort and work towards non proliferation. Chair Australia remains deeply concerned by Iran's protracted failure to comply with its NPT safeguards obligations. Iran's refusal over many years to fully cooperate with the IAEA on safeguards implementation has undermined the international non proliferation regime. Its failure to provide the IAEA with information and access regarding key nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material, including its HEU stockpile is a matter of the utmost gravity. It is essential that Iran return without delay to full compliance with all legal obligations under its safeguards Agreement and relevant UNSC resolutions. Australia continues to support a diplomatic solution that provides lasting assurance to the international community that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. Chair we welcome the attention given to nuclear weapon free zones during this review cycle for existing zones. This shows active implementation of Article 7 of the NPT. As a party to the Treaty of Rarotonga, Australia has long supported nuclear weapon free zones as playing a key role in preventing this spread of nuclear weapons. Australia recognises the importance to a region of the Bangkok Treaty in preserving Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons. We encourage the development of further zones freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned. Chair Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines is fully consistent with our international non proliferation obligations obligations including the npt, the Treaty of Rarotonga and our safeguards agreement with the iaea. Aukus partners are committed to setting the highest non proliferation standard and to providing regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors. Consistent with our commitment to transparency, all States parties are invited to a side event on 8th May which will provide an update on a non proliferation approach. I thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:49:37]:

I thank the distinct representative for Australia for her statement. The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Canada, followed by Netherlands. Canada, you have the floor.


Canada [1:49:52]:

Merci, Monsieur le President.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In a complex and deteriorating state security environment, the NPT and its safeguards regime remains essential to our shared peace, security and prosperity. The role of IAEA in advancing the Treaty's effective implementation is paramount. Canada fully supports the Agency technical and impartial safeguards verification activities. These efforts provide vital assurance against nuclear weapons proliferation and strengthen our collective confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. Canada holds the principled view that a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol form the de facto verification standard under Article 3 of the NPT. We urge all of the parties which have not yet done so to accede to these instruments without delay. Multilateral export control regimes such as the Dzango Committee and the Nuclear Supplies Group also play a critical supporting role. These regimes facilitate and build confidence in the peaceful use and trade of nuclear technologies, materials and equipment while minimizing proliferation risks.

IEA safeguards are core to the NPT's grand bargain, yet they face mounting challenges. Expanded nuclear energy deployment and technological advancements underscore the need for safeguards to continuously evolve. We fully support the IA's efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation. This includes the further refinement and expanding expanded implementation of state level safeguards approaches as well as collaboration with Member States to leverage emerging technologies such as AI. Cases of non compliance with the NPT's non proliferation obligations further undermine the credibility of the IEA safeguard system. State parties in non compliance with their obligations must work cooperatively and without delay to address outstanding questions. Canada fully supports a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis as the only viable means to ensure that Iran never develops or acquires a nuclear weapon. Iran's long standing non compliance with its core safeguards obligations, including its repeated unwillingness to work cooperatively with the IAEA to address outstanding safeguards questions, poses a direct threat to the npt. Iran cannot unilaterally suspend the implementation of its legal CSA obligations under any circumstances. We urge Iran to take the necessary steps to resume cooperation with the Agency, including with respect to its highly enriched uranium stockpile, to enable the Agency to provide the international community with the necessary assurances that Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful. The DPRK's expanding nuclear activities include its increased uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and reactor operations directly violate numerous UN Security Council resolutions and undermine regional security. The DPRK must return to full compliance with its npt, non proliferation and IAEA safeguards obligations. We reject any attempts to legitimize the DPRK's nuclear status and non compliance which run contrary to the core principles of the treaty. Chair in closing, Canada reiterates that the current Review Conference provides a vital opportunity to reinforce the legal, technical and financial elements of the IEA safeguards regime. We urge State Parties to consider concrete recommendations, including the proposals contained in the NPDI, Vienna group of 10 and friends of Safeguards Working Papers to which Canada proudly contributed. These steps are critical to maintaining the NPT's credibility as a non proliferation instrument and its relevance as a unique contributor to to international peace and security. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:53:59]:

I thank the distinct representative of Canada for the statement. The next speaker is Netherlands, followed by Austria. Netherlands, you have the floor.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) [1:54:11]:

Thank you. Chair Allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of your duties as Chair of Main Committee 2. In addition to the statement delivered by the EU, I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Chair, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non proliferation regime. It's no secret that it has experienced challenges over the years. The treaty has been violated by some and challenged by others. Nevertheless, it has proven its worth by setting and maintaining a clear norm of non proliferation. It is therefore paramount that parties to the treaty protect and strengthen the treaty by contributing one the functioning of the institutions that are tasked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and by two addressing potential threats to its purpose. With regard to the institutions that prevent proliferation, the Netherlands reiterates the importance of the IAEA's golden standard. Only the combination of of a comprehensive CSA and an additional protocol allows the IAEA to effectively verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and facilities. Moreover, states with an outdated small quantities protocol must amend or rescind it. Chair the CTBT is a powerful example of international cooperation on non proliferation. Together we have accomplished the establishment of the international monitoring system system. Its data are a reliable and cost effective asset in upholding the norm of zero nuclear testing. Although its continued impact is under pressure due to financial constraints. To ensure continued verification and the continued provision of valuable scientific data and information, financial reform will be necessary. But let me be clear. In general, it's not realistic to expect expect an increased output with less funding. Of course, entry into force remains another crucial aspect of the functioning of this treaty, especially when it comes to low yield testing verification. Therefore, the Netherlands calls upon all States that have not yet done so to ratify to sign and ratify the CTBT, in particular the Annex 2 states. Chair allow me to also seize this occasion to address those that violate or threaten the norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons with a view to Iran. Let me start by repeating that the Netherlands is deeply concerned by the military escalation in the Middle east and welcomes the ceasefire. At the same time, it's paramount that the serious concerns regarding Iran's long standing lack of cooperation with the Agency and the wider international community on its nuclear program are properly addressed. Verifiable steps towards full compliance with Iran's non proliferation obligations, including resolution of all outstanding safeguard questions are indispensable. I would like to underline in this regard that a lasting and sustainable solution can only be achieved through diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, we urge the DPRK to return to its obligations under the NPT as a non nuclear weapon State and to abide by its previous CSA extended by the Additional Protocol to that agreement. We call upon the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and missiles programs in a complete veri viable and irreversible manner. Chair Let me also underline the contribution of effective export controls to the implementation of the npt. We are strongly committed to upholding the highest standards of export controls in order to prevent proliferation while at the same time facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific knowledge for the peaceful use of nuclear technologies by all. Chair these challenging times require that we choose unity over division, trust over enmity and jointly take the necessary steps to reinforce the NPT and the broader non proliferation regiment. We look forward to working together with all State parties to deliver these much needed results. Thank you for giving me the floor.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [1:58:28]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Kingdom of Netherlands for the statement. The next speaker is Austria, followed by Ireland. Austria. George Ltd. The floor is yours. Thank you.


Austria [1:58:44]:

Chair.

Congratulations on your election. Your full support. The full statement is available online and we aligned with the EU and VG10 statements. Let me add some points on the most pressing nuclear proliferation risks on the dprk. We are deeply concerned about its nuclear path, its ballistic missile program and its persistent non compliance with the IAEA and the UN Security Council. We call on the DPRK to reverse this course, to return to NPT compliance, to ratify the CTBT and to engage in good faith negotiations. There is no alternative to diplomacy and we therefore encourage all parties to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In Iran we see a persistent lack of cooperation with the IAEA and enrichment of nuclear material beyond levels explicable for civilian application. We urge Iran to fulfil its NPT obligations including its safeguards agreement. A diplomatic solution is the only viable solution to Iran's nuclear program, including verification and irreversibility as key aspects. The Russian Federation's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine not only caused death and unbearable human suffering as well as large scale destruction of civilian infrastructure. It was also accompanied by nuclear threats by Russia. These unacceptable threats and increased attempts of relying on nuclear deterrence further heightened nuclear risks already at levels not seen in decades. We call on Russia to de escalate and refrain from nuclear saber rattling. These international security crises display the same worrying trend the increasing allure of nuclear deterrence, nuclear weapons being considered as the ultimate solution security guarantee. This trend leads to an erosion of the non proliferation norm. IAEA Director General Grossi expressed his worry about a risk of a nuclear proliferation domino effect of a future with a growing number of nuclear armed states. We share his concern and call on all nuclear weapons states to fulfill their disarmament obligations under Article 6, including by taking concrete steps to lower the risk of a renewed arms race as a direct contribution to the non proliferation regime chair in this 30th anniversary year of the CTBT we have much to celebrate. But equally the challenges to the global test ban are deeply worrying. Any nuclear test at any yield is a blow to the global moratorium and contributes to weakening the non proliferation pillar. It would also be a blow to the survivors of nuclear use and testing who endure the long lasting consequences of nuclear explosions explosions. Austria jointly with numerous other States will hold a statement on this in MC1 to uphold and strengthen the global norm against testing, including through the management of any disputes by addressing allegations of non compliance. We reiterate our urgent call on the Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the Treaty without precondition or delay. And we strongly support efforts to strengthen the ims. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the proliferation of nuclear weapons until the npt, npt, the thousands of nuclear tests and finally the continuously growing scientific evidence about risks and the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are the foundations for the Treaty and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The TPNW's provision strengthened the NPT's non proliferation pillar. Indeed, TPNW State's parties have not only taken on responsibilities on non proliferation going beyond the npt. But the TPNW also foresees important safeguards but provisions for any nuclear armed states joining the treaty in order to strengthen the non proliferation regime. Chair the overwhelming majority of non nuclear weapons states have taken their obligations toward a world free of nuclear weapons extremely seriously. They have implemented the non proliferation obligations, implement safeguards and many have taken on higher obligations via additional protocols or the tpnw. We cannot stand by idly while the non proliferation pillar becomes hollowed out by a number of countries increasingly considering nuclear weapons as a source of their national security is scientific findings make clear the risks for all of us are too high and the consequences too catastrophic. This review conference must therefore conclude with a meaningful recommitment by all to strengthen the non proliferation pillar and overcome the current proliferation crisis. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:03:10]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for the statement and kind words to me. Thank you. The next speaker is Ireland, followed by Colombia. Ireland, you have the floor.


Ireland [2:03:26]:

Chair Congratulations on your election. Ireland aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. The success of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in limiting proliferation has served as a crucial pillar of international security. That success, however, is under significant strain in the context of a general hollowing out of international law and attacks on multilateralism. We are seeing a weakening of non proliferation norms. The increased salience of nuclear weapons is underpinned by the presumption they provide increased security. Our task must be to show the political will to reassert the value of the mp. Its strength derives from the near universality and through the engagement of State parties on the full implementation of its three interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars. Chair during this review cycle we have seen multiple instances where nuclear facilities have been put at risk with the potential for severe and widespread consequences beyond state boundaries. We recall the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security and the five concrete principles as outlined by the iaea. Nuclear safety and security apply in all circumstances, including an armed conflict. Attacks or threats of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities are outside the principles of the UN Charter and international law, including relevant IAEA General Conference resolutions. We reiterate our support for the crucial, impartial and expert work of the iaea, often in challenging circumstances on which we rely. Chair we condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's continued reckless actions and nuclear threats during its war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia poses serious risks to Ukrainian nuclear facilities, including at the Zaporizhzha nuclear power plant, where the situation remains precarious. Ireland has been clear that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons and that a lasting and durable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue lies through dialogue and diplomacy. The JCPOA showed that when all relevant parties are engaged, Iran's nuclear activities can be verifiably limited. Iran must fulfil its legal obligations under the NPT and engage fully with the iaea. Ireland remains deeply concerned about the conflict in the Middle east and the Gulf. We hope the ceasefire in the Gulf can be maintained and negotiations can be resumed to bring a permanent end to the conflict. We continue to call for dialogue and diplomacy and for all parties to uphold international law, including the protection of civilians. The DPRK can never be recognized as a nuclear weapon state. Its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile activities must stop and the DPRK should immediately undertake steps towards the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Chair Ireland is a long standing supporter of the establishment of a Middle east zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which continues to be an integral part of the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT. We call for its full implementation. Chair we call on all states who have not yet done so to adopt the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol which represent the IAEA's verification standard under the NPT's Article 3. Adherence to these international commitments and the transparency in their implementation is crucial to prevent proliferation. Ireland underlines the important contribution of export control regimes to counter proliferation while facilitating the peaceful use of the atom as envisaged by the npt. Chair. Rhetoric and actions that promote proliferation leave this treaty weaker and us all less safe. All state parties join the NPT with the shared understanding that there cannot be any justification for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. All state parties committed to pursue policies fully compatible with the npt. Any reversals are unacceptable. We must work together to achieve real progress for the advancement of international peace and security and have the opportunity to do so at this conference. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:07:30]:

I thank distinguished representative of Ireland for the statement. The next speaker on my list is Colombia, followed by Philippines. Colombia, you have the floor.


Colombia [2:07:45]:

Senior Chairman, allow me to congratulate you on your election to chair the work of this committee and to reiterate the readiness of Columbia to work constructively over the forthcoming weeks. As Columbia said in the general debate, this conference is not starting from scratch. It is building on the bedrock of norms, experiences and commitments that have shown that non proliferation can work to the extent that states comply with what they've agreed consistently, including in complex security contexts. Multilateral and international norms are sustained by their consistent, coherent application. They weaken when they are perceived as selective or instrumental, and they strengthen when there is genuine commitment to complying with them. In this regard, Colombia would like to contribute to this committee on the basis of a simple Nuclear risks are not curbed solely by managing tensions, rather by strengthening the tools that enhance predictability, trust and shared responsibility. One of these is verification. In an international environment such as that that we are currently experiencing, trust cannot be based solely on political statements. Rather it should be based on robust, independent, sufficiently supported technical mechanisms. Verification is one of these. From this perspective, Colombia believes that one specific task that this conference could achieve is enhancing political consensus on verification and safeguards, as well as on the important role of the IAEA to protect their technical nature and ensure that all states contribute to their credibility. This involves ensuring a sustained commitment to the full and non selective compliance with the treaty's obligations. This shouldn't be seen as an additional burden, rather an essential foundation to build trust and predictability between states, at the same time preserving the balance of the treaty and the rights therein. Chairman Colombia believes that this conference could represent an important step forward if it manages, practically speaking, to reaffirm the need to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international security. This isn't a question of imposing visions, but rather mitigating predictable, avoidable risks, beginning with language, postures and the signs that we send out to the rest of the system. In this context, regional arrangements give us clear ideas as to how to move ahead. Nuclear weapons free zones didn't come about out of chance, but rather because states decided that the best way to increase their security was to completely exclude these weapons from their regional environment. The experience in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in Opanao, shows that these commitments generate stability, they enhance cooperation and strengthen the global regime. Colombia believes that the next logical step is to raise the political profile of and keep up the momentum and ensure the coordination of these experiences, as well as keep up the momentum towards establishing new zones in areas such as the Middle east, where tensions and risks remain high. Not advancing on this front would send out the wrong message, and that is that containment is sufficient even as risks ramp up. Chairman the role of the treaty in promoting peace and security doesn't depend solely on the adoption of an ambitious final document. It rather depends on concrete decisions that enhance what we already know works and correct what gives rise to mistrust. Colombia supports in this Committee making progress towards the effective implementation of pre agreed commitments, particularly through the sustained strengthening of verification and safeguards, promoting practical measures to reduce risks from the role of nuclear weapons in international security and fully harnessing regional arrangements as complementary effective instruments within the regime, it is possible to make progress. But it means that this Conference must reaffirm the value of the Treaty not only as a normative framework, but but actually as an operational tool. Through the effective implementation of the commitments that we've made, Colombia will continue to contribute constructively to this effort. Thank you very much.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:12:02]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for the statement. Next speaker is Philippines, followed by South Africa. Philippines, you have the floor.


Philippines [2:12:15]:

Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

The Philippines congratulates you on your election. Our delegation associates itself with the Statement of NAM and the positions outlined in the Landing Zone Paper of npdi. We emphasize that non proliferation is a critical pillar of the NPT to be pursued with equal vigor and determination as disarmament and peaceful uses in our national capacity. We highlight the following positions. First, we call on all State Parties to support efforts towards the universalization of the IEEA standards. We urge those who have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA as well as an additional Protocol as an essential verification standard in accordance with Article 3 of the treaty. To maintain confidence in the regime, all parties must fully cooperate with the IEEA in fulfilling its verification and monitoring functions. Second, we highlight the importance of nuclear weapon free zones as practical and effective building blocks in advancing the non proliferation pillar of the npt. We call on nuclear weapons States to accede without reservation to the protocols of all such treaties, including the Bangkok Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons free zone. The 1995 resolution on the Middle east providing for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region must be implemented. Third, the Philippines also underscores the importance and effective strategic trade management in fulfilling non proliferation obligations. The Philippines consistently endeavors to implement its Strategic Trade Management act in an effective manner and in full compliance with established international obligations, including the UNSC Resolution 15. 44th, for nuclear non weapon States, adherence to the highest standards of non proliferation is predicated on corresponding assurances that they will not be subject to the threat of use nor ambiguity in the use of nuclear weapons. It is the moral and legal obligation of Nuclear weapon States to undertake without further delay an effective, universal, unconditional, non discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non nuclear weapons States. This is an intermediary step towards sustaining confidence in the treaty. We urge that efforts towards this end be reflected in the Review Conferences Outcome Document. The entry of the Force of the CTBT is an integral element in the overall non proliferation architecture. Putting a complete stop to nuclear test explosions would help protect and safeguard communities from short and long term impacts of nuclear radiation as well as disastrous effect on the environment. We call on other states that have yet to ratify to contribute to strengthening the norm against nuclear testing. Lastly, and finally we express our deep concern about the lack of progress or regression in the implementation of some State Parties of their non proliferation mechanisms and obligations. What we observe is a proliferation or intention of or threat of use thereof of nuclear weapons, arsenals and related infrastructure in the guise of deterrence, expanded nuclear doctrines or modernization. We regret that such horizontal or vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, including their qualitative improvement or life extension, is detrimental to the intent and spirit of the NPT and contrary to the resounding call of the vast majority of State parties in this room. Thank you Mr. Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:16:35]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Philippines for his statement and thank you for your warm words. Next Next on my list is South Africa, followed by Poland. South Africa, you have the floor,


South Africa [2:16:51]:

Chair. South Africa congratulates you and associates with the statements of the NAM and the African Group. South Africa firmly believes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes and are essential to attain and maintain a world free free of nuclear weapons. Non proliferation has been the most successful of the three pillars of the NPT as evidenced by the near universal adoption of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the signature of Additional Protocols by more than 140 countries. We welcome these efforts as important confidence building measures. We also call on States that maintain small quantities protocols to rescind or revise them and on all states with advanced nuclear programs and facilities to consider an additional Protocol. Non nuclear weapon states, though accounting for a significant lower amount of the global nuclear material, have been generally complying with their obligations under the Treaty and keeping their end of the Grand Bargain. Regrettably, nuclear weapon States have not delivered on their end of the Bargain. Emerging proliferation challenges remain a concern. Continued reliance on nuclear weapons and security doctrines, development of new types of nuclear weapons and qualitative improvements to existing arsenals have not reduced the concerns of non nuclear weapon States. Additionally, the continued expansion of nuclear ambition, railas and alliances and new nuclear sharing arrangements raises proliferation concerns. Other developments such as naval nuclear propulsion raises unique challenges not only for HEU minimization efforts, but also its potential as a destabilizing factor which could obstruct nuclear disarmament and further fuel an arms race. It must be restated that the primary responsible for undertaking the necessary steps for the elimination of nuclear weapons lies with those States that continue to regard nuclear weapons as central to their security. We emphasize that nuclear umbrella States have equal responsibilities for disarmament and non Proliferation Chair the IAEA remains the only competent authority for verifying safeguards obligations under the npt. South Africa commends the Agency for its central role in ensuring the peaceful nature of States nuclear activities. These assurances are essential for States, in particular developing States, to benefit from the utilization of nuclear and nuclear derived technologies for development. South Africa continues to advocate for a balance between the Agency's promotional and verification verification role and works closely with the Agency on safeguards and technical cooperation in our region. Nuclear Weapon States must also advance transparency, irreversibility and verification through legally binding arrangements for facile material declared surplus to military needs. As agreed at the 2010 review conference chair Nuclear weapon free zones play an important role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear nuclear weapons as well as promote regional cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. South Africa supports existing zones and the universal adherence to their protocols. The establishment of zones will further enhance global and regional peace and security and in this regard we call for progress in the establishment of the Middle East Zone. Furthermore, we reiterate our call for Israel to join the NPT to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to participate in the development of the Middle East Zone. Chair South Africa also stresses the importance of nuclear security while reaffirming that it must not restrict the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities undermine the safeguard system and threaten the integrity of the non proliferation regime. South Africa supports the firm stance of the IAEA General Conference against armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations as violations of the UN Charter and international law. In this regard we call for a clear, unambiguous international norm against such attacks. I thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:21:31]:

I thank distinguished representative of South Africa for the statement and thank you for kind words. Next on my list is representative of Poland, followed by Belgium. Poland, you have the floor.


Poland [2:21:47]:

Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Poland fully associates itself with the statement provided by the European Union and also congratulates you on your assumption of the position of the Chair of main committee too. Mr. Chair, we should fully remain aware that the NPT is the Non Proliferation Treaty in its title, therefore countering and carbon the non proliferation worldwide. From the perspective of the NPT Treaty, in particular its Article 3 we consider as a success story, especially after disintegration of the Soviet Union on the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century. Since then, over the recent years, the security situation has deteriorated significantly and TUART is currently facing major proliferation challenges. These turrets represent one of the gravest threats of the international peace and security. Those challenges need our sustained attention and engagement even more in the current demanding circumstances. Therefore, our deliberations here in New York are so important. Mr. Chair, the Russian military aggression against Ukraine for more than four years has had a negative impact on the global security landscape. This concerns also the safeguards, implementation as well as safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, in particular the znpp. Therefore, let me recall the resolution of the IEA General Conference and the Board of Governors adopted so far, some of them initiated and others supported by Poland as very important in this context, we commend the IEA and its staff for the work they have done so far with regard to the ZNPT safety and security, including its personnel, the Agency is de facto the only credible source of verification on the spot. Without its mission, the international community could remain blind with no transparent reporting from the independent source. Therefore, Poland will continue supporting the IAEA with both politically and as well as logistically in its uneasy duty both on the ZNPP as well as the other Ukrainian facilities. Mr. Chair, it is our common duty to address persistent and serious challenges to non proliferation. We should therefore be consistent in our message to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK must remain a priority on our non proliferation agenda. The Pyongyang regime is absolutely dedicated to expand its nuclear agenda, including next possible testing. The DPRK will never obtain the status of the nuclear weapons state under the NPT and every political declaration expressing and understanding that the PRK's nuclear stance and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a close issue constitute a clear circumvention of the NPT and its non proliferation principles. Similarly, Iran must not be allowed to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. Iran is the only NPT nuclear weapons state to have produced highly enriched uranium up to 60%. This is no credible civilian justification for this. Despite the efforts of the IEA Director General, the Agency has been unable to verify the stockpile of the HEU in its location for nearly a year. This is a matter of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement which cannot be suspended under any circumstances. Once the situation permits, the IAEA inspectors should return to Iran to continue its verification activities. We therefore follow with great interest the negotiation between the United States and Iran which should lead to peace settlement with the Iranian nuclear Program as a central element to address today's proliferation threats, we must act decisively. This means strengthening and non proliferation regime to build trust, confidence and transparency. We should reinforce the role of the IEA in ensuring compliance with non proliferation obligation under Article 3. We also need to work towards universal adoption of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and the Additional Protocol with its current verification standards. We call on all States to have not done so to sign, ratify, implement an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. To conclude, Mr. Chairman, for many years Poland has been actively engaged in addressing proliferation risks, including participation in the NPT review cycles and the IAEA Board of Governors. Poland is also committed to maintaining high export control standards and previously chaired the Nuclei Suppliers Group demonstrating its dedication.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:26:53]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for the statement and thank you for your kind words. The next speaker on my list is Belgium, followed by Qatar. Belgium, you have the floor.


Belgium [2:27:07]:

Thank you, Chair. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons lies at the heart of the npt. The Treaty's record is strong. It brought an end to several nuclear weapons programs and established a norm that has largely endured, thereby strengthening global security. The NPT is a common good. Its integrity must be safeguarded as even small breaches risk cascading into serious and irreversible damage to the entire regime. For this reason, challenges to the Treaty must be confronted directly and not glossed over for the sake of expediency. Iran represents such a challenge. It continues to fall short of providing the necessary guarantees regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. By refusing the IAEA access to its nuclear sites, Iran is in breach of its legally binding obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and therefore does not comply with the npt. Iran must urgently rectify this situation and take concrete confidence building measures, including accession to the Additional Protocol, which would allow for permanent enhanced monitoring. Unconditional, timely and full cooperation with the IAEA is essential to rebuilding trust. As an Annex 2 state, Iran should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Tasban Treaty both as a confidence building step and as tangible evidence of its professed commitment to nuclear disarmament. The DPRK continues its rapid expansion of nuclear and ballistic missiles. Addressing this threat effectively requires a unified international response. That unity is being undermined by Russia, which flagrantly violates Security Council resolutions it previously supported. This weakens the sanctions regime and fragments the international response, creating yet another fissure in the NNPT framework. The DPRK's swift technological advances are facilitated by the illicit procurement of sensitive goods and technologies from abroad. This underlines the urgent need for stronger and more comprehensive export controls at both national and multilateral levels. Belgium therefore calls on all states to adopt and fully implement the guidelines of the Nuclear Supplies Group and of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Chair we find it striking that some States appear insufficiently concerned with the very real proliferation challenges confronting our regime, while directing criticism at practices that are fully consistent with the npt, such as extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements. These arrangements are a necessary response to the existential threat posed by our eastern neighbor, a threat made starkly evident by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and by the irresponsible nuclear rhetoric that has accompanied it. At no point in their decades long existence have nuclear sharing arrangements contributed to proliferation or impeded disarmament. The historical record is clear. The most significant reductions in global nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War took place while these arrangements were in place. Chair it is also important to recall that the Additional Protocol was negotiated in response to a real world case of where comprehensive safeguards agreement proved insufficient to detect a clandestine military nuclear program. The Additional Protocol should therefore not be regarded as an undue burden on non nuclear weapon states nor as a negotiable concession. It constitutes the current verification standard, particularly for States that developing or expanding nuclear programs greater nuclear capability must be matched by greater responsibility and transparency. In the same spirit, we call on all States concerned to amend or rescind their small quantities protocols. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:31:47]:

I thank you distinguished representative of Belgium for the statement and kind words addressed to me. Thank you very much. The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Qatar who will be the last speaker for the general exchange of views at this meeting. Qatar, you have the floor.


Qatar [2:32:13]:

In the name of God, the most gracious, most merciful. Mr. Chair, at the outset we congratulate you on your selection as Chair of Main Committee 2. We align ourselves with the statements delivered by the Arab Group and Non Aligned Movement. The Pillar of Non Proliferation obliges non nuclear weapon States to refrain from acquiring, developing or producing such weapons. On this basis, the State of Qatar underscore the importance of the full and effective implementation of the obligations arising from international agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament. Foremost among them is the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In this context, we reaffirm the necessity of achieving universality of the Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a fundamental step toward its entry into force and toward strengthening the nuclear non proliferation and disarmament regime. Mr. Chair, we reiterate the importance of the work of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction which will hold its seventh session next November under the Presidency of Oman. Tangible progress in its deliberations and its consensus based outcomes directly contribute to achieving stability in the region and responds to the objective of freeing the region from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We stress that the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle east, particularly with regard to subjecting all nuclear facilities in the region under the Comprehensive Safeguards system subject to effective international verification, constitute an essential step toward restoring the importance of the non proliferation pillar in the region. In this context, we emphasize the importance of this criteria conference producing outcomes that support the objectives and discussions of the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, the central role played by the IAEA is fundamental to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Through its safeguard system, the Agency verifies that States respect their legal and international obligations and to use nuclear materials and technologies exclusively for peaceful purposes. Enhancing the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguard system and expanding the scope of its application supports transparency measures and confidence building between nuclear weapons states and non nuclear weapons states. The State of Qatar affirm that the nuclear non proliferation pillar constitutes the first line of defense against the spread of nuclear risks. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:35:27]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Qatar for the statement Excellences Distinguished Delegates that was the last speaker I have on my list to for the general exchange of use for this meeting. Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates. I note that there are three requests from delegations to exercise the right of reply pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure. We will hear them now. May I remind delegations that in accordance with Rule 19, the statements should be as brief as possible. Delegations should limit the interaction interventions to five minutes. May I also remind delegations that in accordance with the established practice, the number of interventions in the exercise of right of reply for any delegation is limited to two. The second intervention should be limited to three minutes consistent with the advice provided by the President of the Conference. Speaking limits will be strictly enforced for their rights of reply. A time I will show on the screen indicating when there is one minute remaining. After the time limit has been reached, the microphone will automatically be cut off. The first state to exercise its right of reply is Russia, to be followed by Japan, such as the Catalopita States.

I would like to now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for His right of reply. Mr. G. Lenkov, you have the floor.


Russian Federation · Mikhail Lenkov [2:37:17]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all I would like to congratulate you on being elected. And I would like to you assure you on the fact that the Russian delegation stands ready to to assist you in any way possible. Mr. Chair, during the discussion we had we heard numerous accusations against my country. A number of states and an organization essentially made them the core point of their statements, frequently giving them priority before agenda items. The impression is created that these delegations are not at all interested in non proliferation issues. This does not facilitate us in attaining the goals of the Review Conference and and objectively leads us to undermining the review process. And I noticed in this context an unprofessional aggressive statement made by the representative by the EEU which contained unacceptable and false insinuations about Russia. This means that once again that providing the EU with the right to speak at the Review Conference along with individual states. A mistake. Zaporizhzhia NPP is a Russian nuclear facility. It came under Russian jurisdiction at the end of the referendum which took place in September 2022. This territory now is an inalienable part of the Russian Federation. As inalienable as Texas or Louisiana is part of the United States or Savoy is part of France. Ukraine regularly is creating danger for the znpp. During their Review Conference they had six strikes against it using drones and one artillery strike. A massive artillery strike against facilities which are there to ensure that the ZNPP is functioning. There were also strikes by the Ukrainian drones against other Russian NPP's in Smolenskursk and Voronezh there is pressure that being exerted on the staff of the Zaporozhye NPP who are doing their duties of psychological terror is exhausting exerted on them. Threatening intimidation of their relatives become routine. None of this would have been possible without a political material and technical and moral support from NATO states. Let me underscore here that NATO, their allies are responsible for Ukrainians actions. All of these states must immediately cease any interaction with Kyiv. As regards the statements made about the militarization of the znpp, there is no offensive weaponry there. The NPP is not being used for offensive activity against Ukraine. At the same time, the NPP does have the contingents of the National Guard to protect the staff. That's normal international practice. There is no international document which bans this kind of activity. Furthermore, IAEA instruments when it comes to nuclear safety directly state that there is a need to undertake proper measures to protect an npp. And we would like to reaffirm for the benefit of all members of the Conference that my country intends to protect the Zaporozhye NPP from any attacks using any necessary means, fully in line with our domestic legislation and the international obligations. The non proliferation issues of those countries who accuse us is not blameless. They, for example, have members of the joint nuclear missions by NATO in the course of which knowledge is being transferred which is necessary for the use of nuclear weapons or even its creation. Furthermore, on the territory of five countries or members of such missions have on their territory foreign nuclear weapons, whereas they had signed comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Agency is stating against about those States, stating that the nuclear materials on those countries is peaceful activities. Well, that's clearly out of line with what is actually happening. We also reject the accusations according to which the so called extended nuclear deterrence is in line with the npt. As regards our interaction with dprk. I would like to say that dprk, unlike Ukraine, is not a threat to peaceful nuclear facilities, is not supporting those States which are involved in this kind of activity. Our cooperation with Pyongyang is being conducted fully in line with international commitments and is in no way impacting the subjects under discussions for npt. We are concerned by the continued Aukus partnership. We've heard affirmations that within this partnership non nuclear states will not be given nuclear weapons.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:42:25]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and kind words of support towards me. Thank you.

To exercise its right of reply is Japan to be followed by Australia? Japan, you have the floor.


Japan [2:42:43]:

Mr. Chair. Allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador, on your assumption of the Chair of Main Committee 2. You may count on my delegation's full support and cooperation. Mr. Chair, our delegation wishes to exercise the right of reply regarding the unfounded allegation by one previous speaker against Japan. We reiterate that Japan observes its three non nuclear principles as policy guidelines. As a staunch supporter of the npt, Japan has been advocating for the implementation

of all its provisions.

This of course includes compliance with its own obligation under the NP. Mr. Chair, all nuclear materials in Japan is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and is under exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, as evidenced by ongoing verification mechanisms, the number of areas subject to inspection and the frequency of those inspections. The IAEA has drawn and continue to draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Japan remains in peaceful activities. Therefore, there are no proliferation concerns regarding Japan. Japan continues to cooperate with the IAEA in a fully transparent manner. Moreover, Japan continues to uphold the principle of not possessing plutonium without specific purposes. Mr. Chair, since the end of World War II, Japan has been consistently maintained its path as peace loving nation upholding freedom, democracy and the rule of law and contributing to international peace and prosperity. This remains unchanged. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:44:43]:

I thank the Syrian representative of Japan for the statement. The last state to exercise its right of reply is Australia. Australia, you have the floor.


Australia [2:44:54]:

A warm thank you, Chair.

I take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom

and the United States to once again address misleading assertions which have been made

in the preceding debate regarding Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program.

Chair, it is unfortunate that delegations continue to repeat misleading assertions.

I will not repeat the points we

have made previously during the general debate.

I will however address the additional factual inaccuracies.

We have heard today that the transfer of high enriched uranium from a nuclear weapons state to a non nuclear weapons state is prohibited under the NPT and unprecedented in history. Chair, neither of these statements is true.

The NPT does not prohibit the transfer

of HEU regardless of its enrichment level as long as appropriate measures consistent with IAEA safeguards agreements are in place. As we have made clear, Aukis partners are fully committed to the npt, are complying with our respective obligations under it

and other relevant instruments and in undertaking

this cooperation will set the highest non proliferation standard.

I thank you, Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:46:35]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement. Next country which requested the right of reply is Republic of Korea. Republic of Korea, you have the floor.


Republic of Korea [2:46:50]:

Thank you, Chair. We expressed our deep concern over the comments made by Russia. It is evident that the military cooperation

between Russia and the DPRK, including the

dispatch of DPRK troops, constitutes a violation of international norms, including the UN Charter and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions

17, 18, 1874 and 2270.

Such cooperation seriously undermines peace and stability in the international community.

We therefore urge Russia and the DPRK

to immediately seize their unlawful military cooperation. As a permanent member of the UN

Security Council that adopted numerous resolutions on

the DPRK and one of the countries that led the efforts to build the

global non proliferation regime.

Russia has a significant responsibility to uphold the integrity of the international non proliferation architecture.

We urge them to promptly put an

end to such illegal activities. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:48:00]:

I thank the sangrip of Republic of Korea for your statement. That was the last state to exercise its right of reply. Now Russia would like to access a second right of reply. Mikhail, you have the floor.


Russian Federation · Mikhail Lenkov [2:48:21]:

Thank you. I would like to point out that we are concerned by the continued and developing Aukus partnership under which it is provided, not just cooperation, nuclear propulsion. There is a great deal of other areas there. We have heard assertions that within this partnership non nuclear states will not be given nuclear weapons. We took note of that and are even ready to believe that this is not going to happen in the near future. Nonetheless, creating an infrastructure, a military infrastructure of nuclear states on the territory of a non nuclear state does not allow us to be certain that nuclear weapons will not appear that in future, if that will be deemed to be necessary. Members of the partnership we see that there is a threat to the non proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament in the continued nuclearization of the Republic of Korea and Japan and call upon these states to reject participation in the nuclear plans of NATO and introduce a ban on the presence of their territory of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. We think that this would be a serious contribution towards the security in the Pacific region. Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:49:42]:

I thank distinguished representative of Russian Federation and with that we finalize today's meeting. Excellencies, distinguished delegates. So that was the last speaker on my list for today. Our next meeting will be tomorrow Tuesday 5th of okay, I see the request for the second right of reply from the distinguished delegation of Japan. The floor is yours.


Japan [2:50:22]:

Thank you Chair for giving me the floor. Our delegation would wish us to exercise the right of reply regarding the unfounded allegation by one previous speaker against Japan. I just would like to state that there is no specific consideration has been given to the introduction of nuclear powered submarines in our country. Thank you very much, Mr.

Chair.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:50:48]:

I thank the delegation of Japan for this remarks. So our next meeting will be tomorrow Tuesday 5th of May at 10am in Conference Room 1 where we will continue with the general exchange of views. Now I give the floor to the Secretariat to make an announcement. The floor is yours.


UN Secretariat · Secretariat [2:51:12]:

Thank you, Chair.

The European Union would like to inform

delegations about the side event that the

President of the Review Conference, the UNODA

and the EU are co organizing titled

Briefing on Regional consultations for the 2026 NPT Review Conference starting at 1:15pm in Conference Room 4.

Thank you.


Kazakhstan · Chair · Khairat Omarov [2:51:37]:

So the meeting is adjourn.