Preparatory Commission: Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (Third Session, Informal Working Group)
General Assembly
Date: 26 March 2026
Language: English
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/ru/asset/k1n/k1nekrnys1?lang=en
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations.

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Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [0:00]:

Good afternoon, delegations. This afternoon we resume our consideration of rules of procedure. Apologies in advance that we're juggling multiple papers up here and my lunch. So we will do our very best. I just want to start with a clarification, a request for clarification made during yesterday's session, we've consulted with the Secretariat and I would like to make the following observation. With regard to voting thresholds for decision making by subsidiary bodies under draft rule 26-1A bis, I note that draft rule 26C currently provides that when matters are subject to a vote, decisions of subsidiary bodies shall be taken by a majority of its members present and voting, except that the reconsideration of a proposal or the reconsideration of an amendment to a proposal shall require a two-thirds majority. So in short, Rule 26C contains two voting thresholds depending on the nature of the decision. Please note that we are still considering placement of the thresholds text between the rules of procedure and the subsidiary bodies document. So coming back to that theme you've heard several times as individual documents are finalised, we will then hold up the overlapping provisions and seek to ensure not necessarily that they're identical, but that they're consistent and they stand up alongside each other. So with that, we will now move on to rule 34, which is quorum. Now, rule 34 consists of two parts, part one or sub-rule one and sub-rule two. In the case of sub-rule two, it deals, oh sorry, Ecuador, you'd like the floor, my apologies.


Ecuador [2:26]:

Thank you so much, co-chair. I would ask your indulgence because I need to make a statement on Rule 22, if I may. Thank you so much. I would like to make this statement on behalf of the following delegations, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and my own country, Ecuador, regarding Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedures of the Conference of the Parties on the composition of the Bureau. In this regard, our delegations support a Bureau consisting of 15 members, namely one chair and 14 vice chairs. This number ensures that each regional group has three members in the Bureau. In this regard, we recall that all BBNJ Bureau since the beginning have been composed in this manner and positive progress has been made with this configuration. We also consider that the authority to nominate candidates should continue to remain within the regional groups. Thank you so much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [3:44]:

I thank you. Just for reassurance, you may not have been here yesterday when we had the discussion of rule 22. I summed up that discussion by noting that it seemed that the preponderance of the view or the delegations was in favour of the larger Bureau of the 15 and very helpfully some states that had expressed a preference for the smaller Bureau very helpfully indicated that they were prepared to be flexible and to accept that the majority of the opinion did lie in favour of the larger Bureau as as you are requesting for. So just to provide that reassurance that that is how I summed up this discussion yesterday. You wish to take the floor again.


Ecuador [4:40]:

Thank you so much, Mr. Kocher. And yes, we have taken note. But as well we have considered that this statement was needed to clarify our position and we understand the state where we are in the negotiations. Thank you so much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [5:01]:

Muchas gracias. Okay, so thank you for that. We'll now move on to quorum, rule 34. So in the second part, so it's got sub-rule one or we'll call it paragraph one and paragraph two, paragraph two deals with regional economic integration organisations. I would propose that we simply suspend consideration of that until we deal with the substantive provision on right to vote under rule 44. So in effect, the decision on the substantive rule or the debate on the substantive rule 44 will then drive what the outcome is on Rule 34.2. I trust that that makes sense. So we will now go to the question of quorum and we have had discussions as co-chairs. We propose to include the majority and not the two thirds threshold here, consistent with the General Assembly Rules of Procedure. So I would invite any strong objections to that approach to please take the floor. Let me repeat that. We propose to include the majority and not two thirds threshold here as that is consistent with the General Assembly rules of procedure. And I would invite any strong objections to that approach, otherwise that is what we will proceed with. I see no one wishing to take the floor. So do people want a few more minutes or is everyone comfortable? Okay. Far be it for me to deny AOSIS. Not AOSIS. It's a long day. Can't see. I haven't had lunch. Far for me to deny CANZ time to coordinate, all things considered. I'll give everyone a minute or two to digest that. Morocco, Morocco would like to take the floor. Morocco on behalf of the Africa group.


Morocco · Africa Group [7:29]:

Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair. And our position was to have a high threshold for the quorum. So would kindly ask to give us a little bit more time as we're coordinating as a group to take a decision. decision on this, but we take note of your proposal. Thank you so much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [7:49]:

We have another session. Can I suggest, if it's acceptable to delegations, let me put that as Chair's proposal, that we include the majority and not two thirds threshold here, consistent with the General Assembly rules of procedure. Let me give all delegations and particularly the regional groups time to consult and we can return to this rule tomorrow when we meet again on rules of procedure and I will open up the question of quorum then after regional groups and others have had time to consider their positions in this proposal. Yep, I'm seeing some thumbs up so I'll take that as approval. So I've flagged clearly what our intention is as co-chairs, but of course it's subject to the will of all the delegations. We're only proposing it on the basis of consistency with the General Assembly rules of procedure. So that is the proposal. We'll come back to tomorrow and I'll invite discussion and consideration and of course flagging from delegations if any delegations have a critical problem with that proposal or if they can live with it for those that it is not their expressed preference. Okay, we'll move now to Rule 39 bis which is the application of Article 18. So delegations will be aware that there are two options here. Before we move to those two options, I would note that there appears to be a drafting error that I would like to seek your permission to correct, you will note in both options, firstly, let's go to option paragraph two of option one, notwithstanding other rules of the present rules of procedure, in cases where a state sends a written notification to the secretariat indicating by reference to Article 18 of the agreement, its objection to a proposal for the establishment of any area-based management tools, including marine protected areas, the conference of the parties shall not consider for decision such a proposal, and in no case shall such a proposal be interpreted as recognition or non-recognition of any claims to sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction. Now, I would note delegates, the word state there, in cases where a state sends a written notification, I think we need to insert the word parties here so that it says state parties. Party, state, plural or singular? Party. Party, where a party. Where, yes, sorry. Don't even know my own language. Where a state, and this is the proposal, capital P, party, inserted after state in paragraph two of option one. And if you go to option two, it's exactly the same amendment. Option two says in accordance with article 18 of the agreement, a state, and then I'm proposing to insert the word capital P party, P-A-R-T-Y, may communicate in writing to the secretariat. So I would regard that as a technical drafting correction. Firstly, is it clear what we are proposing? And then is there any objection to that? Argentina, floor is yours.


Argentina [12:42]:

Thank you, co-chair. I will speak on national capacity. Just if you could please clarify why are you amending this proposal or if you could leave the two options, state and states parties between brackets.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [13:07]:

Quite simply, a treaty or any convention is a set of binding obligations as between obligations and prerogatives as between the states that are states parties. to that convention. So it would be quite extraordinary for effectively the States Parties to allow themselves to be denied one of their prerogatives by a state that has not undertaken the same obligations as all the states that are States Parties. So So, yeah, got that, yeah. So it would be quite exceptional for States parties to effectively be instructed by States that haven't undertaken the obligations of the treaty. Put it another way, were Were a state that was a non-state party to object to the fundamental principle of the convention itself, it could in theory write, if we don't have this clarification, send written notification to the secretariat on each and every area-based management tool proposal. So let's say there was a state out there that objected to the principle of the BBNJ agreement and was a consistent objector, then as currently drafted that State could effectively prevent the COP from considering any area based management tool unless we amend the wording in these two proposals to say State party. Please.


Argentina [15:03]:

Thank you, thank you co-chair for the explanation and clarification. Just thinking about a treaty and the agreement and the consultation process to coastal states in which cases there is no requirement in these cases in the consultation process to be a party to a treaty to raise a comment or objection when an ABMT is presented to be created or there is a proposal so we understand that there could be a linkage between this, uh, provision of the agreement and then this rule of procedure, taking into account also that the, um, sovereign controversies are in the end decided by the states and it's… we understand that we should have the two options here and maybe think about it thoroughly to assess which is the best wording. So we first analyzed these two proposals under the wording proposed by the co-chairs, which stated state. I understand that maybe there was a technical, this is a technical explanation, but under our view, there were reasons to have only state and not states parties in these proposals. So if you could consider this possibility to keep both and then maybe we can discuss it later on.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [16:52]:

We can certainly do that. Just to be clear, yes, in other treaty regimes, the capacity to raise an objection is there, but in this case, it is to effectively prevent a proposal going to the conference of the parties for consideration. So, for instance, and I mean, I will, we will leave this open, I just want to explain, in a previous session of this preparatory commission that I chaired, a state indicated that it objected on principle to ABMTs under this treaty. They objected in principle to ABMTs under the BB&J treaty. So in theory, as currently drafted, that state could write under this provision to the secretariat to each and every single ABMT proposal that is put forward and effectively prevent the conference of parties from even considering it. That's quite an extraordinary proposition. So of course we'll be guided by the membership and maybe this would be a good opportunity to at least get a sense of the room on this proposal. So the proposal is to include the word state, after the word state include the word party, in respect of paragraph two of option one, and in respect of the first sentence of option two. We won't, needless to say, decide it decide it today. We can take it away depending on if there are some fixed and firm objections at the end of the discussion. But I will just open the floor for expressions of opinion on this question. I think, no. Micronesia. Micronesia, I presume speaking on behalf of PCITS.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [19:00]:

Thank you. And since I had a minute or two to think about it, I'm withdrawing the request. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [19:12]:

Philippines, you have the floor.


Philippines [19:19]:

So the Philippines would just like to register anew our position regarding Article 39 bis as being unnecessary and superfluous. If you may recall our previous statement, the language in Article 18 is already delicate and the consensus on the agreement rests on, among other things, a carefully crafted balance. So Article 39 bis has two options and we feel that neither option prefers that, preserves the balance that delegations worked hard to achieve. Option one is unnecessary, it goes beyond Article 18. Meanwhile, option two is expansive with implications that go beyond Article 18. Should we proceed on this basis, these options would upset the balance of the agreement, derail our progress, and risk undermining the agreement's objects and purpose. And the rules of procedure should indeed preserve that balance. So we just want to remind the body not to renegotiate any compromise that has been wisely and firmly arrived. And at this point, we would suggest that we focus less on disputes and work more towards points of convergence. as many of, as we have many in this rules of procedure. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [20:39]:

I thank the Philippines. Can I perhaps make a further suggestion? I appreciate that in asking delegations their views on an amendment to both options, there's an implied assumption there. So let me move to the second part of my, what were going to be my instructions for this item, and I'll try to make them very clear. So I will be asking opinions now, and I will register the Philippines opinion across the board, on two questions. First is whether Let me reverse the order. So the first question is, are states, are delegations in favour of including a form of rule 39 bis? If they are, do they have a preference between option one and option two? If states are not in favour of including 39 bis, but they do have a preference as to from the position of a state that does not want it included, which is least worst, we would be grateful to hear that because again, that gives us a sense of where possible compromises or consensus might lie. So for both states that are in favour of a 39 bis And against the 39 bis, we would like to hear your preferences between option one and two. And then also the specific proposal that we insert the word party after state in both paragraph two of option one and sentence one of option two. Can I just check, is everyone clear on what I'm asking for? Okay, already, good. Okay, we don't need substantive arguments. I think we had a pretty comprehensive ventilation of this at the second PrepCom. So I'm just asking for preferences along the lines of what I just requested. So I'll start with Chile, on behalf of CLAM, on behalf of Chile nationally. You mean you haven't done your regional consultations in the last minute? Goodness me. Chile, the floor is yours.


Chile [23:29]:

Thank you so much. I don't have that power to actually conduct something so fast, but in national capacity, as my colleagues from Argentina do a few minutes ago, We actually, and we think sometimes when we are presented in front of text, we are usually more, we tend to see that we need to find some solutions within that text. And actually, the first question that you are proposing here, it could be maybe a best approach right now on this, that is actually why we need to have that text if we already have such text in the agreement. And we don't need to, we are flexible to not have a Rule 39 bis here.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [24:42]:

Thank you and I appreciate that. For those states, I know there's an aspect of this that might be slightly counterintuitive, but for those states that do not want a 39 bis, it would still be helpful to hear if they are in favour of inserting the word party after state. Even if they're opposed to 39 bis overall, we will still, we will note that first and foremost. We are trying to see where the opinion in the room amongst delegations lies because that allows us to then think about what provision can best reflect overall States opinion. So thank you for that preference expressed overall and registered. Thank you. I think Morocco, maybe I'll just leave it to individual speakers to identify whether they're speaking on behalf of regional group or not. Morocco, the floor is yours.


Morocco · Africa Group [25:52]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I'll be speaking on behalf of the African group. So On Article 39 bis, the African Group supports the retention of Rule 39 bis and aligns with Option 1. Paragraph 1 of Option 1 faithfully reflects the safeguard already enshrined in Article 18 of the Agreement. Given that the Agreement applies to areas beyond national jurisdiction, anchoring this principle explicitly in the Rules of Procedure provides an important institutional safeguard. consistent with the agreement's object and purpose. Now on national capacity, I'll comment on the question that you asked about state parties or states. Morocco is already a party to the agreement and really attached to its objective. We understand the purpose of adding parties behind states because one state that is not parties or is maybe against the objective of the agreement can block the whole process. So we can view this addition favourably. And I'll go back to the group to consult if the whole group can agree about that. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [27:22]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco and I thank you for very carefully structuring your interventions along the lines asked and also identifying where you were speaking in a group capacity and a national capacity. So thank you very much. Next flag up, who have we got? Micronesia.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [27:43]:

Thank you very much, co-chair. So to answer your question, Do we need the 39 bis? The short answer is no, because the agreement already prescribes when you hand in an ABMT proposal, there is a preliminary review. And one of the things that the review looks at is the geographical coordinates. So if there were red flags in terms of the position, they should be ringing at that point. We shouldn't even be coming up until here. So do we need it? No. If you were us to ask which one is the least worst option of option one and option two, we would probably say that option two is a little bit better because it at least requires you to say what the reason is. Is it a national jurisdiction? Is it a dispute? So that's a bit more transparent than option one. As a group, we have not thought about states versus state parties, but the preliminary answer would be that your question makes sense. Someone who is not bound by the provisions of what you're about to adopt, why should they have a veto in the first place? So we would agree with your earlier point on that one. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [29:27]:

I think we don't have sound there. Yeah.


Jamaica · CARICOM [29:35]:

Okay. Okay. Um, we're speaking on behalf of Caricom. We favor neither option at this point we would recommend the deletion of article 39 bis as is however in the spirit of compromise we are prepared to consider language which I then which considers the concerns that have been identified but does not undermine the balance of this agreement we have noted before like all the delegations that the provisions of article 18 are part of a carefully negotiated text and should only be reflected in the rules of procedure, should not be reflected in the rules of procedure in this form. With respect to the reference to party, as identified by the co-chair, it's one of the fundamental rules of international law that it is states who are bound by the agreement. that should be dealt with. So we prefer this reference, the inclusion of the reference to party. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [30:50]:

I thank Jamaica speaking for CARICOM and I give the floor to Iran. Iran, you have the floor.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [30:58]:

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for your proposal. First of all, on your first question, we see merits in reflecting Article 18 in these rules of procedure for obvious reasons and as for your proposal for adding parties, we're not really inclined to add that term here. Of course, we understand the rationale and logic you kindly provided to the room, but we believe that it would actually have an adverse impact on how we interpret Article 18. we understand that the treaty creates obligations and rights for its parties, not for third estates, but looking in Article 18 and the way the language has been crafted broadly, doing otherwise, I mean, adding parties might suggest a contrary that a country that is not a party, for example, is just a signatory, their rights could be prejudiced. And I don't think that's in line with the fundamental principles of international law of the sea. So claims of sovereignty or sovereign right or jurisdiction are sensitive, are very nuanced topics. I don't think the intention of the drafters of this agreement was to make this article specific to parties because it should be in line with the fundamental principles as I mentioned. I humbly suggest that we try to use the language in Article 18 And then I think every confusion would be resolved in light of Article 18 and its languages. Doing otherwise, I think, would actually prejudice right of non-parties, for example, signatories. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [32:46]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran and I give the floor to the European Union.


EU [32:56]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair, and good afternoon, colleagues. The EU and its member states oppose both options under rule 39 bis, and I think it is important just to recall why we oppose them, and that is why I won't be able to express a preference for either of them. In our view, both options are a clear departure from article 18 of the agreement. As we heard, the PSIDS, CARICOM and the Philippines mentioned, Article 18 applies to the entire Rules of Procedure. In the hierarchy of law, Article 18 applies to all proposals for ABMTs and we don't feel that it needs to be replicated in the Rules of Procedure. In addition, both options under Rule 39 bis include an objection procedure, whereas Article 18 does not include any objection procedure, so it goes further than Article 18 and upsets the careful balance that was negotiated in Article 18. The effect of this objection procedure then also concerns us because the effect of the objection procedure is to establish a veto for a single state over any ABMT proposal. And in our view, this is unacceptable. It's a direct contravention of the voting provisions in Article 23 of the agreement and it does risk undermining the entire ABMT chapter. We really want to see the objectives of the agreement enforced and put into place and not to be compromised, those objectives. We also do recall the statement of President Raina Lee in March 2023 when the text of the agreement was finalized and she pronounced on the understanding of the delegates to the IGC and that understanding was that if there is a an article 18 issue that the COP can look at a proposal but not decide on the proposal. But this, these, both of these options under rule 39 do not allow the COP to even look at the proposal. And that really undermines the good faith negotiation in relation to article 18 that took place here two years ago. In addition, Mr. Co-Chair, as you said, we really find it objectionable that the current draft states, provides that any state not that any party can object to an ABMT proposal so at a minimum we would agree with you that state parties should be included but we would suggest that it's preferable if article 18 is to be addressed somewhere that it should be addressed through the modalities for consultation and assessment that will be articulated under the ABMT chapter and which modalities will then be adopted by the COP under article 21 of the agreement that would be our preference so not I'm sorry that I can't express the preference each of the two options unfavourable. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [35:27]:

I thank the European Union and I give the floor to Japan. You have the floor.


Japan [35:36]:

Thank you, Co-Chair. Japan finds both options unacceptable. We believe that the COP's obligation to take decision on the establishment of ABMT under Article 22 include obligation to decide whether or not a proposal falls within the scope of Article 18. So both option one and two are too over restrictive and infringe COP's competence. So we cannot accept neither option. And as for your question on whether regarding in reference to party, I would like to reserve right to come back to it because I need to consult with my colleague. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [36:24]:

Thank you, Japan. And I now give the floor to Vietnam.


Viet Nam [36:38]:

Thank you, Mr. Kocher. Regarding Rule 39 bis, we propose removing it from the text because its subject matter is already addressed in Article 6 and Article 18 of the Agreement and would otherwise create duplication. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [37:01]:

I thank Vietnam and I now give the floor to Bangladesh.


Bangladesh [37:10]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. First, I will go with the word party and the State party. Obviously, that is in the definition of the agreement. So considering this one, the party can be included. In that case, if we say the State party, then the meaning of party and the State party remains the same. In that case, we can say only the party. In other ways, if we see the law of the sea convention, there it is not defined, but in many articles, the state party is written. So in that case, we may have some discussion on this, whether we'll put the party or not, but I am with the word party. Regarding the Article 39 bis, once it is there in the agreement, in agreement article 18, so Bangladesh considers that rule 39 may not be there. Still, I am flexible with the delegations, even if we have to keep this one. In that case, Bangladesh will prefer keep the first para of the option one and take the option two. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [38:38]:

I thank Bangladesh and I give the floor to Chile.


Speaker 34 [38:42]:

Turkey.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [38:43]:

Oh, sorry, my bad. Turkey.


Türkiye [38:45]:

Thank you, Co-Chair. I will be so brief. We are not in favor of Rule 39 bis, but nevertheless should there should be a reference to retain such a provision, we support option one. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [39:10]:

Tashi Kuoderm. I now give the floor to Norway.


Norway · CANZ [39:20]:

Thank you, Chair. And I'm giving this statement on behalf of Iceland, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Famously, can see, but now I've stated all the names for so there's no confusion. To your first question, and per our previous numerous statements, we are not persuaded that there is a need to impose substantial obligations of the agreement into the rules of procedure. We haven't been and we're still not, and consequently we cannot support rule 39 bis, neither option one or option two. And as others have remarked, the imposition of such rule would upset the balance on which the treaty is constructed. On the other question, notwithstanding opposition on the rule itself, we must say that we agree with your legal analysis that a non-party could prevent a proposal going forward would be quite extraordinary. To us, that is clearly not an available reading of the treaty. In any case, it would be appropriate to add party here. That also leads us to question whether it really could have been the intention of the proponent that non-parties could challenge the function of the treaty and FTA chapter. So maybe that's a point of clarification from us. I'll stop there. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [40:46]:

I thank Norway speaking on behalf of CANZIE and I now give the floor to Thailand.


Thailand [40:58]:

I'll be brief. So we don't see the need of the Rule 39 bis because -- and it actually goes beyond the obligation under the agreement as many mentioned. However, we -- if the PrepCom agree to include some sort of language, we could probably work on option one. and we insist on the wording of the State party. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [41:35]:

And I now give the floor to the Republic of Korea.


Republic of Korea [41:54]:

Thank you, co-chair. As colleagues from Philippines, EU, Japan, and many others mentioned, both options for rural 39 prevent the COP from examining whether the objection genuinely falls within the scope of Article 18 of the agreement, as they require the suspension of consideration based solely on a unilateral objection. This would undermine the authority of the COP to consider proposals for the establishment of ABMTs. Therefore, we are not in favour of Rule 39 bis and would like to propose the deletion of Rule 39 bis. Thank you, Co-Chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [42:43]:

I thank Korea and I now give the floor to Saudi Arabia.


Saudi Arabia [42:51]:

Thank you, Co-Chair. For us, I will answer all of your questions regarding the whole idea that has been discussed so far. For us, we lean more toward option two in case of retention of 39 bis. And we will take note that the proposal to align the terminology with the agreement to refer to state parties to underline the importance of ensuring that non-party states are not excluded from the process, particularly when issues of sovereignty or jurisdiction may arise. So we therefore propose maybe the reflection of appropriate modalities to allow such concerns to be communicated and duly noted. Maybe that would be a bridging proposal. And for us, we would rather see like suggested by other colleagues to have both options state and state parties in the text for now, just to reflect and consult on it before we take any steps forward in this direction. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [43:52]:

Thank you. I have now got the United Kingdom, to be followed by Brazil, the Maldives and India. The floor is yours to the United Kingdom.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [44:05]:

Thank you very much. Like others that have come before us, we cannot accept either option under rule 39bis for reasons that we have outlined at various times before. We, like others, do not think that article 18 of the agreement requires further elaboration in the rules of procedure and to do so risks upsetting the delicate balance that reflects the outcomes of careful negotiations at the IGCs. On your question about the wording in either option, whether the word party should be added after state, we agree with your analysis. It's unacceptable that a non-party to the agreement could preclude the operation of the treaty in the way in which the drafting currently in these options would suggest, but that is of course without prejudice to our position, which we hold firmly that we can't support either option at 39 bis. Thanks.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [44:57]:

I thank the United Kingdom and that is clearly understood in terms of how you've structured your response, which I appreciate. Brazil, the floor is yours.


Brazil · CLAM [45:11]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Coutinho, for giving me the floor.

I'd like to deliver a general statement related to Rule 39 bis on behalf of CLAM.

Our countries express our appreciation for the work undertaken in advancing draft Rule 39 bis.

Which addresses an important procedural aspect of the agreement. We recall that Article 18 of the agreement provides for legal certainty.

It prescribes that the establishment of area-based management tools, including marine protected areas, shall not include areas under national jurisdiction and shall not be relied upon as a basis for asserting.

Or denying any claims to sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, including in respect to any disputes relating thereto.

As a result, Article 18 establishes that the COP.

Shall not consider for decision the proposals for the establishment of such ABMT.

In our view, Article 18 of the agreement requires an effective operationalization within the procedural framework of the Conference of the Parties in line with the agreement.

And in this regard, Rule 39 bis serves this purpose.

We see Rule 39 bis as a relevant provision to ensure that the Conference of the Parties.

Will act in conformity with the agreement, particularly with respect to sensitive issues relating to sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction.

CLAM is ready to work on the basis of the text proposals in a manner that.

Reflects the purpose and spirit of the BBNJ agreement.

I thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [46:50]:

I thank Brazil very much for that intervention on behalf of CLAM. I didn't hear a view expressed on the second, so I heard a very clear statement in favour of 39bis recorded. I appreciate it may be too early, would be interested in your views and CLAMS views in due course on whether if 39 bis is retained, the word party should be inserted after the word state. I appreciate it's too early to ask for that, but if you could come back to us on that, that would be appreciated. Thank you. So, turning now to the Maldives.


Maldives [47:35]:

Thank you, co-chair. First, at this point of time, we would really like to understand the reasons behind the proposal. We really want to understand what added value that it would bring into the decision-making process in ABMTs. First, to go back and answer the question, we don't really see any merit in keeping the proposal as it is. But if you were given an option, we would really like to go to option two. And then on the question that you posed about state parties, in line with the agreement in Article 24, a state party is the only state that can object to the decision-making process. However, we would also like to take note in getting views with regards to ABNTs, non-state parties views are also considered if you look at the agreement as per se. So we are talking of two different regimes in here and if you want to reach an agreement between the two significant divides that might be something that can be considered in trying to delineate the two different processes that can take into account. I'm sorry that I added more complexities into that. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [49:03]:

No need to apologise because it is good complexity in the sense that I think as always we've heard concerns expressed, we've heard rationales for ensuring that the views of non-state parties, the distinguished representative of Iran and others have made this point, are accessed. So is there an alternate way of drafting that achieves the objective of ensuring there's a means of seeking the views of non-states parties without non-states parties being able to prevent the COP from performing its function? At the end of the day, as chairs, we are you know, we serve the delegations and if there are drafting proposals out there that can achieve those objectives and reflect all of the concerns, then please, we're interested. So as I said, don't apologize, it's a good challenge and it's welcome complexity. Thank you. I now give the floor to India, to be followed by the Russian Federation.


India [50:22]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. With regard to your first question, whether to have Rule 39 bis, we would suggest no. We believe that Article 18 of the agreement is well balanced and carefully crafted provision, which should not be diluted. But in the spirit of cooperation, if we answer your second question, whether to add parties after state, we believe that the language under Article 18 of the agreement does not support this proposal in our understanding. In this context, we would like to emphasize that the Conference of the Parties remains a platform for technical and environmental cooperation rather than a forum for adjudicating complex sovereignty related or jurisdictional disputes which fall outside the mandate of this agreement. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [51:11]:

I thank you very much and I give the floor to the Russian Federation. Floor is yours.


Russian Federation [51:18]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Co-Chair. So we would like to echo delegations who spoke in favour of keeping Rule 39 bis. Some delegations actually stated that this rule would break the balance of the Convention. Our position on the agreement is quite known to the delegations, I'm not going to repeat it. We consider the agreement to be imbalanced. And we guess that this rule in the rules of procedure could somehow slightly try to restore this balance in the agreement. So we actually see the merit in keeping it in the rules of procedure. We have no preference for option one or two, but we would oppose adding the word party. But we have to reiterate, there should be no confusion in any way whether we keep party or delete it, states not parties will not be bound by ABMTs, that's clear. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [52:18]:

That completes the speaking list unless there's somebody out there that we haven't seen. Delegates, if you'll just give me a minute to reflect on how to sum up this discussion. Well, thank you delegations for what's been a constructive discussion. It won't surprise you to hear me say that it's apparent that we're still some way from consensus on this particular question. And that fact in and of itself will not necessarily be a surprise to anyone in the room either. So, We will take this away, but I again would reiterate that as chairs, our job is to guide this procedure, this process as best we can, but the success or otherwise of the Preparatory Commission depends on all of the delegations that participate. So there's some clear divergences of opinion on issues and I would encourage delegations to go away and to talk and to by all means be creative, look at alternate possible drafting fixes that can take account of all of the concerns that have been expressed if that is indeed possible. So We've certainly heard some very strong views on a range of issues. Again, if delegations can talk, be active in seeking to come up with compromise text and needless to say, Janine and my doors are very much open. Okay. With that, I will now move on China has requested the floor. China, the floor is yours.


China [55:11]:

Sorry, I didn't notice that. I'm just seeking the clarification, is the discussion on 39B closed?


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [55:22]:

Well, I indicated that my list was closed, but of course you're welcome to state, absolutely welcome to state your views. And if there is anyone, you know, we won't, this is a difficult room in which to operate and, you know, we'll be flexible about people hearing and receiving the call. So yes, please go ahead.


China [55:46]:

Okay, thank you, co-chair. I know many people in this room are expecting my intervention maybe. Well, apparently we see the operationalization of Article 18 necessary and China aligns with states and states groups who are in favor of this text. And may I just make some further exploration. As I said yesterday, The boundary for the applicable area for this agreement is clearly defined in the text but not clearly defined in the reality. So we deem that the applicable area issue is highly politically sensitive. Apparently the conference of the parties of this single agreement is not a suitable arbitrator these sensitive issues or even to show a preference on these issues. And we also heard some delegations advice or say intervention that the consultation prior to the conference of parties deliberation is enough to show these sensitive to flag this sensitiveness for the caution of the parties. But since this consultation does not necessarily prevent the proposal to go into the discretion of the COP, we see a further procedural arrangement within the COP is necessary. And let me say a few words about statement on behalf of the negotiating parties at the end of the IDC process. They can look at and shall not decide. We see these as two separate elements. When we are talking about the rules of procedure of the COP by reference to 39 B, we are it means that the proposal has already fallen into the sight of the COP, which suffices the element of can look at. While they shall not decide, the element is not secured by the procedure if 39B is not there. So we see that is the merit of 39B. Since 39B lies under Rule 39, captioned competence, I just want to say a few words about competence. Let's rethink about Article 18 of the agreement, whether it creates a definite legal consequence or a pending status if the proposal is deemed to concern areas within national jurisdiction or disputed areas. It says clearly it shall not decide, so it is definite. legal consequence. It is not something to be further decided by the Conference of the Parties whether it has the competence to decide on it or not. So that is basically our understanding and the logic behind our proposal. And to answer the second question from the co-chair, apparently as the contributor of these proposals, we have no preference on option one or option two. We are open for discussion with other delegations. And for the state or state party issue, I just want to clarify that when China proposed the text, we used the term state, not state party. but we are flexible on that issue. We want to hear more. But as I said in my previous intervention, that the disputed areas may concern a state party or a non-party. So these scenarios are all possible. So that will conclude my intervention. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:00:59]:

And when you hadn't taken the floor, I think I had one or two very enjoyable sing-tows at your function last night. I was just wondering if you'd had a couple more, that's all. Okay, that concludes discussion on this article for now. Costa Rica. The floor is yours.


Costa Rica [1:01:23]:

Thank you very much, Chair, and sorry for coming a bit late. So in line with what was stated by Chile and others, we also see benefits in not having this rule since it was covered by Article 18 of the agreement. Of course, we're also in line with what CLAM stated, but in case we decide to continue with this rule, we would prefer option one with the addition of state party. and also included in reference in paragraph two of the legal justification that would accompany the written notification to read it as follows, notwithstanding other rules of present I'm sorry, notwithstanding other rules of the present rules of procedure in cases where a state party sends a written notification, including the respective legal justification to the secretariat indicating by reference to Article 18 of the agreement, its objection to a proposal for the establishment of any area based on management tool. And we could provide this, we could provide a textual proposal. Thank you so much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:02:34]:

I thank Costa Rica for your intervention. Can I just do a final look of the room? Is there anyone else who wants to take the floor on this item? I see no one, so I will definitively close it for now, I think. And with that, we will move on to the right to vote, which is rule 44. The easy issues just keep coming this afternoon. So in this rule, there is one issue for us to consider, which is the terms in brackets, present and voting. And it's a simple inclusion or exclusion, so it's a binary decision. I think as you are aware, we are coming under time pressure. I'll make some observations about our consultations on this, and then of course the floor is open for people to express their views. I think as Janine and I have both said, our two principles are listening and reflecting to the best of our ability, the views of delegations, and also fidelity, very importantly, to the agreement. We've had consultations on this issue, reasonably extensive consultations. It's fair to say that it's an emotive issue. and there's some strong views on both sides of it. And I certainly say from the perspective of my Pacific friends, I absolutely understand it. I've never been able to exercise the prerogatives of my country in a UN forum in under at least 30 hours of door-to-door travel. And I'm very aware that a number of my Pacific colleagues, when I see them on the plane in Sydney, they've hubbed via Port Vila or Suva, down to Brisbane, down to Sydney, then they get on the plane I'm on, and I've got another 24 hours and they've already been travelling for two days. So I understand it. On the other side, I understand the very strong views of countries that have taken a conscious decision to delegate aspects of their national sovereignty to a regional economic integration organisation who want to see the manner in which they've chosen to delegate that national sovereignty reflected in the way that they want it to be done. So there are strong and very legitimate views on both sides of this. we can open it up and I will open the floor. I can't see that we will reach consensus on this based on the discussions I've had. So I think it's going to be difficult to see an environment in which we will reach consensus around the text currently in brackets. And so I can't see an outcome. We can spend two minutes, two hours, two days on this. I'm not sure we're going to get any further on this other than that to finalise this rule, the bracketed text won't reach consensus. So with that, I will open the floor and I see Micronesia. for whom 30 hours door-to-door is probably a luxury. The floor is yours.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [1:06:56]:

Thank you, Adam. And you might actually be surprised by the perspective of your Pacific friends on this one. So, of course, we know what the paragraph is trying to do. Yes, you have outlined what our realities are. Are we the happiest that this is making it easier for someone who is not us? No, not really. Do we understand where that rule is coming from and why it's here? Yes, we do. So we're not happy. We're not fighting this one. We are, however, a bit puzzled by how the square brackets frame it. because it says present and voting in square brackets. Now, if we look back at the top of the document under definitions, that has a very specific meaning and that is the only meaning that the Pacific will ever accept. And it says either you vote yes or you vote no or you are not counted. That is the standard practice at the UN. That is in the agreement. That is what we insist on and we're not changing that one. Now, if you include it here, it logically doesn't seem to make sense because the next sentence is shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its members exercise their right to vote. Yet we're saying has the number of its members present and voting, meaning the number of its members that pushed a yes and no button. And in the next sentence, we say they can't push the button if they did. So there seems to be a logical inconsistency here. We don't see that term present and voting to have anything to do with who is in the room or How do you count? We also don't see it very practical that at the start of each meeting, the secretariat is like, let's count how many members of the regional integration organization are actually in the room. There's two ways of doing that. One would be a seating chart where you highlight them, then you're like, them. The other one is you could take the automobile technology, you know, like, if you sit down in your seat and you didn't buckle your seat belt, your car complains. Those would be the only two ways that we could see that actually done in a practical way. So again, it's not the happiest of suggestions for us, but we also want to be practical about it. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:09:58]:

Will I I certainly appreciate the suggestion. I suppose the one thing I didn't quite round out in my comments to begin were the logical inconsistencies, if they're there, are there in Article 64, which was obviously part of a very carefully negotiated compromise and in which sort of things were traded off. I wasn't in the IGC, of course, That's a disadvantage. Sometimes actually might even be an advantage. I mean, it's both. But in any case, I wasn't there, but as always, deals were done, things were traded for other things, and it's fair to say we can't change whatever the logic or otherwise, we can't change the meaning of Article 64 and what was done in the IGC through the rules of procedure. But with that, I'll give the floor to the European Union. Floor is yours.


EU [1:11:01]:

Thank you Mr. Chair. I'd like to start by extending my thanks to Micronesia for the very eloquent and clear explanation of the illogical nature of the words in the square brackets. We reread it the same. If the words president voting are included in the text, it would give the EU and its member states two votes. And that is not the intention of Article 64 of the agreement. Article 64 is clear that if the Member States are voting, then the EU cannot vote, whereas if the EU votes, then the Member States can vote. But if we include the words in square brackets, it gives a double vote and we're sure that a logical conclusion is not the intention of the proposers of these rules and so we assume the intention is to delete the words in square brackets. Now Mr. Chair I could go into kind of the legal technicalities of how the EU member states have transferred their competence over certain aspects of their sovereignty to the EU. I'll save everyone that painful legal explanation but just to emphasise that the wording in the square brackets doesn't make sense and we hope it can be deleted and that the text of the rules of procedure can faithfully to Article 64 of the agreement. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:12:09]:

I thank the European Union on a range of levels for that. Is there anyone else who would like to take the floor? Japan, the floor is yours.


Japan [1:12:28]:

Thank you, co-chair. Japan would like to retain the language in the bracket, but following up on the comment just made, perhaps deleting and voting is more correct. So that would be equal to the number of its member states that are parties to the agreement and present, perhaps, I don't know. Okay. But anyway, anyway, So our point is that for the sake of fairness among the parties, as well as consistency with Article 47, paragraph five of the agreement, which stipulates that if all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, decisions and recommendations of the COP shall be adopted by majority or two-thirds majority of the parties present in the voting, so maybe present, so they, the states to exercise their right to vote, they have to be present in the meeting. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:13:37]:

I thank Japan and I now give the floor to Morocco. I presume for the African group, but you can clarify. Thank you.


Morocco · Africa Group [1:13:47]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair, and I'll be speaking on behalf of the African group. On the bracketed formulation present and voting in paragraph two, governing the exercise of voting rights by regional economic integration organizations, the African group supports its retention. Voting rights must reflect actual participation in the room consistent with the principle of sovereign equality and also with our position on quorum under Rule 34, but we didn't have the chance to go into that. I'll stop here.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:14:28]:

And that's 100% correct, as I said at the time. Obviously, when we reach an outcome on this rule, the rules on quorum will then be altered to reflect whatever the outcome has been here. The United Kingdom, floor is yours.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:14:48]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just to be brief, I mean we need to be faithful to the agreement text and we know what you and others have said about what 64 provides, so we need to make sure that we reproduce the text faithfully in this rule 44, so we would be in favour of deleting the square bracketed words. Thanks.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:15:14]:

The Russian Federation has requested the floor.


Russian Federation [1:15:21]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. So it is clear that when the participation of regional economic integration organizations is mentioned, the European Union is primarily implied. As in previous stages of the process, we would like to reiterate our strong disagreement with the approach reflected in Article 64.2 of the BBNJ Agreement. It runs counter to the practices of the United Nations under whose auspices the agreement was drafted. The specifics of the EU's participation in the UN work are governed by a special resolution which does not grant the EU the right to vote, a right that is in fact the prerogative of states in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality of states enshrined in the UN Charter. Thus, para 2 of draft rule 44 is inconsistent with the UN practice and should be deleted in its entirety. That said, if the parties to the agreement nevertheless decide to retain this paragraph, in our view, the text in square brackets should be retained. But at the same time, due to the reasons the EU representative just stated about double voting, maybe a further work on the text is required for the common understanding. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:16:34]:

I thank the Russian Federation and I give the floor to New Zealand on behalf of CANZEE. New Zealand, the floor is yours.


New Zealand · CANZ [1:16:45]:

Thank you, Co-Chair.

CANZEE countries support the deletion of the words present and voting. As you alluded to, co-chair, during the IGC, there were trade-offs. At the time, there were proposals in the text to include the words present and voting. Those proposals failed. And what we have is Article 64, paragraph two in the agreement. Speaking on behalf of just New Zealand, during the negotiations of the treaty, it was not our preference. to land on the language that we did, but this is the language that we have now. And so, as you said, we cannot change Article 64 too.

As you have said, as the UK has said, we need to ensure fidelity with the agreement.

And I don't think it's possible to achieve fidelity with the agreement with the inclusion of the words present and voting in rule 44.

Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:17:51]:

I thank New Zealand on behalf of CANZII and I give the floor to Japan to be followed by Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.


Japan [1:18:02]:

Thank you, co-chair, for giving the floor again. Actually, Japan would like to propose a revision of the language in the bracket. So we would like to propose present at the time of voting instead of present and voting. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:18:23]:

I thank Japan and I give the floor to Argentina.


Argentina · CLAM [1:18:30]:

Thank you, Co-Chair. Let me please make a comment on paragraph 2 of Rule 34 on quorum which is linked to this rule on behalf of CLAM. CLAM understands that for the determination of quorum in the case of original economic integration organization, it shall be counted on the basis of the number of member states of that organization that are parties to the agreement duly accredited and present at the meeting at the time the quorum is determined. Thus, the last part of paragraph two of rule 34 should read as follows, on the basis of the number of its member states that are parties to the agreement duly accredited and present when a decision is taken. In relation to this, we therefore support retaining present and voting on Rule 44, paragraph 2. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:19:36]:

I thank Argentina and I give the floor to Saudi Arabia.


Saudi Arabia [1:19:44]:

Thank you, Chair. For us on Rule 44, paragraph 2, we actually support the retention of the practice test present in voting. We think this formulation is consistent with the established multilateral practices and for us it provides necessary clarity in the calculation of voting rights. Also, it helps including the application of Article 64 of the agreement, so we support the retention of the present in voting. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:20:12]:

Thank you, Saudi Arabia, and I give the floor to Turkey.


Türkiye [1:20:18]:

Co-Chair, we support the retention of the bracketed text. We believe that proxy voting would undermine the decision-making process. Therefore, we support a framework based solely on the direct participation of duly accredited representatives. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:20:38]:

I thank Turkey and I give the floor to Iran to be followed by Micronesia on behalf of P-7. Iran, the floor is yours.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:20:53]:

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. Just quickly, we would like to reflect our view in this discussion. Rules of procedure should be consistent with the agreement itself. For example, Article 23, paragraph two of the agreement states that, I quote, if no consensus is reached, Decisions and recommendations shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the parties present and voting before which the conference of the parties shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the parties again present and voting. End of the quote. In our view, this provision is clear, Mr. Chair, and stipulates that voting should indeed be taken by parties present and voting without distinction. Therefore, the term present and voting needs to be kept in this paragraph. We do not concur with the reading of this rule by the distinguished representative of the European Union. Present and voting in light of Article 64, paragraph 2, never means double voting. It simply means that the EU members, for example, that are party to the agreement should be present. Thank you so much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:22:04]:

I thank Iran and I give the floor to Micronesia on behalf of PCEETS.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [1:22:12]:

Thank you, co-chair. And yes, I neglected to say before that it's on behalf of PCEETS, but that was true for all the other interventions as well as any that might still come for today in case I forget. So I do agree with some of the sentiments said and I do disagree with some of the others. First, to the point that the EU raised that it's not about double counting, so it's not Member States plus the EU. We didn't read it in that way, but we thank for the clarification because obviously that would be a red line. You cannot have an extra vote. That is clear. Again, for us, the term present and voting means one thing and one thing only, it means you either vote yes or you vote no. It does not have anything to do with like you physically being in the room who is there at what time or anything like that. And that is important for us because it's about counting the votes on how many votes it takes to pass something more in favor than against 20 in favor, 19 against and 100 abstentions still passes any measure and that's in the implementing agreement and that's what we insist on retaining. Now, so again, the language in brackets here present and voting is confusing because we don't know what it technically does. We could show flexibility and the EU is probably not gonna like this one. on Japan's formulation, which was like present at the time of the vote. Of course, that will involve extra paperwork on part of the European Union because they now need to credential things. But credential people, we don't have a strong opinion. I'm just showing flexibility. If they wanted to know how to cheat the system, they're welcome to talk with me privately afterwards. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:24:34]:

I'll give the floor to the High Seas Alliance. Oh, hang on. Oh, EU, yes, please. European Union.


EU [1:24:44]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We have listened carefully to the interventions today from the floor and from colleagues. Just in response to one of the delegations from the delegate from Iran, the definition of party in the Article 1 of the agreement includes a regional economic integration organization. So when delegates refer to specific rules that say parties present in voting, that also means a REO present in voting, not simply the individual member states of that REO. Just to assist parties, because I know there has been some reference to what's common in other international agreements, the EU has a list of 17 different rules of procedure for multilateral environmental agreements. We'll submit it in writing for the benefit of other states. I'm not going to read out the list now, where the rule as replicated without President voting is present in all those other MEAs. Perhaps that would assist states and give them some comfort when they see how it works in practice in other agreements. The proposal for Rio to be able to vote without the Member States being required to be present is a common practice. And I just think that might give some reassurance to delegates when they're reconsidering this rule. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:25:58]:

China has requested the floor. China, floor is yours.


China [1:26:02]:

Thank you. Let me call your attention back to the basic rule on decision making in the agreement that is Article 47, paragraph 5. it says that all these vote should be adopted by the parties present and voting. So the present and voting term is there in Article 47, paragraph five. So if we remove the term, the reference in Rule 44, it means that we are creating some unequal treatment towards the parties who are members of the rail and those who are not. So here China's position is in favor of the retention of present voting in rule 44. Thank you co-chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:27:08]:

I thank you China and with that I give the floor to the High Seas Alliance.


HSA [1:27:18]:

Thank you, Co-Chair.

With your permission, we were not able to intervene yesterday on the issues discussed. So with your permission, I would like to briefly address Rule 26 on decision making of SBs. The Hisses Alliance recommends amending paragraph 1C on draft rule 26 to allow for substantive decisions of subsidiary bodies, at least in the case of STB, to be taken by a two-thirds majority rather than by simple majority. Decisions on procedural matters may be taken by a simple majority. We note this recommendation is based on the assumption of a limited small membership body and a majority quorum requirement. recommend adopting the remainder of the rule as drafted with all brackets removed. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:28:11]:

I thank the High Seas Alliance. That concludes the speaking list. Iran, you have the floor.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:28:31]:

Thank you so much. I just want to thank my distinguished colleague from the European Union for his explanation, but I'm sure that, well, of course, we are well aware that party has been defined in the agreement, but I'm sure that you are also well aware that the agreement does not allow for another vote for European Union, I mean, double voting. So in light of that, when we put this in light of Article 64, paragraph two, and the practices that had been in many other, you know, conference of parties, I think our reading are clear. There is no double voting. And if the concern is that, because I see the EU is also concerned about double voting, as for example, my colleague from Micronesia, maybe we could add a language that clearly states that this does not mean double voting. They should be present and voting maybe along those lines would be helpful. But may, may I ask a question, Mr. Chair, are we also focusing on paragraph three of rule 44? Do we have time to do that? Because we would like to also reflect on that very shortly.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:29:55]:

Thank you for the question, Eran. My understanding was we were going to deal with this issue substantively in the Financial Rules Committee and then replicate out the understanding that was reached there and bring it into the Rules of Procedure. But with your indulgence, can I check with my fellow co-chair, Janine, and come back to you on that. I thank you. I think with that, just to double check to confirm, because again, this is a difficult room, is there anyone who wants to take the floor on this? No, okay. Well to sum up delegates, It's probably as well that I've got a 30 hour flight home because I might need several stiff drinks after this. It's clear that we don't at this stage have consensus on the deletion of the words present and voting and that there must be further discussion on this, I would just ask that we've referenced various parts of the agreement, but at the end of the day, this does come back to Article 64. I would respectfully submit it's difficult to read paragraph two of Article 64 in isolation It's difficult to read it other than in one way. And I'm always struck by the quality of the interventions in this forum. But on this occasion, I was particularly struck by something my New Zealand cousin said, which was to paraphrase him basically along the lines of, well, we don't like it, but it's there. So I think that's an accurate paraphrasing. So there it is. Some people like it, some people don't, but it's there. So we need to ensure that whatever possible bridging of the gap that is done remains consistent and true to the wording of Article 64. It's pretty clear to see where the respective proponents are on this. And so can I suggest again that people have discussions and see if they can come up with what in this case will have to be some very creative drafting. But anyway, I'll leave it at that there for now. Can we have something easy? Rule 44. So we'll move to Rule 44. Oh, 45. Moving to Rule 45. Yeah, let's just, if we can take 60 seconds and apologies delegates and I'll come back to you. Okay, Delegation's moving to Rule 45 and we're looking here at paragraph three. You will see that there are two bracketed alternative formulations with respect to the question of whether a question is procedural or substantive. I will open the floor and I'd be interested obviously in preferences as between the two square bracketed items. So with that, the floor is open. Is everyone clear? So it's rule 45, it's paragraph three. You will see there are two alternate formulations. on the question of whether how to decide the voting threshold for deciding whether a matter is procedural or substantive. And the floor is open for preferences or points of view on that question. Jamaica, on behalf of CARICOM, the floor is yours.


Jamaica · CARICOM [1:35:34]:

Thank you, co-chair. CARICOM If there is a debate among states in the conference of parties as to whether a matter is substantive or procedural, CARICOM believes, CARICOM prefers the second bracketed text. We believe that this matter should be resolved by the parties in the most efficient way possible. And this, the text in the second brackets, which is taken from article 158, which is 159 of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea achieves this objective.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:36:14]:

I thank Jamaica speaking on behalf of CARICOM and I give the floor to Micronesia speaking on behalf of PSCDS.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [1:36:26]:

Thank you very much. So our preference would be for the first option as it reflects the practice at the UN. That said, you wanted an easier paragraph, so I'll also signal that this is not a red line. We'll ultimately be flexible on this one. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:36:49]:

Thank you very much, Micronesia, on behalf of PSIDS. As always, that's very helpful. Thank you. I give the floor now to Argentina on behalf of CLAM.


Argentina · CLAM [1:37:02]:

Thank you, Co-Chair. On behalf of CLAM, CLAM prefers the first formulation as well, namely that the President shall rule on whether a matter is of a procedural or substantive nature and that any appeal against this ruling shall be put to a vote immediately. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:37:21]:

I thank Argentina on behalf of CLAM and I give the floor to Japan.


Japan [1:37:27]:

Thank you, Co-Chair. As for paragraph 3, Japan prefers the second bracket. And can I also make a quick comment on paragraph 2b, if that's okay?


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:37:42]:

Yes, of course. Please feel free. As I've said, we are concentrating as a general rule on the bracketed text, but that's without prejudice to the rights of delegations, of course, to raise non-bracketed text, bearing in mind that at the end of this whole process, I will come back for a final sweep through the whole rules of procedure for any issues that haven't been covered elsewhere. But no, please go now to 2.


Japan [1:38:12]:

Thank you. Japan would like for paragraph 2, we would like to suggest to add of the agreement after part three in the second line, just for the clarity. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:38:39]:

Noted. Thank you, Japan. India, floor is yours.


India [1:38:51]:

Thank you, Chair. On the question of distinguishing between procedural and substantive matters, India supports the second option in the brackets. We believe that it is more transparent, legal standard to treat a question as one of substance by default if its nature is in doubt. This precautionary approach would prevent a simple majority from reclassifying a critical substantive issue as procedural just to pass it with a lawyer vote count. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:39:21]:

I thank you very much, India, and I give the floor to the Maldives.


Maldives [1:39:27]:

Thank you, co-chair. We prefer the second option. We believe during the decision-making process, if you involve the president, then it becomes a huge friction between the president going forward in the appealing process and so forth. And thus, we believe it's better for the COP to make decision on a matter of substance. On coming back to, if you may allow, coming back to the previous discussion, we've been deliberating and listening to others and for us, for procedural fairness, I think it's really important for delegations to be present during the decision-making process and thus we would really like to have a draft in language that reflects that process. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:40:17]:

I thank the Maldives and we will record that against the previous item. Anyone else looking to take the floor on this question? Iran, the floor is yours.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:40:29]:

Thank you so much. Very quickly, our preference of course is not option one. We believe that determination of whether a question is of substance or procedure sometimes entail maybe a juridical exercise which a president of the conference may not be able to do that. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:40:47]:

Thank you, Oran. Do we have anyone else looking to take European Union? The floor is yours.


EU [1:40:55]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Unfortunately, I'm somewhat going to complicate the options. The EU's position is that we prefer option one, but with a hybrid amendment to it that brings in a two-thirds majority. So our preference is a slight amendment that if there's a question as to whether the matter is substance or procedural, the president shall rule on the question, and then we would insert comma after consulting with the bureau, full stop. And then if there's going to be an appeal against that judgment, we would prefer that appeal to be overruled by a two-thirds majority. Is that clear or should I repeat it? Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:41:39]:

Thanks, Barry. We've got it. Yep. Okay, Iceland, on behalf of KANZY.


Iceland · CANZ [1:41:46]:

Indeed, Mr. Kocher, thank you very much. On rule 45, and I'm happy to hear you describe this as an easy one, para three, this has been discussed previously and what was in there previously did not seem to be a landing zone, so that is why we came forward with an alternative. which is the second square bracket. And we would just draw attention to that those are mutually exclusive, as you have pointed out. I'm afraid the first square bracket is a no-go for us, but luckily we found an elegant solution, which is agreed language from UNCLOS itself. And I think that's a very important argument here. This proposal has been taken from the second sentence of Article 159, paragraph eight of the convention, which pertains to procedure and voting of the assembly of the International CIPAA authority. I don't think I can make a stronger argument here, unless prevails, I think, and it's agreed language from there. Thank you, thank you so much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:42:56]:

Thank you very much. So you'll put that into us or we've got it.


Iceland · CANZ [1:43:09]:

Yeah. Yeah, so this rationale came with the proposal when we sent it in at Precom 2.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:43:15]:

My apologies, got it now. Thank you. Okay, China, to be followed by Thailand.


China [1:43:24]:

Thank you, co-chair. May I comment on paragraph two B of rule 45 on the trigger point for the, in recognizing whether the efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted. Well, the current text says the president, after consulting with the bureau, could make the decision. Well, in other view, since the Bureau of the COP is consisted of individuals, not like the PrepCom consist of countries representing other parties in the regional group, we deem that the views of parties are not fully represented in these trigger point decision making. So our suggestion is whether the efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted shall be made by the President after consulting with the Bureau and taking into account positions of the parties. So that is our suggestion to add a few words to the end of this paragraph, taking into account positions of the parties. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:44:48]:

Thailand, Sawadee Kap.


Thailand [1:44:53]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On Rule 45, paragraph 3, so Thailand support the second bracket as noted by our colleague earlier that the language itself is from UNCLOS. So we go along with that. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:45:16]:

Thank you. I'll give the floor to the United Kingdom.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:45:26]:

Thank you. We support in 45 paragraph three, we prefer the second option. We think it's appropriate that COP should decide on this. And we note, as others have stated, the precedent for this wording in UNCLOS and the procedure governing the ISA assembly. Thanks.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:45:46]:

Thank you, United Kingdom. Apologies, Singapore. I think you might have had your flag up for a little while, but it's really hard to see from up here. But in any case, the floor is yours.


Singapore [1:45:56]:

No worries at all. Thank you very much, Mr. Kocher. On this rule, Singapore, like many delegates, we preferred a second option. As Kenzie and many others explained, this option is taken directly from Article 159 of UNCLOS. And we think that this approach is tried and tested and is also suitable for our purpose. The approach essentially places the ability to decide whether a matter is one of substance or procedure in the hands of the Conference of the Parties instead of giving the power to the President to first rule on the question. And this approach we think will cause less friction in decision making. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:46:41]:

I thank Singapore and I've got Saudi Arabia. The floor is yours.


Saudi Arabia [1:46:51]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. For us, we are coming in to react to a proposal made by the distinguished delegate from China. We do support the proposal, just to make it a point that it will make more clarity and make more sense. So for two best, their proposal for the end of two best. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:47:12]:

Thank you. That exhausts States at the moment, so I will give the floor to the FAO. Floor is yours.


FAO [1:47:27]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair.

FAO would go for the second.

Option, which is to treat it as a matter of substance to be determined by the Conference of the Parties.

And this is not only based on the arguments eloquently stated by many delegations here, but also because it aligns with practice of states in many RFMOs, in particular those that were.

Established under the auspices of FAO. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:48:03]:

I thank the FAO very much. That exhausts My speaking list, if anyone wants to take the floor, please wave frantically. I see no frantic waving, so I presume that finishes that item. Two observations. China has made what seems to be, to my mind anyway, quite sensible proposal in respect of 2bis. So I haven't heard any opposition to it. I take that as, well, we will take that away, but I would just note that it makes sense and we haven't heard anyone oppose it. So if you please, European Union.


EU [1:48:56]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And we have to reserve on 45 two base. We just have to consider what the distinguished delegate from China said. We just haven't had a chance to consider it properly.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:49:05]:

Yeah, thanks Barry, understood. The way I would put it is nothing of course is without prejudice to everyone's right to come back on any issue of course. We're getting a sense of where the room might lie as to what might go into a next version. And obviously the proposal has just been put on the floor. I haven't heard opposition seeking a general, if you like, sense of whether it would be appropriate to put it into the next version. But of course, it's everyone's prerogative at that stage to then come in if you have had the chance to consult and say whether you do or don't like it. So nothing in these summations is in any way binding or setting down of you know, in concrete anything. It's just getting a sense of what, where we go with the next draft. In a similar vein, yeah, we just, just give me 10 seconds. Yeah, so a question, maybe the setting of some homework. In looking at rule three, two regional groups spoke in favour of the first option in the square brackets and all others were in favour of the second option. Of those two regional groups, PSIDS said they could be flexible. So that leaves the only regional group with a firm preference, standing with a firm preference for the first one as CLAM, can I respectfully ask if CLAM could go away and consult and consider whether you've got any flexibility with respect to accepting the second option in brackets in paragraph three. That's of course absolutely without prejudice to your right to continue to object. We're just seeking to get a sense of where the balance may lay in the room as we go forward. So I'd appreciate advice on that question from CLAM in due course. With that, we'll conclude the item and we will move on to, 51.1. Yep. 51.1. I'll give everyone a moment to flick over. It's on page 19, rule 51, and we're looking at the first paragraph. And the bracketed text is on the question of secret ballots and whether there is a modality for secret ballots. So with that, I'll give everyone 30 seconds to digest. So that is rule 51, paragraph one, that's on page 19. The bracketed text is at the end of the paragraph on whether there should be modalities for a secret ballot. With that, I'll open the floor. Floor is open. Micronesia on behalf of PSIDS.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [1:52:58]:

Thank you very much. My observation would be that the part in brackets is actually redundant because the paragraph already references two different modalities of voting. The first one, a show of hands, is basically a vote that is not recorded, where you only record how many voted in favour, how many voted against. Like literally your hands are up or you push the button and only the numbers show up. Now in all my years here, and that's been over 30, I've only ever seen that happen twice. The most prominent was probably when the International Criminal Court was adjusted, everyone in favor and two against. And it was not written down who wrote it which way. So that is already one modality that's in there. That is exactly the same, that's for practical terms, that's the same as a secret ballot. The other one, a roll call vote, that would actually be a recorded vote where you write down how each and every country has voted on the proposal. That is the norm because countries normally want to put themselves on public record of where they stand on an item. Now, has there been provisions for voting by secret ballot? There's a 400 page annotated version of the GA rules of procedure. And yes, the Office of Legal Affairs have found somewhere, I think it was in regards to the General Committee where you could actually do that, but it's not really practiced. Generally, you have two kinds of votes, one where you just record numbers, whether it's showing of hands or pushing of buttons, and another one where you record how each and every single country has voted. Hopefully that clarifies, but I'm afraid it confuses everyone. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:55:16]:

Thank you very much. Micronesia, nominally on behalf of PSIDS, but I would regard it as a general kind of elucidation for the room. Thank you. Anyone else wanting to come in on this? Japan, you have the floor.


Japan [1:55:40]:

Thank you, co-chair. So this was actually Japan's proposal to add the sentence, I mean two sentences actually, So we believe that in order to encourage a broader participation to the agreement and also ensure autonomy of parties in decision making on any kind of issues, every option voting, including a secret ballot should be available. And for example, CITES rule of procedure includes methods of voting as a method of voting a secret ballot. and it has been practiced. So we believe it should be there.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:56:28]:

Don't worry, I give the floor to Argentina on behalf of CLAM.


Argentina · CLAM [1:56:35]:

Thank you, co-chair. CLAM considers that the bracketed text at the end should be deleted and that secret ballots shouldn't be allowed except in the case of elections. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:56:50]:

Thank you very much. European Union, the floor is yours.


EU [1:57:00]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. The EU and its Member States have to reflect on Article 48 of the agreement when they consider this proposal. It is helpful that the distinguished delegate from Japan reminded us where it came from. I had forgotten that. As you will recall, Article 48 does provided that the COP promotes transparency in decision-making. We are hesitant to engage in secret voting, but if there is to be secret voting, we believe it should be a high threshold, such as a two-thirds majority. We would not like to see secret voting enabled just by two parties proposing and seconding it. If it is to be included, we would prefer to see a high threshold. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:57:39]:

Thank you. European Union. The floor is open. Anyone else looking to come in on this question? United Kingdom. Floor is yours.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:57:59]:

Thank you, sorry. We also have the same concerns as the EU has just set out there when we thought about this in the context of transparency in Article 48 in particular. We were also concerned that the threshold that is set out in the drafting is a low one. We have listened with interest to the explanation that was given, and I think that I just about followed it, and we will reflect on it further. However, we also agree that, in light of that explanation, the bracketed text is probably not necessary, so we would be erring in favour of deleting it. But if it is retained, we would want a higher threshold for that. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:58:44]:

Thank you, United Kingdom. Anyone else looking to take the floor on this item? I've got Turkey A, and then I've got China. Turkey A, the floor is yours.


Türkiye [1:59:01]:

Thank you, co-chairs. I would like to support distinguished delegate Japan because we have also a rule regarding secret ballot in the CBD rules of procedures and also another support to EU. If there is a secret ballot, it should be a high threshold voting. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [1:59:23]:

Thank you very much, Turkey. And I give the floor to China.


China [1:59:31]:

Thank you, co-chair. The first sentence in this paragraph one of rule 40, 51, it says voting except for elections. And I am just seeking clarification whether the content in the bracket applies to all voting or those except for elections. That is the first question. And the second one is whether the content in this package also applies to virtual meeting. So China will express, we will deliberate our position after verification on these two questions.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:00:24]:

We'll take it away for clarification. We'll come back to you. Morocco for the Africa Group.


Morocco · Africa Group [2:00:36]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I've been trying to take the floor without interrupting the flow of the discussion, but with your indulgence, I would like to come back to Rule 33 as the African Group has some comments. Of course. Thank you. I'll be speaking on behalf of the African Group. On the bracketed threshold for closing sessions to observers, the African Group favours deleting the second sentence of Rule 33. The first sentence already establishes the general rule that sessions shall be held in public unless the Conference of the Parties decides otherwise. A decision to close a session is, in the Group's view, a procedural decision and would therefore be governed by the general decision-making rules under Rule 45. Inscribing a specific two-thirds threshold in Rule 33 for what is essentially a procedural decision would be inconsistent with Rule 45 and would create an unnecessary internal contradiction with the Rules of Procedure. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:01:50]:

I thank Rocco on behalf of the Africa group. Iceland, you've got on behalf of KANZI, you've got the floor.


Iceland [2:02:00]:

Not on behalf of KANZI actually, because the discussion is developing very rapidly. And I think first of all, speaking for Iceland, we will need some time to reflect on what's been floated here. I just wanted to express our support for the possibility of a secret ballot, but we understand and we agree that two parties is a very low threshold. Thank you. We might come back on this because there is a lot to it.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:02:42]:

Thank you, Iceland. I appreciate it. And in response to the last two interventions, we are moving at a pace and of course you don't need to apologize for coming back. It's understood it's also not an easy environment in this room, so we'll always be flexible. Thank you. India has requested the floor to be followed by Canada.


India [2:03:04]:

Thank you, Chair. This is regarding Rule 51. Regarding the bracketed text in paragraph one, India expresses caution. While we recognize that secret ballots are a standard tool for elections, their application to general matters should be strictly limited. Decisions that affect the implementation of the agreement, its financial rules, or its programmatic content should be reached through a transparent process. Hence, in the interest of transparency, India proposed to delete the bracketed text. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:03:33]:

Thank you, India. I've now got Canada to be followed by Australia. Canada, the floor is yours. Sorry, Canada, the floor is yours.


Canada [2:03:45]:

Thank you, co-chair. I will be very brief and apologies that we were not able to coordinate within CANZII for this one. First off, I will say I will commit to following up with the distinguished representative from the Federated States of Micronesia because I just want to understand from an operational perspective much more clearly how that would work in terms of the show of hands assuming using electronic means or versus mechanical means. In general, our position is that we do prefer to remove the brackets around the end of Rule 51 para one, take the point that the threshold for seconding a request for a secret ballot is quite low. Not sure if this is helpful, but there are a number of other multilateral environmental organizations that, of course, include secret ballot options that do have higher thresholds, whether that's five or ten states to second or support the request. So we would be open to those discussions. Thanks, Chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:04:49]:

Thank you, Canada, and no need to apologize. Two days ago, the Cairns E Joint Statement was but a dream, and now it is such a reality. The Chair just assumes it unless told otherwise. And with that, I will appropriately give the floor to Australia. Floor is yours.


Australia [2:05:08]:

Just coming in very briefly for Australia in a national capacity. Just to register that we did have some questions about the appropriateness of just one party being able to being required to second the request and we separately also were interested to hear the comments from the delegate from Federated States of Micronesia and we want to reflect on that further so we'll reserve our position on this paragraph for now, thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:05:42]:

I thank you Australia and Iran. The floor is yours to be followed by Micronesia. Iran, floor is yours.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:05:51]:

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. I would also like to recall that this has been the practice that elections are usually taken by secret ballot. So the default rule is usually this. Maybe that would be helpful. Different conferences of parties have adopted this approach. Just coming back to the rule 33 that the African group mentioned, may I just have a very quick remark on that? Thank you so much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:06:16]:

Of course.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:06:16]:

Thank you so much, sir. And well, we believe the decision to close the session, of course, we could support the proposal of the African group, but should there be any second sentence, I think signatory states should be excluded from this because signatory states, subjects of international law, they are bound to a general obligation not to defeat the purpose and object of the agreement, they do have this right to be in meetings of closed sessions. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:06:48]:

I thank Iran and I give the floor to Mike Ronesia on behalf of P-CITS.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [2:06:55]:

Thank you. And just to reiterate, like I've never seen the case where there had been a request to do an actual vote on a proposal or amendment by secret ballot. Never. That said, I understand that there might be some unease if we write that in about the threshold. I do want to point out, however, Rule 53, which has to do with elections. So this is not about a proposal, but this is about electing. All elections should be held by secret ballots unless otherwise decided. And then the second one is not in the GA rules, it's a GA practice established by GA resolution. The secret ballot shall be dispensed with when the number of candidates corresponds or is lower than the number of seats. So if it's a clean slate, and then comes the kicker, unless a party specifically requests a vote on the given one. So and that I have seen where we had like five candidates for five positions. Someone did not like one of the particular candidates requested a vote and then we actually went through the secret ballot. So I'm just throwing that out to complicate your life. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:08:28]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Micronesia speaking on behalf of PICs, I think. Maldives, the floor is yours.


Maldives [2:08:41]:

Thank you, Chair. With regards to the secret ballot, we are flexible on this. However, we do take note of the comment made by India with regards to the financial and budgetary matters, whether it should be taken by a secret ballot. And we feel that there is an opportunity for secret ballot in terms of, for example, the ABMT proposal and addition that's been made with regards to establishing an area based management tool. So we're exploring on how this would work in practice. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:09:23]:

I thank the Maldives. That exhausts my list on this item, secret ballots. Wave frantically if you want the floor. I see no one, so let's draw a line under that and move on to rule 60, amending the rules of procedure. I'll give everyone time to get there. Rule 60 amending the rules of procedure. Obviously, we're particularly focusing on the text in brackets, which is most of the paragraph on the question of the President's prerogatives after consulting with the Bureau on the question of whether all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted. With that, well, I'll give everyone a minute to get there and digest it. So Rule 60, paragraph 21 of 21, looking at amendments to the Rules of Procedure. With that, I'll open the floor and I might also ask for the assistance of Canada in a minute. Okay, all righty, Singapore. Singapore, you have the floor.


Singapore · AOSIS [2:10:54]:

I'm speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States. AOSIS would like to see the second set of square brackets included in Rule 60, which provides for applicable voting threshold when efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted. We note that this is in line with Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure and Article 47 of the Agreement, which provides a modality for decision making when efforts to reach consensus have exhausted.


Co-Chair · Janine [2:11:30]:

Thank you Singapore. I don't see anyone else on the speakers list right now. European Union, you have the floor.


EU [2:11:41]:

Thank you Mr. Co-Chair. The EU and its member states are of the view that consensus should be required to amend the rules of procedure given that the rules of procedure are adopted by consensus under Article 47 of the agreement. However, we do note the language in square brackets and if there is to be a departure from consensus, we could show some flexibility, but we believe it should be a high majority such as four fifths. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Janine [2:12:09]:

Thank you to the European Union. I have the distinguished representative from the Federated States of Micronesia. The floor is yours, sir.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [2:12:16]:

And on behalf of PSCs, yes, of course, I align with and welcome to the hot seat, by the way. Yeah, fully align with the point just raised by EOSIS. For us, we can have some flexibility of the actual threshold, but it cannot be strict consensus. And in that respect, we do want to recall that the co-chair had made it clear that we have to get through the rules. look for the good, don't look for the perfect. There's still quirks in there. And if I look at how many times the GA rules have been amended, and we are happy with the GA rules, it's not a bad thing to have that option. But again, flexibility on the threshold, but not consensus. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Janine [2:13:09]:

Thank you to the Federated States of Micronesia. I would just revert to apologies to Singapore. I did not recognize, of course, that your statement was on behalf of EOSIS as well, just in the musical chairs. We have next Japan followed by Turkey.


Japan [2:13:28]:

Thank you. Thank you, co-chair. Japan would like to reserve right to come back to this comment on this later stage. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Janine [2:13:38]:

Thank you, Japan. To the representative of Turkey.


Türkiye [2:13:45]:

I'm here. Thank you, Coach. We constantly emphasize that as reflected in the agreement, decision should be taken by consensus. We consider consensus to be primary and preferred approach to comprehensive support among parties. And and Rule 16, we reiterate that the rules of procedure should be amended by a decision of the CoP taken by consensus in accordance with Article 47, paragraph 4 of the Agreement. In this regard, we support the deletion of the bracketed text. Thank you, Co-Chair.


Co-Chair · Janine [2:14:29]:

Thank you, Turkey. I have next Iceland on behalf of Kansi.


Iceland · CANZ [2:14:41]:

Thank you very much. Too bad Adam is not here to hear me speaking on behalf of KANSE. Allow me to be quick and clear. KANSE is of the opinion that, since the rules of procedure are adopted by consensus, as per the agreement, which makes them special in the context of the agreement, the same should apply for amendments.


Co-Chair · Janine [2:15:08]:

Thank you, Iceland. Conciseness is always appreciated. Next, I have the representative of Saudi Arabia. Oh, no, sorry, apologies. Apologies. We're going to regional groups first. So I have the distinguished representative of Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM, and then we will go to Saudi Arabia. Thank you.


Jamaica · CARICOM [2:15:32]:

Thank you. CARICOM recognizes the importance of consensus, but also aligning ourselves with the statement by EOSIS, we believe that when consensus is not possible, there should be voting using a high threshold. However, CARICOM is flexible as to what this threshold may be.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:16:00]:

I thank Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM, and I give the floor to the United Kingdom.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2:16:08]:

Thank you. We support the first option in this rule. We also think that the rules of procedure, given that they are being adopted by consensus, should, as per Article 47 of the agreement, should also be amended by consensus. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:16:23]:

I thank the United Kingdom and I give the floor to Argentina for CLAM to be followed by Morocco for the Africa Group. Argentina, the floor is yours.


Argentina · CLAM [2:16:34]:

Thank you, Co-Chair. In accordance with former distinguished delegations which took the floor, as for Rule 60, CLAM supports the retention of the language in brackets. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:16:47]:

I thank Argentina on behalf of CLAM and give the floor to Morocco on behalf of the Africa Group.


Morocco · Africa Group [2:16:56]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Co-Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the African Group. The African Group supports consensus as the primary mode for adopting amendments to the rules of procedure. On the bracketed fallback mechanism referring to rule 45, the African Group supports this cross-reference, provided that rule 45 retains an appropriate majority threshold for substantive decisions. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:17:22]:

I thank Morocco on behalf of the Africa Group, and I give the floor to Saudi Arabia.


Saudi Arabia [2:17:30]:

Thank you, co-chair. On Rule 60 of the Rules of Procedure, we consider that amendment to the Rule of Procedure, given their institutional nature, should be adopted exclusively by consensus. So for us, we request the deletion of the bracketed text and maintaining the nature of consensus for this rule. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:17:52]:

And I see India. My apologies. India, the floor is yours.


India [2:18:00]:

Thank you, Chair. Regarding the bracketed text, India proposes its deletion. We believe that the rules of procedure should not be subject to voting thresholds, even as a measure of last resort. Introducing a mechanism to bypass consensus on the rules themselves risks creating a cycle of procedural instability. If the rules that define how we reach decisions can themselves be changed by a majority, we undermine the legal certainty required for the long-term implementation of the agreement. Thanks.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:18:30]:

Namaste. Thank you, India. And I give the floor to Thailand, Kopkun Kap.


Thailand [2:18:38]:

Good afternoon, co-chair. Thank you. So regarding Rule 60, my delegation views the rules of procedure as the foundational architecture of our collective action. So the stability in this rule is paramount to ensure the predictability and for the trust of the parties. Therefore, Thailand remain firmly committed to the principle of consensus and we propose the deletion of the bracketed text. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:19:06]:

I thank Thailand. I see no one else looking to take the floor. Please, oh, China, there you go. Sorry, my apologies. China, the floor is yours.


China [2:19:16]:

Thank you. It is my fault. I pressed the button so late. China reserves the right to comment on this specific role at a later stage. That is all what I want to say. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:19:31]:

Thank you, China. If there's anyone else looking to take the floor, please wave vigorously. Philippines. Lovely wave. Thank you. Floor is yours.


Philippines [2:19:42]:

All right. So regarding Article 60, we prioritize stability and predictability in the rules of procedure. So we do favor a consensus decision to trigger an amendment. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:19:54]:

Mabuai, Philippines. And oh, down the back, Indonesia.


Indonesia [2:20:04]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. Just to give some ideas as well for the delegations. This relates with the rules of procedure that will be applied by subsidiary bodies. Indonesia believes that it is true that the ROP for the Conference of the Parties shall remain is a foundational architecture, so it should be amended only by consensus, but there should be some consideration on amendment in subsidiary bodies because there's still a discussion that the ROP for COP will apply mutatis mutandis to subsidiary bodies. So just to just to give some ideas for the delegation's consideration. Thank you, Chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:20:48]:

Tira Mekasi, Indonesia. I do not see any other delegations inscribing and I see no vigorous waving. So we'll draw a line under that and give me 30 seconds. Thank you, delegations. That concludes the targeted read through concentrating on particular clusters of issues that, to be frank, we expected to be most problematic, so wanted to deal with up front. Now I am opening the remainder of the agreement open, so again with a focus on square brackets in particular, but any other concerns on any rule, any other concerns, I am going to give people a minute or two to sort of work through their rules of procedure and have a think about what they want to say, but the floor is now open on basically everything. Well, not everything, not life, the universe, Tips for dating, whether guinea pigs are a good pet or not, no, they're not by the way if anyone's wondering. We'll stick to the rules of procedure for the Conference of Parties. All parts of that are indeed open. European Union.


EU [2:22:44]:

Thank you, Mr. Cochair. Could I just make a brief suggestion, perhaps just to aid delegates, could we go through section by section, maybe if you take rules one to five or something, just to give us some guidance as we go through it. Sure. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:22:55]:

Okay, good idea. Well, let's go chapter by chapter. I think that's the simplest way to go. So chapter one, scope and definitions. Chapter 2 now, we spent quite a bit of time on this on Monday and I know that there is some work going on, particularly in relation to observers. UK has requested the floor.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2:23:43]:

Sorry, I actually do have some comments on Chapter 1, but if you can give me 30 seconds to get my notes. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:23:57]:

That's fine, Rachel. We'll wait. And then for the benefit of everyone else, given the discussion we had on rules 3 bis and 3 ter and 4, I'll only open up chapter 2 for rule 3 and rule 5. So after we've heard back from the United Kingdom, we will move to rule three and rule five in chapter two. Okay, UK, the floor is yours.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2:24:35]:

Thanks very much for your patience. I've submitted these suggestions to DUALOS, but to read them out now as well, we suggest an amendment to rule one, We suggest an addition at the end that says: "convened in accordance with article 47 of the agreement or under these rules of procedure". I referenced this the other day when we were discussing intersessional decision making in virtual meetings and the general sense that those meetings themselves were neither extraordinary nor ordinary. meetings of the COP. This drafting is simply suggested to ensure that it is clear that the rules of procedure apply to all meetings of the COP, including those convened under rule 3ter. Moving to rule 2, we would suggest changing the definition of meeting so that it reads: meeting means any meeting of the Conference of the Parties convened in accordance with Article 47 of the agreement or under these rules of procedure. And that is for the same reason as for the changes to rule one. And then one more comment on the definitions. It was a small comment about the definition of chair. We suggest that we change this to say chair means chair or acting chair. And we'd also suggest a change in the subsidiary body's terms of reference. And sorry to cut across both, but they do interrelate here. So that is a change to all 19 in the subsidiary body's terms of reference so that it says in the absence of the chair, the vice chair shall take his or her place as acting chair. If we make both those changes, it will make it clear that, while acting as chair, the vice-chair has the powers and functions of the chair, many of which are set out in the COP rules of procedure. We think that those two changes together address that slight gap.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:26:54]:

I thank the United Kingdom for those comments. The second part sounds very much like you're very helpfully doing some of the scrubbing for us between the documents. I thank you for that. Any reactions to the proposals? I appreciate that this may will be something we need to return back to, but if there's any immediate reactions, I'm grateful. I see that Argentina, probably on a different point, but please feel free to react as well, has asked for the floor. Argentina, the floor is yours.


Argentina · CLAM [2:27:28]:

Don't know, yeah, but on rule five, is that okay? Okay. On behalf of CLAM, so we were discussing on this rule and in order to assess the convenience or not of lifting the brackets, It is not clear to us what would constitute reasons of urgency to shorten the notification period of COP meetings. So we kindly request clarification on this point and then we could discuss and take a position on this. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:28:13]:

Can I suggest, we're just trying to remember whose text this is. Can I suggest whoever proposed the bracketed text, if they can offer any wisdom with that regard, we'd be grateful. We think it was an EU proposal. They're looking guilty over there. You've given yourselves away. Do you want to have a go?


EU [2:28:51]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. On behalf of the EU and the Member States, I do not have in front of me the justification for that suggested insertion. But perhaps in order to assuage any concerns delegates may have, perhaps we could limit shortening the timeframe to 30 days for reasons of urgency only in respect of extraordinary meetings rather than for ordinary meetings. Maybe that would reassure some people. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:29:21]:

I thank you for that and very much European Union and I give the floor to Japan.


Japan [2:29:31]:

Thank you co-chair. Japan has a comment on rule five. We would like to open the bracket and include the language as is now. to introduce shorter time period for reasons of urgency.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:29:54]:

And I give the floor to Singapore.


Singapore [2:30:01]:

Thanks very much, co-chair. We would like to react to the UK's edits for rule two definitions, especially for the definitions on meetings. We support the edits made to the definition of meetings because it is a consequential edit following from rule three ter. And we do have a scrubbing edit to suggest as well, and this relates to paragraph seven of rule two definitions on president. We wonder if we also need to define vice president since we are defining president. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:30:46]:

That's certainly a good point. Would you see vice presidents being defined as members of the Bureau?


Singapore [2:31:04]:

Yes, we think that the vice president would be members of the Bureau. We can submit text if co-chair you prefer.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:31:14]:

That, yeah, text would be fine. My immediate reaction would be the definition of a vice president would be basically any member of the Bureau is normally a vice president of the negotiations. I'm sure Martin will correct me if I'm wrong on that, but that would be my understanding. But yes, if you could provide text, that would be appreciated. We will do that. Thank you, Singapore. Thank you. I think was it Indonesia? Yes, Indonesia. Thank you. The floor is yours.


Indonesia [2:31:44]:

Thank you very much, co-chair. Just to flag, I think Indonesia's statement in the first day and also in PrepCom too, Indonesia looks at the practice of the rules of procedure in ISA that both ordinary meeting and extraordinary meeting have their own specific articles or paragraphs or rules in this case. We just think it will be easier to basically distinguish when ordinary meeting and extraordinary meeting can happen and I think ISA provides a really good reference. Indonesia can probably provide a textual proposal on this matter because we see that it is still scattered especially regarding the timing. and I think it will be helpful as well for the Conference of the Parties moving forward in this regard. This is also following the discussion with some members of delegations when delegate of Indonesia seeks clarification on when extraordinary meetings should be conducted. whether, for example, if ordinary meeting cannot result in a decision, then extraordinary meeting can happen or any other situation that still needs some consideration by the COP. So having these specific rule on both ordinary and extraordinary meeting might be helpful for the COP moving forward. Thank you, co-chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:33:14]:

Tera Mekasi, Indonesia, and we look forward to receiving that text. Okay, anyone else requesting the floor? Singapore.


Singapore · AOSIS [2:33:26]:

Thank you, Ko Chen. This time I'm intervening on behalf of EOSIS on Rule 5. Thank you to the EU for their clarification as proponents of the text in square brackets at the end of Rule 5. EOSIS understands that there may be instances where the 60 days timeline would not be feasible because of reasons of urgency, so we are flexible to include the text in the brackets. And we're happy to consider any further amendments as may be suggested by the proponents as well. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:33:56]:

Thank you very much Singapore and IOSIS for that indication of flexibility. Thank you. Anyone else looking to take the floor? European Union, you have the floor.


EU [2:34:09]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. This is just unrelated to Rule 8, which is related to rule five. If there is going to be any amendments to rule five, there should be consequential amendments to rule eight. So just to flag that when we're talking about rule five, so people in the room are aware there is a related rule that they should also pay cognizance to. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:34:29]:

Thanks. That's helpful, very helpful. Thank you. Singapore.


Singapore · AOSIS [2:34:37]:

Since the EU has taken us to rule eight, I'm happy to express that EOSIS is also equally flexible in relation to the square brackets in rule eight. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:34:49]:

Thank you very much, Singapore. I'm starting to feel like I'm watching a tennis game here. So, any other comments on part two? Micronesia, on behalf of PCIT.


Micronesia (Federated States of) [2:35:08]:

This time, just in my personal capacity, I quickly looked through the rules of procedure of the General Assembly in regards to the question on presidents and vice presidents. The GA rules quite helpfully define neither one. The first time it appears is shall elect one president and so many vice presidents. The practice has also been that normally whoever is chairing is referred to as the presiding officer, whether that is a president or a vice president. But whoever sits up in front, normally the nameplate still says president. It does not switch over. So just to confuse everyone. But you did start it.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:36:00]:

I did. I really kind of left it wide open there. So although I'm quite entertained by the notion of an intervention in your personal capacity, so. And anyway, I see Morocco and I would be grateful for clarification. Are you intervening as Morocco, the Africa group, or in your personal capacity?


Morocco · Africa Group [2:36:28]:

I'll say just I have a question earlier on rule 8 bis because the African group have some comments on that point. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:36:38]:

It is getting late in the afternoon, I'm prepared to concede. So we kind of crept to rule 8 bis by virtue of being in part two, which contains rule five and a number of delegations referred to the linkage between Rule 5 and Rule 8 bis. So we weren't technically in Rule 8 bis, but we've kind of gotten to Rule 8 bis by subterfuge. So on-- It's Rule 8. So just on that basis, please go ahead. Floor is yours.


Morocco · Africa Group [2:37:20]:

Thank you very much for the clarification. I'll be speaking on behalf of the African Group. The African Group strongly supports the retention of Rule 8 bis. While Article 5 of the agreement establishes the substantive principle that the agreement shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that promotes coherence and coordination with relevant instruments, frameworks and bodies, it does not set out the procedural modalities for operationalising that cooperation. Rule 8 bis fills that gap and provides the necessary institutional basis, consistent also with Article 8 of the agreement. The African Group proposed, therefore, two amendments to the current text. First, the Group proposed adding at the end of the rule an explicit not to undermine clause, reading as follows, and I quote, Such arrangements shall be pursued in a manner that does not undermine the agreement or the relevant instruments, frameworks and bodies concerned, end of quote. This language directly mirrors Article 5 of the agreement. It is therefore not an innovation. It is a transposition of an existing and agreed treaty principle into the procedural framework of the conference of the parties. Second, The group supports anchoring a standing agenda item under Rule 10 on matters arising from consultations with relevant instruments, frameworks and bodies in order to give operational and regular effect to Rule 8 bis. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:39:01]:

I thank Morocco speaking on behalf of the Africa Group. Delegations, I think I will now say I'll open the floor up for everything up to and including Rule 8bis with a view that we finish our deliberations tonight with Chapter 4 on the agenda to start with as a clean start next time. So let's see how we go, but my aim will be to finish off up to and including 8bis. All of parts one, two and three are open and I see Argentina to be followed by Singapore and then Saudi Arabia. Argentina, floor is yours.


Argentina · CLAM [2:39:44]:

Thank you, co-chair. Going back to rule five, it's still not clear after the clarification of the distinguished colleague from the European Union. this what actually constitutes reasons of urgency. Although he made this clarification on extraordinary or ordinary meetings, maybe we could find out or a way out by including a definition on these reasons of urgency in rule two, I think, among the other definitions. And then I move to Rule A bis on behalf of CLAM. In our understanding, its inclusion in the COP rules of procedure is not necessary. On the one hand, the agreement already provides for this authority of the COP, and on the other, the first COP is expected to adopt a decision on this matter. That's the position of CLAM. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:41:05]:

I thank Argentina on behalf of CLAM. I'll respectfully put my chief counsel's hat on rather than my chair's hat for one second to say, only because I've seen it come up in other contexts, the problem with always with trying to define urgency, and I've seen it in at least another convention, is of course by definition it's not necessarily foreseeable. So if we go down this route, I think it would be appropriate to draft text that contains a range of reasons that would constitute urgency, but leave some flexibility. I've just seen another convention regime come into a major problem in respect of that question. So that is just my respectful drafting suggestion. Singapore, then Saudi Arabia, then Indonesia. Singapore, the floor is yours.


Singapore [2:42:04]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Co-Chair. We think that it is beneficial to include Rule 8 bis, and we just have a scrubbing edit to suggest to Rule 8 bis, and that is in the title of the rule. So we propose that the title of Rule 8 bis be aligned with Article 5 of the BBNJ Agreement to read, cooperation arrangements with other relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant bodies. This is just a scrubbing amendment. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:42:40]:

Thank you, Singapore. I now give the floor to Saudi Arabia. The floor is yours.


Saudi Arabia [2:42:46]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. And we will be coming in on 8 bis. We also echo what our distinguished colleague from Argentina on behalf of CLM said that we do not see the necessity for this rule and we do not support the retention of it in the rules of procedure. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:43:10]:

Thank you Saudi Arabia and I give the floor to Indonesia to be followed by Japan and the Philippines.


Indonesia [2:43:18]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. We support the inclusion of Rule 8 bis, but apologies beforehand, you mentioned that you opened the floor for any other issue that we can raise. Would it be possible if Indonesia raised it, not related to this section?


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:43:38]:

So we're open up to the start of Chapter 4, which is agenda. So if it's anything before then, please.


Indonesia [2:43:45]:

Yeah, it's after that, so it's fine. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:43:47]:

That's fine. We will, of course, then go to all of those issues tomorrow morning. So thank you. Japan, followed by the Philippines, Micronesia, and the Maldives. Japan, floor is yours.


Japan [2:44:02]:

Thank you, co-chair. Japan would like to propose an inclusion of new paragraph as rule eight ter, titled additional condition for observers. We already submitted this in writing, but I'm going to read it for now. It goes, the conference of the parties may decide by one-third majority that observers are required to subject to additional conditions for participations as necessary to facilitate cooperation with relevant instruments, frameworks, and bodies. reason for this suggestion is that conditions set for participation of observers under Rule 6 paragraph 4 are lenient compared to conditions under some IFBs. For example, some regional fishery management organizations set more stringent requirements for observer participation. So in order to encourage frank and straightforward discussion with IFBs at PBNAJ meetings, it is necessary to have an option to adopt additional conditions for observers' participation as appropriate. Such additional conditions may include restriction on the publication of specific information. Thank you, co-chair.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:45:33]:

Thank you, Japan, and I give the floor to the Philippines.


Philippines [2:45:45]:

So on Rule 8 bis, we have no objections to these texts. We can go along with this inclusion since the paragraph is reflected of the spirit of the agreement to promote cooperation with relevant IFAs. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:45:58]:

Thank you, Mr. Mabouay. And I give the floor now to Micronesia on behalf of P-CEDS.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [2:46:06]:

Thank you, and yes, it's true. I'm back to my P-CEDS gig. So on HBIS, we do think it is redundant. It's already in the agreement. The way it's written, it's not something you would normally find in a rule of procedure. better place than some terms of reference and stuff. So it seems out of place. On the comment just raised by Japan on more stringent rules, we are skeptical about that. We have to think about the actual implications, but we do want to point out if we, for example, offer If, for example, an RFMO is an observer as an IFP at the COP, then that applies to the organization. It does not apply to the subset of who is observer at that particular RFMO. So again, skeptical, but we'll need to think about it some more. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:47:15]:

Thank you, Mike Ranisjah, and I give the floor to Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM.


Jamaica · CARICOM [2:47:23]:

Thank you, co-chair. We are flexible about the inclusion of eight bis. With respect to the definition of exceptional situations, ideally we would prefer not to have it deleted. However, if not to have it included, I'm sorry. However, if it is, we think it is very important to have an open-ended definition, by the nature of exceptional circumstances, this is fluid and not foreseeable and we would not want us to box ourselves in by trying to identify things that cannot be anticipated in the present. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:48:08]:

Thank you, Jamaica for CARICOM. Delegates, it's getting on six. We will lose the sound at some point. Let's keep going, but if everyone can bear in mind, I've got an announcement from Janine and a wrap up. But with my loud voice, we can probably get away with doing it if we lose sound. So we'll try and get through Maldives, Iran and China, if at all possible. And then just please stay. I've got a couple of announcements. And the EU. So Maldives, the floor is yours.


Maldives [2:48:43]:

Thank you, co-chair. Since I've lost my voice, it's good that I have the microphone. Uh, we, we, we would really like to, uh, keep the text, um, as it is in, in rule 8bis, and, and we welcome this addition by, by Marco on behalf of the African group, I think it's really important. We feel that the rule 8 bis gives the authority for the conference of parties to establish arrangements which include, for example, in the region that we are discussing right now, Timbulu, for example, a task force or as such. So we believe that rule 8 bis gives the implementation power for the conference of parties on rule 5, sorry, article 5 of the agreement. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:49:31]:

I thank the Maldives and I give the floor to Iran. You have the floor.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:49:35]:

Thank you so much. Very briefly, we believe Rule 8 bis is a matter of substance, not procedure, and in the Rules of Procedure we do not intend to modify the content of the agreement, we just simply focus on procedures. For that reason, we are not in favour of adding Rule 8 bis and request its deletion. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:49:56]:

I thank Iran and I now give the floor to China to be followed by the European Union and that exhausts my list of speakers. China, the floor is yours.


China [2:50:06]:

Thank you. China's position is flexible whether to include this section and the rule and if it is retained, China intends to add the element of not undermine into the expression of this paragraph and also modify the caption of this section and the role to amend cooperation from a cooperation to relationship. I mean cooperation with IFBs to relationship with IFBs. So this could be a more neutral expression to encompass the element of not NMI. And also on the suggestion to add a new paragraph, a new rule. China needs some time to think about it and we also need to look at the suggested text. But we need to point out here that the IFB doesn't necessarily equal with observer and we have already got a separate section on observer. So it is suggested that maybe the rules on observer could be put in one section.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:51:25]:

I give the floor to the EU, to be followed by Australia.


EU [2:51:30]:

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. The EU and its member states gratefully adopt your submission on the definition of urgency. We think that that is a sensible suggestion not to box us in to a predefined set of circumstances that may be urgent. In relation to 8 bis, the EU and its member states do value the role and input of IFBs into the BBNJ process, and so we can support the language as drafted at the moment. We don't think that it needs any more additions. And finally, in relation to the distinguished delegate from Japan's proposal for a new 8 ter, we're cautious on that, will be our initial reaction. We have to see it in writing, but we think the comments made by the PSE seemed reasonable, so we would be reluctant to be adopting the new eight ter, but we will study it in detail tonight. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:52:17]:

Thank you very much, European Union, and I now give the floor to Australia.


Australia · CANZ [2:52:23]:

On behalf of CANZ, we would prefer to see Rule 8 bis retained as drafted, as original proponents of this text. We think it signals the importance of cooperation and coordination with and among IFBs, which is central to the functioning of the agreement. So we'd prefer to see this retained as drafted. Thank you.


Co-Chair · Mr. Kocher [2:52:45]:

Thank you very much. Australia on behalf of CANSI. Okay, firstly an announcement from Janine while I still have sound. In CR11 tomorrow, we will now do financial issues in the morning. That is the Jeff. plus additional time on the special fund and the VTF, and then secretariat arrangements in the afternoon. Do you want me to read that out again? Is everyone clear? Okay. So that's in CR11. Tomorrow morning in the main room, CR4, we will continue on with chapter four of the rules of procedure with agenda. I will open it up chapter by chapter to sweep up the issues that we didn't consider in the more targeted interventions that we've gone through in terms of the groups so far. So I'll be opening it up more widely. We will then in the main room in the afternoon start off with a consideration of the remaining issues, exhausting of the speaking list that we had and a consideration of the remaining issues on subsidiary bodies. I am then hoping we can move pretty quickly into rules of procedure. And when we've done that, I think everyone gets an early mark, so that's my incentive for everybody. I would like to thank everybody for a really productive afternoon and particularly the flexibility when we've been moving at pace. And again, I'm conscious most people aren't working in their native language. One final point, it's pretty obvious where some of the major issues are going to be for us to be resolving next week, again, I would encourage delegations to be talking to one another. If you're listening to the discussion, it's pretty obvious what some of the stumbling blocks are going to be and where consensus is going to be hard to find. So please, interested delegations talk to one another, start working up proposals. Thank you. Thanks everyone. Good night. Thank you.