Первый комитет, 11-е пленарное заседание - Генеральная Ассамблея, 81-я сессия
Генеральная Ассамблея
Date: 16 October 2026
Language: English
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/ru/ga/c1/81/11?lang=en
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations.

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1st Committee · Chair [0:00]:

Good morning, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues. The 11th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, before proceeding further, I would like to remind want you once again that the deadline for the submissions of all draft proposal is today 8 to 12 noon. In accordance with the program of work, today the committee will first engage in an exchange with the director and deputy to the high representative for disarmament affairs, Mr. Adeyeye Ebo, including on the implementation of GA resolutions 80/53 on the establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verifications. This will be followed by a final discussions with independent experts and high-level officials in the field of arms control and disarmament as nominated by regional groups. The Latin American and Caribbean group has nominated His Excellency, Ambassador Juan Carlos Aceda, Bolivian Secretary General of the Agency for Prohibition of the Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, OPANAL, and the African Group has nominated. Our Excellency, Ambassador Vivian Okeke, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency Liaison Office in New York. The chairperson of the Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of the Nuclear War is unable to attend today's meeting, but her written statement was sent to all the delegations yesterday. Following the exchanges, the Committee will continue the second phase of its work, namely the thematic discussions on specific subjects and the introductions and considerations of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under the agenda items allocated to the committee. It is now my pleasure to extend a warm welcome to the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adeyede Ebo. the representative of the Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of the Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, His Excellency Ambassador Hector Basco Celos, and the Director of the International Atomic Energy Liaison Office in New York, Her Excellency Ambassador Vivian Okeke, joining us at the podium. I will first give our panelists the floor to make their statements. Thereafter, we will sense to an infernal mode to afford delegations the opportunity to ask questions. I have asked our distinguished panelists to keep their statement concise to ensure that we have adequate time for an interactive discussions on the subjects. With this, I now invite the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adeleji Ebo, to address the committee. Now you have the floor.


ODA · Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs [3:52]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, Ambassador Tapper, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I am pleased to participate in this high-level exchange on behalf of the High Representative, who regrettably cannot be here today. She's literally airborne, traveling as we speak. I should start by acknowledging the very rich general debate that just concluded. Delegations highlighted growing concerns over nuclear risks, rising military spending, and implications of emerging technologies. But we also heard, loudly and clearly, commitment to multilateralism and strengthening the UN disarmament machinery. For this exchange, I take the opportunity to build on the opening remarks of the High Representative. Specifically, the High Representative called for the pursuit of transparency and confidence-building measures, or what we usually call TCBMs, to help close the trust deficit. I would like to further unpack this call to action. So first, A look back. TCBMs have long been part of the disarmament agenda. A UN comprehensive study from 1982 outlined the concept of CBMs, including their objectives, their characteristics, and their opportunities. Resolutions tabled in this committee have advanced their application in areas such as conventional arms and outer space, as well as in the regional and sub-regional context. Key transparency instruments such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN Report on Military Expenditures were established. The Disarmament Commission has also addressed TCBMs in both general and issue-specific context, including outer space activities and conventional arms. Implementation of these measures has evolved in response to the international security environment. In the Cold War era, TCBMs were developed to prevent large-scale direct confrontation between the two largest nuclear powers. Very practical actions were suggested and agreed to avert nuclear catastrophe, from ballistic missile launch notifications to hotlines and to troop movement notifications. These measures were negotiated during periods of extreme instability, demonstrating that TCBMs remain viable even under the most challenging circumstances. Military transparency was advanced through information exchanges, notifications, observation of military activities, and verification measures, with the OSCE Vienna Document serving as a principal framework in Europe. We have also seen the inclusion of TCBMs in disarmament and arms control agreements. Confidence-building measures were agreed 40 years ago in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention. State parties agreed the modalities for the exchange of information, and the type of information provided. Over the years, these modalities have been reviewed, expanded, and updated. More recently, TCBMs have been applied to emerging domains, such as outer space and ICTs. A 2013 group of governmental experts developed TCBMs on outer space activities, including measures on information sharing, risk reduction, and consultation. In 2023, the Disarmament Commission recommended measures to promote their practical implementation. In the ICT domain, States established a global point of contact directory to facilitate communication during significant ICT incidents. Other CBMs tailored to the ICT domain have been consensually agreed. History has shown the value of TCBMs, but there is still room to strengthen them. But in doing so, we must recognize the role of political will in ensuring their effectiveness. Their impact depends not only on sound technical design, but also on sustained political commitment by states to build confidence and to enhance security. So now, a look forward. First, we must reinvigorate existing TCBMs and adapt them to today's security environment. Advances in precision, speed, range, and autonomy have transformed military competition, complicating traditional confidence-building measures. Therefore, we must ask ourselves, how existing measures might be updated and complemented by new efforts. In the nuclear sphere, experience shows that while TCBMs cannot replace disarmament obligations, they can meaningfully reduce risks by clarifying intentions, preventing miscalculation, and helping to avoid arms racing. But to remain effective, today's TCBMs must be flexible, must be inclusive and incremental. Properly designed and implemented, they can help to build the trust needed to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Work also continues in relation to biological weapons. State parties to the BWC have developed recommendations on confidence building and transparency. I hope they will be adopted at the final session of the working group on the strengthening of the convention in December. In the area of conventional arms and military matters, there is a strong foundation for further work. But what is needed is a renewed commitment. Commitment to the UN transparency instrument remains vital, particularly as global military spending rises to unprecedented levels. An increase in reporting to the UN register and the report on military expenditure is encouraging. But we also need a commitment to pursue other practical measures with a proven track record. The UN repository of military confidence-building measures is a useful resource in this regard. And such measures may benefit from a regional or subregional approach. Regional and subregional contexts, expertise, and experience are critical, given that there is ultimately no universal template for confidence building. Second, we should consider the possibility of additional TCBMs to close the trust deficit. An array of options could be explored, from codes of conduct to political commitments to technical measures. Advances in AI offer opportunities to expand TCBMs to address new sources of unpredictability and instability. Measures such as AI incident reporting and crisis communication mechanisms could be explored at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. Given the private sector's central role in AI development, industry engagement will be essential. Of course, there are challenges. AI-enabled tools are often dual-use and evolve rapidly, making it difficult for states to effectively monitor TCBM implementation. But the value of building mutual understanding and trust surely outweighs the difficulties. Against this backdrop, it is timely that the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters has dedicated its 2026-27 programme of work to TCBMs. By examining existing and emerging measures, the Board is identifying practical ways to rebuild confidence, and I look forward to its recommendations. For its part, ODA has launched new initiatives to advance work in this area, including establishment of a task force and the convening of a symposium series bringing together experts to deepen analysis and explore new TCBM approaches. Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, before concluding, I wish to briefly address the traditional topic of follow-up on resolutions and decisions adopted at the previous session of the Committee and presentation of reports of the Secretary-General. As in past years, a detailed table of state views submitted in response to general assembly requests will be posted on the ODA website as an annex to this statement. I would underscore, however, that response rates remain low. Aside from the transparency-related reports, most receive only five to 10 submissions. I encourage states to consider both the value of these reports and how their mandates might be refined to enhance their usefulness. I thank you very much for your attention.


1st Committee · Chair [17:06]:

I thank the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ewu, for his statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency, Ambassador Hector Basco Mncelose, Representative of the Secretary-General of OFNAL. Excellency, you have the floor.


OPANAL · Representative of the Secretary-General [17:30]:

Thank you very much.

Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly, Deputy Director to the High Representative of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, distinguished delegates, I'm speaking to you in this high-level exchange on behalf of the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, OPANAL, the Ambassador Juan Carlos Ojeda Villone, to share with you some of the priorities which, within the framework of the SIRS committee, we have seen in OPANAL With respect to the current situation of disarmament and non-proliferation, as you know, the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which in 2027 completed 60 years since its opening for signature, As a result of a complex international context where we saw clearly the risks that a nuclear confrontation would represent not only for our region, but for the entire world, the political will and the efforts promoted by the countries of the region to seek a collective response and a diplomatic solution not only laid the basis for a regional initiative, which enjoyed the support of the General Assembly of the United Nations, but also set a precedent which is now part of the international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation system. and which the States Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and as a result, members of this body, continue to promote and maintain. This political will, which was upheld by the States Parties and supported by the international community, besides revealing the ability to adapt and of the necessary institutional work in order to guarantee compliance with international commitments and the importance of multilateralism. This has also kept the region of Latin America and the Caribbean free of nuclear weapons without undermining the sovereign right to use nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has also approved that the balance between security and development is not only possible, but also necessary, acknowledging the right of states to develop research, and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with their international obligations. This distinction makes it possible for nuclear applications to contribute to areas such as medicine, agriculture, and scientific research within a framework of transparency, accountability and compliance with the non-proliferation obligations. As established in the very Treaty of Tlatelolco, through its control system, which considers, among other mechanisms, the presentation of twice yearly reports to OPANOAL and to the IAEA, as well as the implementation of the safeguards which correspond to existing agreements and is also based on other mechanisms and contributions of the region, such as the Brazilian and Argentinian Agency for Accountability and Control of Nuclear Material, the ABAC. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, as we know, also considers commitments from extra-regional states through its additional protocols. Additional Protocol 1, those with international responsibility and practice and at law on territories located within the zone. are compelled to apply in these areas the relevant provisions of military denuclearization. And Additional Protocol II commits the five nuclear powers recognized in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to observe the status of military denuclearization and to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states parties of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Both protocols have been ratified by all of its users, although some interpretive declarations continue to give rise to concern. over the scope of the obligations which have been assumed. That is why dialogue with the States Parties in the Protocols continues to be an ongoing task, a diplomatic task, for OPANAL. OPANAL, through its secretariat, follows up on all of the matters and work of the OPANAL bodies. and facilitates coordination with other international organizations and forum, including taking part as a permanent observer in the work of the General Assembly. And in this way, we are also preserving institutional memory and ensuring the continuity of the diplomatic work of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in our region. In this respect, education plays an increasingly important role in this work. OPANAL, through its courses, training activities for the officials who make up the diplomatic services of the member states, and with the strengthening of its internship programs, All this has contributed to the specialization and revitalization of interest around the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In a context where resources are limited, which international organizations are facing as a whole, any voluntary contribution to sustain and expand these opportunities is appreciated and acknowledged. These efforts to strengthen Open All, and with it the contributions that our experience can make, as well as training new generations, this takes on particular importance in the light of the current challenges of our complex international situation and the growing difficulties faced by the international community to achieve new agreements in the area of disarmament and even to uphold the existing ones. It's in this respect that today, as was the case when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was first conceived, the growing risks of a nuclear confrontation for humankind should not be overlooked within the work of the First Committee. Given these challenges, the 33 member states of OPANAL continue to reassert their commitment through joint statements and through the presentation of a collective position in multilateral fora. reiterating their alarm and dismay over the threats of the use of nuclear weapons, over the increase in the operative alerts of nuclear arsenals, and the continuing modernization of nuclear weapons systems, and the increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. In this respect, in February 2027, we will commemorate the 60th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That is an opportunity to celebrate, besides the achievements and the existence of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone established in a densely populated area, We hope that the international community will renew its support and its commitment. This commemoration doesn't only invite us to acknowledge the efforts we have made over six decades, but also to reaffirm the validity of its principles and to renew the commitment of the international community to nuclear disarmament. Dear colleagues, we cannot allow nuclear weapons to be used once again by any actor or under any circumstance. This can only be ensured through the prohibition and subsequent transparent, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons. It's always timely to recall that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represents a very important step towards nuclear disarmament, as well as a contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and for the reduction of the nuclear risk. In this respect, We acknowledge the document drawn up by the group of qualified experts in accordance with the resolution of this General Assembly on the new, and I quote, "comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects," which contributes to strengthening existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and to the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. It's with this spirit and on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we renew our determination to continue contributing to this collective effort, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and promoting tangible progress in the international disarmament architecture. Thank you very much.


1st Committee · Chair [30:42]:

I thank Ambassador Hector Basconcelos, speaking on behalf of the O Panel. And now I give the floor to Her Excellency, Ambassador Vivian Okeke, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency Liaison Office in New York.


IAEA · Director [31:06]:

Thank you, Excellency Ambassador Takwa, Chair of the First Committee. Excellency Deputy High Representative, Mr. Adelebo Ebo, my brother. Excellency Ambassador Hector Condensation, open now. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, good morning. It's a pleasure to join you today and welcome the opportunity to inform on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this African group experts exchange with the first committee. As already indicated in the IAEA statements during the general debate, the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is coming under increasing strain. Yet, despite these challenges, the IAEA continues its work of contributing to international peace and security by strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, while widening access to nuclear science and technology for purposes of development. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. Even though the 11th Review Conference of the NPT concluded without an agreement on a substantive consensus final document, it is imperative that Member States recommit to the Treaty and support the IAEA in carrying out its mandate. The Agency's international safeguards inspectors continue building the foundation of trust on which the international non-proliferation regime rests. The number of states with safeguards agreements in force remains 193, and 146 of these states have additional protocols in force. The Director General has urged an African state party to the NPT, the only remaining non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT without a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force, to bring this agreement into force without delay. The Director General has also reiterated his repeated calls for the remaining 11 states with small quantities protocol based on the original standard test to amend or receive them as soon as possible. The Director General has also encouraged states that have not yet concluded additional protocols to do so as soon as possible. Now, coming to the work of the agency in Africa. It is grounded in national priorities and regional cooperation in the application of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, the third pillar of the NPT. As Africa is a member of the Pelindaba Treaty, Africa is a nuclear weapons-free zone. So through the technical cooperation program, We support Member States in applying nuclear science and technology to address concrete development needs from energy planning and water to food security, cancer care, and radiation safety. Interest in nuclear energy continues to grow. The IAEA latest projection indicate that nuclear power capacity could more than triple by 2060. The agency supports 43 countries, including those in Africa, embarking on nuclear power using this milestone approach, integrated work plans, review missions, legal and regulatory assistance, and capacity building. Another 20 are considering joining. Small modular reactors are also becoming increasingly relevant. In May, the first small modular reactor school in Africa was held in Nairobi, bringing together officials from several countries to better understand emerging technologies. Water is another priority area where nuclear science provides practical tools for development in Africa. This is strengthened through the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training, AfRA. Through an AfRA regional project on enhancing the planning, management, and sustainable utilization of water resources, the agency is strengthening isotope hydrology capacity across Africa through expert missions, academic fellowships, and regional knowledge exchange management. Bringing together 48 countries, AFRA is one of the strongest mechanisms we have for regional cooperation in Africa. allowing countries to share expertise, build regional capacity, and advance common priorities. With reference to agriculture, the joint IAEA-FAO flagship initiative, Atoms for Food, is helping countries to build more resilient agri-food systems. This includes support for crop improvement, animal health and productivity, soil and water management, food safety, and the control of insect pests. As part of the Atoms for Food Initiative, the agency is supporting Burkina Faso in strengthening agri-food resilience and addressing food insecurity. With the agency's support, the country has accredited eight new rice varieties. In addition, a country assessment mission identified key gaps and opportunities for enhancing crop production, soil quality, and agri-food resilience. These findings will contribute to strengthening national capacity to address food insecurity and lay the groundwork for future agricultural innovation. In Liberia, an Atoms for Food mission took place at the end of July. Nuclear techniques are already supporting the development of climate-resilient rice varieties, helping to strengthen food security and reduce reliance on imports. Similarly, in Uganda, nuclear-based breeding techniques are being used to develop a new cassava line. In Mozambique, IAEA support has provided advanced tools to help determine and confirm contaminants and residues in food, strengthening national food safety capacities. Chair, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, when it comes to health, Through the flagship initiative, Rays of Hope, the IAEA is working with member states and partners to expand access to cancer diagnosis and treatment. This means strengthening radiotherapy services, supporting training and capacity building, and developing regional capacity through anchor centers. The Rays of Hope anchor centers are leading cancer institutions designated by the IAEA to serve as regional hubs for training, knowledge sharing, capacity building in radiation medicine. In Africa, ANCO centers in Morocco, Algeria, South Africa has helped to strengthen regional expertise and support the long-term development of cancer care professionals. Under ZODIAC, the agency continues to help member states respond to zoonotic disease emergencies. Through NUTEC-Plastics, in Global Marine Plastic Monitoring Network. This brings together institutions worldwide to generate global comparable microplastic data. The Agency has also continued to support women entering and advancing in the nuclear field through its Maria Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship and the LIVES and MENTOR programmes. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, the IAEA is committed to working with African Member States to turn priorities into practical results. Together, we can strengthen energy planning, improve water security, advance food security, expand cancer care, and support the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology for sustainable socioeconomic development. I look forward to our exchange today and to hearing your views on how we can further strengthen cooperation, as well as preserve and strengthen the foundations of international peace and security, while ensuring that nuclear science and technology continue to serve the needs of humanity. I thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [39:49]:

I thank the Director of the IAEA Liaison Office in New York for her statement. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, In keeping with the established practice of the Committee, I will now suspend the meeting to afford delegations the opportunity to have an interactive discussion with our panelists through an informal questions and answers session. The meeting is suspended. Distinguished delegates, the Committee will now begin the second phase of its work, namely the thematic discussion on specific subjects and the introduction and considerations of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under the agenda items allocated to the committee. I would like to remind all delegations that the time limit for the statements during the thematic statement is three minutes when speaking in one's national capacity and four minutes for a statement on behalf of several delegations. The committee will meet all day today, so delegation wishing to exercise their right of reply will be able to do so at the end of the day. Let me take this opportunity to remind delegation that rolling list of speakers for the thematic discussions will be closed today at 6:00 p.m. Therefore, all delegations intending to take the floor during the segment and who have not yet inscribed on the list are encouraged to do so before the deadline. At the same time, I strongly encourage all delegations to finalize their statements for the next thematic cluster to facilitate our work should the committee be able to exhaust the list of speakers for the nuclear weapons cluster ahead of schedule and begin considerations of the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction. The first speaker on our ruling list for the cluster on nuclear weapons is Distinguished representative of Indonesia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.


Indonesia · NAM [42:26]:

Thank you, Chair. The full version of this statement will be submitted to the Secretariat. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. NAEM reiterates its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, as well as the lack of progress shown by nuclear weapons states in eliminating their nuclear weapons. NAEM is also concerned that the strategic dialogue between the NWS has remained limited, and regrets the expiry of the New START Treaty in February 2026 without agreeing on a successor treaty. NAEM calls for the early negotiation of a successor agreement, and the renewal and increase of the commitments agreed within the framework of the treaty. Reaffirming NAM's principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains the agreed highest disarmament priority for the UN, NAM strongly calls upon the NWS to comply with their legal obligations and undertakings urgently and eliminate their nuclear weapons totally in a transparent, irreversible, time-bound, and internationally verifiable manner. All modernization or extension of their nuclear weapons-related facilities should also cease immediately. NAM welcomes the multilateral efforts toward nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and takes note of the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021. NAM said parties and signatories to the TPNW are fully committed to its implementation and are engaged constructively in preparations for the first TPNW review conference from 30 November to 4 December 2026 under the presidency of the Republic of South Africa towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Chair, NAMM said parties to the NPT expressed their disappointment over consecutive failures of the 9th, 10th and the recent 11th NPT review conference. to adopt a consensual outcome document, despite the constructive engagement of non-State Parties to the NPT. They stressed their concern at the lack of political will and apparent backtracking on longstanding commitments pertaining to the implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty, particularly on disarmament and especially by nuclear-weapon States. The NAM states parties to the NPT call upon state parties to urgently renew political will and genuine engagement to uphold the integrity and credibility of the review process. NAM welcomes the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 9 September 2026, which removed from the Board's agenda the issue concerning serious past non-compliance and concluded the Board's considerations of the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreements in the Syrian Arab Republic". NAMR reiterates its full support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. NAMR affirms the inalienable rights of its States to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy, including sovereign rights to develop, full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with Article I and II of the NPT. Finally, while noting the statements by NWS of their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, NAMMRE affirms the need for their urgent concrete actions to achieve this goal in accordance with their nuclear disarmament legal obligations and commitments. Vietnam remains committed to cooperate for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [46:20]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Vietnam, speaking on behalf of ASEAN.


Viet Nam · ASEAN · Permanent Representative [46:36]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the 11 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN. The full version will be made available on eStatements. Mr. Chair, ASEAN underscores its commitment to the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We are deeply concerned by growing nuclear risks, the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, and the declining commitment to global disarmament and non-proliferation. The expiry of the New START Treaty without a successor represents a significant setback for strategic stability. We urge the United States and the Russian Federation to resume negotiations towards a new, legally binding arms reduction framework. ASEAN reaffirms the NPT as the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We regret that the NPT Review Conference could not reach consensus on a substantive outcome document for the third consecutive time. We call upon all states, particularly nuclear weapons states, to uphold the treaty's credibility and fully implement their obligations under Article VI in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. We reiterate the urgency of bringing the CTBT into force and urge all remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify it without delay. We urge all nuclear weapons States to maintain the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing pending its entry into force. ASEAN recognizes the complementarity of the TPNW to the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and looks forward to its first review conference. We reaffirm the vital role of nuclear weapon-free zones in advancing disarmament and regional security. ASEAN continues to explore the possibility of allowing individual nuclear weapons states which are willing to sign and ratify the Sean Fest protocol without reservations and provide prior formal assurances of this commitment in writing to proceed with signature. We commit to continuously engaging with all nuclear weapons states, including those with reservations, to resolve all outstanding issues in line with the objectives and principles of the Seon Fest Treaty. ASEAN reaffirms the inalienable right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We call upon all states to demonstrate the political will to strengthen multilateral disarmament and advance towards a world free of nuclear weapons. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [49:29]:

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Vietnam speaking on behalf of ASEAN. Now I give the floor to the Deputy representative of South Africa speaking on behalf of the TPNW State Parties and signatories.


South Africa · TPNW States Parties and signatories · Deputy Representative [49:47]:

I take the floor on behalf of the States Parties and signatory States to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the TPNW. The full version of this statement will be uploaded on eStatements. We meet at a pivotal time for the global nuclear architecture following the disappointing conclusion of the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without a final outcome, and in advance of the first Review Conference of the TPNW. We, the States Parties and signatory States to the TPNW, reiterate our commitment to both the NPT and the TPNW working towards achieving concrete progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. We reaffirm that the establishment of a legally binding regime on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the core purpose of the TPNW, is a necessary and effective measure in preventing a nuclear arms race and towards achieving nuclear disarmament. We welcome the latest states that have signed and ratified the TPNW. taking the total combined number of States Parties and signatories to over 100 States, demonstrating the determination of a global majority of States to eliminate nuclear weapons. We invite States who share our aspiration for a world without nuclear weapons to sign, ratify or accede to the Treaty and support the TPNW resolutions to be tabled in this Committee. Share the awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and a firm conviction to prevent such consequences continues to guide our work to advance nuclear disarmament. The inherent risk, transboundary and global consequences of nuclear weapons make clear that all states' security is jeopardized. The complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons is an ethical and humanitarian imperative for global security and the survival of humanity. We remain gravely concerned that nine states still possess arsenals of thousands of nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear weapons being used again remains an inherent threat due to their very existence, which results in profound and legitimate security concerns for all states. We re-stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and it is inadmissible and contrary to international humanitarian law. We are increasingly seeing the application of emerging technologies, including autonomous and artificial intelligence, in the nuclear weapons context. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-armed States must maintain meaningful human control and oversight of the relevant decision-making processes over nuclear weapons. Chair, nuclear testing must not resume for any reason or under any pretext, and therefore we urge all States to uphold the global norm against nuclear testing. Chair, in conclusion, we, the States Parties and signatory States to the TPNW, stand united in our unwavering determination to confront escalating nuclear dangers. We will use the first review conference of the Treaty to strengthen implementation, deepen cooperation, and widen participation. I thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [53:33]:

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa speaking on behalf of the TPNW state parties and signatories. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Jamaica speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community, CARICOM.


Jamaica · CARICOM · Permanent Representative [53:52]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I do have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the 14 member states of the Caribbean Community. CARICOM reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the complete, irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. More than eight decades after the first use of these weapons, their continued existence remains one of the greatest threats to international peace, security and sustainable development. The Caribbean has a unique and lasting attachment to the cause of nuclear disarmament. Through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Our region forms part of the first populated nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. This achievement reflects our collective conviction that true security cannot be founded upon the threats of mass destruction, but rather upon international cooperation, dialogue and respect for international law. CARICOM remains deeply concerned by the heightened global tensions, the modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, the erosion of arms control architecture, and rhetoric that increases the risk of use of nuclear weapons. The continued allocation of significant resources to nuclear weapons programs diverts critical investments away from sustainable development, poverty eradication, climate resilience, and public health. We reaffirm the central role of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and the foundation for the pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We call upon all States Parties to fully implement their obligations under the Treaty, particularly those related to nuclear disarmament under Article VI. We regret that, despite our best efforts, consensus was yet again not reached for a third time at the recent NPT Review Conference. CARICOM further recognizes the important contributions of the TPNW toward advancing the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and strengthening the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament. We encourage efforts to reinforce the international norm against nuclear weapons and promote inclusive dialogue among all states. We welcome the convening of the first review conference to be held later this year under the able leadership of South Africa, and we take this opportunity to express our unequivocal support to the President-designate during this process. The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapon detonation would be catastrophic, transcending national borders and overwhelming the capacity of any state or international organization to respond effectively. Small island developing states, including those of the Caribbean, would be particularly vulnerable to the environmental, economic and social impacts of such an event. CARICOM supports practical and measurable steps towards nuclear disarmament, including reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, enhancing transparency and confidence-building measures, bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty, and strengthening negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women, youth and underrepresented groups, including persons with disabilities, in disarmament decision-making processes. Their contributions are essential to building a more inclusive, representative and sustainable disarmament architecture. CARICOM reiterates that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or the threat of their use. We strongly encourage member states to pursue dialogue and cooperation through established multilateral institutions, thereby advancing the long-standing aspiration for future generations to live in a world free of nuclear weapons. I thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [57:43]:

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the CARICOM. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya, speaking on behalf of Arab Group.


Libya · Arab Group [58:04]:

Mr. Chair, the Arab Group reaffirms its firm position on nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons as a top priority for international peace and security. We emphasize that the NPT is the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Renewing commitment to these principles is all the more important in light of the geopolitical tensions and setbacks in the disarmament regime in our world, the latest setback being the third failure to reach an outcome document for the NPT Review Conference. The Group rejects the continued adoption by the nuclear weapon states of military doctrines that permit the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, the development of nuclear arsenals, nuclear sharing arrangements and extended nuclear deterrence. These contradict the spirit and purposes of the NPT. In this context, the Group emphasizes that the full and complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner is the only guarantee that such weapons will not be used. It recognizes the positive nature of confidence-building measures and negative security assurances, but notes that they are not a substitute for the elimination of nuclear weapons through a binding legal agreement. The Group stresses the importance of enhancing the NPT's credibility through the implementation of the agreed upon commitments agreed at previous review conferences. This includes by achieving the treaty's universality with a balance in the implementation of its pillars, by refraining from focusing on non-proliferation at the expense of disarmament, and by enabling states parties to exercise their inalienable right to peaceful uses and with full respect for the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA. The Arab Group reaffirms the importance of the TPNW and its complementarity with the NPT. The Group reiterated support for efforts to promote the universality of multilateral international instruments on nuclear disarmament. It emphasizes the specific responsibility of nuclear weapons states in accordance with Action 10 of the 2010 Review Conference Plan of Action. with regards to the ratification of the CTBT, as well as in encouraging the states of Annex 2 to accede. Mr. Chair, we emphasize that the responsibility of making the Middle East free of nuclear weapons is a collective international responsibility. The Arab Group has committed to its part in it. What remains is for the other parties to commit. The Group expresses its concern about the continuing danger posed by the Israeli entity's continued refusal to join the NPT. and its refusal to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime. The Group condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear threats by the Israeli occupation government, the last of which was against Gaza and its unarmed people in November 2023. We affirm that the continued delay in the implementation of the international obligation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the basis for the treaty's indefinite extension represents a serious setback and impedes progress in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. The group therefore stresses the need to take immediate steps to achieve this goal, as called for in the annual Arab draft resolution entitled Risks of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East. The Group welcomes the convening of five sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. We look forward to the continuation of discussions in this regard. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [1:01:57]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of European Union, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states.


EU · EU [1:02:13]:

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement. Preserving the NPT and fully implementing all obligations under it and all related commitments of previous review conferences remain a fundamental priority for the EU. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and an important element in developing nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with the nuclear weapons use and emphasizes that all states share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening. We recall the principle from the joint statement that, quote, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," unquote. Universal and full adherence to the NPT is essential to strengthening the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime. The EU condemns in the strongest possible way Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric, and its threats to use nuclear force in its war of aggression against Ukraine, which are irresponsible, provocative, dangerous, and escalatory. This includes deep concern about Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear weapons states arising from Article VI, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, underlining the special responsibility of the states with the largest nuclear arsenals, we strongly encourage seeking further reductions to their arsenals. The EU notes the potential serious repercussions of the expiry of New START and calls for urgent work towards a new legally binding framework limiting the largest nuclear arsenals. Statements expressing concerns about possible nuclear testing, as well as Russia's unprecedented decision to revoke its ratification, make it all the more urgent to bring the CTBT into force. The EU calls on all states to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions. The EU also calls for negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the document CD/1299. The EU remains deeply concerned by China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is inconsistent with its commitments under the NPT and raises doubts about the credibility of its no first use policy. The EU recalls that it is essential that nuclear weapons states enhance transparency, build mutual confidence, and fully engage in relevant risk reduction measures. The EU reaffirms the importance of IAEA safeguards and calls for the universalization of CSA and AP. The EU remains strongly committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Iran must comply with all its legally binding obligations under the NPT, the relevant Security Council resolutions, and its CSA. We urge Iran to promptly facilitate the full and effective implementation of verification activities by the Agency and urgently address its concerns. The EU urges the DPRK to fully comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions and calls for its complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. The DPRK cannot and will not have the status of a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT or any other special status. The full version of this statement will be available online. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [1:06:00]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states. Distinguished delegates, in accordance with the programme of work, we will now have a briefing by Mr. Adedeji Iyobun. on the implementations of the resolutions 80/53 on the establishment of the group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verifications. And now I give the floor to Mr. Adedeji for this briefing.


ODA · Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs [1:06:44]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Excellency, Ambassador Tapper, Excellencies, and distinguished delegates, I am pleased to brief you today on the progress on the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 80/53, entitled "Establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification." Ladies and gentlemen, verification has long been an important component of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agenda. The establishment of this group is preceded by successive UN frameworks that have progressively built upon this area of work. And this include the group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament established pursuant to Resolution 71/67 of 2016, the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, including, inter alia, the concept of a group of scientific and technical experts established pursuant to Resolution 74/50 of 2019, and most recently, the report of the Secretary-General on the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification for 2025. Through resolution 80/53, the General Assembly decided to establish the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations and requested the Secretary-General to select 21 experts through a wide call for nominations from member states on the basis of their outstanding technical expertise and on as wide a geographical basis as possible and giving due regard to gender balance. To this end, ODA issued a call for nominations to all member states through a note verbal dated 29 June 2026. We received a total of 37 nominations from 25 member states. Only six of these nominations were for women candidates. Last week, the Office notified 21 Member States of the selection of their nominated candidates to the Group. The geographical breakdown of the Group is as follows: three experts from the Africa Group, five experts from the Asia-Pacific Group, two experts from the Eastern European Group, four experts from the Latin American and the Caribbean group, and seven experts from the Western European and others group. Despite the Office's efforts to ensure gender balance in the composition of the group, only six of the 21 experts selected are women, due to a low number of nominations of women candidates. The group has been tasked to take actions required to accomplish the following objectives. One, identify and consider technical challenges in and possible approaches to nuclear disarmament verification in terms of tools, techniques, processes, and procedures. Two, appraise knowledge on nuclear disarmament verification derived from past and ongoing initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification or related areas. Three, enable states to participate in technical discussions on nuclear disarmament verification on a voluntary basis. And four, incorporate and preserve knowledge on nuclear disarmament verification within the United Nations system. and provide assurances to the international community that States are focused on this matter. In accordance this with its mandate the group will hold four two-week sessions in Geneva and Vienna between January 27 and September 2029 the first session will take place from 18 to 29 January 2027 at the pal de n in Geneva Switzerland The second session will take place in October or November in 2027 at the Vienna International Center in Vienna, Austria. The third and fourth sessions will take place in Geneva in 2028 and in Vienna in 2029 on dates to be determined. The group will present its report to the 84th session of the General Assembly, with a view to making a possible decision on the extension of the activities of the Group. The Secretary-General has also been requested to bring the report of the Group to the attention of all Member States, as well as to the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and other relevant organizations. The Office for Disarmament Affairs will continue to support the implementation of this present resolution, together with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, which has been invited to provide technical assistance to the group. Thank you very much for your attention.


1st Committee · Chair [1:13:27]:

I thank the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ibo, for his briefing. Now I give the floor to Distinguished Ambassador for Arms Control of Finland.


Finland · Ambassador for Arms Control [1:13:46]:

Mr. Chair, in addition to the statement delivered by the European Union, Finland wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity. The international security environment remains deeply challenging. The global arms control architecture has weakened, increasing uncertainty. Finland is firmly committed to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Times of growing tensions do not diminish the importance of nuclear disarmament. Quite the contrary. Current times call for more dialogue, more confidence building measures and more actions to reduce nuclear risks. The greatest obstacle to ease tensions is Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia's actions have undermined international security and weakened the foundations for arms control. Finland calls on Russia to stop its aggression, withdraw its forces from Ukraine, and respect Ukraine's full sovereignty. Mr. Chair, Finland remains deeply concerned by Russia's development of new nuclear capabilities, especially tactical nuclear weapons systems. We are very concerned by the nuclear weapons programs of the UN-sanctioned Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the military cooperation with Russia. We call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and fully comply with its safeguards obligations. Finland is concerned by China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal. More dialogue and transparency would strengthen confidence and stability. Finland supports arms control discussions between the United States, Russia and China with the aim for limiting the world's largest nuclear arsenals. Mr. Chair, The 2026 NPT Review Conference showed the importance of the treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Although consensus on the final document failed, the conference reaffirmed the clear and unwavering support of states parties for the NPT. Finland welcomes the attention given to nuclear risk reduction during the negotiations, including among the P5. In today's security environment, risk reduction measures are essential for building up confidence. Looking ahead, Finland remains committed to the full implementation of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT. We also stress the contribution of nuclear technologies to sustainable development, energy security and climate, keeping in mind that they must meet the highest standards of safety and security. Finland stands ready to work constructively with all partners to strengthen the NPT. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [1:16:29]:

I thank the distinguished Ambassador for Arms Control of Finland. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium.


Belgium [1:16:39]:

Mr. Chair, Belgium aligns itself with the EU statement. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has curbed proliferation, enabled peaceful use, and inspired disarmament steps. It is not immune to growing international tension, as we witnessed earlier this year. The repeated failure to adopt an outcome document is regrettable, but it should strengthen our resolve to preserve the treaty's achievements and address the challenges that threaten its effectiveness. The DPRK's nuclear program remains illegal, and the DPRK cannot claim a status under the NPT that it was never granted. Iran's actions contradict its professed commitment to an exclusively peaceful nuclear program. Iran stands alone in its belief that implementation of its safeguard is an optional and adaptable to its wishes. Chair, with the expiration of New START, the parties involved need to negotiate a new agreement while maintaining the current limits in order to avoid an arms race. The US and Russia retain the largest nuclear arsenals, but the rapid and opaque expansion of China's nuclear forces also warrants serious attention. At a minimum, China should engage in arms control deliberations and demonstrate more transparency regarding its nuclear doctrine and capabilities. We also encourage the P5 to continue the pursuit of a strategic stability and arms control dialogue, as stated during the NPT Review Conference. At a time of heightened uncertainty, we must move forward in areas where success is within reach, including the promise of a world free of nuclear testing, as embodied by the CTBT. Nuclear weapons states should recommit to a policy of zero yield testing and solidify this undertaking by agreeing confidence building measures, such as mutual test site visits. Pending the CTBT's entry into force, states can take additional steps, such as closing and dismantling test sites, or maintaining and upgrading the verification system. Chair, the consequences of nuclear weapons use are far reaching. Preventing both the intentional and unintentional use of nuclear weapons must therefore remain a priority. Deterrence is part of preventing nuclear use. Belgium fully supports NATO's stance on the need for nuclear deterrence as long as adversaries possess nuclear weapons, and certainly when they threaten to use them against us. Forward-deployed nuclear weapons are part of this deterrence. This arrangement predates the NPT, was fully taken into account during the negotiations, and is thus fully consistent with its provisions.

I thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [1:19:33]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Italy.


Italy · Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament [1:19:48]:

Thank you, Chair. Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, and I would like to add a few remarks in my national capacity. Preserving and strengthening the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture is more important now than ever. We regret that the 11th Review Conference of the NPT did not lead to a consensual outcome. Yet, it should not obscure the enduring value of the treaty. We must preserve its integrity for the future. Our ultimate goal remains a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. And Italy believes that this goal must be pursued through concrete, progressive, effective, verifiable, and irreversible measures. In this context, preserving channels of communication, increasing transparency, and rebuilding confidence among nuclear-armed states are essential. As long as nuclear weapons continue to exist, Italy considers that their fundamental purpose should remain deterrence and prevention of coercion. We strongly condemn The Russian Federation is irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and strategic intimidation. The entry into force of the CTBT remains also an essential priority. Italy attaches equal priority to the immediate commencement of negotiation in a conference of disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Italy also follows Iran nuclear program with utmost concern and Iran must never acquire nuclear weapon, must fully comply with its legally binding obligations. In addition, we remain committed to the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons. We remain equally concerned by the DPRK continued development of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs and call on it to comply fully with all relevant Security Council resolutions. Chair, nuclear disarmament is now more difficult, but also more urgent. And Italy will continue to work towards a world free of nuclear weapon.

Thank you, Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [1:22:31]:

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Italy. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Republic of Korea.


Republic of Korea [1:22:45]:

Thank you, Chair. Chair, amid the ever-shifting global geopolitical environment, international concern is mounting over a growing vacuum in nuclear arms control and the weakening of the international legal framework for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The Republic of Korea shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. However, in the current security environment, where strategic unpredictability continues to grow, we must take a realistic and pragmatic approach. We need to return to the fundamentals and build upon our existing treaties and commitments. Chair, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture, and the ROK reaffirms its unwavering commitment to its obligations under the treaty. Although we regret that this year's review conference failed to reach an agreement on a final document, it is also true that we saw some progress in a few areas. In particular, the ROK welcomes the fact that the nuclear weapons states were able to agree on language recognizing the importance of substantive engagement and constructive dialogue. The ROK firmly believes that all nuclear weapons states should engage in regular, in-depth, and structured dialogue on strategic stability and arms control. We also welcome the Nuclear Weapons States Agreement on various voluntary measures to prevent miscalculation, misperception and miscommunication. Building on this positive momentum, the P5 should agree on concrete and substantive nuclear risk reduction measures, including effective crisis communication channels, prelaunch notifications and enhanced military to military engagement. Chair, we call for transparent and responsible behavior from nuclear weapons states in line with their special responsibilities stipulated in the NPT. In this regard, Russia's continued irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, as well as the opaque expansion of nuclear arsenals by a certain nuclear weapons state, remains deeply concerning. The AROK also underscores the need for nuclear weapons states to ratify the CTBT and to uphold moratorium on all nuclear test explosions. We also emphasize the importance of commencing the long overdue negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty and of strengthening negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states in compliance with the NPT. Chair, one of key issues at this year's NPT review conference was compliance, given its direct bearing on the integrity and credibility of the NPT and relevant international legal framework. In this context, the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs remain among the most serious cases of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations and pose a great threat to international peace and security. The ROK remains committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and reaffirms that the DPRK cannot have the status of nuclear weapons state under the NPT. At the same time, as President Lee Jae-myung of the Republic of Korea emphasized in his recent address to the UN General Assembly, we'll continue to work toward peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula through close cooperation with the international community. We call on the DPRK to respond to our sincere efforts to engage constructively in dialogue.


1st Committee · Chair [1:25:48]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Republic of Korea. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland.


Poland [1:25:58]:

Chair, Poland aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the European Union and would like to add some national remarks. We address the first committee again amid growing nuclear risks, eroding trust, and intensified geopolitical tensions. Against these troubling developments, we have a collective duty to uphold the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and reaffirm its principles. For Poland, the NPT remains the cornerstone of this regime. While we regret that the 2026 Review Conference lacked consensus, the differences that prevented it should only strengthen our commitment to dialogue, rebuild trust, and drive collective action. As a matter of priority, we must confront the grave implications of Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Again, not a special operation, a brutal and illegal war. Since the first committee session last year, the situation has further deteriorated. Russia has intensified its hostile activities across Europe below the threshold of armed conflict, also by continuing to use nuclear weapons threats as an instrument of coercion and intimidation.

This must stop.

Chair.

Poland condemns Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus, as well as nuclearization of Kaliningrad Oblast. The increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons and any lowering of the threshold for the potential use

runs counter to international efforts aimed at reducing nuclear risks and strengthening strategic stability.

Chair, in this deteriorating security environment, NATO nuclear sharing arrangements remain an essential pillar of Poland's security. We deem these arrangements a necessary shield against potential aggression, being fully compliant with the NPT. Poland is increasingly alarmed by the expansion of nuclear arsenals by certain nuclear weapons states.

We call for greater

transparency regarding arsenals, doctrines, and modernization efforts, and transparency is indispensable for building trust and enabling further progress in disarmament. The expiration of New START earlier this year increases the risk of miscalculation and prompts an arms race. It is vital that the possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals engage in strategic dialogue to restore stability, uphold the NPT, and ensure future treaties account for all nuclear weapons, including non-strategic warheads.

Poland stands ready to support these efforts.

Chair, other proliferation challenges have only become more apparent. Ensuring that all states remain in compliance with the NPT remains critical to upholding the entire regime. Given deeply concerning developments in the Middle East, the risk of further proliferation is rising globally, and the DPRK's continued nuclear development outside the NPT framework and IAEA safeguards consistently compound these risks. Chair, as long as nuclear weapons remain part of our security environment, deterrence, risk reduction, and our commitment to disarmament must go hand in hand. Poland is fully committed to pursue efforts in this regard.

Thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [1:28:57]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Poland. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia, speaking on behalf of the African group.


Namibia · Africa Group · Permanent Representative [1:29:11]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the African Group. The group aligns itself with the Non-Aligned Movement statement, and the group's full statement will be shared via a statement. The African Group reiterates that nuclear weapons constitute an existential threat to humanity, and that their total elimination remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. We remain deeply concerned by the continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, nuclear threats, and the persistent reliance on nuclear deterrence in military doctrines. We stress that nuclear risk reduction measures cannot substitute for nuclear disarmament or underscore the imperative of maintaining full and effective human control over nuclear weapons, particularly in the context of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. Mr. Chair, the group expresses profound disappointment over the failure of the three consecutive NPT review conferences to achieve consensus outcomes. We urge nuclear weapons states to demonstrate renewed political will and fulfill their disarmament obligations under Article 6 of the NPT. The African group reaffirms the importance of nuclear weapon-free zones in advancing regional and international peace and security. We remain firmly committed to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which establishes Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and encourage the establishment of similar arrangements in other regions. In this regard, we reiterate our concern over the continued non-implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East. We welcome the progress achieved through the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/546, and call upon all concerned parties to engage constructively in the seventh session, scheduled for November 2026, under the presidency of Oman. Mr. Chair, the Group welcomes the historic entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW, and looks forward to its first review conference scheduled for 30th November to 4th December 2026 under the presidency of South Africa. We urge all States, particularly nuclear weapons States, to join the Treaty and advance its universalization. Mr. Chair, the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons demand urgent collective preventive action. The African Group therefore calls for concrete, transparent and irreversible steps towards their total elimination. We remain convinced that the world free of nuclear weapons is essential to achieving lasting international peace and security. The full statement, as indicated, will be submitted via e-statement. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [1:32:19]:

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia speaking on behalf of the African Group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.


Egypt [1:32:36]:

Mr. Chairperson, Egypt wishes to highlight the following remarks. First, the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons and their possession by a few states is undisputable. There is no logic more compelling than the total, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons as the only guarantee against their proliferation, use, or threat of use, not deterrence, no reduction of strategic risks. Second, Egypt remains concerned with the lack of progress in implementing obligations, primarily Article VI of the NPT, as well as the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear arsenals and the risks of integrating artificial intelligence into any aspects of the life cycle of nuclear weapons.

After a third consecutive

failure of the NPT, serious discussions need to take place on how to preserve the credibility and the sustainability of our disarmament machinery, particularly between nuclear weapons states. Third, confidence building and risk reduction measures, such as no first use and negative security assurances, contribute positively, however, They are not a substitute to nuclear disarmament. Egypt supports tangible accountability and transparency measures by nuclear weapons states through reporting on the implementation of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and Main Committee I of the Review Conference. Fourth, the lack of implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which allowed the indefinite extension of the NPT, is a major setback to the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. We call upon the three co-sponsors of the resolution to undertake the responsibilities towards implementation through supporting concrete and tangible measures. In this regard, we believe that the relevant annual United Nations conference is an inclusive process to negotiate a legally binding instrument. At its previous six sessions, it witnessed incremental procedural and substantive progress. We hope that all the invited members and observers participate in the upcoming seventh meeting. Finally, we call the full membership to support both Egypt's resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the annual Arab Group resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. I thank you, Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [1:35:03]:

I thank the representative of Egypt. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Angola.


Angola · Permanent Representative [1:35:13]:

Mr. Chair. Angola aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group, and wishes to add the following remark in its national capacity. Angola reaffirms that the total, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. We call on nuclear-weapon States to translate their commitments into concrete, measurable action. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains central to international security. Angola will use balanced implementation of three pillars, particular Article VI disarmament obligations. As a signatory of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons since September 2018, Angola recognizes its contribution to strengthening international norms against nuclear weapons. As a party to the Treaty of Pelindaba, Angola supports African nuclear weapon-free status and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. We use legally binding security assurance for non-nuclear weapon states. Having ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 2015, Angola calls on remaining annexed states to sign or ratify it as appropriate without delay. Mr. Chair. Accountable disarmament requires effective verification. Angola supports implementation of General Assembly Resolution 80/53 on nuclear disarmament verification and calls for greater attention to the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Angola's elections to the IAEA Board of Governors for 2026-2028 Reinforce our commitment to safeguards, nuclear and radiation safety, technical cooperation, and national regulatory capacity. Equitable access to peaceful nuclear application in health, agriculture, and water management must advance 2030 agenda, the African Union Agenda 2063, consistent with international obligation. Angola stands ready to advance practical nuclear disarmament while hastening nuclear science for peace and sustainable development. I thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [1:37:43]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Angola. I now call on the distinguished delegate for Costa Rica. You have the floor.


Costa Rica [1:37:57]:

Senior President.

Mr. Chairman. The 11th NPT Review Conference concluded once again without consensus. For Costa Rica, this outcome demonstrates the widening gap between the disarmament commitments undertaken by states and the nuclear policies that they actually implement. Costa Rica wishes to offer three reflections. First, we cannot continue to allow commitments to progress on paper while in practice arsenals expand and undergo modernization. According to ICAN, in 2025, the nine nuclear-armed states allocated $119 billion to their arsenals, a 19% increase in just one year. We are passing the burden of nuclear risk onto future generations. Secondly, We live in dangerous times characterized by a weakening arms control architecture, an increasing role for nuclear weapons and security doctrines, and persistent rhetoric that normalizes the threat of their use. Emerging technologies introduce new vulnerabilities. Costa Rica considers it essential to maintain effective human control over any decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Costa Rica encourages nuclear-armed states to increase transparency regarding their arsenals, doctrines, and modernization programs, and to reduce the role these weapons play in their security policies. However, risk reduction must be a step towards disarmament, not a substitute for it. Thirdly, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons represents the clearest legal response to the gap that we have highlighted. It demonstrates that the international community has already charted a path towards elimination through concrete prohibitions and obligations. The TPNW does not compete with the NPT. Rather, it contributes to the implementation of its disarmament objectives. Costa Rica calls upon states that have not yet done so to accede to the TPNW and support its universalization. Chairman, We cannot enter the 22nd century with weapons designed in the 20th century, modernized in the 21st, and justified by doctrines that we have long pledged to move beyond. Nuclear risk management is necessary, but the only sustainable solution continues to be the total, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. Thank you very much.


1st Committee · Chair [1:40:34]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Kosovo. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada. You have the floor.


Canada [1:40:45]:

Thank you very much, Chair. Every year, this committee calls for urgent action across the nuclear agenda. These calls matter. Yet without implementation, repetition becomes ritual, not progress. Recent developments have exposed that gap. Even as many states work to reduce nuclear dangers, some arsenals are growing, rhetoric is escalating, transparency is narrowing, and the disarmament architecture is weakening. These trends raise strategic concerns and test our collective capacity to respond. The recent NPT review conference showed why. In negotiations, consensus requires compromise. But compromise should narrow differences, not just text. Instead, substantive measures were removed while positions remained unchanged. Ultimately, the power to block consensus outweighed the will to build it. Let us be clear. The conference ended without agreement, not without a mandate to do less. Its draft cannot become the baseline for the next cycle. Canada remains committed to supporting practical, reciprocal, and verifiable steps towards nuclear disarmament. But if every state waits for another to move, no one moves. We propose that states turn conditions into propositions, what they are prepared to do, what they require in return, and what would allow action to begin. Reciprocity should break deadlock, not preserve it.

Chairman, the CTBT offers an opportunity to apply this approach. Canada proposes action in three areas. First, relevant Annex 2 states can pursue voluntary transparency measures. Scientific exchanges and sharing relevant national data can reduce misunderstanding and reinforce confidence in testing moratoria. Second, states can explore coordinated pathways towards entry into force. Where security concerns are linked, mutually reinforcing ratification steps could address fears of strategic disadvantage and open the way forward. Third, we must invest in every component of the CTBT's verification regime to ensure that it remains fit for purpose. All signatories must pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. Together, these propositions can turn conditions into action, preserve long-standing commitments, and reduce nuclear dangers. Thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [1:43:32]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Canada. I now call on the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Germany. You have the floor.


Germany · Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament [1:43:46]:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Germany fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. Nuclear non-proliferation, after all, is a success story and has many aspects. First and foremost, the NPT remains the central reference point on matters of nuclear order for almost all UN member states. For more than half a century, the NPT has been providing significant security gains for its states parties and has successfully curbed the emergence of new nuclear weapons states. Second, there's the IAEA, which has given millions of people around the globe access to a vast range of nuclear applications while assuring the safe, secure, and peaceful use of these technologies. Only stringent verification can create and preserve the trust in the NPT's nonproliferation norm, and it is the basis for any exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful uses. Finally, an often overlooked aspect of the nonproliferation success story lies in extended nuclear deterrence that has always been at the heart of nonproliferation. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have effectively reduced the incentive for non-nuclear Allies to seek their own nuclear weapons in response to the threats they faced and still face. 1950s Germany is a particular point in case. Colleagues, Today's security environment remains extremely challenging. By launching its war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has dismantled the European security architecture, violating both the Budapest Memorandum and fundamental international law. In pursuit of its imperialist goals in Ukraine, Moscow has employed reckless nuclear threats, derailed arms control treaties, and even undermined the NPT and UNSC resolutions by partnering with North Korea to fuel its attacks on Ukrainian civilians. China's massive nuclear buildup without any transparency has further added uncertainty to the international security landscape and is a serious stumbling block for further progress on nuclear disarmament. In addition, serious proliferation challenges remain, first and foremost with the ongoing proliferation crises in Iran and the DPRK. We are also concerned that some nuclear weapons states may have carried out nuclear tests below the IMS detection threshold. The moratorium on nuclear testing must be maintained and the CTBT strengthened. Colleagues, under these dire circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect bold disarmament steps. This does not mean that we need to remain idle. Germany will continue to work on practical measures to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict, increasing transparency and laying the foundations for nuclear disarmament verification. We work on ensuring that the NPT remains capable of responding to the risks created by artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities and space technology.


1st Committee · Chair [1:46:52]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Germany. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria. You have the floor.


Austria [1:47:04]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Austria aligns with the statements by the EU and its member states and the statement by the TPNW state parties. At this year's NPT Review Conference, the Secretary-General warned of an unacceptable state of collective amnesia about nuclear weapons.

The warning lights are glaring.

Arsenals growing in number and sophistication, trust among nuclear weapon states at Cold War lows, creeping.

Proliferation, and an eroding nuclear taboo with unacceptable nuclear threats, escalatory rhetoric, and talk of resuming nuclear testing.

Some countries maintain that nuclear weapons guarantee security or even conclude that more nuclear weapons make them safer. Austria firmly rejects this. A security paradigm underpinned by reliance on nuclear weapons is not sustainable.

It is based on inherent, even existential.

Risks of nuclear weapons that are created by a few, while the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use.

Will be borne by all. Science leaves no doubt about this.

Every new study, from climate modeling to health and food security, confirms that any nuclear use would trigger cascading global.

Harm. Policy must follow the evidence.

Austria has argued this consistently for years, and thus we strongly support the.

UN independent scientific panels on the effects of nuclear war.

Chair, our answer must be a collective recommitment to nuclear disarmament with actions in three areas. First, we must defend the nuclear disarmament treaties that hold the line. The NPT with its obligations that bind all without exception on non-proliferation and.

The obligations especially to nuclear weapons states on disarmament. The CTBT and the need to urgently uphold the testing taboo and a strong modern IMS. And third, the TPNW with its upcoming first review conference and.

Legitimate security concerns, which is an offer of engagement to those not yet on board.

We invite your support for the two resolutions on the TPNW and humanitarian consequences. Second, we must rebuild trust, reduce risks now, and not wait for a better geopolitical climate. New START limits must be respected.

And a successor agreement negotiated without delay and with the engagement of all nuclear weapons states. And transparency matters. The H Code of Conduct plays a central role here, and we invite your support for the resolution tabled again this year.

Third, we must close pathways to catastrophe.

Nuclear command, control, and communications must never be delegated to algorithms. As artificial intelligence advances, meaningful human control must be preserved. Chair, 80 years ago, this Assembly set the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Five years ago, their prohibition became an international norm. Nuclear weapons are not a law of nature. They are a political choice, and what was chosen can be undone. Austria stands ready. Thank you so much.


1st Committee · Chair [1:49:56]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Austria. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway. You have the floor.


Norway [1:50:07]:

Thank you. Thank you, Chair. Wars, conflicts, and rising political tensions are increasing nuclear risks. High levels of tension demand urgent attention to risk reduction. Threats of nuclear use are intolerable. The DPRK's continued buildup of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities are unacceptable. We call on the DPRK to comply with its international obligation and engage in a dialogue for denuclearization. We also remain deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear program and call on Iran to grant the IAEA access to all nuclear facilities necessary for effective inspection and verification. Russia's repeated nuclear threat and development of new nuclear weapon systems increases arms racing, proliferation pressures, and undermines strategic stability. Chair, We urge China to show greater transparency. The rapid and opaque increase in nuclear arsenal is of profound concern. An acknowledgement that there are numerical increases would be a meaningful step towards building greater confidence. We call on Russia and China to accept the invitation by the U.S. to engage in strategic stability dialogue, which can help prevent miscalculation and escalation. Risk reduction is not instead of disarmament. It helps ensure there is a future in which to disarm. Chair, an effective ban on nuclear tests is vital. The CTBT plays a crucial role. Until it enters into force, all states must uphold the moratoria. Further strengthening capabilities to detect and verify low yield nuclear explosions could reinforce the treaty's verification regime. Negotiations on FMCT should begin without further delay. building confidence, supporting non-proliferation and eventually disarmament. Existing stocks should be included. Meanwhile, all nuclear-armed states should declare moratorium on such production. The IAEA is indispensable to the implementation of the NPT. Its verification and safeguard activities help ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, simultaneously underpinning non-proliferation and international cooperation on peaceful uses. Chair, we call on all Member States to support the three interrelated principles of nuclear transparency, verification and irreversibility. Advancing them builds confidence today and supports future negotiation. This work does not replace disarmament, it enables it by laying practical foundations for the steps ahead. Finally, I want to thank the UN ODA for their briefing and for their thorough efforts in implementing the resolution establishing group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification and repeat our appreciation for the.


1st Committee · Chair [1:53:10]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Azerbaijan. You have the floor.


Azerbaijan [1:53:20]:

Thank you, Chair. Upholding and fully implementing the NPT and all its related commitments and obligations is a key priority. The NPT is a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, an important element in development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. Regretfully, the three consecutive NPT review conferences failed to reach a consensus on a substantive outcome. However, this should not diminish the commitment to the Treaty, but rather strengthen the determination to preserve its integrity and advance the full implementation of its three mutually reinforcing pillars. Mr. Chair, as we explore the expanded use of nuclear energy, Azerbaijan strongly believes that our efforts must be redoubled to address nuclear safety and security. Azerbaijan highly values the IAEA's leading role in strengthening global nuclear safety and security, promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, and supporting member states in addressing their national development priorities and advancing their strategies. In this regard, Azerbaijan places great importance on its cooperation with the IAEA. ensuring that the country fully benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear energy, especially in nuclear and radiation safety and security regulatory infrastructure, nuclear research and technologies, food security, sustainable agriculture, health, environment, and water resources management. Having concluded a revised supplementary agreement concerning the provision of technical assistance, Azerbaijan actively participates in the Agency's technical cooperation programme, this portfolio of 32 completed and 11 ongoing projects. This year, the CTBtu marks its 30th anniversary, however it has yet to enter into force. The CTBT has reinforced the norm against nuclear testing and provides for a verification regime, including a global monitoring system designed to detect nuclear explosions. Pending its entry into force, the States should maintain existing moratoria on nuclear weapon explosions and uphold the integrity of the verification regime. To conclude, Mr. Chair, as the PGA recently states, We must uphold and strengthen the multilateral architecture that has helped to restrain nuclear dangers for decades. That call is especially pertinent today. The international community must rebuild trust and renew its commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament. Thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [1:55:54]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Azerbaijan. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Togo. You have the floor.


Togo [1:56:07]:

Mr. Chair, the delegation of Togo aligns with the statements delivered by the distinguished representatives of Nigeria and Indonesia, respectively, on behalf of the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. We are addressing this agenda item faced with a striking paradox. nuclear arsenals are growing stronger, to the point where they occupy a central place in current geopolitical tensions. All the while, arms control mechanisms are weakening. The failures that we saw once again this year during the UNDC session and the 11th NPT Review Conference seem to point to the existence of a culture of disagreement that is insidiously taking hold within our committee on the subject of such an important issue as nuclear weapons. In such a context, are we not within our rights to wonder whether the First Committee will be able to keep its promises this year on just such a matter? The clock is ticking, and one more day with nuclear weapons is one day too many, because the possibility of a catastrophe is not merely an abstract concept, given the high level of international rivalries and the growing importance attached to these weapons in the security doctrines of some powers. For Togo. No strategic imperative can justify the perpetuation of an existential threat for humanity. For that reason, my delegation reiterates its commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or the threat of their use. Like several states and regions, Africa made the determined choice to be a continent free of nuclear weapons through the Treaty of Pelindaba. This commitment shows our conviction that collective security must be based on international law, cooperation, and conflict prevention, rather than on the threat of mutual destruction. It is in this spirit that Togo has continued to work to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in support for its development efforts. In recent years, my country has worked to strengthen its legal and regulatory framework relating to the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. in addition to the adoption of the law number 2020-006 of the 10th of June, 2020, on the safe use.


1st Committee · Chair [1:59:23]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Togo. I now call on the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka. You have the floor.


Sri Lanka [1:59:33]:

Mr. Chair, Sri Lanka Alliance itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

And wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. Across this organization, we invest enormous collective effort in building a better world.

We advance the SDGs, including by working to lift populations out of poverty, safeguarding the environment, and protecting the.

Rights of every person. Nuclear weapons place all of it at risk. A single mistake could undo in minutes what humanity has spent decades building.

There would be no development agenda left to pursue.

Mr. Chair, we remain concerned by the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals. Non-nuclear weapons states have upheld their obligations, yet progress on disarmament by the nuclear weapons states has been repeatedly deferred. good faith dialogue among the nuclear-weapon States remains essential to rebuilding confidence and making meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. Sri Lanka is deeply concerned that the eleventh Review Conference of the NPT closed without agreement.

On a substantive outcome for the third consecutive time. There is an urgent need for renewed political will.

Mr. Chair.

Sri Lanka reaffirms that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.

We repeat the call for a universal.

Unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

We call on all nuclear weapon states and states relying on extended nuclear deterrence, refrain from actions that would.

Prolong the nuclear arms race or undermine the goal of elimination?

The expansion of nuclear sharing arrangements and the increasing role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines run counter to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chair, Sri Lanka's commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is principled and longstanding. We are a State Party to the NPT, CTBT and TPNW.

Sri Lanka reiterates its support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and upholds the right of all States to pursue such uses without discrimination.

Consistent with IAEA safeguards.

Mr. Chair, We spent years building the foundations of a safer and more prosperous world. Nuclear disarmament is ultimately about protecting that work from a danger that could undo it all.

To ensure that the world we spent generations improving is not being held hostage to weapons that can destroy it in minutes. The responsibility belongs to all of us, and it demands urgency.

I thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [2:02:28]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bangladesh. You have the floor.


Bangladesh [2:02:38]:

Thank you, Chair. Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of NAM. Let me share our national position. Nuclear disarmament-related talks are ongoing in this premise for decades after decades, yet today the nuclear danger is not receding. The status quo entails the continuous modernization of nuclear arsenals. Nuclear rhetoric is also becoming more frequent. Thus, our efforts and the existing mechanisms to rein these weapons appear to be not strong enough. Mr. Chair. Bangladesh doesn't believe that nuclear weapons can guarantee lasting security. Our commitment to nuclear disarmament is therefore not symbolic. As enshrined in our constitution, it remains an integral part of our foreign policy. NPT being the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, we must acknowledge the recent hurdles surrounding the treaty during its 11th review conference. However, the credibility of the NPT depends on implementation of all its pillars. In particular, nuclear weapon states must demonstrate concrete progress towards their Article VI obligations. Mr. Chair, for developing countries, peaceful nuclear technology can support energy security, health care, agriculture, and sustainable development. Bangladesh, therefore, attaches great importance to the full and non-discriminatory implementation of Article IV of the NPT. In the pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy, we recognize the central role of the IAEA in promoting safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear applications. Bangladesh continues to cooperate with the IAEA in this regard, as we recently signed the Country Program Framework, CPF, with IAEA for the period of 2026 to 2032. Mr. Chair, Bangladesh believes that TPNW strengthens the global norm against nuclear weapons and complements the NPT. Therefore, we look forward to the first review conference of the TPNW. We also call upon the remaining annexed states to sign and ratify the CTBT without further delay. There's a rhetoric that a nuclear war must never be fought, but this remains a fable when there is any existence of nuclear weapons. The world urgently needs fewer nuclear risks and ultimately no nuclear weapons at all. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [2:05:09]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Bangladesh. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Guatemala. You have the floor.


Guatemala [2:05:19]:

Thank you, Chair. The existence of nuclear weapons continues to represent one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. Guatemala notes with concern that expected progress on nuclear disarmament continues to be insufficient. The persistence and modernization of nuclear arsenals, as well as the vast resources used to maintain them, contrast with the objective of advancing towards a world free of nuclear weapons. There is still concern over the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences that any use of these weapons would have, be it intentional, accidental or through miscalculation. These consequences transcend borders and generations, affecting all of humanity. The only absolute guarantee against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons continues to be their total, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination. Therefore, it is concerning that the 11th NPT Review Conference did not manage to achieve a substantive outcome by consensus. This demonstrates the need to revitalize multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. The experience of Latin America and the Caribbean shows that cooperation and collective commitment can make an effective contribution to concrete confidence-building goals and strengthening regional security. At the same time, Guatemala reaffirms the importance of the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the applicable international obligations. Technical cooperation advanced by the International Atomic Energy Agency has helped strengthen national capabilities in areas such as health, food security, agriculture, and disease control, generating tangible benefits for the population. We welcome the work of the CTBTO, and we welcome their contribution to the international monitoring network as part of international efforts aimed at strengthening verification mechanisms and mechanisms the detection of nuclear tests. Chair, the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and advancing towards a world free of nuclear weapons are not opposing objectives. On the contrary, they are complementary pillars of an international regime that is based on cooperation, collective security, and sustainable development. Thank you very much.


1st Committee · Chair [2:08:02]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Guatemala. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nepal. You have the floor.


Nepal [2:08:13]:

Thank you, Chair. Nepal Alliance itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the non-aligned movement. The international security landscape is marked by deepening strategic rivalries, declining mutual confidence, and increasing reliance on nuclear deterrence. The modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, coupled with confrontational rhetoric, heightens the risk of nuclear confrontation and undermines global security. Chair, Nepal regrets that the 11th NPT Review Conference failed to achieve a substantive outcome for the third consecutive time. Yet our divergences must not weaken our resolve to advance nuclear disarmament. Nepal calls for a renewed political commitment to the full, balanced and effective implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. Nuclear weapon states must fulfill their Article VI obligations through concrete, verifiable, irreversible and time-bound disarmament measures. The expiration of New START in February this year without a successor framework underscores the urgency of restoring effective arms control arrangements. Nuclear risk reduction measures must complement, never replace, nuclear disarmament. Nepal considers the NPT, CTBT, and TPNW as mutually reinforcing instruments. We look forward to tangible outcome from the first review conference of the TPNW later this year. We reiterate our call for early entry into force of CTBT. We welcome the comprehensive study by the qualified group of experts on nuclear-weapon-free zones as a basis for strengthening regional disarmament efforts. Nepal supports establishing such zones across all regions, including in the Middle East, and calls for legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. We also support early negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the Conference on Disarmament. Chair, the potential integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command and decision-making raises profound concerns for strategic stability. Meaningful human control, judgment, and accountability must remain indispensable. Nepal reaffirms the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology under Article IV of the NPT and recognize the IAEA's vital role in verification and safeguards. We further support assistance and environmental remediation efforts to survivors of nuclear weapons production, testing, and use. In conclusion, nuclear disarmament must be measured not by commitments repeated, but by weapons eliminated. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons demand urgent action. Nepal calls for renewed political will, sustained dialogue, and collective action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons for a sustainable future of our people and the planet. I thank you.


1st Committee · Chair [2:10:56]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Nepal. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina. You have the floor.


Argentina [2:11:08]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Argentina would like to begin by expressing its sincere concern over the deteriorating international security and nuclear disarmament context. One example of the present situation is that a scientific independent panel had to be convened to study the effects of a nuclear war, which is something that an Argentine expert participates in. We are concerned by the risk of a nuclear conflict, the modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, the rising tone of nuclear rhetoric, and the impact of emerging technologies. Artificial intelligence in command and control systems increases the risks of miscalculation and erodes the multilateral architecture. We urge nuclear weapons states to begin a dialogue on this subject. We reiterate our historic commitment of more than 70 years to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, fully in accordance with the NPT, the cornerstone of the regime, and the safeguards of the IAEA and ABAQ. We highlight the contribution to non-proliferation from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which this year is chaired by Argentina. We look forward to working together at the next plenary meeting. We reaffirm the value of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which this year is marking its 60th anniversary, and we call for the withdrawal of interpretive declarations to Protocols I and II. We express our concern over the military nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. and over the situation of the Iranian military program. And we reiterate the appeal for full compliance with NPT obligations and full cooperation with the IAEA. We firmly support the entry into force of the treaty on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the launch of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, as well as on negative security assurances. Mr. Chair, following three NPT review conferences without substantive outcomes, it's important to redouble efforts towards the 12th review conference. Nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures, without being a replacement for disarmament, help create the necessary conditions to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons. And to that end, Argentina stands ready to work constructively with the member states. Thank you very much.


1st Committee · Chair [2:13:52]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China. You have the floor.


China [2:14:04]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The current international nuclear arms control landscape is complex and grave. Cold War mentality, double standards, and unilateralism constitute the greatest obstacles to global governance in the nuclear field. The international community should uphold a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security and work together to address risks and challenges in the nuclear domain. In this regard, China wishes to propose the following: First, curb the dangerous tendency towards seeking to win a nuclear war. and effectively reduce nuclear risks. Nuclear weapons must never be used. Nuclear wars must never be fought. Relevant nuclear weapons states should abandon nuclear deterrence policies premised on the notion of winning a nuclear war and on the first use of nuclear weapons. They should commence negotiations without delay on a treaty on mutual no first use of nuclear weapons and an international legal instrument on negative security assurances. Second, uphold the existing arms control treaty regime and advance global governance in the nuclear domain, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. Its three pillars should be advanced in a comprehensive and balanced manner. The international consensus on the prohibition of nuclear testing based on the CTBT must not be challenged. The misguided practice of deliberately smearing other countries to justify the resumption of nuclear testing is not popular. China firmly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East. that fastly uphold the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and consolidate the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. All nuclear weapons states should openly commit to not seeking to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely, adhere to the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all, and advance nuclear disarmament in step-by-step manner. Countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly fulfill their special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and make further substantial and substantive reductions to their nuclear stockpiles. The NATO's nuclear sharing and extended deterrence seriously hinder international efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Fourth, support international nuclear energy cooperation and uphold the right to development of countries in the global south. Non-proliferation efforts will not undermine the right of developing countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A certain country is stockpiling large quantities of nuclear materials, attempting to abandon the three non-nuclear principles, openly advocating the acquisition of independent nuclear armament. The international community must exercise strict oversight over such developments. China is unswervingly committed to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Its efforts to safeguard global security and stability have never ceased.


1st Committee · Chair [2:17:11]:

I thank the distinguished representative of China. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Czech Republic. You have the floor.


Czechia [2:17:21]:

Chair, distinguished delegates, the Czech Republic fully subscribes to the statement delivered by the European Union. In addition, allow me to add several remarks in our national capacity. Chair, over the past several years, the role of nuclear energy has become more important than ever. Nuclear power provides a reliable, low-carbon source of electricity and contributes to sustainable development and energy resilience. The Czech Republic views international cooperation and the responsible expansion of peaceful use of nuclear energy as indispensable and essential for accelerating innovation and ensuring the highest standards of safety, security, and non-proliferation. As a country actively pursuing the expansion of its domestic nuclear energy capacity, currently done in collaboration with the Republic of Korea, we emphasize the importance of robust safety standards, effective safeguards, and the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in strict accordance with the NPT. Furthermore, we have strengthened cooperation with our British partners on the deployment of small modular reactors, which are set to become an important part of future clean energy strategies through reliable, flexible, and low-carbon power generation. Chair, we condemn Russia's deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. including repeated strikes on Ukraine's energy grid that increases nuclear safety risks. The continued occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant with repeated outages of the plant's off-site power supply illustrates Russia's disregard for nuclear safety and security. We reiterate that the plant must be returned under full Ukrainian control. For the Czech Republic, Russia's action reaffirms the wider importance of collective defense within NATO and the essential role of allied nuclear deterrence in ensuring security. The Czech Republic agrees that credible deterrence and responsible arms control are mutually reinforcing. NATO's nuclear sharing, conducted under strict oversight and in full compliance with the NPT, enhances stability while reducing incentives for new nuclear programs. The extended nuclear umbrella has long anchored allied security within the NPT framework. demonstrating how cooperative arrangements can strengthen non-proliferation and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Chair, we remain convinced that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons does not provide a viable pathway to disarmament. It disregards the current security realities and risks undermining the NPT, which enjoys near-universal adherence and proven effectiveness. I thank you, Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [2:19:52]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Czech Republic. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. You have the floor.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) [2:20:09]:

In addition to the statement delivered by the European Union, I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Chair, excellencies, distinguished delegates. Five months ago, the NPT State Parties did not succeed in reaching consensus on a substantive outcome document. And although the NPT remains the foundation of our nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, we acknowledge that it does not sustain itself. It requires continued good faith engagement of the international community. With that in mind, I would like to make the following points. Russia, a nuclear weapons state, is waging a war against Ukraine, a non-nuclear weapons state, and has repeatedly issued irresponsible nuclear threats. At the same time, China continues to rapidly and opaquely expand its nuclear arsenal. These developments challenge not only regional security, but undermine the credibility of our global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. To ease international tension and to reduce risks, we urgently call on the P5 to engage in substantive talks along the lines of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the last version of the draft outcome document of the 11th NPT Review Conference. Progress should be made on risk reduction, transparency and accountability, so that work on arms control and disarmament can advance again. Chair, despite the challenges, the NPT delivers every day, and the work of the IAEA remains indispensable. Its safeguards and verification activities underpin the credibility and effectiveness of the treaty. We urge Iran to resolve its noncompliance with its NPT safeguards obligations, full cooperation with and access by the IAEA have to be restored unconditionally and immediately. It is of utmost concern that the Agency is not in a position to draw the conclusion that Iran's nuclear program is fully peaceful. Chair, the Netherlands remains committed to the objective of a world without nuclear weapons, in line with Article VI of the NPT, and we seek to contribute to creating the necessary security environment to achieve this goal. We call on States that have not yet done so, particularly those listed in Annex II, to ratify the CTBT and maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing. allow division to further erode our nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, or reinvest in cooperation and dialogue to strengthen it. The Netherlands chooses for the latter, and we stand ready to work with all delegations who make the same choice. I thank you, Chair.


1st Committee · Chair [2:22:52]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Distinguished delegates, the next meeting of the committee will be held this afternoon in this conference room. In accordance with the program of work, we will continue the thematic discussion on the nuclear weapons cluster. The meeting is adjourned.