Положение на Ближнем Востоке - Совет Безопасности, 9994-e заседание Совет Безопасности Date: 12 September 2025 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/ru/sc/9994?lang=en Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [0:06]: The 9,994th meeting of the Security Council is called to order. The provisional agenda for this meeting is the situation in the Middle East. The agenda is adopted. In accordance with Rule 37 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. In accordance with Rule 39 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, I invite Ms. Itsumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item 2 of the agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to documents S/2025/536 a letter dated 27 August 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Ms. Itsumi Nakamitsu. UN · High Representative for Disarmament Affairs [1:47]: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, distinguished members of the Security Council, I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief you once again on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2118 on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the last consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with our counterparts in the OPCW Technical Secretariat on activities related to Resolution 2118. I also held a virtual meeting with His Excellency Ambassador Ibrahim Molabi a few days ago. Mr. President, since the Council's last meeting on this matter, the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic have continued to engage on how to address outstanding issues related to Syria's chemical weapons dossier. Given the significant challenges to overcome in these efforts, I welcome the remarkable progress that has been made since the Council's last meeting. As previously reported, since 2014, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been able to confirm that the declaration submitted by the previous Syrian authorities was accurate and complete, because of the insufficient and inaccurate information it contained. A total of 26 outstanding issues were reported, of which 19 remain unresolved. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has reported that the substance of these issues is of serious concern as it involves large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. In this month's report, the OPCW Technical Secretariat reported that, in addition to the 26 declared chemical weapons-related sites, information made available to the OPCW suggests that there are more than 100 other sites that may have been involved in chemical weapons-related activities. As part of its work on this matter, the OPCW Technical Secretariat plans to visit all these locations, taking into account security and other relevant considerations. Mr. President, since March 2025, there have been four deployments of OPCW teams to the Syrian Arab Republic, to consult with relevant authorities, and to visit declared and suspected chemical weapons sites. The first two, as previously reported, in March and April, and the most recent two in June and August. I am also encouraged to hear that further deployments are being prepared. However, I note that the most recent deployment in August was initially scheduled for 20 to 28 July. I am informed that the OPCW was forced to postpone this deployment as a result of air strikes carried out by Israel on 16 July, targeting several sites in Damascus, including a building in which the OPCW team teams has held several consultations with relevant Syrian authorities, and that was located in the direct vicinity of the hotel used by the OPCW teams during its missions in Syria. Mr. President, I have been further informed that during the deployment that took place in April, the OPCW collected three samples at one of the visited locations. The OPCW has reported that the analysis of these samples conducted by OPCW-designated laboratories revealed indicators of nerve agents. This is a concerning finding, and the OPCW has shared the results with the Syrian authorities and intends to address the issue in subsequent deployments. Mr. President, as has been previously reported, There are significant challenges ahead, and consistent support from the entire international community will be critical for the efforts to rid Syria of all chemical weapons. The OPCW Director-General has noted that the tasks ahead will likely be more complex than those carried out 11 years ago with the destruction of Syria's declared chemical weapons programme. I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has been supporting and advising the Syrian Arab Republic and other States Parties with regard to the plans for destruction of any identified chemical weapons and related remnants. The OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a note on 24 July, which outlines the context for which for such destruction and also addresses the exceptional circumstances or conditions that may justify expedited in-situ destruction and verification process. Mr. President, the OPCW Technical Secretariat remains committed to delivering on its mandate to verify the full implementation by Syrian Arab Republic of all declaration requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention, decisions by OPCW policy-making organs, and of course, Security Council resolutions. I would also reiterate that the commitment of the new authorities in Syria to fully and transparently cooperate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is commendable. Mr. President, distinguished members of the Security Council, as I have previously emphasized, there is currently a critical opportunity to obtain long-overdue clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to rid the country of all chemical weapons. I once again urge the members of this Council to unite and show leadership in providing the support that this unprecedented effort will require. The United Nations stands ready to support and will continue to do our part to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time. I thank you very much for your attention. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [9:07]: I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. And I give the floor to those Council members who wish to make a statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States. United States of America [9:23]: Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you, High Representative McAvity, for your briefing. The United States welcomes the new Syrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Ibrahim Al-Abi. The United States also welcomes the progress that has been made by the Syrian government and the OPCW since last December. We urge the OPCW and Syria to redouble their efforts to locate and destroy remnants of the Assad regime's chemical weapons program. We also look forward to progress at the upcoming October OPCW Executive Council on the next steps toward the destruction of any chemical weapons remnants found in Syria. And we can all agree The OPCW and the Syrians supporting this important mission need to be able to operate fully and safely on the ground. We take note sample results from the OPCW's April visit have revealed indicators of nerve agents. Although this does not come as a surprise, it is another urgent reminder the OPCW mission in Syria is complex but critical. We must uncover the true scale and scope of the Assad regime's chemical weapons program to address any residual threats to regional and international security. As the Security Council, we must also ensure all those responsible for the use of chemical weapons are held to account in accordance with Resolution 2118 adopted by this Council in 2013. Addressing, declaring, and verifiably destroying any remnants of the Assad regime's chemical weapons program is an important task. The United States echoes the calls by the OPCW Director General and the Technical Secretariat for voluntary, monetary, and in-kind contributions to the Syrian mission. Mr. President, we also urge Council members to adjust the ISIL and al-Qaeda sanctions regime under Resolution 1267 to ensure the OPCW and Member States can provide all necessary support for chemical weapons destruction in Syria. We urge all Council members to continue working with us on this critical matter until that work is done. Thank you, Mr. President. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [11:52]: I thank the representative of the United States for the statement. And I give the floor to the representative of Russian Federation. Russian Federation [12:02]: Mr. President, we thank the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Madame Izumi Nakamitsu, for her briefing. We welcome the new representative, Mr. Al-Abi, for the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as Turkey. We closely read the latest report of the Director-General of the OPCW, Fernando Arias, We note that the Technical Secretariat has incrementally been establishing close working relations with the Syrian side. We also welcome the commitment of Qatar, which they assumed to act as a channel of communications with Damascus and the willingness of Doha to represent Syria at the OPCW until the appointment of the Syrian permanent representative to that organization. We have already for many long years been discussing the need and addressing the need to promptly resolve outstanding issues linked to the initial declaration of Syria on the CWC, which on the whole would help to close the Syrian chemical dossier. All of this could have been achieved far earlier had the OPCW Technical Secretariat operated in good faith, as is stipulated both in its mandate and the provisions of the Convention. However, unfortunately, for more than a decade, the OPCW has been purely seeking to act on political instructions to drag out the process as long as possible, artificially contriving to keep the Syrian dossier afloat as a lever of pressure on the Syrian leadership, the former Syrian leadership. To that end, they used violations of the methodology for collection of evidence set out by the CWC and fabricated evidence as well as deductions which fly in the face of basic scientific laws as well as false testimony from phony so-called witnesses. All of this is what the international community observed when the technical secretariat investigated the incidents in Saraqib in August 2016, in Al-Latan in March of 2017, in Han Sheikhoun, April 2017, and in Aleppo in November of 2018. In light of this grim track record of the technical secretariat, we continue to have very serious doubt that after all of these years, the secretariat, after all of the in a few short months, miraculously recovered from the chronic deficits and that it will now conscientiously and in good faith fulfill its mandate. especially given that there have been neither staffing nor methodological changes in the approaches of the technical secretariat in its work. The fact that the declaration assessment team, the establishment of which was pushed through by Western states in breach of the CW, now has full freedom of action on the ground, in our view, in no way exonerates it, nor does it legitimate the body. But rather, this gives rise to reasonable concerns and fears we will see a recurrence of the scandals which circulated around investigations of the technical secretariat in the past. I wish to recall the egregious falsifications of the report of the fact-finding mission on the use of chemical weapons in Syria regarding the incident in Douma. As was confirmed by various sources, including former inspectors of the OPCW itself, the final version was radically different. It was changed as compared to the initial version. Attempts undertaken by these inspectors to have the OPCW investigate what transpired were unsuccessful. Furthermore, these people were persecuted for their quest for the truth. Irrespective of the political landscape, the key outstanding issue remains the OPCW's inability to qualitatively carry out its mandate and the principled unwillingness of the leadership of the Technical Secretariat to correct the original sin in the methodology of its work, including violations of the chain of custody procedure. Under these circumstances, the situation will not be helped by the demonstrated willingness of the transitional authorities of Syria to constructively cooperate with the OPCW, nor the willingness of the international community to turn this page of Syrian history as soon as possible. The latest report of Director General Arias unfortunately only bears out this conclusion. There is language which is maintained there stating that the transfer of power to the new authorities in Syria presents an opportunity for the organization to obtain clarifications on the full extent of the scope of the Syrian chemical weapons program is completely at odds with the real situation on the ground, not to mention the fact that this goes beyond the framework of the technical mandate of the OPCW. Council members are perfectly aware of the fact that the situation in Syria remains highly volatile. Syria is convulsed by ethnic and sectarian clashes, and part of Syrian territory is entirely outside of the control of the transitional authorities in Damascus. Furthermore, Israeli strikes are continuing to target Syria, as a result of which many military and industrially significant facilities have been destroyed. Under these circumstances, one can hardly talk about the appropriate collection of new samples nor about the chain of custody. All of these issues which arise and these questions which arise for any objective observer remain unanswered. Against this backdrop, the Technical Secretariat statements about the result of samples received during the April visit of the declaration assessment team, which allegedly revealed indicators of substances containing nerve agents. as well as the need for inspections in 100 additional locations, with reference to information from certain OPCW States Parties, appears to be unsubstantiated. And this also suggests that underpinning this is nothing other than an attempt to pin responsibility on the former Syrian authorities, not an attempt to establish the truth. We believe that members of the Council should not condone such an approach. In this connection, once again, we urge the technical secretariat of the OPCW to draw conclusions from past mistakes, to focus on a thorough analysis of already existing material which was compiled over previous years, and not to trot out new accusations without credible evidence. This will only further pollute the atmosphere of mistrust around the Syrian chemical dossier. The only possible way to resolve outstanding issues is to have an approach rooted in professionalism and objectivity by the technical secretariat, and which needs to take into account the entire scope and complexity of the current domestic political situation in Syria, including the need to uphold this country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rebuilding of government institutions, and the fight against terrorist threats. Equally important is for the work of the technical secretariat not to undermine the fraught process of national reconciliation in Syria and for Security Council Resolution 2218 not to morph into a tool for the settling of accounts. Otherwise, the prospects for stabilization in this friendly country are liable to be imperiled, which we, and we hope other members of the Council, wish to avoid. It is important now not to rock the boat, but through concerted efforts to strive to help the Syrian people as they seek to surmount the challenges of the transitional period. This is precisely what the Council's efforts should focus on, both in the context of the chemical dossier and vis-a-vis other aspects of the Syrian resolution. Thank you very much. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [20:21]: I thank the representative of Russian Federation for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria. Algeria · A3+ [20:29]: Thank you, President. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the A3+, namely Guyana, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and my own country, Algeria. We thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for her briefing. We also welcome the participation in this meeting of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey. Mr. President, at the outset, the A3+ reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We, the A3, also condemns the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, and under any circumstances. We note with satisfaction the continued progress in the implementation of Resolution 2118, and we recognize the significant enhanced cooperation between Syria and the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; the Director-General visit to Damascus in February 2025; the reorganization of the conduct of the Secretariat's activities through the Office of Special Missions in June 2025; and the signing of the agreement on privileges and immunities for OPCW personnel on 16 June 2025 are all emblematic of the improved cooperation between Syria and the OPCW. And we welcome. We welcome the successful OPCW deployment in March, April and June this year. Deployment marked by unprecedented access, cooperation and the successful collection of new documents and samples which were previously unrevealed. The A3+ Command Qatar's continued instrumental role in representing Syrian interests before the OPCW. We also acknowledge the Syrian authorities' submission of a concept plan for the destruction and verification of remaining chemical weapons on July 2025. We urge the continued support of the international community to the Syrian authorities as it advances implementation of the plan. In a related positive step, we welcome the lifting of comprehensive sanctions by major international partners, and Syria renewed eligibility for support from international financial institutions. This development will be crucial for the country's reconstruction efforts. The A3+ supports the ongoing work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in close collaboration with the Syrian authorities in addressing the 19 outstanding issues involving quantities of potentially undeclared chemical warfare agents and munition. We urge all parties to approach these outstanding issues with the utmost seriousness. working collaboratively and transparently to address the gaps and ensure full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Furthermore, the A3+ acknowledges that over 100 additional locations may have been involved in chemical weapons activities. The OPCW's comprehensive approach through the Office of Special Missions, in close collaboration with the Syrian authorities, represents an appropriate way to address this. President, this progress is complicated by a deteriorating security situation. The A3+ is deeply concerned about the Israeli aggressions, including the airstrikes of the 16th of July 2025, targeting Damascus, which forced the postponement of OPCW deployment and undermined the ongoing efforts. We condemn all Israeli aggressions in the strongest term and insist on an immediate halt of all aggressions against Syria's territory. Syria's unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity must be respected, and civilians should not be put at risk. The continued threat posed by Daesh remains a significant concern. We stress the importance of preventing chemical weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. Finally, we, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Algeria, underline that sustainable progress on chemical weapons elimination requires: Immediate cessation of all military aggression against Syria. 2. Full and sustainable cooperation between Syrian authorities and the OPCW. 3. Adequate international funding and technical support to Syria. 4. protection of civilians, and strict adherence to international humanitarian law. President, we encourage continued dialogue and cooperation between Syria and the OPCW, with appropriate international support, to permanently permanently close this file. I thank you. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [29:12]: I thank the representative of Algeria for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan. Pakistan [29:19]: Thank you, Mr. President. We thank Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing. We welcome the participation of the new permanent representative of Syrian Arab Republic, as well as of Turkey, in this meeting. Pakistan has always opposed and condemned the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances. We consider the Chemical Weapons Convention a pillar of global arms control and disarmament regime. We support continued efforts for CWC's universal adherence and its full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation. Pakistan remains committed to advancing the objectives of the Convention and upholding the OPCW's effectiveness, impartiality, and the protection of its verification mechanisms. Mr. President, Pakistan supports the shared objective of stabilization of Syria through an inclusive, Syrian-owned, and Syrian-led political process facilitated by the United Nations. We extend our support for Syria's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We remain concerned about various aspects of the situation in Syria, in particular the military occupation by Israel of parts of Syrian territory and its continuing strikes against various locations in Syria. Regrettably, Israeli military attacks have also impeded the technical work of the OPCW in Syria in discharge of its mandate. These reprehensible attacks and violations of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity must stop. Mr. President, Pakistan welcomes the commitment of the Syrian authorities to fully implement the CWC, secure suspected chemical weapons sites, and address all outstanding issues. In this respect, we particularly appreciate Syrian authorities' positive engagement and cooperation with the OPCW to fulfill its mandate, addressing longstanding questions and ensuring unimpeded access to enable independent and full verification by the OPCW for the elimination of suspected chemical weapons in Syria and any risks of further proliferation in compliance with the CWC. We also commend the engagement of the OPCW Director-General with the Syrian authorities for implementing the mandate entrusted to the OPCW. We welcome the deployment of the OPCW team to Syria and continue necessary activities required for establishing an OPCW presence in Syria on an adaptive and sustained basis and to conduct declaration-related activities. We support continuation of these important efforts in a transparent and equitable manner. All concerned should seize the present opportunity to address outstanding issues in Syria, including those related to chemical weapons. We urge continued dialogue, cooperation, and full compliance with the CWC and Security Council resolutions. as a way forward to close the Syrian chemical weapons file as soon as possible. I thank you, Mr. President. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [32:43]: I thank the representative of Pakistan for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Slovenia. Slovenia [32:50]: Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, I thank the High Representative Nakamitsu for her informative briefing today and welcome the representatives of Syria and Turkey to the meeting. Mr. President, Slovenia firmly condemns the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, and under any circumstances. We therefore reiterate the imperative of identifying and bringing to justice those responsible for chemical weapon attacks in Syria and elsewhere. We take note of the information provided by the Director General of OPCW, on the latest developments, and we remain concerned over the numerous unresolved issues regarding the Syrian chemical weapons program. Syria needs international assistance to address its chemical weapons stockpiles. We are therefore encouraged by the ongoing collaboration between the Syrian Arab Republic interim authorities and the OPCW in efforts to identify the remaining elements of the chemical weapons program. The cooperation is already yielding visible results, as demonstrated by the recent identification of nerve agent indicators at one of the locations visited by the declaration assessment team in April. Moreover, it now appears that the undeclared chemical weapons program has been larger in scope that previously thought, with OPCW now deciding to inspect more than 100 additional locations that may have been involved in chemical weapons-related activities, which we heard from the High Representative today as well. It is therefore essential to establish a comprehensive picture of the chemical weapons program developed in Syria, while at the same time ensuring the safety of OPCW personnel and their Syrian counterparts. With this in mind, Slovenia reaffirms its support, full support for Syria's sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, which is key for regional stability, and calls on Israel to respect the demilitarized zone and the 1974 disengagement agreement. At the same time, we call on the Syrian interim authorities to maintain and consolidate the cooperation with the OPCW in order to fulfil the obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and to comply with the relevant OPCW decisions and the Security Council resolutions. Mr. President, in conclusion, allow me to reaffirm Slovenia's full support for the work of the OPCW, The Organization's work contributes towards achieving a future without the threat of chemical weapons. It is vital for strengthening the stability of Syria and the wider region. We stand ready to support all efforts that will enable the Syrian people to build the peaceful and secure future they both want and deserve. I thank you. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [35:50]: I thank the representative of Slovenia for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Panama. Panama [35:58]: Thank you, Mr. President. Our country would like to thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, for her briefing on the 143rd monthly report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on Syria. And we welcome the new representative of Syria, Ambassador Ibrahim Alawi, and the representative of Turkey, honouring us with their presence. The situation of chemical weapons in Syria is inextricably linked to the ongoing political process. More than a decade after the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention, its initial declaration remains incomplete. Significant gaps persist, along with concrete evidence of possible undeclared sites and activities. Therefore, we stress the urgency of moving toward an inclusive political transition in line with Security Council Resolution 2254. It's only through a strong political process that strengthens legitimate and effective governance that it will be possible to create the conditions necessary for moving forward in permanently eradicating the threat posed by chemical weapons. Through this report, we can see that the threat of the use of chemical weapons persists and that the international community cannot let down its guard. The fact that the recent presence of neurotoxic agents was detected in collected field samples should be a matter of alarm for everyone. The persistence of 19 fundamental unresolved issues, including the existence of potentially undeclared substances and chemical munitions, poses an ongoing threat to regional security. This is why we call on all national and international actors to refrain from endangering verification missions and to allow OPCW personnel to deploy safely to all sites as required. We recognize the commitment expressed by the Interim Syrian Authorities to cooperate with the OPCW through the signing of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of its personnel. as well as their willingness to receive missions and eradicate the remnants of the inherited chemical programme. However, it is essential that this commitment be translated into verifiable actions. The adoption by Syria of a conceptual plan for the destruction and verification of any remnants of the chemical programme is a positive step, but insufficient on its own. We reiterate our support for the technical, rigorous and independent work carried out by OPCW personnel. Likewise, we value the efforts of regional actors towards this goal, in particular those undertaken by the State of Qatar. We also support the pertinent call of the OPCW Director-General for calling for voluntary contributions. These are essential in order to maintain the momentum of operations, for ensuring the safety of deployed personnel, and guaranteeing the continuity of verification and on-site destruction work. Mr. President, the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances constitutes a violation of international law and an atrocious crime that must never go unpunished. Panama urges this Council to work together in its condemnation and to prevent these kinds of weapons from ever being used again in conflicts in the future. We reaffirm our commitment to disarmament, justice for the victims, and a Syria free of chemical weapons that contributes to the preservation of international peace and security. Thank you very much. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [40:39]: I thank the representative of Panama for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of United Kingdom. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [40:46]: Thank you, President, and my thanks to High Representative Nakamitsu for her comprehensive briefing. I welcome the presence of Ambassador Alabi as the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and the presence of the representative of Turkey. President, after 10 years of obstruction and denial by the Assad regime, we have a window of opportunity to end the threat of chemical weapons in Syria once and for all. We welcome the progress made by the new Syrian Government in delivering on its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and UN Security Council resolution 2118, as underlined by Foreign Minister al-Sabbani. We also welcome the recent deployments to Syria by the technical secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The director-general's report confirming the presence of a nerve agent found at a site undeclared by the Assad regime affords us a deeper understanding of the serious nature and scope of the chemical weapons programme. Discoveries such as this underline the urgent need to maintain momentum. As high representative Nakamitsu's briefing set out, the scale of the challenge means there is much more to do. We therefore call on Syria and the OPCW to accelerate efforts to identify, secure and verifiably destroy all remaining chemical weapons. We look forward to early decisions by the OPCW Executive Council to establish a clear mandate for this work to proceed safely and expeditiously. President, It is clear that the OPCW requires technical, financial and logistical assistance from the international community to accomplish this vital work. The United Kingdom continues to strongly support the work of the OPCW's technical secretariat, and in July we pledged $2.7 million in support of the OPCW's missions in Syria. In addition, to the $1.1 million we had provided following the fall of the Assad regime. We urge all Member States to step up support for Syria to eliminate these weapons. Finally, President, the United Kingdom notes with concern that Israeli military actions have delayed OPCW deployments and risk undermining the security and stability of Syria and the wider region. Preserving evidence at chemical weapons-related sites is essential to ensure accountability for both those who use these weapons and their supporters. We therefore urge Israel to de-escalate and avoid any further disruption to this critical work. President, this latest report is another stark reminder of the importance of this Council continuing to support Syria and the OPCW so that the new Syrian Government can meet its international obligations and move towards a safer and more secure future for all Syrians. I thank you. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [43:59]: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China. China [44:07]: President, I thank High Representative Izumi Nakamizu for her briefing. I welcome the new Permanent Representative Syria and the presence of Turkey at today's meeting. As always, China firmly opposes the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual under any circumstances for any purpose. The use of chemical weapons is not to be tolerated at any time, anywhere. We hope for an early realization of a world free of chemical weapons. I wish to make three points. First, to resolve the issue of chemical weapons in Syria, dialogue and cooperation is essential. China has noted that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has continued to interact with the interim Syrian authorities and made positive progress recently. It is hoped that both sides will maintain the momentum of cooperation and resolve the outstanding issues in a comprehensive and thorough manner. The OPCW stays committed to its technical nature, strictly performs its duties in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, provides in a timely fashion the State Parties with detailed information and facilities to be inspected in Syria, and ensures that next steps are carried out in an impartial, transparent, and secure manner. As a State Party to the Convention, Syria has the responsibility to fully fulfil its obligations under the Convention. Second, when addressing the issue of chemical weapons in Syria, we should take into count the counter-terrorism dimension to it. The spate of large-scale violent incidents in Syria highlights the serious threat posed by the terrorist forces entrenched in Syria, which warrants heightened vigilance. We urge the interim Syrian authorities to take all measures to combat all terrorist organizations and individuals listed by the Security Council, including the ETIM. The destruction of chemical weapons should be carried out in a verifiable manner so as to prevent dangerous chemical weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. Third, to address the issue of chemical weapons in Syria, a safe and stable environment is necessary. Israel's attacks on Syria seriously violate international law, infringe upon Syria's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, and complicate the resolution of the chemical weapons issue in Syria. We call on Israel to cease its military actions against Syria and withdraw immediately from the Syrian territory. In closing, I wish to emphasize that the issue of chemical weapons in Syria is closely related to the political resolution of the Syria dossier. China expects the interim authorities of Syria to engage in extensive dialogue and consultation with all parties to bridge internal differences, advance an inclusive political transition, and ensure that the rights of all Syrians are protected. We stand ready to work with all parties to promote the early realization of a political transition in Syria and restore peace and stability. Thank you, President. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [47:11]: I thank the representative of China for her statement. I now give the floor to the representative of France. France [47:18]: Thank you, Mr. President. I wish first and foremost to thank the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Madame Nakamitsu, for her briefing to the Security Council. And I also wish to welcome the new Permanent Representative of Syria, Sir Ibrahim Ali, and to welcome his presence amongst us. Mr. President, Syria last December entered into a historic political transition. France has adopted a resolution. We resolved to accompany, we resolved to support the new Syrian authorities. as they carry out a respectful transition in accordance with the principles of Resolution 2254 of the Security Council. Syria is facing a spate of challenges, including community-based tensions, a tenuous security situation with the persistent threat of Daesh, and foreign interventions, and the need to build new, inclusive, and robust institutions. This political transition also represents a historic opportunity. for the chemical disarmament of Syria, nearly 12 years after Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Bashar al-Assad regime had continued, including after Syria joined the CWC, continued to carry out an offensive chemical program. The Bashar al-Assad regime used, in a number of cases which have been attested to by independent investigations, continued to use chemical weapons against its own population. The Assad regime hid from the teams of the OPCW entire swathes of its program. The Organization is still not in a position at present to consider the declaration from the Syrian regime on its chemical programme as being accurate or complete in accordance with the demands of the CWC. Mr. President, we applaud the willingness which has been expressed by the new Syrian authorities to cooperate fully with the OPCW to close outstanding issues pertaining to the Syrian chemical program and to arrive at the complete elimination thereof. This is among the goals set out in the Paris Declaration on Syria, dating 13 February 2025. This new willingness for cooperation has been reflected this year in a number of deployments in Syria of OPCW teams. We applaud the fact that the teams tasked with investigating and identifying those responsible for chemical weapons use have been welcomed in Damascus for the very first time. The fight against impunity is critical to deliver justice to the victims and to buttress the norm of prohibition of chemical weapons. France will continue to play a key role to that end. We, to that end, have launched the International Partnership Against Impunity for Chemical Weapons Use. This was launched in 2018. A tremendous task remains to be accomplished. The OPCW believes that it needs to inspect more than 100 undeclared locations which may have been a part of the Assad regime chemical program. Measures need to be undertaken to urgently secure, reliably evaluate, and subsequently destroy all of the country's chemical weapons production, stocks, and capabilities. To that end, we encourage the Syrian authorities to continue to proactively cooperate with the teams, with the OPCW Office of Special Missions, and to submit as soon as possible, a plan facilitating the verifi- -- allowing for the verifiable destruction. We are cognizant of the fact that OPCW needs to carry out activities amid a delicate security situation. In this regard, we are concerned by the risk of destabilization. emanating from Israeli strikes, which last July targeted one of the buildings of the Syrian Defense Ministry. The strikes are liable to undermine the proper conduct of the missions of the organization in the country. The Council and the international community as a whole need to support the efforts for chemical disarmament of Syria. And this needs to be a critical step towards reintegration of Syria within the international community. France will continue to play its full role supporting the political transition in Syria, and we hope that multilateral efforts will be coordinated to maximize the results. Chemical disarmament of Syria will contribute to the goal of a chemical weapons-free world, and thus will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Thank you. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [52:11]: I thank the representative of France for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Greece. Greece [52:18]: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Nakamitu, for her briefing. I also welcome the participation of the new Permanent Representative of Syria to this meeting. Greece remains concerned by the volatile security situation and the fragile political transition in Syria, a country with which we share longstanding historical and cultural ties. We fully support Syria's efforts to achieve progress and prosperity, to preserve its rich ethnic and religious diversity, and to close all outstanding issues related to its protracted civil war, including the chemical weapons file. Mr. President, I wish to reiterate Greece's full adherence to the principles and objectives of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. We condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons by any state or non-state actors anywhere and under any circumstances, and we stress the need to hold all those who use such weapons accountable. I wish to highlight three points. First, we welcome the latest monthly reports of the Director General of OPCW on the progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program. The reports indicate that despite 26 declared chemical weapons related sites, Information made available to the Secretariat of OPCW suggests that there are more than 100 additional locations that may have been involved in chemical weapons-related activities. Greece fully supports the Secretariat's efforts to verify the accuracy of this information, including through visits to all these locations. Moreover, the reports confirm a persistent lack of progress on 19 of the 26 outstanding issues that have been reported by the Secretariat since 2014. These issues constitute a source of great concern, as they relate to large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions, and must be addressed. Second, Deniz values the fact that the OPCW is carrying out its mandate impartially, professionally, and in adherence to the highest international standards. Furthermore, we acknowledge the first steps made by the interim Syrian authorities to improve their cooperation with the newly established Office of Special Missions of OPCW, and we encourage the two parties to continue their close cooperation. Third, we call upon the interim Syrian authorities to take any possible measure in order to prevent any non-state actors from gaining access to chemical weapons. This development would have an impact on regional and global peace and security. Mr. President, in conclusion, Greece reiterates its full support to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Syria, which must be fully respected by all. We also reaffirm the importance of upholding all relevant international agreements and Security Council resolutions, in particular Resolution 2118, and of preserving the international norm against any use of chemical weapons. I thank you. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [56:14]: I thank the representative of Greece for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Denmark. Denmark [56:21]: Thank you, Mr. President. I also thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing, and I welcome the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to our meeting. Ambassador Labi, I know that you have worked closely with the OPCW, and we look forward to hearing from you. I would also like to welcome the representative of Turkey to this meeting. Colleagues, all of us around this table remember the Assad regime's deplorable use of chemical weapons over the last decades. Assad was responsible for the development of a secret chemical weapons programme and for the use of it, openly, to quell any opposition and to attack innocent civilians. With this tragic history in mind, we acknowledge the enormity of the task at hand for the Syrian Transitional Government. We therefore urge all actors to extend all technical and financial assistance to Syria and to the OPCW in sharing this burden. As Denmark has stated before, it is not only in Syria's interest to eliminate all chemical weapons and to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention. It's a common interest for all nations. Mr. President, turning to progress on this file. We are encouraged by the recent positive steps taken by the OPCW and the Syrian Transitional Government. The constructive and close cooperation between the Syrian Transitional Government and the OPCW is very welcome. The recent visits by the Technical Secretariat to Syria is also cause for optimism. We hope the recently concluded agreement between Syria and the OPCW concerning immunities and freedom of movement in Syria can pave the way for more frequent and extensive visits. We are confident that the proposed destruction plan presented by Qatar to the OPCW this week will help to increase the momentum on this file. Mr. President, in closing, and with these developments in mind, we reiterate our hope to make further progress towards concluding the chemical weapons file as rapidly as possible. At the same time, uncovering the full scope of the Syrian weapons programme and ensuring accountability for perpetrators must take priority. We encourage the OPCW and the Syrian Transitional Government to continue to work diligently towards this end. I thank you. Republic of Korea [58:45]: I thank the representative of Denmark for the statement. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Republic of Korea. Let me begin by thanking High Representative Itumina Kamitsu for her valuable briefings. And I also would like to warmly welcome new permanent representative of Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the presence of the representative of Turkey. Let me brief the following three points. First, we urge all concerned actors to prioritize Damascus' full implementation of its CWC obligations. We welcome the progress made between Syria and the OPCW toward resolving the longstanding issues related to Syria's chemical weapons program, and look forward to their continued cooperation. We also take note the findings which revealed indicators of nerve agents in the samples collected earlier this year. In this regard, we are gravely concerned that the Israeli airstrikes in July, as reported by the OPCW, targeted several sites in the direct vicinity of the location used by the Secretary during its mission in Syria. Such airstrikes as the OPCW Director-General raised his concerns over last year, might not only create a risk of contamination, but could also lead to the destruction of valuable evidence for investigations related to past use of chemical weapons. In this connection, we urge Israel to refrain from actions that could impede Syria's full implementation of its CWC obligations. such as munitions strikes that targeted Homs, Latakia, and Palmyra. Second, the Council and OPCW must spare no efforts in holding perpetrators accountable for using chemical weapons against innocent civilians, regardless of their affiliations. Beyond the complete destruction of chemical weapons, broader accountability measures must be pursued as part of Syria's political transition. In this connection, we reaffirm our support for the OPCW-Syrian team, including the Declaration and Assessment Team, Fact-Finding Mission, and the Investigation and Identification Team. The essential ongoing work of the OPCW-Syria team should therefore continue until all chemical weapons in Syria are destroyed and the perpetrators that used them are identified. We oppose any attempts to undermine its value and legitimacy. And we also call Syria to recommit to breaching all perpetrators to book. Third, we call upon all member states to consider providing voluntary contributions to the OPCW Syria team beyond 2026. As a Member State that has contributed to the OPCW Syria team this year, it provides us with some respite to finally see that the funding target is met for this crucial file. We take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the OPCW, who painstakingly reprioritized its limited resources to meet the target. Yet, The Watchdog's estimate for the following years gives us an enduring challenge to mobilize more financial resources to realize our common aspirations to eliminate all chemical weapons from Syria. We therefore call all Member States to consider pledging additional voluntary contributions for the 2026-27 cycle to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons in the war-torn country. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I now give the floor to the representative of Syrian Arab Republic. Syrian Arab Republic · Permanent Representative [1:03:24]: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to begin by congratulating you and your friendly country, the Republic of Korea, for your presidency of the Council during this month of September, and I wish you every success in your work. I thank His Excellency the Permanent Representative of Panama for his remarkable management of the Council's work last month. My thanks also go to Madame Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and other disarmament affairs representatives for their briefing and their cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic. And I also welcome the presence of the Permanent Representative of Turkey at the meeting. Mr. President, distinguished members of the Council, since this is the first time that I'm taking the floor before this august body on behalf of Syria, I have the honor to represent the Syrian Arab Republic, which is working tirelessly to become a haven of peace and prosperity in the region after years of fighting by the survivors of chemical weapons, fighting on behalf of those who have fought for their rights to ensure that their voices can be heard in this Council. It is their battle that enables me today to speak to you today on behalf of the government, which is proud to represent them, just as I am proud of this responsibility that has been given to me. My colleagues dealing with this dossier in Damascus are witnesses who have survived these weapons, and they are determined to once and for all put an end to these chemical weapons, to ensure their elimination once and for all. Of course, they will need technical expertise and the necessary teams, but they have the patience and courage to address this situation until such time as Syria will be once and for all free of these weapons. This is the new Syria, Mr. President. Mr. President, on the 21st of August last, we marked the 10th sad anniversary of the largest chemical massacre that took place over the last 30 years, a massacre that took place a few kilometers away from the capital, Damascus. For the first time in 12 years, survivors, victims' families and survivors were able to meet with representatives of organizations that they created, civil society organizations that assisted them, headed by ministers of the Syrian government, they were able to commemorate this massacre in Damascus and express their grief after years of oppression, displacement, misinformation and intimidation, years during which they were deprived of their fundamental rights to grieve for the family members that they lost. During the commemoration of this sad anniversary this year, the survivors and the families of the victims were received in the presidential palace by His Excellency the President of the Republic, who listened carefully to their demands and their misgivings and reassured them that the new Syria will not allow these chemical weapons to be used against anyone and that Syria will spare no effort in ensuring that these crimes are not repeated and that the perpetrators will be brought to justice. The The Syrian Arab Republic has a national priority to non-proliferation. We want to give access to justice for the victims to ensure that we can prevent these events happening again. In this context, the Syrian Arab Republic has pursued its efforts in order to prepare the fifth deployment of 2025 of technical teams of the OPCW in order to facilitate their access to the sites in order to gather the information required. The fourth deployment of the OPCW between the 18th of August and 1st of September 2025 included the visit to five sites suspected of hosting chemical weapons around Damascus and investigations into the chemical weapons program under the Assad regime. are being studied. This included meetings with the Syrian team to promote cooperation and coordination in order to look into possible scenarios for destroying these weapons by identifying the best way of proceeding. Also, the Syrian Government, during this visit, concluded an agreement with regard to the privileges and immunities for the staff of the OPCW. given the concerns of the Syrian Government, to ensure that the legal framework is in place and mechanisms are in place to allow the OPCW to make progress in its mission, to help it to best complete its tasks. We are aware of the enormous challenges that are involved in destroying the chemical weapons program of the Assad era, and we are actively addressing this challenge. The Assad regime carried out these activities in the greatest secrecy and had set up a complex security structure aimed at getting around inspections. and flouting the Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires a lot of cooperation now between all parties concerned. The legacy of the Assad regime is not just limited to the nuclear program, because challenges such as the weakness of infrastructure, the need for economic recovery, an economy that has been worn out by years of conflict, are all challenges that Syria faces. Also, mining and remnants of war must be addressed. They are preventing access to some military sites and making those operations extremely complex, requiring a lot of preparation and precaution. And these challenges demonstrate that We need to strengthen our capacities and provide the necessary teams in order for these weapons to be destroyed. There have also been discoveries of sarin gas, and I am proud to have been able to accompany this mission. These sites where the gas was found were in deserted areas, and we are very proud to have been able to discover them, and they weren't previously reported. Samples have revealed, after being sent to the relevant laboratories, that there indeed was the presence of this substance. Mr. President, the behavior of the Israeli entity, so military strikes on Syrian territory, targeted attacks that have destroyed a number of military positions, including the Defense Ministry in the Damascene capital, the military complex were attacked. as well as other buildings. And it was presumed that these sites were used by the Assad regime to store chemical weapons. And this is not only a attack on the sovereignty of Syria, but also a flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations resolutions, and this makes it even more difficult to access these suspect sites, as is explained in the OPCW report. Excellencies, members of the Council, you're now seeing a new Syria, a Syria which many times at the highest level has expressed its political willingness through sincere efforts and by making available to the OPCW all facilities necessary. On the 29th of July, for example, 2025, through the permanent mission of the State of Qatar to the OPCW, we presented a conceptual plan for the destruction and verification of the remaining chemical weapons and other remnants. This plan was distributed to States Parties by the Technical Secretariat. We would particularly like to express our thanks to Qatar for their efforts in representing Syria in the person of Ambassador Dr. Mutlaq al-Qatani. And we also would like to thank the technical secretariat of the OPCW for their remarkable work. We'd also like to thank the states that have supported this work and expressed their determination to provide technological and logistical support. Syria has also submitted for the first time a draft decision to the OPCW Executive Council, which can serve as a framework for the final destruction of the Assad-era chemical arsenal. Despite the heavy legacy inherited by Syria from the Assad regime, and despite decades of repression, war, and unspeakable suffering brought about by this war, the fight against drugs and terrorism and those that have disappeared, we will continue to resolutely proceed with rebuilding in order to overcome this legacy and spare no effort to destroy the arsenal of chemical weapons. Thank you, Mr. President. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [1:15:29]: Thank you, representative of Syrian Arab Republic for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey. Türkiye [1:15:37]: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like also thank and appreciate High Representative Ms. Nakamitsu for her comprehensive and informative briefing. I also welcome the new Permanent Representative of new Syria, Ambassador Olabi. His intervention touched me. He reminded us the terrible years of Syrian revolution. during which former regime used chemical weapons against its own people, even in the agreed de-escalation zones, including Eastern Ghouta, which is a suburb of Damascus. This always should be remembered to avoid such things. Mr. President, after years of obstruction by the former regime in Syria, political situation since 8 December has opened a window of opportunity for the OPCW to establish a more effective working relationship in Syria. This new dynamic provides a basis to address long-standing issues related to Syria's chemical weapons programme and to advance sustained compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. In this context, We welcome the ongoing cooperation and engagement between the Syrian authorities and the OPCW. The agreement concluded in June between Syria and OPCW on privileges and immunities of the Organisation and its personnel constitutes an important step in facilitating the conduct of operations. By granting access to relevant sites and extending cooperation, Syrian authorities have demonstrated a willingness to move forward on this file. Consequently, several deployments of the declaration assessment team, the fact-finding mission, and the investigation and identification team have taken place since December. We also take note of the concept plan prepared by the Syrian authorities for the destruction and verification of any remaining chemical weapons. This plan, which aims to enable the declaration and verified destruction of remaining stocks and former production facilities from the Assad era, provides a constructive framework. Mr. President, the key priorities remain in the identification of all chemical weapons-related locations, the full and accurate declaration of Syria's chemical weapons inventory, and the verifiable elimination of residual stocks. We are conscious that, despite the determined efforts of the OPCW, the secretive nature of the former regime's programme and gaps in available documentation continue to pose significant challenges to this process. In parallel, additional difficulties stem from serious lack of technical expertise, economic constraints, insufficient equipment ongoing security threats from terrorist groups, and Israeli air strikes. For these reasons, supporting Syria in terms of capacity building, technical resources, and security remains essential. The Syrian authorities, together with the Secretariat, will require significant financial, human, and logistical support to ensure that the necessary conditions are in place. Turkey stands ready to contribute to the training and capacity building of Syrian experts and will continue to facilitate the work of OPCW missions in the field. Mr. President, we must recall that Israel's continued attacks in Syria not only undermine the country's territorial integrity and unity, but also impair Syria's ability to fulfill its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The unlawful attacks jeopardize implementation of the OPCW mandate and disrupt deployment of its experts on the ground, as was witnessed in July following Israeli strikes on the Syrian Ministry of Defense. Such attacks must cease. Mr. President, we firmly believe that lifting remaining sanctions on Syria is essential to facilitate efforts of both the OPCW and the Syrian government in identifying and eliminating any remaining chemical weapons. Turkey supports all initiatives in this direction. Turkey remains firmly committed to supporting genuine and verifiable steps towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. We call upon the international community to extend its support to the Syrian authorities and the OPCW in this critical endeavor. The opportunity to make Syria safer in the region and beyond is within our reach. Thank you. Republic of Korea · President of the Security Council [1:21:10]: I thank the representative of Turkey for the statement. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The meeting is adjourned.