联合国大会第81届会议第一委员会 - 第12次全体会议 联合国大会 Date: 16 October 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/zh/ga/c1/81/12?lang=en Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- 1st Committee · Chair [0:01]: The 12th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee, First Committee, of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, the committee will now continue its thematic discussion under the cluster of nuclear weapons. I trust all delegations were able to submit their proposals before the noon deadline of today. Before I open the floor, I would like to remind all delegations that the time limit for statements during the thematic segment is three minutes when speaking in their national capacity and four minutes for statements on behalf of several delegations. The first speaker on the list of speakers is the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia. You have the floor. Namibia · Permanent Representative [0:48]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Namibia aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the African Group and Non-Aligned Movement. We deliver the following remarks in our national capacity. The global nuclear landscape today confronts us with a sobering question. How did humanity arrive at a moment where rising conflicts and geopolitical tensions once again overshadow the lessons of our past? Arms control frameworks, once symbols of restraint and collective wisdom, are eroding before our eyes. Nuclear rhetoric, which should have been relegated to history, resurfaces with unsettling ease. And the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals continue, as if security can be built upon instruments capable of annihilating civilizations. Let us be reminded that the scars left by the use of nuclear weapons are not confined to history books. They injure the affected communities, damage ecosystems and collective memories. The Pact for the Future highlights the existential risks posed by nuclear weapons and calls for enhanced international cooperation. As a state party to the Pelindaba Treaty, Namibia reaffirms the urgent need to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. We remain firmly committed to a world free of nuclear weapons and reject any security doctrine that relies on those weapons. We therefore call for the full, irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, in line with Article VI of the NPT. We further emphasize the importance of TPNW and urge for the early entry into force of the CTBT as vital instruments that strengthen our disarmament architecture. Currently, Namibia is hosting the CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise, the first time such an exercise is conducted in Africa, marking a historic milestone for the global verification regime. Mr. President, for Namibia, The peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology are NPT's promise, the part of the bargain that speaks to human progress rather than human destruction. If this pillar is to retain credibility, it must be implemented fairly, without discrimination and hierarchies, and without double standards. With a sense of renewed urgency, let us work in unison. to spare future generations the human suffering, environmental devastation, and lasting developmental harm caused by nuclear weapons around the world. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [3:37]: I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Namibia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden. Sweden [3:49]: Thank you, Chair. Sweden aligns with the statement made by the European Union with the following remarks in national capacity. Ongoing geopolitical conflicts continue to weaken the architecture for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. They trigger security concerns for many countries, including my own. Sweden's choice to join a defensive alliance after more than 200 years of military non-alignment was a direct consequence of Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. We reiterate our condemnation of Russia's flagrant violations of international law, recurring attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, and threats of nuclear weapons use. Chair, the NPT remains the cornerstone of global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Despite the absence of a consensus outcome document at the Review Conference in May, we were encouraged by the broad commitment to the Treaty expressed by States Parties. In times of geopolitical challenges, this was a welcome reconfirmation of support that it is our duty to build on. At the review conference, we saw emerging momentum emanating from growing transregional support on certain pertinent topics. We want to highlight three areas of particular importance for follow-up efforts. Firstly, as tensions grow stronger, so do demands for risk reduction measures to avoid nuclear conflicts by mistake or misperception. Sweden takes part in the Transregional Initiative to Reduce the Risk for Nuclear Conflict. Proposals were presented by the initiative during the previous review cycle. We encourage other States Parties to continue or add their support in a joint effort to uphold the momentum in this important work. Secondly, in times of distrust, efforts to enter into meaningful dialogue become the more important. During the final days and hours of the NPT Review Conference, we were encouraged by reports indicating a greater degree of readiness among P5 to enter into strategic dialogue. These efforts must continue with the aim of strengthening the outlook for strategic stability in uncertain times. We commend the U.S. efforts so far in trying to make such a dialogue come about. Thirdly, transparency and accountability are fundamental blocks for confidence-building, for the realization of the NPT, and ultimately to strengthen our common security. We call on the nuclear weapons states to lead the way on this important matter. We commend the US, UK, and France for spearheading an NPT culture of transparency, and we urge China and Russia to follow suit. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [6:45]: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Jamaica. Jamaica [6:56]: Thank you, Chair. Jamaica aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of CARICOM and the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity. The full statement will be available online. Chair, the adoption of the TPNW stands as a significant example of what principled diplomacy, coalition building, and inclusive multilateral engagement can achieve. Member states, working alongside international organizations and civil society, helped challenge the prevailing discourse on nuclear weapons and advanced an approach that places the protection of humanity at the center of disarmament efforts. Jamaica therefore reaffirms its support for the TPNW as a significant contribution to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. As we consider the outcome of the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the inability of States Parties to agree on a substantive consensus outcome document underscores the persistent divisions that continue to impede progress. Jamaica reiterates that the absence of consensus must not be interpreted as an absence of obligation or political responsibility. The NPT remains central to the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and all its State Parties must continue to implement the Treaty in good faith. Jamaica calls on all State Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate renewed political will and to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. This requires concrete, transparent, irreversible, and verifiable progress towards nuclear disarmament. Nonproliferation, while essential, cannot by itself achieve the objectives of a world free of nuclear weapons. Jamaica, therefore, underscores the importance of citizen diplomacy, public awareness, and disarmament education in sustaining the global movement for nuclear disarmament. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war must remain at the forefront of our deliberations, and future generations must be equipped with the knowledge and understanding necessary to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We are also concerned by the potential risks associated with emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, when integrated into military decision-making and nuclear systems. Such developments raise important questions regarding human control, judgment, accountability, and the possibility of error. International efforts to reduce nuclear risk, strengthen transparency, and build confidence are necessary, but they must complement rather than substitute for meaningful progress towards disarmament. Finally, Jamaica underscores the opportunity cost of continued investment in nuclear arsenals at a time when countries face urgent developmental needs, and we call on the international community to 1st Committee · Chair [9:58]: I thank the distinguished representative of Jamaica for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia. Malaysia [10:07]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Malaysia associates itself with the statements delivered on behalf of NAM, ASEAN, and the TPNW States Parties. The growing reliance on nuclear deterrence amid renewed nuclear arms competition stands in stark contrast to long-standing disarmament commitments. Malaysia firmly believes that nuclear weapons cannot be the answer to an increasingly insecure world. Their continued prominence only deepens mistrust and undermines the pursuit of lasting peace and security. Malaysia is alarmed by the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, the entrenchment of nuclear deterrence arrangements, and the emerging risk posed by AI in nuclear decision making. Heightened insecurity must not become a pretext for perpetuating nuclear arsenals. Malaysia deeply regrets the failure of the 2026 NPT Review Conference to achieve consensus on a substantive outcome for the third consecutive review cycle. This continued impasse risks undermining confidence in the treaty and underscores the urgent need for the full implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. Against this backdrop, Malaysia welcomes the continued advancement of the TPNW and looks forward to its first review conference later this year. As a complementary instrument that reinforces the NPT, the TPNW provides an important pathway towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Malaysia remains committed to advancing its effective implementation, including through our continued work with the Philippines as co-chairs of the IWG on the implementation of Article IV. As we mark the 30th anniversary of the CTBT, Malaysia reiterates its call for its early entry into force and urges all remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay. We also regret the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026 and urge the parties concerned to pursue a successor agreement with legally binding and verifiable limits on their nuclear arsenals. We also call for the strengthening of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the establishment of new zones. We remain committed to the Bangkok Treaty and look forward to continued engagement with all nuclear-weapon states, including those with reservations, to resolve all outstanding issues in line with the objectives and the principles of the Treaty. This year also marks the 30th anniversary of the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Malaysia continues to present its annual resolution on the follow-up to the advisory opinion, which reaffirms the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to conclusion negotiation leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We look forward to the continued support of member states. Malaysia firmly maintains that nuclear weapons offer no lasting security. Thank you. Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [13:01]: I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia. Australia [13:11]: Thank you, Chair. This committee meets at a time of heightened nuclear risk. Growing strategic competition and persistent proliferation risks demand practical action to strengthen nonproliferation, reduce risks, and advance disarmament. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains foundational to these efforts. While this year's review conference highlighted significant challenges, it also reaffirmed the treaty's enduring value and shared commitment of states parties to uphold and strengthen it. We call on states parties to translate that commitment into action across all three NPT pillars. This means strengthening safeguards implementation, enhancing transparency, and advancing practical measures that reduce nuclear risks and build confidence. Recent developments underscore the urgency of this task. The continued expansion of the DPRK's unlawful nuclear weapons program, Iran's serious noncompliance with its safeguards obligations, and Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric continues to undermine international security and confidence in the nonproliferation regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency is indispensable to global nonproliferation efforts. reaffirms its strong support for the agency and for upholding the IAEA's independent technical mandate, which is essential to maintaining confidence that nuclear material and activities remain exclusively peaceful. Chair, as long as nuclear weapons exist, reducing nuclear risks must remain an urgent priority. Greater transparency, sustained strategic dialogue, and practical confidence building measures can reduce the risks of miscalculation and escalation while building the trust needed for disarmament. Australia calls on the P5 to reaffirm the value of nuclear risk reduction and agree concrete measures to build confidence and trust, and urges all nuclear weapon states to strengthen transparency and reinvigorate arms control dialogue. Chair, this year marks the 30th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty opening for signature. We warmly welcome the Kingdom of Tonga's signature and ratification of the CTBT, which completes the universalisation of the treaty in the Pacific. Australia welcomes this milestone and calls on all states which has not yet done so to sign and ratify the treaty without delay. We also celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Rarotonga's entry into force, another powerful demonstration of our region's enduring commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. Chair, progress requires sustained dialogue and practical cooperation. Australia will continue working with partners to strengthen the NPT, reduce nuclear risks, and advance a safer world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [15:52]: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cote d'Ivoire. Côte d’Ivoire [16:06]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Chair, Cote d'Ivoire notes with great concern the evolving international nuclear landscape. The continued modernization of arsenals, the growing place of nuclear weapons in some security doctrines, the erosion of arms control mechanisms and persistent major geopolitical tensions are increasing the risk of these weapons being used deliberately, accidentally or through miscalculation. The failure of the 11th NPT Review Conference in May to achieve a substantial consensus after those of 2015 and 2022 makes us aware of the danger of making impasse the norm at a time when exacerbating tensions are questioning our collective responsibility. Kutteva therefore calls for a collective leap forward in towards nuclear disarmament based on dialogue, transparency, confidence and comprehensive respect for international obligations. In this regard, my country reaffirms its commitment to the total, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a balance across its three pillars. My delegation remains committed to complementarity between the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the universalization of which would help consolidate the international norm prohibiting these weapons. My delegation considers that nuclear risk reduction is particularly urgent today, even though it cannot be a replacement for disarmament. Cote d'Ivoire encourages nuclear weapon states to strengthen mechanisms for communication, transparency, and preventing miscalculations, and to maintain effective human control over any decision relating to the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in light of the rapid development of artificial intelligence. Mr. Chair, my country encourages all efforts with a view to opening negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and, in the meantime, calls for the observation of production moratoria. Cote d'Ivoire reiterates its call for the entry into force of the CTBT, which is a crucial step which, 30 years after the treaty was opened for signing, cannot be put off indefinitely. My country will continue to make its contribution to the international verification regime, including through the installations of the international monitoring system that it hosts on its territory. Finally, Cote d'Ivoire reaffirms the full importance of the Pelindaba Treaty. Nuclear weapons-free zones remain concrete instruments for regional confidence, non-proliferation, and disarmament. Thank you for your kind attention. 1st Committee · Chair [18:55]: I thank the distinguished representative of Cote d'Ivoire for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iraq. Iraq [19:09]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, we associate ourselves with the statements delivered by NAM and the Arab Group. Mr. Chair, we express grave concern at the continued imbalance in the implementation of the NPT pillars. Iraq stresses that the failure of the 2026 review conference to reach a consensual outcome document for the third time in a row raises serious questions about the credibility of the treaty and the effectiveness of the implementation of its obligations. In this context, Iraq stresses the need to take practical steps, most importantly the following. First, the need to continue to keep nuclear disarmament at the forefront of the international community's priorities until the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons is achieved. Second, the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT by nuclear weapons States that continue to develop and create new types of nuclear weapons and maintain the role of such weapons in their security and military doctrines. Third, immediately begin negotiations to reach a binding and non-discriminatory international legal instrument on safeguards against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States under the NPT. Mr. Chair, Iraq once again warns of the negative repercussions of the continued non-implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution on the credibility of the treaty. In this regard, we call for accelerating the establishment of a zone free of weapons in the Middle East in accordance with relevant UN resolutions. We welcome the successful convening of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in its six sessions. We stress that these efforts constitute a parallel and supportive process to the other paths for the establishment of this zone, and they are not a substitute for the 1995 Middle East resolution. what was approved by the review conferences of 2000 and 2010. In conclusion, Iraq reiterates its strong condemnation of the dangerous statements made by a minister in the Israeli entity's government in 2023 regarding the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the Palestinian people in Gaza. We affirm that these threats reflect the Israeli entity's disregard for international standards against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This shows the urgent need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We reaffirm that under no circumstances can this resolution be implemented without the Israeli entity joining the NPT as a non-nuclear party and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [22:05]: I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore. Singapore [22:15]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Singapore aligns itself with the statements delivered by Vietnam on behalf of ASEAN. There can be no doubt that the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime is under severe strain. The risk of nuclear conflict is heightened, geopolitical divisions are deepening, and meaningful progress remains elusive. The failure of three consecutive NPT Review Conferences to adopt substantive outcomes, including the most recent 11th NPT RevCon, illustrates these challenges. However, these must strengthen our resolve to ensure that the collective progress made over the years does not unravel further. Singapore would like to emphasise four points in our national capacity. First, we must resume making progress on nuclear disarmament. The NPT remains indispensable to international peace and security, and its commitments must be matched by action. Nuclear weapons states must fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, including through transparent, irreversible, and verifiable reductions of their nuclear arsenals. The expiry of the New START Treaty in February 2026 further underscored the fragility of the nuclear arms control architecture. We encourage the United States and Russia to work towards a new agreement. We also call for the commencement of long overdue negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty under the Conference on Disarmament. Second, we must accelerate efforts to bring the CTBT into force. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the opening of signature of the CTBT. Singapore welcomes the Kingdom of Tonga's ratification of the CTBT in July. We reiterate our call on all states who have yet to do so, especially the nine remaining Annex 2 states, to ratify the CTBT without delay. Third, Singapore is a committed state party to the Seonfest Treaty and supports the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones as practical building blocks towards a nuclear weapon free world. We encourage individual nuclear weapon states that are willing to sign and ratify the protocol to the Seonfest Treaty without reservations and provide written formal assurance of this commitment to go ahead with the signing. Singapore remains committed to engaging all nuclear weapon states to intensify efforts of all parties to resolve outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Seonfest Treaty. Finally, we must to uphold the inalienable right of all state parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article 4 of the NPT in conformity of Articles 1 and 2. We reaffirm the IAEA's indispensable role in expanding access to the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology, including through its technical cooperation program. As Singapore looks ahead to our chairmanship of ASEAN in 2027, we will also work closely with other ASEAN member states to strengthen regional cooperation at the IAEA, including through the proposed ASEAN-IAEA Strategic Partnership on nuclear energy safety and governance. Mr. Chair, Singapore is committed to working with all member states to translate long-standing commitments into concrete progress. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [25:07]: I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Senegal. Senegal [25:16]: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. My delegation aligns itself with the statements made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Namibia on behalf of the African Group, and would like to share these considerations in its national capacity. Chair, the collective security architecture faces complex challenges impacting military spending, eroding trust, and exacerbating strategic rivalries. Multilateral discussion frameworks on disarmament are all faced with blockage. The successive failures of the NPT review conferences, the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament, the difficulties faced by the Disarmament Commission and the persistent blockages in the First Committee are evidence of that. Even more worrying, the abandonment of strategic arms ceiling arrangements, the successive withdrawals from arms control instruments confident nuclear rhetoric and a rise in spending on nuclear arsenals are worrying signs. Finally, the potential inclusion of new technologies in nuclear weapon systems, in particular, artificial intelligence, is increasing the risk of the use, even accidentally, of nuclear weapons. At no time since the Cold War has the risk of the use of a nuclear weapon been so high. Mr. Chair, in this context, my delegation would like to share several thoughts by way of a contribution to these discussions. First, my delegation would like to call for greater awareness of nuclear risk and call for tangible, concrete measures to move forward in achieving our shared goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, nuclear weapons states once again are invited to take their individual and collective responsibilities to agree on a more ambitious program for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Second, while recalling the importance of ensuring a balance between the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, my delegation calls for resetting the imbalance between the relative progress on nuclear nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the one hand, and the stagnation of nuclear disarmament on the In this context, my delegation agrees with the frustration of non-nuclear weapon states, given the persistent asymmetry of obligations due to nuclear weapon states not complying with their obligations for disarmament under Article 4. Third, Senegal believes that nuclear sharing arrangements raise proliferation concerns and calls for targeted discussions. Fourth, my delegation is in favor of the universalization of nuclear weapons-free zones. While reiterating its commitment to the Pelindaba Treaty, my country supports the creation of a zone in the Middle East. Five, the peaceful use of energy is a right that is recognized by Article 4 of the NPT, which must be exercised without discrimination in accordance with non-proliferation obligations. Finally, all of these efforts cannot be enough in and of themselves. At the same time, military spending should be put at the heart of multilateral discussions. New measures should be adopted to restore confidence among states and in multilateral action and to preserve the good functioning of disarmament bodies. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [28:05]: I thank the distinguished representative of Senegal for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland. Ireland [28:16]: Chair, Ireland aligns with the statement of the European Union. Fifty-six years ago, in the midst of crisis, states came together and first signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It remains one of the most significant achievements of multilateral disarmament. At the heart of its grand bargain lies the understanding that an ever greater number of nuclear weapons in the hands of an increasing number of states brings only instability and the risk of disaster. The NPT has served to limit the proliferation of these weapons, paving the way for arms control agreements and reductions of some nuclear arsenals to the present day. Importantly, it also provided a framework for the peaceful exploitation of the atom, facilitated by the oversight provided by the independent expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet today, regrettably, we continue to see the widespread modernisation of nuclear arsenals, the rapid and opaque build-up of nuclear weapons, and an absence of progress on disarmament obligations, all under the pretext of providing certain states with greater security. Ireland has always remained firm on this. More nuclear weapons does not bring greater security. We regret that, for a third time, the NPT Review Conference could not achieve a consensus outcome. However, this does not mean we should or can turn a blind eye to non-compliance challenges, the failure of some States Parties to implement their obligations, or attempts to water down related commitments. Chair, we must confront several grave challenges. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues to threaten nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Meanwhile, attacks on nuclear facilities threaten the world with potential grave consequences within and beyond national borders. The DPRK continues to engage in illegal missile testing, and vital arms control agreements that have limited stockpiles for decades have now ended, presenting pressing proliferation challenges. We call on Iran to fulfill its legal obligations and to engage in good faith with the IAEA as a state party to the NPT. Dialogue and diplomacy are the only path to a sustainable solution for the Iranian nuclear program. Chair, we cannot allow the challenges of today to undo the progress we have achieved. Disarmament remains integral to the very core of the UN's purpose and ambition. The norm against nuclear weapons testing must be held. Likewise, the nuclear taboo must be reinforced, while the devastating humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapon must both inform and give urgency to our work. Ireland stands ready to work with all states to advance multilateralism and work for progress. We will continue to focus on efforts towards meaningful and credible reduction of nuclear risk and advance the objectives enshrined in the TPNW as a means of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [31:01]: I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Hungary. Hungary [31:14]: Chair, Hungary associates itself with the statement made by the EU. The full statements will be available online. The multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament framework remains under unprecedented pressure due to current geopolitical challenges, including Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and multiple crises in the Middle At this critical time, we must strengthen our collective efforts to uphold and preserve the NPT, the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. As a NATO member, we strongly support the role of allied nuclear deterrence in collective security while maintaining our full commitment to disarmament and nonproliferation. It is now more than four and a half years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and illegally seized Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Russia's continued military attacks gravely endanger nuclear radiation safety, security, and safeguards in Ukraine and pose. Serious risks for the wider region. Hungary joins others in calling. On Russia to enable the legitimate Ukrainian authorities to regain control over their nuclear power plant. We reiterate our solidarity with and support for Ukraine. The Iranian nuclear issue has remained unresolved for nearly a quarter of a century. We firmly believe that a sustainable solution of the Iranian nuclear issue can only be found through diplomatic means. Effective verification and monitoring by the IAEA is an essential component and an important. Prerequisite to the success of any negotiated agreement designed to obtaining the required trust. And assurance that Iran's nuclear program serves exclusively peaceful purposes. With regard to Syria, Hungary welcomes the resolution of outstanding safeguard issues related to the Syria's past nuclear activities. Hungary is deeply concerned about the nuclear and ballistic missile program of the DPRK, which pose serious threats to regional and global security. We urge the DPRK to comply with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and to abandon its nuclear weapons in a. Complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. We remain committed to the entry into force of the CTBT and call on all states, particularly the remaining Annex II states, to ratify the treaty without delay. At the end, let me. Call the importance of effective. Export controls in accordance with Article 3 of the MPT and in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [33:54]: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lithuania. Lithuania [34:04]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Lithuania aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Deteriorating security environment has weakened the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture, making the full implementation of the NPT more important than ever as we address the key challenges facing its future. Russia's continued war of aggression against Ukraine, escalating nuclear rhetoric, announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, and militarization of occupied Ukrainian ZNPP constitute a grave violation of international norms and are incompatible with the responsibilities of a nuclear weapons state. We are also concerned by China's lack of transparency, rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and insufficient ballistic missile notification practices. Serious proliferation challenges also persist in Iran and the DPRK. Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon, must fully comply with its NPT obligations, and cooperate with the IAEA. The DPRK must abandon its unlawful nuclear activities, comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including cease its illegal military cooperation with Russia. The DPRK cannot and will not have the status of a nuclear weapons state under the NPT. We are further alarmed by reports on possible covert nuclear testing and call on all states. To uphold the global moratorium. While strategic risk reduction cannot substitute for disarmament obligations, it plays a complementary role in reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. We regard transparency as key pillar of risk reduction and support the active efforts in this regard. Lithuania also supports P3 efforts. To prevent a nuclear arms race and advance a new arms control framework, limiting the large nuclear arsenals. We urge Russia and China to engage constructively and meaningfully. As a state bordering an aggressive neighbor possessing nuclear weapons and threatening to use them, Lithuania understands the value of credible security guarantees. In this context, NATO nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements help ensure the secure of NATO alliance, deter aggression, and remain fully consistent with the NPT and strengthening the global nonproliferation regime. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [36:46]: I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Chile. Chile [36:59]: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We reaffirm the historic commitment of my country to general and complete disarmament, as well as to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Our position has been consistent throughout the years. Chile has the conviction that the very existence of these weapons represents in itself a threat to humankind. Chile adheres to the principle of the indivisibility of international security, and this is all of the states without consideration of their size or power. They all have a responsibility to contribute to the strengthening of an international order which is based on cooperation and regulated by standards. This position can be seen clearly at the regional level in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was established in 1967 and created the first densely populated zone which was free of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Chairman, for Chile, the NPT is the cornerstone of the regime. It is important to continue with the implementation of its three pillars. We are convinced that the progress achieved within the framework of the NPT is cumulative and that the commitments taken on are fully applicable for all of the Member States. and States Parties. We regret the fact that we haven't adopted a document by consensus at the last review conference, but the commitment of all member states to continue to contribute to the existence of the disarmament regime must go beyond the current circumstances, especially in a global context plagued with uncertainty. We must reflect in a timely and realistic fashion on the results of a treaty with unique characteristics, which is close to universalization. Sir, we would like to stress the fact that next December, we will celebrate the first review conference of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We'd like to point out the decisive commitment of all of these states who have adhered to the concept of that treaty, which is an important component of multilateral We would also like to reaffirm the centrality of the ratification of the treaty for the complete for the CDP and we urge states in Annex 2 to accelerate the process of ratification. And to conclude, Chairman, we'd like to point out the 81st anniversary of the foundation of the Organization of the United Nations, that all of the states present here must comply with the obligations that we have assumed, and that's essential behavior in order to contribute to the peace and security of the planet. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [39:58]: I thank the distinguished representative of Chile for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico. Mexico [40:09]: Chairman, allow me to begin by expressing the deep concern of Mexico for the worsening of the international situation and the increase of the nuclear risk. It's unacceptable that more than decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there are voices that want to trivialize the use of nuclear weapons. It goes against common sense when we see the increasing spending and the modernization expansion of nuclear weapons. the expense of investments in order to, at the defense of spending to combat poverty and climate change. Nuclear deterrence is a false guarantee, false security guarantee, and it's compatible with lasting peace. The measures to reduce risk are necessary, but they shouldn't become a justification to can definitely perpetuate these arsenals. The expiration of the New START represents a serious setback, as well as the questioning of fundamental norms, such as nonproliferation or the prohibition of nuclear testing. The lack of new agreements in the most recent review conferences of the NPT do not suspend nor weaken the obligations and commitments that we have taken on in the past. The nuclear weapons states agreed unequivocally on their commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons and must show it through concrete action in this direction. The humanitarian and environmental consequences of any nuclear detonation would be catastrophic and would transcend borders and generations. As a result, a negative security environment is precisely the main argument in favour of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The review conference at the end of this year will show that there is a space and a will for dialogue to move towards disarmament. We urge States who have not yet done so to adhere to this treaty. And we invite all parties, including those with critical views, to take part in this conference. In February, we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. And today, 113 states belong to six of these free zones. And in this respect, we welcome the new exhaustive study of the qualified group of experts, which offered concrete opportunities to strengthen these zones. Chairman, it's contradictory if we resign ourselves to only manage indefinitely the nuclear threat. We have to eliminate it. Now, thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [43:03]: I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Slovenia. Slovenia [43:08]: Mr. Chair, Slovenia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and would like to offer the following remarks in its national capacity. Mr. Chair, preventing any use of nuclear weapons must remain our highest priority. In this regard, I would like to recall the joint statement of the leaders of the five nuclear weapons states on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms races from January 2022. Slovenia continues to view the NPT as the cornerstone of international peace and security. While it is regrettable that consensus on an outcome document was not achieved at this year's review conference, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a major achievement of multilateral diplomacy. Slovenia strongly supports the entry into force of the CTBT and urges the remaining annexed states to ratify it without delay. Likewise, negotiations on a verifiable FMCT should begin without further postponement. Mr. Chair, we condemn Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric, and threats to use nuclear force in its aggression against Ukraine. This includes deep concern about Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus and the use of dual-capable missiles in Ukraine. We are concerned by China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT and raises doubts about the credibility of its no first use policy. We call on China to demonstrate transparency and engage in meaningful arms control dialogue, risk reduction and confidence building measures and enhanced information sharing. We encourage nuclear weapons states to show leadership through transparency and restraint. Slovenia calls on all states to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any nuclear explosions, and calls on all states to uphold CTBT's object and purpose. Mr. Chair, Slovenia remains concerned with the scope and transparency of Iran's nuclear program, especially the stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Slovenia has called out Iran's unacceptable disregard for its nonproliferation obligations, and it has also called out that nuclear facilities should never be attacked. The only viable path is a peaceful solution. Slovenia reiterates that Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. We are equally concerned by the trajectory of DPRK's nuclear program. The DPRK must comply with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions as well as MPT obligations with a view of abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missile programs. The full version of this statement will be available online. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [45:42]: I thank the distinguished representative of Slovenia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation. Russian Federation [45:55]: Mr. Chairman, we are firmly convinced that the very broad and varied range of subjects under the nuclear disarmament cluster touch upon the fundamental issues of ensuring international security and strategic stability. and also give rise to the biggest disagreements in the First Committee. And so they cannot be considered superficially. However, the very tight time limits imposed on delegations only give us an opportunity to provide a telegraphed and very speedy outlining of our national approaches and priorities, which is entirely not sufficient for the task before us. Either, as many delegations are doing, to circulate within this authoritative body unfounded and accusations against some delegations, including the Russian Federation, and allegations that are detached from reality. We refute such allegations against us. And we would invite colleagues to familiarize themselves with the written text of the substantive Russian statement, which will be placed on the resource site of the First Committee of the General Assembly. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [47:40]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Philippines. Philippines [47:47]: The Philippines aligns itself with the statements of ASEAN, NAM, and the TPNW States Parties and signatories. For the past two weeks, we have heard the resounding concern and categorical rejection by the international community of the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, Dangerous nuclear rhetoric, including the threat of use of nuclear weapons, the lack of progress on disarmament commitments, the absence of transparency measures on stockpiles, inadequate negative security assurances, the continued salience of nuclear weapons and security doctrines, and the risks posed by the emerging and advanced technologies, all in recognition of the unimaginable humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons testing and use. The principle of nuclear deterrence offers a false sense of security. For as long as nuclear weapons exist, for as long as their use is contemplated, for as long as they remain a military option and strategic advantage, for as long as they are considered assets and not liabilities, the whole of humanity and our planet are imperiled. Our diplomatic forbearers have demonstrated great political will, urgency, and resolve through the establishment of complementary and mutually reinforcing instruments and mechanisms to address our concerns. The NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture, the TPNW, the IAEA safeguards agreements, the CTBT, the START and New START treaties, the Hague Code of Conduct, nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the proposed FMCT. We of the First Committee have the responsibility of sustaining this diplomatic tradition. The times call for reinvigorated political will to advance the universalization, as well as the full and effective implementation of these instruments. The 11th NPT Review Conference was a missed opportunity to agree on concrete, tangible measures to move forward our stalled commitments. It is deeply regrettable that the recent RevCon demonstrated the gradual erosion of the established principles for nuclear disarmament, and that the proposed solutions have been overshadowed by politicization. The majority of non-nuclear weapons states, who have been faithfully implementing their arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, have been aspiring for a world free of nuclear weapons since August 1945. We look forward to the first TPNW review conference scheduled late this year, which offers a constructive and forward-looking platform to advance this aspiration. Finally, Chair, we convey our support for the resolutions that have been put forward under this cluster and look forward to their adoption. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [50:29]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa. South Africa [50:40]: Thank you, Chairperson. South Africa associates with the statements delivered by the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. Deteriorating security conditions and the weakening of the global disarmament architecture have increased the risks associated with nuclear weapons. We meet against the backdrop of the failure of the third consecutive review conference of the NPT to reach consensus, placing the NPT and international peace and security in jeopardy. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The absence of an agreed outcome does not diminish the obligations undertaken by States Parties, nor the commitments made at previous review conferences. South Africa attaches great importance to the continued validity and balanced implementation of the commitments agreed in 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences. We remain concerned that Article VI continues to be undermined by nuclear weapon modernization programmes. plans to expand stockpiles, evolving deterrence arrangements, and the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines. The belief that nuclear deterrence guarantees security is misguided. Chairperson, it is unjustifiable that the majority of states would have to bear the catastrophic consequences of the use and testing of nuclear weapons, particularly without legally binding assurances. South Africa recognizes the TPNW as an important contribution to advancing nuclear disarmament. The TPNW does not in any way replace the obligations and commitments already made under the NPT and other instruments, but reinforces efforts towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We commend the universalization of the treaty with 101 signatories to date. And we call on states to fully participate in the first review conference. We also call on the remaining annex two states to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and maintain a moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions. of utmost priority should remain on the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. South Africa further reiterates its strong support for the inviolability of nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes. Thank you, Chairperson. 1st Committee · Chair [53:33]: I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of France. France [53:44]: Chairman, France associates itself with the statement made by the European Union and would like to make the following comments in our national capacity. France reaffirms the essential nature of the NPT, the cornerstone of international security architecture. The negotiations carried out at the last review conference have confirmed the strong attachment of the States Parties to the basic principles of the Treaty. This multilateral framework remains the only one that makes it possible to achieve the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, in respect for the principle of undiminished security for all. France's ambition is to move forward on the path towards nuclear disarmament according to a gradual approach, which is anchored in strategic reality. France has a unique record under Article VI of the NPT. The unilateral measures that it has taken are unprecedented. Backed up by this ambition, France will continue to support measures to reduce strategic risks. a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the entry into force of the CTBT, greater transparency in the implementation of commitments under the three pillars of the NPT, in agreement with the Action Plan of 2010. France's mobilization will be complete, namely when it comes to the P5 process, which we chair. Chairman, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs remain sources of concern. France calls upon Iran to not block cooperation with the IAEA. It stands ready to contribute to diplomatic efforts to find a lasting agreement, also robust and verifiable, which would guarantee that Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon. France also urges North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible and manner in accordance with the Security Council resolutions. France will continue to support the IAEA, whose actions are essential to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. It congratulates Guinea and Somalia for the entry into force of their agreement on widespread guarantees and encourage the last state party of the NPT who has not yet done so to follow this path. Lastly, France remains committed to the sensitive technology export control regime, which contributes to facilitate the legitimate trade and to develop cooperation when it comes to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Chairman, thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [56:34]: I thank the distinguished representative of France for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada on behalf of group of countries. Canada · Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey [56:45]: Thank you, Chair. I take the floor on behalf of Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia. Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic. Of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. Chair. It is in the interests of all humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again. Maintaining the 81-year nuclear taboo is critical to achieving our common goal of complete, irreversible, and verifiable nuclear disarmament. In January 2022, the leaders of the P5 reaffirmed in a joint statement that, "A nuclear war cannot be won. And must never be fought." We urge the P5 to uphold this commitment to intensify dialogue towards this goal. We remain dedicated to pursuing a practical and achievable path. Toward the shared vision of a world free from nuclear weapons. Our approach to disarmament takes careful account of the global security environment with a clear focus on the risks posed by nuclear weapons. At its heart, our. Commitment is informed by a deep awareness of the devastating humanitarian and environmental consequences that nuclear conflict would bring. Much of the nuclear. Arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation architecture remains strong and functional, even under the present challenging security conditions. The IAEA plays a vital role in advancing global nuclear nonproliferation through the application of safeguards. At the same time, the Agency is indispensable in promoting access to the peaceful uses. Of nuclear energy and technology, including through. Its technical cooperation program, while supporting the highest standards of nuclear safety and security. The CTBT, while it has yet to enter into force, has helped build and sustain a. Powerful norm against nuclear testing. We call for the CTBT's prompt entry into force, which would activate its full verification regime and enhance our collective ability to monitor and reinforce treaty compliance. Yet our common pursuit is addressing fundamental challenges, including irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, a lack of respect for international. Law, as well as the rapid and opaque expansion of some nuclear. Arsenals and a persistent stalemate in reaching new agreements, such as on fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Chair. The nuclear weapons states, and especially the three largest arsenals, have a particular responsibility. We call on them to pursue transparency and risk reduction measures and enter into multilateral strategic stability talks. Since the expiration of the New START treaty, the world has been left without any reciprocal nuclear arms control agreements. It is of the utmost importance that discussions begin on new agreements reflecting the rapidly changing security environment. We urge Russia and China to accept the U.S. invitation to hold such discussions towards our collective disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation objectives. We regret that the 2026 NPT Review Conference concluded without a consensus outcome document. Despite this, we draw positive. Signals from the sustained dialogue among the P5, and we remain committed to fulfilling our obligations and advancing our commitments. Across all three pillars of the treaty. As we begin the next NPT review cycle, it is imperative that the P5 continue the conversation on strategic risk reduction, transparency, and commitments against nuclear testing. We note their ongoing conversations under the P5 process as a positive indication of potential further cooperation. As tensions continue to rise globally and nuclear. Risks increase concurrently, it is more important than ever to find common ground on measures to prevent nuclear war, increase. Transparency and accountability, and build confidence and trust. 1st Committee · Chair [1:00:47]: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for his statement on behalf of group of countries. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Democratic People's Republic of Korea [1:01:00]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Nuclear weapons had appeared eight years ago. Since then, mankind has been aspiring to a nuclear-free, peaceful, and stable world without nuclear threat or nuclear wars. The world is, however, coming closer to the threshold of nuclear war, as there has been a spate of geopolitical crises in different parts of the world in recent years. Further, mistrust and confrontation are on increase between nuclear powers as never before. Particular concern is that global strategic stability is shaken at its root. The US, after its successive withdrawals from arms control treaties, even destroyed the last bulwark of international arms control regime. Extended deterrence provided by the US to its non-nuclear allies and their nuclear sharing mechanism, and US attempt to transfer nuclear-propelled submarine technology to Australia and the ROK. These stand as main factors of undermining the international nonproliferation regime. For the nuclear disarmament regime to take effect, it is imperative for the U.S., the world's biggest nuclear power, to refrain from any act that may trigger a nuclear arms race. And it should withdraw its nuclear assets deployed overseas and take a lead in reducing nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, Japan has made a tacit move to develop nuclear capabilities under the veil of nuclear victim. It has now gone so far as to openly state its sinister nuclear ambition, even discussing the amendment of the three non-nuclear principles. The international community needs to bear in mind that there would be an irretrievable disaster for peace in Asia and the rest of the world if we remain indifferent to the war criminal state's scheme to possess nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, the Korean Peninsula has been the world's hottest spot for the protracted period of more than eight years. The danger of nuclear conflict continues to hover about there. That is due to military moves by the most aggressive nuclear war state and its allies containing nuclear elements as well. The security environment around us has kept the world's record without a moment of peace. DPRK, to cope with this, has built up its war deterrent. and it is his legitimate right to self-defense, and it serves as a main guarantee and effective safety catch that stifles the enemy's will to provoke a war and maintain the balance of power in the region. The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear state, will continue to exercise its sovereign rights to the full under its constitution to prevent all types of war and firmly secure peace and stability of the world. The full version of the statement will be available online. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:03:41]: I thank the distinguished representative of DPRK for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel. Israel [1:03:50]: Thank you, Chair. For decades now, Iran has advanced its military nuclear program while deceiving the international community. Iran is a clear example of a state that refuses to comply with international instruments. Iran's noncompliance has been portrayed in IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, such as the one adopted in June 2025. Since then, Iran's systematic noncompliance has deepened dramatically. Over 9 tons of nuclear material, including 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, have been outside the agency's safeguards for more than a year. Iran did not provide any necessary information regarding the status of its nuclear material and facilities, nor access to any of those facilities. Furthermore, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on June 10, 2025, calling Iran to urgently remedy its noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. Iran failed, again, to respond to the international community's calls. And on September 9, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution deciding to report Iran's noncompliance to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. Chair, in response to Iran's persistent and significant nonperformance of its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA, the Security Council sanctions on Iran were reinstated in September 2025. It is imperative for the Security Council to exercise its authority and fulfill its responsibility to convene the 1737 Committee, nominate a panel of experts pursuant to Resolution 1929, and oversee the implementation of the sanctions. The international community must remain vigilant and use every tool at its disposal to prevent Iran from obtaining military nuclear weapon capabilities. Mr. Chair, with regards to the Syrian nuclear file and TPNW, we have referenced both in our general debate statement. Lastly, Chair, some actors in the Middle East still claim that a comprehensive security architecture can be initiated without direct engagement with Israel. or through ill-motivated initiatives, such as the UN Conference on the Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. This notion is in direct contradiction with the 1999 UNDC guidelines and the principles for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zones. Israel will not participate in unrealistic processes that bypass the established practices. The full statement will be shared with the Secretariat. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:06:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of Israel for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland. Switzerland [1:06:54]: Mr. Chair, the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture is under unprecedented pressure. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of this architecture. Switzerland deeply regrets that for the third consecutive time, its review conference was unable to reach a consensus outcome. This situation tests the treaty's durability, but it does not change existing obligations or the commitments made at previous conferences, which must be fully implemented. Mr. Chair, the reversal of the trend in nuclear disarmament that we noted last year has unfortunately been confirmed. Nuclear arsenals are being modernized and even expanded amid a lack of transparency. Since the expiry of the New START Treaty, no agreement limits the strategic arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers, and no negotiations on a successor are underway. Renewed efforts are needed. First, we call on the United States and the Russian Federation not to exceed the New START limits and to begin negotiations without delay on a new arms control framework. The other nuclear weapons states have a constructive role to play, including within the P5 process. Second, we encourage the nuclear weapons states to continue their efforts towards greater transparency and accountability in nuclear disarmament. Third, the norm against nuclear testing must be preserved. We call on all states to respect existing moratoria, to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and, if they have not yet done so, to sign and ratify it. Finally, we must respond to the increased risk of nuclear weapons use. While not a substitute for disarmament, concrete risk reduction measures are needed, and all states must contribute to them. We urge States possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from any destabilizing action, to reduce the role of these weapons in their doctrines, and to take into account the risks associated with emerging technologies. In this regard, Switzerland calls for an agreement to keep artificial intelligence out of decisions to use nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, Switzerland recalls that it condemns any use of force contrary to the UN Charter and that nuclear facilities must not be attacked. Having said that, no state can ignore its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. We call upon Iran to immediately re-establish its full cooperation with the IAEA. Switzerland also remains concerned about the expansion of the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic programs. Mr. Chair, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We must redouble our efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. And the full version of our statement will be available online. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:09:50]: I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Maldives. Maldives [1:10:01]: Thank you, Chair. 80 years after the UN first call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, we remain far from that call. Nuclear tensions are rising. Countries continue to modernize their weapons. The important arms control agreements are weakening. Maldives has consistently called for total elimination of nuclear weapons. Their use would cause serious harm to people and the environment far beyond national borders. The nuclear risk requires urgent action. The Maldives highlight three priorities. First, we must make progress on nuclear disarmament. The expiry of the New START treaty is a serious setback. Nuclear weapons states should return to strategic dialogues and work toward verifiable limits on arsenals. Second, we must strengthen existing treaties. The NPT remains important for nuclear disarmament. We also call for early entry into force of CTBT and until then, continue moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosion. Third, we must address lasting harm caused by nuclear weapon and testing. For small island state, radioactive pollution threaten our ocean, maritime life, and food security. Affected communities need support, including long-term environmental monitoring, access to relevant data, technical assistance, and remediation. Progress should be measured by what change in practice, fewer risks, stronger verification, better implementation, and tangible support for those already affected. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:12:01]: I thank the distinguished representative of Maldives for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste [1:12:09]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Timor-Leste aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of NAM and by Vietnam on behalf of ASEAN. For Timor-Leste, the existence of nuclear weapons is not simply a question of military security. It is fundamentally about human survival, human dignity, and our collective responsibility to future generations. We believe peace cannot be sustained through fear. It must be built on trust, respect for international law, and genuine cooperation among nations. Excellencies, The repeated failures of NPT review conferences to achieve consensus remind us that commitments alone are insufficient. We urgently need renewed political will, meaningful dialogue, and measurable progress toward fulfilled disarmament obligations. We therefore call upon all states, particularly nuclear weapon states, to pursue credible, transparent, and time-bound disarmament measures, reduce nuclear risk, and refrain from actions that could undermine strategic stability or encourage a renewal arms race. We must also recognize the human and development cost of nuclear weapons. At a time when millions struggle with poverty, food insecurity, and climate-related disaster, enormous resources continue to be devoted to nuclear arsenal. Even a fraction of these resources could strengthen healthcare, education, climate resilience, and opportunities for young people. As ASEAN members, Timor-Leste attach particular importance to a strengthened nuclear weapons-free zone, including the Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone established under the Bangkok Treaty. This arrangement demonstrated how regional corporations can build confidence, reinforce non-proliferations, regional corporations, and commitment, and contribute to global disarmament. We encourage stronger implementations, continued dialogue, legally binding, negative security, insurance from nuclear weapon states. Mr. Chair, Timor-Leste believes that nuclear security cannot rest indefinitely upon the threat of mutual destructions. Genuine security must be grounded in international law, confidence, and the shared convictions that every human life deserves protections. Finally, Our historical transitory has taught us the value of peace and the importance of international solidarity. We therefore remain committed to working with all member states towards a world where future generations can live without the fear of nuclear. 1st Committee · Chair [1:15:12]: I thank the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Venezuela. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) [1:15:26]: Good afternoon, Mr. Chair. The proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to represent an extremely relevant challenge for humanity. Their elimination is an ethical imperative and a fundamental goal for guaranteeing international peace and security. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela reiterates the importance of strengthening multilateral efforts in the area of international security, disarmament and non-proliferation, strictly in accordance with the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Venezuela reaffirms its positions of principle in favour of nuclear disarmament, which continues to be the top priority of the United Nations in the area of disarmament. We maintain our firm commitment to continue to promote initiatives aimed at reducing risks associated with the existence of nuclear weapons and to progressively move towards their total elimination. In this regard, Venezuela encourages the adoption of measures that would help limit the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. We stress the importance of strengthening international instruments and agreements in the area of arms control and disarmament because of their valuable contribution to international strategic stability. The most effective guarantee against the danger of a nuclear weapon and the use of the threat of use of nuclear weapons continues to be complete nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of all of these weapons. Venezuela underscores the relevance of the United Nations Disarmament Commission as a space for dialogue and the making of concrete recommendations aimed at strengthening the international disarmament agenda. We recognize the importance of continuing to promote consensus in the context of the review process for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to achieving tangible results that would advance the shared disarmament goals. It is also important to move towards legally binding instruments that strengthen security assurances. Venezuela considers that the universalization of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a significant step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. We welcome the recent accessions to the Treaty and the upcoming review conference planned for the end of 2026. We need to continue to promote the expansion and strengthening of these international instruments with the conviction that this will be a decisive contribution to the common goal of achieving the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [1:18:17]: I thank the distinguished representative of Venezuela for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Vietnam. Viet Nam · Permanent Representative [1:18:27]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Vietnam aligns itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement and of ASEAN. Allow me just to make two points. First, there is understandably significant disappointment and concern over the failure of the 2026 NPT Review Conference to reach consensus on a substantive outcome. But at the same time. There is broad agreement that the conference succeeded in generating much needed recommitment to the NPT itself and meaningful momentum for enhanced dialogue, for rebuilding trust, for the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the treaty, and for strengthening the review. Process. We must not lose this momentum. Vietnam calls for enhanced efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. Through unilateral, bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral frameworks. Nuclear weapons states must take the lead. We call on nuclear weapons states to continue to engage in constructive dialogue to reduce nuclear risks. And facilitate future arms control discussions, maintain the moratoria on nuclear explosive testing pending the CTBT's entry into force. Enhance transparency, and fulfill their obligations under Article VI towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The second point I would make is this: the risk of nuclear weapons being used is real and increasing. Let us not wait for a disaster to happen before taking action. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:20:08]: I thank the distinguished representative of Vietnam for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria. Algeria [1:20:17]: Thank you. We align ourselves with the statements delivered by NAM, the African Group. Again, we regret the failure of this year's NPT Review Conference to achieve consensus, despite the efforts of the Vietnamese presidency, and for this we are grateful. This failure, the third in a row, conveys an alarming message about the NPT's future and the credibility of the nonproliferation regime. It also reveals the continued gap between declared commitments and actual implementation of disarmament obligations. Still, the NPT remains the pillar of the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime. Having presided over the NPT Conference twice, Algeria is aware that the success of such a conference is still possible when political will is mustered and when parties show readiness to uphold their obligations in good faith. As tensions continue to rise and arsenals continue to modernize, nuclear disarmament cannot be further deferred. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. We renew our support for the NPT. In addition, we strongly condemn attacks against IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facilities. These attacks imperil nuclear security and safety and undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The humanitarian dimension must remain at the heart of international nuclear disarmament efforts. In this context, we welcome the first international conference on victim assistance and environmental remediation in September 2026. We look forward to its recommendations. In conclusion, The cumulative explosive force of shelling on Gaza since October 2026 is estimated to be 15 times the explosive force of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. We strongly condemn these attacks and their destructive humanitarian and environmental consequences for the Palestinian people. We will submit our full statement. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:22:58]: I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Thailand. Thailand [1:23:08]: Chair. Thailand aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the NAM and ASEAN, and will highlight a few points on behalf of my national capacity. The full statement will be delivered online. Escalating political tensions have heightened nuclear risks. The NPT Review Conference concluded without an outcome document for the third consecutive time, and the expiry of the New START Treaty has left the two largest nuclear arsenals without legally binding limits. We urge all States to maintain their nuclear testing moratoria and the remaining Annex 2 States to ratify the CTBT without delay. A nuclear-weapon-free world is the only absolute guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons. We call on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their Article VI NPT obligations and their unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their arsenals with transparency and accountability. Until then, non-nuclear weapons states should receive universal, unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances. Concrete risk reduction measures are urgently needed to complement, but not replace, disarmament. As artificial intelligence enters nuclear command, control and communication systems, decisions on the use of nuclear weapons must remain under human control and never be delegated to machines. In line with Resolution 80/23, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons to affirm this principle in their doctrines. As the Bangkok Treaty approaches the 30th anniversary of its entry into force, we call on all nuclear weapons States to sign and ratify its protocol without reservations. As co-facilitator with Ireland on complementarity, Thailand supports strengthening linkages between the TPNW and the NPT. We look forward to the first TPNW review conference as an inclusive space for dialogue toward our common goal. Chair, Thailand actively advances peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The Rama III IAEA Rays of Hope Anchor Center, the first in Southeast Asia, has trained over 150 professionals from 18 countries. Looking ahead, Thailand seeks to expand this network to multiply the impact. In parallel with IAEA support, we are also building the regulatory foundations for small modular reactors. Nuclear technology should serve to save lives, not to end them. The use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Only mutual trust, dialogue and political will can reverse this alarming trend. We urge all Member States to join us in preserving a peaceful and secure world. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:25:56]: I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Portugal. Portugal [1:26:05]: Portugal aligns with the EU statement and wishes to make three points in its national capacity. First, we must reaffirm the NPT as the foundation of our collective efforts. The choice is clear. We should make cooperation stronger than fear. The NPT embodies the choice of cooperation. Its three pillars must advance together. The absence of consensus at the review conferences must not lead to resignation. It must renew our collective determination to implement the treaty. Second, we must turn that determination into concrete progress. The expiration of the New START Treaty is a serious challenge, and Portugal calls for renewed dialogue on strategic stability. The invitation by the US to start such dialogue is a good basis for further work. P5 talks on risk reduction must accompany this effort. Channels of dialogue must remain open. The entry into force of the CTBT remains an unfinished promise. We call on the remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify it. Third, we must strengthen trust through verification and make peaceful uses of nuclear energy deliver tangible benefits. Portugal therefore supports the International Atomic Energy Agency's independent and impartial verification. Full cooperation within the Agency is essential to guarantee that States comply with their non-proliferation obligations. Cases of non-compliance and lack of cooperation with the Agency are alarming and should be addressed. The nuclear agenda must also offer opportunities for development. The right of peaceful uses, consistent with the NPT, must translate into practical benefits. cancer treatment, safer foods, cleaner water, and stronger scientific capacities. Technical cooperation should widen access to these benefits, particularly for developing countries. Chair, the credibility of our commitments will be the measure by what we collectively deliver. Portugal calls on all members to use the power of diplomacy to reduce arsenals, prevent proliferation, and bring nuclear science closer to the people. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:28:42]: I thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe [1:28:52]: Zimbabwe aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Africa Group, and we add the following in our national capacity. Distinguished delegates, the international nuclear disarmament architecture is showing increasing signs of weakness as diminishing political will and eroding good faith continue to undermine multilateral efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The year under review has seen long-standing bilateral strategic arms reduction treaties expiring without successor arrangements in place. We also witnessed the 11th review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concluding this spring without a consensus outcome for the third consecutive time. However, we commend Vietnam for its dexterity as President of the NPT Review Conference and for its consultative approach across regional groups. Chair, Zimbabwe implores nuclear weapons states to recommit to their NPT Article VI disarmament obligations, including the 2010 NPT Action Plan and to other existing undertakings in this regard. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Zimbabwe calls for the delivery of negative security assurances to all non-nuclear weapons states and for the articulation of no first use policies as an immediate guardrail. Zimbabwe further urges all remaining Annex 2 states to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with a renewed sense of urgency. Zimbabwe looks forward to the first review conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to be held later this year under the presidency of South Africa as an important platform which complements the NPT and plays a vital role in catalyzing disarmament. Distinguished delegates, To achieve the balanced implementation of the NPT, we call for the increased provision of peaceful nuclear science-related capacity building and training programs, especially for the Global South. Zimbabwe also underscores the central role of the IAEA, both in verifying compliance through its safeguards system and in supporting nuclear safety and security worldwide. Let me conclude, Chair, by reaffirming that Zimbabwe remains steadfast in its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:31:21]: I thank the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of New Zealand. New Zealand [1:31:31]: Chair, New Zealand remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Nuclear arsenals continue to be modernised and expanded. The role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines is growing. Strategic competition between nuclear-armed states is intensifying and nuclear risks are increasing. Nuclear rhetoric and threats are becoming more common. These developments should concern us all. We are moving further away from, rather than closer to, the world free of nuclear weapons that states have repeatedly committed themselves to achieving. Chair, the NPT remains indispensable to progress on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. However, three review cycles without consensus have weakened the treaty and impeded its full implementation. This trend must be reversed. The NPT was never intended to legitimize the permanent possession of nuclear weapons. We call on nuclear weapons states to take practical and measurable steps to implement all their NPT commitments. In the interests of transparency and accountability, nuclear weapons states should provide clear, measurable, and comparable information on the implementation of their disarmament obligations and commitments. Further to this, we call on States with nuclear weapons to engage in strategic dialogue to reduce the risk of use and arms races. We also urge them to negotiate verifiable reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Our discussions in this Committee have clearly shown the importance of maintaining and strengthening the global moratorium against nuclear explosive testing. New Zealand calls on States that have not yet joined the CTBT to do so without delay. Its entry into force is long overdue. We welcome the recent ratification of the treaty by Tonga, completing universalization across the Pacific. Chair, the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons remain central to the need for their elimination. New Zealand supports the TPNW as the clearest legal rejection of nuclear weapons. We encourage states to contribute constructively to the TPNW's first review conference to strengthen implementation, broaden participation, and reinforce the norm against nuclear weapons. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty reinforces that norm and the Pacific's commitment to peace and security. This and inadequate prior pre-launch notification made the recent test of a nuclear-capable ballistic missile into the zone all the more concerning to New Zealand and other Pacific states. New Zealand welcomes the work of the United Nations Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War. Decisions relating to humanity's most destructive weapons must be informed by the best available evidence. We await its independent findings. We are confident that as global understanding deepens, so too will momentum for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Closing the gap between commitment and implementation in nuclear disarmament and arms control must remain our collective priority. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:34:28]: I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil. Brazil [1:34:37]: Mr. Chair, nuclear disarmament remains a priority for most UN member states, yet the implementation gap continues to widen. The expiration of the New START without a successor leaves the two largest nuclear arsenals without legally binding limits. Negotiations must urgently resume. The failure of the 11th NPT Review Conference reveals a profound implementation crisis. Commitments undertaken in 1995, 2000, and 2010 remain valid. The NPT cannot legitimize indefinite nuclear possession. Brazil is alarmed by arsenal modernization, expanding nuclear deterrence arrangements, and nuclear sharing. portraying nuclear weapons as indispensable to security and their minds non-proliferation itself. Restoring confidence requires transparency and accountability. Nuclear weapons states must report substantively on their arsenals, doctrines, and Article 6 implementation, enabling meaningful scrutiny by all state parties. N5 dialogue cannot substitute for broader accountability. Brazil supports advancing nuclear disarmament verification, including through the group of scientific and technical experts beginning work in 2027. We also reaffirmed the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcome the comprehensive new study. In this regard, we invite delegations to co-sponsor the resolution presented by Brazil and Mexico. Mr. Chair, deteriorating security conditions cannot justify postponing disarmament. They make concrete progress more urgent. Nuclear weapons states must translate commitments into action through transparent, accountable, and verifiable measures towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:37:01]: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mauritania. Mauritania [1:37:15]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. One of the risks of nuclear weapons against humanity, in addition to the environment and sustainable development, is the renewed threat to international peace and security. These are all elements that require us to renew international commitment for the full elimination of these weapons, which are an existential threat for humanity's survival. We reaffirm our principled commitment to effectively participating in international efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation. And this we have stressed through being part of all efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons. The full and complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons based on the NPT and relevant instruments is the only real guarantee for their lack of use or threat of use. And we must work on to ensure the universality of all instruments that regulate nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction, including specifically the NPT as the cornerstone and the launching pad for international cooperation in nuclear disarmament. We regret the failure of three consecutive review conferences of the NPT to reach the adoption of an outcome document. This is a setback for the nonproliferation regime and for multilateralism. This is a failure that we must avoid, again, through preparatory meetings for the next review conference. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on a regional level is one of the main approaches taken to gradually reach nuclear disarmament for the entire world, and this is still a distant goal, unfortunately. However, we believe in this approach, and this is constant and firm since we joined the NPT in 1993 and then the in 1996. which is for the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone in addition to the TPNW. We also worked on -- we are working on establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and free of other weapons of mass destruction, as decided as the indefinite extension and review conference of 1995 and UN -- relevant UN resolutions. and specifically the resolution stating about having a legally binding instrument for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. And this was worked on through the annual conference that has had seven sessions so far and has reached remarkable results. The state parties of this conference are agreed on establishing this zone-- the microphone has been cut off. 1st Committee · Chair [1:40:19]: I thank the distinguished representative of Mauritania for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia. Indonesia [1:40:28]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia aligns itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement, ASEAN and TPNW States Parties. I wish to make three additional points. First, we must reject the normalization of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence does not eliminate insecurity. To the contrary, it perpetuates it. No state should regard the capacity for catastrophic destruction as legitimate or necessary instrument of security. All nuclear-armed states must urgently make credible, concrete, measurable, and irreversible progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Existing disarmament commitments, including under Article VI of the NPT, must be fully implemented. Second, we must address nuclear risk without legitimizing nuclear weapons. Indonesia believes that nuclear weapons anywhere pose catastrophic risk everywhere. Emerging technologies, particularly AI and autonomous systems, further heighten the risk of miscalculation, unintended escalation, and loss of control. Pending their total elimination, full and effective human control and oversight over decisions concerning nuclear weapons use must remain indispensable. The catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons must remain central for disarmament, guided by sound science. Indonesia supports the Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War and looks forward to its findings in 2027. Third, we must strengthen the foundations of nuclear disarmament. The NPT, CTBT, TPNW, and nuclear-weapon-free zones are mutually reinforcing. Their implementation and universalization must advance together. This requires sustained political commitment, broader participation, and practical cooperation. In this period, in April 2026, Indonesia co-hosted an Asia-Pacific regional conference in Jakarta to advance TPNW universalization. An Indonesian expert also contributed to the UN qualified group of experts on nuclear weapons free zones, which completed its study this year on strengthening existing zones and exploring new ones. Through cooperation with the CTBTO, including six seismic monitoring stations, Indonesia contributes to international nuclear test monitoring. Looking ahead, the first TPNW Review Conference this November offers an opportunity to strengthen implementation and expand participation to advance our common objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, we must move from nuclear dependence to disarmament, from promises to implementation. A world free of nuclear weapons is not merely an aspiration, it is an imperative for the future of humanity. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:43:19]: I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of United Arab Emirates. United Arab Emirates [1:43:32]: Mr. Chair, at the outset, the UAE reiterates the significant importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. In this context, we regret the nonadoption of the outcome document of the 11th Review Conference of the NPT for the third consecutive time. This reiterates the need for real political will to bypass disagreements and to implement existing obligations and achieve tangible progress that increases the effectiveness of the treaty and its universality and credibility. We reiterate our call to nuclear weapons states to take tangible and transparent and irreversible and verifiable steps towards nuclear disarmament as the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons. We stress our support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It is important to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. We look forward to the seventh session of the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of the Zone in November under the chairmanship of the Sultanate of Oman. We encourage all the countries of the region to engage constructively with the aim of reaching a legally binding treaty that enhances regional security and stability. The CTBT entering force is a main step to enhance the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Therefore, we call on Annex 2 States to sign and ratify this treaty so that it may enter into force as soon as possible. We also reiterate the central role of the IAEA safeguards regime in enhancing the nonproliferation regime and ensuring the useful use of nuclear energy as a reliable mechanism that ensures the use of nuclear facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. Therefore, based on transparency and international standards as part of our national program for nuclear energy, my country has now a CSA with the IAEA and signed the additional protocol, we reiterate our call on states that have questions regarding their nuclear activities to cooperate fully with the IAEA and take all necessary measures to build confidence in the peaceful nature of their programs. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, the UAE-- the microphone has been cut off. 1st Committee · Chair [1:46:32]: I thank the distinguished representative of United Arab Emirates for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso [1:46:44]: Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, at this moment of uncertainty and antagonism and distrust between states, Burkina Faso would like to express its concern in the light of nuclear arsenals. Our concern is all the more serious as these arsenals are increasingly modernized in order to cause even more destruction as if we'd forgotten the painful lessons that we learned in the past. Chairman, Burkina has fully supported the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, not as a formality, but as a moral commitment towards our peoples. The three pillars of that treaty, disarmament, the non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, they are a basis for the future and the future of our children and grandchildren. We call upon states that have nuclear weapons to go from words to action to concrete commitments. Chairman, distinguished delegates, through the Pelendaba Treaty, Africa has made the decision to make our land a territory that's free of nuclear weapons. This is not an abdication. It's the conviction that lasting security is built through cooperation, dialogue, and the respect for rules that we have taken together. We invite the other regions of the world to follow that example. Chairman, Burkina Faso is also concerned by artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, as well as cybernetic technology. These technologies should not be able to decide alone the use of a nuclear weapon. We therefore call upon the international community to draw up clear standards which would guarantee an effective human control and a permanent control over any decision that could have catastrophic consequences for humankind. Chairman, Burkina Faso, like other states of the Sahel, is facing serious threats on a daily basis: terrorism, transnational crime, violent extremism, arms trafficking, like the sacrifices made within the framework of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Our efforts should continue along the same lines in order to strengthen the ability of states who, on a daily basis, are fighting for the survival of their populations against enemies that don't respect borders. Nuclear disarmament and collective security must be tackled from a global perspective, because the asymmetric threats cannot be dealt with in isolation. Distinguished guests, our people are expecting acts and results, not promises. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [1:49:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of Burkina Faso for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Myanmar. Myanmar [1:49:55]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Myanmar aligns with the statements of ASEAN and NAM respectively. Myanmar reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons remind us that their total elimination remains the only effective guarantee against their use or threat of use. Myanmar has once again submitted its draft resolution entitled Nuclear Disarmament at this session and proposed its biannual considerations beginning with this current session. We urge all member states to co-sponsor and extend their continued support to the resolutions. Mr. Chair, a large-scale nuclear conflict could severely disrupt the global climate, agricultural productions, and food security, with catastrophic consequences for present and future generations. At a time of growing climate and environmental challenges, nuclear disarmament is essential not only for international peace and security, but also for safeguarding humanity and our planet. Mr. Chair, the past three NPT review conferences have consecutively failed to adopt a consensus outcome document. It is deeply regrettable. We all are responsible and must work together in good faith and with strong political will and flexibility for sake of ending this cycle of failure to adopt an outcome document towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, Myanmar reiterate its support for the CDBD and call for its early entry into force. We also welcome the forthcoming first review conference of the TPNW and believe that it will contribute to advancing nuclear disarmament. Mr. Chair, since the illegal military coup in 2021, the people of Myanmar have suffered immensely from the military widespread violence against civilians. We remain deeply concerned about the military hunters so-called nuclear power plant and the potential misuse of nuclear-related technologies to non-peaceful purposes. The military past record raises serious concern about its credibility as a partner in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferations. We stress that any international cooperation on nuclear energy with Myanmar must take place only under a legitimate civilian government with effective safeguards, transparency, and civilian oversight. Mr. Chair, nuclear technology must serve peace and development, not military repressions or destruction. Taking this opportunity, I appeal to all member states to prevent the transfer of arms, weapons, jet fuel, dual-use items, and related technologies to the military hunter. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:52:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of Myanmar for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba. Cuba [1:52:56]: Mr. Chairman, we support the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of South Africa on behalf of the States Parties and signatories of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Likewise, we would support the statement made by the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of a group of countries. The global situation is increasingly dangerous and challenging. The imminent danger of avoiding the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than eight decades ago continues to be latent as long as we haven't eliminated in a transparent way, as well as a complete and irreversible way, all of the nuclear weapons that exist. The reiterated failure of the most recent review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons alerts us, takes us away from a world free of nuclear weapons and is a disturbing signal that requires concrete action. The Disarmament Commission has not been able to adopt recommendations either, specific recommendations on this item. What is urgent is to universalize the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and we welcome the fact that Tonga has joined this instrument in 2026, which contributes to this aim. We hope that the first review conference will achieve successful results, and we reiterate our support for South Africa in order to comply with its work. It's crucial as well to see the entry into force of the treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear testing. We reaffirm our support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We support, as well, the inalienable right of all states to develop the production, research, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. With respect to our region, we ratify the existence of the Latin American and Caribbean programme as a zone of peace and the commitment to the application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We repudiate the Monroe Doctrine and any attempt to militarise, to intervene or to have imperial domination of our region. A world of justice, dignity and peace is possible if respect prevails for international law and cooperation between states. Cuba will continue to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons under the principles of our foreign policy, reaffirmed in our Constitution. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [1:55:49]: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ecuador. Ecuador [1:56:01]: Chairman, the worsening of the international security situation, the increase in geopolitical tension, the modernization of nuclear arsenals and the growing nuclear rhetoric reinforce the fundamental conviction of Ecuador. There are no good means for nuclear weapons. What we see is the the it's the persistent use of the threat of nuclear disasters with the unimaginable consequences. Even though the measures to reduce the nuclear risk are urgent, they cannot replace disarmament. The only effective guarantee against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons are its total elimination, also transparent, verifiable, and irreversible. Chairman, the NPT continues to be the cornerstone of the global regime for disarmament and nonproliferation. Unfortunately, the 11th review conference concluded for the third consecutive time without a consensus on the final document. And this should reinforce our determination to preserve the treaty and its review process. The obligations of the parties and the commitments taken on in previous review conferences remain valid. In particular, Article 6 establishes the obligation to proceed with good faith on negotiations on measures relative to reducing nuclear armament. At the same time, Ecuador reaffirms the inalienable right of States Parties to the research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. At the same time, Ecuador reaffirms its support for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and we hope that the first review will continue to its full implementation. 30 years after its opening for signature, the entry into force of the CPT continues to be urgent. We exert states of Article 2 who have not yet done so to ratify without delay. Our region took six decades ago, took the decision to of security without nuclear weapons. As a state party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we reaffirm the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones, their full respect, and the need for unequivocal and legally binding security guarantees. Ecuador will continue to work for an international order which is based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the international law, as well as cooperation with a view to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [1:58:51]: I thank the distinguished representative of Ecuador for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain. Spain [1:59:02]: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Spain supports the statement made by the European Union and would like to make the following comments in our national capacity. The, uh, uh, current uncertain international context renews the importance of the regime of, uh, nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. We value the commitment, uh, to the NPT reaffirmed by the states parties during the review conference. 2027, and we reiterate our support for the necessary universalisation and full implementation of the treaty. We continue to defend nuclear disarmament as the best guarantee for a lasting peace that is stable and secure. In accordance with article 6 of the NPT, nuclear weapons States must move forward in complying with their obligations when it comes to disarmament. We support a strategic dialogue with a view to adopting new legally binding agreements that would limit the large nuclear arsenals through the expiration of the New START, especially with a view to the increase of certain nuclear arsenals. Spain supports a dialogue and an agreement with practical measures to reduce risk, such as those promoted by the Stockholm Initiative, which we are a member of, while being aware of the fact that these measures do not replace in any way the ultimate objective of disarmament and the increase in transparency. Spain is committed to a diplomatic and lasting and verifiable solution to the question of the Iranian nuclear question based on full cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and respect for its obligations stemming from its safeguards agreement and the resolutions of the Security Council. The recent report of the IAEA reflects a situation which is extremely serious in the DPRK. We urge their authorities to fully comply with the resolutions, to refrain from new testing, and to undertake their full and verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. Spain reaffirms its full support for the central role of the IAEA in the international nonproliferation regime, as well as the universalization of the safeguards agreement of the Additional Protocol as the international standard of verification. We must see the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT. And we urge all states in Annex 2 to a site and ratify it, and the Russia Federation for its return to this. Meanwhile, we defend the maintaining of the international moratorium on nuclear testing. We support the beginning of negotiations for a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material, and we encourage the maintenance of the existing moratorium on that production. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 1st Committee · Chair [2:01:57]: I thank the distinguished permanent representative of to the Conference on Disarmament for a statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Bahrain. Bahrain · Permanent Representative [2:02:15]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We align ourselves with the statement of the Arab Group, the statement of NAM. Mr. Chair, the Kingdom of Bahrain attaches great importance to the efforts aimed at a world free of nuclear weapons, based on our belief that the continued presence of these weapons and the risks of their proliferation and the arms races threaten international peace and security and require enhancing multilateralism and building trust and dialogue. In this context, we would like to focus on the following points. First of all, The Kingdom of Bahrain reiterates its support for the efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and enhancing the nonproliferation regime and implementing related commitments. We also emphasize the importance of the NPT as a main pillar of the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime and the need to enhance its three pillars. Second, the Kingdom of Bahrain reiterates its its position supporting the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the implementation of 1995 resolution on the Middle East. We emphasize the importance of placing all nuclear activities and facilities to international safeguards. In this context, we call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to meet its commitments in line with the CSA and to fully cooperate with the IAEA to deal with outstanding issues related to safeguards and verification. The Kingdom looks forward to effectively participating in the seventh session of the conference related to the establishment of this zone chaired by Sultan the Sultan of Oman which is scheduled to be held in November 3rd the kingdom of Bahrain emphasizes the importance of maintaining State's right to the useful you to the peaceful uses of nuclear power and technology based on International commitments and security and safety norms and safeguards. We also reiterate our commitment to the nonproliferation regime and the international safeguards through the CSA that we have with IAEA and the Additional Protocol. We appreciate the central role of the IAEA in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programs. And in light of the latest regional developments, we emphasize the importance of protecting nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes from any attacks or hostilities. And in conclusion, we affirm that sustainable security is based on international law. Microphone has been cut off. 1st Committee · Chair [2:05:16]: Distinguished representative of Bahrain. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of United States of America. United States of America [2:05:24]: Chair, upon the expiration of New START in February, the United States called for the next era of arms control. This era is one that recognizes the United States increasingly faces not one, but two nuclear peers in Russia and China. Subsequently, we have asked both countries to work with us with the goal of reducing the risk of nuclear war through concrete actions. This process won't be quick. Past agreements, including New START, took time to negotiate and were built upon decades of precedent. They were also between only two powers. However, just because something is difficult does not mean that we should avoid pursuing it or settle for less than what is necessary for global security. We see three areas ripe for further discussion and development of practical measures: nuclear risk reduction, nuclear testing, and mutual nuclear transparency. We continue to invite our Russian and Chinese colleagues to engage and bring proposals of their own. Chair, as we enter this new era, we will field prompt, precise, and proportional capabilities that underpin an effective nuclear deterrent and ensure that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners remain strong and credible. Let me be clear. U.S. modernization efforts and extended deterrence arrangements do not and have never violated the NPT, but they are necessary to prevent proliferation due to China and Russia's nuclear activities. We will do all of this while seeking to fulfill our President's many statements for a world with fewer nuclear weapons. We cannot achieve that goal safely on our own. Chair, the United States also has demonstrated its commitment to nonproliferation through our support for IAEA safeguards, nuclear security, and multilateral initiatives that help partners develop capabilities to prevent proliferation. We continue to encourage all State Parties to the NPT to adopt the highest standards of nonproliferation and IAEA safeguards, and we applaud the progress by both Somalia and Guinea, who have entered into force their IAEA safeguards agreements. We look forward to the single remaining NPT non-nuclear-weapon state without a CSA to finalize one expeditiously. Chair, for over 50 years, the NPT's three pillars have been central to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. But history has shown state parties must do more to implement them. We were extremely disappointed that the last RevCon's final document was not submitted for adoption, thus allowing a treaty violator to be shielded from blocking consensus. It is the duty of all NPT state parties to defend the nonproliferation regime on which we all depend. State parties must fulfill all their NPT obligations, including those under Articles 2 and 3, preventing non-nuclear weapon states like Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon, and those under Article 6, requiring good faith negotiations towards arms control and disarmament. Thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:08:15]: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Japan. Japan · Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament [2:08:28]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Making progress towards nuclear disarmament has become increasingly difficult in recent years. At the 2026 NPT Review Conference, States Parties could not reach consensus on an outcome document. Nevertheless, the conference served as an opportunity for States Parties to demonstrate their unwavering commitment to the NPT and to strengthening its implementation. We commend Ambassador Dao Phuong Viet's tireless efforts to guide us during the course of the conference. Mr. Chair, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan remains committed to realizing a world without nuclear weapons. The tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki must never be repeated. Japan's draft resolution, Common Steps Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons, seeks to encourage the international community to move forward together towards this common goal, building on positive elements in the discussions at the NPT Review Conference and focusing on realistic and practical measures. Such measures include the early entry into force and the universalization of the CTBT. As we mark the 30th anniversary since the opening for signature of the CTBT, Japan calls on all states, especially the remaining Annex II states, to sign and ratify the CTBT. Japan also calls for the immediate commencement of the negotiation of an FMCT and reiterates the importance of voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Japan's draft resolution calls on the nuclear weapons states to engage in efforts to promote international peace and stability, enhance mutual transparency, and adopt concrete risk reduction measures. The resolution also calls for enhanced and equal transparency by the nuclear weapons states, including the use of standard reporting forms and the organization of structured, in-person and interactive discussions in each NPT review cycle. Mr. Chair, we need to strengthen IAEA safeguards to verify that all nuclear material and technology are used for peaceful purposes only. We welcome the recent progress towards universalization of the CSA and call for the process to be completed. We also reiterate our position that AP, together with the CSA, should be the safeguard standard of the NPT. Mr. Chair, Japan is seriously concerned about the advancement of the DPRK's nuclear and missile activities and its military cooperation with Russia. It is essential for the international community to be united and fully implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK's all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges. Japan urges Pyongyang to abide by all the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and fully comply with the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:11:25]: I thank the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Japan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Greece. Greece [2:11:36]: Mr. Chair, Greece fully aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union and will add the following remarks in its national capacity. My country fully supports the NPT and considers it as a cornerstone of the international disarmament and nonproliferation architecture. We regret the lack of consensus during the 11th NPT Review Conference. The preservation and universalization of the NPT, a balanced approach regarding its three pillars, and a sincere dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear States should be top priorities during the next review cycle. Commitments under Article VI are not conditional, and a world free from nuclear weapons remains our goal. Progress must be gradual, realistic, and verifiable. A step-by-step approach, grounded in trust and accountability, remains the most viable path forward. In today's complex security environment, including in Europe, extended nuclear deterrence continues to contribute to strategic flexibility. Greece considers that such arrangements, including within NATO, are consistent with the NPT. My country encourages further reductions to nuclear arsenals and urges all the relevant parties to continue engaging in the dialogue towards concluding a successor agreement to New START Treaty. The universalization and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty remain key priorities. Ongoing proliferation crises are undermining the integrity of the treaty. Developments in Iran and the broader Middle East are alarming. Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We call for its full cooperation with IAEA, and we support a comprehensive, verifiable arrangement on its nuclear program. We condemn the DPRK's continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in violation of Security Council resolutions. At the same time, we support diplomatic efforts towards the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We welcome Syria's transparency and cooperation with the IAEA, which has enabled the resolution of outstanding safeguards issues relating to its past nuclear activities, and we encourage it to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol. Greece supports the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. My country remains committed to supporting the effective and universal implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Mr. Chair, as a newly elected member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 2026-2028 period, Greece stands ready to contribute to the agency's technical, independent, and impartial work in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Nuclear safety and security are inherently transparent. States which exercise the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy must uphold the highest standards of transparency and responsibility, particularly in regions which are exposed to nuclear risk. Finally, we commend the courageous work of the IAEA in maintaining a continuous presence in Ukraine under challenging conditions. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:14:37]: I thank the distinguished representative of Greece. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Qatar. Qatar [2:14:46]: We align ourselves with the statements delivered by the Arab Group. Mr. Chair. The development of nuclear weapons, the threat of their use, mainly by some countries, the increased salience of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, the ongoing nuclear testing and their means of delivery foment tension and undermine international peace and security. Relevant treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons must be upheld. Nuclear weapons must not be used and must be eliminated. The NPT must be upheld. We support the seventh session of the UN Conference for the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East to be presided over by Oman in November this year. Among the alarming disarmament challenges the 11th NPT Review Conference has failed to reach a consensus outcome document from 27 April to 22 May 2026. In addition, the UNDC, as the main negotiating forum on disarmament, has failed for three consecutive sessions to agree on consensus recommendations. Chair, on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, this is an inherent, inalienable right for Member States under Article IV of the NPT. The IAEA's CSAs must be upheld. The IAEA's technical cooperation programmes are a key instrument to exchange knowledge, build capacities, and ensure compliance with the highest standards of nuclear security and safety. Qatar pursues its close technical and institutional cooperation with the IAEA. On 26 September 2025, Qatar Development Fund signed a partnership agreement with the IAEA worth 600,000 USD to support technical cooperation projects for radiological treatment purposes in Syria. We welcome the Board of Governance decision to conclude consideration of Syria's non-compliance and to remove it from the list of non-compliant states. This is an important development which will help Syria regain its rightful place at the IAEA. In conclusion, we underscore the importance of concerted international efforts to achieve our objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 1st Committee · Chair [2:17:40]: I thank the distinguished representative of Qatar. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Armenia. Armenia [2:17:50]: Mr. Chair. Disarmament and non-proliferation are among Armenia's priorities in the pursuit of international peace and security. Armenia reaffirms its strong support for the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and regrets that for the third consecutive time, state parties were unable to reach consensus on a substantive outcome document at the 11th review conference of the treaty. Nevertheless, we recognize the importance of the extensive discussions held during the conference and the continued commitment of states parties to the objectives and principles of the NPT. Mr. Chair, there are various steps that must be taken to further advance disarmament efforts, and among them is the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Armenia views it as one of the key elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a strong tool for constraining nuclear weaponry. We extend our call upon all Annex 2 States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest opportunity. The credibility and effectiveness of the international nonproliferation regime cannot be fully ensured without CTBT's entry into force. We opted for a transparent and open policy for safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and will continue to pursue this policy further, strengthening and undertaking necessary measures to enhance and maintain nuclear safety. Armenia appreciate the crucial role of the cooperation with the IAEA through its safeguards agreements and additional protocol, as well as its technical assistance program. We are proud to be among the countries for which the agency is able to regularly draw a comprehensive safeguards conclusion regarding the peaceful use of our nuclear materials on an annual basis. Armenia remains firmly committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to close cooperation with the IAEA, including in the context of extending the operational lifetime of the Armenian nuclear power plant until 2036 and preparing for a secure and responsible transition to a new nuclear power unit. As we work toward taking a final decision on the technology and model for the new nuclear power plant by the end of 2027, Armenia will ensure full transparency and timely communication with the international community in strict adherence to its international legal obligations and in close cooperation with IAEA. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:20:23]: I thank the distinguished representative of Armenia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cambodia. Cambodia [2:20:30]: Mr. Chair, Cambodia aligns itself with the statement of ASEAN and the non-alignment movement. I would like to make a remark in my national capacity. At the time of heightened nuclear risk and growing geopolitical tension, when the modernization of the expansion of nuclear arsenal threatened international peace and security, The world needs restraint, dialogue, and the renewed commitment to the nuclear disarmament, not the demonstration of military might or displays of power. In this regard, Cambodia remains firmly committed to the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. This commitment is enshrined in Cambodia's constitution, which prohibits the possession and the use of nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop, Cambodia wishes to highlight the following points: First, Cambodia reaffirmed the central role of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global effort in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We call on nuclear weapons states, which bear special responsibility for international peace and security, to reduce nuclear risks and refrain from action that could exacerbate them. Second, complement the NPT, the Treaty of Prohibition of the Nuclear Weapon, TPNW, reinforce our collective aspiration for a world of nuclear weapon. Cambodia look forward for the first TPNW conference to be held later this year under President of South Africa as an important step toward achieve this goal. Third, the alienable right of state party to develop and use nuclear energy for people's purpose must be respected. Cambodia commend the IAEA for promoting nuclear science and technology for sustainable development and call for enhanced technical cooperation, particularly for the developing country. For the fact of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not entered into force is gravely concerning. Cambodia therefore urge all states to demonstrate the political will to complete the remaining ratification process and bring this landmark treaty into force without further delay. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, Cambodia remains committed to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We stand ready to work with all states to strengthen multilateral cooperation and advance our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:22:59]: I thank the distinguished representative of Cambodia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Niger. Niger [2:23:13]: Mr. Chairman, we're deeply concerned by the persistent threat posed by the insufficient progress achieved toward nuclear disarmament. In an international context marked by the erosion of confidence and the weakening of arms control measures, my delegation reaffirms that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons is their complete and irreversible and verifiable elimination. In this regard, we regret that the 11th Review Conference of the NPT which is held in New York from April to May 2026, ended without a consensus-based outcome document. This is an impasse, and it impedes our efforts to uphold this cornerstone of international disarmament. Mr. Chair, we have continued to translate our commitments on disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation into concrete acts. These move beyond international instruments. We are a party to the main international and regional instruments in this regard, the NPT, the CTBT, and the Pelendaba Treaty. As such, we're actively helping to consolidate international efforts at disarmament and nonproliferation. This contribution is illustrated, inter alia, by the fact that we have international stations on our territory, which are an integral part of the detection machinery for nuclear testing. And we support the CTBTO, and we've been recognized as one of the key parts here. This is a strategic importance. Turning to the national front, we're continuing our efforts to strengthen nuclear security. We're aiming to prevent any diversion of nuclear and radioactive materials for illicit purposes, and we're guaranteeing the effective implementation of international commitments. In this regard, in 2020, we voluntarily hosted a visit on international -- on nuclear security. Mr. Chair, Niger continues to fully shoulder its responsibilities on nonproliferation while ensuring the preservation of our legitimate rights. In this regard, we want to say that disarmament commitments and-- 1st Committee · Chair [2:26:12]: I thank the distinguished representative of Niger and for his statement. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:26:29]: We are now in order with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM. International peace and security, as well as the credibility of the entire global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, are being gravely undermined by the unlawful actions of certain states. The US and Israeli regimes act of aggression against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities in 2025 and 2026 and their continuing threats of further aggression strike at the foundations of the UN Charter, the NPT and the IAEA Statute, creating a situation without precedent in the history of the Committee. Yet, despite these exceptional circumstances, we are once again witnessing a First Committee session dominated by familiar statements. Certain Western States continue to invoke their so-called proliferation concerns and demand Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, while refusing even to condemn these unprecedented attacks. What meaning can the NPT's inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy have if unlawful attacks against safeguarded facilities elicit no meaningful response? Today Iran is the target, tomorrow it could be any other country. Article 6 of the NPT imposes a binding obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith toward nuclear disarmament, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice. The continued possession of nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon states and deployment of US nuclear weapons in European non-nuclear weapon states constitutes serious noncompliance. Article 1 and 2 prohibit the transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons. Military alliances provide no exemption. NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, including the proposed Franco-European nuclear partnership involving Germany's participation in French nuclear exercises, violates NPT's provisions. We urge the states concerned to end these arrangements. AUKUS arrangements also warrant serious scrutiny regarding diversion, risk, and safeguards integrity. Mr. Chair, 52 years after Iran first proposed a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, its establishment remains unrealized. The principal obstacle is the Israeli regime's refusal to join the NPT and accept comprehensive safeguards, sustained by unconditional political support from the United States, the UK, and France. If this unbalanced and discriminatory situation persists in our region, It will undermine confidence in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and jeopardize the credibility and sustainability of the IAEA safeguards system. This dangerous outcome must be prevented. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:29:30]: I thank the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran. Distinguished delegates, it seems that no delegation is ready to speaks in this session. So I shall now call on the delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second interventions. With this, I call on the representative of the Russian Federation. Russian Federation [2:30:11]: Mr. Chairman, we see it necessary to avail ourselves of the right of reply and bring those delegations back to reality that are circulating in this hall a lie about the supposed occupation and militarization by the Russian Federation, as they put it, of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. First, Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and also Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are an integral part of Russia. The residents of these territories expressed their will in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, and they were tired of the terror of the Kyiv regime, and they made a historic choice in favor of the Russian Federation. Thus, Russian jurisdiction has been extended to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Any attempts to dispute the fact that they belong to Russia or in any way to dictate security parameters at the station will be viewed by us as an intervention into the domestic affairs and as a hostile action against our country. Second, the only ones who are threatening the nuclear security of the Zaporizhzhia plant is Ukraine. This is not a secret for anyone, regardless of the fact that some observers don't have the courage to call things by their real names. Everyone understands everything about what is happening in the UN and in the IAEA and in global capitals, no matter how much the representatives of the Kyiv regime try to say the opposite. We're not talking about some coincidental attack on the station. Ukraine regularly and deliberately continues to create threats to the to the threat of a serious nuclear accident in the plant. Moreover, Ukraine has been striking the power lines leading to the power, and they've used tools of psychological pressure like threats and blackmail against the staff of the station and their family members. We'd like to emphasize that Ukraine has organized provocations against other Russian civilian nuclear sites, the Kursk and Smolensk nuclear power plants. All of this, all of these are indisputable facts. and they demonstrate the terrorist nature of the regime sitting in Kyiv. Against this backdrop, what appears particularly cynical are the claims against Russia of supposedly deploying the necessary security forces in the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. We'd like to underscore that our country will continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of protecting the Zaporizhzhia plant from Ukraine's attacks in accordance with our laws and international obligations. The Russian Federation has showed unprecedented transparency as regards the plant. On Russia's invitation, starting on the 1st of September 2022, we welcomed specialists of the IAEA who saw ongoing provocations committed by the Ukrainian armed forces. The DG of the IAEA, Grossi, visited the plant five times. the planned visit in August was disrupted by the Ukrainians. Kyiv threatened the DG of IAEA, saying that they couldn't vouch for his security if he approached the plant through Russia. This is self-incrimination by the Kyiv regime. The Ukrainians aren't hiding their criminal intentions against an agency, one of the largest international organizations, and de facto they're threatening the DG with death and turning him into a target. All of these actions of Kyiv would be impossible if there wasn't ongoing material, military, and political support provided to Ukraine by Western countries. This is what is instilling the false hope into Kyiv of of impunity, and this is what is leading it to engage in more risky undertakings and fruitless attempts to pressure our country. I'd like to underscore that in encouraging Ukraine, regardless of the madness of its acts, the Western states have become accomplices of the crimes of Kyiv. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:34:13]: I now call on the representative of China. China [2:34:23]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Chinese delegation firmly rejects some countries' erroneous remarks that were intended to discredit China's nuclear policy and national defense force development. China has always taken a very prudent and responsible approach to nuclear weapons. From the first day of possessing nuclear weapons, China has advocated for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. committed itself to no first use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, unconditionally undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and has always maintained its nuclear force at the minimum level required for national security. China's nuclear force is not of the same order of magnitude as U.S. or Russia. At this stage, it is unfair, unreasonable, and infeasible to ask China to participate in the so-called trilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations of China, U.S., and Russia. China's no first use policy is highly responsible and stable. It is a practical measure to fulfill NPT obligations, diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy, and help mitigate strategic risks. It's being widely welcomed by the international community. This policy has not changed and will not change. Nuclear transparency measures should help enhance strategic mutual trust with full considerations for the security environments and interests of the countries. Their implementation should be voluntary and tailored to national conditions. There is no one-size-fits-all model. All parties should view rationally the objective differences among nuclear-weapon states in terms of nuclear capabilities, nuclear policies, and security environments. and respect the legitimate and reasonable security concerns of the countries on nuclear transparency. In the current international security context, the transparency of intentions and policies is the most relevant. China is firmly committed to a path of peaceful development, a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and a no first use policy. This is the transparency measure of the greatest practical significance. Nuclear alliance countries that snuggle under nuclear umbrella claim to support nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, but in fact, they are constantly increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and heightening the risk of nuclear war. Nuclear sharing and extended deterrence are discriminatory arrangements that create inequality among non-nuclear weapon states. these constitute ongoing acts of nuclear proliferation in breach of the purpose and object of the NPT. China once again urges relevant countries to stop spreading false narratives, stop undermining international nonproliferation system, stop upgrading nuclear alliances, and stop creating new obstacles to nuclear disarmament. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:38:06]: I now call on the representative of the United States of America. United States of America [2:38:15]: Thank you, Chair. I take the floor to set the record straight on U.S. extended deterrence and U.S. military exercises in the Indo-Pacific. U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan combined military exercises are longstanding, purely defensive in nature, intended to maintain force readiness, strengthen interoperability, and contribute to regional security and stability. U.S. extended deterrence is foundational to the strength and credibility of our alliances and remain vital as our countries address an increasingly severe and complex security environment. The United States continues to strengthen extended deterrence cooperation in light of the DPRK's efforts to advance its unlawful and destabilizing nuclear and ballistic missile programs and China's rapid, opaque, and sustained nuclear weapons buildup. U.S. extended deterrence arrangements support the fundamental U.S. goal of advancing shared approaches to peace through strength. U.S. extended deterrence with the ROK, Japan, and Australia specifically serves as a critical pillar in a broader strategy to preserve peace, deter conflict, and ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. All U.S. and alliance military or defense efforts comply with the NPT and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as opposed to the rhetoric and actions by the DPRK, China, and Russia. that justify alliance defense postures. The United States remains committed to the denuclearization of the DPRK and refutes the suggestion that this is a closed issue. Our commitment to the defense of our allies is ironclad and unwavering. Chair, I take note of the Iranian delegation's complaint about the theme of the familiar and unchanged statements throughout this session. I would reply that if the Iranian delegation wants this to change, the room needs to see verifiable evidence that their actions have also changed and are not familiar. We need to see verifiable evidence that Iran is no longer violating its obligations. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:40:46]: I now call on the representative of Iran. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:40:55]: Mr. Chair, while my delegation strongly rejects baseless allegations against Iran's peaceful nuclear program, we would like to underscore that Iran's peaceful nuclear program, conducted under its applicable safeguards obligations, must be assessed based on facts and law, not political allegations or double standards. The NPT cannot be a treaty of selective obligations, applied strictly to some, while interpreted conveniently for others. Mr. Chair, the Nobel Prize for hypocrisy would go to those delegations, including Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, and United States, that level baseless allegations against Iran's peaceful nuclear program while refusing even to condemn attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities and defending their own nuclear sharing arrangements. Those who invoke the NPT against Iran should first answer for their own violations and noncompliance with the treaty's obligations through their own nuclear sharing arrangements. In their defense, these delegations advanced two arguments, neither which did stand legal scrutiny. First, they argue that these arrangements predate the NPT, but historical precedence is not a legal exemption. Where does the NPT provide that arrangements established before its entering to force are exempt from its obligations under Article 1 and 2? Second, They claim that nuclear sharing enhances their security and prevents them from acquiring their own nuclear weapons. But preventing one form of proliferation does not legitimize arrangements that violate the very treaty these delegations claim to uphold. Furthermore, these arrangements must also be considered in the context of Article VI, which obliges all state parties to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations. By institutionalizing a continuing rule for nuclear weapons in their security policies, participating states cannot simply invoke non-proliferation to violate the disarmament obligations. There is also a fundamental question of consistency. Would these delegations accept the same interpretation if another group of states invoked comparable security concerns to justify similar nuclear sharing arrangements? The NPT cannot be interpreted according to the identity of the alliance or the geopolitical interests of its members. In response to the representative of the US, let me state this plainly. The facts are undeniable, and no amount of American distortion can rewrite history. It has been nearly five months since the NPT Review Conference concluded, yet the representative of the U.S. is already attempting to distort what happened. The international community witnessed the fact that it was the United States that blocked consensus on the final document because it was unwilling to reaffirm commitments made at previous review conferences, unwilling to honor its obligation under Article VI of the treaty, and determined to shield its unlawful nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO from scrutiny. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:44:43]: I now call on the representative of Ukraine. Ukraine [2:44:51]: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Our delegation feels compelled to respond to the statement made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. First of all, we categorically reject any claims made by the Russian Federation regarding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The NPP is located within the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine and remains Ukrainian. nuclear energy infrastructure under temporary occupation of Russia. In the statement dated 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a statement in which it called the referendums conducted by the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine as sham referendums and which violated the constitutional laws of Ukraine and the principles of international law, and they produced no legal consequences with regard to Ukraine's internationally recognized borders and territorial integrity. This position was further supported by United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES/11/4 of 12 October 2022, which condemned the attempted illegal annexation by the Russian Federation of parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions of Ukraine, and called upon states and international organizations not to recognize any alteration of the status of these territories as a result of Russia's actions. On the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, it is only Russia that continues to pose an unprecedented threat to nuclear safety and security by occupying and militarizing the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. In fact, Russia turned Europe's largest nuclear power plant into an instrument of coercion and nuclear terrorism. Russia put the international community in a situation when a nuclear catastrophe with consequences across the wider European region might be a matter of weeks, not years. As we already mentioned, the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP remains extremely fragile because of repeated losses of offsite power, equipment degradation, maintenance constraints, increased fire risks, unreliable water supply, and shortages of qualified personnel. which continue to undermine systems and functions essential for nuclear safety. The IAEA has also repeatedly reported restrictions on access for the IAEA support and assistance mission to Zaporizhzhia. Russian UAV operators are continuing to use the premises of the ZNPP to launch combat drones against Ukrainian government-controlled territory. We consider this snuffing as nuclear terrorism. With regard to the human rights issues, the ZNPP seizure has resulted in serious human rights violations and abuses that are an integral part of Russia's genocidal and neocolonial policy. Ukrainian plant employees and residents of Energodar, the satellite city of the ZNPP, have been illegally detained, subjected to torture and ill treatment, and prosecuted or convicted on fabricated charges. Pressure on Ukrainian personnel further undermines the preconditions of the safe and secure operation of the plant. Unless the ZNPP is demilitarized and returned under the full sovereign control of Ukraine, the continued deterioration of the situation will inevitably lead to irreversible consequences for the nuclear safety and security of the whole Europe. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:48:43]: I now call on the representative of DPRK. Democratic People's Republic of Korea [2:48:51]: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I'd like to ask France to study the dictionary. or in encyclopedia to know the proper names of countries that are member states of the UN before they take the floor the next time. My delegation is exercising the right of reply in response to reckless provocation from the delegation who took the floor today, like US, France, ROK, Japan, and on. My delegation that categorically reject those stereotyped and absurd accusations against the DPRK as they are intended to mislead the international community and evade their responsibility for the deterioration of the tension on the Korean Peninsula. As we have stated on several occasions, DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons is the sovereign right to defend itself from the nuclear threat of the U.S., which lasted for several decades. The DPRK's nuclear deterrence is the legitimate defense means to safeguard the national sovereignty and the security of the region. It is the realistic requirement for the DPRK to step on the rapid and accelerated bolstering up of its deterrence to cope with the military threat of the U.S. and its allies, which are getting more rampant recently. The concept of the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has gone a long time ago. It will never tolerate any attempt to unilaterally change the current status of the DPRK. The DPRK will, as ever, consistently adhere to the line of bolstering up the nuclear force and thoroughly control the threat and blackmail of the hostile forces by making use of all its own political and military tools and perfectly attain its strategic goal. And regarding the allegation of the ROK, who voted for conciliation, I am reiterating once again that we will never see face-off-face with ROK, the most hostile country. It is an unshakable stand of the DPRK. My delegation also reject those groundless blames against the legal cooperation between DPRK and Russian Federation. This cooperation meets the word and spirit of the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership concluded between DPRK and Russian Federation and international laws, including UN Charter. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:51:26]: I now call on the representative of Japan. Japan [2:51:33]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am compelled to exercise my right of reply regarding Japan's policy in response to the statements by a few states. Over the past eight decades, Japan has consistently walked the path of a peace-loving nation and has consistently contributed to peace and prosperity in the international community. This is widely and accurately recognized and highly appreciated by the international community. Japan's fundamental defense policy, which is exclusively defense-oriented policy, remains unchanged. Our defense capability is necessary to ensure the security of Japan in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Our defense capabilities are kept to the minimum necessary. Japan will never change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation. The government of Japan observes three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines. Japan, as a staunch supporter of the NPT, has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This, of course, includes compliance with its own obligations under the NPT, and Japan continues its cooperation with the IAEA in a transparent manner. Japan continues to uphold the principle of not possessing plutonium without specific purposes, and uses most of its plutonium stockpile for nuclear fuel of power plants, with the remaining amount used as material for peaceful nuclear research. Also, Japan has declared the policy to reduce the amount of its plutonium stockpile in 2018, and the amount has decreased since then. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:53:34]: I call on the representative of Republic of Korea. Republic of Korea [2:53:40]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation wishes to address several misleading claims made by the DPRK. First, it must be clearly understood that our military posture, including combined training and exercises, is a necessary and legitimate response to the DPRK's escalating military threat, not their cause. The DPRK's unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs pose a grave threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Our combined military posture serves a strictly defensive purpose to protect the lives of our citizens, deter aggression, and uphold regional peace and stability. Second, the DPRK has asserted that its nuclear weapons program is an exercise of its sovereign rights. However, sovereignty does not exempt a UN member state from its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1718 and subsequent resolutions, clearly demand that the DPRK abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and cease all related activities. Third, The DPRK has characterized its military cooperation with the Russian Federation as an exercise of sovereign rights under a bilateral treaty and as consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. However, under Article 103 of the Charter, obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations under any other international agreement. A bilateral treaty between the two countries cannot therefore provide legal cover for conduct prohibited by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Under Security Council Resolution 1718, 1874, and 2270, all UN member states are prohibited from supplying arms and related assistance to or receiving them from the DPRK. Fourth, contrary to the DPRK's assertions, The Republic of Korea remains steadfast in its pursuit of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation through dialogue, as our government has reiterated on numerous occasions. Finally, responsibility is demonstrated through compliance with international obligations, not through self-proclaimed labels. The DPRK's contribution to peace and stability should begin with compliance with Security Council resolutions. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:56:39]: I now call on the representative of Iran for the second intervention. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:56:45]: Mr. Chair, my delegation rejects and condemns baseless and absurd allegations by the representative of the Israeli regime against Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The Israeli regime is the last entity on earth entitled to lecture Iran or anyone else. A regime responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza has no moral authority to lecture others. A regime that has carried out unlawful attacks against Iran, including its peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards, has no credibility to lecture Iran on nuclear nonproliferation. As the only entity in the Middle East that has not acceded to the NPT, the Israeli regime is in no position to lecture Iran, a state party to the NPT since 1970, on compliance with or implementation of the NPT. And a regime that continues to obstruct the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction cannot lecture Iran. which initiated this historic proposal in 1974. I urge representatives of the Israeli regime to look at the shocking videos and photographs circulating in the media and on social media, depicting children who have lost their entire families, whose siblings have all been killed, and who have been left with amputated limbs and severely disfigured faces. These are not abstract statistics or political talking points. They are human lives shattered by the Israeli regime's violence. Next time, before presuming to lecture others, I urge them to look in the mirror and reflect on the atrocities for which their own regime must be held accountable. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:58:44]: I now call on the representative of Israel for the first intervention. Israel [2:58:54]: Thank you, Chair. I didn't intend to take the floor, but I'm compelled to react to the absurd comments we have just heard from the Islamic Republic of Iran. On Saturday morning, February 28, Israel launched Operation Iron Lion in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Operation Epic Fury. The purpose of the operation was to neutralize the existential threat posed by the Iranian regime's military nuclear activity and accelerated ballistic missile production. Israel was compelled to act before it would be too late to effectively counter these threats. Israel has acted in accordance with international law. In stark contrast, and in true terrorist fashion, the Iranian regime deliberately and systematically targeted the civilian population in Israel and across the Middle East. Iran attempted to inflict pain against Israel's civilian population, including with the ongoing use of missiles carrying cluster munitions that were launched against population centers in Israel. Chair, let me be clear. Nothing in Iran's military nuclear program is devoted to peaceful purposes. No one can argue that the agency safeguards have been statistically applied in Iran, as the Board of Governors has determined time after time. Iran denies its legally binding obligation, violates the Atomic Energy Agency privileges and immunities, arbitrarily rejects experienced inspectors, massively sanitized locations, and hides undeclared nuclear material and equipment. It is deeply ironic to hear the representative, the Iranian regime speaks about international law and aggression after its country attacked 15 countries in the Middle East and beyond, terrorized the maritime traffic, terrorizes the maritime traffic, and executes its own citizens by thousands. The Iranian attempt to divert the attention from its actions and intention will not succeed. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [3:01:19]: Excellencies, distinguished delegates, we have just exhausted the time available for this meeting. The committee will reconvene on The following delegations are unable to exercise their right of reply due to time constraint. DPRK for the second interventions. They will be heard as the first speaker to exercise their right of reply at our next meeting. Also the Russian Federation as well. Distinguished delegates, the committee will reconvene on Monday, 19 October, in the morning in this conference room to continue the thematic discussions under the cluster of nuclear weapons. Given the number of. The speakers remaining on the list of speakers, I strongly encourage delegations registered under the next cluster, other weapons of mass destruction, to also be prepared to make the statement on Monday. The meeting is now adjourned.