联合国大会第81届会议第一委员会 - 第14次全体会议 联合国大会 Date: 20 October 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/zh/ga/c1/81/14?lang=en Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- 1st Committee · Chair [0:00]: Good morning, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. The 14th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 84th session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, before we continue considerations of the cluster of the weapons of mass destruction, I suggest to the committee to first hear the delegations the first here the delegations requested to execute the right of reply to the second intervention 16 October followed by the our under the cluster of the nuclear weapons may I take it that the committee which is asked to proceed it's I just outline I see no objection it is so decided with that I would give the floor to the Russian Federation for the second interventions of the second 16th October that means Friday. Russian Federation [1:27]: Mr. Chairman, we believe it necessary to avail ourselves of our right of reply with regard to the disinformation of Ukraine about the situation surrounding the Russian nuclear power plant and the adjoining areas. For us, this issue has been closed. The residents of Zaporizhzhia have chosen to join the Russian Federation. And only this year alone, there have been attacks on radioactive waste storage facilities in the machine energy block number six of the Zaporizhzhia plant. There's been shelling of the reserve diesel generators of the station. What is the height of cynicism are the statements of the representatives of Kyiv about the fact that there is a lack of qualified personnel. And it was Ukraine that carried out a campaign to deliberately and systematically kill the staff of the station, including the one that died on the 15th of July of this year, the chief engineer of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Alexander Yakovlev. We would also like to respond separately to the latest attempts of the representatives of South Korea to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Russia and the DPRK's cooperation. We're compelled to repeat that the UN Security Council has not limited the right of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under Charter Article 51. No statements about Article 103 can change the Charter. We would recommend that Seoul think about the facts of the agreements in the Russian-Korean agreement, and they should analyze the actions that they are taking, which are the root cause for the increase in escalations on the Korean Peninsula. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [3:56]: Now, I give the floor to the Russian Federation for the right of reply for the first intervention of the cluster first. Russian Federation [4:11]: Mr. Chairman. I would like to respond to the latest spurious accusations. We heard them from a number of Western countries, and they were against Russia. The accusations have to do with the so-called irresponsible nuclear rhetoric. These claims lack any genuine basis. They should be viewed as propaganda. They're motivated by a maniacal obsession to demonize our country. Official statements of the representatives of Russia on nuclear issues are fully aligned with the relevant international commitments, and they do move beyond our national doctrines, which are purely defensive. We would recall that the document that lays out the basis of Russia's state policy on nuclear deterrence clearly lays out the set of extreme circumstances in which we would allow for a nuclear response. Such an arsenal could be used only to repel aggression that is critical aggression. in terms of public rhetoric, we act in stringent alignment with these basic tenets. The state of affairs is such that we occasionally need to send to NATO countries serious warnings. This is due to their extremely aggressive rhetoric and highly escalatory actions, actions that create for us a direct and clear threat. It was precisely the classical logic of deterrence that prompted our signals about Russia's firm resolve to protect its core interests, security interests, through all available methods. In addition, we're compelled by the deplorable situation, the blame for which falls on NATO. NATO is bent on expansion. It is deeply hostile to us, and it has plunged relations with Russia to a very severe crisis. Moreover, they're carrying out heedless actions. In so doing, they're risking tipping this crisis into a head-on collision of nuclear powers, which is fraught with catastrophic dangers. The such a situation forces us to envision the worst-case scenarios as fully realistic. The threats from NATO countries have continued to increase, including in the nuclear realm. The remilitarization of Europe includes the formation of cooperative schemes for the use of the arsenals of Great Britain and France in a common and for common purposes involving non-nuclear allies. In addition to the advanced deterrence practiced by Paris, we're talking about the nuclear they're talking about the nuclear umbrella provided by London for the participants of the Joint Expeditionary Force. At the same time, a number of non-nuclear states of Europe are liberalizing their national laws and doctrines, clearing away obstacles to appearance of nuclear weapons on their territory. All of this is happening in addition to the capacities and the algorithms of NATO nuclear sharing missions which are actively and comprehensively being developed. There's also in Italy right now exercises underway rehearsing NATO states use of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and they're absolutely not hiding the fact that these acts are against Russia. Thus the states of NATO are engaged in multiplying and destabilizing deterrence of variable geometry, which harms the NPT. Inter alia, this strengthens and ramps up the aggregate common NATO capacity, which threatens Russia. This is coupled with escalatory rhetoric, brandishing of nuclear arsenals, and probing of ways to undermine our country's security and hatching provocative plans that includes the further harmful expansion of NATO, an expansion which poses for us a serious strategic threat. What is this, if not, irresponsible behavior? Given the foregoing, these countries aren't the ones to be the judge of irresponsible policy and rhetoric. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [8:14]: I now call on the representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Netherlands (Kingdom of the) [8:24]: Chair, in response to the Russian Federation accusation with regard to politicizing the OPCW, I would like to share some inconvenient facts also on behalf of Germany. With regard to the widespread use of riot control agents, RCA, in Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities have documented more than 14,000 cases of the use of riot control agents since 2022. 1st Committee · Chair [8:51]: Would you please? Yeah. Now, yeah, I give the floor for the Russian participants on the point of order. Russian Federation [9:04]: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As far as we understand, right now we're in the cluster on the right of reply in the context of cluster one on nuclear disarmament. And as we see it, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands is attempting to use his right of reply in the context of the second cluster, responding to a statement delivered by our country in the context of cluster two. And as we've understood from your explanation, that's not the decision that we've just taken this morning. This segment for the right of reply is dedicated to cluster one, nuclear weapons. In that regard, we would ask to put off the statement of our distinguished colleague from the Kingdom of the Netherlands until the segment of the right of reply on cluster two. And right now, we should focus on the right of reply on cluster one, nuclear weapons. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [10:20]: So, cluster two. May I suggest the distinguished representative of Kingdom of Netherlands and to defer the right of replies at the end of the second cluster, because this is the first cluster we are discussing. If it is related to the first cluster, you can continue. If it is not, you have to defer for the second one. Netherlands (Kingdom of the) [11:00]: Chair, as always, we are as supportive as possible in your direction. I asked yesterday indeed the right of reply with regard to a statement made by the Russian Federation regarding other weapons of mass destruction. So I'm all in your hands to deliver this statement at a later moment. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [11:25]: So in this case, and it will be at the end of the day, and still we are discussing about that. So on that, I would now call on the representative of Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [11:54]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Over the past two weeks, my delegation has addressed and firmly rejected the baseless allegations against Iran's peaceful nuclear program, both in our national statement and in several right of replies. I will not revisit those points and instead refer delegations to our previous interventions. However, I must point out that the representatives of the United Kingdom and certain other Western states continue to misuse every available platform, including Cluster 1, dedicated to addressing nuclear weapons, to advance politically motivated narratives against Iran. Rather than perpetuating these allegations, This cluster should serve as a forum for addressing the concerns repeatedly expressed by non-nuclear weapon states regarding the persistent failure of the UK and its allies to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. Regrettably, certain non-nuclear weapon states have also chosen to use this opportunity to level baseless allegations against the NPT state party, rather than focus on the urgent need to fulfill nuclear disarmament obligations. These same countries who lecture others on nonproliferation watched silently as two nuclear weapon possessors launched a bombing campaign against Iran's safeguarded nuclear facilities, targeting scientists and infrastructure under IAEA oversight. If the UK and certain other states genuinely seek a path forward, They must abandon their policy of hypocrisy, discrimination, double standard, pressure, intimidation and distortion. A sustainable solution is possible only through engagement based on Iran's inalienable rights under the NPT, not coercion. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [13:52]: Now I call on the representative of DPRK and for the ROR of the first cluster of nuclear weapons. Democratic People's Republic of Korea [14:11]: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the floor. My delegation is compelled to take the floor to respond to the absurd allegation of the ROK. Now, the situation in the Korean Peninsula, especially in the southern border, is very unstable. The ROK military are seriously threatening the safety of our service personnel by firing warning shots at them with automatic rifles and large-caliber machine guns under such unreasonable pretext that the personnel involved in fortifying the southern border crossed the border line. Such provocations began in August, alongside warning loudspeaker blaring. They committed 2,870 rounds of provocative loudspeaker warning and 201 warning shot provocations from August 1 to October 17. Such enemy provocations, more openly perpetrated in the wake of the fabricated mine explosion farce, has gone beyond the red line. The reckless move of the ROK aimed at gaining the superior strength, foretell the escalation of regional military tensions and considered a root cause and adding the new element of instability to the security environment of regional countries. The ROK have initiated on the 19th of October the large scale field mobile war exercises, HOGU, to be conducted with the US forces in ROK. from 19th October until October the 13th. The ROK did not conceal the aggressive and provocative nature of the Hoguk by announcing that it would intensify cooperation and actual war simulation in the spheres of rounds, sea, and air, and conduct such field mobile drills as stimulated battles between units in the light of recent warfare during the exercises. Recently, the ROK staged provocative military drills, such as the Maritime Infiltration Drill and Sangyong, all of which were aimed at mastering the war-fighting capabilities and enact a special law to introduce nuclear submarines. The present situation in which the hostile forces get frantic in their military moves to infringe upon the security interests of the DPRK and undermine the regional strategic stability highlights the validity and justice of the DPRK's indispensable self-defensive efforts to deter them. Bolstered deterrent is required to deal with ever-escalating threat and repeated provocations are bound to meet with such prompt reaction as bolstering of stronger capabilities. The DPRK is unshakable in its stand to control and manage the threat to its security sphere, given the immutable reality that the enemy state's ill-intended moves for military confrontation will never come to an end or diminish. tit-for-tat principle based on strong power will be applied to cope with the muscle flexing of the enemy state. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [17:36]: I now give the floor to the representative of Republic of Korea. Republic of Korea [17:54]: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. The Republic of Korea wishes to respond to the entireless, groundless allegations by the representative of the DPRK that the ROK is carrying out provocations along its so-called southern border. The Republic of Korea has remained consistent and firm in its principled response to the DPRK's continued activities within the demilitarized zone, which constitute a breach of the armistice agreement. The Republic of Korea's warning broadcasts and warning shots are legitimate and defensive measures aimed at preventing the DPRK's troops from crossing the military demarcation line and expelling those who have crossed who have trusted. We call upon the DPRK to cease its escalatory activities and return to dialogue. And the DPRK is consistently misrepresenting the cause of the situation. We reiterate that ROK-U.S. combined defense and deterrence posture is a response to the DPRK's ever-growing military threats. This posture constitutes a legitimate and defensive response to protect the lives and safety of our people and to contribute to regional peace and stability. Regarding the illegality of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, we will not reiterate our points as most delegations here are already well aware of this issue. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [19:32]: Distinguished delegates, the Committee will continue its considerations of the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction. The Committee will meet all day today, so delegations wishing to exercise the right of reply will be able to do so at the end of the day. I would like to inform delegations that they will have an opportunity -- no, no, no. Before I open the floor, I would like to remind all delegations to respect the time limit for the statement during the thematic discussion. The first speaker on the list of the cluster is now the distinguished representative of Lithuania, speaking on behalf of the group of the countries. Lithuania [20:35]: Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, the European Union, and my own country, Lithuania. In the interest of time, I will deliver a shortened version of the statement. The full text will be made available online. Our delegation's reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the absolute prohibition of the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances. In this regard, we note with utmost concern the growing body of reports on the Russian Federation's use of riot control agents as a method of warfare and toxic chemicals on the front lines in Ukraine in violation of the CWC. Ukraine has documented over 14,000 cases of the use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals, including chloropicrin by Russian forces since February 2023. In addition, Ukraine has reported that 6,021 of its service personnel required medical care for symptoms of chemical exposure. Our concern is further reinforced by the findings of three consecutive OPCW technical assistance visit reports conducted at the request of Ukraine. These reports confirm that environmental and munition samples collected from locations along the confrontation lines in the Dnipropetrovsk region contained CS, a riot control agent. OPCW-designated laboratories independently verified the presence of CS or its degradation products in grenade fragments, soil, vegetation, and even components of first-person-view drone frames. These reports raise serious concerns about a clear and systematic pattern of use, going well beyond isolated incidents. They provide further evidence that CS gas has been used as a method of warfare, which would be in direct violation of Article 1 of CWCA. These findings add to longstanding concerns regarding the Russian Federation's compliance with its obligations under CWCA. We also recall with profound concern the numerous additional reports on the Russian Federation's use of chemical weapons, including against its political opponents. We express our full support for the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW in fulfilling the mandates set by the Convention and the decisions of the policy-making organs of the Organisation. In this regard, we urge the Russian Federation to fully comply with its obligations under the CWB. Considering the seriousness of the situation and the evidence presented, and consistent with Ukraine's request for assistance in carrying out this investigation, we stress the need for OPCW to provide technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors, or otherwise involved in the use of chemical weapons on Stryd, in line with OPCW's existing mandate. Chair, any use of chemical weapons by state or non-state actors is unacceptable. Such acts must be met with a unified, firm, and principled response. 1st Committee · Chair [24:47]: I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania speaking on behalf of the group of countries. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Jamaica speaking on behalf of the Caribbean community, CARICOM. Jamaica · CARICOM · Permanent Representative [25:05]: Thank you, Chair. I do have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the 14 member states of the Caribbean community. full statement will be uploaded. Chair, Kyrgyzstan firmly believes that the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention are crucial to the effectiveness of the broad disarmament regime. Any and all use of toxic chemicals as weapons of mass destruction is unjustifiable and contrary to international law. Caricom thus reaffirms its support for the CWC and for the work of the OPCW, especially for the ongoing capacity building efforts to advance implementation of the Convention in our region. In this regard, we welcome the convening of the 27th Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean in Trinidad and Tobago in July this year. Effective implementation of the Conventions must be accompanied by practical support for national and regional preparedness. We welcome initiatives that strengthen emergency response, technical expertise, and cooperation across Latin America and the Caribbean. We call for meaningful, sustained international assistance to enable developing states to establish and maintain the legislative, regulatory, scientific, and operational capabilities necessary to both meet their obligations and protect their populations. America remains deeply concerned about the potential misuse of advances in science and technology for purposes prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention, including by non-state actors. We underscore the importance of strengthening the Convention's capacity to assess relevant developments while safeguarding international cooperation and the exchange of scientific knowledge, equipment, and materials for peaceful purposes. In this respect, we welcome the continued deliberations of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC in its eighth and ninth sessions in February and August this year. CARICOM is grateful to the Implementation Support Unit and other partners for the assistance provided to our region in building capacity toward full implementation of the Convention. The BWC is crucial for regional security, public health, and resilience. Caribbean states face risks from biological threats and outbreaks, making stronger disease surveillance, biosafety, and emergency preparedness essential. International cooperation can help address resource and capacity constraints across the region. CARICOM remains mindful of the challenges to peace and security posed by our unique geography, which consists of permeable land and maritime borders. Addressing the risks that actors, particularly non-state actors, may exploit this potential vulnerability continues to be a regional security priority. To combat these threats, CARICOM has continued to work with the UN in elaborating a CARICOM counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy aims to reduce the risk of terrorism and violent extremism while strengthening resilience to extremist ideology. Complementing these efforts, CARICOM has supported weapons and ammunition management training to increase national capacity. We welcome joint partnerships aimed at maintaining peace and security. We remain committed to fulfilling our obligations under Security Council Resolution 1540, as well as other resolutions of the Security Council on the non-proliferation of WMD. Chair, in adopting the Pact for the Future, adopted just over two years ago, all 193 Member States united under a promise to pursue a world free from chemical and biological weapons. We have the instruments in place to do so. And CARICOM calls upon all states to reaffirm their disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [28:49]: I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Jamaica speaking on behalf of CARICOM. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya, speaking on behalf of Arab Group. Libya · Arab Group [29:12]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chairman, the Group of Arab States upholds its principled position on a world that is free of all weapons of mass destruction, while giving necessary importance to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other forms of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It is paramount to remember that the first special session of the General Assembly for disarmament has clearly and consensually stated the priority of nuclear disarmament. However, we have seen no progress in banning and disarming nuclear weapons in terms as is done with chemical and biological weapons. group has exerted efforts in getting in ridding itself of weapons of mass destruction and is a member of biological and chemical weapons conventions and we condemn any use of weapons of mass destruction by any party regardless of the circumstances Arab states member states in the two agreements and engage in them constructively, including in the working group that was created to strengthen the WUC. And we hope that it would make the aspired for progress, especially in implementing Article 10 on international cooperation. The group calls upon the OPCW to guarantee its important role and performing it in a nuclear and non-politicized way by paying attention to reports of the use of the Israeli entity of banned chemical substances in its aggression on the Gaza Strip. The group stresses that the Israeli entity's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state and placing its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards agreement will contribute towards correcting the strategic imbalance in the region, especially since that entity is the only country, the only party in the region that has not acceded to any of the weapons conventions banning weapons of mass destruction. We have created We have expanded the coverage of the ban on weapons of mass destruction in the region to include chemical and biological weapons. Nuclear weapons are being owned as a means of intimidation by one party in the region. Therefore, Arab states are pioneering in putting forward a proposal to create a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. We call on the international community to give its continued support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other forms of WMD in the Middle East. We welcome the decision taken by the IAEA's Board of Governors in September to remove all forms of noncompliance in Syria's file to remove that from the board's agenda, and this shows Syria's cooperation with the IAEA and its implementation of its obligations towards its safeguards regime. The Arab Group expresses appreciation for the recent positive developments in the Syrian chemical weapons file, and we welcome the widespread recognition by the OPCW's Executive Board in its 110th session as recognition of the positive cooperation that by the Syrian Arab Republic. This includes giving all the necessary facilitations, such as offering unrestricted access to information and suspected sites to allow for the implementation of what remains of the former regime's chemical program. We here, we would like to welcome the constructive role played by the sisterly state of Qatar, especially through its diplomatic support for dialogue. In closing, we support the made to prevent the ownership by terrorist organizations of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. And we call for continued work to enhance international cooperation and the implementation of GA Resolution 77/75 and Security Council Resolution 1540. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [33:12]: I thank the distinguished representative of Libya speaking on behalf of the Arab Group. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. Republic of Korea [33:29]: Chair, at this critical juncture when geopolitical tensions are rising, it is of the utmost importance that we uphold the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. As a responsible state party to the CWC and the BWC, the Republic of Korea reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the goals of both conventions. Chair, my delegation is encouraged by the tangible progress achieved on the Syria dossier. For the first time, the OPCW has verified the destruction of category three chemical weapons in Syria, which is a breakthrough on the file that had remained at a standstill since 2013. We also welcome the decision to restore the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the CWC. Building on this momentum, it is our sincere hope to see continued progress on resolving the outstanding issues, dismantling the former regime's chemical weapons programme and establishing accountability for past chemical weapons attacks. Yet the picture ahead of us is not entirely bright. My delegation notes with serious concern the OPCW reports confirming the presence of riot control acts agents as a method of warfare on the battlefields in Ukraine. The use of chemical weapons under any circumstances and by anyone must never be tolerated. Reaffirming that any such use constitutes a clear violation of the convention, my delegation underscores the importance of attribution, as identifying those responsible is what signals to the world that such acts will not go unanswered. Chair, the rapid development of artificial intelligence presents new opportunities while also raising concerns for biosecurity. Of particular concern is the potential misuse of AI to facilitate the design and production of biological agents, potentially lowering barriers to capabilities previously limited to specialized expertise. These risks underscore the continued relevance of the BWC as an essential international framework for addressing the biosecurity threats. Strengthening the convention and its implementation is urgently needed to enhance our collective capacity and preparedness. With this in mind, the Republic of Korea looks forward to a successful outcome of the final session of the working group in December. We hope that the BWC community can achieve an outcome that further strengthens the Convention, including the establishment of the international cooperation and assistance mechanism and the science and technology review mechanism. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [36:13]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Germany. Germany · Representative to the Conference on Disarmament [36:27]: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Germany aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. Germany is fully committed to upholding the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. As for chemical weapons, we commend the new Syrian Government for the positive example they set by addressing the chemical weapons left behind by the Assad regime and for its close cooperation with the OPCW. In July, due to significant progress achieved, the OPCW's Executive Council reinstated Syria's rights and privileges. And notably in August, the first OPCW-verified destruction of chemical weapons from Syria since 2014 was accomplished. Many tasks lie ahead. We call on States Parties to contribute to the OPCW Syria Mission Trust Fund. By contrast, Germany strongly condemns Russia's systematic use of riot control agents and the choking agent chloropicrin in its war of aggression against Ukraine. More than 14,000 incidents involving Russia's use of toxic chemicals have been documented by Ukraine since 2022. These are blatant violations of the CW and must stop immediately. Holding Russia accountable is crucial to defend the global norm. Moreover, it is clear that Alexei Navalny was poisoned with the lethal neurotoxin epipartidin, which highly likely led to his death in a Russian penal colony in 2024. We reiterate our call on Russia to provide full clarification of this case, which constitutes not only a grave violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but also of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Mr. Chairman, Germany remains fully committed to strengthening the BTWC. Rapid developments in science and technology, in convergence with AI, have lowered the threshold to produce biological weapons. The BTWC is currently ill-equipped to respond adequately. In particular, a mechanism to assess scientific and technological developments, as well as building a verification regime, are needed. Germany welcomes the important work of the BTWC working group under the able stewardship of Ambassador Meier of Brazil. We call on all States Parties to redouble their efforts to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion in December this year. Germany continues to support the operational readiness of the US UNSGM under the current guidelines and procedures, which remain fully effective and thus require no further revision. We do so through training measures for experts in laboratories. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [39:12]: I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada. Canada [39:18]: Thank you, Chair. In the past 12 months, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have faced serious challenges, but they have also delivered important progress. Yet recent developments remind us that these regimes are only as strong as states' willingness to uphold their obligations. Canada remains deeply concerned that Russia retains an undeclared stockpile of chemical weapons and has employed chemical agents systematically in its unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine has documented more than 14,000 chemical attacks attributed to Russian forces, while OPCW reports have confirmed the use of CS as a weapon in violation of the Convention. Credible reports concerning the death of Alexei Navalny in Russian prison further reinforce concerns about Russia's continued reliance on prohibited toxic chemicals. We therefore call on Russia to cease its use of toxic chemicals as weapons, fully declare any remaining chemical weapons, and answer the questions posed to it under Article IX of the CWC. Chair, while accountability remains essential, recent developments in Syria demonstrate that progress is possible when states cooperate with international mechanisms. Canada welcomes Syria's continued cooperation with international verification efforts and is supporting these efforts through the OPCW Trust Fund and the Breath of Freedom Task Force. We congratulate Syria on the recent verified destruction of category 3 unfilled munitions. Monsieur le President. Chair. States Parties to the BTCW should also undertake to ensure the application of the Convention. We share in the frustrations of the Chair of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BTWC. We urge all States Parties to demonstrate compromise at the last working group meeting in December, so as to agree on a text creating an international cooperation and assistance mechanism, a science and technology review mechanism, and an open-ended working group on compliance and verification. Such an outcome would position us well for the 10th BTWC Review Conference in 2027 and the 30th anniversary of the CWC's entry into force. Let us seize both opportunities to strengthen the implementation of the Convention to improve accountability and to reinforce the international norm against chemical and biological weapons. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [42:17]: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Vietnam. Viet Nam [42:28]: Mr. Chair, Vietnam aligns itself with the statements of ASEAN and the Non-Aligned Movement. Vietnam reaffirms its commitment to the full and effective implementation of the BTWC and the CWC. We recognize the important role of the organizations for the prohibition of chemical weapons in advancing the objective of the CWC, especially in light of the recent positive developments regarding the Syrian chemicals weapons file. We underscore the importance of maintaining consensus in the OPCW's decision-making process. We support the efforts of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to facilitate international cooperation and capacity building for the implementation of the Convention, as well as the peaceful application of chemistry. Vietnam supports efforts to strengthen and institutionalize the BTWC framework, including through the work of the working group on the strengthening of the conventions toward establishing a mechanism to facilitate and support international cooperations and assistance under Article 10 of the treaty. Mr. Chair, rapid advances in science and technology offer significant opportunities for sustainable development, while also creating new challenges for chemical safety and security, biosafety and biosecurity. Vietnam remains firmly committed to the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. We call for strengthened international cooperation to ensure that scientific and technological advances are harnessed for peaceful purposes. purposes, and that the benefits are shared by all. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [44:18]: I thank the distinguished representative of Vietnam for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bangladesh. Bangladesh [44:35]: Thank you, Chair. Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia. On behalf of NAM, allow me to share our national position. Bangladesh remains firmly committed to the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. These weapons pose a grave threat to humanity. We are particularly concerned about the acquisition and use of such weapons by some non-state actors. In this regard, Bangladesh remains committed to implementing Security Council Resolution 1540 Earlier this year, we submitted the third national report on its implementation, reaffirming our commitment to preventing the proliferation of WMD and their acquisition by non-state actors. Mr. Chair, Bangladesh attaches great importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention. At the national level, we have established a strong legal and institutional framework through the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Act 2006 and the Environment Rules 2010. Our national authority for CWC continues to discharge its responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of the convention. We regret that the fourth and fifth review conferences of the CWC failed to reach consensus on substantive outcome documents. We urge all states parties to overcome their differences to reach consensus during the next review. Bangladesh advocates for the work of the OPCW. We must preserve its credibility, relevance, and effectiveness. Our strong cooperation with OPCW dates back in 2019, when Bangladesh became the first member state to introduce the Chemical Incident Preparedness for Hospitals, HOSPREP, initiative. Mr. Chair, Bangladesh attaches equal importance to the Biological Weapons Convention. Rapid advancements in science offer enormous opportunities, but also increase the risk of misuse of biological agents. Therefore, we must strengthen our collective preparedness to avert such mishandling. Now this calls for effective implementation of PWC. We look forward to the 10th review conference in 2027 and hope that the recommendations of the working group on the strengthening of the PWC will bring meaningful progress. To conclude, Mr. Chair, we call upon states for their constructive roles in the pursuit of preventing the development of WMDs as well as their total elimination. 1st Committee · Chair [46:51]: I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Bangladesh for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Chile. Micro for Chile. Chile [47:18]: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My country wishes to reiterate that the use and the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. We condemn the use or the threat of use of biological and chemical weapons under all circumstances, at any time and in any context. At the same time, we promote international cooperation and the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge, equipment and technologies for the peaceful use of chemical and biological products and materials. Chairman, we wish to reiterate our commitment to the Convention on Biological Weapons, and we advocate for its full universalization, since it represents a fundamental part of the international legal architecture governing weapons of mass destruction and in safety and security, it further enhances capacity building, builds trust and transparency. For our part, we promote universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons. We support the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The use of chemical weapons and toxic chemical products as weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances is wholly contrary to international law. In this regard, we note with satisfaction the effective operation of this convention as a comprehensive multilateral treaty prohibiting these weapons of mass destruction, that establishes a verification regime and promotes the use of chemicals with peaceful purposes. Chair, we wish to stress the importance of Security Council Resolution 1540. This resolution seeks to prevent non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also establishes essential measures to prevent the proliferation of these weapons, since they pose an ongoing threat to international security and stability. Along these same lines, the adoption of regulations that contribute to strengthening export control systems is crucial to preventing the diversion of materials and dual-use materials and technologies. We wish to recall that Security Council Resolution 2663 of 2022 mandated the 1540 Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of this resolution before December 2027. This requires commitment from all Member States to updating their national reports in this area. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [50:09]: I thank the distinguished representative of Chile for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden. Sweden [50:22]: Thank you, Chair. Sweden associates itself with the statement of the European Union. The following remarks are made in a national capacity. We join others in expressing concern about the deteriorating security environment, the undermining of arms control regimes, and the re-emergence of chemical weapons both on and off the battlefield. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and international law, and Sweden condemns it in the strongest possible terms. Our support for Ukraine and its efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace based on international law, including the UN Charter, remains unwavering. The reported use by Russia of riot control agents in the battlefield in Ukraine is in breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW Technical Assistance Visit reports underline the gravity of the situation. The poisoning of Mr. Alexei Navalny with a lethal toxin, epibutidine, while in prison is yet another flagrant example of Russia's disregard for its international obligations under the Convention. Ensuring accountability for these violations is crucial. Sweden welcomes the reinstatement of the rights and privileges of Syria under the Chemical Weapons Convention and commends the constructive cooperation between Syria and OPCW. We stress the continued importance of finalizing the full elimination of the former regime's chemical weapons programme and to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons. Reports of use of chemical weapons in Sudan is deeply concerning. As any State Party to the Chemicals Weapons Convention, Sudan must abide by its obligations under it. Sweden calls on Sudan to cooperate fully with the OPCW and take concrete measures to ensure full compliance with the Convention. Chair, the research of use of chemical weapons is an urgent threat to international peace and security and needs to be dealt with firmly and collectively. The use of chemical weapons under any circumstance is a clear breach of international law and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Impunity for these breaches cannot be tolerated. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [52:39]: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia. Australia [52:53]: Thank you, Chair. As technologies and proliferation risks evolve, Australia's commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is undiminished. Our efforts are reinforced by effective institutions, universal treaty implementation, and robust export controls. Together, they prevent the misuse of sensitive goods and technologies while promoting trade, scientific cooperation, and peaceful development. As founder and permanent chair of the Australia Group, Australia remains firmly committed to preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons through common control lists, outreach, and capacity building. The Australia Group supports implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention, strengthens global security, and enables trade. These efforts also support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Australia was proud to host a Westpac Indo-Pacific conference on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in September 2026. We welcome the 1540 Committee's first voluntary technical reference guide on export controls and preparations for the 2027 comprehensive review. Chair, Australia strongly supports the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its role in upholding the prohibition against chemical weapons. Australia co-sponsored the decision to reinstate Syria's rights and privileges under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This must be matched by the verified destruction of the remaining legacy chemical weapons. We remain concerned by the OPCW's confirmation of riot control agents in samples from frontline areas in Ukraine. Australia supports Ukraine's request for the OPCW to investigate these reports. Australia is deeply concerned by the findings of the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany, and the Netherlands that Alexei Navalny was poisoned with a lethal toxin while imprisoned in Russia. We call on Russia to comply with its international obligations, engage transparently, and ensure accountability. These reports raise serious concerns about potential undeclared chemical weapons programs in Russia. Chair, rapid advances in technology reinforce the need to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Artificial intelligence offers new opportunities for verification, but it also lowers barriers to the development of biological weapons. It is therefore critical we deliver on our mandate at the final working group session in December. We call on all states to join us in this effort. Chair, as technologies continue to evolve rapidly, Australia will continue to champion practical action, strong institutions and accountability to prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [55:51]: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Hungary. Apologies, Cameroon. Now the floor goes to Hungary. Hungary [56:19]: Thank you, Chair. Hungary aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. The full statement will be available online. The prohibition of biological and chemical weapons remains a fundamental pillar of the international disarmament and nonproliferation architecture. At a time of growing geopolitical tensions, rapid scientific and technological developments, and increasing challenges to multilateral cooperation, preserving and strengthening these norms is more important than ever. We have a collective responsibility to ensure that the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BWC remain effective and relevant in addressing present and future challenges. Hungary attaches particular importance to the BWC as the traditional sponsor of the annual GA resolution. We have long considered it both a privilege and a responsibility to promote the Convention's objectives, universalization and effective implementation. Rapid advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence offer significant opportunities for peaceful scientific progress, but also present new risks that require our detention. This year, we have decided not to submit the resolution to the First Committee, instead have submitted a short draft decision to ensure the BWC remains on the agenda. However, we recognize the growing need to streamline the work of the First Committee, reduce unnecessary procedural burdens, and make the most effective use of our collective time, energy, and financial resources. This decision in no way diminishes Hungary's unwavering commitment to the BWC, its full and effective implementation, or its universalization. Turning to chemical weapons, we reiterate our strong and unequivocal support for the CWC and the OPCW. The OPCW remains indispensable to international peace and security. Its achievements in overseeing the verified destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles demonstrate what effective multilateral cooperation can accomplish. Any use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances is unacceptable and constitutes a violation of international norms. We welcome the progress achieved in cooperation between the Syrian authority and the OPCW Technical Secretariat, including the recent step toward addressing the chemical weapons legacy of the former regime. We also encourage further cooperation in Syria. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [59:02]: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon. Cameroon [59:13]: The paradox of the double-edged sword of progress is at the heart of our matter before us. The same ends that can help food security, if misused, can also become destructive. Our challenge, therefore, is to prevent these threats, but also promote the peaceful uses of science and technology. For us, the double-edged sword of progress means that we need to ensure that prevention keeps up with scientific progress and the risks related thereto. The prohibition on chemical weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as Resolution 1540 of the Security Council, represent essential instruments, the effectiveness of which is relies both on States' abilities to anticipate new threats and to avoid diversion of scientific progress. In this regard, Cameroon suggests strengthening within existing multilateral fora inter-State exchanges. In light of the progress in biotechnology and artificial intelligence, this approach would allow us to more quickly identify emerging risks to understand national gaps and without establishing new structures or holding up the peaceful use of science. This is based on a firm belief that international prohibitions cannot fully bear fruit without lasting use. We therefore call for an effective implementation of existing instruments so that risk anticipation, the prevention of proliferation and the preservation of the peaceful uses of science is part of a complementary and mutually strengthening approach. Chair, as is recalled by African wisdom, When spider webs unite, they can tie up a lion. This image illustrates the power of collective action. It goes beyond borders. It shows us that no state can act alone effectively. It is by pooling our efforts that we can share knowledge and national capacities. This is our best guarantee of prevention. Our collective responsibility is therefore to resolve the double-edged sword paradox to prevent the diversion of science while also guaranteeing that it remains accessible to all. Scientific progress must remain not a source of threat, but rather a lever for peace, security, development for all of humanity. Thank you very much. 1st Committee · Chair [1:02:11]: I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of France to the Conference of Disarmament. France · Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament [1:02:24]: Mr. Chairman, France aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, and we would like to add a few remarks in national capacity. We call for a genuine and concerted effort by the international community to address the current challenges in the chemical and biological fields. Indeed, a concerted effort is needed to address the ongoing and increasing violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are facing a real risk of the resurgence of the use of chemical weapons as a means of warfare, with concerning allegations of their use in multiple theaters. At the same time, the chemical industry is growing and evolving, making it more difficult to control the risks of proliferation. Today, Russia is primarily responsible for the erosion of the prohibition norm. It is using riot control agents in its war of aggression against Ukraine. It has also used weapons that are expressly prohibited to carry out targeted assassinations, the most recent being that of Alexei Navalny. We call on Russia to finally respond to legitimate requests for clarifications. It must cease its delaying tactics and the dissemination of its disinformation, which also seriously undermines the norms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. More broadly, we call for a collective effort to ensure that countries that violate the CWC are held accountable. A concerted effort is also needed to address the incompleteness of our regime for the prohibition and nonproliferation of biological weapons, more than 50 years after the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention. Without a mechanism to monitor scientific and technological developments, we are collectively ill-equipped to deal with the evolving threats. Without a robust verification mechanism, the prohibition norm rests largely on the taboo surrounding these inhumane weapons. The clock is ticking for the Biological Weapons Convention. We solemnly call on all States Parties to mobilize and reach an agreement within the Working Group to establish functional mechanisms. This also requires addressing the obstructive tactics of certain delegations, which penalize the entire international community and, ultimately, the developing countries in particular. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1st Committee · Chair [1:05:10]: I thank the distinguished representative of France for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel. Israel [1:05:20]: The Middle East is still suffering from a chronic lack of compliance with non-proliferation and arms control norms, obligations, and mechanisms. Certain states are part of binding treaties and international frameworks, yet deliberately and systematically violate them. Another troubling phenomenon the region is suffering from is the growing impact of NSAs, and specifically terrorist groups, and their attempt to arm themselves with various weapons, including non-conventional ones. Chair, the international community should strongly support the important work of the OPCW. Israel supports the vital work of the OPCW and has a longstanding record of supporting it. Following the political changes in Syria, Israel continues to support the efforts by the OPCW and the international community to dismantle sites, stockpiles, and equipment associated with Assad regime's chemical weapons program. In this regard, we recall the OPCW's report regarding samples which reveal the indication of chemical warfare nerve agents in Syria, and we call on the authorities in Syria to allow full definition of the scope of these weapons-related activities. All these tasks are vital to prevent such lethal materials from falling into the hands of unstable and/or unauthorized actors that are still active in Syria. Chair, over the past two decades, Iran has been secretly developing a chemical weapons program based on weaponized pharmaceutical agents. It has been developing such weapons in various sites, such as the Shahid Maysoumi Research Group Complex. Beyond this R&D program, it appears that Iran produces fentanyl-based munitions and other types of weaponized PBAs. These substances have been incorporated in grenades and mortars, which can be used for multiple purposes. In this regard, covertly developed Iranian munitions have been transferred to Iran's regional proxies, most notably the Houthis and Hezbollah, for deployment against Israel and other countries. The Houthis' ongoing malign activities demonstrate that the threat they pose to regional stability is far greater than previously anticipated, and their ambition to acquire strategic chemical capabilities has intensified. Operating without restraints or limits, this Iranian proxy presents a direct threat to the international community. Finally, Chair, the international community must take concerned action to ensure that rough actors face meaningful consequences for noncompliance. Otherwise, they will continue with their shameless violations. Terrorist groups, too, need to be stopped and held accountable. Diplomacy and dialogue remain crucial tools in resolving disputes, but they must be backed by strong enforcement mechanisms in order to deter violators. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:08:09]: I thank the distinguished representative of Israel for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Maldives. Maldives [1:08:19]: Thank you, Chair. The Maldives reaffirms its commitment to the complete elimination of chemical and biological weapons. As a State Party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention, the Maldives believes that strengthening their implementation, verification, and international cooperation must remain central to our collective efforts. In this regard, I would like to make three points. First, strengthening verification and compliance. The Maldives support the continued work of the OPCW in investigating alleged chemical weapon use and call for full cooperation with its mechanism. The Maldives also encourage the state to strengthen national legislation, control over relevant chemical and enforce capacity to prevent prohibited activities. The ongoing working group process afford an important opportunity to address long-standing gap in the convention. The Maldives support concrete progress towards strengthening verification and compliance under the convention, including through the development of legally binding measures, improved transparency and confidence building measures. and an effective framework for international cooperation and assistance. The 2027 10th review conference should deliver concrete progress rather than repeated existing commitments. Third, translating international cooperation into national preparedness for small state, limited laboratory capacity, specialized and emergency response resources can hinder effective implementation. We encourage the OPCW and state parties to expand practical training, technical assistance, and knowledge sharing. The Maldives has itself benefited from OPCW capacity building initiative, including training on chemical emergency response. The Maldives also wishes to emphasize that non-proliferation Obligation must be implemented alongside the right to peaceful scientific and technological development consistent with the convention. International assistance should strengthen public health preparedness and biosafety without creating unnecessary barriers to legitimate research and technological transfer. Our priorities must be closed implementation gaps, strengthening accountability, and ensure that every state possesses the capacity to meet its obligation. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:11:15]: I thank the distinguished representative of Maldives for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste [1:11:22]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. with this statement delivered on behalf of NAM and ASEAN. We wish to deliver the following remarks in our national capacity. The full versions will be available online. For a small state like Timor-Leste, preventing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not merely a security obligation. It is about protections, human lives, preserving peace, and ensuring that scarce national resources support socioeconomic development rather than the production of these weapons that can lead to catastrophic consequences. We remain concerned about the risk posed by the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, particularly their potential acquisitions by non-state actors. Rapid technological advances, complex supply chains, and the possible misuse of dual-use materials make prevention increasingly challenging. No state can address these threats alone. The Security Council Resolution 1540 remains central to global nonproliferation efforts. Effective implementation requires appropriate national legislations, border and export controls, secure management of sensitive materials, and institutional coordinations. However, small developing states often face significant technical and financial constraints. TMOA therefore emphasized that international assistance must be accompanied non-proliferation obligations. Support for regulatory framework, customs authorities, border management, and specialized training is essential and must effective national circumstances. Mr. Chair, from the perspective of small state, Timor-Leste highlight three priorities. First, strengthen national prevention capacity through effective legislations, institutional coordinations, and safeguard against the diversions of sensitive materials. Second, ensure accessible and predictable technical assistance, particularly for developing countries, through capacity building, regional corporations, and information sharing. Third, reinforcing inclusive multilateral corporations, including treaty compliance, transparency, and confidence building, and effective verifications, while safeguarding the peaceful use of science and technology. Mr. Chair, lasting security cannot rest on the threat of mass destruction. It must be grounded in international law, mutual trust, and collective actions. By strengthening provisions today, we protect our people, our peace, and the generations to come. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:14:18]: I thank the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria. Algeria [1:14:28]: Thank you. We associate ourselves with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group, as well as the joint statement in support of efforts to strengthen the Secretary-General's mechanism to investigate allegations on the use of chemical and biological weapons. We reaffirm the fundamental importance of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention as pillars of our collective security architecture and cooperation. not just through the role in combating the use of these weapons, but also in their capacity as the framework for international cooperation for social and economic development. We reiterate our firm position that any use of these weapons by any party, and regardless of the circumstances, is a grave violation of international law and human dignity, and we categorically condemn such use. Mr. Chair, On chemical weapons, we welcome the recent positive developments and the recognition by the OPCW's Executive Board of the constructive cooperation and positive engagement of the Syrian Arab Republic. We welcome the IAEA's Board of Governors' decision in September to remove issues related to Syria's past compliance from its agenda. We also stress the importance of continuing to provide the necessary technical support and international funding. On biological weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention remains the primary framework, and its effectiveness depends on the comprehensive, balanced, and transparent, and verifiable implementation. The absence of a verification regime is an ongoing challenge to the effectiveness of this convention. We stress the need to resume multilateral negotiations over a legally binding and non-discriminatory protocol that would address all the articles of the convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner, including verification measures. We welcome the progress made within the framework of the open-ended working group established by the Ninth Review Conference, especially on the activation of Article 10 on international cooperation and assistance. On Security Council Resolution 1540, we stress it is a, this resolution is a complementary tool to prevent weapons for mass destruction from falling into the hands of non-state actors, including terrorists. We'd like to stress the following, the need to stress the assistance by comprehensive, for comprehensive implementation, including supporting developing countries. And second, strengthening cooperation between the 1540 Committee and regional instruments such as the Pelendaba Treaty and the African Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The full version of the statement will be posted to the UN website, I think. 1st Committee · Chair [1:17:28]: I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Thailand. Thailand [1:17:40]: Thank you, Chair. Chair, Thailand aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of ASEAN and NAM. The full statement will be available online. Chemical and biological weapons remain a serious threat to international peace and security, while advances in science and technology, including artificial intelligence and the life science, bring both promise and new risks. Thailand, therefore, wishes to highlight three points. First, we must strengthen the full and effective implementation of the CWC and the BWC. Thailand condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances, and supports the OPCW's verification mandate. We welcome the verified destruction of chemical munitions declared by Syria, the first since 2014. On the BWC, Thailand supports efforts towards a legally binding verification mechanism. As friend of the Chair on national implementation, Thailand has actively engaged in the working group on the strengthening of the BWC. We welcome the progress made in August and urge all State Parties to show flexibility at the final session in December. This will be key to reaching agreement on international cooperation and assistance, as well as science and technology review ahead of the 10th review conference in 2027. Second, we must advance national implementation and regional cooperation to prevent proliferation. Thailand submits its confidence-building measure reports regularly and continues to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity. We have hosted regional workshops with UNSCAP and UNODA and welcome the UNRCPD's efforts to connect national focal points across Southeast Asia. Thailand also strengthens controls on dual-use items, including cash or control measures for items outside the National Strategic Items Control List, where proliferation risks are identified. And in support of the Security Council Resolution 1540, Thailand encouraged the United Nations to provide practical, needs-based support for national implementation. Third, the peaceful use of chemistry and biology are essential to sustainable development. In line with Articles 10 and 11 of the BWC and CWC respectively, Thailand supports capacity building and international cooperation for peaceful purposes, alongside robust safeguards. Chair, Thailand calls for greater trust, cooperation, and collective action to free the world of weapons of mass destruction for generations to come, and I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:20:20]: I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lithuania. Microphone for Lithuania. Microphone for Lithuania, please. Lithuania [1:21:01]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Lithuania aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. The following remarks are in my national capacity, and the full statement will be available online. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a grave threat to international peace and security. Lithuania reaffirms the principle that any use or threat of use of biological or chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable, and that those responsible for the use of such weapons should be held accountable. In this regard, the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BWC, remain indispensable pillars of the global disarmament and nonproliferation architecture. Mr. Chair, Lithuania remains deeply concerned by Russia's continued use of toxic chemicals and riot control agents as a method of warfare in its war against Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities, I'm so sorry. have documented more than 14,000 cases involving hazardous chemicals on the battlefield, while the OPCW Technical Secretariat has independently confirmed their presence through multiple technical assistance visit reports and analyses conducted by OPCW-designated laboratories. The evidence shows that Russia's use of chemical weapons is systematic rather than isolated, and forms part of a broader pattern that includes the poisonings of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, Dawn Sturgess and Alexei Navalny. Accountability is essential. Violations of the Convention cannot be effectively addressed without identifying those responsible. Russia must not be allowed to violate the Convention with impunity. The international community must remain united in defending the global norm against chemical weapons and ensuring that those responsible are held to account. Mr. Chair, Lithuania supports a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, alongside the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program. We note the progress achieved and encourage further efforts. We would like to highlight the issue of chemical munitions dumped at sea as well, Mr. Chair. As aging munitions continue to deteriorate and reckless activities could disturb their resting sites on the seabed, this issue requires greater international attention, including the security domain. Mr. Chair, Lithuania remains committed to upholding the norm against biological weapons and strengthening the BWC. We welcome the work of the Working Group on strengthening of the Convention and support a meaningful outcome by December 2026. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:24:00]: I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan [1:24:09]: Preventing the use of chemical and biological weapons requires effective international rules and institutions capable of supporting their implementation. Kazakhstan supports the complete prohibition of these weapons and their universal elimination. We call all states to join the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons remain indispensable for these efforts. We condemn the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, and call for full compliance with this convention. Kazakhstan supports strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, including through works on verification and compliance. President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev's initiative to establish an international agency for biological security response to this need. We invite constructive discussion of its possible function in relationship with existing bodies. Mr. Chair, Kazakhstan also support implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540. effective export control and security management and sensitive materials and in initial for this task. Kazakhstan will continue contributing to exclusive cooperation towards these objectives. The full text of statement will be uploaded to the e-delegate portal. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:25:53]: I thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Syrian Arab Republic. Microphone for Syria, please. Syrian Arab Republic [1:26:15]: My delegation aligns itself with the statements of the Arab Group and NAM. Mr. Chair, the past year has witnessed qualitative steps in Syria's cooperation with the OPCW. These efforts culminated last last September with the launch of a process for destruction of chemicals in a process that is the first of its kind since the liberation of Syria. This proves that the file that for years was a source of danger for Syria and the world can become a model of what diplomacy and genuine will can accomplish in the context of Syria's transformation from a country that provoked the anger of the international community to a country that shows leadership We took the initiative to establish the Breath of Freedom Task Force led by Syria, with the commendable participation of a number of international partners who responded to the attacks and embodied international solidarity on the ground. We also updated the initial declaration, and we continue to cooperate with the organization. In this context, we received the director general of the organization a few days ago, where she held a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, during which a roadmap was discussed to move from the progress made to the final closure of the file. Mr. Chair, Syria welcomes the decision of the IAEA-- of the OPCW Executive Council, decision of the OPCW Executive Council regarding the restoration of Syria's rights and privileges. This was adopted by consensus. We express thanks to the sisterly state of Qatar, which sponsored the draft resolution. This is a message of confidence in Syria's return to a status it deserves as a reliable partner to the international community. at the time when new Syria has announced that it has broken with the practices of the old system and has shown its commitment to international commitments to become a pillar for stability, it is still facing attempts to undermine its stability. As you know, the repeated Israeli aggressions on Syrian territories have hampered its efforts and the organization's. These aggressions not only constitute a violation of Syria's sovereignty, but also harm efforts aimed at strengthening the chemical regime. The risks go beyond my country's border and affect the security of the region. This is why it is important for the international community to fulfill its responsibility to create secure conditions for the continuation of this path. We continue to deliver justice for the victims. As part of these efforts, we arrested 18 people involved in the chemical attacks to bring them before justice. We recently also joined in the international partnership to combat impunity led by France. My delegation commends the approach adopted by Poland in drafting the paragraphs on Syria and the draft resolution on the implementation of the CWZ. We welcome that this text reflects the new positive climate. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:29:13]: I thank the distinguished representative of Syrian Arab Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Pakistan [1:29:24]: Thank you, Chair. The biological and chemical weapons conventions remain among the most vital pillars of the global arms control architecture. They embody our collective resolve that these abhorrent weapons must never be developed, possessed, or used. Rapid advances in the life and chemical sciences, increasingly converging with AI and synthetic biology, are creating novel and unpredictable risks. Science is moving faster than governance. Our response must be balanced, preventing misuse while safeguarding the right of state parties, particularly developing countries, to benefit fully from peaceful applications. New barriers to legitimate scientific progress and equitable access to technology must be resisted. Chair, the BWC stands at a defining moment. After four years of work, the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention will hold its final session in December. Success is within reach. We must conclude it on a high note by agreeing to establish the two long overdue mechanisms, one on international cooperation and assistance, and one on science and technology. As one of Friends of Chair, we will support these efforts. Confidence-building measures enhance transparency, but they are no substitute of verification measures, which remain the only credible guarantee of compliance. At the national level, Pakistan this year enacted the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Act, giving full domestic legal effect to our obligations under this Convention. Chair, Pakistan remains fully committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. We value the OPCW's verification regime and the professionalism and impartiality of its technical secretariat. We welcome the Executive Council's consensus decision in July to restore Syria's rights and privileges under the Convention and the progress made on the file. It shows what cooperation, rather than confrontation, can achieve. We hope this spirit will make consensus-based decision-making the norm once again within the OPCW. Chair, the Secretary-General's mechanism remains an essential tool for investigating alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. We support regular review of its guidelines and procedure. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:31:59]: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil. Microphone for Brazil. Brazil [1:32:18]: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Brazil unequivocally condemns the development, the stocking, the use, or the threat of use of chemical and biological weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstance. The catastrophic consequences of the use of such weapons demand unwavering commitment to their prohibition and elimination. Brazil reaffirms its support for the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the work of the OPCW. Technical rigor, transparency, and impartiality must guide its activities. Preserving the organization's integrity and strengthening international cooperation remain essential to ensuring compliance and preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons. Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and its universality are equally important. More than 50 years after its entry into force, the Convention still lacks a verification mechanism and adequate institutional support. These shortcomings must be urgently addressed. Rapid advances in biotechnology, particularly its interaction with artificial intelligence, offer unprecedented opportunities, but also create growing biosafety and biosecurity risks. This development reinforces the urgency of equipping the BWC with effective mechanisms to address emerging challenges. As chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Strengthening the BWC, Brazil reiterates its call on all States Parties to demonstrate the political will and flexibility required to successfully conclude its mandate in December and deliver concrete results. Finally, Brazil reiterates its long lasting support for the Security Council's 1540 Committee in preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation to non-state actors. We emphasize international cooperation, technical assistance, and capacity building while ensuring that non-proliferation measures do not unduly restrict access to technology for peaceful purposes. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:34:24]: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia. Indonesia [1:34:35]: Indonesia aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of NAM and ASEAN. I wish to add the following points in our national capacity. Indonesia reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Universality remains essential to achieving a world free from chemical and biological weapons. We urge all states not yet party to these conventions to join without preconditions. However, universality must go beyond numbers. It must be accompanied by full and effective implementation, stronger national capacities, international cooperation and assistance, and responses to emerging scientific and technological challenges. On chemical weapons, Indonesia remains committed to strengthening the CWC, including through its membership in the OPCW Executive Council for 2026 to 2028. Indonesia welcomes recent progress on the Syrian file, including the first verified destruction of chemical weapons in August, and the Executive Council's decision to reinstate Syria's rights and privileges under the Convention. We hope these developments will facilitate constructive engagement and progress on outstanding issues. We call on all state parties to uphold the CWC in good faith and support the OPCW in carrying out its mandate professionally. Looking ahead to the sixth CWC review conference in 2028, Indonesia underscores the importance of early and inclusive preparations to achieve a consensus-based outcome that strengthens the Convention. Chair, on biological weapons, Indonesia welcomes ongoing efforts to strengthen the BWC, including through its working group. And as we approach the 10th review conference in 2027, states parties must work towards a consensus-based outcome that addresses outstanding institutional and verification challenges and strengthen the convention in all its aspects. These efforts must preserve the BWC's mandate, ensure complementarity with the CWC, and avoid unnecessary duplication. Our collective priority must remain preventing the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons, while ensuring that advances in science and technology serve peaceful purposes. Finally, Indonesia underscores the importance of strengthening national implementation through Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction, alongside sustained international cooperation and assistance. Through these collective efforts, we can strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and ensure that science and technology serve humanity. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [1:37:12]: I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine. Ukraine [1:37:21]: Chair, the delegation of Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the EU, as well as the statement delivered by Lithuania on behalf of a group of states. We would like to make additional remarks in our national capacity. We welcome the progress achieved in the cooperation between Syria and the OPCW Technical Secretariat. We hope that these efforts will lead to the full identification and safe destruction of all remaining elements of the former regime's chemical weapons programme. Chair, since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces have repeatedly used hazardous chemicals and riot control agents as a method of warfare, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As of October 2026, the competent authorities of Ukraine have documented more than 14,000 cases of the use by Russian forces of munitions containing toxic chemicals, including chloropicrin and CS. In 6,021 cases, servicemen sought medical assistance after experiencing symptoms of chemical exposure. Three reports issued following OPCW technical assistance visits conducted at Ukraine's request have confirmed the presence of CS around control agent in environmental munition samples. We express our sincere gratitude to the OPCW Director General and the Technical Secretariat for the continued assistance under Article X of the Convention, as well as to the State Parties whose voluntary contributions have made this important work possible. Establishing facts is essential, but it's not enough. The next critical step must be to establish responsibility and ensure accountability. We call on OPCW within its existing mandate to provide the technical expertise necessary to identify the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. Ukraine has put forward its candidacy for membership of the Executive Council of the OPCW for the term 2027-2028. Ukraine is determined to contribute to the effective work of the Council and to strengthening the Convention as a whole. We respectfully ask all States Parties to support our candidacy at the upcoming session of the Conference of the States Parties. Chair, since 1975, Ukraine has been a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and fully complies with its provisions. All Ukrainian scientific and medical institutions operate solely for peaceful purposes. At the same time, the Russian Federation systematically violates the BWC. Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine has led to the destruction of essential medical and biological infrastructure, illegal seizure of Ukrainian laboratories, and threats to biosafety. Russia also spreads disinformation regarding alleged Ukrainian biological weapons programs, aiming to discredit Ukraine and divert international attention from its war of aggression and crimes committed in its course. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:40:10]: I think the distinguished representative of Ukraine for his statement I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia [1:40:22]: see the list mr. chair we align ourselves with the statement by the Arab group and the statement by now we deliver the following statement in our national capacity first the kingdom believes in the importance of international peace and tries to achieve this through its commitment to the UN Charter, international treaties to which it has acceded, and through respecting international law and the promotion of peaceful cooperation among states to serve the common interests of our people. Second, we affirm the responsibility of the international community to prevent the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, specifically in the Middle East. We call in strengthening the role of the UN and international bodies to implement relevant Security Council resolutions, including 1543. We emphasize the importance of full compliance with the treaties prohibiting the proliferation of other WMDs, including WBC, which we acceded to in 1972. to contribute to maintaining international peace and security. We affirm our commitment to the provisions of the CWZ and the importance of its comprehensive and balanced implementation. We stress that the use of chemical weapons is a crime and a flagrant violation of international law and provisions of the convention. Fourth, we express our appreciation for the recent positive developments regarding the Syrian chemical weapons file, and we welcome the broad recognition by state members of the Executive Council of the OPCW. and the cooperation and constructive engagement demonstrated by the Syrian Arab Republic, including the provision of all necessary facilities, such as granting unrestricted access to information and suspected sites to enable the destruction of the remnants of the chemical program from the Assad era. In this context, we commend the continued constructive role played by State of Qatar. Fifth, Israel's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon and the placement of non-nuclear weapons state and its placement of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguard system would contribute to confidence building and university of the treaty it would also help rectify the existing strategic imbalance in the region and enhance a regional international security as Israel remains the only state that has not joined any of the three treaties related to wmds we affirm that the establishment of zone free of all weapons of mass destruction the Middle East is a collective responsibility acquiring political will and sincere sustained International efforts thank you 1st Committee · Chair [1:42:42]: thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Myanmar. Myanmar · Permanent Representative [1:42:55]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, Myanmar aligns its with the statement of ASEAN and NAM. As a state party to BWC and CWC, Myanmar reaffirms our commitment to uphold norms against biological and chemical weapons and underscore the importance of their universal adherence. The lack of a verification mechanism continues to hinder the effectiveness of the BWC. Against this backdrop, Myanmar supports the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC in addressing structure and operational gaps, including verifications, compliance, and institutional mechanisms. Mr. Chair, Myanmar strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstance. We commend the work of the OPCW in the complete destruction of all declared chemical weapons. At the same time, Myanmar took note of the progress in the Syria chemical weapons file. Mr. Chair, many chemicals under the CWC are dual-use in nature. We are of the view that this very nature of dual-use chemical is readily exploited by malicious actors, including dictators and terrorists in conflict settings. Unfortunately, in my country, Myanmar, dual-use industrial chemical has been repeatedly misused by the military hunter, especially after the military coup in 2021. Reports on the ground have recorded alarming incidents of chemical bombs dropped by military hunter involving high content tear gas, white phosphorus, and aluminum phosphate. Prior to these recent incidents, the military was reportedly to be operating a chemical weapons production facility in southern central Myanmar in 1980s. and constructing another one in central Myanmar in 2009, the former produced sulfur an X1 chemical, the alleged use of chemical which won't bind the military warrants additional scrutiny due to their lack of transparency and sincerity, their repeated human rights violations and their complete disregard for international law. As such, I ask the international community to closely monitor these concerning developments in Myanmar and provide necessary support to our people in documenting and verifying such incidents. It should be abundantly clear by now that the military junta will use any illegal means available to punish civilians indiscriminately. Taking this opportunity, I appeal to all Member States to cut the flows of arms, weapons, jewelry, and other dual-use items and related technologies to the military hunter to save the lives of the people of Myanmar. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:45:43]: I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Myanmar for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Oman. Oman [1:45:59]: Chair, the Sultanate of Oman aligns with the statements of the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. We affirm our position in support for a world free of all WMDs. We categorically reject the use of chemical or biological weapons by anyone and under any circumstances. These weapons pose a grave threat to people and to international peace and security. We stress the importance of the CWC and the BWC as two essential pillars in the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. We call for promoting the two conventions and for their full, balanced, and non-discriminatory implementation, the OPCW. must fulfill its mandate with professionalism and objectivity. Cooperation among Member States should be advanced to preserve the credibility and effectiveness of the Convention. On the BWC, we emphasize the importance of continued efforts to promote the Convention, including through the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC. It is also important to address challenges pertaining to compliance and verification and to foster cooperation, assistance, and exchange of science and technology for peaceful purposes in line with the Convention. Chair, the Sultanate of Oman attaches particular importance to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East. This is a comprehensive goal encompassing all categories of WMDs. The achievement of this goal will contribute to promoting security and stability for all countries of the region. We call for continued support from the international community. In this regard, we are honored to assume the presidency of the seventh session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other WMDs in the Middle East, to be held next November. The Omani presidency, in cooperation with participating states, will build on what was achieved during the previous sessions, will advance dialogue, confidence, and continued discussions on various elements of this region. This includes publications pertaining to chemical and biological weapons. We also call on all invited parties, without exception, to effectively and constructively participate in the works of the conference and to engage in goodwill towards the establishment of the zone under a legally binding treaty, thus promoting the collective security of all countries and peoples of the region. We also stress the importance of continued international cooperation to prevent the acquisition by terrorist elements and groups of WMDs and their means of deliveries in line with relevant international obligations. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:48:53]: I thank the distinguished representative of Oman for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba. Cuba [1:49:04]: We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. We live in an absurd world which squanders exorbitant amounts on armaments, including nuclear weapons, while pledged ODA falls by the wayside, while wealth inequality is growing disproportionately, and while millions of people continue to suffer from hunger and poverty. The elimination and full prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, transparently, verifiably and irreversibly, is the only possible guarantee to prevent their development, transfer and use. Cuba thoroughly and faithfully complies with all provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We condemn the imposition of unilateral coercive measures that are manifestly illegal, which restrict or prevent discriminatorily the exercise of the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, they hamper international cooperation and the scientific technical progress of Member States in the biological and chemical spheres. We reject the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba, which breaches the provisions of articles 10 of the Convention on Biological Weapons and 11 of the Chemical Weapons Convention. These articles reflect the commitment of the signatory parties to facilitate the broadest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical information. information for the peaceful use of chemicals, biological agents and toxins, including for disease prevention. We reiterate our unwavering commitment to promoting general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. Cuba does not possess, nor do we have the intention to possess, any type of weapon of mass destruction. We reject the use of these weapons by any actor and under any circumstances. We fully support the existing multilateral regimes prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [1:51:34]: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Greece. Greece [1:51:46]: Chair, Greece fully aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union and will add the following remarks in its national capacity. My cadre is alarmed by the risk associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In particular, we remain committed to contribute to efforts on preventing non-state actors, including terrorist groups, from acquiring access to those weapons. As acting chair of the 1540 Committee for this month, Greece remains fully committed to supporting the effective and universal implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540, which aims to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions and their means of delivery to non-state actors, including for terrorist purposes. Greece's active engagement within the committee include the co-chairing of the annual open briefing in October 2025, as well as the organization of a workshop on maritime border security enforcement in November 25 in Crete, Greece. We regret the continued lack of agreement on appointing the committee's chair and vice-chair for this year. which prevents the Committee from effectively fulfilling its mandate. Moreover, it is important to ensure that the Committee's group of experts works efficiently, including through the filling of the vacancies within the group without further delay. Mr. Chair, Greece reiterates its unwavering commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to the global norm of the absolute prohibition of the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances. Such use constitutes a grave violation of international law and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. My country supports Syria's efforts to resolve all outstanding issues relating to the Assad's regime chemical weapons program. We continue to engage with the competent Syrian authorities, including through the provision of assistance and capacity building. The decision of the OPCW Executive Council to reinstate Syria's rights and privileges under the Convention was a step towards a right direction. We are concerned from the reports on use of riot control agents and other toxic chemicals on the front lines in Ukraine. We commend the ongoing investigations of relevant Ukrainian authorities, and we hope that perpetrators will be held accountable. Moreover, Greece remains committed to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and to the norm against the use of biological. 1st Committee · Chair [1:54:49]: I thank the distinguished representative of Greece for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria. Austria [1:54:59]: Mr. Chair, Austria aligns with the statement by the European Union. The current deteriorating international security environment is characterized by an erosion of international legal norms and arms control frameworks, as well as the heightened risks regarding weapons of mass destruction. In this context, it is of utmost importance to protect the global prohibition norms against the use of chemical and biological weapons and to strengthen the integrity of the two conventions. Russia's widespread use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, as well as use of toxic chemicals in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, constitute clear violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and are of grave concern. We call on Russia to comply with its obligations. Accountability for violations must be ensured. We strongly reject any attempt to undermine the global prohibition norm against chemical weapons. Austria reiterates its full support for the professional and impartial work of the OPCW. We welcome the Syrian new government's continued collaboration with the OPCW and the progress made in the detection and elimination of remaining chemical weapons. This is the window of opportunity to end the legacy of chemical weapons in Syria once and for all. Austria also financially contributed to the OPCW work in Syria to this end. Mr. Chair, Given rapid developments in biotechnology and life sciences, as well as increased use of artificial intelligence, it is paramount for States Parties of the BWC to make progress in strengthening the institutional capacity of the Convention and ensure it remains relevant in a changing biological risk environment. We urge all States Parties to work constructively towards a substantive outcome at the final session of the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC in December to successfully conclude recommendations for the adoption of mechanisms for science and technology and for cooperation and assistance. For Austria, progress towards verification and compliance remains crucial to strengthen the prohibition norm against biological weapons and prevent their re-emergence. In this context, we also highlight the unique mandate and the central role of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism. Austria continues to provide expertise and laboratory resources to the Mechanism. Mr. Chair, the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime remains under significant pressure. We reiterate our commitment to the full and effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Multilateral export control regimes play a vital role in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and providing a platform to share information and enhance transparency. We note particularly increasing importance. 1st Committee · Chair [1:58:02]: I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain. Spain [1:58:13]: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Spain aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. In line with the new national strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 2026, my country reaffirms its commitment to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and to strengthening verification mechanisms and confidence-building measures among states. We staunchly uphold the integrity, impartiality and credibility of the OPCW, and we actively support its technical cooperation initiatives. We reiterate our categorical condemnation of the use of toxic chemicals or riot control agents as a method of warfare under any circumstances. We reiterate that the Russian Federation must provide credible and transparent answers to the legitimate questions raised under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and without any evasion, fulfill its international obligations. Spain welcomes the continued cooperation of the Syrian authorities with the OPCW, and we encourage the country to maintain full transparency and technical cooperation until the complete, irreversible, and definitive elimination of its former chemical weapons program. We also reaffirm our strong support for the UN Secretary-General's mechanism for investigation into alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. This is the only independent international instrument that is operationally prepared to investigate the possible use of biological agents. Chairman, advances in biotechnology and artificial intelligence have lowered the barriers that previously limited the production and manipulation of biological agents and toxins for weapons purposes, thereby facilitating their proliferation. Spain is working towards the adoption in December of the final report of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention. This particularly reflects the establishment of a cooperation and assistance mechanism and promotes the establishment of an open-ended group to address compliance and verification under the Convention. Spain reiterates the validity of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and we uphold the relevance of multilateral export control regimes as complementary and necessary tools to prevent illicit diversion. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:00:59]: I thank the distinguished representative of Spain for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belarus. Belarus [2:01:12]: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The issue of the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons remains one of the priority issues on the international disarmament agenda. We reaffirm our dedication to the goals of consolidating multilateral efforts to enhance, and strengthen the relevant international toolkit. We support the strengthening of the Conference on Disarmament as a forum for development and adoption of international legal instruments in this area for the interests of the entire international community. The Republic of Belarus, in recent years, has initiated and promoted at the conference constructive discussions of the problem of new types of WMDs. We've also continued to draw attention to the problems related to the acquisition of WMDs by non-state groups and the use of science and technology to create new types of weapons of mass destruction. Preventive action and proactive approaches are, as we see it, the best way to respond to new risks and threats to international peace and security. To improve international procedures for tracking the situation surrounding the possible creation of new types of WMDs, we regularly, on a trilateral basis, submit a draft resolution to the UNGA. It's called the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacturing of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons, Report to the Conference on Disarmament. The previous resolution was adopted by overwhelming majority of votes. That was at the 70th session of the UNGA in 2023. The latest draft is submitted for the consideration of this session of the first committee of the UNGA. The project contains a technical update and it fully retains the meaning the substantive content of the resolution that for decades garnered the consensus of states, the support of states. The document is preventive in nature and seeks to prevent the emergence of new WMDs. The resolution reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament. promoting ongoing efforts to monitor the situation and the development of recommendations. The resolution does not duplicate existing conventions, but supplements them. It maintains a focus on new types of WMDs, including weapons that might emerge from new technologies, so that the international community can respond before and not after they emerge when it is too late. We thank the states that have already expressed their support for the draft and have joined it as co-sponsors. And we encourage all delegations to follow suit. Thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:04:07]: I thank the distinguished representative of Belarus for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan. Japan [2:04:19]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Japan remains fully committed to multilateral efforts for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In this regard, Japan stresses the importance of strengthening and universalizing the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Mr. Chair, Japan is deeply concerned by reports that Russia has used chemical weapons and riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine. We note with appreciation the significant achievements made through the constructive engagement between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic in resolving outstanding chemical weapons issues. Japan reaffirms its unwavering support for the Technical Secretariat activities in Syria. Mr. Chair, Japan has continued to expend its utmost efforts to make progress in the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China by investing in human and financial resources in line with the CWC. As the ACW project is a joint project between Japan and China, Japan is proceeding with the project while sharing perceptions with the Chinese side on various issues. We'd like to point out that appropriate and timely cooperation from the Chinese side is necessary to advance the project as planned. Japan and China jointly submitted destruction plans through the discussion to seek a feasible plan. In accordance with the destruction plan, Japan has been making the best possible efforts to complete the destruction with necessary cooperation by China. We will continue to make our efforts based on the destruction plan beyond 2022 as well. Mr. Chair, in this final year of the mandate of the BWC working group, Japan continues its active and constructive engagement in the negotiations, particularly on the establishment of two efficient, practical, and effective mechanisms. Ahead of the 10th review conference next year, Japan stresses the importance of strengthening effectiveness and improving the implementation of the BWC. Mr. Chair, Japan also attaches great value to the UN Secretary-General's mechanism as the only available tool to independently investigate any case of biological weapon attacks. Strengthening the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is important for tackling the threat of WMD proliferation to non-state actors. Japan has been supporting its implementation in the Asia-Pacific region, including through financial contributions. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:07:01]: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States. United States of America [2:07:13]: Thank you, Chair. The United States aligns itself with the joint statement delivered by Lithuania earlier today. The conventions banning chemical and biological weapons are only as strong as our will to enforce them. Today, some states are openly testing that will. The United States renounced biological weapons in 1969 and helped create the BWC. Its core rule remains clear. No state may develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons. Yet, some state and non-state actors continue to pursue them. Under President Trump's administration, the United States is leading the way to apply modern tools, especially super intelligence, to strengthen BWC implementation, compliance assessment, and enforcement. As part of several side events of the BWC with government, industry, and civil society, we presented our first SI-enabled tool, which helps review and improve confidence-building measures. invite every state party to join us in building more tools to strengthen compliance and transparency in July the United States stopped federal funding for dangerous gain of function research at home and abroad and restricted funding in countries lacking appropriate safety security and oversight standards we urge others to do the same the United States and its Partners assess that Russia has repeatedly used chloropicrin against Ukrainian forces, as well as riot control agents, as a method of warfare, in violation of the CWC. The OPCW confirmed riot control agents in munitions recovered from the front lines on three occasions. This year, five European states concluded, based on their national investigations, that Alexei Navalny, who died in Russian detention, was highly likely poisoned with a lethal toxin. This fits a clear pattern. Russia used Novichok in the United Kingdom in 2018 and against Mr. Navalny in 2020. Russia must end its chemical and biological weapons programs and comply with the CWC and BWC. Additionally, the United States assesses that Iran has developed pharmaceutical-based agents as part of a chemical weapons program, and we continue to press Iran to address these concerns. Meanwhile, the government of Sudan also used chemical weapons in 2024, prompting two rounds of U.S. sanctions. Sudan must declare its chemical weapons to the OPCW and verifiably destroy them. Russia, Iran, and Sudan highlight why accountability matters. In contrast, Syria shows what is possible when a government chooses cooperation over concealment. In 2026, the joint OPCW Syria mission reached major milestones that resulted in the first OPCW-verified destruction of newly declared chemical weapons since 2014. The Syria mission is a collective effort, and we call on all States to contribute. Chair, the United States opposes the use of chemical or biological weapons by anyone, anywhere. We call on every State to uphold its BWC and CWC obligations, work with us on new tools to build confidence in compliance, and hold accountable anyone who uses these weapons. Thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:10:11]: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Qatar. Qatar [2:10:26]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Arab Group and the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction and their catastrophic consequences for humanity require the international community to intensify its efforts to prevent the possession of such weapons and to ensure the prohibition and criminalization of their use under any circumstance. And it also requires strictly adhering to the legal obligations contained in relevant international treaties. As a member of the Executive Council of the OPCW for the period 2026 to 2028, the State of Qatar reaffirmed its commitment to supporting the organization's efforts aimed at enhancing the full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and in a manner that would contribute to the promotion of international peace and security. The State of Qatar also continues to develop and update relevant national legislation in the field of weapons of mass destruction to align them with our obligations under the agreements to which we acceded, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, considering it one of the fundamental pillars of the multilateral disarmament system. in order to establish an international community that lives in peace, stability, security, and development. Mr. Chair, with regards to our efforts aimed at eliminating and eradicating chemical weapons, given their grave harm to humans, animals, and the environment, we note the adoption by the OPCW's Executive Council during its 112th session held in The Hague on the 9th of July 2026, We note this adoption of the draft decision submitted by the State of Qatar concerning the restoration of the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic within the organization with the participation of 66 state parties in co-sponsoring the resolution. The adoption of this resolution is the culmination of diplomatic efforts undertaken by the State of Qatar through a series of consultations and initiatives to build broad consensus among the state parties. This paved the way towards the adoption of the resolution. In a related matter, the State of Qatar is proud to join the international working group led by Syria. This group was launched on the 19th of March last in New York and is dedicated to eliminating the remnants of the chemical weapons program. This group also includes Turkey, Canada, France, the UK, and the United States. And we look forward to working together to achieve the objectives of the working group. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:13:09]: I thank the distinguished representative of Qatar for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2:13:21]: Thank you, Chair. In this time of change across geopolitics, science, and technology, we are deeply concerned about attempts to undermine global norms that ban both the development and use of chemical and biological weapons. Chair, this year the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, and Germany concluded that Russia highly likely used the lethal toxin epibatidine to poison Alexei Navalny while held in a Russian prison. We unequivocally condemn this act, which was a violation of both the CWC and the BTWC. This was also the latest in a series of Russian violations including the use of a Novichok nerve agent in the UK in 2018, which led to the tragic death of a British woman, Dawn Sturgess, the Novichok poisoning of Alexei Navalny in 2020, and Russia's use of chemical weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine. We are also seriously concerned about reports of chemical weapons use in Sudan, and we urge the Sudanese government to publish the findings of its investigation. In the face of such blatant disregard for legally binding conventions, our collective response must be to strengthen them. Chair, in this regard, we welcome the fundamentally different path Syria has taken since the fall of the Assad regime. Syria has made important progress towards eliminating the remnants of the former regime's chemical weapons program under OPWC supervision. The UK is honoured to assist in these efforts through substantial technical, financial and diplomatic support for Syria and the OPCW and through the Breath of Freedom Task Force. In the BTWC, we welcome progress made by the Working Group. The upcoming 10th BTWC RevCon presents a significant opportunity to ensure the BTWC is fit for future challenges. We look forward to progressing this work alongside States Parties and the Chair in December. Chair, the UK's support to both the BTWC and CWC is unwavering. We continue to fund projects to strengthen their implementation, universalization, and to reinforce the OPCW's designated laboratories network. As we near the 40th anniversary of the UNSGM, we continue to support its work through funding expert training and encouraging expert nominations from underrepresented regions. We urge all States to implement in full UNSCR 1540 and to support the 1540 Committee's efforts to provide advice and assistance to States to prevent the spread of WMDs to non-State actors. Chair, in a more unpredictable world, marked by challenges to international norms and rapid advances in science and technology, It is vital that our nations continue their work through international law to confront today's threats and safeguard tomorrow's stability. Thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:16:11]: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cambodia. Cambodia [2:16:21]: Mr. Chair, Cambodia aligns itself with the statement delivered by Zin and Nam. I would like to make a following remark in my national capacity. International peace and security remain under the threat as long as the weapon of mass destruction continue to pose catastrophic risk to humanity. Cambodia reaffirms that the total elimination of weapon of mass destruction, including the chemical and biological, is essential to protect humanity and ensuring lasting international peace and security. At the national level, Cambodia firm opposition to the weapon of mass destruction is clearly in constitution. This commitment being implemented and further in sanction by the relevant authority including the national authority for the prohibition of chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological weapon. Cambodia echo member says strong support for full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapon Convention, CWC, and command the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapon, OPCW, for its export toward achieving a world free of chemical weapon. In this regard, Cambodia stressed that, given the devastation to military and environmental consequences, the use of chemical by any actor under any circumstances is unacceptable and must be addressed in accordance with international law. Cambodia also recognized the important roles of the OPCW in addressing scientific and technological development irrelevant to the chemical weapon, and emphasize that innovation must serve humanity and contribute to international peace and security. Cambodia called for support for the OPCW effort to monitor such development, address potential proliferation risks, and promote responsible application of scientific and technological advance. Cambodia reaffirmed its support for the Biological Weapon Convention and underscored the importance for its full and effective implementation. We particularly emphasize the value of confident building measure in promoting transparency, fostering mutual trust, and strengthening cooperation among state party. We also encourage enhanced international cooperation and capacity builder effort to support the implementation of the convention and addressing evolving biological risk. In conclusion, Cambodia remains firmly committed to the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. We call for strengthened international cooperation and effective implementation of relevant international instruments to achieve a world of weapons of mass destruction and ensure lasting international peace and security. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:19:10]: I thank the distinguished representative of Cambodia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey. Türkiye [2:19:17]: Thank you, Chair. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, particularly the risk of their acquisition by non-state actors, including terrorists, continues to pose a grave and real threat to international peace and security. Turkey attaches great importance to the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the full and universal implementation of Chemical Weapons Convention. Violations of the Convention must be addressed in accordance with its provisions. We welcome the reinstatement of Syria's right and privileges at the OPCW and renewed cooperation between the Syrian authorities and the Organization. We also welcome Syria's accession to the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. Mr. Chair, Turkey considers the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention a fundamental component of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. With this understanding, we support and contribute to the ongoing works to strengthen the Convention. At the same time, the rapid advances in science and technology, while offering significant benefits, may also create new proliferation risks. The growing accessibility of scientific knowledge, materials, technology and know-how increases the risk of their misuse by malicious individuals and organizations, including terrorists. We therefore attach particular importance to preventing weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-state actors. In this regard, we continue to support the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 and collective efforts aimed at strengthening international prevention, detection and response capabilities. Turkey maintains a policy of zero tolerance towards proliferation in its all forms and firmly opposes the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical and biological weapons. At a time when international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture is under growing pressure, sustained international cooperation, full implementation of existing obligations, and effective multilateralism remain indispensable. Turkey will continue to work constructively with all partners to strengthen the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime and contribute to a safer and more secure international environment. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:21:56]: I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria. Nigeria [2:22:19]: Thank you. Nigeria aligns statements delivered by the non-aligned movement and wishes to make the following remark in its national capacity. Nigeria affirm its unwavering commitment to the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and to strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. remain convinced that the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of relevant international instrument is essential to securing international peace and security. Nigeria attaches great importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention and commends the Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapon for its contribution to the verified destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles. My delegation emphasizes the need to preserve the technical integrity, credibility, and effectiveness of the OPCW through constructive engagement, dialogue, and consensus building. We equally reaffirm the importance of implementing Article 11 of the Convention, particularly through international cooperation, capacity building, and on endurance access to chemical technology for peaceful purposes. Mr. Chair, Nigeria remain firmly committed to the Biological Weapons Convention as a cornerstone of the global architecture against biological weapons. We continue to underscore the importance of strengthening the convention, including through an effective verification mechanism. In this regard, Nigeria support the ongoing efforts of the working group on the strengthening of the convention toward practical, inclusive, and consensus-based outcomes. Nigeria further emphasized the importance of the international cooperation and assistance under the Article 10 of the BWC, particularly in promoting equitable access to scientific knowledge, technology, and capacity building. Such cooperation is indispensable to strengthening national preparedness, biosafety, and biosecurity capacity, especially in developing countries. My delegation also recognizes the importance of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering to non-state action in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1540. Mr. Chair, Nigeria calls for continued vigilance against emerging technology and potential development of new category of weapons of mass destruction. Nigeria remains committed to working with all member states toward a world free from chemical and biological weapons, founded on mutual trust, international cooperation, and respect for international law. I thank you, Mr. Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:25:06]: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:25:21]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM. US and Israeli regime aggression against Iran's peaceful chemical and biological facilities, including vaccine and medicine producers, refineries, and industrial complexes in 2025 and 2026, gravely undermines international peace and security and the credibility of the CWC and BWC. These attacks, endangering even an OPCW Schedule 1 laboratory, risk catastrophic humanitarian, environmental and public health consequences, and violate international law, the CWC and BWC, and States Parties' right to peaceful development. The First Committee must condemn such attacks and ensure accountability. We condemn Israel's repeated use of white phosphorus munitions and depleted uranium against Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, including incidents injuring UNIFIL peacekeepers. These crimes demand urgent collective action. Universal adherence to the CWC and BWC is vital, particularly in the Middle East. Israeli regime must accede to both conventions unconditionally to safeguard regional peace and security. Preserving the integrity of the chemical and biological weapons disarmament regime also requires non-discriminatory international cooperation, access to peaceful technologies and effective assistance to victims. Article 10 and 11 of the CWC and Article 10 of the BWC are essential pillars of international cooperation and peaceful technology transfer. Iran rejects discriminatory export controls and unilateral coercive measures that impede access to peaceful chemical and biological technologies. As the largest victim of chemical weapons, Iran reaffirms its commitment to the CWC and urge the OPWC to uphold professionalism, impartiality, and consensus-based decision making. States that supplied chemical weapons to Saddam's regimes, including Germany and the United States must be held accountable. Assistance to victims must be prioritized, and restrictions impeding access to medicine and medical equipment for Iranian victims raise grave humanitarian concerns. The destruction of all abandoned chemical weapons is essential to a chemical weapons-free world. We urge full destruction of the abandoned chemical weapons in East Asia. Turning to the BWC, its effectiveness must be strengthened through a legally binding compliance and verification protocol, negotiations on which the United States obstructed for decades. We call on the BWC working group to give equal attention to all seven mandates of the BWC. 1st Committee · Chair [2:28:22]: I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lesotho. Lesotho [2:28:42]: Thank you, Chair. Lesotho aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and delivers these remarks in our national capacity. It is common cause that the existence, production, enhancement, stockpiling, and proliferation of all forms of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose a threat to international peace and security. Decades ago, The international community recognize the danger and catastrophic humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons against anyone, anywhere in our world. There is a greater need now more than ever for dialogue, international cooperation, and assistance towards ensuring their permanent and irreversible destruction. Chair, For a small, landlocked developing country like ours, the impact of rising geopolitical tensions, rapid scientific and technological advancements, divergent of development financing towards funding defense budgets is felt the hardest by the ordinary people of our nation and threatens to set back hard-earned gains towards attaining the sustainable development goals. As a state party to the BWC and the CWC, Lesotho has never developed, produced, acquired, stockpiled or retained any biological or chemical weapons and remains committed to fulfilling its international obligations. Lesotho supports all efforts aimed at prohibiting their proliferation to non-state actors for use in chemical or biological terrorism and calls for the strengthening of the compliance and verification regime without delay. Lesotho welcomes the peaceful use of emerging the emerging scientific and technological advancements for sustainable development and calls for greater technical assistance and capacity building to enhance the research, medical, pharmaceutical, and agricultural development aspirations of developing countries. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:30:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of Lesotho for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sudan. Sudan [2:31:00]: I thank you, Mr. Chair. Sudan would like to affirm that the failure to fulfill obligations undertaken under legally binding international instruments, especially those related to weapons of mass destruction, continues to pose a threat to international peace and security. We consider the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by any party, and under any circumstance to be a violation of international law. Accordingly, Sudan calls for the full implementation of international obligations for strengthening international cooperation and transferring technology for peaceful purposes. We call for the development of effective and non-discriminatory verification mechanisms. We call for the preservation of the central role of the General Assembly and multilateral frameworks in addressing the dangers posed by WMDs. Sudan is appreciative of the recent positive developments regarding the Syrian chemical weapons file. We reiterate our call on developed countries to enhance international cooperation for the benefit of State parties through the transfer of technology, of chemical materials, and equipment for use peacefully, and to remove all discriminatory restrictions that are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Convention. Sudan attaches great importance to the OPCW, and it's a member of the Executive Council of the OPCW. We stress the importance of consensus in making decisions and of adhering to professionalism and impartiality in accordance with the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The absence of a verification regime is a major challenge to the effectiveness of the BWC. Therefore, Sudan calls for the resumption of multilateral negotiations with the aim of concluding a legally binding and non-discriminatory protocol which addresses all the provisions of the Convention in a manner that is balanced and comprehensive and would strengthen it sustainably. We welcome the establishment by the review conference of the BWC, the establishment of a working group tasked with strengthening the Convention, including the group's mandate relating to compliance and verification. We renew our commitment towards the establishment of a mechanism to facilitate and support international cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 10. In the context of Security Council Resolution 1540, The Sudan emphasizes the need to ensure that any action taken by the Security Council does not undermine the UN Charter, nor does it undermine existing multilateral treaties related to weapons of mass destruction or the role of the General Assembly. I thank you. 1st Committee · Chair [2:33:42]: I thank the distinguished representative of Sudan for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. OPCW [2:33:56]: Mr. Chairperson, it is my honor to address you on behalf of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Chair, despite the challenging geopolitical climate, the OPCW continues to make progress across all its mandates, in particular to the Syria chemical weapon file. In August, 42 area bombs were destroyed on verification, a major step forward since 2014. On a visit last week, Director General Sabrina Hold productive discussions with Foreign Minister, His Excellency, Mr. and other senior officials in Damascus. Both sides are committed to building on its momentum with a view to closing the file. Meanwhile, the OPCW monitors over 5,000 chemical facilities globally, providing assurances of long we imagine. Our international cooperation and assistance programs benefit thousands of professionals from states parties each year. Despite progress, we are also faced with many challenges. allegations of use of chemical weapons continue to emerge. The Secretariat has so far conducted three technical assistance visits to Ukraine. Analysis by our designated laboratories has confirmed the presence of CS, a riot control agent, in samples collected along the confrontation lines. The use of riot control agents in warfare is prohibited under the Convention. The Secretariat continues to closely monitor other allegations of chemical weapons use, including in Sudan. We maintain a high level of preparedness to respond to requests as part of collective efforts to defend global law against chemical weapons. In recent years, the Secretariat has been prioritizing work on biotoxins chemical forensics, artificial intelligence and uncrewed aerial vehicles. Efforts in these areas will consolidate the verification regime and ensure it is fit for purpose. Next year, our organization will mark the 30th anniversary of the Convention's entry into force. This is an important opportunity to reflect on three decades of success and the future of the CWC. We welcome all sides' active participation. I thank you, Chair. 1st Committee · Chair [2:36:41]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We have heard the last speaker on the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction. Seventy delegations made statements this year, compared to 65 statements last year. Distinguished delegates, the committee will reconvene this afternoon at 3:00 p.m. in this conference room to begin thematic discussion under the cluster on outer space. The meeting is adjourned.