Preparatory Commission: Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (Third Session, Informal Working Group)

Okay, I'm going to dispense with all of the formalities, and in the Australian vernacular, let's get stuck in. So, rules of procedure. There were some clarifications requested yesterday in the session, and I would like to make, we've done some looking into some of the questions, and I'd like to make the following observations. With regard to draft rule 4, paragraphs 3 and 4, a clarification was sought on how parties could express support for the holding of an extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties upon a written request by a party for such a meeting. The co-chairs understand that, in the context of the United Nations General Assembly, concurrence with a request for a special session of the General Assembly is typically expressed through a written communication by States addressed to the Secretariat. With regard to participation as observers of States, not party to the agreement, I wish to recall that the text of draft rule 6, paragraph 2A provides that representatives of states falling under subparagraph A, that is states not party to the agreement, are entitled to participate as observers, subject to prior written notification to the head of the secretariat. So we would welcome any comments in relation to that draft rule, either now or in due course when we return for consideration of it. I see no one wishing to take the floor, so let's move on to our consideration of, as you would remember, delegates, we are grouping issues together. So I'm going to move on to consideration of Rules 9 to 13. Now, there's a cross-cutting issue with respect to those rules, which is in regard to Rule 9, 10, 12 and 13. You will see in brackets the text taking into account Article 6 of the Agreement. I propose to deal with these collectively, as it's the same amendment for the same purposes in all four rules. Delegations may remember that we had quite an extensive exchange on this at PrepCom 2. So I don't intend to ask delegations for a comprehensive recital of the arguments in favour of the inclusion of the bracketed text or against the inclusion of the bracketed text. What I would be grateful for is an indication of delegations' preference for the inclusion or not, and for those supporting the inclusion, an indication of whether it is more important for them with respect to some rules than with respect to others. So I trust that is clear. So we're looking at rule 9, 10, 12 and 13, the bracketed text, taking into account Article 6 of the agreement. Grateful for indications of whether delegations are in favour of the retention of that text or would like to see that text removed. The floor is open. It's hand signal, by the way. And perhaps for the sake of completeness, if people could indicate which delegation they are representing and if they are, if I don't get it correct, if they're representing a group. Okay, floor is open. Saudi Arabia, you have the floor.

Thank you, co-Chair, and good morning. I just have a procedural question. Will we be going back? I know we are taking, as you said, the. You are taking it in bulks, in parts and issues, so we will be coming back to the bracketed text that has not been resolved in 7 and 8 and so on at a later stage, just to clarify. Thank you.

That is correct. Did you have a substantive comment, Saudi Arabia, or no? Okay, thank you. Shukran. Next, I see Japan to be followed by Vietnam.

Thank you, co-chair. Japan is in favor of removal of all reference to Article 6 of the agreement in this section. And also on Rule 12, Japan supports the inclusion of no later than 30 days in the second bracket. And also on rule 13, we would like to open the first bracket and include "or extraordinary." That is all. Thank you.

Thank you, Japan. And I give the floor to Vietnam, to be followed by Micronesia, I presume on behalf of PSIDS, and the Philippines.

Sorry. Thank you, co-chair. I would like to have a comment on rule 9 and 10. So we consider the proposed insertion of specific reference to article 6 in rule 9 and 10 unnecessary and propose deleting that reference. The Secretariat must prepare the provisional agenda in accordance with agreement and other relevant rules. Furthermore, the article 6 does not set out detailed rules for preparing the provisional agenda and does not restrict the Conference of the Parties from considering or taking into account any agenda items. Thank you.

I thank Vietnam, and I give the floor to Micronesia, speaking, i presume, for PSIDS.

Thank you very much, and yes, that is correct, on behalf of PSIDS. Very briefly, Article 6 is already in the agreement, so I think it is redundant here to restate it. It doesn't really change much. We're fine with pretty much the other brackets in the section that you have outlined. Thank you.

Thank you, Micronesia. I give the floor to the Philippines.

Hello. Okay. Hi. Okay. So we'd like to address the bracketed text throughout part four on the rules and agenda. We note that what is crucial now is whether such language has likelihood to bring about convergence in the room and contribute the progress in our work. In this regard, we'd like to register anew our position that there's no need to reflect article 6 and 18 in the rules of procedure as in this part of the rules. We support, therefore, the removal of the reference to Article 6 in the bracketed text, and we recall our previous statement on the language that these articles are delicate and that the consensus on the agreement rests on, among other things, that carefully crafted balance. This proposal to include Article 6 obsess at balance, derails our progress, and risks undermining the agreement's objective and purpose. Thank you.

Thank you, Philippines. European Union, you have the floor.

Thank you, co-chair. I know we're trying to be brief, and I really appreciate that, but I will try to make three points, and I'll try to be short. Apologies for that in advance, and I hope the room will accept, be a bit patient with me. On Article 6, which is the main subject that you raised, the EU agrees with Japan, Vietnam, PSEDS, Philippines. We don't see the necessity for that. I think the reasoning that was given by PCID was very relevant, as well as the one given by Vietnam. Article 6 is a clause that defines the legal effect of the BBNJ UNCOP decision. It doesn't define the subject matter that the BBNJ may or not address. And anyway, the agenda is subject to the entire agreement. We are not going to be discussing something that is not in the BBNJ agreement. I'd like to make two other points. With regard to Rule 9 and 12, the EU and its Member States consider that the provisional agenda-setting power should be given to the President instead of the Secretariat. So the President, following consultation with the Bureau and with the support of the Secretariat. Such process would better ensure that the COP's work reflects the political mandate entrusted by the Parties to the President. It would thus strengthen accountability in the process of setting the agenda. We do recognize that the agenda may have scientific or technical nature, agenda items that will be of scientific or technical nature, and will be shaped out by what comes out of the subsidiary bodies, but we do consider that the President can use their political skills to determine the order in which these items can be discussed in order to build support and coalition for agenda items. The Secretariat's role in this system would then be to prepare the annotated agenda and gather the technical documents to support each agenda item. In any case, as it's already provided in the rule, the provisional agenda will be then submitted to the COP, where Parties will have the power to amend it before adopting it. And I would like to make another point, which goes a bit beyond Article 6, but it's important for the EU. We note that in Rule 11 and 14, there is an expression which says "made available to observer", and this is not very clear. In our view, like all other official documents mentioned in Rule 6.4.c, the agenda should be distributed to observers, and the UN and its Member States also consider that promote the transparency in decision-making process that is mentioned in Article 48, the agenda should be made available to the general public. And on Rule 13, as we are here, I'll just mention that we should refer to both ordinary and extraordinary meetings. Thank you.

Thank you, European Union, and that's noted. Morocco, the floor is yours.

Good morning, colleagues. Thank you very much, Mr. Court Chair. The African Group wishes to make observation on Rules 9, 10, 12, and 13, and on the reference to Article 6 of the Agreement. The African Group underlines that, given the Agreement's application to areas beyond national jurisdiction, retaining this reference ensures that agenda preparation remains consistent with the Agreement's object. and purpose, and also with the spirit and letter of Article 6 of the Agreement. For interest of time, the African Group would also support the retention of these references, as I said, in Rules 12 and 13. On the formulation in Article 9 of "in consultation" or "after consulting", the African Group would prefer the formulation "in consultation". That implies that an ongoing and substantive engagement with the Bureau throughout the process, whereas after consulting suggests a more limited sequential step. The four, I mean, in consulting would be the African group understand that in consultation would be better. And I'll stop here. Thank you.

Thank you, Morocco. On behalf of the Africa Group, I now give the floor to Argentina on behalf of CLAM.

Thank you, co-chair. Yes, on behalf of CLAM, with respect to chapter 4, we have no substantial comments to make. This chapter has reached, we understand, a sufficiently advanced stage, allowing discussions to continue without the need for significant modifications. We also have no concerns regarding the inclusion of the bracketed text in the provisions. We consider the proposed rules acceptable as they are based on the regulations of similar forums. Thank you.

I thank Argentina on behalf of CLAM and give the floor to Saudi Arabia.

Thank you, co-Chair, for giving me the floor. I'm coming back to give some substantive comments regarding some of the issues raised. Regarding article 6, we are in support of retaining the reference to article 6 in the Rules, so just to make it short. And regarding rule 12, We had made previous comment in previous prep comm regarding our feeling regarding this rule, and we stress that the inclusion of supplementary agenda item must remain under the authority of parties, and in line with established multilateral practice, such items should also be subject to confirmation by conference of the parties. So we did suggest a textual proposal in the previous prep comm, so we will propose it here again. to follow by any such supplementary agenda item shall be subjected to confirmation by the Conference of the Parties. So we submit this change to make sure that any addition to the agenda should be after consensus and in the spirit of consensus by Parties of its inclusion. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia, and I give the floor to Switzerland.

Thank you very much, co-chair. We would like to join others, Japan, Vietnam, PCIT, Philippines, the EU, in supporting the deletion of Article 6 in Rules 9, 10, 12, and 13 for the reasons explained by others. And with respect to rule 11 and 14, we also think that we need to ensure transparency and that the agenda should be distributed to observers as well, and are also supporting that comment that was made by others. Thank you.

Thank you, Switzerland, and I give the floor to Jamaica, if you can confirm on behalf of CARICOM. Jamaica, the floor is yours.

Thank you, co-facilitator. Yes, this is Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM, and we do join all the delegations, including PCID’s, Japan, the EU, and the African Group, in supporting the deletion of the reference to Article 6 in Rules 9, 10, 12, and 13 for the reasons so clearly articulated.

I thank you, Jamaica, on behalf of CARICOM, and I give the floor to New Zealand.

Thank you, co-chair. I speak on behalf of Canada, Australia, Norway, Iceland, and New Zealand. We add our voice to those supporting the removal of the language in square brackets, the references to Article 6, for the same reasons that have been expressed by others. The references aren't It's not an issue of procedure, and in any event, the rules of procedure are subordinate to the agreement. Thank you.

Thank you, New Zealand, and I give the floor to Fiji.

Thank you, co-chair. Fiji joins others in lending its voice in terms of removal of references to Article 6. We also would like to just seek clarification on the point made by EU in terms of the agenda to be prepared by the President. I believe that this is a point that kind of signals whether the Secretariat is likely to be politicized or not, or are they leaning towards that angle, on why, and if there is any justification for this change on why the President would be responsible for the preparation of the agenda? Thank you.

Thank you very much, Fiji. We will respond to that question at the end of the item. I'll just continue to take States' views for now and we will respond. I give the floor to Turkey.

Chair, with regard to reference to Article 6 of the Agreement in Rules 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, we consider that provisions already contained in the Agreement and do not necessarily need to be replicated in the Rules of Procedure, as this may lead to duplication and could potentially give rise to interpretative inconsistencies. Furthermore, as reflected in Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure, the primacy of the Agreement over the Rules of Procedure is already ensured. In this regard, we recall that Article 6 constitutes a general provision of the Agreement, which applies across the implementation of the instrument as a whole. We believe that its application is already ensured, irrespective of whether it's explicitly referenced in specific procedural rules. We would like to also note that selective references to Article 6 in certain rules, but not others, may unintentionally create ambiguity regarding its scope or suggest differentiated application. But we remain flexible and open to engaging constructively with other delegations in a spirit of compromise. Thank you, co-chair.

I thank you, Türkiye, and I give the floor to Morocco, to be followed by the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Chair, and I would like to come back on Article 6. Just to clarify that the African Group's position is the retention of the bracketed text that relates to Article 6.

Thank you. I thank Morocco for that clarification on behalf of the Africa Group, and I give the floor to the United Kingdom.

Thank you very much. Good morning, everyone. The UK joins Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, the EU, PSIDS, CANZI, and others in opposing the references to Article 6 in these rules. We recall our previous interventions on this. These issues are already sufficiently addressed in the treaty, and we do not need to reproduce those references in the Rules of Procedure as well. In rule 12, we are content with removing the square brackets around no later than 30 days, and we also can accept the, we can accept removal of the square brackets of or extraordinary in the first line of rule 13, though we do note that that is duplicative of what we have in line two of rule 14 currently. We're generally flexible on where that reference goes. Thank you.

I thank the United Kingdom. Is there anyone else looking to take the floor on this issue? China, the floor is yours.

Thank you, co-chair. For rules 9 to 13, China prefers to lift all the square brackets concerning reference to Article 6, that is, to say, to retain the contents of reference to Article 6. We deem it a necessary element to be considered when preparing the agenda of the Conference of the Parties to ensure that the agreement focuses on its right area of application. I also heard the argument that has expressed by several delegations that this is simply a duplication of the text of the language of Article 6, but what we are talking here today, it is not only the rules in text, we are also talking about the rules in fact. The application area of the BBNJ agreement is clearly the area beyond national jurisdiction, but in practice, in fact, in the real world, the boundaries of this area is not always clearly defined. So in our view that to retain the reference to Article 6 would secure that the agendas of the COP would not infringe on any area within national jurisdiction or disputed area. Thank you, co-chair.

I thank China and I give the floor to Cuba.

Yes, thank you, president, and good morning, almost good afternoon to all our colleagues here. I will be very quick with article 9. When we are addressing issues regarding UN, we have to say some formalities. One of them is that the Secretariat is always supporting, but it's up to the Member States to lead or to have the leading role during the processes. So that's why I support what was said by some delegations, including EU. that we would like to see that for saving the formalities that the President, in close consultations with the Bureau and with the assistance of the Secretariat, will prepare the provisional agenda for the meeting. Thank you.

I thank Cuba. Is there anyone else seeking to take the floor on this item. Switzerland, the floor is yours.

And apologies for coming back to this. I just wanted to also comment on the fact that indeed it should be a Member State-led process and the Secretariat is in a role of support. So we heard the comments by Cuba and the EU, and we would like to know if there is some drafting proposal with respect to that, that we could examine in order to see whether this could be something we would be favourable to. Thank you.

Thank you, Switzerland. I'm aware that there has been a sidebar or there are sidebar discussions going on on this point. Do the delegations involved wish to take the floor? Or if not... Yep, okay. European Union, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. I think that the main point is a bit as highlighted by Switzerland, is to ensure that this is a party-driven process and ensure accountability in the setting of the agenda. We are happy to submit the proposal in writing. Thank you.

I thank the European Union, especially as you were put on the spot. So thank you. I now give the floor to Morocco.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And our understanding was to reflect only on Article 6 of the agreement, but now I understand that we should reflect on Article 9 to 14 on any bracketed language, right?

Well, my initial request was that we concentrate on Rules 9, 10, 12, and 13 in relation to Article 6. and the references to Article 6 that are square bracketed. The conversation has, the interventions have also strayed into wider issues in respect of those rules. So certainly I think it would be fair to say that the floor is open if you've got any further comments on the other square brackets in those rules.

Yes, thank you so much for the clarification on Rule 12. The African Group supports 30 days as the deadline for supplementary agenda items and opposes any reduction. This threshold reflects the time required for national and regional coordination, which is particularly important for African delegations. On rule 13 bis, the African Group notes that adoption of the agenda is already the first act of any formal meeting in practice and therefore questions the added value questions the added value of this provision. The Group does not oppose its retention if colleagues see value in codifying this practice. And on Rule 14, the African Group understands the need for a degree of flexibility in extraordinary meetings. However, the Group underlines that extraordinary meetings are convened for a specific purpose on the basis of items either proposed by the Conference of the Parties at an ordinary meeting or including in the written request that triggered that meeting. That purpose should remain the boundary of the extraordinary session's work. The current formulation, which allows items to be added to the agenda at the very moment of its adoption, risks placing delegations in a position where they must engage on items for which they had no time to prepare or consult with their capital. This is of particular concern for delegations with limited capacity. The African Group therefore proposes two safeguards. First, any item added to the agenda of an extraordinary meeting should be directly related to and necessary for the purpose for which the meeting was convened. Second, any such item would not be considered until at least 48 hours after its inclusion in the agenda to allow delegations a minimum period of preparation. The Group considers that these two safeguards strike a reasonable balance between operational flexibility and the fundamental principle of adequate advance notice. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. And I can see now there is room for some level of confusion between Article 6 and Rule 6. So just to say again, we have these modalities. from the Chair to try and focus in on particular questions, but having said that, it's difficult, and also most states in the room are not working in their native language. So whenever comments are made in respect of other rules or items, they are recorded and will be very much taken into account. But I admit that is particularly confusing with Rule 6 and Article 6 appearing in the same part of the text. So, thank you very much for that, Morocco. Cuba has asked for the floor. Cuba, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Chair. Very quick, just to say that in Article 12, we are going to apply the same logic that we are talking in Article 6. So, in Article 6, sorry, in Article 9. So the idea is that is the chair, in consultation with the Bureau and with assistance of the Secretariat, they want to prepare supplementary topics in Article 12. So it's the same thinking or reasoning behind Article 9. Thank you.

Are we talking, if I could just ask Cuba, are we talking about the rules or the articles?

In about Article 9, in Article 9, we explain that the leading roles should be states, through states, and that logic is also applying to Article 12, sorry, Rule 12. where the Chair, in consultation with the Bureau and with the assistance of the Secretariat, should be presenting supplementary topics. Sorry, with my translation, I have a version here in Spanish.

That's completely understood. As I said, I'm conscious that most delegations in the room are not operating in their native language, so entirely understood. Thank you. Muchas gracias. Okay, delegates. I think it would be fair to say there's not a consensus on this particular question, obviously. Unfortunately, it falls into that category of issues that are relatively binary in the sense that the references. Oh, Fiji has asked to take the floor. Fiji, the floor is yours.

Sorry, sorry, Coach, for coming back in. I think we've just gone back and reviewed the current formulation of Rule 9. And I think one of the things that we would like to make known as a delegation is that largely the structure reflects a established practice across other MEAs. I mean, I'm looking at UNFCCC, CBD, even Minamata, where the provisional agenda is actually prepared by the Secretariat in agreement with the President. And in this regard, we see merit in maintaining this approach because this is what ensures the balanced party-driven process. And I think at this stage, in its current formulation, we also seek clarification on the role of the Bureau in this provision, because it's not mentioned explicitly in any other MEA rules. And we do not wish to ensure that this does not unintentionally constrain the ability of parties to propose and advance agenda items. And I think In the spirit of compromise as well, while we are acceptable to removing Article 6 references, it would be good that established MEA practice is followed in this process. Thank you.

I thank Fiji very much for those comments which we have heard. Can I suggest that if delegates do wish to submit text, to address these issues, that would be very gratefully received. This can be a difficult process in the sense that, of course, as the Chairs, we are not here to necessarily explain everything. We are here to compile the text that has been put to us or to distil the various proposals that are on the table. And I acknowledge the issue flagged, and yes, if delegations could consider a textual solution to that, that would be very much appreciated and we would look forward to receiving that. I was starting to sum up the item overall. So to state the obvious, there's not a consensus either for the retention or the deletion of the bracketed text across the four articles in four rules, now I'm doing it, the four rules in which it's included. As I said, unfortunately, this is binary. There's either inclusion or deletion. We will go away and look at this again. I would ask all delegations, those who've expressed support for the retention of the text, and those who've expressed support for the deletion of the text, to consider whether there is any ranking of priorities as between which rules it is more important for than others. I appreciate that probably everyone in this room would look at these rules, the bracketed text, as if you like a package. Nevertheless, we need to think very seriously and collectively about where the room for a possible compromise on this particular question might lie. With that, I thank everyone, and I propose to move on to Rule 22, which is the composition of the Bureau. I will just give everyone a minute to be able to flick through to that. So that is Rule 22, page 10, for those who are looking, with paragraphs 1 to 5, including 2 bis. So I think for ease of reference, we will refer to the sub-rules as being paragraphs with the number. So the first subrule there is rule 22, paragraph one. So, the bracketed text is limited to the number of seats on the Bureau, as well as whether to have a rapporteur. The bracketed number of vice presidents, 11 or 16, reflected the options for two or three Bureau members per UN regional group. Both numbers include one additional Bureau member representing small island developing states and one representing least developed countries. With the President, the Bureau would have a total membership of, respectively, 12 or 17 members. The floor is open and we are welcoming views specifically on this and on the proposal to include a rapporteur. Floor is open. I see that Singapore has asked to take the floor. Singapore, the floor is yours.

AOSIS is glad to see that Rule 22 provides that one Bureau member shall represent the small island developing states, and we continue to emphasize that the SIDS seat on the Bureau should be a dedicated SIDS seat. which is to say, the sixth seat should be in addition to the seats allocated to each regional group. And this is in line with the practice and the precedent from the UNFCCC COP Bureau and the subsequent Bureau of the COP, CMP, and CMA under the Paris Agreement. And we have no objections to the LDC seat being also in addition to the seats allocated to each regional group. So with this, we support either 11 vice presidents or 16 vice presidents, and we are flexible with either two or three bureau members per regional group. So either option would work for us. And on a note of principle, Article 7 of the BBNJ Agreement on Principles and Approaches provides that the parties shall be guided by the full recognition of the special circumstances of small island developing states. And so we submit that it's consistent with that principle for the institutional architecture we are now building to offer SIDS the same as what was secured in the climate regime three decades ago. And we hope that delegations can support this dedicated SID seat on the BBNJ COP Bureau on the basis of this principle and the clear precedent of the Bureaus under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. And in relation to subparagraph para 2 bis, AOSs can be flexible as long as this does not apply to SIDs. We note that the financial rules contain language excluding SIDs, LDCs, and parties that have agreed on and are respecting a schedule of payments in accordance with the financial rules. And on the role of the rapporteur, AOSIS can also be flexible on this in subparagraph 5. Thank you.

Thank you, Singapore, and apologies, Amanda, for not introducing you as speaking on behalf of AOSIS. I would encourage all of those representing regional groups, please, if we miss it from up here, it's not easy operating in this room, please do clarify that, as Singapore has just done, that you're speaking on behalf of a group. With that, I will give the floor to Indonesia. The floor is yours.

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. On the Rule 22, Indonesia support Bureau structure. that ensure that highest level of inclusivity and legitimacy, Indonesia can be flexible on the number of Vice President, either 11 or 16, and the number of the Bureau member for each regional group, as long as it ensures that the Bureau reflect the diverse membership of the agreement and provide adequate space for all regional group in this regard, Indonesia maintain that unique perspective or archipelagic state must also be considered as well. This position is informed by the legal precedent of the CBD COP 11 decision 11/31, which underscores the necessity of gender balance and equitable geographical representation as functional requirement for the effectiveness of the Bureau. And on the next, on the matter of paragraph 2 bis, Concerning the eligibility in relation to financial contributions, Indonesia agrees that the bracketed text that this rule must be read in conjunction with Rule 5.3 of the Financial Rule. And while we recognize the importance of financial responsibility, we must ensure that the institutional leadership of this agreement remain accessible to all developing states. And we also add some highlight regarding these two pieces. which is a protection of LDCs and SIDS, which say that eligibility penalties do not apply to least developed countries or small island developing states. This is essential to prevent the marginalization of the Swiss special requirement under Article 52 of the agreement. And then we are also responsive for force majeure provisions, consistent with the position of the group G77 and China. We maintain that the payment extension and resulting eligibility for office must account for global economic shocks and external crisis. This is also relevant with Rule 5.3D of the TRL Financial Rules. And the last, our highlight about these two bits is about transparency in payment schedule and determination of ineligibility. Under Rule 22, must be preceded by a transparent consultation process where the Secretariat facilitates a realistic payment schedule of up to four years. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Terima kasih, Indonesia. And I now give the floor to Micronesia on behalf of PSIDS.

Thank you very much, co-chairs. So, of course, I align myself with the OSIS. So from our perspective, you could pretty much lift all the brackets. The only one that's a binary is should it be two or three, which then informs whether it's 11 or 16. We're ultimately flexible, but from the level of interest that we have seen, it might seem more sensible to go with the higher number on this one. I did have another question, but I'm actually going to save you that so that we can make some progress. Thank you.

Thank you, Micronesia. I give the floor to Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM.

The co-facilitator. CARICOM aligns itself with the statement given by Singapore on behalf of AOSIS, and therefore in paragraph one, we would prefer the lifting of the brackets around the reference to the allocation of a seat for small island developing states. We also would want the second brackets in relation to gender balance and those provisions and adequate representation. We would highlight again to BIS that the issues there, which we understand are cross-referencing the financial rules, would be addressed appropriately at the relevant time. Thank you.

Thank you, Jamaica, and I give the floor to Japan.

Thank you, Co-Chair. So Japan supports the the number, the composition of the officers to be three from the each regional members, and with the one member from each CS and LSC, so the total should be 17. And on the question of rapporteur, which applies to paragraph three and five, Japan is of the view that to ensure the neutrality of records, reporting tasks should be entrusted to the Secretariat, so there's no need to designate a rapporteur. So we would like to delete the reference to rapporteur and also delete entire paragraph 5. And also, we would like to propose addition of a sentence. at the end of the paragraph 3, for the reason that we would like to ensure the better representation. So the proposed text would go: "No parties may have their representative to be elected as a member of the Bureau for more than two consecutive terms." That should be added at the end of the paragraph 3. Thank you, co-chair.

Domo arigato gozaimasu. Just a point of clarification. We didn't quite catch what you said in respect of seats for additional groups. Would you mind just repeating that for our benefit and the benefit of the room?

So you mean for the composition of the officers? So we would like, for the first two sets of bracket, we want a 16. And for the regional groups, we would like three. So the total should be 17, including the president. Thank you.

Thank you very much for that. The European Union, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Mr. Co-Chair. Let me start with Rule 2 bis. We've heard the comments that were said in the room and we'll consider them. We do consider that there should be something that happens if there is an error in payment, so in favor of the rule in itself. We're fine with the drafting as it is. We just suggest that we keep the bracket around Rule 5.3, paragraph F of the Financial Rules. just because it's still under negotiation. So we are fine with a cross-reference, but just that the reference to the rules of financial rules are finalized. On the question of the rapporteur in paragraph 5, we would support the text as presented in paragraph 5. We note for Commissioner Mairead earlier that the report would be drafted with the assistance and support of the Secretariat, so it does see a role of the Secretariat in that process. So similarly, then in paragraph three, the role of the rapporteur should be included and the brackets lifted. And then coming to paragraph one, we have a preference to keep the presentation at the usual practice to have just the five regional groups. Thank you.

Thank you, European Union. And I give the floor to Argentina on behalf of CLAM.

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. On behalf of CLAM, I must say that CLAM is still analyzing this issue and at this stage does not yet have a position regarding the number of Bureau members. At the same time, CLAM remains open to considering mechanisms that would facilitate inclusion of States with special circumstances. Thank you.

Thank you, Argentina, for CLAM, and I give the floor to New Zealand on behalf of CANZIE.

Thank you, co-chair. Yes, on behalf of CANZIE, we support the Bureau having seats for SIDS and LDCs. We are generally flexible on the size of the Bureau, but we do have a preference for the higher number there, so three Bureau members per regional group. Thank you.

Thank you, New Zealand, on behalf of CANZI, and I now give the floor to Morocco for the Africa Group.

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair, for giving me the floor. The African Group emphasized that the Bureau must be sufficiently sized to ensure equitable and inclusive representation. We can show flexibility on the number, either 11, 16, we heard in the room, 17, but we stress that any formula should not disadvantage regions or weaken the voice of developing countries. We can support dedicated representation for LDCs and SIDS while ensuring inclusivity across all developing regions. On the rule 22 bis, the bracketed provision linking service in the Bureau to arrears, the African Group should reserve its final position pending agreement on the financial rules, so that the two dispositions remain coherent. Thank you.

I thank Morocco for the Africa Group, and I give the floor to Switzerland.

Thank you very much. With respect to 2bis, we are in favor of the inclusion of 2bis, conscious that these rules are also under negotiation, so we can keep the brackets as long as this is still being negotiated, but on principle, we are in favor. With respect to the rapporteur, we also would welcome the paragraph five. With respect to the composition of the Bureau, we would support a composition made of the five regional UN groups as per usual practice in other MEAs. And with respect to the size, we don't have a strong view. We are flexible. Thank you.

Thank you, Switzerland. And I give the floor to the Philippines.

Hello. All right. The Philippines would like to submit the following comments on Rule 22. First, as to the number of vice presidents, we favor a large enough number to guarantee equitable geographic and group representation and adequate representation of developing countries, including SIDS and LDCs, but not too large to risk the slowing of the Bureau's work. 16 Vice Presidents or 17 Bureau members could be a reasonable number, and in line with the suggestion, we further suggest that each of the five UN regional groups be represented by three Bureau members. So three. We note the increased interest of states in most ocean governance processes and the importance that the Bureau membership should reflect this. We also support the assignment of the role of rapporteur, and we are open to unbracketing the text on Rule 22.5, as well as subjecting the role to a rotation similar to that of the Presidents provided in the bracketed text in 22.3. Thank you.

Thank you, Philippines. I give the floor to the UK, to be followed by Bangladesh and then Japan. UK, the floor is yours.

In our view, we prefer 11 Bureau members to ensure efficiency. We can support SIDS and LDC seats on the Bureau, and we agree with the formulation set out that would be in addition to two representatives from each of the UN regional groups. We were actually the proponents of removing the references to the Rapporteur in this role, and the reason reasoning for that was that we considered it more appropriate for the Secretariat to assume the function of preparing a record of the meetings, and we noted precedent for that in various rules. But in the interest of pragmatism and flexibility, we are flexible and we can go along with the rapporteur references being retained, and we do note the role of the Secretariat in assisting and supporting the rapporteur as provided for in paragraph 5. So, yeah, we can be flexible on that. Thank you.

Thank you, United Kingdom. That offer of flexibility is very much appreciated. I will give the floor to Bangladesh, to be followed by Japan.

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair.

On Rule 22, we support broader participation, 16 for Vice President and three for Bureau members. However, Bangladesh is flexible on the number given, that it is resolved in a manner that ensures equitable geographical representation, gender balance, and adequate representation of developing countries, including due consideration for LDCs and SIDS. Any final criteria for the election of officers should be clear, transparent, practical, and broadly acceptable.

I thank you. Thank you, Bangladesh, and I give the floor to Japan.

Thank you, co-chair, for giving the floor again. As regard to paragraph 2 bis, Japan prefers to retain this paragraph. Thank you.

Thank you, Japan, and I give the floor to Indonesia.

Thank you, Mr. With regard to para, wait a minute, para 3, We'd like to leave the bracket of "office" and for paragraph 5, we like to remove all the bracket, yeah, within paragraph 5. Thank you, Mr. President.

Okay, appreciated. That concludes interventions on this item. Oh, China, you have the floor.

Thank you, co-chair. My intervention will be very short. In terms of the number of Bureau members accepted, President, China intends to support the option of 16 and 3, and China welcomes allocating special seats for SIDS and LDCs. We are flexible on other bracketed contents.

That's it. Okay, delegates, this has been a useful run through. I don't think there's anything in Rule 22 that is not bridgeable. I heard a distinct preference in the room that bigger is better in terms of the Bureau. So my apologies to the United Kingdom, but I might be asking you to be flexible more than once with respect to Rule 22. But I think this has given us some material. I think delegations should expect to see the large number of 16 Vice Presidents in the next version that you see, and then we will go and look at the various other comments and review the discussion and come back with what I hope will be a close to consensus version of this rule. Before we move on, can you just give us 30 seconds, if that's okay? Thank you for your patience, delegates. We will now move to Part 7, Chapter 7, that is Subsidiary Bodies. That goes from Rule 26 to Rule 30 bis, so from page 11 to 13. That is the bad news, but the good news is there's very little in the way of brackets in there. I mean, the main set of brackets is in relation to rule 26, sub-rule B, and there's a couple of other brackets in there. One thing that I would ask all delegations to be aware of is, of course, there is a related discussion taking place on subsidiary bodies. that will resume again on Thursday. I would just ask delegations to bear in mind that obviously, when we have the final product of that discussion and the final version of this rule, we will, of course, put them up side by side and ensure that any duplication is eliminated. and also ensure that they are consistent. So there's no need to take the floor on those issues yet. We will seek to ensure once we have final products on both, that they are scrubbed appropriately to ensure that they sit well alongside each other. That is the contents of this rule. Chapter 7 on subsidiary bodies and the outcome of the subsidiary bodies discussions that are taking place in parallel. So, with that qualifier, the floor is open for any comments on Chapter 7, subsidiary bodies, that's Rule 26 through to Rule 30 bis, but obviously with a particular focus on the bracketed text. Floor is open. Singapore, the floor is yours on behalf of IOSIS.

Thank you, Chair. I just confirm that we're confining comments right now is just for Rule 26.

No, sorry, Amanda, my fault. We're on Chapter 7, which is subsidiary bodies. That is Rule 26 through to Rule 30 bis. pages 11 through to 13, but I'm obviously asking for a particular focus on the bracketed text, and most of the bracketed text, or the most significant bracketed text, is in rule 26. But the floor is now open for chapter 7, subsidiary bodies, that is rule 26, through to rule 30 bis. I hope that clarifies it.

Thank you very much. In that case, I will go through the entire Chapter 7 with your indulgence.

Absolutely.

So starting out with Rule 26, and AOSIS's comments here are without prejudice as to whether these rules and subsidiary bodies are better placed in the COP ROP or the TORs of the subsidiary bodies. AUSIS supports Rule 26.1 which allows the chair of a subsidiary body to exercise the right to vote. We understand that this is in keeping with the standard practice at the UN, where bodies are comprised of people elected in their individual capacities who are entitled to exercise the right to vote. So an example of this would be the ACABQ. And AUSIS' understanding of the effect of Rule 26 is that any subsidiary bodies' terms of reference adopted by the COP will prevail over the COP Rules of Procedure as the more specialized rules, with the COP ROP representing the residual rules. Finally, I note that AOSIS is still considering the advisory mechanism on Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional knowledge, and so on the issues throughout this part, We note that there will be textual proposals made by the PSITs on this matter, and as AOSIS, we do not wish to foreclose the possibility that such a body may be created, and this paragraph may need to be reconsidered pending the outcome of those discussions. So this caveat will just apply throughout. And moving on to Rule 28. AOSIS favours giving the Chair of the subsidiary bodies the autonomy to decide on the dates of the meetings of the respective subsidiary bodies. However, we note that the budgetary implications of these meetings will ultimately have to be approved by the COP. Moving on now to rule 28 bis. AOSIS continues to strongly support ensuring SIDS representation in the bureaus of all subsidiary bodies. If subsidiary bodies are to have officers, one seat should be a dedicated SIDS seat. We therefore support the language in the square brackets, “UN regional group or by the relevant category of States”, and we suggest a small textual tweak as follows: “a replacement shall be nominated by” Parties from, that's the insertion, two words, the UN regional groups or from the relevant category of States concerned for the remainder of that member's term. And we understand that the addition of this two words, parties from, more accurately reflects the process that actually happens. And on the second set of square brackets, again, this is 28 bis para one. We consider that all members, including replacement members, should be elected by the Conference of Parties, and would therefore like to see the brackets around that text dropped. As for paragraph, subparagraph two, we are flexible on this. Again, this goes back to the financial rules, and we understand there's text there, which allows it not to apply to SIDS. Moving on now. to rule 29, AOSIS continues to strongly support ensuring SIT's representation in the bureaus of all subsidiary bodies, and therefore the wording here should also be aligned, and the rotation should apply to the UN regional groups and relevant categories of States. So we would like to see insertion of language there to reflect the SIT seat in the SB, so this is a comment that would just carry through. In relation to Rule 30, as previously highlighted by AOSIS, the subsidiary bodies should develop their own programme of work in a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down. AOSIS sees the development of the work programme as separate to its approval by the COP. And we can go along with Rule 30, as it does not prescribe more than approval from the COP and gives power to the President to adjust the allocation of work should the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies request it. And moving on finally to the last square bracketed Rule 30 bis, AOSIS is flexible on the inclusion of this draft rule. And if it is retained, the square bracketed language on the role of the chairs of the subsidiary bodies should be retained, as it ensures a degree of independence for the subsidiary bodies and ensures that technical level cooperation is not overly centralized under the COP alone. And with that, that concludes EOSIS's comments on Chapter 7. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Singapore, on behalf of AOSIS. And I now give the floor to Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM.

Thank you, co-chair. As always, CARICOM aligns itself with the comments of AOSIS, which were delivered by the delegation of Singapore. With respect to paragraph 26, 1(a), CARICOM agrees that a majority of the members of this subsidiary body, which is the first set of brackets, would constitute a quorum. For paragraph 26 (1) bis, we have no difficulty with the removal of the brackets in that paragraph. On paragraph 26 (1) c, while we support the removal of the brackets for the paragraph, we also have a question which is that whether the increased threshold of two-thirds majority for decision-making with respect to the reconsideration of a proposal or an amendment is necessary for a technical body. While the requirement for an enhanced majority for decision-making may be appropriate in a conference of parties as a political body when reconsidering decisions or amendments, It is not clear to us that the same is required for a technical body. Also, concerning paragraph 26, c bis, we favor the opening of the brackets for that paragraph. Turning to rule 29, CARICOM agrees that the chair of any subsidiary body should be elected in accordance with the procedures and terms of reference for that subsidiary body. As technical bodies made-up of independent experts, each subsidiary body is best placed to elect a chair to guide the work of the body to be done. Therefore, we favour the removal of the square brackets in that paragraph. Thank you, co-chair.

Thank you, Jamaica, on behalf of CARICOM. That point is noted. That will also be one that is obviously will be considered in the subsidiary bodies discussions, and as I said, we will round back to ensure that the two sets of texts are consistent with one another. With that, I will give the floor to Micronesia speaking on behalf of PICIDS. Floor is yours.

Thank you very much, co-chair. And of course, I also align myself with the points just made. and just want to add a few additional ones. One is, you made the point that we're dealing in two place, that there is a bit of an overlap, that we have one work stream here dealing with the subsidiary bodies, and then we have one that specializes in that, and that there is a little bit of overlap in those provisions right here. I do want to note that PCITs have made a proposal in the other room. Whether those paragraphs end up here or there, our proposal, of course, still stands, but I will not repeat it. I'm going to save you the time because you've already heard it. Whether we end up here or there, the main point for us here is what applies where, when. First, you have the rules of procedure. They're kind of like the base structure, and that's why we put the mutatis mutandis, because it's a fallback. Now, they're adopted by the Conference of Parties. Now, if the Conference of Parties sets discrete rules for one of the subsidiary bodies, then those discrete rules would be the ones governing or altering what is written in the COP rules. We just wanted to make that clear, because we have heard a couple of times, if there is a conflict, then it's the COP that prevails, and we're like, not necessarily if it was something that was made specifically for a subsidiary body. And in that respect, Rule 27.2, we're still trying to figure out if that phrases it rightly in exactly that context. And I'll leave it at that because EOSIS has already pronounced on things like the voting rights of the chair, et cetera. Thank you very much.

I think Micronesia speaking on behalf of PSIDS, and yes, you're absolutely correct. We do have, of course, as I flagged at the beginning, these two places where this rule, and of course, the process on subsidiary bodies, where these issues are to be resolved substantially or discussed substantially, I would prefer that to take place in the subsidiary bodies modality. for two reasons. One, I think it's just the better place, but also as a Chair of both to be purely pragmatic, time is of the essence here in a way that it's not with respect to subsidiary bodies. So you are right, we will pick that back up in the subsidiary bodies discussion, and I thank you. With that, oh, you're right in front of me. Sorry. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran. Sorry, I was looking one side and the other.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. Well, actually, I was in the other discussion on the Secretariat and was able to come here just now. Thank you for giving me the floor. Just on the question related to whether the chair of subsidiary body should have a right to vote or not, our position has been consistent, and we believe it's fair that a chair of subsidiary body remain neutral, not to participate in the voting processes. Looking into Rule 45 on the voting threshold, you might remember, Mr. Chair, that yesterday we raised a question in relation to the voting threshold, where the Chair of the Conference of Parties might have to say that, well, there is no consensus, all efforts have been made, and we need to go for voting. And as the Rules of Procedure is going to be applied mutatis mutandis on the subsidiary, bodies, this situation might lead to a, I mean, it might be rare, but you might see a situation of conflict of interest, where the chair of the subsidiary body is the same person who is going to say that there is no consensus, we need to go for a vote, and that chair would have a right to vote. I think it's appropriate not to follow that path. On the ACABQ, I would like to mention that from our understanding within the United Nations and the Fifth Committee, That kind of practice, I could say, is an informal procedure where there is no agreement. The chair tries to guide the process. Quite contrary, the established practice was that usually the chairs of a body or a meeting or a commission, they do not have right to vote. Of course, if there is any member from that delegation among the members of the subsidiary bodies, they do have the right to vote. In relation, very quickly, in relation to article 28 on the dates of the meetings, maybe it's better that the COP adopts this to make sure that there is no conflict in the schedule. And one last comment, Mr. Chair. Fortunately, as I mentioned, we have to cover both parallel meetings. I'm sure that there were a couple of rules that have been covered. I'm not going to touch upon them, only one, and that is rule 8 bis. If I may, I would like to briefly touch upon that. Thank you so much. On Rule 8 bis, which refers to cooperation with relevant IFBs, in our view, this is a matter of substance, not of procedure. This needs to be addressed in its own context and framework. Modalities for this matter could be considered, but this place is not in the Rules of Procedure. Therefore, our preference is to delete this provision. Should there be a discussion in this regard in the Rules of Procedure, Article 5, sub-paragraph 3 of the agreement, a non-prejudice clause for non-parties to the arm clause must be fully taken into account. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Iran, and I now give the floor to Saudi Arabia, to be followed by Japan, the European Union, and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Mr. Co-Chair. We will come in on several rules regarding this chapter of the Rules of Procedure. On rule 26 (1) bis, we underline that subsidiary bodies should operate primarily on the basis of consensus, consistent with established multilateral practice. and to ensure all positions are captured is essential to us, so to preserve transparency, inclusivity, and confidence in the process. So we propose the additional text that if consensus cannot be reached, divergent views should be fully reflected in the report. Regarding rule 26.1b, we have reservation regarding granting the chair an additional voting rule. as has been mentioned before, in subsidiary bodies where members act as representative of their States, allowing the chair to exercise a vote may lead to double representation and could affect the balance among parties. So we think the chair should remain facilitative and impartial role. So we propose the deletion of paragraph B. On rule 28 bis, we note that the reference to relevant categories of States lacks clarity and it's not defined in the agreement, so we would seek that this be clarified or removed. Thank you.

I thank you, Japan, and I give the floor to the European Union. My apologies. We're operating with no technology up here, so Needless to say, I would never intentionally ignore Japan, and sumimasen. Japan, the floor is yours.

Arigatou gozaimasu, co-chair. So first on the 26/1b, Japan believes it is important to make sure that the chair maintains the neutrality. So Japan does not support the inclusion of this paragraph. And next on 21c. We have two points to raise, and first, given that the decision-making at the COP is based on the principle of consensus, and that in case where substantive issues are to be decided by voting, a two-thirds majority is required, so Japan prefers to apply the same standard to subsidiary bodies, at least for the scientific and technical body, where it's where its scientific and technical recommendations should be based solely on objective facts and logic. Voting threshold should be two-thirds majority for SDB. And also, on the second point that is that it is not clear what reconsideration of a proposal or reconsideration of amendment of proposal is referring to in this paragraph. And if it is referring to reconsideration of a proposal of ABMT, Japan would like to add after the reconsideration of recommendation, the following language. It should read, the consideration of a recommendation on the area-based management tool and the part three of the agreement. And also, if it is referring to other recommendations by subsidiary bodies for approval or adoption by COP, instead of adding the language I just read, proposal should be replaced by recommendation. Japan already submitted this proposal in writing, so if you could look it up. And also for paragraph 28. Japan considers that decision on the dates of the meeting of subsidiary bodies should not require a COP decision, and the chair of each subsidiary body should be authorized to make such decision in consultation with the Secretariat and the President of the COP. And at the same time, it is necessary to give due consideration to budgetary implication when deciding on dates and duration of the meetings. So we would like to delete the Conference of Parties, and add at the end of this paragraph, "with due regard to budgetary implication." We already submitted this also in writing. So that is all. Thank you. Arigatou gozaimasu.

And watashi wa sumimasen. for having that mistake. And I now give the floor to the European Union. Floor is yours.

Thank you, co-chair. So the European Union and its member states would like to insist that decisions in the subsidiary body should be made by consensus, and we agree with the comments that have been made before that where there is a disagreement, it should be reflected in the report, and we'd like to just highlight that this is already in paragraph C bis. On whether the chair of the subsidiary body GABODI may exercise a right to vote, the unit's member states do consider that they should have a vote for reasons that were outlined, I think, by EOSIS and others. One of the other arguments in favor of that is that if they do not have a right to vote, then it might also disincentivize members to try to become the chair of that body. So we do see a value in having them have a vote. On paragraph C, We know that what is provided for is a majority for decision making, and we do believe that if the aim is to keep consensus and try to seek to have a consensus, such threshold is much too low. We do consider that we should have a higher threshold, maybe something like four-fifths, to ensure that most of the members aligned, and if there are one or two divergences, then they're in the report as provided by CBIS. We are open, though, to have a different voting threshold for procedural and substantive matters. Moving on to Rule 27, we do think that the second paragraph in that rule, which is bracketed, can be included for clarity. On Rule 28, On the dates of meeting, we agree with Japan. I think Eosys also made that point. There might have been other delegations. Apologies if I do not mention you, but I do agree with you that the chair of subsidiary bodies should be the ones to make the decision. Going through the COP would make it overly burdensome. We do also agree with the suggestion of Japan to add wording such as due regard to budgetary limitation. Moving on to rule 28 bis. So, on that, we are not sure about the need to have a replacement elected by Conference of Parties. I mean, the Conference of Parties will not happen every month. There will be a Conference of Parties every so often, and we do not want to have the subsidiary bodies limited because for a bit of time there is no COP meeting, so we're not really sure about having an election the need for an election directly. There would be an election at the next COP for the replacement, but in between they should be able to participate in the body. So in our view, the end of paragraph one should read: "If a member of a subsidiary body is resigned or is otherwise unable to complete the assigned term, the replacement shall be nominated by the UN regional group concerned for the remainder of that member's term." On paragraph two, we just want to reiterate the comments we've made for the Bureau in terms of nominating Bureau members on that rule. And then moving on in the rest of the bracketed text, we agree with EIOSIS that the second sentence of Rule 30 bis is rather burdensome and with limited added value, so we would suggest to delete it. On the first sentence, we may have some textual suggestion that we'll submit.

I thank the European Union. Delegates, I've now got Türkiye, Indonesia, Philippines, the UK, the High Seas Alliance. I would really like to finish this item before we break for lunch. And even though we don't have interpretation, we lose the sound pretty much quickly after 1:00. So let's try and trot through if we can. Türkiye, the floor is yours.

Thank you, co-chair. Regarding Rule 26, para. 1(a), we note that the quorum requirement of one quarter for open-ended subsidiary bodies may be relatively low. Therefore, we would be open to considering a quorum based on a majority of parties as a more balanced approach to ensure adequate participation. Rule 26, para. 1(b), we consider that the Chair should maintain a neutral and facilitative role, and therefore shouldn't exercise the right to vote. In this regard, we would support either the deletion of this para or its revision to reflect this approach. Rule 30(b), we support to delete last sentence in the bracketed text. And we believe that subsidiary bodies should adopt the recommendation to the COP by consensus, and we are in favor of the, if it's a vote, we are in favor of the higher threshold. Thank you, co-chair.

Thank you, Türkiye. We'll go to Indonesia next.

On the rule 20, We can agree with the general principle of the mutatis mutandis, however, Indonesia also would like to emphasize that the architecture of Article 48, 49, 52, and 53 of the Agreement collectively ensure that all subsidiary bodies function as technical or consultative organs that report to, advise, and provide recommendations for the final consideration of the COP. In this regard, we seek further clarification with the provision regarding Rule 26B, our intention to exercise the right to vote. And move to Rule 27, we like to reiterate the fundamental principle of that form must follow function. In this context, Indonesia emphasised a tailor-made approach for any such body, for any new subsidiary body to be truly active. truly effective, it must be accompanied by specific TOR. And we also like to suggestion, we can really agree with the bracket, and for textual proposal, we'd like to suggest that rule 26 of the present rule of procedure applies to any additional subsidiary body established in accordance with the present rule, subject to the mandate of its subsidiary body, for the last sentence. And for rule 28, Indonesia maintains that final authority to adopt resolution concerning the agenda and scheduling of subsidiary body meetings must remain with the COP, and we believe that COP should exercise this authority in close consultation with the chair. So Furthermore, in the interest of administrative efficiency and cost-effectiveness, where appropriate, meeting of subsidiary bodies should be held in conjunction with the ordinary meeting of the COP. In this regard, we'd like to leave some bracket of Rule 28 and read as follows: "The Chair of Subsidiary Body, in consultation with the Secretariat and the President of the Conference of the Parties shall decide on the dates of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body, and where appropriate, meetings of the Subsidiary Body shall be held in conjunction with the meeting of the Conference of the Parties. And moving on to 28 bis, paragraph two, we support to leave all the bracket. Indonesia reaffirms its support for linking the eligibility to Subsidiary Body to the fulfillment of the financial obligation under the financial rules. And lastly, on rule 30 bis, we agree with previous delegation from EU to delete all the last bracketed text. It's kind of unsure with the wording jointly decided. Thank you, co-chair.

Thank you very much, Indonesia. I now give the floor to the Philippines, to be followed by the UK and China. Philippines, the floor is yours.

Regarding the part on subsidiary bodies, the Philippines stresses the importance of clarity in their mandates, composition, and decision-making procedures, including voting rights where applicable. Clear delineation of these elements will be essential. To avoid procedural uncertainty and ensure coherence within the institutional framework, we remain open to further discussions on whether detailed provision should be retained in the COP, rules of procedure, or elaborate in separate instruments. Nevertheless, we'd like to submit comments on the section as follows. Number one, we can already unbracket Rule 26B with the President being allowed to vote in line with his capacity as representative. In Rule 28, we prefer the language that the chair of a subsidiary body in consultation with the Secretariat and the President of the Conference of the Parties representing the first set of bracketed text. in line with the technical expertise of the subsidiary bodies. So, on Rule 28 bis, we support suggested language that a replacement shall be nominated by the parties from the UN regional groups or from the relevant category of states concerned for the remainder of that member's term, as conveyed by AOSIS/Singapore. Finally, we welcome the inclusion of Rule 30 bis, as this may work to increase coordination between COP and the subsidiary bodies and improve delineation of responsibility, avoid procedural uncertainty and ensure coherence within the institutional framework. Thank you.

I thank the Philippines, and I give the floor to the United Kingdom.

Rule 26.1(b). We support the right for the chair of a subsidiary body to vote for the reasons outlined already by others, including AESS and the EU. We agree on 26.1 that decisions, recommendations should be made by consensus, with voting only as a last resort. We've listened with interest to others' proposals on requiring higher threshold for voting should it take place, and we think some form of provision to this end sounds sensible, so we will consider those proposals carefully. On 21.1, There was some crossover to the subsidiary body discussion yesterday of provision all 56 in the terms of reference. Like there, we think the drafting should be strengthened here. I think it should say “shall ensure” rather than “should make reasonable efforts”. Lastly, on rule 28, we agree with others that we don't think a COP decision should be required to set the date, so we'd be in favour of retaining the first sentence there, and we listened to Japan's additional suggestion, which on initial consideration sounds sensible, so we will consider that drafting proposal carefully. Thank you.

Thank you, United Kingdom, and I give the floor to China, to be followed by Iceland, Switzerland, and Morocco. China, the floor is yours.

Thank you, co-chair. The first comment from China is concerning Rule 28bis, paragraph one, how to deal with the replacement of a vacant, of a leaving member during the elections. We don't see the option that the replacing member could be nominated by the original nominating state. We deem it is a proper option here for the continuity and the consistence of work of the leaving member, in case the original nominating state waives its right to nominate, the replacement could be nominated by the relevant UN regional group or relevant category of states to complete the remainder of the term of the leaving member. So our suggestion is to add an option of the nominating the replacement to be nominated by the original nominating state. And the second is about Rule 26, paragraph one, subparagraph a bis. China wants to seek clarification whether this language of the recommendations to be submitted to the COP shall be adopted by a vote. There is no threshold here, so China just wonders whether the voting rules in rule 45 would apply here, because this whole sub-paragraph A bis lies an exception to the mutatis mutandis application of the present rule. So China just want to seek clarification on this point. I hope I made my point clear.

We will provide clarification on that at the start of the next session of the Rules of Procedure. I'm just conscious of time, but we will come back to you on that. Iceland, floor is yours.

Thank you, co-chair. I'm speaking on behalf of CANCIE here. Now, on Rule 26 as a general comment. CANCIC sees consensus-based work of the SBs as something to emphasize due to the nature of the work as scientific and expert work, although we would not want to exclude the possibility altogether. And we know that this all relates to the work on SBs elsewhere, but just to re-emphasize this consensus-based work of the SBs. Now, specifically, on Rule 27, Part 2, we see this as legally unnecessary. So we would prefer to have it removed, although we do not feel strongly about it. But less is more in those rules. Now, on 28, we prefer flexibility to ensure SBs can work and therefore prefer the first brackets. On rule 30 bis, We are all for cooperation, always, of course, with IFBs, but we have not fully understood the notion of cooperation with in the title. Is this referring to the COP, which would seem obvious? So something to consider. Between SBs, of course, makes sense to us. Now, lastly, on 30 bis, we do think this raises the issue of autonomy of subsidiary bodies. So we wonder whether the bracketed text requiring joint decision of the COP and chairs of SBs strikes the right balance. And we don't think this text is needed. Therefore, we prefer to strike it out. Thank you very much.

I thank you, Iceland, on behalf of CANZIE and give the floor to Switzerland.

Sorry, it's 1 PM, so I will make it short. On Rule 26, on the right to vote of the Chair, we We still reserve our position for now. We want to check common practice on Rule 26. We are fine with the thresholds there. We think that if there is a change, we might come back to it. On Rule 28, on the dates of meetings, we agree that the chair of the subsidiary body is best placed to organize the work. They should make the decision, and we support the suggestion by Japan to take due consideration of budgetary implications. On rule 28 bis, we request the deletion of the wording "or by the relevant category of States" on para 1, and on para 2 bis, we support this insertion. And on rule 30 bis, we will consider the comments with respect to the autonomy of subsidiary body, but at least we don't think that the last bracketed sentence is actually necessary. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Switzerland, for the brevity in particular, and I give the floor to Morocco on behalf of the Africa Group.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The African Group recalls its general position that the Rules of Procedure should apply mutatis mutandis to the SBs. while allowing differentiated rules aligned with their specific mandates. The Group also underlines the need to streamline overlaps between the provisions under the Rules of Procedure and the terms of reference and the negotiation under the SBs, so as to avoid inconsistencies and duplicity, and we are between your hands on these matters. On Rule 26, Subsidiary bodies are by nature advisory and technical, so consensus should remain the rule, and any fallback voting mechanism must be subject to strict conditions and clearly framed. On the election and role of the chairs, the African Group underlines that chairs should be elected by members, and the members of the SBs, in the interest of neutrality and impartiality, should not exercise the right of vote. On Rule 26, paragraph C bis, the obligation to fairly reflect the views of all members in reports to the Conference of the Parties should be strengthened. This is a fundamental safeguard for minority position and also the integrity of the reporting process. On the rule 27, the African Group can support the application of rule 26 to any additional subsidiary body established by the Conference of the Parties under rule 27. And on the dates of the meetings and rule 28, the African Group favors that the Conference of the Parties, as the main deciding body, decide on the dates of the SBs meetings. with the Bureau and the Secretariat playing consultative roles. The group underlines that predictability of meeting dates is particularly important for developing countries and also their delegation, who are expected to defray their own participation costs. On rule 28 bis, paragraph 2, on the eligibility to nominate members of SBs to subject to areas. Here again, the African Group reserves its position until discussions on the financial rules are finalized. But the African Group would like to emphasize that, however, this provision should not be unduly punitive or restrictive. It must take into account the financial situation of concerned parties, their good faith efforts to normalize their situation through payment plans, and give adequate consideration to developing States, including least developing countries and small island States. On rule 29, consistent with rule 26, the African Group confirms that chairs of subsidiary bodies should not exercise the right to vote. And on rule 30 bis, the African Group views Rule 28bis positively and supports its retention, and we believe that cooperation and coordination between subsidiary bodies is key to the current and effective implementation of the agreement, and that this provision offers valuable institutional foundation on such coordination. Thank you very much. I have been running on time not to be interrupted by the... I mean, my microphone not interrupted. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Morocco. We have five minutes maximum. I will give the floor to Argentina. China has an announcement. I will then allow China to make its announcement. If we lose sound, I can still sum up because I've got a very loud voice. Argentina, the floor is yours. And apologies to the High Seas Alliance. I wanted to give you the floor, but we've just run out of time. Argentina, the floor is yours.

Thank you, co-chair, and I will try to make it fast. On behalf of CLAM, regarding chapter seven on subsidiary bodies, CLAM's general position is that the rules of procedure of the COP should apply mutatis mutandis to those bodies, and in this regard, we support in principle rule 26, subject to the arrangements, agreements reached on the composition of the subsidiary bodies. CLAM also understands that it will be necessary to have additional and specific rules of procedure for subsidiary bodies, particularly regarding the mandate of each body, its composition, and its working methods. With regard to rule 26, subparagraph C, the text is based on article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, and we agree with its content. However, the wording of rule 26, subparagraph C, is not as clear as that of article 18. In this regard, we believe it should be reformulated and we will send an alternative text, a proposal, not to read it here. And with regard to Rule 26C bis, we suggest replacing "should make reasonable efforts to ensure" with "shall ensure". This change is based on the understanding that the subsidiary bodies must ensure and not merely make reasonable efforts that the positions of its members on any matter subject to a vote are accurately reflected in the report submitted to the COP. In Rule 28, on the dates of meetings of subsidiary bodies, we believe that the COP should decide such dates, as the COP, as a superior body, will have an overall view of the meeting schedule. In Rule 28bis, on the election of members of subsidiary bodies in the event that a member cannot complete their term, we do not agree that the concerned regional group should propose a replacement. In our view, it should be the state of nationality of the member who resigned that proposes the new member. With regard to Rule 28B, sub-paragraph two, CLAM does not agree that errors in the payment of contributions should prevent a State Party from presenting candidates for subsidiary bodies. Therefore, we request its deletion. In Rule 30, we believe that the adjustment of the work program of subsidiary bodies should not be an exclusive prerogative of the COP President, but rather of the Bureau as a whole. Therefore, we suggest adding after the word "President" the expression "in consultation with the Bureau". We support inclusion of Rule 30 bis. We believe that regular consultation between the COP and Subsidiary Bodies is essential for the effective implementation of the Agreement. We welcome that this new version replaced the verb "may" with "shall". Thank you.

I thank Argentina