(5th meeting) Plenary Session, Global Mechanism on ICTs in the Context of International Security (20-24 July)

Good morning. Good morning. We're about to begin. The fifth meeting of the substantive plenary session of the 2026 Global Mechanism on Development in the Field of Information and Communication Technologies in the Context of International Security and Advancing Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs is called to order. I would like once again to thank all delegations for their very substantive contributions under the topic voluntary norms. As you will recall, under this same agenda item, there was a request for a right of reply. And so I will give the floor to the delegation of Ukraine.

Good morning, everyone. Madam Chair, I would like to take the floor for exercising the right of reply in relation to yesterday's intervention by the representative of the Russian Federation. Madam Chair, distinguished delegates, yesterday and the day before, we had a profound discussion on the existing and potential threats, where many delegations expressed their concerns about the growing threat of disinformation and information manipulation. It is ironic that right after that, the Russian Federation intervenes with a speech that qualifies for an act of intentional disinformation and information manipulation. Let's see why. Even the AI suggests that in the process of countering disinformation, every piece of information should be evaluated for excessive appeal to emotions, Fact-checked, and if inconsistent, reported and not disseminated. Russia's yesterday's intervention was over-exaggeratedly emotional, with elaborated epithets and lack of factual reference, a clear sign of potential disinformation attempt. Now to the fact-checking. The International Criminal Court has issued a number of warrants of arrest for Russian top officials, inclusive of Putin, crime of aggression. That's the fact. Currently, Russia temporarily occupies under 20% of Ukrainian territory. That's another fact. That these territories are recognized by the international community as Ukrainian is also the fact stated in numerous General Assembly resolutions, which I shall not list here for the sake of the precious time. Although Ukraine temporarily cannot exercise the effective governance on the— on these territories, Also the fact, regretfully. Unlike the occupational administrations of the Russian Federation, who act as they please on the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, thus maintaining the permissive environment for the criminal cyber ecosystems to flourish. Yet another fact. These facts are well known, but were not mentioned in Russia's intervention of yesterday, which is another clear sign of a disinformation and information manipulation attempt. Distinguished delegates, it looks like we have just had a quick situational tabletop exercise on a practical case of a disinformation attempt happening right here in this room. We looked into it together, and now we all know how it works. Madam Chair, I would like to report the case of attempted disinformation, namely Russia's intervention of yesterday, so it will not be disseminated. #StopFake. Thank you.

Thank you. Ahora continuaremos con el próximo. We will now move on to the next item, which is the continued study of the applicability of international law in the use of ICTs, including consideration of whether any gaps in. exist and possible future elaboration of additional legally binding obligations if appropriate. As I mentioned, we don't have a predetermined time limit for interventions, but it would be greatly appreciated if you would consider delivering an abridged version of your statement and sending the full version to e-statements and to the chair's team so that we can hear from all delegations. Also, for your reference, a timer will be displayed on the screen. I will now invite delegations to indicate their interest in taking the floor under this agenda item. As we did for the other agenda items, I would be grateful if you could indicate your desire to speak now so that We can see who wishes to take the floor on behalf of their national delegation, and if we could ask those wishing to take the floor on behalf of a group if they could approach the Secretariat so that we can give them priority. I will now give the floor to Switzerland, who will be speaking on behalf of a group of states.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czechia, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and my own delegation. Our states, spanning all regional groups represented in this room, share a common conviction: clarifying the concrete application of international law to conduct in cyberspace will be central to the work of this global mechanism. We must continue building on the common understandings established by previous GGEs and the OEWGs. The key built in the consensus reports of the GGEs of 2010, 2013, 2015, and 2021, and the final reports of the 2019 to 2021 and the 2021 to 2025 OEWGs is clear. International law applies to the use of ICTs. The task before us is to deepen our common understanding of how exactly it applies. Rich and substantive discussions on the application of international law, including IHL, took place in the GGEs, OEWG, and other fora. These discussions were facilitated by numerous capacity-building initiatives that enabled a growing number of states to contribute. Further, numerous regional and national positions on international law, including IHL, were published in the course of the OEWG. Yet the final report of the OEWG did not fully reflect all of these. Especially regrettable is that the final report did not retain explicit language on IHL, which should now be a priority for the mechanism. 2 working papers submitted by the OEWG in July 2025 provide a solid basis for the work ahead. The cross-regional working paper on the application of international law in the use of ICTs identified areas of emerging convergence on state responsibility, human rights obligations, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the application of IHL in armed conflict. The cross-regional working paper on the application of international humanitarian law to ICT operations elaborated the specific rules and principles of IHL applicable to cyber operations and identified measures to ensure respect for IHL. Important work has also taken place outside the OEWG, reflecting the importance attached to the application of IHL in cyberspace by a great majority of states. The resolution adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2024 and the ICT work stream under the Global Initiative to galvanize political commitment to international humanitarian law are prominent examples. These complementary processes reinforce our understandings and can provide an invaluable basis for the work of this mechanism. We wish to be clear on one point: applying IHL does not increase the risk of armed conflict in cyberspace. Failing to apply it leaves that risk unaddressed and civilians and other protected persons and objects less protected. Building on this bedrock, we are committed to advancing focused discussions on international law, including IHL. Indeed, important questions on the concrete application remain open and need to be discussed. We therefore propose addressing, among others, the following 5 areas of international law in a structured and inclusive manner by the mechanism. First, sovereignty and the prohibition of intervention. Second, state responsibility and due diligence. Third, the prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Fourth, IHL as it applies to cyber operations in situations of armed conflict, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, precaution, necessity, and humanity, as well as the protection of protected persons and objects. And fifth, the application of international human rights law to state conduct in cyberspace. Including privacy, freedom of expression, non-discrimination, and the freedom of association. Madam Chair, we welcome the integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting nature of DTG 1, which draws on the 5 pillars of the framework, including international law. This approach offers a valuable opportunity to examine specific challenges in ICT security. We encourage the co-facilitators of DTG I to ensure that international law, including IHL, features prominently in the substantive work of DTG I. This mechanism was created to continue and deepen the work of its predecessors. Continuity on international law, including IHL, is not optional, and we stand ready to support you in your endeavors to do so. For that purpose, we encourage you, Madam Chair, in coordination with the co-facilitators of DTG I, to initiate dedicated discussions on the application of the aforementioned rules of international law in real-world scenarios, including the protection of critical infrastructure such as hospitals, water systems, and energy networks from malicious ICT operations both in times of peace and in armed conflict. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Tonga speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum.

Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the members of the Pacific Islands Forum with a presence at the United Nations, namely Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and my own country, Tonga. Chair, on international law, the Pacific Islands Forum continues to support a principled approach grounded in the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant obligations under international law. We reaffirmed that international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace. We also reaffirmed the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber activities in situations of armed conflict, and the importance of protecting human rights, which apply online as they do offline. The global mechanism should build on the progress made in the OEWG and reflect the depth of legal discussions that have already taken place. It should acknowledge the areas where there is a broad convergence while also providing space for states to continue building common understandings on how international law applies. For the Pacific, further discussion of state responsibility and the peaceful settlement of disputes remains important to our understanding of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and to preventing escalation. At the same time, legal discussions must be accessible to all states. Many countries require support to build the legal capacity needed to engage meaningfully in these conversations, including support for officials who are not specialist international lawyers. Legal capacity building should therefore be a practical and cross-cutting priority of the global mechanism. Scenario-based training, regional workshops, peer exchanges, and accessible expert briefings can help states develop national views and participate on a more equal footing. The Pacific also continues to caution against moving too quickly towards discussions of additional legally binding obligations before states have had the capacity and opportunity to engage with how existing international law applies. Before we can have a meaningful discussion on whether there are gaps, we need the legal capacity to understand and apply the existing framework. In this regard, the DTGs can contribute by creating a less formal and more practical environment for legal dialogue among States and supporting broader capacity-building efforts. Exchanges among States on experiences, challenges, gaps, and capacity needs regarding the implementation of existing legal obligations in cyberspace, supported by appropriate expert briefings, would be valuable, particularly when they help translate legal principles into realistic scenarios and practical policy choices for states. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the European Union, to be followed by Australia, South Africa, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Italy, and then Portugal and Cameroon.

Chair, colleagues, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the EU and its member states. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, aligned themselves with this statement. As outlined also during our statement on threats, malicious behavior in cyberspace from both state and non-state actors is increasing in scale, severity, sophistication, and impact. The increasing number of cyber threats poses a major challenge to the functioning of our societies, our economies, and our way of life. Cyber threat actors target our critical infrastructure and attack to attempt to hamper the efforts of states to fully grasp the economic and social benefits of digitalization. With cyber tools also increasingly playing a central role in conflicts, respect for, and adherence to the UN Framework of Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace is essential to maintaining international security and stability. The EU and its member states reaffirm their full commitment to the application of international law, in particular the UN Charter, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the Law on State Responsibility in Cyberspace. We underscore that respect for international law should be at the core of the efforts of the international community. And to this end, we should continue to work, including in the DTGs, to further enhance our common understanding on how international law applies and build also global capacities to this end. A better global common understanding of how international applies— law applies to cyberspace is necessary to contribute to global cyber resilience and further transparency, predictability, and accountability for states' conduct in cyberspace. In that vein, the EU and its member states continue to support third countries through training and capacity building on the implementation of the UN framework, including on how to develop a national position on the application of international law in cyberspace. And we acknowledge that an increasing number of states have already developed and put forward their national and regional positions on this issue. To support finding further common understanding, we have in 2024 ourselves presented our common understanding on a non-exhaustive set of legal elements on the application of international law. And in conjunction with our declaration, as well as the African Union's common position, over 100 states have now either individually or collectively published their positions on international law, which is a real achievement. This increasing understanding shows that international law is fit for purpose in this digital age, and that the application of and compliance with fundamental principles and rules of international law to cyberspace, such as state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, the prohibition of the threat of or use of force, due diligence, as well as international human rights law and international humanitarian law, Are essential to ensure security and stability. Areas to be also further discussed, as just outlined in the statement by Switzerland on behalf of a large cross-regional group of states. We also underscore that recognizing the application of international humanitarian law in cyberspace does not lead to, nor encourage, the militarization of cyberspace, nor does it legitimize cyber warfare. Actually to the contrary. The EU and its member states will continue to further develop, extend, update, and share our understanding on the application of international law at national, regional, and international level, and we encourage all UN member states to do the same. The open-ended working group confirmed this common understanding even through the result of hard work of cross-regional groups and the reference to the resolution of the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Crescent were not included in the final open-ended working group report. And we note that further efforts of the global mechanism should build on previous discussions and achievements and include them in their results. States have recognized that the application of the law of responsible— states' responsibility, international human rights law, and in situations of armed conflict, international humanitarian law. And we see the global mechanism and its DTGs as a new opportunity to reflect and articulate clearly the progress made. And continue to make progress on our common understanding, particularly by reflecting on its practical application in real-world scenarios. We also welcome the continued efforts by the cross-regional groups on this issue and look forward to incorporating this work in our discussions under the global mechanism, including in the dedicated thematic groups. Thank you very much.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Australia.

Thank you, Chair. I am delivering this statement on behalf of the cross-regional group of states that includes Australia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Kiribati, Moldova, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. International law is a key pillar of the framework for responsible state behaviour. All states have reaffirmed that international law is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. In their use of ICTs, States have reaffirmed the application of the principles of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, and the international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty, non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state, the prohibition on the use of force, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. States have had increasingly rich discussions over time and reached more common understandings on how international law applies in the use of ICTs, including in the GGEs and and OEWG's that preceded this forum, as well as the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and the ICT work stream of the Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment to IHL. States from all regions have engaged in discussions, drafted working papers, delivered statements, and published national positions that have helped reinforce capacity, build confidence, and deepen our common understandings on how international law applies in the use of ICTs. These outcomes demonstrate the value of regular, continuing discussions on these topics and offer ground for carving out additional areas of emerging convergence. This permanent global mechanism represents a valuable opportunity to build on these strong foundations and continue these critical discussions in a structured and inclusive setting. It is important that this includes detailed and substantive discussions among states on the application of international law to the use of ICTs by states in an integrating— integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting manner in the first dedicated thematic group. Consideration should also be given to how capacity-building efforts, including those advanced through the second dedicated thematic group, can better enable states to meaningfully participate in these conversations, develop their own national positions, and enhance the implementation of international law. The cross-regional group on behalf of which I speak today, comprising states of various sizes from all regions, calls in particular for this mechanism to draw on work such as the cross-regional working paper on the application of international law in the use of ICTs, and the working paper on the application of international humanitarian law to ICT operations that were produced in the context of the OEWG 2021 to 2025. The first of these working papers, produced by many members of this group, reflected emerging common understandings on the application of international law to cyber activities in a few areas, including in relation to state responsibility, human rights obligations, and the application of IHL to states' use of ICTs in the context of armed conflict, which were reached through rich and substantive dialogue between states throughout the OEWG. We consider this global mechanism must further these discussions on the application of international law in the use of ICTs, and that emerging common understandings reached during these discussions must be reflected in the reporting of this mechanism. We express our shared conviction that the substantive work of states on international law from preceding fora remain valuable and highly relevant. Reaching more common understandings on how international law applies to states' use of ICTs is critical to maintaining peace and stability, including by increasing the predictability of state behavior, lowering the risk of miscalculation, and clarifying the consequences of unlawful state behavior. It is crucial that we build upon the sound foundation laid by the OEWG, including the papers and statements of this group and of others, to realize this vision and the mechanism's full potential. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of South Africa, who will be followed by Uruguay.

Thank you, Chairperson. The dedicated thematic groups provide us with an opportunity to reflect further on how international law applies to cyberspace. The previous open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies benefited from States sharing their national views on how international law applies in cyberspace. While regional papers provide valuable references, they are non-exhaustive. The lived experience and practice of member states in the context of applying international law to cyberspace is also a practical resource. We could also broaden our understanding by allowing for presentations by legal experts, including those in civil society and academia. Member states have agreed, for example, that international law In particular, the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety is applicable and essential to maintaining peace, security, stability, and promoting an open, secure, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. Chairperson, with regards to breaches of sovereignty, South Africa understands that a cyber operation is deemed internationally— an internationally wrongful act when it is attributable to a State under international law and involves a breach of an international obligation of the State. States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs. It follows that if a State is notified of harmful activity emanating from its territory, it must take reasonable steps to address such activity. Chairperson, the implementation of the UN Charter includes reference to— in Article 1 to international human rights law. One of the stated purposes of the UN stated in its Charter is to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. Without distinction as to race, gender, language, or religion. There is no doubt that women and vulnerable groups, such as the disabled and the LGBTQI+ community, are particularly affected by breaches of ICT security, as well as online misinformation and disinformation campaigns led by state and non-state actors. Member States disagree on how the applicability of international law should be treated over the longer term. The global mechanism should therefore engage in a good-faith discussion in the DTGs on how the applicability of international law, including international humanitarian law, could be strengthened. These discussions, held informally with experts from civil society and academia in DTG I, could identify the capacity-building needs of member states, which could be addressed in the discussions of DTG II. The GM is an action-oriented mechanism, and we should use it to build consensus in areas where this is possible. Chairperson, South Africa's national position on how international law applies to cyberspace is still developing as we consider the fast-paced developments of malicious actors, using new and emerging technologies to spread divisive information that is contrary to the UN Charter itself. Our collective gaps as an international community should first be ventilated by member states in the context of the global mechanism, and then we could chart a way forward if needed. I thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Uruguay, who will be followed by Kosovo. Costa Rica, and then Italy.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. As this is the first time that I'm taking the floor, I'd like to begin by congratulating you on your stewardship of this process, and I'd like to express our appreciation for your dedication and also for the tireless work of your team. You can count on us to work constructively. Uruguay reaffirms that international law is the foundation for preserving international peace, security, and stability, including in the use of ICTs. We value the significant progress made in the OEWG and the GGE and also in other relevant processes. These have made it possible to deepen our common understandings on the application of international law to the use of ICTs and has helped to strengthen trust between states. In this context, we especially recognize the contributions of the Interregional Group on International Law, especially as regards the application of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the international responsibility of states. The new Permanent Global Mechanism represents an opportunity to continue with this progress and to consolidate an inclusive forum where we can further develop common understanding, strengthen state capacities, and take stock of advancements reflected in the periodic reports. Deepening consensus on the application of international law in the use of ICTs will help to strengthen the predictability of state behavior, to reduce the risk of miscalculations, and promote cyberspace that is open, stable, secure, peaceful, and accessible to all. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Costa Rica.

Madam Chair, Costa Rica is grateful for this opportunity to speak on this pillar relating to the application of international law to the use of ICTs by states. One of the major contributions of the previous working groups is the recognition that cyberspace is not a legal vacuum. International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies fully to the use of ICTs by states. This encompasses, as appropriate, the principle of sovereign equality, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prohibition of the threat or use of force, non-intervention, due diligence, the law of international responsibility, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. In this regard, allow us to share with you 3 reflections. First, Costa Rica believes that the added value of this global mechanism lies in moving beyond a general affirmation of applicability towards a more concrete, technical, and inclusive understanding as to how these legal concepts apply to specific situations. This includes operations involving the use of proxies, digital coercion, attribution, response measures, and operations below the threshold of the use of force. Under this framework, sovereignty and non-intervention continue to be central principles. Certain cyber operations can be legally significant when they cause physical damage, loss of functionality, or interference with inherently governmental functions. Likewise, coercive operations targeting electoral processes, essential services, public administration, or sovereign decisions may raise questions or issues under the principle of non-intervention depending on the circumstances of each case. Finally, Costa Rica also believes it is essential that we address the issue of attribution with rigor and prudence. Although rules of attribution in international law are not new, the digital environment presents unique technical and evidentiary challenges. Therefore, we should promote good practices, voluntary transparency, capacity-building, and confidence-building measures that help to distinguish between technical, political, and legal attribution. Madam Chair, legal clarity strengthens trust and protects civilian populations. Costa Rica hopes that this mechanism will foster common understandings without weakening existing norms and reaffirm the fact that security in cyberspace must always advance in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations, human rights, and international humanitarian law. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Italy.

Good morning, Madam Chair. Thank you for giving me the floor. Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add a few considerations from its national perspective, also including some contributions of the 4 stakeholders objected by the Russian Federation. We emphasize the importance of deepening our collective understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace. As noted by the EU and other delegations before me, international law is fully applicable and relevant in the digital age. International law includes the UN Charter, the law of state responsibility, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. Italy publicly shared its national position on this matter in 2021, and we encourage other States to continue to do the same. This year, we are also planning an update of our national position paper, and we look forward to the outcomes of this global mechanism as valuable inputs to our work. Promoting transparency by publishing national and regional positions is in the collective interest, as it reduces uncertainty and the risk of miscalculation in interstate relations. Furthermore, it establishes a global baseline for the application of international law in cyberspace. The EU Common Understanding of the Application of International Law to Cyberspace demonstrates that it is possible to agree on principles such as state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, the prohibition on the use of force, and compliance with international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and state responsibility law. In this regard, we also greatly value the common African position on the application of international law to ICTs and would welcome the recognition of the importance of regional perspectives by this global mechanism. Italy would also like to stress the importance of supporting capacity-building efforts including with the aim of ensuring that all states are able to participate on an equal footing on the development of common understandings of how international law applies in the use of ICTs. With this regard, we particularly appreciate the precious work done by organizations like UNIDIR. Based on the OAWG recommendations, it is now important to continue discussions at the Global Mechanism on how international law applies in the use of ICTs. Such discussions would greatly benefit from briefings of experts, for instance, from the International Law Commission and academia. That is why we believe that DTG I can play a significant role in helping all of us understand the impact of certain threats and situations on international law, particularly thanks to scenario-based discussions and similar activities. DTG II then could elaborate tailored projects to assist countries in building capacities in the field of international law. Italy stands ready to contribute to these collective efforts. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Portugal. They will be followed by Cameroon, Kiribati, and Austria. Portugal.

Madam Chair, Portugal aligns with the EU and the Switzerland statements, but would like to emphasize once more the centrality to stability in cyberspace of the binding duty to protect the right to freedom of expression. It is worth remembering in this regard that Article 19 of the Universal Declaration asserts the fundamental right to hold opinions without interference from any receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers. And that Article 19 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights asserts that this personal right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art or or through any other media of choice. Of course, the international right to freedom of expression across borders has been at times violated by states that sponsor campaigns of online disinformation with the aim of discrediting the institutions of countries whose freedoms they fear. Those online campaigns are a dangerous hybrid threat to national security, and therefore the role of the state in combating them, based on the identification of artificial behavior, is justified. However, when we reaffirm the applicability of international law in cyberspace, we also mean the binding state duty to protect freedom of digital expression of their citizens across borders, including anonymous expression. State responsibility, sovereignty, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention, and the right of self-defense are, of course, pillars of international peace and security, also in cyberspace. But states, according to precedent and jurisprudence, must also uphold and protect the freedom of expression across borders of their citizens, including anonymous expression, because that is part of their binding obligations under international law. Therefore, in our view, scenario-based discussions by the 2 cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups of the global mechanism namely on how binding state obligations apply to particular situations in cyberspace, should give adequate attention to the duty to protect freedom of expression, including anonymous expression, and regardless of borders. Thank you, Miss Madam Chairman.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Cameroon.

Madame la Présidente. Madam Chair, the history of international law is one of a constant search for balance between the enduring principles that underpin the international legal order and the need to accompany the profound transformations of international society. And in every period of major change, law has been called upon not only to regulate new realities, but also to preserve the fundamental values that make peaceful coexistence among nations possible. Cyberspace is today one of such major transformations. It has become an essential space for cooperation, innovation, economic development, and social progress. However, it has also become a domain in which complex challenges to international peace and security, the stability of states, and trust among nations are manifested. And in light of this reality, Our collective responsibility is to ensure that the digital revolution remains a force serving humanity rather than an additional source of instability. And that is why international law must remain our common reference point, not as a constraint opposed to technological progress, but as the indispensable framework of trust that enables us to harness its benefits, prevent its risks, Madam Chair, for Cameroon, international law is a basis for peaceful coexistence and a way to resolve differences. It remains a normative reference and remains an indispensable foundation of peaceful coexistence. And if new challenges bring in— new technologies bring in new challenges, but they do not question the validity of the Charter's fundamental principles. Those principles— sovereign equality of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, not intervention, prohibition of the threat of force, and respect for states' sovereignty and political independence— remain the essential foundation of stability and predictability. The issue, therefore, is not whether international law applies to cyberspace, but rather continuing in a spirit of dialogue, cooperation, and consensus to examine the practical modalities of its application. We have always supported the progressive development codification of international law through including the ICT because we think that it help improve legal certainty and the implementation of relevant obligations. However, this reflection must be conducted with caution, objectivity, and legal rigor. It cannot proceed from the assumption that the existing international legal framework is insufficient, nor presume that there are normative gaps that exist. Rather, it should be based on a methodological analysis grounded in state practices, applicable principles of international law, and operational realities associated with digital technologies. In this regard, we remain open to continuing discussion on the possible evolution of international legal framework. If following an inclusive, transparent, and consensus-based process, states conclude that certain situations are not sufficiently covered by existing law, they may then consider where appropriate, the development of new legally binding obligations. Such development should aim to strengthen the existing international legal order and ensure universal application of law rather than selective application of rules. This also depends on the capacity of states to implement them effectively, and in this regard, capacity building, technical assistance, The sharing of best practices, knowledge, and expertise, as well as strengthened and inclusive international cooperation, remain indispensable to enable all states, particularly developing countries, to participate fully and effectively in international cyberspace governance. In a digital environment where vulnerabilities of states— and we are all interdependent— our work, not just an expression of international community, but an expression of a joint will. Madam Chair, allow me to conclude by recalling an African proverb which says that the strength of a river comes from the meeting of its tributaries. And this recalls a fundamental reality that a state alone cannot meet the complex challenges on their own. I thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the delegation of Kiribati. be followed by Austria.

Madam Chair, Kiribati aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Kingdom of Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum members and with the cross-regional statements on the application of international law delivered by Australia. We speak now in our national capacity. Madam Chair, let me begin with the reason this pillar matters Most to all states like mine. Kiribati is a large ocean state of small islands, a nation of 120,000 people spread across an ocean the size of a continent. We have no army to speak of. We have no capacity to deter and no capacity to retaliate. If a state chose to act against us in cyberspace tomorrow, We could not answer it, and we could not prevent it. When we ask ourselves what actually protects Kiribati, the honest answer is this: international law protects Kiribati's sovereign equality, the prohibition of the threat and use of force, non-intervention, the peace settlement of disputes. These are not matters of legal theory. Thank you. They are our defenses. They are, in truth, the only defenses we have. So when this mechanism affirms that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, applies to state conduct in cyberspace, Givet does not hear a technical proposition. We hear our security being spoken aloud. Thank you. In the previous Open-Handed Working Group, Kiribati joined a cross-regional group of states from the Pacific, Asia, Europe, and Latin America in presenting convergence language on international law. Those understandings must be carried forward and reflected in this mechanism's reporting. Madam Chair, Permit me now to be candid about something rarely said plainly in this room. There is an assumption running quietly beneath our discussions of international law that every state arrives here with a settled national position drafted by its own international lawyers, refined across its own governments. For much of this membership, that assumption does not hold. And so a discussion that is being opened in principle becomes, in practice, a conversation among those who already have the capacity to hold it. Kiribati's delegation to this session is 3 people. Between us, we hold our national cybersecurity mandate, our incident response function, and our legal and regulatory work. The officer who would draft Kiribati's national position on international law is in this room this week and is also the officer who must do everything else. That is not a complaint. It is the arithmetic of a small state and it is the arithmetic behind a great many of the empty chairs in these discussions. Legal capacity building is therefore not a footnote to this pillar. It is the condition of this pillar being real. Guinea-Bissau reiterates the proposal we co-sponsored in this OEWG that scenario-based exercises on international law be taken up within the dedicated thematic groups. Working through realistic scenarios is how legal principle becomes operational understanding, and it is at the same time one of the most effective forms of legal capacity building available to states like ours. That is what turns a legal debate in a legal conversation that includes us and allows every state to participate not as an observer but as a contributor. This is also why Gitega counsels patience about new legally binding obligations. Our position is not opposition. It is sequence, and it comes from recent experience. Kiribati sat through 3 years in the ad hoc committee negotiating the United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime. For the largest delegations, that was a demanding process. For a delegation the size of ours, it consumed very nearly everything we had to give. Thank you. And Madam Chair, at the end of those 3 years, our networks at home were not one day better defended. I say not that as a criticism of that convention, but as a plain statement of what such an undertaking costs a state like mine. Before we can say responsibly whether there are gaps in existing law, we must first be equipped to understand and apply the law we already have. We would rather build that capacity first and then speak with a voice that is genuinely our own. Madam Chair, in closing, for the powerful, international law is a constraint they accept. For the small, it is the protection they depend on. In this room, Kiribati's vote counts the same as any other. That equality is not a courtesy extended to us. It is a legal principle, and it is the most valuable thing we possess. International law protects the small. Kiribati will continue to work with all partners to ensure it protects them in cyberspace, too. I thank you, Madam Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much for that, Kiribati. I now give the floor to the delegation of Austria.

Madam Chair, Austria fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the EU and the joint statement delivered by Switzerland and would like to make some additional remarks in its national capacity. As this is the first time our delegation is taking the floor, we would like to take the this opportunity to congratulate you on your election. We trust in your continued excellent stewardship of this global mechanism. Let me start by recalling the Open-Ended Working Group's conclusion that international law as a whole, including the UN Charter, applies to states' cyber activities, and by reaffirming Austria's firm view that there can be no doubt that such a finding encompasses international human rights and international humanitarian law. While the Global Mechanism is new, the issues on its agenda are not being discussed in the UN framework for the first time. It is thus important to build on the achievements of the last decade. This includes, in particular, the most recent open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies, which concluded its mandate in 2021. We believe that this OEWG has achieved great progress, particularly on international humanitarian law. Affirming the applicability of IHL to cyber activities in connection with an armed conflict does not encourage or legitimize cyber warfare. It aims to provide clarity and affirm the global consensus that armed conflicts are subject to rules and limitations, irrespective of the means of warfare being employed. The existing legal framework must form the basis for any and all cyber activities conducted by both states and non-state actors. Non-legally binding norms can be a helpful tool to implement these legal obligations and to support the development of a common international standard for best practices. In this respect, we wish to highlight the initial overview of the EU's efforts to implement the norms of responsible state behavior, which the EU and its member states presented ahead of the plenary session to UN member states. With respect to the work of the DTGs, Austria considers further, more detailed discussions on how existing international law applies to cyber activities as a priority. We firmly believe that discussions on international law should be scenario-based and practice-oriented. With regard to the working methods of the DTGs, we should look to best practices from other bodies which are dealing with similarly complex technical issues. For example, interstate discussions could be preceded by expert panels that would also provide delegations with sufficient time to ask questions and engage in a meaningful exchange with the experts. The meetings of the DTGs should be focused on specific sub-areas one at a time to allow for in-depth discussions. Madam Chair, allow me to also briefly react to the discussion on stakeholder participation and express my delegation's frustration with the lack of consensus in that regard. We share the concerns raised by the multi-stakeholder community in this week's joint multi-stakeholder statement on the objections to the participation of stakeholders. I want to emphasize that that it always will be states making the decisions in this forum, but for these decisions to be effective, they must be grounded in a sound and comprehensive factual basis. The expertise provided by non-governmental stakeholders is crucial to that. In the spirit of the UNAD process, we cannot afford for this new global mechanism to become a forum that is out of touch with reality. My delegation remains committed committed to this issue and thanks you again for the opportunity to share our views on these important matters. Thank you.

Gracias. Thank you. I now give the floor to Malawi, who will be followed by Singapore.

Madam Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, international law remains a cornerstone of the cumulative and evolving framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Successive consensus reports of the United Nations GGEs and the OEDWG have affirmed that international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, applies to the use of ICTs by states. This shared understanding provides the foundation upon which we should continue to build. Just like the Pacific Islands Forum and Kiribati, my delegation believes the Charter remains our principal point of reference. Specifically, its principles of sovereignty— sovereign equality of states under Article 2, paragraph 1, the peaceful settlement of disputes under Articles 2, paragraph 3 and 33, the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, under Article 2, Paragraph 4, and the obligation to cooperate in maintaining international peace and security are no less relevant in cyberspace than the physical world. The Republic of Malawi is in support of statements shared by the European Union, Italy, and Switzerland on behalf of a group of member states, recognizing that where ICTs are used in situations of armed conflict, international humanitarian law applies. Respect for the principles of humanity, distinction, proportionality, necessity, and precaution remains essential to protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure. Equally, the principles of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and state responsibility continue to guide responsible state conduct in cyberspace. Jurisdiction enables states to investigate and prosecute cybercrime, while respecting the sovereign rights of other states. Likewise, while technical analysis may identify the source of malicious ICT activity, attribution to a state remains a legal determination that must be based on international law and credible evidence. Responsible attribution is therefore essential to maintaining international peace, security, and stability. Madam Chair, today's agenda also invites us to consider whether gaps in international law and whether additional legally binding obligations may, if appropriate, be elaborated in the future. My delegation believes these questions should be approached carefully, inclusively, and on the basis of evidence. Before concluding that legal gaps exist, we should first ask whether the greater challenge lies in the law itself or in our collective ability to understand, implement, as well as operationalize the law that we have already agreed applies. For many developing countries, including the Republic of Malawi, strengthening implementation remains the immediate priority nationally. We continue to strengthen our legal and institutional framework the development of new national cybersecurity policy, our cybersecurity bill, complementary cybercrime legislation, and implementation of our Data Protection Act, as well as the work of the Malawi Computer Emergency Response Team and our Data Protection Authority. Should future discussions demonstrate the genuine legal gaps— should future discussions demonstrate the genuine legal legal gaps exist and that additional legally binding obligations are both necessary and capable of attracting broad international consensus, the Republic of Malawi stands ready to participate constructively in those discussions. Madam Chair, allow me to conclude with an observation. The most significant gap before us today is not a gap on international law. It is the gap between legal consensus and practical implementation. Closing that gap would do more to strengthen international peace and security than debating obligations that many states are not yet equipped to operationalize. As this global mechanism enters its implementation phase, let us continue to advance our work through dialogue rather than division, cooperation rather than confrontation, and implementation guided by the principles of international law. The Republic of Malawi stands ready to contribute to the shared endeavor. I thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, let me tell you who's next. We've got Singapore, Colombia, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. I would be grateful if If those delegations who haven't yet done so would please submit their statement to eStatements, and you can also hand it to the chair's team in the room. Thank you very, very much for all of your interventions so far. They have been very enriching. We're very grateful for them. I now give the floor to Singapore.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Singapore sees international law as a crucial component of the mechanism's work. As a firm believer in a rules-based international order, Singapore's view is that fostering common understanding among states in the application of international law to the ICT context will contribute to greater peace, security, and trust among states. In this regard, we also see considerable value in states issuing national statements or regional ones, such as what the African Union and the European Union have done previously. Such statements would contribute to the acquis of states' understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace that assists our work in this Permanent Mechanism. Singapore remains open to engaging and participating in discussions on the application of international law as a concrete first step needed before we can go on to discussing the identification of gaps in existing international law in the context of cyberspace. At the concluded OEWG, states have made progress in discussions on international law topics such as sovereignty, principle of non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the prohibition against the use of force, and we look forward to states taking the discussions further and deeper. Madam Chair, this is where the role and work of DTG II becomes crucial. Capacity building in international law is an essential part of fostering common understanding on how international law applies in the use of ICTs. We need to continue capacity-building efforts with the aim of ensuring that every state acquires the necessary expertise and capacity to participate on an equal footing and contribute meaningfully to discussions on international law. This remains a crucial undertaking for all member states, especially in the context of the fast-evolving ICT landscape and the threats outlined by states in the earlier session. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Colombia.

Señora Presidenta. Madam Chair, Colombia aligns with the statements delivered by Australia and Switzerland on this topic. In our national capacity, we wish to share the following observations as the outcome of the deliberations under the framework of the GGE and the OEWG, there is today broad consensus on the applicability of international law to the use of ICTs by states. In this context, Colombia reaffirms that international law, and especially the Charter of the United Nations, apply to cyberspace, and they are essential for maintaining international peace, security, and stability. Therefore, the challenge that we face today consists in moving towards a more practical and broadly shared understanding of the idea that international law will apply to activities in cyberspace, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. So in this regard, my delegation wishes to indicate 3 spheres where the first thematic group can provide significant added value by developing concrete outputs that will allow us to move legal arguments into practical guidance for states. Firstly, Colombia believes it is relevant to go deeper in our analysis on the application of international humanitarian law to cybernetic operations in situations of armed conflict. And especially, we consider it to be useful to analyze how international humanitarian law and customary international law have been consolidated on cyberspace, including the— for those states, while they may not have offensive cybernetic capabilities, they may have legal and humanitarian interest in the development of such norms. Secondly, Colombia has reiterated that international humanitarian law applies fully to the use of ICTs during armed conflict, both international and non-international armed conflicts, and that the fundamental principles of these continue to underpin the behavior of parties in this context. And so we believe that it is necessary to continue examining how these principles apply given the transformations that digital technologies have introduced into the nature and impact of armed conflicts, including the use of digital platforms and social networks for the forced recruitment of boys, girls, and adolescents by illicit or illegal armed groups. Finally, my delegation believes it is relevant to go deeper in the study of malicious cybernetic actions carried out by non-state actors in the territory of a state. This obligation should apply to all states equally regardless of of their level of technological development. In this context, we believe that it's also relevant to advance towards identifying means that will allow us to strengthen the effective implementation of this, including the establishment of disclosure mechanisms of vulnerability, technical cooperation so that those states with reduced capabilities can detect malicious use in their territory as well as elaborating guidelines that can clarify the actions that states could take in order to ensure compliance with these principles. Madam Chair, Colombia believes that the development of a common understanding on the application of international law to cyberspace is absolutely crucial for consolidating a safe, stable, and predictable digital environment. These efforts will allow us to reduce the legal uncertainty, promote responsible behavior by states, and mitigate the risks emanating from confusion as to the applicable international norms. We invite states to actively participate in this dialogue, and we are convinced this will contribute to strengthening trust between states, preventing conflict, and consolidate a more secure, stable, peaceful, and resilient cyberspace for all. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of the Republic of Korea, to be followed by New Zealand.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The Republic of Korea would like to reiterate that existing international law, including the entirety of the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law applies to cyberspace. Building upon this shared understanding, my government published its National Position on the Application of International Law to Cyberspace in July 2025 last year, with a view to, to contributing constructively to the ongoing discussion in the international community. Existing international law already provides a sufficient legal foundation for governing conduct in cyberspace. Rather than pursuing the negotiation of new legally binding instruments, our efforts should focus on clarifying and operationalizing existing international law while strengthening mechanisms for its effective implementation through international cooperation. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that recognizing the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace neither legitimizes nor encourages armed conflict. Rather, it seeks to ensure that if an armed conflict occurs, the protections afforded under international humanitarian law continue to apply in order to reduce human suffering and protect civilians. Discussions on the application of international law must also take account of the unique characteristics of cyberspace. In particular, we should recognize the challenges arising from the significant role of non-state actors, as well as the anonymity, speed, and technical complexity of cyber operations, all of which make attribution and response more difficult. The global mechanism should therefore continue to serve as a platform for deepening our understanding of the realities, realities of cyberspace, and for progressively developing a common understanding of how existing international law applies in this domain. I thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of New Zealand, to be followed by Israel, Estonia, United Kingdom, Armenia, Mexico, and Cuba. New Zealand, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. New Zealand aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Kingdom of Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum and the statement delivered by Australia on behalf of the Cross-Regional Group of States. These statements reaffirm our shared understanding that international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace. This includes the UN Charter in its entirety, the Law on State Responsibility, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. These statements also recall that our role in this process is to build on these common understandings. But as we begin to consider how international law applies, we invite states to keep 3 questions in mind. First, why are we discussing international law? Second, what issues should we be focusing on? And third, who should be in the room? On the first question, why are we discussing international law? New Zealand acknowledges that developments in cyber capabilities raise novel questions about how international law applies in cyberspace. The global mechanism presents a unique opportunity to work together to answer these questions. However, we do not consider the answer is to create new legally binding obligations, not until all states have the capacity to engage with the existing legal framework. Our aim when discussing international law should be to work together to apply and implement this existing legal framework, which leads me to the second question: what issues should we focus on? The global mechanism, including the DTGs, should not just prompt states states to recite well-established positions. It should enable us to share practical experiences and best practices on the application of international law when assessing or responding to common challenges; to identify international law capacity-building needs; to discuss areas of international law where our understandings remain less settled. Like Italy, we see value in the common African position on the application of international Law, which identifies a helpful example of one area that could benefit from further discussion between states, namely the rule of non-intervention. While states share a common understanding that coercive cyber operations are inconsistent with the rule of non-intervention, the threshold at which such operations become coercive is less settled. Other national position statements on the application of international law to cyberspace, including New Zealand's National Position Statement, signpost additional areas where our agreement on the application of international law converges, but our understandings of how international law applies can be strengthened. These discussions should continue here in the global mechanism. On the third and final question, who should be in the room, New Zealand maintains that meaningful participation by relevant stakeholders both in the plenary and the DTGs is essential. This includes legal experts whose positions broadly support the need to build— to continue building an understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace. Equally important is the direct participation of government lawyers from all states. As powerfully put by my colleague from Kiribati and many others in this room, legal capacity building central to this. Lawyers should be in the room with policy colleagues when developing case studies and scenarios which integrate international law issues and perspectives. Lawyers can help turn legal principles into practical examples and contribute to drafting recommendations on possible action-oriented measures. We therefore continue to support capacity-building efforts and measures that enable and justify broader participation on international law. Particularly by small states. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Israel.

Good morning, and thank you, Chair. Israel reiterates its consistent and longstanding position that the existing international law applies to cyberspace, including the UN Charter. And the law of armed conflict. For this reason, among other reasons we have mentioned yesterday, we are of the firm position that there is no need for a new legally binding instrument. Our discussion under the pillar of international law should be focused elsewhere. Traditional international legal principles were established in physical domain-specific contexts. Their application to unique and decentralized features of the cyber domain requires meticulous evaluation rather than automatic transpositions. To offer but unique example of the unique characteristics of the cyber domain that have meaningful ramifications for interpreting and applying international law to cyber activities, we should recall that data lacks a meaningful physical manifestation. It is highly dynamic as it can travel globally across multiple jurisdictions instantly and relies heavily on privately owned international infrastructure. This example highlights another methodological insight we must bear in mind: international legal frameworks that were developed for domains with particularly unique characteristics, such as maritime domain, international aviation, and space law were done so after comprehensive considerations and cautious deliberations. The cyber domain is similarly unique, and we should learn from our predecessors by investing sufficient time to exploring the unique characteristics of the cyber domain before reaching premature conclusions. Rules developed in physical domains should not be presumed ipso facto to apply similarly to the cyber domain, particularly where the relevant practice or opinio juris relate to domain-specific state activity. The wide divergence in views held by states on key legal issues in the cyber context also militates we exercise care before asserting that a certain position reflects the lex lata. The DTGs could play a role in identifying the unique factual characteristics of cyberspace that are most relevant to the interpretation and application of existing international law. As part of the cross-cutting multi-pillar discussions, this approach will make sure that we do not prematurely advance our discussion on international law without proper understanding of the relevant technical and factual aspects, aspects that could and should be illuminated by appropriate technical experts from the tech community and academia. Finally, Madam Chair, Israel takes note of the numerous state positions that have been published over the last few years against the background of the open-ended working processes Israel, for its part, has formally submitted its comprehensive legal position paper to the UNODA Secretariat. To conclude, Madam Chair, the Global Mechanism can contribute to this positive trend by exploring the intersection between capacity building and international law. In our view, there is much value in using the DTGs as a vehicle for capacity building with an aim to help states in crafting refining and publishing their national legal views. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Estonia, to be followed by the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Estonia aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and adds the following in its national capacity. Previous UN processes have clearly confirmed that existing international law applies in cyberspace. The task before us now is to strengthen its implementation, deepen common understanding, and promote transparency in how states interpret and apply their international legal obligations in the ICT environment. Estonia strongly believes that international humanitarian law should be among the international law topics addressed by the global mechanism. Our discussion should move beyond, beyond questioning its applicability and instead focus on the concrete legal questions already emerging in practice, including those usefully identified by the ICRC in its working paper. Other international law topics the global mechanism should address include the the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, state sovereignty, the obligation of due diligence, the principle of non-intervention, the law of state responsibility, and international human rights law. I would also like to point out the important role national and regional positions on international law play in promoting clarity, predictability, and transparency in cyberspace. Earlier UN processes demonstrated how these positions usefully informed intergovernmental deliberations on the international law applicable in cyberspace. Estonia set out its first national position already in 2019. To ensure our position reflects current state practice, technological developments, and our evolving national interest, the position is currently in its 3rd review process. We encourage other States to articulate, share, and, where appropriate, regularly update their national views. Looking ahead, the Global Mechanism should facilitate the exchange of national experiences on how international law is applied in practice. This includes: First, assessing the legality of contemplated cyber activities. Second, responding to unlawful cyber operations. And third, pursuing accountability for violations of international law committed in cyberspace. Such exchanges can help identify effective approaches, develop best practices, and strengthen consistency in the application of international law in cyberspace. Chair, the predecessors of the Global Mechanism have since 2012 agreed and reaffirmed that existing international law applies in cyberspace. Moreover, over 100 countries, a majority of the international community representatives of all geographical regions, through national and regional positions, have already articulated their views on how international law applies in cyberspace. Those positions confirm that the substantial body of international law already applies in cyberspace, that various rules of international law restrict malicious state cyber activity, and that international law provides numerous measures of redress to states subject to or affected by malicious cyber activity. International peace and security would now benefit most from investing the Global Mechanism's limited resources in advancing a consistent application of existing law. Chair, international law is a cross-cutting theme. It must inform all areas of the Global Mechanism's work, including discussions on threats, norms of responsible state behavior, confidence-building measures, capacity building, cooperation, and accountability. Legal considerations should therefore be addressed consistently across all thematic discussions. In this regard, Estonia welcomes the integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting nature of Dedicated Thematic Group 1, which draws on the 5 pillars of the framework, including international law. As also underlined in the joint statement of the cross-regional group, this approach allows us to examine specific ICT security challenges in a holistic manner while ensuring that legal considerations remain fully integrated across our work. In closing, the global mechanism should keep international law at center of cybersecurity discussions by supporting implementation, transparency, and practical cooperation within the existing framework of responsible state behavior. Estonia stands ready to contribute constructively to this work. Thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much for that statement. I now give the floor to the delegation of the United Kingdom.

Chair, The United Kingdom is pleased that the Global Mechanism will continue to provide a forum for consideration of how international law applies in cyberspace, following on from the important work of the OEWG. Through the rich and deep discussions there and in other fora, we found areas of convergence in our collective understanding of the rules and principles that govern states' cyber activity. Including industry, academia, and national and international organizations. Each have an important contribution to make in moving us beyond theoretical questions to help define what responsible cyber behavior means in practice. All states have agreed by consensus that international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace. In short, cyberspace is not a lawless. The UK's position is clear: states have the right to exercise cyber capabilities subject to the restrictions imposed by international law, just as they do in other domains. But we cannot settle on that basic premise. We must move beyond the fact that international law applies and grapple with the more challenging questions of how existing rules apply in cyberspace. That's one important contribution the global mechanism should strive to make, both in these plenary sessions and through the work of the dedicated thematic groups. But this means turning our minds again in detail to relevant rules and principles, including of the ways in which state responsibility, IHL, and IHRL apply in cyberspace. The UK has been at the forefront of states and international organizations in pressing these issues, including through our detailed public statements on prohibited interventions, countermeasures, the use of force, and the use of cyber means in furtherance of armed conflict. Where other states have not done so or have not done so in detail, we encourage them to set out their positions in a similarly public way, including in this forum. States developing or reviewing their positions may find assistance in the practical handbook published by scholars from the University of Exeter, developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, published in 2025 but placed on the Global Mechanism webpage earlier this week. Like others in the room, we regret that stakeholders with genuine expertise expertise, including those from the University of Exeter, were blocked from participating in this plenary session. Chair, the greater the clarity on the boundaries of lawful behavior, the lower the risk of miscalculation, and the clearer the consequences can be for those who transgress them. The momentum that we built through the OEWG must not be lost. We must ensure that our exchanges help us all to realize a cyberspace that's free, open, peaceful, and secure. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Armenia. They will be followed by Mexico and then Cuba.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Armenia reaffirms its position that international law, including the UN Charter, is applicable in cyberspace as well. We underscore that respect for and faithful implementation of international law is essential to maintaining international peace and security, promoting stability and predictability in cyberspace, and fostering an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. We support the continued discussions on the application of international law to the use of ICT including through the exchange of national views and practices, in order to enhance clarity, transparency, and legal certainty. We underscore the importance of promoting a shared understanding of the application of international law in cyberspace, while recognizing that capacity building is essential to enable all states to participate effectively. We emphasize that the consensus reports of of the GGE and OEWG provide a solid foundation for advancing discussions on the application of international law to the use of ICTs. Future work should build upon these agreed outcomes, ensuring continuity, avoiding duplication of efforts, and further developing a common understanding among states. We highlight the importance of ensuring that future discussions on the application of international law take into account the needs and perspectives of developing and capacity-constrained states so that all states can effectively participate in shaping a common understanding of how international law applies to the use of ICTs. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Mexico.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Mexico reaffirms that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law, all apply to the use of ICTs by states. This applicability of international humanitarian law does not legitimize the militarization of cyberspace nor that of armed conflict. On the contrary, it imposes limits on the conduct of parties and protects civilian populations. Mexico appreciates the progress made in the publication of national positions and welcomes inter-regional contributions on the implementation of international law, including the UNIDIR Compendium and the recently published Common African Position, and we would invite more states and regions to publish their positions as a measure of transparency and trust-building. We cannot fail to point out that our country is continuing to work on consolidating its national position. Mexico supports the deepening exchanges within the mechanism as to how specific principles such as distinction, proportionality, precaution, due diligence, and state responsibility are to be applied, making the most of inputs from initiatives such as the Global Initiative on IHL and ICT. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the next delegations, which are Cuba, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Brazil, Germany, Mauritius, and Venezuela. Cuba, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The use of ICTs must be fully compatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, especially those governing sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. They should be a tool for peace and development, not a means of war that encourages a theater of military operations. Security of cyberspace, while this involves other actors, is a responsibility of states. Like other states, we also have presented and published a working document with our national position under the framework of the mechanism. Under Article 2 of the United Nations cybernetic action does not constitute an armed attack insofar as it lacks the physical characteristics and other requirements that define military attacks, their impacts, and their legal consequences. We are not disputing in this forum whether international law applies or not. Rather, we are discussing how it applies. For Cuba, Automatic applicability of international law and international humanitarian law to cyberspace is not acceptable insofar as this supplies a step towards militarization of cyberspace. This would lead to making a cyberattack the equivalent of a standard military attack, and so legitimate defense could be invoked under Article 51 of the Charter corresponding to the use of force. Amongst other difficulties is the broad range of actors that interact in cyberspace and the negative impacts— cross-border impacts of this in the absence of a multilateral mechanism that would impartially and unequivocally determine the origin of cybernetic incidents. This can be easily manipulated today. These are all challenges and they cannot be tackled with the fractured and fragmented norms across different jurisdictional areas and many of these norms being flouted with any kind of legal consequences. Voluntary— the idea that voluntary norms are sufficient would enable legal uncertainty and would lead to an avoidance of international responsibility that falls to states and falls upon them when they commit internationally illicit acts or fail to act. There is a need for a legally binding instrument that would be negotiated multilaterally under the framework of the United Nations. Unlike other fora for cyberspace, there are no primal norms that would regulate the conduct or due diligence of states or other private interests that have a significant control over this. In certain contexts, there may be very different actors involved. There is also capacity to generate international friction, so this continues to be a pending issue. We need to define common terminology that would allow us to define consensus on an understanding of concepts such as cyber incidents, information sharing, or what the different types of improper use of ICTs might be. We believe that This is essential. It is also necessary for us to establish a real commitment to the elimination of the vast technological gap and all of the obstacles placed on developing countries in terms of investing in their ICT infrastructure, including unilateral coercive measures that limit the ability of these states to tackle existing and potential threats. We should focus on the key purpose which is preserving ICTs for exclusively peaceful use aimed at development. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I will now give the floor— sorry, I will now tell you who is on the list next. First, the Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by Nigeria who has let us know that we'll be speaking on behalf of the African Group, then Netherlands, Brazil, Germany. Iran, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam Chair. My delegation fully recognizes that the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the generally accepted principles of international law, apply to the use of ICTs by states. The OEWG process has reaffirmed broad agreement on this fundamental point, including with respect respect to the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality, the prohibition of the threat or use of force, territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, and the good faith fulfillment of obligations under international law. However, recognizing that generally accepted principles of the international law apply does not by itself resolve all legal questions arising in ICT environment. The unique characteristics of ICTs, including their cross-border nature, the anonymity of malicious activities, the complexity of attribution, and the increasing involvement of private sector actors, create legal and practical challenges that require additional legal rules. Madam Chair, the evolution of both domestic and international practice demonstrates that existing legal frameworks alone are not always sufficient to address the unique challenges arising from the use of ICTs. At the national level, an increasing number of states have enacted new legislation or substantially revised their legal frameworks to regulate various aspects of the ICT environment, including cybersecurity, data governance, digital platforms, the protection of critical infrastructure, and cybercrime. A similar trend can be observed at the international level. The successful negotiation of the United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime demonstrates that have already recognized the need to develop new legally binding international rules to address certain challenges arising from the use of ICTs. Had existing international law been considered sufficient to address all such challenges, there would have been no need to negotiate a new international convention in this field. These developments confirm an important reality: Technological developments give rise to new legal challenges requiring further legal regulation. This is fully consistent with the agreed mandate of the global mechanism, which explicitly envisages the development of additional legally binding obligations. The question of additional legally binding obligations cannot be deferred indefinitely. Member states. Deliberately preserved this issue within the mandate of the global mechanism, and discussion on it should therefore continue in both the plenary sessions and the first dedicated thematic group. Voluntary non-binding norms should not be regarded as a substitute for the elaboration of additional legally binding obligations. In this regard, we take note of the updated concept of the convention Of the United Nations on ensuring international information security, submitted by the Russian Federation and co-sponsored by a number of member states as a possible contribution to discussions on this issue. I thank you, Madam Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Doy ahora la palabra a la. I thank the representative of Rwanda. I now give the floor to Nigeria on behalf of the Africa Group.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the African Group. The group reaffirmed that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to the use of ICT by states and remains essential to maintaining international peace, security, and stability in cyberspace. African member states have advanced a common understanding through the adoption of the Common African Position on the Application of International Law to the Use of ICT in Cyberspace, which reflects Africa's collective perspective while recognizing that the articulation of legal positions remains the sovereign prerogative of each state. The group believes that regional and continental perspectives enrich global discussions on the application of international law and underscore the importance of strengthening legal capacity, particularly in developing countries, to enable informed participation and effective implementation. In this regard, the African Group encourages the global mechanism to: 1, support capacity building for legal, diplomatic, and technical experts; 2, Facilitate exchanges of national and regional experiences and practice. 3, promote dialogue among legal, diplomatic, and technical communities. And finally, strengthen cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations to enhance expertise and knowledge sharing. Many thanks, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, after which Brazil.

Madam Chair, the Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, and we have also supported the joint statements read out by Switzerland and Australia. And for the sake of time, I will deliver a short version of our national statement. The Kingdom of the Netherlands considers that this mechanism should build on the existing acquis, including the common understanding that international law applies to cyberspace in its entirety. Rather than revisiting areas where consensus has already been reached, we should turn our attention to the practical application and the tools that international law provides us to deal with the real-world threats. The integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting nature of DigiD1 lends itself to such discussions. For instance, malicious cyber activities targeting critical infrastructure can be addressed through rules and principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention, as well as international humanitarian law during armed conflicts. Other threats that could benefit from further analysis are ransomware, and malicious cyber activities targeting or impacting medical facilities and humanitarian and international organizations. The law of state responsibility can provide states with options to respond to such threats. As apparent from yesterday's side event on international law hosted by Egypt, such discussion could benefit enormously from the views of legal experts. And other relevant stakeholders. Discussions could also draw from work taking place outside this forum, for instance by the ICRC, on the implication of international humanitarian law in cyberspace. Finally, my delegation would like to echo the many states that have stressed the continued importance of capacity building on international law. Capacity building is vital to allow for the participation of all states and are needed to bridge the gap between technical, policy, and legal experts. As mentioned by the European Union, the Kingdom of the Netherlands stands ready to share its own experiences in developing a national position on the application of international law in cyberspace. Thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Doy ahora la palabra. Thank you. I now give the floor to the delegation of Brazil. to be followed by Germany.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by Switzerland on behalf of a number of like-minded countries and would like to make additional remarks in its national capacity. International law is an essential part of the maintenance of an open, secure, stable, peaceful, accessible, and interoperable ICT environment. The General Assembly rightfully recognized over a decade ago that international law, including the United Nations Charter, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law, is fully applicable to states' use of ICTs. That, of course, was only the beginning of our work on this issue. Since then, subsequent GGEs and both OEWGs extensively debate how to apply existing rules of international law to cyberspace. Though we have made significant progress, the complexity of this endeavor will require further in-depth discussions to reach additional common understanding— understandings in this regard. This is likely the reason why, among all the pillars of the mandate, international law is the one in which consensus reports least reflect the richness of our debates. One important step in this process is, as recognized in, in OEWG reports, having a wide and diverse range of national views on how international law applies to the use of ICTs. As one of the first countries to publish its national position on the applicability of international law in cyberspace, Brazil welcomes the increasing number of national positions that have been published and hope to see many more in the near future. Especially from developing world. A plethora of national perspectives would enrich our collective understanding in this field. Having a broad and diverse range of states' views is particularly important when thinking of possible customary law rules, which, as we all know, require both opinion juris and state practice. And as we have expressed in a national position, The mere fact that a certain state behavior or position has not been formally protested against cannot be interpreted as acquiescence. The capacity-building initiatives that have been taking place in this area have been particularly important. We have both benefited from and contributed to those initiatives by sharing our experience with the development of our national position. This global mechanism could make fostering the publication of these positions one focus of its work, including within DTG II. Madam Chair, the application of international humanitarian law to cyberspace is perhaps the issue in which the OEWG reports have been most lacking. As we have repeatedly stated, IHL applies to situations amounting to armed conflict independently of its classification as such by the parties. It does not matter whether the armed conflict is lawful or not because it is the objective— because its objective is to minimize human suffering and provide a minimum level of protection to civilians in any scenario of hostilities. Therefore, the recognition that international humanitarian law applies to cyberspace does not in any way endorse its militarization or legitimize cyber warfare. If that were the case, the very existence of IHL itself would legitimize the use of force. We hope that relevant recent developments, such as the resolution Protecting Civilians and Other Protected Persons and Objects Against the Potential Human Cost of ICT Activities During Armed Conflict, adopted by the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and the work of the ICT work stream of the Global Initiative to Govern Political Commitment to IHL, can help us make the required progress on the subject within this global mechanism. Madam Chair, even though we must continue to make progress in finding common understandings on how existing rules of international law apply to ICTs, we recognize that as our debates evolve, we might find the need to specific— for specific legally binding obligations to bring greater clarity to all states on international law application to cyberspace. As we have repeatedly stated, there is no contradiction between the applicability of currently international law to cyberspace and the eventual lex specialis on the subject, or between binding obligations and voluntary norms, which are complementary and mutually reinforcing. We should not let this false contradiction prevent us from advancing our work. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Germany.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Germany aligns itself with the statement of the European Union as well with the statements by the cross-regional groups delivered by Switzerland and by Australia. We will deliver the following additional remarks in our national capacity. Dear colleagues, it is important to note once more that we do not begin our discussion on this agenda point from scratch. Successive consensus reports of the GGEs and open-ended working groups and the General Assembly have affirmed and consistently reaffirmed that international law applies to cyberspace. Our common task for the global mechanism is therefore rather to deepen our common understanding how it applies in practice. The previous open-ended working group provided a great forum for the increasingly rich and focused exchanges on international law. States discussed substantive issues ranging from sovereignty, international human rights, to international humanitarian law. Working papers supported by a diverse group of states were shared and showed room for emerging convergence in states' opinions on the issues. At the same time, Germany, in line with the observation of Brazil presented just before us, is of the opinion that the final report of the OEWG did not fully reflect the breadth and depth of those discussions, especially when it comes to international humanitarian law. This should not bar us, however, from continuing our good work, building on this foundation and the momentum that has continued to build since then. A growing number of states from all regions have published national or regional positions on their interpretation of international law on cyberspace. And we are hearing from more and other states that they are preparing to voice their opinion as well. At the same time, work on international law in cyberspace is also taking place outside of New York. Here I just want to mention a resolution adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and the ICT work stream under the Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law, as also already highlighted by colleagues. Conscious of time, we won't repeat the shared understanding expressed in the joint statements, but would like to highlight the following 3 points. First, capacity and the need for capacity building on international law, as highlighted by many colleagues. From our own experience, we know that drafting a national position can be demanding, time-consuming, and requires a lot of coordination. This is why international law is a priority for Germany's partnerships in cyber capacity-building engagement. As pointed out by Singapore, it is important that all states can participate on an equal footing at our discussions. Second, we believe that regional organizations have an important role to play. Many regional organizations were key to foster discussions in their respective regions, such as the AU, OAS, and the EU, or included international law and capacity-building activities, as for example, IOC Secretariat. Their deliberations and the outcome of their work then feed back into our work here at the Global Mechanism. And finally, looking ahead to the DTGs, we hope that international law will be integrated holistically into the work of the DTGs. When examining concrete challenges and activities in cyberspace, we also need to consider how international law applies to them. This would provide a solid foundation enabling us to move forward in an action-oriented, practical way to address the challenges we face collectively in line with the framework of responsible state behavior. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegations of Mauritius, to be followed by Venezuela, Vanuatu, China, France, and then Japan. Mauritius, you have the floor.

Thank you for giving me the floor. Chair, distinguished delegates, and colleagues, Mauritius remains committed to the continued exchange of national views and practices to promote a common understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace. The experience of Mauritius demonstrates the importance of translating international principles into effective national implementation. Through our Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Act 2021 and related institutional mechanisms, Mauritius continues to strengthen our ability to prevent, investigate, and respond to cyber threats while ensuring that cybersecurity measures remain consistent with the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. For Mauritius, Developing a national position on the application of international law in cyberspace represents an important step towards strengthening legal certainty, enhancing transparency, and contributing to international dialogue. It also enables us to better understand our rights and obligations under existing international law while informing national policy and decision-making. In this regard, and taking into consideration the common African position, Mauritius has undertaken the development of its national position on the application of international law in cyberspace, which is currently undergoing the necessary approval processes prior to its publication. Our national position reflects our specific national context and priorities as a small island developing state. For Mauritius, the following principles provide an essential foundation for addressing current cyber challenges. First, sovereignty is closely linked to our ability to protect our critical infrastructure and essential services. Second and third, due diligence and state responsibility support responsible behavior and effective responses to malicious cyber activities. Fourth, respect for human rights ensures that cybersecurity efforts remain people-centered. And fifth, peaceful settlement of disputes reinforces the importance of dialogue and cooperation in addressing the cross-border nature of ICT threats. Given the rapidly evolving nature of the digital environment, Mauritius considers this position as a living document which may continue to evolve in light of technological developments, emerging challenges, international discussions, and lessons learned from national implementation. Allow me to highlight that this achievement was made possible through the invaluable support of UNIDIR, whose technical expertise, guidance, and capacity-building support enabled an inclusive national process involving relevant government and multi-stakeholders. In partnership with UNIDIR, Mauritius also had the privilege of co-organizing a side event on Monday as a pre-launch of our national position. The process of developing our national position has demonstrated that this is not merely a legal drafting exercise. It is a valuable capacity-building process that strengthens institutional knowledge, promotes dialogue among legal, technical, diplomatic, and policy communities, and builds a common national understanding of the legal issues arising from the use of ICTs. We share the views of Italy, New Zealand, Germany, and many others in that capacity building is a key enabler for advancing discussions on international law in cyberspace. Many developing countries, possess the willingness to engage substantively in these discussions but continue to face constraints in terms of specialized expertise, institutional capacity, and resources. Tailored, demand-driven capacity-building initiatives empower states to develop their own national positions, participate more effectively in international processes, and contribute meaningfully to the development of shared understandings on the application of international law in cyberspace. In this context, Mauritius welcomes the continued efforts of the Global Mechanism and the DGGs to facilitate practical cooperation and support capacity-building initiatives that respond to the needs and priorities identified by states. Mauritius remains available to share its experience and lessons learned from the development of our national position with other interested states. We hope that our experience will encourage more states to embark on similar processes, thereby contributing to greater transparency, confidence, and a deeper common understanding of the application of international law in cyberspace. I thank you very much, Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Venezuela, to be followed by Vanuatu.

Thank you very much, Chair. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela shares the view of other states whereby we believe that there is no universal and consensual opinion on the applicability of international law and international humanitarian law to cyberspace. Question the full and automatic applicability of international norms to the use of ICTs, by virtue of which we gradually need to adjust and adapt international law to this sphere as a result of the specific characteristics of this technology and its functioning. Venezuela believes that international law and international humanitarian law are not automatically applicable to cyberspace or virtual space. We need to continue assessing how exactly it should apply. This is not— we're not saying that it doesn't apply altogether, but rather we're saying there is a need to critically explore how such law applies to this sphere in particular. We believe that the creation of a legal legally binding framework of comprehensive spoke is not only necessary, but also we believe this is part of the mandate of the former working group, former OEWG. In this regard, we also believe that for the— this legally binding framework should be based on the 5 pillars of the permanent mechanism as set out in the last annual report. Finally, we reiterate, as we have indicated previously, that it is of the utmost importance that we preserve the principle of consensus in all decisions and activities of the global mechanism, including those undertaken under the thematic groups. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Vanuatu, followed by China, France, and then Japan.

Madam Chair, Vanuatu aligns itself with the statement delivered by Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum members, supports the cross-regional group statement delivered by Australia, and offers the following remarks in its national capacity. Vanuatu believes in international law, not rhetorically, but as a matter of demonstrated national conviction. When our people face the gravest threat to their future, we took the question of states' climate obligations to the International Court of Justice, and the world followed. We bring the same conviction to this pillar. For states without armies of scale or arsenals of deterrence, the rule of law is not one security strategy among several. It is the security strategy. Vanuatu, therefore, reaffirms, as we did through the OEWG, that international law, with the Charter of the United Nations at its core, applies in full to state conduct in cyberspace. The obligations that follow are not abstractions: respect for sovereignty and the sovereign equality of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, refraining from the threat or use of force and non-intervention in matters within domestic jurisdiction. We further reaffirmed the applicability of international human rights law to the online sphere and of international humanitarian law to cyber activities in armed conflict, a body of law whose purpose is humanitarian protection and whose affirmation makes conflict less cruel, not more likely. Vanuatu attaches particular importance to the law of state responsibility and to the due diligence expectations that accompany sovereignty over ICT infrastructure. For states like ours, clarity on these questions determines whether accountability for malicious activity is a realistic prospect or a theoretical one. We were encouraged that the OEWG's final report captured convergence in these areas, and we consider that record the floor for the mechanism's legal discussions, not their ceiling. Madam Chair, Vanuatu has been engaged in sustained national work to deepen and articulate our own understanding of how these rules apply, and we look forward to contributing the fruits of that work to this mechanism at the appropriate time. We commend the states, including in our own region, whose published positions have enriched the collective picture, and we underline that developing such positions is itself a demanding legal exercise for a small foreign ministry, which is why legal capacity building must remain inseparable from this pillar. Vanuatu supports dedicating structured time in this mechanism, including within the thematic groups, to working through how the law applies in concrete situations so that legal discussion becomes a shared capability rather than a specialist preserve. Law serves those who can invoke it. Vanuatu's aim in this pillar is a cyberspace in which every state, whatever its size, can. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to China.

Thank you, Madam Chair. On the issue of international law, China wishes to further elaborate on the following 3 points. First, we must further underscore the role of the UN Charter and its purposes and principles as the cornerstone, especially the principles of sovereign equality, the prohibition of the use or threat of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. With taboo on cyber warfare blatantly breached now and cyber peace and security faced with unprecedented challenges, we must more than ever uphold a cyberspace order based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. All countries should explicitly oppose the use of cyber means to carry out acts of aggression. Major countries in particular should use cyber technologies during armed conflicts with caution. All countries should uphold strategic communication to enhance mutual trust, resolve differences through consultation and dialogue, and prevent and avoid state-to-state cyber conflicts. Major countries in particular should shoulder their responsibilities, take the lead in observing international rules in cyberspace instead of engaging in exceptionalism or selective application. Second, the application of international humanitarian law in cyberspace must be handled with greater prudence. The inherent legal and technical difficulties in applying the international humanitarian law in armed— in cyberspace remain unresolved. Furthermore, large tech companies from certain countries are deeply involved in geopolitical conflicts. Posing new challenges to the application of IHL in cyberspace. In cyber conflicts, it's already hard to distinguish between peace and war, as well as between civilians and combatants. The involvement of tech companies makes such a distinction even harder. Whether their participation in armed conflicts complies with the principles of distinction and military necessity warrants close attention of all parties. Third, We must more seriously discuss the issue of formulating new legal instrument to maintain lasting peace and stability in cyberspace and prove and build a shared cyber order. The— we should, in view of the characteristics of ICT and evolving landscape and based on broad participation from all parties, we should discuss and conclude a new international legal instrument China believes that the Convention on International Information Security proposed by Russia can serve as a very good basis for discussion. Madam Chair, China hopes that the DTGs under the global mechanism should take full— take into full consideration concerns of parties and advance discussion internationally in a balanced manner. China is willing to adopt a constructive attitude to participate in certain relevant discussions. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to France, to be followed by Japan.

Thank you, Madam Chair. My delegation aligns itself with this statement delivered by the European Union and would like to make the following remarks in its national capacity. Let me first I must recall that this is the first plenary mission of the Global Mechanism, the importance of discussions on the applicability of international law in all of its aspects, including naturally international humanitarian law. France remains very committed to international law and at its heart, the Charter of the United Nations. And this is a cornerstone of the complex architecture that we're building here to regulate relations between states and to maintain international security and stability in cyberspace. Weakening the Charter threatens us all, as Russia is notably doing, waging a war of aggression against Ukraine with devastating effects both in the kinetic and cyber domains. I would like to briefly highlight 3 points before concluding. First, France advocates the implementation of the existing regulatory framework, of which international law, of course, is a pillar of this framework. We face collectively a major task within the mechanism, which is to develop a common understanding of key concepts of international law, such as— and there are others— such as state responsibility and due diligence. And France is ready to do so. Second, the debate on new binding standards is for us of secondary importance. And we understand very well, having listened to the room, that just a few member states think that this is a priority. But here again, we regret that the most fervent defenders of a new treaty are precisely those who are to today trampling existing international law underfoot. Third, My delegation supports the statement made by Switzerland on international humanitarian law. In particular, we call for the forthcoming findings of the global initiative launched by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which, as you know, has devoted part of its consideration to international humanitarian law and the use of information and communication technologies to be taken into account in our work, and we thank them for this work. I thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Doy ahora— Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Japan, to be followed by Canada and then Ireland.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Through discussions in the OEWG, we understand that there is a consensus among all UN member states that existing international law applies in cyberspace. In the global mechanism, based on this consensus, it is important to facilitate practical and concrete discussions on how existing international law applies, with a focus on responding to specific incidents such as cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. In this regard, from the perspective of of complying with existing international law, we consider it an option to deepen discussions in light of application of responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. In DTG1, we hope that through expert briefings and interactive, practical, and concrete discussions Member states' awareness and understandings of the specific application of existing international law will be deepened further. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Canada.

Canada associates itself with the cross-regional joint statement on the application of international law delivered by Switzerland, Canada wishes to make the following statement in its national capacity. Madam Chair, Canada is firmly committed to ensuring that this new global mechanism builds on the important acquis developed through the successive UN groups of government experts and open-ended working groups. We are committed to ensuring that the mechanism advances the existing accomplishments on international law. Thanks to several years of sustained engagement, states have moved well beyond the initial debates. The challenge before us is therefore no longer whether international law applies in cyberspace. There is now a widely recognized consensus on this point. Our task is to continue deepening our common understanding of its practical application. During the March 2026 organizational meeting and in the course of the last 2 days of the plenary, the vast majority of member states expressed their willingness to pursue down this path and to engage in the work of the mechanism in a constructive exclusive and good faith manner. Canada therefore believes that the global mechanism should focus on substantive discussions and implementation, including through integrated discussions on real-world cyber challenges. All states may face ransomware attacks affecting hospitals as well as malicious cyber activities targeting critical infrastructure such as healthcare, energy, and transport. Discussions of this nature provide unique opportunities to examine the practical application of international law. The dedicated thematic groups provide here an ideal platform for informal exchanges on such concrete cases, including through encouraging the participation of both government and non-governmental legal experts. Such exchanges could contribute to strengthening common understandings of the practical application of international law and to further developing those understandings in specific areas such as international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Capacity building should remain a central and necessary element for the success of this pillar. Efforts in this area should be needs-based and should continue to assist states in developing national positions, strengthening participation in discussions, and improving practical implementation. The continued publication of national positions and regional approaches have already contributed significantly to building common understandings. Open and inclusive dialogue should continue in this regard, including through the sharing of best practices on the application of national positions to specific cyber issues. Madam Chair, international law remains an essential element of our collective efforts. Continued dialogue on international law is itself an important confidence-building measure. By reinforcing existing consensus, deepening common understandings, strengthening capacity, and focusing on practical implementation, the global mechanism can make a meaningful contribution To stability, predictability, and security in cyberspace. Canada looks forward to working with all delegations in that spirit. I thank you.

Thank you very much. Doy ahora la palabra. I now give the floor to the delegation of Ireland, to be followed by Türkiye and Ukraine.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Ireland aligns with the intervention of the European Union. And wishes to make a number of remarks in our national capacity. At the outset, we wish to note that Ireland is pleased to have co-sponsored the Joint Statement on the Application of International Law in the Use of ICTs submitted by Switzerland and others, and the Cross-Regional Group Statement submitted by Australia and others. The Global Mechanism provides an opportunity to advance our shared understanding on how international law applies in cyberspace and to build on the work of the GGEs and the OEWG. We should make full use of the mechanism structures to advance this work, including the DTGs and the plenary. In particular, we call for international law, including IHL, to feature prominently in the substantive work of DTG 1. We would welcome the use of appropriate working modalities to facilitate a more dynamic exchange of views on international law in the DTGs and plenary as appropriate. Such modalities may include guiding questions, structured discussions, and scenario-based exercises. We agree with the list of 5 priority topics identified in the joint statement on the application of international law in the use of ICTs submitted by Switzerland and others. We also support calls to use capacity-building discussions in DGG2 to better enable states to develop their own national positions on the application of international law in cyberspace. We are particularly supportive of the intervention of Kiribati in that regard. The application of international law in cyberspace is in particular the UN Charter, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the law on state responsibility, is an objective legal fact. Ireland strongly disagrees with any suggestion that affirming the application of IHL to cyberspace encourages or legitimizes the militarization of cyberspace. IHL is concerned with limiting the suffering and caused by armed conflict and mitigating its effects, rather than with the justifiability of the initiation of the conflict. The application of IHL in cyberspace ensures that we minimize any gaps in legal protection when it comes to armed conflict in cyberspace, especially the protection of civilians and civilian objects. Madam Chair, we note that there is now real momentum in states developing national positions. Over 100 states have now published, either individually or as part of a regional group, their positions on international law. The experience of developing our own national position, which we published in 2023, was a valuable one, and we encourage all states to consider developing a position either individually or collectively. Ireland is willing to engage informally with any states in order to share our national experience in preparing a national position. The more national positions that are developed and published, the closer we come to bridging gaps in our shared understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace. Whilst there may be gaps in our shared understanding of the law, it is not evident at this stage that there are significant gaps in the law itself. Accordingly, we consider that any calls for new legally binding rules would be premature, and our priority should instead be to consolidate our shared understanding. Finally, as we consistently submitted in our statements during the OEWG process, we believe that any outcomes of the global mechanism should focus not just on identifying areas of consensus, but but also areas of convergence in order to accurately capture the balance of views in this room. We look forward to contributing positively to further discussions on international law within the Global Mechanism. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Türkiye.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Turkey considers it essential to preserve a rules-based, open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. In our view, cyberspace cannot be regarded as a legal vacuum. Although rules and understandings specific to cyberspace are still emerging and continue to be discussed by Member States, it may be reaffirmed that existing international law applies to State conduct in the ICT environment. In this regard, the UN Charter remains the cornerstone of the international legal order. Its purposes and principles are equally relevant in the ICT context. These include, in particular, the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality of states, non-intervention in internal affairs, and prohibition of the threat of use of force, and the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Türkiye believes that these principles provide the necessary foundation for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Activities in the ICT environment should not be used to undermine the sovereignty, security, or public order of other States, nor should they be used in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the principles of the Charter. At the same time, the application of international law to the use of ICTs should be addressed in a careful, inclusive, and consensus-oriented manner. Differences in national legal systems, levels of technological capacity, and security concerns should be duly taken into account. In this respect, continued dialogue within the UN, along with the mechanism, is essential for developing common understandings among member states. I thank you.

Gracias. Thank you. I now give the floor to the delegation of Ukraine, to be followed by Thailand and Albania.

Thank you, Chair. Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and would like to add some considerations in our national capacity. Ukraine reaffirms its unwavering support for the cumulative framework developed within the United Nations, under which international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, is applicable to the use of the ICTs by states. The international community has repeatedly reaffirmed that existing international law provides a comprehensive legal framework governing state conduct in the ICT environment and remains essential for maintaining international peace and security. Accordingly, Ukraine does not support efforts aimed at developing new legally binding or non-binding guiding international rules governing state behaviour in cyberspace. At this stage, our collective priority should be to deepen the common understanding of how international law that exists, how it applies in practice, and to strengthen its faithful implementation. Chair, respect for international law is not optional. It is the foundation of stability, predictability, and accountability in international relations, including in cyberspace. The principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the prohibition of the threat or use of force remain fully applicable when states use ICTs. Likewise, Article 51 of the Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, applies irrespective of the means by which an armed attack is conducted. Chair, Ukraine believes that discussions within the global mechanism should therefore focus on improving states' common understanding of the application of existing international law, exchanging national views and practices, and strengthening legal capacity across all regions. To our understanding, the work of the DTG I, could significantly contribute to that. Also taking into account that the international law is complemented by the 11 voluntary norms of the responsible state behaviour. In this respect, we support the in-depth discussion on the cybersecurity of the healthcare infrastructure, whilst also suggesting the in-depth discussion of the issues relevant to protecting the objects of energy infrastructure against the cyberattacks. The importance of which, to our understanding, is determined by the fact that in the digital age, the internet coverage, data accessibility, access to the transport and banking services, and even the house heating, and literally any kind of online activity is dependent on the availability of the stable access to the electricity. To our understanding, this is cross-cutting both in terms of the application of international law and international humanitarian law, also in reference to the joint statement earlier delivered by the Swiss delegation. And operationalization of the framework of the responsible state behavior, as well as potentially determining the approaches and good practices towards balancing the scopes of responsibilities of the stakeholders within the public-private partnerships. Chair, the effectiveness of international law ultimately depends on its observance. States cannot selectively invoke international law while simultaneously violating its fundamental principles through malicious ICT activities directed against other states. Such conduct undermines trust, weakens international stability, and erodes confidence in the rules-based international order. Ukraine believes that accountability must remain an integral, integral element of the rules-based international order in cyberspace. International law cannot effectively contribute to if its violations remain without consequences. States responsible for internationally wrongful acts conducted through ICTs must be held accountable in accordance with international law. This includes strengthening international cooperation on attribution, promoting transparency regarding malicious cyber activities, and ensuring that violations of international law do not become normalized. In this regard, systematic malicious cyber activities conducted as part of the war of aggression waged against Ukraine by a certain P5 member state clearly demonstrate the importance of ensuring accountability for violations of international law committed in and through cyberspace. Impunity only encourages malicious behaviour and undermines confidence in the international legal order. Ukraine remains firmly committed to promoting the full implementation of existing international law in cyberspace and looks forward to working with all delegations to strengthen peace, security, and stability in the ICT environment. Thank you.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegations of Thailand, to be followed by Albania.

Thank you. Madam Chair, Thailand aligns itself with the statement delivered by Australia on behalf of the cross-regional group upstairs. The transition from the UNGGE and the UNOWG on this global mechanism marks an important milestone in our collective efforts to advance our common understanding of the application of international law cyberspace. On this agenda item, Thailand wishes to make 3 points. First, Thailand reaffirms its longstanding position that international law, in particular the UN Charter, applies to the use of ICTs. We remain firmly committed to an international order that is rule-based, grounded in international law, as the most effective means of safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and interests of all states. The publication of our first-ever National Position on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace last year stands as a clear demonstration of this position. We welcome the continuation of discussions on international law under this global mechanism. While this may not be the separate dedicated thematic group that Thailand and a number of other member states has proposed, we believe it nevertheless provides a valuable opportunity to further deepen our common understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace. Thailand also believes that Reflecting the common understandings we reached during the session in a report would be valuable. Such a record would enable us to identify the progress we have made in narrowing our differences while also highlighting the areas where further dialogue and work remain necessary. Second, Thailand attaches great importance to fostering common understanding on lawful and responsible state behavior in cyberspace through enhanced international dialogue and the regular sharing of national views and positions. This helps reduce the risk of misunderstandings and escalation among states while also contributing to progressive development of internationally accepted rules and principles governing state behavior in cyberspace. Thailand has consistently shared its national views throughout the OEWG progress and looks forward to continuing to do so actively and constructively within this global mechanism. Third, promoting a common understanding of international law in cyberspace also requires bridging the gap between the legal and ICT communities and addressing remaining capacity gaps among states. In this regard, Thailand co-hosted with UNIDIR the workshop on the implementation of the UN norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace in Bangkok earlier this month. Such initiatives also strengthen misunderstanding of how international law applies in cyberspace, while also serving as confidence-building and capacity-building measures. The other 2 important pillars, we stand ready to engage in further discussions on those respective agenda items. In closing, Thailand reaffirms its unwavering commitment to contributing to the continued development of international law in cyberspace. We stand ready to work with all partners to advance the objective of this global mechanism. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Albania. They will be followed by the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Albania supports and aligns with the European Union position for full implementation of the United Nations Framework of Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace, as well as remains committed to a rules-based, open, secure, and stable cyberspace. We believe that existing international law remains fit for purpose in the digital and cyber domain. Malicious cyber activities are increasing in scale, sophistication, and impact, affecting societies, economies, and critical infrastructure, and may threaten international peace and security. Albania reaffirms that international law, in particular the Charter of the UN, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law, fully applies to cyberspace. A better global understanding of its application contributes to greater transparency, predictability, and accountability in states' conduct. In line with the EU Declaration on a Common Understanding of International Law in Cyberspace, Albania supports international law application in the cyber context of state sovereignty, the principles of non-intervention, due diligence, the prohibition of the threat or use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the law of state responsibility, and lawful state responses. States must conduct their activities consistently with their international obligations, and internationally wrongful cyber operations entail states' responsibility when the relevant requirements are met. Albania reiterates that international humanitarian law applies cyber operations conducted in the context of armed conflict, and recognizes this neither encourages the militarization of cyberspace nor legitimizes cyber warfare. The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution remain essential, and civilians and civilian objects must receive the protection under international humanitarian law. International human rights law likewise applies online as it does offline. Albania attaches particular importance to cooperation and capacity building. Training, exchanges of national and regional positions, scenario-based exercises, and the support for developing national positions can help create shared understanding on how international law applies to cyberspace. The Global Mechanism should provide an inclusive and action-oriented forum for advancing these discussions. Its plenary sessions and dedicated thematic groups should facilitate focused exchanges on concrete legal questions, draw on national and regional practice, identify capacity needs, and promote practical recommendations. Differences of interpretation should not be treated as issue, but should encourage deeper dialogue to reach a common understanding on the application of UN framework already in place. Albania remains committed to upholding and promoting international law in cyberspace and stands ready to work with all partners to strengthen a peaceful, secure, stable, and rule-based ICT environment. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The rules of responsible state behaviour are, of course, an important and necessary element of our work, but it is clear that for an effective insurance of international information security, they're clearly insufficient today. It's necessary to guarantee that all states comply with the agreements reached and eliminate any differences in their interpretation. And these objectives can only be achieved by granting voluntary non-binding rules of responsible state behavior a legally binding status. In October 2025, an important step was taken towards shaping an international legal framework of international information security. The first universal treaty in this sphere, the UN Convention Against Cybercrime, developed on Russia's initiative, was opened for signature. The document has already been signed by 78 countries. I would like to take this opportunity and call upon all states to join this important instrument in the fight against hackers and online fraudsters. The adoption of the convention has become indisputable evidence of the demand for global treaties to regulate the digital space, whose unique technical and legal characteristics do not allow automatic and full application of existing norms of international law. The next logical The next step, in our view, should be to develop similar international legal instruments for other aspects of international information security, above all with a view to preventing and peacefully resolving interstate conflicts in the information landscape. We would like to note that specific proposals on this matter already exist. They were presented within the OEWG and the General Assembly in the form of a concept of UN Convention on International Information Security. This document reflects an understanding of how universally recognized principles of international law apply to ICT and enshrines provisions based on the recommendations of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions under the agenda item Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of international security. We believe it is important to continue substantive discussions on this matter, and this is provided for by the mandate of the Global Mechanism, which was established by a consensus, uh, UN General Assembly Resolution 79/237 and 80/16, and they are mandatory. In this regard, we call upon the chair to organize relevant discussions within the dedicated I would like to address separately the concept which is promoted by some delegations, namely reporting on implementing voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior. States here are being offered to adopt a supposedly voluntary checklist of practical actions to implement the norms. We do not refused to discuss the document, but only on the understanding that it will indeed in practice be voluntary and will not become, as openly stated by a number of delegations, a form of reporting by some states to others. We reject such an approach as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter. At the same time, in our view, even in its current form, the above-mentioned checklist is inadequate. It must be expanded primarily through additional rules contained in UNGA Resolution 73/27, including the norms that requires the provision of evidence when attributing responsibility to states for carrying out cyberattacks. This so-called framework for responsible behavior should take into account all relevant General Assembly decisions. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate Voluntary rules of responsible state behavior can be observed, but only obligations under international treaties can be implemented. Therefore, we believe that the concept of implementing rules of behavior could be possible only after these voluntary rules are given a legally binding character. I thank you for your attention.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Indonesia, to be followed by Ghana and then the Philippines.

Thank you, Madam Chair. International law provides the essential framework for ensuring stability, predictability, and responsible behavior in the use of ICTs. Indonesia reaffirms that international law, in particular the UN Charter, applies to cyberspace and that existing international law principles, including sovereignty, non-intervention, the prohibitions of the use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes, remain fully applicable to states' conduct in the ICT environment. The OEWG has made clear that while the existing body of international law applies, shared understanding of how these rules operate in practice remains uneven. This gap risks fragmentations, misinterpretations, and inconsistent implementations. Therefore, the global mechanism provides an inclusive platform for the continued dialogue needed to deepen shared understanding and strengthen the practical applications of international law, ensuring that all states can meaningfully interpret and apply international law in cyberspace. In a more, in a more practical approach, we underscore the need for the global mechanisms to address the issue of attributions on objective, transparent, and based on technical standards and methodologies. Attribution must never be used as political instruments. Such an approach is essential to maintaining trust, preventing miscalculations, and ensuring that the applications of international law in cyberspace remains fair, non-discriminatory, and respectful of differing capacities of states. In this regard, Exchanges on national positions, case studies, and legal methodologies are essential. Indonesia underscored that such exchange must be non-prescriptive, non-hierarchical, and respectful on differing legal traditions. Madam Chair, as the global mechanism advances its work, Indonesia believes that priorities should be placed on cooperative capacity building, including training on the applications of international law in cyberspace. Strengthening these areas will help ensure that the applications of international law in cyberspace is inclusive, consistent, and reflective of the needs and the realities of all member states, particularly developing countries. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Ghana.

Chair, distinguished delegates, Ghana aligns itself with the position of the African group delivered by the distinguished delegate of Nigeria and wishes to deliver the statement in its national capacity. Ghana reaffirms that international law, particularly the Charter of the United Nations, remains applicable and is essential to maintaining international peace security, and stability in the use of ICTs. This includes the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, as well as the applicability of international human rights law and international humanitarian law where applicable. This position is consistent with a common African position on the application of international law in the use of ICTs. Ghana believes that continued dialogue on the application of international law is essential to promoting a common understanding among states and reducing the risk of misunderstanding and conflict in cyberspace. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the dedicated thematic working group on international law as an important platform for inclusive and constructive discussions. Ghana also reaffirms the importance of Article 2 of the UN Charter, which calls upon states to settle international disputes by peaceful means in a manner that does not endanger international peace, security, or justice. This principle remains relevant in the context of ICT-related activities. Madam Chair, Ghana remains committed to working with member states and all relevant stakeholders to advance a shared understanding of the application of international law in the use of ICTs. We look forward to continuing these discussions under the global mechanism in a spirit of cooperation, consensus, and mutual respect. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of the Philippines.

Thank you, Madam Chair. International law remains a cornerstone cornerstone of the UN framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. The Philippines reaffirms the consensus reflected in successive reports of the UN Groups of Government Experts and the OEWG that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, applies to the use of ICTs by states and contributes to maintaining international peace, security, and stability in cyberspace. As the global mechanism advances from dialogue to implementation, our collective work under this pillar should focus on strengthening understanding of and practical implementation of this established consensus. In this regard, we are aligned with the other member states that emphasize practical implementation, continued dialogue, and voluntary exchanges of national experiences while recognizing differing legal systems, national circumstances, and levels of technological development. The Philippines believes that discussions under this mechanism should prioritize practical exchanges on the implementation of international law at the national level, sharing national legislation, policies, institutional arrangements, administrative and judicial practices, and operational experiences can promote transparency, enhance mutual understanding, and assist member states in strengthening their domestic legal and policy frameworks in accordance with their respective legal systems and international obligations. Such exchanges are particularly valuable for developing countries seeking to strengthen national cyber resilience while keeping pace with rapid technological developments. We also recognize that member states continue to hold different legal views on certain aspects of the application of international law in cyberspace. The global mechanism provides an appropriate platform for continued dialogue and the voluntary exchange of national perspectives, practices, and experiences. These discussions can contribute to greater clarity and a shared understanding of how existing existing international law is applied in practice. Madam Chair, the Philippines continues to strengthen its domestic legal and institutional frameworks to support the implementation of international law in the use of ICTs. The proposed Cybersecurity and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Bill, which remains part of the country's priority legislative agenda, reflects our continuing efforts to strengthen the protection of critical information infrastructure, enhance institutional coordination, and reinforce national cyber resilience. We have likewise continued to update our regulatory and governance frameworks to support secure digital transformation, strengthen government data governance, protect sensitive information, and ensure that our domestic legal and policy frameworks remain responsive to emerging technologies. As ASEAN Chair in 2026, the Philippines also continues to advance regional implementation of the agreed framework through the ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy 2026 to 2030. Cyber exercises, trusted information sharing, operational collaboration among competent authorities, and the exchange of best practices complement national implementation efforts and contribute to regional stability and resilience. Madam Chair, the Philippines believes that practical implementation should remain the foundation of our work under this pillar. As member states continue to exchange experiences and deepen their understanding of how international law applies in the use of ICTs, these discussions will contribute to the continued development of our collective understanding. understanding. Any such discussions should remain inclusive, transparent, consensus-based, and responsive to the evolving ICT environment without prejudging their outcome. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I will now give the floor to the delegation of Botswana.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, Botswana aligns itself with the statement of the African Group delivered today by the Federal Republic of Nigeria and wishes to make a statement in its national capacity. Botswana remains committed to a secure, stable, and peaceful cyberspace governed by international law and the UN Charter, recognizing that operationalizing these rules requires actionable technical Our delegation emphasizes that capacity building is indispensable in ensuring that all states, regardless of technological maturity, can meaningfully interpret and apply international law to state practice. In this regard, Botswana highlights the vital importance of the DTGs by convening multidisciplinary experts from the legal, technical, and policy, as well as operational domains. The DTGs will provide an inclusive platform to bridge the gap between the legal principles and the technical realities, as well as develop practical understandings of how international law applies to cyberspace. Botswana considers it vital for the DTGs in their discussions to focus on the general international principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, prohibition of the use of force, international human rights law, as well as the international humanitarian law, on issues of distinction and proportionality. These discussions should consider the unique nature of cyberspace, align the traditional physical frameworks to match the highly evolving digital realities. Botswana aligns with the common African position on the application of international law in cyberspace, as in— and is in the process of refining its national position on international law and intends to publish its holistic perspective to the global community as a way to contribute to the ongoing discussion. Chair, as already highlighted, capacity building is an essential prerequisite to comprehend and determine the applicability of international law in cyberspace. This is why we commend international and regional bodies, particularly the UNIDROIT, African Union, and SADEC, for their contribution in facilitating technical assistance and capacity initiatives that empower member states to understand how international law applies to cyberspace and share with others as a confidence-building measure, and in expanding the global understanding in this regard. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. We have now heard the last delegation for this morning's meeting. I am grateful to you all for your interventions. I'm grateful for your engagement. I am going to share with you some information regarding the meeting this afternoon. There are still 4 speakers waiting to speak under this agenda item. I will tell you who they are: Switzerland, United States, Australia, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. We will hear those interventions under this agenda item this afternoon. But first, as reflected in our program of work, at 3:00 PM we shall once again be convening in this room to hold the dedicated stakeholder session. And I would encourage all delegations to be here as well for that. Following that meeting, the dedicated stakeholders meeting, we are going to resume our speakers list and we will give the floor to the delegations that I mentioned. When we have concluded this agenda item, immediately after that we will move to the next agenda item, which is developing and applying confidence-building measures. And so in this regard, I would ask you to come prepared for this afternoon's meeting. And the meeting is now adjourned. Thank you.