Navigating A New Era for Nuclear Energy in the Middle East

Excellencies, Honours Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen, good afternoon to those of you who are here in the room, and good morning, afternoon, or evening of you who are joining us online. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to UNIDIR and the EU event, Navigating New Era for Nuclear Energy in the Middle East. As we also take this opportunity to launch UNIDIR latest publication with the same name, and I just would like to mention we have publication in the side here if you would like to pick up some. UNIDIR initiated the Middle East Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone Project in 2019 with the support of the European Union. To say that the Middle East has changed and continue to undergo significant transformations will be an understatement. The project, therefore, aim to account for both the traditional concerns related to regional weapon of mass destruction possessions, use, threat of use, and development, and those that currently emerge due to changes in the regional security environment and advancement in science and technology. We recognize the difficult times and the undergoing suffering in the region. the situation is critical. We hope this project can contribute, even in small ways, to building bridges and promoting a more secure and peaceful Middle East. The paper we will present today is one of the project's latest products, which aim to do just that. Nuclear energy again gains momentum in the region, be it due to its to energy, water, or food insecurities, or to rising energy demands driven by AI. Nuclear energy has many promises, but as all of us know, it comes with the responsibility to ensure that it's safe, secure, and used only for peaceful purposes. The panel today is an invitation to explore these intricacies and their unique manifestation in the reality of the Middle East today. The panel today is, I'm looking forward to sharing this publication with you and hearing our panelists' take on those issues. I will note that from the outset that this event is being live streamed online on UNTV and recorded. We will distribute the recording later on. Online participants will be able to send us questions via e-mail, which is included in the event description on the screen. But before we move to our esteemed panelists, I am delighted to give the floor for opening remarks to Ambassador Stefan Clement, the EU Special Envoy for Nonproliferation and Disarmament. that has been a true partner to UNIDIR in general and the Middle East Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone in particular. The floor is yours, Ambassador.

Good afternoon, everyone, and many thanks again for this introduction. I thank, of course, UNIDIR colleagues for having organized this and for being such good partners in the implementation of this project, which you just mentioned. I'm very happy to introduce this very high-level panel here on the issue. And of course, let me say at the outset a few basic but still very important things, which is, of course, that the European Union has been and remains a long-standing supporter of the NPT and, of course, of its balanced implementation review, which we actually started a few hours ago here in this building, meaning the three pillars, the disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses pillar. And of course, they are mutually reinforcing and must be looked at all together. And of course, when developed under robust multilateral frameworks and robust verification and full compliance with the NPT, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, contribute as such to international peace and security, because they contribute to development. And of course, we as EU, we have always been very much supportive of Article 4 implementation, which is the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And of course, peaceful nuclear applications are a very essential element of the NPT framework, and they contribute to cooperation, scientific progress, sustainable development, but have, of course, to be pursued in a responsible manner. And of course, as EU, we support equal access by everyone to these technologies. And of course, we want countries to cooperate on these issues, in particular that those countries which have limited capabilities, they should benefit from nuclear technology in a safe, secure, and fully safeguarded manner. And we have done this also from a financial perspective in the context of the IEA. In the Middle East, and as it was mentioned before, the EU is a committed partner in concrete conference building scientific cooperation. A flagship example is the SESAME project in Jordan, which is a unique regional research facility that brings scientists from across the region together. Indeed, they pursue research, but also medic application, material science, applications, archaeology, and other things. And SESAME has also, by the way, very strong cooperation with the European Nuclear Research Center. in Switzerland. And I had the pleasure, by the way, myself earlier this year to visit the SESAME facility, and I was really very positively impressed to see how the practical benefits by this cooperation can be harvested by scientists, by scientific projects in the region, and this, of course, fosters regional cooperation and also confidence. But of course, beyond CESAME, which is, as I said, a flagship project in the region, the EU and the EU member states are the largest donor in the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, which basically has as an objective to develop peaceful nuclear cooperation. We have also the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence, which are also very active in the MENA region, and this is also helping to spread knowledge and develop common standards. In the context of the GCC, I mean, you see I'm focusing in a more sub-regional context, we have helped the GCC to establish an emergency management center, which should also be further developed to become a full nuclear radiological emergency center. And of course, last but not least, we have been supporting the unit at WMD free zone project since 2019. And in this context, we have this publication which was mentioned, and I think it's very important at this juncture where we see many new developments and accelerating developments in nuclear energy, which will also be for sure widely used in the Middle East about small modular reactors, but also other technologies, that here even more should be done. But of course, i would also like to stress that I mentioned the aspect that technology should be used, but also in a way which is secure and safe. This is why we are of course strong promoters of IAEA safeguards and additional protocol and a maximum of transparency in order to carry out this in the most conducive manner. And of course, i have also to make the kind of reference to the current unfortunate context, we have been seeing armed attacks against nuclear facilities in the region. And of course, we very much recall the importance of the IAEA nuclear safety standards, the seven pillars and the five principles, in order to protect the safety. And of course, what I can say is At these uncertain times where the future is very much unclear, the EU will continue to support the peaceful uses pillar, this is for sure, and of course also regional cooperation, because in the end the EU is a regional organization, and this has to be anchored, of course, in the NPT context and in the principles of the NPT. But I'm very much looking forward, these were just some very general introductory remarks, I'm looking forward to the interesting exchange of the panel and with the audience. Thank you.

Thank you, thank you, stephan. And without further ado, let me introduce our speakers in the order that they will speak today. So we will start with our own UNIDIR, Mr. Al-Mutasar Al-Balawi, Research at the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Project, who will present the paper and the main findings that we are discussing today. The floor is yours, Al-Mutasar.

Thank you, Ren. Thank you, everyone. Good afternoon. Nuclear energy is regaining momentum. States in the region and globally, they're reconsidering the nuclear option increasingly. When we started this research a year ago, we wanted to understand what are the drivers behind this interest? What are the policy discourses and assumptions shaping decision making? We also wanted to see what are the risks that if these decisions to commit to nuclear energy What risk will face under the current conditions, globally and in the region? Finally, we wanted also to see the implications and what could be risk mitigations. Thank you. Excuse me. And finally, we wanted to see what are the risk mitigation strategies that could be used to to navigate this complex environment. So this is not an endorsement or prediction of a nuclear energy expansion, it's analysis of the factors that shapes decision making. Just to give a context before we delve into the risks and the assumptions, as well as the factors, if we look at the status of nuclear energy programs in the region, Out of the 24 states, members of the conference for the WMD free zone in the Middle East, we have two states currently operating nuclear reactors in the region. Four nuclear power units in Egypt and one in Iran is currently listed under the IAEA database as under construction. Two other states, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are considered in the post decision making, where states took the decision to introduce nuclear energy or in the process of building necessary infrastructure. Five other states from those 24 are considered embarking countries, where they are evaluating the option of nuclear energy. There are some progress recently, including, as you can see in the picture, installing the reactor vessel, a key component of the Egyptian reactor, and the currently estimated operation year is in 2028. For the reactor in Iran, the second unit, there is no estimate, and what we recently witnessed before the war is a $25 billion agreement with Russia to introduce more units and new sites. We also saw new cooperation agreements. between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. There's also, interestingly, discussion on the official level in Israel about the introduction of nuclear energy reactors. Now, just to understand what is behind this interest, what are the logics? If we look at the discourse on a global and regional level, it's always grounded in strategic interest and national interest. Some of the discourses in Europe, for example, thought phasing out nuclear energy was a strategic mistake, and that wasn't just in the context of the energy crisis after the war in Ukraine. You can see this discourse also in other parts of the world. Either it's connected to the same strategic and economic reasons or to the AI ambitions. In the region, it's similar. It's about long-term security of energy, it's about the economic benefits, and you can see from the discourse in official statements and documents reference to learning from past mistakes where over-dependence on single sources or limited sources of energy was negative, and also where hesitance or reversal of nuclear plans had opportunity cost. Interestingly, some formulations about historical gaps, describing the absence of nuclear in the region at a significant scale, and citing impacts on industrialization. We cite in our report why some of these programs did not materialize, including, for example, the accidents that happened. outline those specific factors and drivers of this interest. If we look at the energy need and demand in the Middle East and North Africa region from 2000 to 2024, it tripled, and it's expected to surge more given the ambitious economic visions and also the AI demand for mass energy. Not to mention the unique need for desalination and cooling in the Middle East region. But there's also the element of crises, which would create and push for further diversification of energy. The region witnessed multiple crises in the, and recently, and currently, there is a big crisis which the International Energy Agency describes as the biggest threat in the history, anticipating a massive response in energy trends, including a possible boost for nuclear energy. I would give just two examples why someone in the region might think of nuclear energy as a strategic component. If you think of Barakah, the nuclear reactor in UAE, it generates around 25% of the domestic needs, which means freeing up almost around 2.5 billion USD of export of gas, liquid gas, for the UAE. If you look at the case of Saudi Arabia, which consumes around one third, one quarter of their production, oil production, it's becoming more compelling for these states to considering nuclear energy. There's also the element of water. The Middle East is considered among the highest on the water stress score. and also the ambitious commitments for decarbonization, which it would be really difficult to meet these quotas and commitments without resorting to alternative energies, including nuclear energy. Now, what are the assumptions around these decisions? If we think of the policies around exporting nuclear energy, it has been the case that For example, uS restrictions on exporting nuclear power energy, it was considered restrictive. The concerns about proliferation resulted in what some would perceive as unjustified or selective restrictions on nuclear energy cooperation. Now, this hindered some of the cooperation or anticipated cooperation in the region. Recently, the assumption that the current administration, given that the market, the nuclear energy market in the Middle East was dominated by other exporters like Russia, the UAE was given to the South Korea, the current administration is easing these restrictions and trying to make case-by-case reviews so that they can have more cooperation. This is considered or assumed to be an opportunity to revive a stalled cooperation talks in the past. There is also the funding, the World Bank, other international banks are now lifting the ban on funding nuclear projects. There's the AI component, nuclear energy as a source of mass energy is considered, is increasingly linked to ambitions on AI. There's also the promises of nuclear technology, like SMR, where they offer flexibility in operation and deployment, low cost, and also short construction time. Those all have hindered or make the case difficult for states to pursue nuclear energy. Beyond energy, obviously, there is a Other considerations and assumptions, including that nuclear energy would create more opportunities and more would strengthen domestic industries in these countries. It would help localize advanced technology and bring talent to the country. But most importantly, and I think this is a key assumption for some of the logics about nuclear energy in the region, which is if you build your reactor or partner with specific countries, this would mean strengthening the strategic partnership with these countries, bringing the partnership and the relationship with the country forward, which opens up more cooperation and opportunities in different domains. We also look at the interest in enrichment, and there are a couple of states in the region who are clearly interested in developing elements of fuel cycle capacities, including uranium enrichment. The economic case is obviously debatable because we don't have a country in the region with a large fleet of nuclear power reactors, and if we look globally, the supply for enriched uranium is expected to meet the demand in the mid-term, but maybe due to geopolitical constraints, sanctions, for example, or failure of the exporters to meet their expansion of capacity commitments, this would affect and possibly by early 2030, we would see that the demand is above the supply. Still, We look at this from a different also perspective, not just the economics. Enrichment can be for some states, or they perceive it, a compelling, strategically compelling aspiration. And if we cite some of those logics, including how they see the external supply assurances vulnerable to politicization, to tensions, And also absence of a credible assurances that could withstand these constraints. So for example, during tensions, they see that these supplies would be conditioned to political alignment. Other states, they would like to move up the value chain. They don't want to do just mining and milling. They want to also have, even at a pilot scale, enrichment for research and development where they can work on novel fuel. But I think importantly, we should also look at the sovereignty aspects. For some states who have a clean record of compliance and membership of all the transparency and safeguards agreements, they think of it inconceivable to give up their rights to enrich uranium while others have exemptions, unless this is framed within a larger, broader frame, either for disarmament or fissile material control, whether it's on a regional framework or globally. We also have the security value of enrichment capacity. including options in the future for naval propulsion ambitions. Evaluating nuclear energy in the Middle East should also consider that these reactors would be attacked, these reactors would be shut down or even not completed before even they get operated. This means a long-term vulnerability if we consider a history of attacking nuclear facilities in the region and sabotage. But it's not just about the direct damage to the, the physical damage to the facilities that creates this long-term vulnerability. Even during a crisis or a spillover in the region, this could affect the supply, the fuel supply or maintenance, or create maintenance disruption. which would lead to safety and security concerns. If we also consider accidents or deliberate attacks or sabotage that would result in radiological consequences, one event of a similar nature would dramatically change the perceptions in the region about nuclear energy. And if we consider the current events, I think we see enough of this caution. There's also the risk of these technology not delivering their promises. There's still a long road towards commercializing SMRs or creating the manufacturing ecosystem. Just very quickly, we should also consider when we talk about the proliferation risk, consider that these nuclear programs, nuclear power programs, they're going to be introduced in certain regional dynamics and nuclear landscape. The nuclear power reactors by themselves, they don't pose unique risk. Historically, they were not used for producing nuclear weapons. But we should consider that this, also, the region has highest membership of the NPT, the CSA. Obviously, membership does not mean compliance. We still have cases of compliance. We have rhetoric for using nuclear weapons, for developing nuclear weapons in priority. All of these, they would shape the environment where these nuclear programs established. We looked also at the implications for the WMD-free zone. I'll just do it very quickly. We think that once we see more nuclear power programs completed in the region, this would fill the technical capacity gap that tended hindered cooperation in the region, this would mean that credible proposals for regional cooperation might come forward. If we also consider the possibility of having interdependence technical interdependence as a result of this regional technical cooperation, this would strengthen transparency and trust between states. On the ongoing discussions and negotiations of the zone, we think that this will also prompt discussion on whether states would include provisions, operational provisions for these arrangements, including dedicating a body to supervise or to facilitate the cooperation. States would also discuss, for example, if certain fuel cycle activities warrant limits and controls, and also provisions on safety and security. We propose a couple of risk mitigations actions, and one of the key things is just to look at the international tools for supply assurances. If we're expecting new fuel, high assay, low enriched uranium, maybe we should look at tools like the IEA bank. to provide more legally, more credible assurances, contractual assurances that would withstand politicizations and tensions. The idea is these would address the concerns that drive interest for some states to have their domestic uranium enrichment and fuel cycle. There's also a need to look at if these new technologies, nuclear reactors, would create new diversion scenarios, prompting a discussion on adaptation of verification. But there's also the idea of creating a regional or a multilateral fuel cycle consortium, which is a proposal that for a long time was endorsed by states and also by experts. To materialize these proposals, there should be sustained attentions to the political and the technical details, and they can also be tested at the formal venues between states. I can mention, and I'll conclude with this, some of the political and technical details for one of the proposals, the consortium. Obviously, there are advantages. We think that decentralising ownership of fuel cycle facilities would strengthen proliferation resistance, it would also pool expertise from the region and globally, and if it was built or established under what is known as black box model, where there are technical barriers to prevent access to Sensitive information that could lead to proliferation, this would definitely increase also the proliferation resistance. This would mean also fewer facilities instead of having multiple and less efforts for verification. Economic also, it would be less costly to join such a consortium than building yours. But there are the questions that need to be asked. Is it BlackBox? Which hosted country? What is the access granted? And what are the financial sources? I'll leave it there, and I look forward to the discussion. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you, Almutazir, for, i think, providing us a vast basis for discussion and not without controversy. So with that, let me move to our other esteemed or our next esteemed panelists, and we will start from those from the region. So it is my pleasure to introduce our next speaker, His Excellency Ihab Mustafa, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the UN and the head of the Egyptian delegation to the Review Conference. The floor is yours, Ambassador Mustafa.

Thank you very much, Ms. Keane, and I would like to thank UNIDR and the European Union for organizing this side event on a very topical aspect of the conference, the 11th Review Conference of the NPT. So we thank you very much for highlighting and bringing this very valuable research report on the regional dimension of peaceful use of nuclear energy within the Middle East, which is a very important topic of the day. Let me start by outlining a few elements of my presentation today. So I would like to highlight the integrated energy strategy within the wider Egypt Vision 2030, which highlights and emphasizes the civilian nuclear program of Egypt in Dabaa, which has been alluded to by Mr. Al-Muntasir, the integration with national and regional energy projects, and within that framework, the nuclear regulatory framework that manages or under which those projects or that strategy takes shape. Following that, I would like to also shed light on a very important question regarding the protection of nuclear facilities and regional security implications in the Middle East. and we'll end up with a couple of words on the universal application of the IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, so that it provides a context for the topic that we are addressing today. Let me begin by saying that Egypt firmly believes that the promotion of peaceful uses should not be constrained nor subject it to undue restrictions or conditionalities. On the contrary, we believe that exercising the right to peaceful uses, especially in the nuclear power field, in order to provide the necessary energy for the various forms of economic activities within a nation, would contribute to strengthening the Treaty, the NPT, and upholding its values. This is a very deep conviction that Egypt has held over the years. Having said that, let me address the Egypt Vision 2030 and the position of integrated energy strategy within that vision. So within the framework of Egypt's Vision 2030, Egypt has adopted a comprehensive energy strategy aimed at ensuring sustainability, diversification, and long-term energy security, while also taking into consideration its climate-related commitments through a just transition approach. Egypt's commitment to building a modern, competitive, and investment-friendly energy sector is also a key feature of that vision. Now, more specifically, Egypt's civilian nuclear program is now embodied in El Dabaa project, which Mr. El-Multaser alluded to in his presentation. So at the core of this vision lies Egypt's nuclear program, peaceful nuclear program, with El Dabaa nuclear power plant representing a historic milestone which features four VVER-1200 generation, generation 3+ reactors, with a total capacity of 4,800 megawatts. The project is being implemented in cooperation with Russia's Rosatom and in full coordination with the IAEA. The El Dabaa project represents not only a major addition to Egypt's energy mix, but also a comprehensive national endeavor for technology localization, capacity building, and sustainable development. The first unit of Al Dabaa nuclear power plant is expected to become operational in 2028, with the remaining units to follow by 2029, leading to full operational capacity around 2030. So, where does El Dabaa fit in the integration with national and regional energy projects? So, domestically, Egypt continues to expand large-scale renewable energy projects, including the Benban Solar Park and the Gulf of Suez wind farms. Additionally, Egypt aspires to become a regional energy hub connecting Africa, Europe, and Asia. In this regard, Egypt is advancing major electricity interconnection projects with neighboring Arab countries, as well as with Europe. This includes the Egypt-Saudi Arabia electricity interconnection project, as well as a planned link with Europe via Greece, with a capacity of up to 3,000 megawatts. In this context, nuclear energy plays a crucial role in enhancing the stability and efficiency of interconnected systems, providing reliable power and enabling the export of clean electricity on a 24/7 basis. Our nuclear power plant as a centerpiece of this energy mix is a key addition to global energy security and endeavors of regional integration. This is how we see also the Al Dabaa project situated in a wider regional integrated strategy for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Now moving to the regulatory framework that Egypt has adopted. Egypt has established a robust institutional and regulatory framework led by the Egyptian Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority, ensuring full compliance with the highest standards of safety and oversight. Recently, in 2023, Egypt acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, reaffirming its firm commitment to the highest international standards of nuclear safety. Following its accession, Egypt actively engaged in its first Conventions peer review process within the 10th Review Meeting, which concluded its work last week in Vienna. Egypt continues to implement all its nuclear activities under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, ensuring full transparency and adherence to respective international obligations. Now, on the question of security and the protection of nuclear facilities in the Middle East, I would like to share a couple of words from a regional perspective on the situation of nuclear facilities in the context of armed conflict. This is an issue that the General Conference of the IAEA has repeatedly paid attention to. In this context, And bearing in mind the position of international law and norms, as well as the general principles and purposes of the NPT itself, Egypt underscores the grave risks associated with targeting nuclear power facilities, where nuclear accidents pose the highest cross-border radiological risks and a plethora of humanitarian, health, and environmental grave consequences. In this context, Egypt stresses the importance of all countries in the Middle East placing their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards as a key measure to enhancing transparency, building confidence, and ensuring the full effectiveness of non-proliferation regime in our region. In this context, we consistently advance this objective through our annual draft resolution at the IAEA General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, as well as through our long-standing initiative at the United Nations General Assembly on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. and the annual draft resolution in this regard. We would like to highlight and underscore here the particular importance we attach to the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, established pursuant to decision 73/546 of the General Assembly in 2018. The conference aims at elaborating a legally binding treaty establishing such a zone. And I would like to conclude by mentioning that during the deliberations of that conference, the fourth and fifth session of the conference, addressed the dimension of peaceful uses. The discussions reflected the growing interest in nuclear-generated power and aspirations in arrangements that allow regional integration and partnerships. There was general agreement among the members of the conference that establishing a zone will be a monumental step that open wide and promising horizons to nuclear energy in the Middle East. in a context of mutual trust and enhanced peace and security of a zone free of nuclear weapons. And I thank you very much.

Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador Mustafa. And we will now turn to our esteemed colleagues from outside of the region. First, I'm pleased to introduce our next speaker, Mr. ***** Kamishima, a Senior Coordinator Officer at the IAEA Director General's Office. Please, Mr. Kamishima.

Thank you very much for the introduction. So let me start by thanking UNIDEO and European Union for convening this timely and important discussion. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, since the last review conference, we have witnessed significant developments in the global nuclear landscape. These have been shaped by mounting geopolitical tensions, including conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, as well as increasing pressures on multilateral frameworks. In this context, the risk of a nuclear accident or incident has also increased, reaching levels not seen in recent decades. At the same time, however, we are also witnessing positive trends during the current review cycle. such as renewed global momentum around nuclear energy, broader stakeholder engagement, and rapid technological innovation in nuclear. Peaceful nuclear technologies are increasingly recognized as scalable solutions that can deliver tangible benefits for development. This is particularly evident in nuclear power, At COP28 in 2023, nuclear energy was formally recognized as a low-emission technology that must be accelerated. 33 states have endorsed the goal of tripling nuclear power capacity by 2050. The IAEA has supported this momentum by facilitating high-level dialogue. including the two nuclear energy summit co-organized with Belgium in 2024 and with France just last month. Partnerships with international financial institutions are also evolving. The agreement signed between IAEA Director General Grossi and World Bank President Baner last year marked a significant step, opening the door to renewed engagement on nuclear energy financing, and helped to catalyze similar cooperation with other development banks. At the same time, Growing interest in small modular reactors is bringing together governments, regulators, and industry under the IAEA's Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative, promoting regulatory harmonization and industrial standardization. Today, 416 reactors in 31 countries provide nearly 10% of global electricity. Sixty-three reactors are under construction and around 60 countries are considering or planning to introduce nuclear power, including SMRs. Against this backdrop, the Middle East is emerging as a region of particular importance. The region is experiencing rapid growth in electricity demand, driven by population growth, urbanization, rising living standards, and increasing climate pressures. Nuclear power is increasingly recognized as a potential contributor to energy security, decarbonization, and long-term economic development. In addition, Growing global demand for energy intensive technologies, including AI and data centers, is reinforcing interest in reliable and low carbon energy sources such as nuclear power. Across the Middle East, interest in nuclear energy is expanding at different stages. Some countries are actively considering nuclear power. while others are progressing towards implementation or already operating nuclear facilities. There is also growing investment in the infrastructure, regulatory frameworks, and human capacities needed to support informed decision making. The IAEA has been supporting these efforts through peer review, advisory services, and capacity building. including through the technical cooperation program, with a focus on ensuring that nuclear power programs are developed in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, what we are witnessing is not simply a revival of nuclear energy. It is a convergence of energy needs, technological innovation and evolving security dynamics. This creates significant opportunities. If developed responsibly, nuclear energy can support sustainable development, strengthen energy resilience, and even serve as a platform for regional cooperation. But it also raises important challenges. The expansion of nuclear energy is taking place in a changing regional security environment, including ongoing and recent conflicts. In this context, it is essential to ensure that nuclear energy program developed in a safe, secure, and peaceful manner while building confidence and trust. I would like to highlight three key elements. First, robust safeguards. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, complemented by the Additional Protocol, and for relevant countries, decision or amendment of Small Quantities Protocol remain important for the IAEA to provide credible assurances that nuclear material is used only for peaceful purposes. Second, strong safety and security frameworks. As nuclear programs expand, Ensuring the highest standards of nuclear safety and security becomes even more critical, particularly in regions affected by conflict. Third, international cooperation. Strengthening transparency, technical collaboration, and information sharing can also help build confidence and support the peaceful development of nuclear energy. The IAEA stands ready to continue supporting its Member States in this vision as a technical, impartial and trusted partner in this effort. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Kamishima, for describing the important work that the IAEA is doing to support nuclear energy in the region. With that, it is my pleasure to introduce our last speaker, Professor Zia Mian, Senior Research Scholar and Co-Director of the Program in Science and Global Security at Princeton University. The floor is yours, Zia.

Thank you. I'm going to make a series of remarks that are from the perspective of how to think about science and security in the context of time, because a lot of the discussion so far, and that is part of the report, has been about looking forward, that these investments and the possibility of nuclear energy and navigating a new era, an era is a period of time, so we're thinking about time in the future of the nuclear Middle East. So I want to focus on science, security, and time. And the first part of that is, it's worth thinking about when it comes to nuclear power reactors, what is an appropriate unit of time to think about when we have these conversations? I would suggest that for discussion, we might set as a reasonable requirement that the unit of time should be the lifetime of a nuclear power reactor. Because once you decide to build it, it takes some amount of time to then raise financing, begin construction, complete construction, operate until it reaches the end of its operating life, unless there is a decision to extend its lifetime. So when you add all of those times up, we're basically talking about from now until the end of this century as the appropriate unit of time. It's 2025, so we're basically talking about the end of the century. So all this conversation has to be, what do we imagine the world will be for the next 75 years if this future of a new era of nuclear energy in the Middle East goes forward? And how can we judge a future that we haven't seen? And Al-Muntasser talked about uncertainty, but I would argue that, at least from the scientific point of view, what one does is one begins with what one already understands about the world and moves forward on that basis of some degree of reliable knowledge. And in this context, I'd like you to think about the fact that when the first expansion of nuclear energy began, commercial nuclear energy began, a lot of the focus was basically in North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. After World War II, in a period marked by long-term relative stability, there were no big wars, there were no big civil wars, there was no huge crisis, there was a Cold War, but it was a stable political structure on the timeline in which many of these things took place. And so one of the things that is remarkable is that if you ask the question, so what has the last 60, 75 years like been for the Middle East upon which we now look to forward? Well, we could go back 60, 70, 80 years and ask the question, so what has the last six, seven decades been like about which we now expect to move forward? So even if we only begin in the 1960s, You have the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, then you have the 1973 war, then you have the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, then you have the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, you have the first Gulf War, the second American war against Iraq, then you have the Syrian Civil War, and then you have, and you see all the way up to today. So, any presumption about the promise of nuclear energy and the institutions and all of this question The first question is, are you willing to bet that the next 75 years will be fundamentally different from the last 75 years? And if so, on what basis will you make this experiment, this judgment, this set of decisions? You might choose to do so, but as a scientist, my first question is, what is the basis of reliable knowledge that you have that allows you to come to that conclusion? What do you understand to be the politics, economy, society, culture, national identities that will suddenly change that have not been there for all of this time? It's a question. The second question is that 75 years ago, 65 years ago, however you choose to start it, when we started talking about nuclear energy and expanding the number of nuclear power plants in the world, no one really talked about climate change. It was all about electricity, cheap electricity. And it turned out nuclear electricity was not cheap. But we built the reactors. And, but now we live in a world where we understand climate change, and we understand what at least the scientific models of climate change tell us about what the next 50, 60, 70 years of climate may actually reasonably look like. And so you can look at what will the future climate for the Middle East look like? in the context of which you are making all of these decisions. And for those of you who haven't seen it, I commend to you the World Meteorological Organization's very first report on the status of climate in the Arab region. It was published in 2024. It's the very first one on the future of climate in the Arab region. And what does it tell you? It tells you that 2024 was the hottest period year ever recorded in the Middle East. which is no surprise since that was true for the world as a whole. But the average temperature in the Middle East is rising twice as fast as the global average temperature increase. So when we talk about the average temperature of the world increasing due to climate change, it doesn't increase at the same rate everywhere. In the Middle East, it is rising twice as fast as the global average temperature. And the heat waves that are coming in the Middle East are now longer and higher than in the past, because the climate is actually changing the longevity and intensity of heat waves. The temperature in key areas in multiple countries in the Middle East has, on more than one occasion, gone beyond 50 degrees centigrade. That is a temperature at which it is considered that human beings cannot survive outside for any extended period of time. This also leads to questions of drought, water stress, and all of these things. The projections from the World Meteorological Organization based upon current climate models. which so far have done a reasonably good job of explaining where the temperature and models of where the climate is today, project the temperature rise for the Middle East region by the end of this century to be five degrees centigrade. Not one and a half, which was the global average that we discussed trying to keep as part of the Paris Agreement, five degrees centigrade by the end of the century. In other words, if you build these nuclear power plants, By the end of their life, the average outside temperature in the Middle East will be five degrees warmer. Basically, that means that those areas will effectively be uninhabitable for people outside. So what model of society do you actually have in mind which will have these nuclear power plants working? You might say, you need the power plants to power the cities and the buildings in which these people will live. Fair point. But on the other hand, do you think your nuclear power plants will work when the outside temperature is five degrees warmer and you have long, intense heat waves? The heat exchange requirements for nuclear power plants are enormous. The cooling water requirements for nuclear power plants are enormous. And I direct you to this simple fact. Every year, every summer, France has to turn off its nuclear power plants in the summer when you need the most to produce electricity for cooling because it's too hot. outside. Heat is a problem for nuclear power plants cooled by water. So when we talk about a nuclear power future, the new era for the Middle East is going to be one marked by intense climate pressure, unless you presume that we have solved the climate problem. That's a perfectly reasonable assumption if you wish to make it, but tell me the basis upon which you come to that conclusion. Given where we are now, that we have failed over and over again in COP after COP, promise after promise has been made, and the temperature rises, and the emissions rise, and the gatekeepers to this process are in large part the fossil fuel producing monarchies and others, including those of the Middle East. So, that's the second issue of time and the new era that you're going to have to deal with. The third thing that I want to mention, and I'll stop with this, is that all the speakers have mentioned the importance not just of technologies, but of institutions, whether it's government planning institutions that will set up these nuclear power plants, manage them, and the markets that will sell the electricity and so on, but also of safeguards and cooperation and the IAEA and national bodies and international cooperation. So, what do we know about institutions within countries and in the non-proliferation arena? We have experience. We don't have to assume that institutions work perfectly. They're made by people, so they carry many of our flaws. But unless you have a magical theory that institutions will suddenly one day work perfectly, then what do you expect institutions to actually do under reasonable assumptions of what they have done in the past going forward? Because that's how your model of the world is. You know what you've understood about the world, and you assume that that's how it works until new information comes along. That's at least how science works. So, what has been the success or failure of nonproliferation institutions? within countries and internationally in the Middle East? And the answer is, it's a dismal history. Almost the largest number of violations of non-proliferation obligations in any region of the world, except for Article VI of the NPT, which stands in a category all of its own, of the non-proliferation obligations. has been in the Middle East. Country after country has violated their obligations with secret facilities, secret programs, denial of access, all of the things that all of you know, that we all read about. So that's, to be fair. And as Al-Muntasser mentioned, there is a history of attacks on nuclear facilities. The largest number of attacks on nuclear facilities in any region of the world has been in the Middle East. We talk about Zaporizhzhia correctly, but that's one facility. Count the number of facilities in the Middle East that have been attacked beginning in the 1980s. So it's not new, it begins in the 1980s. And one of my colleagues at Princeton actually wrote a paper some years ago, and he made a list of the facilities, and it goes back to attacks beginning in 1980 and 1981 in the Iran-Iraq War, and then the Israeli attack. And then it follows, and it follows, and it follows, including not just armed attacks with missiles and bombs, but cyber attacks. The first ever major use of a cyber weapon was against a nuclear facility in Iran by the United States using Stuxnet. So it's not just countries within the region attacking each other, but outside players attacking. So all of that has happened since the 1980s. So, the capacity of national institutions to obey non-proliferation law that they have accepted as a country, we see that that has not worked. And we see that international commitments to not attack nuclear facilities also has not worked. So, where is your strength of confidence in institutional behavior and propriety coming from? So, let me just give you one last example, and then I'll stop since There should be some time for discussion. And this is one of my favorite examples, and it's from the official history of the IAEA by David Fischer. And it's a book that tells the history, the official history of the IAEA for the first 50 years. It's available online for free, so you should read it. So he tells the story of what happened at the IAEA after the Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981. And so, Israel attacks the reactor. The Director General of the IAEA and the Board of Governors condemned Israel's action and asked the General Conference of the IAEA to consider suspending Israel from the exercise of its rights and privileges. Almost no one remembers this story anymore, but the Board of Governors of the IAEA, which included the United States, asked the General Conference to suspend Israel's rights and privileges for attacking a nuclear facility in Iraq. The General Conference considered this, and they stopped short of voting to suspend Israel, but voted only to suspend technical assistance to Israel. So not all rights and privileges, only technical assistance. So less than what the Board of Governors had asked for. Then, the following year, the General Conference of the IAEA considered a resolution to refuse Israel the right to participate in the General Conference. And the vote was a majority vote to suspend Israel's right of participation in the General Conference. What happened? The official history of the IAEA says, when the vote went against Israel, the US demanded an appeal. When this was lost, in other words, the General Conference voted against the United States, the delegations of the, and this is a direct quote from the IAEA's official history, "The delegations of the United Kingdom and the USA walked out of the conference hall, followed closely by most other Western delegations." And the quote continues, "Before withdrawing from the General Conference, the US delegate announced his government would reassess its policies regarding United States support for and participation in the IEA and its activities." In other words, if you vote against Israel, the United States would withdraw from the IEA and stop funding. The IAEA backed down, the general conference backed down, and the director general and the board declared that Israel would remain a full member of the IAEA, and the US resumed its relationship with the IAEA. So what that tells you as an institutional history is that when institutions get put to the test, what we've seen is a particular set of pathologies that present themselves, and if you're going to build a future that is going to be for the next 65 or 75 years, then you have to have a theory of politics where this stops. I would like to see that theory of politics.

Thank you, thank you, Zia, for giving us both a taste of history as well as, and probably you could have look on last year, GC, probably live in the memory of more people around here as well. With that, let me open for questions. We do have about 10 minutes to ask question from the audience, as well as the ones online. The ones online, we have the e-mail to send the questions for. With that, please raise your hand. I think that will be, there are no flags here, right? And then introduce yourself, name and a question. And if there are no, I will start asking my questions. Okay, by the time, oh, yes, please.

Excuse me, sir, can you use the mic?

So much for the distinguished panel. I'm delighted to join you. My name is Samih Aboul-Enein. I'm representing the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Council today. Good to see you all. Now with the crisis in the Gulf, with the developments and the implications on the economic oil and gas industry and supplies of energy from that part, that region, this is a question to the panel: what are the reflections on the positive future for nuclear energy as a possible route to energy supplies from that region? Thank you.

Thank you, Sameh. Any takers? And let me add to that, because I think there is another kind of follow-up question, especially Zia, based on your presentation. Nuclear energy is an happening event in the region, despite your calls, if I understand correctly, to at least be cautious about it. So which measures you will suggest for countries, and this is an opening for everyone, to take, given the fact that it is something that countries in the region are taking on themselves? So what are the measures that countries should consider while taking those endeavors forward? And also answering Sam’s question about assurances of supply.

Mr. Al-Montasser, I think maybe part of the answer would lie in the report that UNIDIR has produced. So perhaps we’ll pick up from there.

Thank you.

Thank you. I'm not sure that I'm answering your question, but I would like to make a comment on what I've been hearing. And first of all, I think, first of all, as it was rightly said by you, actually, it is happening already that nuclear energy becomes not only in the Middle East, but globally, again, more interesting for a number of reasons. And I think in the report, this is very well set out. perspective of what the region could do to basically counter these risks, which you have mentioned, I think. And this is why actually the European Union is supporting this project, because this is exactly what Europe, to a certain extent, has been doing after the Second World War, when things were very bad and when, luckily, the kind of negative things which had happened during the Second World War brought people together to develop something together. And I think this is what is missing in the Middle East, if I may call it provocatively the Robert Schuman moment of the Middle East. I don't buy into this argument by saying First of all, I disagree. I would say that we are now at the beginning of the NPT review conference. The NPT has worked in many, many aspects very, very well, including Middle East. Of course, this does not mean it has done a perfect exercise, but I think institution building and international cooperation today is more needed than ever. And I don't think you can build based on the historic fail of humankind not to achieve something, automatic assumption that this will has to continue in the future. And it's difficult me to say this because I'm first of all also a scientist, so I try to base on facts and normally consider the pessimist, so it's against my normal nature. But I think building something together and developing something, this is actually what can bring us forward. And I think this is what we have to try, and this is what we modestly trying by this project. So I and nuclear energy, I mean, i don't have to say it has to be nuclear energy. There could be other modern technologies which could preserve this, or present this trigger for the Middle East region. But I stop here because it gets too philosophical.

And just to mention, you cannot work on the Middle East without being optimists. So this is, I think, a precondition for anyone that works in the region. But please, Mutasar and then Zia.

Yeah, thank you. One thing you also learn in political science and even in natural science, try to avoid prediction. Nobody wants to. I'm trying to be faithful to this principle. That's why the phrase new era does not mean that we're having this transformation or breakthrough, but it's a change. There's this consideration of nuclear energy. It's becoming trendy. Everyone want to see SMRs everywhere on the political level. It's not just industry talks, but at the same time, you have We have these realities, these risks, and I think this is the main purpose of this report. If you're thinking about nuclear energy, not just in the Middle East, you should also consider these things. And again, not an endorsement, but also we're optimist. I think there is a merit in seeing the benefits of nuclear energy. To the question of Mr. Abulhanein, I think we highlighted some of the ideas of how this could impact energy supplies. Even if we look at models in Europe, the nuclear energy is being supplied from the producer country to the neighboring countries. And when we discussed this with the regional states, whether it's the officials, the experts, they really felt like this would be an ideal model where you have stakes in a regional project where nuclear energy is produced in your neighbor country, you benefit from it. You exchange expertise, and they think once one project is successful, this would pick up the regional potential. I'll leave it there to.

Yeah, so thank you. So the answer to your question is that if you ask me, it would be a disastrous mistake to pursue this process at this time. actually at any future time. It is old thinking. I've seen multiple occasions now of people talking about the nuclear renaissance. This is not the first time. And every generation, they come along and they sell you the old flying carpet, right? It is technological determinism of the worst kind that technology will solve your political and social and cultural and economic and sovereignty issues. Just Buy my reactor, and tomorrow there will be a golden age. The world doesn't work like that. Politics and people and institutions and history are key to this. The technology does not drive this process forward. So that's point one. The second is, I agree absolutely with the ambassador here about learning from the European experience. And the European experience, at least in my reading of that history, and he and others in the room may wish to correct it, is that a commitment to rethinking European sovereignty was key to the process that allowed the emergence of what we now see as Europe. And so it began with iron and steel and things like this. eventually we get to an EU, but there was already a set of shared understandings, of a collective understanding that what happened in World War II should not be allowed to happen again. And so my first question is, are people in the region convinced that what we've been going through should never be allowed to happen again? Or is this our version of Middle East World War I and World War II is yet to come? I don't know. I'm not making a prediction, but anybody who is They need to be able to explain how and why they have come to this conclusion. So I think that searching for ways in which, and this is where I have concerns about the way that this is being pitched, it is not being pitched in terms of shared and rethinking sovereignty. These are sovereign programs. And Al-Muntasir mentioned several times the idea of that somehow nuclear power was going to do something for national security. Which is not about sovereignty, then, is it? About ceding sovereignty, sharing sovereignty, becoming part of a common political and economic, cultural set of institutions. And so this is part of the dilemma that we face here, that if the Middle East is actually going to become a place which can deal with potentially dangerous technologies, it has to rethink the question of sovereignty. and how to share. And if you're going to share sovereignty, then you're much better off sharing it with windmills and solar power plants and batteries that can actually allow you to share power across the Middle East in the ways that Europe has already started to do, than you are with trying to think about how to address big nuclear power plants that are somehow sovereign facilities. So I would actually say that the core question that we're dealing here is actually the gap between the technology and where we are in the Middle East in terms of thinking about sovereignty and security. Do we think about collective security or national security? And this is part of the dilemma that, you know, the Europeans have struggled with this, the Middle East is struggling with this, but the answer to the question is that you have a hard case to make. that somehow the Middle East will transform itself into a place of collective security and shared sovereignty in the model that works, perhaps, in the European Union, given the experience that we've had over so many years and now.

Thank you. I see one more question, the gentleman in the back, or two more. Can we just collect all of them and then pick up and answer for everything?

Yeah, because that was still on.

Yeah, so we will answer all of them together. So let me just collect all questions, and then we will go one more time between all our speakers. Yes, please, the gentleman in the back.

From the United Kingdom. from CND as a delegate here. I don't want any nuclear weapons and frankly any nuclear power either, all across the Middle East, and therefore I support what Zia has just said about alternative energy sources. My question is that there is already some degree of nuclear power in the region, therefore there is nuclear waste or likely to be nuclear waste in the future. The US bombing of facilities, enrichment facilities in Iran, we don't honestly know what the consequences of that have been. What facilities are there and what arrangements are being made for the storage of nuclear waste that is in anything like a safe condition for the future? If further wars break out, then quite clearly, the bunker-busting bombardment of concrete-encased waste becomes an act of war and indeed becomes an opportunity for war as well. So I'd be interested to hear if anyone has any views on how this might be dealt with.

of the Geneva Liaison Office for International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. And I just wanted to follow up on the issue of time when it comes to the construction of these reactors, and also the question of financing. You know, in some economies, the UAE, for example, had the resources and the time to build four reactors, but a lot of other countries in the Middle East perhaps would find it would be more advantageous to spend that money on things that are less expensive that could produce electricity much more quickly. So my question is, are those factors being considered adequately when you're looking at this plan? Thank you.

Thank you. With that, let's go through our speakers in the order of the sitting and any concluding remarks, as well as if anyone have answer to Samer's question. So with that, El-Motasir, please.

Thank you. Maybe I'll answer the question from Mr. Jeremy Kope. So the practice is that once you have spent fuel of operation, when you refuel your reactor, you store these in the facility, and usually have arrangements already in place with the exporter of the technology either to take it back or to discuss different pathways. I think for the existing reactors, the practice is to take them after, you store them for 10 years almost, more or less, and then you send them back to the exporter of the fuel and technology. Waste is still a big problem for nuclear in general, I admit. I think one of the solutions that we have or are currently testing is what we call the repository. They put them down in the earth in a very structured and built facility. I think there is one in Europe opening up after, i think, 10 years or seven years of studies and consideration and also building. It's a technology. I think I believe in science as well, I think it's one possible way. I don't know if we can call it an ultimate solution and we can resolve the whole problem with waste using that, but it's one of the scientific approaches. The risk of damages to spent fuel is big, and it's really alarming for sure. To this point, we did not have any history of direct attacks or damages on spent fuel, that's my understanding. But there are studies about the potential risk and radiological dispersion.

Thank you, and let me just reflect one more question from our audience online, if anyone wants to pick it, from Sara El-Sayed: "To what extent is AI drivers for what seems like the technologically deterministic nuclear endeavor?" So if anyone wants to pick that as well, please do.

On waste, in 2021, there was a paper looking at what would happen if spent nuclear fuel, after it's taken out of the reactor, as Al-Montasser said, actually is attacked or otherwise has an accident and the cooling system is lost. And it tracked where the radioactivity would be carried by the wind. And from looking at both Boucher and the reactors in UAE, and the findings was that given the way that the wind blows, some of the major cities in the Middle East will be subject to lethal amounts of radioactive fallout. So whether it's an accident or whether it is a deliberate military attack, even the fact that there is only 10 years worth of fuel. at any time in the pools. If the cooling system of the pools is damaged, destroyed, or fails by accident, there would be lethal, catastrophic radiological fallout that would go. And that's just a question of which way the wind is blowing at that particular time. That's all there is to it. And that's not something anybody can do anything about. So it is a perpetual and enduring problem. On the question of financing, it is remarkable about the fact that This issue of time is not included in the policy-making process, because we all now can see from the cost of actually existing capital investments and rates of return in energy that the fastest way and the cheapest way to produce electricity is not by nuclear power. You get electricity faster and more quickly from solar power and wind power, and in terms of the climate impact, Instead of waiting 10 years before you have nuclear electricity, you can have 10 years of solar electricity or 10 years of wind electricity for a much smaller fraction of the price. So in terms of the climate gain per dollar spent, there is no comparison. So this is just the fact of the matter. What we're struggling with here is policy capture. by nuclear policy entrepreneurs in governments and in countries, and the fact that some countries are seeking to export their nuclear technology by saying, we will fund this reactor by giving you the money to pay for it. And so this is a, you create the market for your own technologies, and then it's not about efficiencies or anything, it's about making money and having a captive client. And as far as the question from Sarah Al-Sayed, the future of AI data centers is actually really interesting and increasingly uncertain. More and more cases, we're starting to realize data centers are promised and never get built. And so we will yet have to see what the actual extent of the AI data center construction process will look like. And you can't build a future market on something that you don't actually know will be built.

First of all, maybe on the waste, indeed, waste needs a lot of attention, and Muntazir referred to that in one European member state, we have actually the first facility which is in operation now for deep geological repository storage. Once again, I look from the angle of cooperation, of course, that's my bias. In the Middle East, where you have not so much nuclear energy at this moment, it's maybe a good opportunity for countries to work together to develop common or joint waste repositories. this could be done, so this is one of these options, which is by the way in the European Union law it is foreseen these kind of options have not materialized, but I would not exclude to see something at some point. On more the question once again on this cooperation or not, where do we stand in the Middle East compared to European history, I don't want to engage into comparative historical analysis, but If we assume that what happened after the Second World War in Europe was a positive development, maybe I may say the following provocative: it's not necessary for all countries, for all regions in the world to make exactly the same mistakes in order to come to the good solution. So you can also do this maybe in a more proactive and direct way. Maybe this is a good end here, as you said, you need optimism in the Middle East.

Thank you. Let me get back to the question from Ambassador Samha Boulahnein. And I wouldn't disagree with Professor Yan about the complexity of thinking nuclear cooperation in the Middle East, because actually the existing situation and also history doesn't really support any vision of a collaborative approach to sharing nuclear energy or nuclear collaboration of any sort, simply because one single country in the Middle East insists to remain outside the comprehensive safeguard arrangements under the NPT. This is exactly where Egypt, for one, has been very vocal about that the cornerstone of moving forward on the NPT regime, and whether in its nuclear disarmament pillar or safeguard pillar or the peaceful use, is actually that universality of the NPT and the universality of the NPT within the Middle East. Why? Because the Middle East happened to be a very troubled region with wars and repeated wars and continuing tension, and as we have seen in the past years, and most recently with the war in Iran, nuclear facility is a military target for, you know, in the context of conflict and war. So that's why it doesn't augur very well to think that there will be ever a nuclear collaboration. However, that's one part of the story. The other part is that not only the Middle East, but generally developing countries are in a bind within the context of the energy transition to non-fossil fuel energy. The region has actually have been reliant and dependent on fossil fuel energy since its independence. And now we have a few years to spend trying to make sense of that transition, solar, wind, but also nuclear energy, as part of what we say and what we call in the region the energy mix. So nuclear has come back to the forefront of development agendas and energy strategies because of the fact that it is no longer possible to think only fossil fuel or coal, and there is a need to think about the various and the mixed approach to energy transition. And that's why nuclear energy has presented itself as part of that mix, and it should present itself also as part of the regional collaboration on energy and integrated strategy, regional integrated strategy on energy going forward. The problem, however, is that we need to also grapple with the political and security problems within the region and the universality of the NPT regime within the region. Thank you.

Thank you. Let me respond to the question regarding the nuclear funding, financing, and as well as the waste management, because these are quite important issues. As you know, the development of nuclear facilities, of course, national efforts with the responsibility of each country. However, Agency provides assistance to support the country, those countries that have decided to Include the nuclear power as a energy mix, and it is well known that the agency provide assistance based on the milestone approach, but it is it may not be. It may be less known that we have like 19 nuclear infrastructure issues that encompass all issues. It's. And then this financing, and then the waste management, among those important issues that we are addressing. It's not only safety safeguards, but also there are so many other issues like funding, the regulatory infrastructure, and also the electricity grid, and then human resource development, regulatory framework, so on and so on. So there are so many other issues that need to be addressed. And then in a way that we work together with the country. Agency works very closely with Egypt for the project, and we have sent our mission to support, apply, implement Agency safety standards and also security guidance. And so this is a ongoing process that we can. And then this experience also can be learned by other countries, including those countries in the region. So I think it is very important to work together with the Agency to continue enriching the experience for other countries too.

Thank you. Please, first, I want to thank all of you for joining us and preserve despite taking longer than a lot of the time. I want to please join me to thank our speakers and the ones that join us online, thank you as well. So with that, please join me to thanks our speakers.