Afghanistan's Path Forward: Toward an Afghan-Led Political Process for Inclusive Governance and Regional Security

Yes. Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished guests, dear colleagues and friends.

A very warm welcome.

On behalf of the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations, it's my great pleasure to welcome you to today's discussion on Afghanistan's path forward toward an Afghan-led political process for inclusive governance and regional security. I would like to express our sincere appreciation to our co-organizers, the Andiana Foundation and the Independent Diplomat, for their partnership in bringing us together today. I also warmly welcome State Secretary, Her Excellency Laura Reizinen of Finland, our distinguished panelists, Two of them are, of course, on the way, will be joining us. Representatives of member states, Afghan political and civil society figures, experts, colleagues, and friends of Afghanistan, as well as those who are watching this event live. Five years have passed since the Taliban's military and forced return to power in Afghanistan. During these five years, much of the international response has understandably focused on managing immediate crises, humanitarian needs, economic deterioration, terrorism, refugees, narcotics, human rights, and most urgently, the systematic restrictions imposed on women and girls. These issues remain extremely serious. Only last week, the United Nations told the Security Council that there has been no progress on issues of profound concern, including severe restrictions on women and girls, exclusionary governance, the human rights situation, and the continued presence of terrorist groups threatening Afghanistan, the region, and international peace and security. But after five years, I believe we must also ask a broader political question. Where is Afghanistan heading and what is the political end state that Afghans and the international community are actually working toward? Humanitarian assistance is indispensable, but humanitarian assistance cannot resolve a crisis of political legitimacy Even humanitarian aid has declined. Counterterrorism is an immediate security concern but it requires for a responsible and legitimate government committed to its national and international obligations. Economic initiatives require funding and development aid which has been suspended. And engagement, however necessary, cannot become an end in itself. The question should therefore not simply be whether the international community should engage or isolate Afghanistan. The more important question is engagement toward what objective? The objective should be a durable political solution that enable legitimate, inclusive, representative, and accountable governance reflecting the will and aspirations of the Afghan people. And such a solution cannot be designed exclusively outside Afghanistan and then presented to Afghans. It must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. That means Afghans must have the central role in defining their political future. It means bringing credible Afghan stakeholders into a genuine political process, including women, youth, civil society, democratic forces, political figures, and other representatives of Afghanistan's diverse society. Women in particular cannot be treated as a separate humanitarian or human rights issue while political decisions about Afghanistan's future are made elsewhere. They must participate where political decisions are actually made. At the same time, an Afghan-led process does not mean Afghanistan can solve these challenges in isolation. Afghanistan's stability is deeply connected to the stability of the region. Terrorism and violent extremism, narcotics trafficking, refugee movements, economic connectivity, water-related challenges, and cross-border tensions do not stop at Afghanistan's borders. This is precisely why Afghanistan's political future is not only an Afghan concern. It has direct implications for regional and international peace and security. Our neighbors, therefore, have an important role. Regional organizations have an important role. Member states have an important role. And the United Nations has an essential role, but there is an important question. The role of international and regional actors should be to facilitate, support, and enable an Afghan-led political process, not to direct it, substitute for it, or determine Afghanistan's political future on behalf of its people. The United Nation has already articulated an ambition for Afghanistan to be at peace with itself and its neighbors, reintegrated into the international community, and meeting its international obligations. Recent UN briefings have also stressed that engagement should not be equated with endorsement of the existing political order. So today, I hope we can move beyond simply describing Afghanistan problems. We know many of the problems. The purpose of this discussion should be to consider what comes next. on our hope today is not necessarily to produce complete agreement on every issue, but we should seek greater clarity on the destination, greater coordination on the pathway, and greater determination to restore Afghan agency to the center of discussions about Afghanistan's future. With that, I once again thank all of you for joining us, and I look forward to a substantive, frank, and forward-looking discussion. So now it's my honor to hand over the floor to our co-organizer, Dr. Niloofar Sakhi, President and Founder of Andiana Foundation. Ms. Sakib, the floor is yours.

Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Faayek, and good afternoon to everyone. On behalf of the Andiana Foundation as a co-organizer of today's event, I would like to thank and welcome all of you in joining us at this official side event of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly. I'm also grateful to Her Excellency, Ms. Laura Rissanen, the State Secretary to the Minister of Social Security of Finland, for taking the time to join us at this important event. As Ambassador has mentioned, the purpose of today's event is to highlight the importance of an inclusive political process in a regional consensus on Afghanistan. And we are grateful to have esteemed panelists with us today to reflect on these issues in greater depth. And the Dandana Foundation has conducted a series of consultations and track two dialogues to bring Afghan voices and regional stakeholders to discuss Afghanistan's political instability and security crises and identify the underlying issues and explore pathways towards consensus building and practical solutions. And our today's discussion, Afghanistan's path forward toward an Afghan-led political process for inclusive governance and regional security, I believe is both timely and important as five years have passed since Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, yet the country continues to face fundamental challenges in governance, political inclusion, human rights, economic security, and regional stability. Over the last five years, the Taliban's policies towards women and girls have become increasingly institutionalized. Women and girls continue to face extensive restrictions on education, employment, and participation in public and political life. The Taliban's oppressive policies towards women and girls affect virtually every aspect of their lives and remain a critical impediment to Afghanistan's stability and reintegration into the international community. On the other hand, the humanitarian situation is also equally concerning. According to UNICEF report, approximately 21.9 million people, nearly half of the population, require humanitarian assistance in 2026, including more than 11.6 million children. Approximately 17.5 million people are projected to experience acute food insecurity during parts of 2026. while nearly 3.7 million children under five projected to suffer from acute malnutrition. Afghanistan also face deep economic structural challenges, which I'm not going to talk in depth about it. At the same time, Afghanistan's security challenges have evolved rather than disappeared or been reduced. One of the most serious concern is the continuous presence and activities of transnational militant and terrorist groups in Afghanistan and their reported links with the Taliban authorities. The United Nations Security Council Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team reported in 2026 that concerns remain about terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and their potential regional impact. The report states that al-Qaeda continues to enjoy what the monitoring team describes as patronage from the de facto authorities. and acts as a provider of training and advice to other terrorist organization, particularly Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan. It also reports that continuous presence and activities of Al-Qaeda is in Afghanistan. This relationship, together with cross-border militancy and increasing tensions between Afghanistan and its neighbors, particularly Pakistan, as well as the incapability and unwillingness of the de facto authorities to address interstate conflicts due to their connection with transnational militant and terrorist groups, demonstrate that Afghanistan's security crisis cannot be viewed simply as an internal Afghan matter. Transnational militancy has direct implications for the security architecture of the wider region and beyond. There's also another long-term concern, the institutionalization of radicalization. When restrictive ideological narrative becomes embedded within education, governance, social institution, and public life, the consequences extend beyond immediate security threats. They can shape a generation, normalize exclusion and intolerance, and create conditions in which radicalization become institutionalized rather than remaining confined to non-state extremist organizations. This present a long challenge, not only for Afghanistan, but also for regional security. For these reasons, for these very, very, very reasons, we should not assume that the conflict in Afghanistan has ended. The conflict has changed its form. Fundamental questions of political representation, human dignity, human freedom, women's right, justice, safety, and security remain unresolved. Afghanistan's ongoing crisis cannot be sustainably addressed without the political process that deals with these fundamental issues. This brings me to two parallel processes that I think require serious consideration, and the United Nations and international community can contribute a lot in these two parallel processes. First, an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political process. There is need to create meaningful space, political space for Afghans. representing from Afghanistan's diverse communities to discuss the political future of their country. It's important to maintain a policy of non-recognition toward the Taliban. The future of women in Afghanistan should be considered directly in relation to institutionalized radicalization in the country and the risk that such an environment may enable terrorist and extremist movement to operate and expand. Going forward with the current status quo, without meaningful progress on political inclusion, fundamental rights, Afghanistan's international obligations, would not address the underlying cause of Afghanistan's political crisis. So the priority should instead be creating conditions for credible national dialogue and ultimately a negotiated political process. The United Nations has an important role to play UNAMA's current mandate specifically includes the use of its good offices and engagement with national, regional, and international stakeholders in pursuit of Afghanistan's peace and stability. Second, there is a need for a structured regional mechanism. Afghanistan's political and security crises is deeply interconnected with its region. Terrorism, cross-border violence, migration, water insecurity, narcotics, and economic instability cannot be effectively addressed by Afghanistan or any neighboring countries acting alone. The regional mechanism should therefore focus on conflict resolution and management with regional ownership, continuity, and predictability. Its immediate priority should be operational prevention, particularly addressing cross-border terrorism and violence. Over time, it should also develop structural prevention, initiatives around issues such as water and security, migration, climate-related pressures, and alternative to narcotics production. These two processes should move in parallel, an Afghan-led political process addressing Afghanistan's internal political crisis, and a regional mechanism addressing the transnational and regional dimension of insecurity. And these two processes going together could support an honest and inclusive political process. To conclude, I would like to say that Afghanistan's future ultimately belongs to its own people. The responsibility of international community, particularly the United Nations, is to help create the political space in which Afghans can meaningfully participate in determining that future. I stop there. Thank you. Now I would like to invite Her Excellency, Ms. Laura Rissanen, State Secretary to the Minister of Social Security of Finland, for her remarks. The floor is yours, Madam.

Thank you.

Let me start by... Yeah, okay. Thank you. Thank you all and excellencies, distinguished colleagues and friends. Let me start by saying that I couldn't agree more on the future of Afghanistan, on being on the Afghan people. And your remarks were right on. So thank you for that. I have been here in New York now for two days, and on both days I've had the opportunity to meet with strong Afghan women, and I've heard the work that you are doing on the ground in Afghanistan, and I think that is so important. So, thank you for that. We are at a time where we see new conflicts coming up every day all around the world, and sometimes maybe a bit fatigued about the old ones, but we cannot forget these, and that's why it really is important to have events like this here today to remind us that there is an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and we cannot forget, and we cannot turn our backs on Afghanistan. Finland stands in solidarity with the Afghan women and girls and strongly condemns all human rights violations in Afghanistan. The Taliban's actions against women and girls, the gender based violence and the extreme discrimination that denies women and girls education, work and the freedoms of movement and expression are unacceptable, simply unacceptable. The UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, Mr. Bennett, has noted that the systematic discrimination against women and girls may amount to gender persecution, a crime against humanity. We must all remember this. Finland is content that the investigative mechanism for Afghanistan has been established because the Taliban must be held accountable. Accountability is not only about the past, but it's also about sending a clear message that systematic oppression has consequences. Gender equality and the rights of all women and girls remain priorities for Finland's foreign, security and development policy. It has been a priority for us for a long time, and we continue to provide funding for sexual and reproductive health services in Afghanistan. is truly a top priority for us. Over the past five years, we have seen a severe collapse in human rights, economic stability, and public health in Afghanistan. One of the very few reasons for optimism is the unwavering determination of Afghan women and girls to claim their fundamental rights and shape their country's future. And I want to thank you for that example. We draw inspiration from their extraordinary resilience, leadership, and courage. As agents of change, they are essential to building a stable, prosperous and inclusive Afghanistan. We simply cannot and we will not turn our backs on the women and girls of Afghanistan. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Rex Wensy, Madam Secretary, and we are, of course, grateful to Finland's principled support for Afghan women and for gender equality and for your support.

For the people of Afghanistan. Now we will move to the next part of our agenda, which is the main discussion, the panel discussion.

And it is my honor to invite our dear colleague and co-organizer.

Ms. Marlene Spoori, she is the Director of U.S. and U.N. Independent Diplomat, and she is also moderating this panel discussion. Marlene, you have the floor, please.

Thank you, Ambassador, and good afternoon. On behalf of Independent Diplomat and our co-organizers, the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan and the Andiana Foundation, welcome. We look forward to a robust discussion. And we have with us today speakers who are joining us from as far as India, where it is very early in the morning, and as far away as Australia. So thank you all for making it here during such a packed week. Over the last few days, there have been many events on Afghanistan, and rightly so. And we've heard many voices, Afghan voices, in this building and outside of the UN, and the message has been resoundingly clear. The root causes of the crisis in Afghanistan are political. Humanitarian aid, economic engagement, and counterterrorism cooperation can ease the symptoms of the crisis, but they cannot resolve the crisis on its own. And what we've heard from speakers near and far is that what is needed is a political process that leads to inclusive, legitimate governance, one that includes Afghan women and men from all communities so that they can have a real say in how they are governed. But of course, the outstanding question is how do we get there? How do we build a political process when one party, the Taliban, seems completely uninterested in engaging other Afghans? How do we build a process when one party refuses to come to the table and seems content to let the status quo continue? So this raises some difficult questions. What would have to be different for a political process at this time to succeed? Can Afghans begin building that process without waiting for Taliban buy-in? And what role should the region and the UN play? So we're here today to discuss those realities frankly, and to look ahead at what a political process in Afghanistan could look like today. So we'll start with Afghan perspectives. And in particular, I'd like to turn the floor to Ambassador Seikel, who is a former permanent representative of Afghanistan to the UN, can help us really set the scene. We're in a position today where the political track is, you know, quite frankly, stalled. The Doha process seems to be dormant. So if a political process were to restart, what do you think would have to be different this time for it to succeed?

Marlene, excellencies, distinguished guests, friends and colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, let me first of all thank the sponsors of this very important meeting today. Our own permanent mission to the United Nations, the permanent mission of Finland to the United Nations, Independent Diplomat and Aldiana Foundation. To answer that question from the experience of few decades and perhaps from the experience of few centuries, the ownership and leadership of the process is very important. Traditionally, we have a deep interest in processes genuinely led by us and genuinely known by us, not on the paper. Logic two says that when you have a special feeling, you have a special feeling when you know that you lead something, that you really own something. Once you know that, then you're motivated, then you move ahead, then you have the energy. And I'm so pleased to see that in action during this year, this year, leading women and girls, you can see them with energy simply because they own now. They feel that they own this struggle. It's also a best for Afghanistan sovereignty, which has been challenged so many times and as we speak, it's being challenged. We're being attacked from outside. And it's beneficial for the region and it's beneficial for the rest of the world. Let me take you back and give you some examples of Afghanistan's leadership and ownership of processes. Let me take you back to the 1960s when we had the decade of democracy from 1963 to 1973. That golden decade involved a new constitution for Afghanistan. It involved parliamentary elections. It involved the emergence of political parties. When you look back It was genuinely initiated by us. It was led by us and it was owned by us. And that's why we benefited from that to the point that even you saw the reflection of it here in this building. In 1966, Afghanistan was the president of the General Assembly. And Ambassador Pajvak was presiding over the General Assembly. shaping up the agenda, the global agenda. And like that, not that far away, 80 years ago, we chaired the Third Committee of the General Assembly. And I'm so happy that still the spirit of our cooperation in working with the international community at the highest level is alive and we do have the vice presidency of the General Assembly. despite the fact what is going on in Afghanistan. During the 20 years of the Republic, we saw a number of processes. The most famous one that I was heavily involved in was Regional Economic Cooperation Conferences on Afghanistan, which became known as RECA. I was there. My colleagues from foreign ministry are here with us. We felt that we really led that process. We felt we really owned that process. It was us, the people of Afghanistan, the experts of Afghanistan who initiated mega regional projects under that process. In different sectors, in transport sector, in trade facilitation, digital connectivity, industrialization, maritime, transit, to the point that even until today, the region is benefiting from those projects. Heart of Asia Istanbul Process is another one that we launched in partnership with Turkey. We felt, although I wasn't part of the government, but I could see at the time, that we showed the visibility of Afghanistan's leadership was there and our ownership, you could feel it, it was there. And this is why we had success. Yet a sad process was the Kabul process. On the paper, we were supposed to be on the driver's seat of state building. Yet it was quite apparent that there were some miscalculation in the part of the capacity of the state and also the unity of the region and of our international community. That's why Kabul process ended up in failure and the Taliban took over the destiny of Afghanistan. What has been happening in the past five years? When you talk about process, you immediately think about the Doha process. facilitated by the United Nations. Very much based on the recommendations of the independent assessment done in 2023. The essence of those recommendations was to bring change through the Taliban by offering a number of incentives to them. I remember when I look back three years ago, I was here and I was probably the first one to hear that from our good friend, President. And my worry was that the Taliban may take full advantage of the incentives, but may not come to terms with political inclusivity and returning Afghanistan to legitimacy or legitimate governance. It's taken us three years, and we've seen the implementation of those recommendations. It appears that the Taliban have taken full advantage of the incentives, including taking advantage of the working groups on counter-narcotics and private sector. But we haven't seen any move when it comes to political inclusivity and the return of legitimacy to governance in Afghanistan, yet. We've also had other platforms, regional platforms, like meetings of Afghanistan's neighbors, foreign ministers. We've had the Moscow format, we've had the regional security meetings on Afghanistan at the level of national security advisors of the countries of the region, and we've had a OIC contact group that, by the way, met a few days ago here, but without the voice of Afghanistan. I'm a little bit puzzled what kind of groups we have when we talk about Afghanistan without its own voice, not only and a lady activist from Afghanistan couldn't be invited there? So this is why I want to let everybody know that Afghanistan's leadership, Afghanistan's ownership is a must in whatever we do, wherever we discuss Afghanistan. In terms of opposition groups, Beside the formation of various groups and coalitions in the past five years, we've seen that with limited resources and support and limited facilitation, serious attempts have been made in establishing political processes owned by us and led by us. We've seen the gathering of the opposition groups in Austria, in Turkey, in United Kingdom, in Qatar, in Germany, in Russian Federation, in Tajikistan, in Albania, we had a big gathering of the women of Afghanistan, and some others. Some of these processes, or I shouldn't call all of them processes, some of them just a single conference, just to share information, to exchange information, exchange views. Some of them are at early stages discussing basics, our common values, our common principles. But some of them are at advanced level. The Vienna process after a couple of years of confidence building, last year moved towards operationalization and established a national commission which completed a strategic document this year. The document remains under further consultations and consideration for adoption. Our experience shows that trust building and inclusivity is important. I think these two words are crucial. The existing platforms and processes have helped trust building and inclusivity, However, no attempt has so far had all actors or most of the actors on board, probably most, yes, but not all. And discussion is underway to achieve that. But definitely there is a very strong feeling among all the actors to have a single umbrella of opposition. That interest is there. You can feel it every day. under which they could exchange information and have a voice in policy formulation as far as the opposition is concerned. In terms of substance, I don't know how much time is left, one minute, okay, I'll sum it up. In terms of substance, I think when the opposition thinks, we feel the core values are crucial, principles are crucial, the three phases, the current phase, the transition phase, the stability phase is important. We need to have for the three phases, our vision, our strategy, and our alternative political structure. And also we have to have a mechanism of implementation and monitoring. But the priority of all of us is to see the stop of normalizing the Taliban, normalizing the brutalities that's happening in Afghanistan today. I think that's the top priority until we do all of this. Coordination with neighbors and other countries who have legitimate interest in Afghanistan beyond the region is important for the opposition. Once we have put our own documents and our own internal works together, naturally before finalizing it we need to consult the region. Our immediate neighbors, they have legitimate interest, other countries of the region have got legitimate interest and also countries from beyond the region. Facilitation is important. We have got no geography at the moment and in the region we do have limitations. So it's important to see countries stepping forward, institutions and think tanks stepping forward and facilitating the conditions so that we could have the meetings and we could exchange ideas and we could further, we could push the work forward. But we have to be careful not to mix the domestic policies of Afghanistan with foreign policy. Remember, if we had a geography in Afghanistan this small, perhaps we would have had our meetings inside Afghanistan. The reason we have it here, elsewhere, because we don't have it, but we shouldn't mix the domestic policies of Afghanistan and the foreign policies. Of course, We have to think how to incorporate the international system, whatever we have, the UN role, the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Afghanistan, the UN Security Council sanctions regime, the ICC's ruling, the ICJ, the World Bank, and all of that, we need to really work how to coordinate all of them with a genuinely Afghanistan-led, Afghanistan-owned process. I think I'll stop at that.

Thank you, Ambassador. And you mentioned the role of the region, and unfortunately it is very late in India, and we had also hoped to have a speaker, Ambassador Durrani, who was the former special, Pakistan's former special representative on Afghanistan, join us. He was unable to attend today's discussion due to a flight delay, but we do have with us Ambassador Yayant Prasad, who served as Director General of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, and was also India's ambassador to Afghanistan, and so brings to us a unique perspective. He is joining us online and we would be grateful, Ambassador, if you could reflect perhaps on India's posture towards the Taliban and the situation in Afghanistan, which has seen considerable shift over the last five years. And in particular, if you could reflect on the role you see for India on questions of governance in Afghanistan.

Thank you, Marlene. I'm honored to be part of this UNGS side event focused on Afghanistan's path forward. You've asked me to focus specifically on India's policies, and I've been out of government for a number of years. My remarks will naturally reflect India's position, but I cannot dissect fully and predict how our policies are going to be shaped. But I'll give you a general direction. What are some of the positives in the present situation as we see it from the Indian perspective? That the de facto authorities have so far only designated an interim government in Afghanistan, that the foreign minister of this government has from time to time acknowledged the international community's desire to have the rights of women to education and employment restored. And that many members of the Afghan government have ventured to speak of the need to relax heavy-handed policies, even if they have not so far succeeded and they have been overruled. What are some of the negatives that we see? That there is leakage of weapons from Afghanistan that are going into the hands of terrorist groups in the region. That Afghanistan suffers from what can only be called a gender apartheid. That women and minorities are denied their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Afghanistan is only one among 57 Islamic countries which prohibit girls and women from attending secondary schools and universities. And there is no accountability for excesses committed by the security forces. The State Secretary of Finland has already spoken eloquently on this. So in my brief remarks, I want to focus from the Indian perspective on some of the key questions raised in the concept note. I heard very carefully what the representative of Afghanistan said. And while I fully agree with the objective of he outlined, I'm afraid it's going to be difficult for the international community to help establish in the short term a legitimate and inclusive government in Afghanistan. So far, the singular success of a UN effort to secure inclusive governance was unmet in Nepal between 2007 and 2011 in enabling Nepal's political transition from civil war to a peace agreement. And this was made possible only because all parties to the conflict The Maoists and the seven mainstream democratic parties were willing to forge peace and craft a new constitution based on free and fair elections. This isn't the case in Afghanistan. There are many other unfavorable factors in the case of Afghanistan. These include The unstable and internally conflicted neighbors of that country, the transit and connectivity bottlenecks that Afghanistan faces, the absence of a more focused, achievable mandate for UNAMA, the great powers and neighbors working at cross purposes, and a general lack of trust. What could constitute a coherent approach to Afghanistan in these difficult circumstances. Possibly a UN-backed intervention led by a regional organization's mandate, much like the UN-led and AU, African Union, mandated Kenya Initiative in 2008 that produced a power-sharing agreement coordinated by Kofi Annan. What I have specifically in mind, we have discussed before within the Andiana Forum, the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia, in short UNRCCA, established in 2007 in Ashgabat at the request of the five Central Asian states, Three of whom are neighbors of Afghanistan. The UN RCCA could promote functional cooperation between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. It currently focuses on border security, water sharing, counterterrorism, and youth radicalization. Trade and transit could be added to this mix. the UNRCCA model could be expanded to include more interested countries. For incremental positive outcomes, we must temper our expectations. What is difficult to seek for now is inclusive and accountable governance in Afghanistan, as the Taliban has no incentive to work towards it. However, a multilateral UNRCCA-type initiative can keep this option open. It doesn't close that option. Favorable factors for a UN-led functional cooperation mechanism include UNAMA's long experience in Afghanistan and the clearly enunciated benchmarks in the UNSC resolutions on Afghanistan. Despite challenges, a multilateral UN-led approach may be the best option because of its universality and legitimacy. What form can a genuinely Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political process take? Professor Sakhi rightly interpreted it to mean creating political space for all Afghans. Minister cycle expressed that ownership and leadership are of critical importance. Do you know that the first time the phrase Afghan led and Afghan owned was used in its entirety was by the then newly arrived SRSG and UNAMA chief, Staffan de Mistura, in Kabul in March 2010. And from then on, it became part of successive UNSC and UNGA resolutions on Afghanistan, renewing UNAMA's mandate. This phrase needs to be dropped. It's enough to speak of an Afghan process. taking for granted that we cannot proceed without Afghan ownership and leadership. Can regional countries help? Only if they commit to Afghan sovereignty and independence and agree to enable Afghanistan to become a crossroads connecting all countries around and near Afghanistan. thereby making it a regional hub of trade, transportation, minerals, and energy. It's relevant here that Minister Saikal spoke of the abortive attempt at forging such cooperation under RECA and the Kabul process. I want to end by making two points for the consideration of this audience. The divisive debate in the UNSC on September 16 underlines that the first and foremost effort must be to maintain unity of purpose within the international community and not fragment approaches to engaging the de facto regime in Kabul. Second, and this is important, such engagement should include inclusive representation of the Afghan people. Without it, an Afghan-led process is impossible if the eventual objective is an accountable and representative government in Afghanistan. I thank you.

Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. I am now going to turn the floor to Lutfullah Najafizada, who is the founder and CEO of AMU TV. And Lutfullah, you have an incredibly interesting background and engagement in some of these political processes. You engaged both in Doha and also in Oslo, where there were direct conversations with the Taliban. And so I'm curious, based on that experience, How what you think that tells us about how you can engage the Taliban moving forward and also how you can develop what the importance is really of of including civil society actors such as yourself within those processes.

Thank you. I think what has changed since 2018, 2019 and Doha 2022 and Oslo 2023 and Doha again. is the environment around the Taliban, not the Taliban itself. And in 2018, 2019, the Taliban were willing to share power. Think about sort of a post-Emirate Afghanistan, where there is a system that Afghans of all walks of life can come together and form a sort of a unity government. That changed with a takeover of Kabul. The way it was portrayed, the way it was conceived by the leader of the Taliban, that this is a winner take all, this is a military takeover. So that changed the Taliban's call colors. In 2022 in Oslo, when we sat down with them, they were in Kabul, we were overseas. In 2018, 2019, we were in Kabul, they were in Doha. But even in six months after the takeover, they were willing to sit down with non-Taliban Afghans. A group who came from Kabul and those of us who were in the West and the region, we spent two days with the Taliban discussed a variety of things. They also interacted with the Western envoys. But what was unexpected in that meeting, that the Taliban agreed to come up with a joint declaration. Initially, they were hesitant. They were like, you guys are a group of refugees and we are government. How are we going to co-author a joint declaration? And then after a series of discussions, they thought that this was probably in their interest to do it. And then we saw in 2023, a year later, that the Taliban said, we're not going to sit down with Afghans. So what changed in the course of three, four years, I think, is the ambience, is the environment in the international community. And that is changing the Taliban's calculus. So it's very important, the unity of purpose, the vision, sort of the region versus the West division, these things need to be addressed. And that will affect, I think, the Taliban's move when it comes to engaging with non-Taliban Afghans, in my view.

Thank you so much. And I'd be curious if you could also reflect on, you know, given your role at Amo TV and your engagement with Afghans inside the country, What your sense is of their perception of this political process? Are they are they interested in engaging, engaging in a political process? How how what is their view from from your perspective?

You mean the Taliban?

The wider population on engaging in a political process? Is this something they care about?

Of course they do. I mean, the Taliban's approval rating has remained at 15%. This has not changed. pre and post 2021. This is a significant indication of where the Taliban sort of campaign of winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan stands. But then you can have this more sort of profound discussion that a theological regime like the Taliban who do not care about elections, do they really care about public perceptions? You know, public perception do Does it really affect sort of Taliban's calculus when it comes to making it a more inclusive government? I think the people of Afghanistan are tired. The people seek every opportunity to have their voices heard. We have this call-in show on Amo TV where we get 7,000, 6,000 to 7,000 calls in just one hour, and people call us from across Afghanistan on WhatsApp. And they are fighting over this one hour window of a call and show to sort of have their voices heard. The harder the topic, the more the calls. So that is, I think, an indication that the Afghan people want to be involved in whatever the political scenario is in the future. And what is, I think, paining and very sad that there is an overwhelming dependency inside Afghanistan over this miracle coming from abroad. And I'm afraid they are disappointed over and over again.

Thank you so much. And just on the role of civil society within this process, because we've heard from diplomats here, how do you see civil society as playing a role within these processes?

You see it at this UNGA. And the representation of women groups, I think here at the UN, elsewhere, is a testament, I think, to the resolve of our civil society groups, that they want to be involved, they want to be engaged, and they deserve platforms like this. And I'm so honored today to be a small part of it and support their activism here.

Thank you. Thank you so much. I'm now going to turn the table to Ms. Asila Wardak, who was the former director general for UN affairs with the Afghanistan's MFA. You were one of the Afghan delegates, one of 10 women, who sat down with the Taliban during the round of Doha peace talks in 2019. As we've heard, the Taliban now refuse to engage in those types of discussions. So I'm curious from your perspective what you think needs to change for them to come back to the table and what you think an Afghan-led process would look like if we don't wait for the Taliban simply to get their buy-in?

Thank you so much, Madeleine, for giving us the opportunity. And then I would like to take the opportunity to thank the Diana Foundation and also our permanent mission here in New York and all colleagues that are here for being with us. I think the Taliban will return to the table only when isolation become unsustainable. They today believe that they can govern without accountability or legitimacy. That belief must be dismantled through coordinated international pressure and a unified diplomatic front that makes three truths undeniable. One, no regime can survive by erasing half of their populations. Number two, no ideology can silence 40 million people forever. Number three, No government can claim legitimacy without transparency and oversights. So these are the things that maybe if there is pressure, there is no real pressure by the international community. As Ambassador Seikel also mentioned about the sanction and also about political will, unfortunately, there is no political will. If you see the Security Council here, there is no clear vision that what's their vision towards Afghanistan. from the neighbors, from the region, from OIC, from every country, that there is no clear vision. What we can see as Afghan, and especially Afghan women, that all pressure is on the Afghan side. There is no pressure by any countries on the Taliban. The real pressure is on Afghan people. And your second question about the Afghan-led process, an Afghan-led process began when Afghan stops waiting for permission to shape their future. Civil society, as my brother mentioned about the role of civil society, civil society, diaspora networks, religious scholars, youth, and women group can build political momentum outside the Taliban shadow. by defining a national vision rooted in dignity, rights, and justice, developing a credible roadmap for political transition that the international community can support. Number three, create a unified platform where diverse Afghan voices speak with one strategic message. This will be not a parallel government, it's a parallel legitimacy built from the ground up, where Afghans articulate a clear, inclusive alternatives, and Taliban refusal to engage become their weakness, not our weaknesses. Thank you.

Thank you so much. And To build on the the regional discussion that we're having you spent a great deal of time engaging with the OIC you were Afghanistan's first woman elected as a member of the OIC independent human rights Commission Commission So I'd be curious from your perspective, you know, what role you see for the Gulf and the OIC in in Afghanistan and when it comes to issues around the political track what role you see for.

If I start with the Gulf, I think the Gulf holds a unique moral and strategic influence, and it can champion an Islamic narrative that women's rights and education convene credible regional diplomacy and sustain humanitarian and educational lifetime for Afghan girls and Afghan people in general. At the beginning, if you see in the past five years, OIC, immediately after the country has been collapsed, the Secretary General appointed a special Sr. for Afghanistan, Ambassador Tarek, who is a dedicated diplomat, and he is engaged with the Taliban de facto authorities, and a number of statements also came out by different groups of OIC, a number of scholar visitors went to Afghanistan, and then religious groups also. But that's not enough, because unfortunately, as Ambassador Saikal mentioned, that Afghan, and especially Afghan or not at the center of those negotiations. OIC can play a great role, though OIC is not an executive role, but OIC member states, those that they are very much involved in Afghanistan, especially Turkey, Qatar, Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and other strong OIC members, that they can play a great role by interfering to all of these. What OIC can do? OIC is very much involved in the humanitarian assistance also. They have a small office. But what is the gap in the past five years that there is no real monitoring mechanism by OIC member states, that they should play a great role by doing all this. A number of edicts are coming daily, but OIC is silent about that. And also, OIC can maybe do, with help of women's leaders, can become with a action plan on women's rights in Afghanistan, a significant action plan to play a great role. But unfortunately, that's like an OIC member state. So I would like to take the opportunity once again, call on OIC member states, especially now we have a new secretary general dedicated Secretary General that he was a diplomat that play a significant role in Afghan because Taliban are not forever in Afghanistan. Taliban will go. But what we are doing and then what the history will judge, we are looking forward to them Afghanistan nation is the nation that we will become the future of Afghanistan, and the history will judge what role the regional countries and also what role the Islamic countries, especially, build on us, supported us. Taking the opportunity also, I would like to mention about the role of the neighbors, that they are very much important. As I mentioned before, that governments, especially Pakistan, Iran, India, that they are not putting any pressure on Taliban. What they are putting pressure on Afghan generation. And I would like to ask them that do not support madrassas anymore for Afghanistan, because now they are putting bomb on Afghanistan and Afghan civilian, on Afghan people under the name of the terrorism. But what we can see that they are supporting madrassas that they will generate and then they will produce more terrorist and then more fundamental people that which will treat for the Afghanistan nation and also for the region and for the countries. Thank you.

Thank you so much. And now, finally, we will turn to Ms. Zakia Adeli, who has an enormous amount of experience with her professional and experts network for Afghanistan, where she's the founder and president. And so I'd be curious if you could reflect for us what you see as the role for diaspora groups and experts, professionals within a political process based on your own experience and expertise.

Thank you so much. It is a great honor to be here alongside distinguished colleagues. And I would like to express my appreciation to Permanent Mission of Afghanistan, Independent Diplomats, and Indiana Foundation for hosting and organizing this wonderful event. First of all, I would appreciate it if you allow me a little more time for respond to this question and for other questions, I promise I would be brief. Do you allow me? Okay, thank you. Actually, we are facing three critical challenges in this situation. First, a profound crisis of trust. Second, the accelerating loss of Afghanistan's intellectual and professional capital, and third, the effective closure of formal diplomatic channels, making conventional track one engagement limited as a path forward. In this environment of profound distrust, One constituency has maintained across all community, all ethnic group and all political tendency, the trust and respect of Afghan people, its academics and professionals, including professors, journalists, economists, psychologists, IT specialists and so on. But there is a painful paradox here. Afghanistan has lost approximately half of its university faculty since 2021 and 58% of its judges and prosecutors. And unfortunately, most of many of them who left Afghanistan and currently are working in outside of Afghanistan they are working in jobs entirely unrelated to their expertise because their credential has not or are not recognized and no structure channel exists through which their expertise can be directed to their country. As a professor of political science, I think we need to redefine the political participation and inclusive governance, because they have been understood quite differently in Afghan context. and most of practitioners and civil society activists understand them as power sharing, while the meaning goes beyond that. And it includes economic, social, civic, and cultural domination. In light of this, I think the role of professionals and experts and academics is significant. As you know, currently, all formal diplomatic channels are blocked, and, you know, my engagement has not produced a meaningful shift in the Taliban's approach to its international obligations. And I think track two diplomacy is a productive alternative. in this situation, and we can think about that and focus on that. And Afghan academics and professionals are the natural and main actors for track two diplomacy. because all communities trust them and they connected to colleagues inside of Afghanistan. They have knowledge and they are familiar with the context and know what kind of methods is more actionable or you can apply the project or policies or programs. And they can play a significant role in bringing Afghan closer to one another in this situation. And about how can they participate and engage, I can say at least in three areas they can play a significant role. First, in the Doha process working groups, as you know, for this time they have two working groups, including counter narcotics and the private sectors. In this working group and the future working group in Doha process, Afghan economists, psychologists, and legal scholars should be part of the expert layer. providing independent analysts alongside international bodies and other side who are included in the process. Second, in all UN agencies who are working in Afghanistan, who are active in Afghanistan, including UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, and other agencies who are active in Afghanistan and working on Afghanistan, Afghan technical specialists should be engaged in any program design, assessment, monitoring, and in decision-making level because they are familiar with the context and they know what are the real demands of Afghan people. And third, Afghan legal professionals and public policy experts are essential contributors to the independent investigative mechanism. And I think there are many other areas that the professionals can contribute as technical experts, but we can discuss later.

Thank you. Thank you, Zakia. I will I'm going to open the floor for questions because I'd really like us to have an interactive discussion and I'm sure there will be lots of follow-ups around the role of the diaspora and you know, how to bridge the Afghans inside and outside. But maybe before I do that, we've heard a bit about, you know, the role of the region. We've heard about the importance of an Afghan-led and owned process. but a little bit less about specifically what you would like to see from the UN. And we're, you know, in, we have, what, six months to go before UNAMA strategic review is due. And then there's going to be the renewal of the UNAMA mandate in June. And so I just be curious before we open up to the floor or ambassador cycle, if you could reflect on what you see as the role of the UN, UNAMA, the new SRSG within this process?

It's been 81 years when the UN was established to prevent trouble, to prevent wars. If you look at the number of wars in the past 81 years, it is quite a number, a large number of wars that we have seen. And we must have lost more than, what, 20 million who lost their lives in the Second World War? Or I don't know how many millions. I just correct me if I'm wrong, but in the case of Afghanistan, it looks like the UNAMA mandate is very reactive, has remained reactive. We see the deterioration, rapid deterioration of human rights while the actual mandate, it says that you should prevent, but UNAMA continues to report on what happens. I understand a review is and hopefully will take place. I think it's important that UNAMA becomes proactive and preventative. That's the expectation of the people of Afghanistan, what we heard, the people who are calling AMU, they all want to be heard. The highest place that they look at is the UN Security Council. And the Council is in a position to really have a fair review of the UNAMA mandate. Not that they bring anything -- well, hopefully they could bring new elements, but taking the existing contents of the mandate serious, because over there, for example, it talks about political outreach. Now, how many times you have seen UNAMA's representative in the conferences of the opposition? Almost none. And the question is why? The mandate says that you should have outreach, equal outreach, and good offices. But it looks like UNAMA has been heavily engaged with the Taliban. And because the Taliban keep warning that if you engage with the opposition, then I will not talk to you. And the same thing goes to the entire Doha process. You go and bring the women around the negotiating table, then we will stay in Kabul. And then you have to say to the Taliban, okay, no, no, no, we will not bring in the women, please come. My fear is that the Doha process at the end of the day may win the Taliban, but they will lose the people of Afghanistan. And remember, the UN, while we have got the GA debate in here, is supposed to be relevant to those who need it most. And at the moment, the people of Afghanistan need the UN most. So do you want to listen to the people of Afghanistan or to those who have taken them hostage? Somewhere you have to understand the diplomatic sensitivities, but I think going too far in the hope of winning the Taliban, in the hope of seeing the Taliban opening girls' schools, and in my mind it will be too late because the curriculum has already been changed. My fear is we might see our young girls turning into terrorists, highly radicalized. So you may see that, but the people of Afghanistan will be completely confused about the UN role and the charter of the UN. So there are other things too. For example, the sanctions regime, which has been there for years, hasn't been reviewed. Still, if you have a look at the sanctions regime, the Taliban or the insurgents of the Republic Anyway, I asked a member of the just this morning, I asked a member of the Council, the Security Council, has the mandate has the sanctions regime been reviewed? No. Is there any plan to review it? No. If anything, there are a couple of members of the Security Council who are just saying that everything is fine in Afghanistan. I shouldn't say a couple, at least one. Everything is fine. So I think we need to really get serious and it looks like it is important for the five permanent members not to see towards Afghanistan through their geopolitical games but through the genuine interest of the 45 million people of Afghanistan. And that's what the charter says. The charter has mandated members of the Security Council to take care of the troubles of the world based on the wishes of their own people, not based on your geopolitical calculations.

Okay, great. Well, then I will hand it back to the ambassador to open up for questions.

Thank you. Thank you so much, Molin, for ably moderating the panel. And now we will open the floor for Q&A and questions. And we would be very happy that you can, if you can just press the button and introduce yourself and then either make a statement or intervention or just ask your question. So we have one friend on the right side, please.

Assalamu alaikum and hi, everyone. My name is Fazal Montaz. I'm the chief operating officer for Sahara Programs. And so I have two questions. One is kind of-- my first question is to Asilajon Wardak. If you go to history and you see the Doha Agreement, as you were part of this agreement, why this agreement was not been public? public doesn't know about this Doha agreement still. Like I don't know, like most of us, what was in this agreement, what it includes, why it's ambiguous, number one. My second question is from Najif Izadhasib. So when we are talking like led by Afghans, Afghan included negotiations, who are those leaders? We have a huge leadership vacuum, lack of public trust among our own leaderships. distress, and who's going to identify those leaders that can be like, you know, an Afghan included, like including Hazara, including Turkmen, Tajik, Pashtun, who's going to identify this thing? I'm asking you because you have never been part of the government. We used to be. So that's why you can answer it better. Thank you so much.

Nargis Nahon from Faragid. I don't have any question, but I have three suggestions. First of all, for all the regional country, when they are talking about inclusivity of Afghanistan, whether it's about inclusive government or inclusive governance, I believe they need to practice that first themselves. In the past five years, we have been knocking door of all of you, but no country from the region has so far met and engaged with the women of Afghanistan, and as well as with the civil society. I think if you engage with women of Afghanistan, make it public, and as was with the civil society, then that gives you the word, you are worth the strength to ask the Taliban to do the same. By not doing it yourself and asking the Taliban to do it, they know very well that you don't mean what you ask for. Point number two is about incentive that, again, some of the countries are asking for more incentive for the Taliban. You have given the whole country with rights of 50% of the population and a plate for them, in return for nothing. What other incentive do you expect us to give it to them? I think the time has come for pressure for them rather than incentive. And the third point that I would like to make is about UNAMA. There is an opportunity about mandate of UNAMA that we get together, make it stronger. When we make the mandate of UNAMA stronger, it's not only strengthening us, the Afghan opposition groups, women's group and civil society. It's also strengthening the international community when they are demanding reform from the Taliban. It is even strengthening the position of those Taliban that they are interested in negotiation and reconciliation because they say that there is a high demand and we have to deliver. And it's also strengthening the position of the UN SSG because she can go and say that, look, I have this mandate and I have to deliver upon it and I cannot will go lower than this. But by having a very general and weak mandate, I think we are weakening our positions, UNAM's position, and as well as the position of anybody who is interested in reconciliation and peace. Thank you.

Thank you, Nergis Can, for your suggestions. Any other questions, or we move to the answers first? Yes, please.

Sorry, thank you very much. I'm from the Republic of Liberia. And as we all know, Liberia is a member of the Security Council. And I attended the last event, I think, in the same room or the one next. A lot of conversation around the role of women, the lack of inclusivity, and governance, the role of the Taliban, the engagement of the international community. But then we end on a note that the Security Council was both culpable for most of the things that are now happening, I mean, in a certain sense, and also had a key to unlocking the current stalemate. I don't, I'm not from Afghanistan, but I have experience personally and our mission tries to say this whenever we have a chance to intervene, that we know what it feels like for a country to be in this state. You are not at war, but you are also not having the fullness of peace. And there are a lot of friendly countries on the Security Council, but every time we get a criticism that the Council isn't thinking much about the situation in Afghanistan. And I think that is a little bit unfair. We know from the perspective of Afghans, there is nothing that can be done to contain the frustration with the current situation. But there are conversations being held on the issue of Afghanistan. The resolution 2626, which was passed before we got on the Council, is different from the current resolution that renewed the mandate of UNAMA 22. So changes are happening in the mandate as part of the process of searching for the leverage point to put pressure on the Taliban. But we all know the Security Council is a consensus-based group. No matter what you want, what you think, you have to form consensus in order for action to be taken. So it is not so hopeless. We think progress is happening. In resolution 2721, the entire roadmap that was outlined in the assessment report on Afghanistan, it was endorsed by the Security Council. And most of the The points in there which were supposed to be reciprocated by the Taliban have been enforced from the perspective of the Security Council, with the exception of one important one, which is the appointment of a special envoy. And that was a sticking point in the last negotiation before the renewal of the UNAMA mandate. It took a long time. I think we even had to do short-term technical go-over in order to extend the negotiation. Over the past four, five weeks, we have had a series of discussions on Afghanistan. That's how important it is. Liberia is an African country representing the A30. Afghanistan is a far on the A30 mechanism. That's how important it is. So I think the problem here is the Security Council knows what it wants for Afghanistan, and that includes the participation of the Afghans in that process. The problem we see from where we sit on the council is the approach, how to get there. What kind of engagement do we want? What's the realistic definition of the mosaic process? If we can find consensus on that, there will be progress in Afghanistan. We had a situation where there was still made in Liberia for a long time. Should the international community deal with the rebel leader Charles Taylor? or just neglecting, even though he had 85% of the country. And that was a big issue. We found a way with the help of the international community to get past that. So I think if we define what kind of engagement the international community should do, because there are some members of the council who feel neglecting the Afghan people because you don't want to deal with the Taliban. will be increasing the humanitarian situation there. While others think engaging with them too much is indirectly legitimizing their control over the country. So we need to really find the friendly voices and push a uniform position instead of recounting the problem and generally criticizing all members of the Council.

Thank you. Thank you. Let's get to the answers and then we get back to the second round of questions. So there was a question for Ms. Wardak and a question for Mr. Najafi Zada. Ms. Wardak, please.

Thank you so much, our brother from Sahara. I think you know better than everybody that, because you're in media, that the agreement, the Doha agreement, was between the US government and then the Taliban. The government of Afghanistan as a state was not involved in that agreement. So this question should be asked from those that they arranged the Doha Agreement and then signed the agreement, and then why they hid the agreement. Not only the agreement, but there were lots of attachments that now we are hearing that there were lots of attachments also. So this question should be asked that me as a diplomat, I was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then my colleagues also, no one was aware of what was in Doha Agreement.

That's possible. If not, that's okay. Okay.

The question of leadership, right? I'm not sure if we have a leadership vacuum or a leadership outburst. I think it's pretty, I think we can argue that both are the case. In my view, we have to move from, when it comes to the question of leadership, I fully agree that Afghanistan suffered greatly from lack of ownership and lack of leadership for the past 20 years. Fine. Going forward, it has to move from the question of who to the question of what. I think there is a unanimous consensus over the question of what. We all want a transition. We all want girls to go to school. We all want to move beyond sort of the status quo. And I don't see much of a competition on the sort of overarching theme and discussion that has been happening. And that is unfortunately overlooked by the personalities of some of the messengers and some of the speakers who speak here or there. And that is unfortunately also part of the historical references that are there when it comes to the questions of Afghanistan. I think the Security Council debate is very important. Maybe colleagues would jump in. But my one advice would be, sir, to to detach or unload some of the political weight that are there on the shoulders of UNAMA. UNAMA is a Taliban liaison office at best. And that is effective, it is needed, it has to be there. But if you want to think beyond engaging the Taliban, then you have to think about other elements of it. If the title special envoy is, is, uh, uh, as you said, is debated, is challenging. What about a special coordinator? What about appointing somebody who is not in charge of only Afghanistan, sort of as a special advisor to the Secretary General, who is in charge of a thematic issue that include Afghanistan as well? So there are so many workarounds that we can discuss that. So once you have that functionality enabled, part of the independent assessment, then you open, I think, the mandate and its implementation. to sort of wider outreach within the Afghan community as well as in the region. So that is probably one criticism that I also believe that is very valid when it's addressed to the Security Council. Thank you.

How UNAMA can help with this, everything that's going on in Afghanistan. I want to say that the UNAMA mission would not succeed in Afghanistan because they cannot document all the injustices that are going on in Afghanistan, also the human rights violations. So when they cannot document, then they cannot report it accurately. So then there's a gap between people and also UNAMA and also the reportation of the violations of human rights and all these injustices that are going on in Afghanistan. And also, like, there's another concern about people that they are living in different parts of the world. I mean, Afghans. So the absence of Ghanaians in Afghanistan does not make Afghanistan a peaceful country. And we all know that there are so many people in different parts of the world and especially in our neighboring countries that they are undocumented and they're getting deported. While we know that Afghanistan is not a safe country for the majority of people to return, especially for women, that we know that women do not have any voice, they cannot go to school, they cannot work. So then how can we fix this problem? Because it's a very concerning issue for Afghans in different parts of the So how can we work on this issue to bring a pause in deportation of Afghans globally? Thank you. And my question is for all, whoever responds, that would be great. Thank you so much.

Thank you, madam. My name is Ayub Barfani. I would like to thank the organizer for having this important discussion because we also established entity called Forum for National Dialogue based in Istanbul, dealing with dialogue. Therefore, I believe such discussion, political process, inclusive governance, and regional security is so interconnected. And thank you very much for this timely side event and discussion. As colleagues mentioned here, unfortunately, we witness that one of the main problem in Afghanistan, that Afghanistan is not the center of the agenda now, it is the lack of purpose of unity among the international community, particularly the P5, and we see the conflict of priorities of sometime interest of these countries in our region in Afghanistan. Without dealing with United Nations, because I spent almost 25 years of my age here in the United Nations here, without the unity among the Security Council, because we have so many resolutions in the Security Council, Ambassador, as witness knows, so many documents. Without the unity of the Security Council, UNAMA will remain as it is in office, will not be able to have any outreach, will not be able to implement its mandate, Therefore, we hope that those big priorities for the P5s will end soon and Afghanistan will be the center of the agenda again. The second, acknowledging the reality now also as we know that the majority of Afghans here witness the history of regime changes by violence for decades. Unfortunately, we always had in Afghanistan the culture of regime changes by force and starting from zero. We all know the root causes, what's the main root cause that we are talking about, a lot of speakers mentioned today. And in order to avoid another bloody war and repeat the same cycle regime of changes in Afghanistan, probably the political process is very important to solve Afghanistan problem through the political process and have a sustainable stability in the country. But due to the lack of the unity within the UN Security Council, even due to lack of the unity, not just P5, but the international community, as the colleagues mentioned, they are not approaching talking to the Afghan diaspora also. During the lack of unity among them or interest among them, what Afghan, Afghans, political and social and scholar groups, youngs and women's and diaspora, what we can do to create a platform, talk to each other, to unite our vision for the future of Afghanistan, to be a force in order to put more pressure on the Security Council, on the countries, and be effective to play our role. Thank you very much. That's my question.

Thank you. I assume this question is for everyone. Do you want to question here?

Thank you, Niloufar Jahan. In response to what our sister mentioned about UNAMA, I think it's not fair to also blame everything under the shoulder of UNAMA. In the absence of Human Rights Commission, in the absence of very strong civil society organization, in the absence of any commission or any accountable things, UNAMA is doing a great job. Now, especially in terms of documentation of violence, especially in the past one year about the violence and the attacks by Pakistani government to the civilian, because civil society organization, they don't have access even to go to those areas. But UNAMA, what is good about UNAMA? One thing, the documentation and reporting, because reports are coming every month and two weeks. There are so many reports produced by UNAMA. Yeah, what is missing, as Ambassador Saikal mentioned, about the political outreach and also about the human rights work, that they still didn't give that platform to Afghan women and then de facto to sit and then to challenge them, asking them question or sit in one table. That's missing, but about the documentation Um, and, uh, reporting, uh, uh, they are very rich and then they are doing all these things. Thank you.

Hi, my name is Meima Murtaza. It's a pleasure to be here. My grandfather was the former ambassador of the UN for 30 years, Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi. So to continue his love for his country is an honor to be here. I'm currently a co-founder of Asil Technology, which is a fintech startup in Afghanistan. So we work with Afghans every single day across the country. I am very worried about the human element, about what's going on with the humanitarian crisis. And I wanted to bring the higher level conversation to a human level. There are several things happening, displacement, child malnutrition, a lack of governance and rule of law, and a lack of private sector engagement due to sanctions and other issues. And so when we think about that, we think about people without jobs, your neighbor anywhere around the country is suffering. And although we are working directly with UN agencies like UNDP, UNICEF, UNAMA as well, and they are trying their best, but there's a lot of hesitancy and their hands are tied as well. There is, I believe, an opportunity with private sector engagement to create jobs and manufacturing and to get people to be able to create livelihoods and resilience for their own families. And so my question is, how do we get stronger support in that direction to help people in an operational way? And I do believe there's a bit more leeway to work with businesses versus NGOs who get more scrutiny. But we need to find a way to bridge civil society, private sector, and the local NGOs and INGOs together to rebuild. Thank you.

Hi, my name is Survi Kumar. I'm from the UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate. Since 2021, the terrorist landscape has evolved drastically given the return of the Taliban, specifically in South Asia and Central Asia, based on the analytical sanctions monitoring team reports, reports that get made by CTED, by UNOCT, and briefings to the UN Security Council, especially this year, have revealed that the threat landscape continues to worsen, that the, as you mentioned, the transnational aspect or nature of these militant groups have gotten worse and have spread a lot beyond Afghanistan into countries like Pakistan, Tajikistan, and even further away. And I was wondering, given that counterterrorism and the security landscape could be a form of regional cooperation and a forum to kind of engage on this very pertinent issue that does affect multiple partners, how can we engage the Security Council and relevant partners, including especially Pakistan, given that they just fought alongside the Durand Line in cross-border attacks, how do we engage while also respecting national sovereignty and protecting civilians on the ground in Afghanistan?

First, I want to congratulate the Finns for providing an extraordinary example for the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation. It was a heroic Finnish resistance that really led the Afghans to help the Afghans to believe that they could defeat the Soviets. So I want to congratulate Independent Diplomat and the mission here, and of course, Andiana, for holding this session. I think the mission is extremely important. The mission of Afghanistan in 2001, the last time the Taliban had to leave, was crucial in enabling the pathway to the construction of the Islamic Republic. So I want to encourage that. As far as UNAMA is concerned, it's unfortunate, but UNAMA is effectively a hostage to the Taliban. They can't even bring their own employees back into the office, the women employees. And maybe there are things that they could do to get the Taliban to agree to that, but they haven't seemed to be able to do that. The appointment of an outside person as recommended could be really important. And the new Secretary General could appoint a personal representative with only informal consent from the system, as far as I understand. And that might be the way to the future. So that's my answer. And my only other question is, There have been an extraordinary amount of discussions among Afghans that we didn't in the last couple of months, unlike anything that we saw in 2001. And so I commend you to bring more of those kinds of discussions here into the UN so that the representatives can see them. Thank you.

A little background, so during this process, I was responsible for financial transition plan among the donors and the Afghan government, so I was coordinating those transition plans and I was seeing these things like first-hand, including intellectual properties. When it comes to UNAMA, UNDP, I think one of the reasons, I'll be very frank and blunt, on the record I will say, identification of ghost police, ghost army, these stuff were part of this UNDP and UNAMA's blunder. Number one, that was there. I don't like to take the convention over there, but it's about the resolve and willingness. Our intellectual properties for Afghan government, not only in Afghanistan, in other countries as well, it has never been handed over to the countries they had the control, and Afghan government couldn't do anything, number one. Number two, when it comes to, like, as you know, John, when I was mentioning about, it's like, even if you guys were not the stakeholders, why would you not, I'm not talking about you, why we as an Afghan government, were we sitting till 15th of August and waiting when you did not have stake and decisions over there? The public world, like, you know, public has the right to ask this question and it has to be like, you know, it needs to be like resolved, so we're moving forward. So what happens is if you are saying, if we're saying an African-led organization, first of all, it's really important, do we have this capacity to lead this thing or not? Same, we did not have capacity to handle the peace process, and we saw the result. So this is really important, identification of human capital, intellectual properties, and resolution to the problem. That comes with inclusiveness, inclusion, clarity. trust building and removing the trust deficit among the communities, tribes.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you very much. You raise your hand just briefly and then we get down to our speakers for their intervention.

Peace Foundation in Washington. And about three years ago, we drafted an initiative on Afghanistan for Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process in a national dialogue. And we have been working this for three years, and we made many, many trips to overseas and talking to, and I made trips to Kabul. My brother John Dixon has also accompanied me to Afghanistan. We have met with foreign minister, with many head of the national security and other Taliban who have decision makers in Taliban, who have met with all of them a few times. And I think that one thing that the difficulty that we see, the topic of this inclusive governments is the Taliban have complained that there is not enough communication between them and the international community. So therefore, we want to open the door and communicate with them, especially with the United States. I think that's one of the main things I have reached to the US Congress, which is I regularly work with them in Washington. with the African Caucus. We have mentioned this to the National Security, the President's office here, all the requests. And I'm hoping that this is the first time that the UN, and thanks to the Annan Foundation for this, and that we're discussing this, and this is not going to be like any other initiative that it's going to be, after this meeting, it's going to be end, and nobody will talk about it. I think if we're going to pursue this, there is a from our experience working in Afghanistan the last three years, that we see a clear indication from Taliban that they're willing to see the authority and speak with them and resolve the problem. And I have another trip coming in two weeks to go again, and I think that each trip will give us more hope for this kind of national dialogue. We also have discussed with this Indonesia, Malaysia, Yemen, and I'm sorry, Oman, and many other countries to host this meeting for the first trust building. And that's what we do, and I'm hoping to continue this work with the United Nations sponsorship.

All right, thank you. Thank you very much for all your interventions and questions. We give the floor to our speakers to have their final reflections in light of the questions that were asked. So did you have anything else?

I think on the engaging question, President Trump invited the Taliban-- David. you remember that? The Taliban did not come, right? So it's not about the level of engagement. You can have the U.S. President or the U.N. Secretary General to engage with the Taliban at whatever level you want, but you're not going to get the result that we're all discussing. Amina Mohammed, number two here. Do you know where did she go? She went to Kandahar. And who did she meet? The deputy governor. Right? So this is, I know that there are certain individuals who advocate for sort of more senior level Taliban versus American engagement. But in my view, given these opportunities that the Taliban had, The UN's number two went all the way to Kandahar. The Taliban were invited to Camp David by the US President. They declined. So it's not a question of engagement. It's a question of commitment and a question of will on the Taliban side because they prefer the status quo. And the status quo in their mind and influenced by certain players in the region is what will serve them best long term.

Thank you. Honorable, and then I'll come back to you, and maybe for a brief intervention. Yeah, please.

I'd like to be very brief on the international community, and especially for member states. I have one advice that they should come from bilateral engagement to the multilateral engagements. This is important, and for Afghans also, because in the past five years, they are asking, "What should we do? What should we do?" And then we provided a pragmatic set of recommendations. For Afghan people, the future is ours. We have to be united. We have to work together. As I mentioned in my talking points, that we don't need anyone's permission. We have to start being together. Thank you.

I have to jump briefly and then we have to end. Yes.

Brief in response to what our brother raised and what Najaf Sadat has said. You're meeting them again in a few months. Can you also please ask them why they are not engaging with Afghan women and girls? Why are they not talking with their own people first? Can you also ask them why they are not engaging with Afghans and diaspora who had to leave the country because of their discriminatory policies? I think if they come first, talk with us, it would be much easier for all of us to go talk to the international community together. Why are they undermining their own people and they are just going after the international community? Because without the legitimacy by their own people, they will never be able to get the UN seat that they are wishing to have. I hope you convey our message to them. Thank you.

Thank you. And then Ambassador Soyeb and then Ms. Adli.

I think the comment of our colleague from Liberia, we know the Council dynamic, of course, is changing every now and then given the membership in there. But then we our hope is the ten elected members, especially your own mission, to make sure that you raise the voice of the people and you make sure that you bring the focus on the actual issue and take away the geopolitical confrontation from it. Yeah. Especially one of our neighbor, which is a member of the council. We all know that there is a lot of geopolitical games being played. Also, I have to correct myself earlier. I said that 20 people lost their lives in the Second World War. It was actually 75 to 80 million. It was the first World War that 20 million people lost their lives, but it was 80 million. It was because of 80 million people losing their lives that the UN got the momentum to be really established and stop preventing further killing. As far as deportation, counterterrorism, and humanitarian issues and private sector and all that is concerned, I think the root of all of that is to bring legitimacy back to governance in Afghanistan. Without the rule of law, without a legitimate government, no matter what we do, we will face problems. But I fully understand that at the same time, while we're working for the return of legitimacy, we have to do our best and to make sure that the situation doesn't get worse. And for that, I can understand certain level of engagement with the Taliban because they have taken the entire country hostage. I can understand working with the private sector. I can understand the engagement of our neighbors. I can understand the engagement of the UN, simply because you have to talk to the hostage takers, you know, at the end of the day. But we shouldn't lose sight from the bringing the rule of law a legitimacy to governance in Afghanistan if we want to see change. As far as regime change is concerned and violence and all that, whether we should do it in a violent way or not, I think it's the Taliban which is driving the people of Afghanistan to a point that they have to stand up. And it's our job to either manage this standing up or not manage it. If we don't manage it, it will be very chaotic. I think the people of Afghanistan have got every right to stand up against the tyranny. And in the process of this, it's the Taliban who are responsible for the violence. And it's our job to make sure that we coordinate it in the best interest of Afghanistan.

Thank you very much.

Ms. Adli. Thank you.

Regarding your question about the bridge between civil society and entrepreneurs, and also our brother, I think, Mr. Eifani, if I I'm right. I would like to share an experience briefly. I conducted a survey with my team last year about digital participation in democracy with over 700 professionals and academics across 20 countries. And 49% of Afghan professionals expressed they're interested in working in active professional networks. That is why, based off that survey and exploring and study about similar experience in other countries, we develop a model, NCC model, Network Civic Convergence, that create an umbrella for professionals and experts that can work together in interdisciplinary project and programs. I think this model can implement it about other organization and civil society and entrepreneurs. I think it would be a pattern. Thank you.

Thanks to our esteemed panelists and to our active participants who have participated actively into this discussion. Now I give the floor to Mr. Fayer for his closing remarks.

Thank you. Well, thank you so much. As we conclude, let me thank all our speakers, panelists, participants, and partners for a thoughtful and substantive discussion.

Of course, we would like to give a round of applause to our wonderful panelists for a very great, and also to those participants who also joined online, particularly Ambassador Jayan Prasad. He was our panelist. He was joining from India. And also, let me thank our co-sponsors and co-organizers, Indiana Foundation and Independent Diplomat and Finland. And I don't want to summarize because we already heard all very strong messages from our panelists. But thank you so much. The main message could be that The only solution for Afghanistan is through the Afghans. Afghan people should be supported, should be helped to decide about their future, about their, particularly about the political situation of Afghanistan, and all Afghans should participate in a dialogue that should be Afghan-led, Afghan-owned. and Taliban are not representing Afghan people. They are one part of the solution, but they are not the whole solution. Afghan people, particularly Afghan women, Afghan civil society, political oppositions, democratic forces, and particularly Afghan human rights defenders and human Afghan advocates, they must be included in any process, any political process, particularly the decisions about Afghanistan, about the future of our country. Thank you so much and we wish you a very lovely and good evening to all of you. Thank you so much.