7th meeting, 12th Session of Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations

Good morning, everyone. Distinguished delegates, representatives, I call to order the seventh meeting of the 12th session of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights. Before continuing, I would like to briefly explain how we will be proceeding with the three proposals for amendments to article 3, in view of the close relationship that exists between its paragraphs. First of all, I will be presenting, one after the other, all elements linked to proposal 20 on article 3.1, to proposal 21, which refers to article 3.2, and to proposal 22, which is on article 3.3. Secondly, I will be giving the floor to the legal experts for them to give general comments on the entirety of article 3 and that will be in complement to the background information contained in document CRP 2 with proposals for rewording as well as per the explanation provided today. These explanations, if time permits, following statements by States and other stakeholders will allow the legal experts a final opportunity to respond to questions that have been raised during the dialogue on the rewording proposals. Finally, I will open the floor to Saites and other stakeholders. First, with respect to proposal 20 on article 3.1, then proposal 21 on article 3.2 and finally with respect to proposal 22 on article 3.3. Therefore we'll be addressing the proposal 20 on article 3.1 on the scope of the instrument. As you know, all delegations, the The subjective scope has been one of the themes of greatest interest throughout the session of the group. It has been the subject of much dialogue and proposals. I recognise that the working group currently has a considerable number of inputs, elements and reflections, and I trust that delegations have many tools to reflect on the various alternatives and language proposals to help us to move forward in full line with the mandate that was established under resolution 26/9 and in line with the progressive development of the sessions of the working group in the past 12 years. Therefore, this rewording proposal offers two wording alternatives for the sole purpose of continuing to facilitate identification of possible convergences. In its current wording, which maintains that of the third revised version, it stipulates that the LBI would apply to all business activities, including those of a transnational character. You will recall that we have had that wording since the second revised version, which is accompanied in 3.2 by the possibility that States establish differentiated obligations on the basis of the size, sector and operational context of businesses and the gravity of impacts caused. During the ninth session, In October 2023, delegations expressed a diversity of positions. Some delegations supported the current wording, stressing inter alia that a victim maintains that status even when a business operates solely within a State. that all companies that operate within a jurisdiction should be registered as per internal domestic law. Transnational companies should be focused more on their activities than on the nature or legal status of the companies. Furthermore, a significant number of delegations proposed that the instrument be applied to transnational business companies, corporations and other business enterprises of a transnational nature, in some cases throughout their value chain, in strict consistency with the mandate of resolution 26/9, highlighting the greater economic capacity of those States and the difficulties faced by victims in obtaining reparations from them. an intermediate formula was presented that referred to all business capacities of a transnational character and other business activities. That would be flexible language that could address both concerns. Moreover, during the ninth session, Delegations from various regions agreed that it would be appropriate to dedicate time and space to discussions of the article during the intersessional period, with the support of experts. Specifically, in that spirit, at the second intersessional thematic consultations this year, 2026, different possible wording was presented and practical cases reiterating that focusing on the form or legal nature of businesses could be complex, given difficulties in legally defining transnational corporations and the evolution of the structures of business corporations and value chains, while focusing on the nature of activities instead could give a more adaptable focus or approach. In those consultations, questions were put and ideas were raised regarding the inclusion of state enterprises and how to avoid disproportionate burdens for small and medium-sized businesses. In that respect, we should recall that international instruments on the responsibility of companies generally have abstained from defining multinational and transnational corporations, even though they recognise that it is the activity of an enterprise operating across borders that gives it a transnational nature. I would like to underline that resolution 26/9 mandates the group to regulate activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises". As a reference, it considered, among other sources, the comment to guiding principle 14, the tripartite declaration of principles on multinational corporations and social policy of the ILO, the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises and the interpretative guides of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for 2012 and 2024. On that basis, the chair rapporteur submits to the consideration of the working group two options, each of which is substantially based on proposals presented by States during the ninth session. Option 1, the instrument will apply, quote, to all business activities of a transnational nature and other business activities, unquote. This formulation presented at the ninth session as language that could address different positions. focuses first on the transnational dimension of activities, based on the definitions in articles 1.4 and 1.5, and covers the transnational activities targeted in particular by articles 6, 8, 9 and 11, while excluding other business activities that may be harmful to human rights. Option 2, the instrument will apply to all business activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, quote unquote, taking up the formulation of the mandate of resolution 26/9 and very close to the proposal supported by a significant number of delegations during the ninth session. Both options place the transnational dimension at the heart of the scope of the instrument, although they differ in their starting point. The first option is based on the nature of activities and the second on the subjects who implement them. I reiterate that those options have no legal value. nor do they replace the current text of article 3.1 or the textual proposals submitted by States. Its sole purpose is to help identify a possible basis for convergence on an issue that, as we all know, could be decisive for the full implementation of the mandate of the Human Rights Council and for ensuring the coherence of the future LBI. Now we move to proposal 21 on article 3.2, which allows States parties to establish in the legislation a non-discriminatory basis to differentiate the way in which companies comply with prevention obligations, depending on their size, sector, operational context or the severity of impacts. During the ninth session, a number of textual proposals were made on this paragraph, including interalia: that of expressly linking the article to the preventive obligations that are provided for in article 6, a proposal that was supported by delegations from different regions. In addition, it was proposed to include a reference to the responsibility to respect human rights, rather than to obligations. in addition to limiting the differentiation only to transnational corporations and to expressly mention small and medium-sized enterprises, with regulation sensitive to their characteristics. On that last point, the importance of not imposing disproportionate burdens on small enterprises including small traders operating across borders, was underlined. The second thematic intersessional consultation sought clarification as to whether the reference to size, sector and operational context would allow exemptions for SMEs in relation to due diligence. and underlined the need to avoid disproportionate indirect burdens on them. Several delegations supported maintaining this flexibility and raised the question of whether the provision should be moved elsewhere in the text to better align it with its logic. In that respect, It was observed that article 6 establishes the duty to adopt legislative and other measures to prevent abuses, and that the other provisions of the draft are addressed to states without directly requiring specific conduct from companies. In this context, placing this provision in article 6 would help clarify aspects in which states could differentiate in a non-discriminatory manner due diligence and other preventive measures. With regard to SMEs, a specific mention would expand the current reference to size so that States may consider whether it already covers them. As special sources and references, we took into account the commentary to guiding principle 14 and the interpretative guide of the Office of the High Commissioner of 2024. Consequently, and taking up the proposal made at the 9th session, the link with article 6, the chair rapporteur suggests the following: first, move the provision to the end of article 6, preliminarily identifying it as article 6. Second, simplify the wording so that States parties can establish in their legislation a non-discriminatory basis for differentiating, I quote, "compliance with the prevention obligations provided for in the instrument", unquote, depending on size, sector or operational context of the companies or the gravity of the adverse impact on human rights. That formulation allows the obligation to be fulfilled by different means and covers different types of enterprises, including SMEs and state-owned enterprises. The reference to non-discrimination ensures that no differentiation is drawn by the fact that an enterprise is domestic or foreign. Where this introduction I move to the 22nd and final proposal for rewording, which is to 3.3, which is the material scope, in other words, the human rights that the proposal covers. In its current wording, the paragraph provides that the instrument covers all human rights and fundamental freedoms internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms that bind States Parties. It should be recalled that, in the updated draft LBI, that paragraph was slightly adjusted to the third revised draft, precisely in order to enlist the support of as great a number of States as possible. During the ninth session, ninth meeting, that paragraph gave rise to proposals that reflected different approaches. Some delegations proposed deleting the qualifier "internationally recognised", considering that it imposed a threshold that could lead to a certain subjectivity of application, and referred in general terms to all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Other delegations insisted on maintaining it, emphasising that, in order to be universal, human rights must be recognised and enshrined in international instruments, thus avoiding divergent interpretations by each state. In the same vein, it was proposed to refer to universally recognised rights in the light of the Vienna declaration and programme of action of 1993. It was also proposed to limit the material scope to the human rights treaties ratified by each state in order to provide legal certainty on the obligations assumed. Finally, It was proposed to refer to all international human rights instruments, including non-binding ones, or to add express references to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, customary international law and international environmental law. At the second inter-sessional thematic consultation, Several delegations expressed concern that the current formulation might extend to the obligations of States beyond the treaties to which they are party. Other delegations and organisations cautioned that linking the material scope to treaty obligations of each State could create gaps in protection and reduce it to an undesirable minimum. It was also asked whether companies operating across borders should respect the rights recognised in treaties that bind the home state, the host state or the states in which they operate along value chains. In that regard, it It was noted that that paragraph is particularly relevant to the instrument, especially to prevention obligations under article 6, since it determines what rights companies must consider in their due diligence processes. In that regard, it is important to take into account the following. First, eliminating the qualifier "internationally recognised" without adding additional clarifications, could have an amplifying effect towards rights that are recognised only in domestic law. Second, limiting the material scope to treaty obligations assumed by each state could lead to significant differences in the content of the rights that are protected. in view of the uneven ratification of human rights instruments, an issue that could be considered in the light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Third, with regard to international humanitarian law and international environmental law, states may consider whether the specific reference in this paragraph adds elements that are not already present or whether it is more convenient to integrate specific elements of both branches in articles 6 or 16. With respect to international customary law and the general principles of law, which operate independently of the reference thereto in a treaty, With those elements, the chair rapporteur puts before the working group two options that are elaborated, taking into account the different concerns that have been expressed since the ninth session, including legal certainty about obligations that are actually assumed by states, the need to avoid subjective thresholds and the desirability of a common basis in international law. Both replace the current formula with an express reference to human rights that bind state parties, and they differ in the way in which the sources of those obligations are identified. In option 1, human rights are reflected in the treaties to which those states are parties in customary international law in the general principles of law and in the internal law of the States Parties. This option lists the different sources of obligations in line with those considered in the fourth proposal for reformulation presented during the 11th session with respect to article 6. Option 2, which is more concise, human rights that bind state parties under international human rights law. This refers to a common basis of international law without listing its sources. It should be noted that, in both options, the qualifier "internationally recognised" and the reference to fundamental freedoms are deleted, since their content would be covered by the reference to the human rights that bind State parties.

Like in the proposal on article 3.1, these options seek only to facilitate dialogue on an issue that has given rise to different positions throughout the process, without replacing the current text. all the textual proposals submitted by states. With this introduction then of the various proposals for the three paragraphs of Article 3, as I'd said previously, as we've done previously, I'll give the floor to legal experts for them to share some general points with us. Go ahead, please.

Thank you very much, Chairperson-Rapporteur. Good morning, colleagues. Colleagues, today marks the 59th day that this Intergovernmental Working Group has been meeting in a regular session since 6 July 2015. It is therefore particularly significant to go back to one of the main questions raised by this instrument, the content of Article 3 on the scope of the LBI. Since the beginning of the negotiation, a key aspect has been defining which human rights should be covered by the LBI. There are several options, as the Chairperson already presented, all internationally recognized human rights. internationally recognized rights in addition to those that may have been recognized domestically or on account of regional treaties, rights established in treaties to which states are parties to, or in addition to those with a treaty basis, those that have acquired the status of customary international law or that constitute general principles of law. As mentioned in the second intersessional consultation in April this year, this appears to be one of the most legally complex provisions in the LBI on account of the varying levels of ratification of international human rights law instruments. And yet, it is also important to look at the statistics. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has 196 state parties. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has 193 state parties. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has 189 state parties. The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 182 state parties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has 175 state parties. The Convention Against Torture also has 175 state parties. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 174 state parties. the Convention on Enforced Appearances has 78 state parties, and the Convention on Migrant Workers and their Families, 60 state parties. In general terms, there is a significant degree of ratification of treaties recognizing specific rights for certain groups, which acts as a common basis for state action. This complements the twin covenants, which encapsulate the general recognition of all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and which both enjoy a large degree of ratification by numerous states. And as we are aware, and as was already mentioned as well by the chairperson rapporteur, this is without prejudice to the direct application of customary international law and general principles of law, as noted by the International Law Commission in its draft conclusions on identification of customary international law and in its draft conclusions on general principles of law. As the intergovernmental working group has progressed in the detailed analysis of the LBI, it has become clearer that certain provisions encapsulate specific duties that act independently from other provisions in the text or that don't have a cross-cutting effect. But a more pressing question, especially at this stage of treaty design and negotiation, is the function that Article 3 in general and 3.3 specifically performs in relation to the rest of the operative sections of the treaty. For this reason, we consider it important to reflect on how the paragraphs of article 3 interact with the rest of the LBI. Article 4, as you can see in the screen, is a case in point. With the exception of article 4.1, which acts as a chapeau in the provision, the specific content included in the rest of article 4 denotes a series of rights that would operate on their own, regardless of the provision in 3.3. The same can be mentioned regarding Article 5 on protection of victims, which focuses on state parties' obligations under the LBI, and it would act also independently from other international commitments states have agreed upon. Article 7 has a similar function, containing different measures that state parties to this LBI would have to adopt to facilitate access to judicial and non-judicial remedy, specifically with regards to this instrument. Article 8 also does not necessarily have a strict relationship with Article 3.3, although it would interact directly with the provisions under Articles 4 to 7. Articles 9, 10, 11, and 12 follow relatively the same path, that is, they establish specific duties under this instrument that would operate independently of Article 3.3. What remains is the role that the phrase, "all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms binding on the state parties of this LBI," plays in relation to Article 6 on prevention. Arguably, more than focusing on the ratification of human rights instruments by states, the central focus of considering all internationally recognized human rights is the material basis that companies should consider while undertaking human rights due diligence processes. It is in this aspect, it is this aspect which, in our view, merits further consideration. If you review article 6.2 B and C of the updated draft, it reads as follows. State parties shall adopt appropriate legislative, regulatory, and other measures to, B, ensure respect by business enterprises for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and C, ensure the practice of human rights due diligence by business enterprises. The first paragraph already contains an equivalent phrasing that recognizes the obligation of state parties to take measures to ensure respect of all internationally recognized human rights. It is in this regard where some of the conversations from yesterday become relevant. States may integrate in that material scope rights that have gained international recognition and also those that may have been developed at the regional or domestic level. An argument could be raised, however, to refer to the fact that if certain states have not ratified specific treaties, they would not have a duty to adopt those obligations in their domestic jurisdiction, which could potentially then not be required in human rights diligence processes. At this point, it is relevant for states and other stakeholders to consider the potential role that Article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could play in this regard. Article 35 of the VCLT reads as follows. An obligation arises for a third state from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third state expressly accepts that obligation in writing. This article could give states that have not ratified a particular human rights instrument an opportunity to accept a specific obligation in writing for the purpose of article 6.2 and, which could serve to create a more uniform standard in terms of the material basis of human rights that businesses would have to uphold in their transnational activities. We submit these views respectfully for your consideration as the process moves forward towards a new stage with the aim of finding avenues that could facilitate building bridges in terms of which human rights should be considered the material scope of the instrument. And with this, I pass over the floor to my colleague, Kinda Mohamadi, for intervention on Article 3.2. Thank you.

Thank you and good morning, delegates and colleagues. Thanks, Chair, for giving us the opportunity to share some thoughts. So I'm going to address article 3.2. As in a way of just contextualizing what I'm going to say, it is clear that the drafting of this provision, both in the current draft text as well as the Chair's suggested language, cross-references to the prevention obligation. We see that it is this article on prevention, article 6, would be a natural place for this provision. And the change of the placement to article 6 will already help clarify that this provision is meant to address the means of implementation of the prevention obligations. So we have heard several states in the last few days raise points related to SMEs. This has been the case as well in previous sessions, particularly noting that the legally binding instrument should not impede the economic function of SMEs and that the impact on SMEs should be carefully addressed when designing the LBI. If you want to consider the issue of burdensomeness on SMEs, we can see that it arises specifically in the context of the implementation of prevention obligations. Because if we revise the other sections of the legally binding instrument, we can note that the burdensomeness or potential burdensomeness of implementation generally concerns the implementation by the states. Thus, moving the provision 3.2 to article six will further help positioning this provision in relation to SME related concerns as also the chair highlighted. have indicated. So, in this, taking this context into consideration, I would like to highlight two points, building on what the Chair already shared, and share three propositions for Members' considerations. In terms of the two elements, the first is How we read it, this provision would not provide grounds to carve out certain entities from the scope of the legally binding instrument because they are considered nationals of the implementing state, such as state-owned enterprises or companies that are majority owned by nationals of the implementing state. And the reference to non-discriminatory basis, as the Chair have pointed out, would help ensure that the measures taken on the basis of this provision do not differentiate between business entities depending on whether they are considered domestic or national or foreign. So in this sense, this provision would not raise concerns pertaining to discrimination in this kind of discrimination. The second point I want to raise, also building on what the Chair pointed out, is that the provision would provide grounds for States to implement the prevention obligation in ways that account for what the guiding principles refer to, as proportionality of the means of implementation in reference to size, as well as other factors which are addressed under Guiding Principle 14 and its related commentary. For example, recent practice in relation to due diligence and corporate sustainability applies the obligations in reference to size of the companies and their turnover. This would be one example of the interventions or measures that would be justified under the discretion given by Article 3.2. Besides these two elements, the three propositions that I would like to share are the following: one, is that states might want to consider adding further language to explicitly connect or contextualize this provision in relation to concerns pertaining to SMEs. For example, states may consider language at the beginning or the end of the provision that refers to addressing implementation burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises as they are defined by domestic law. And the importance of reference to domestic law here is because SMEs are defined under domestic law of different jurisdictions, and the definitions do vary across jurisdictions based on various economic conditions. So if you look, you can see that generally SMEs are defined as non-subsidiary independent firms which employ less than a given number of employees, but the definition often varies in relation to the number of employees referenced, the turnover referenced, and in some cases, the capital investment referenced. So this is one proposition. The second proposition is that states might want to consider the utility and the implications of the wording at the beginning of the article, referring to notwithstanding Article 3.1. That reference might be read as grounds to carve out certain entities from the scope of the LBI, because article 3.1 refers to scope. However, as was explained by the chair, And as members have discussed, Article 3.2 over the years, this provision is not meant for the purposes of carving out certain entities, but is meant to provide grounds for aligning the means of implementation in relation to size, operational context, and other factors. So this is the second proposition. And the third relates to the importance that the discretion granted to states under this Article 3.2 or 6.x does not undermine the effectiveness or it should not undermine the effectiveness of the preventive measures required by Article 6. For those purposes, one consideration could be considering wording that pertains to positive action that could be taken to support SMEs in relation to indirect implications that might arise, such as trickle-down effect from large entities in a value chain onto SMEs or smaller entities such as suppliers or other service providers in this chain. which would arise in the context where the entities that have the obligation are trying to undertake certain assessments or collect certain data, et cetera. Those kinds of trickle-down effects could arise in the context of transnational activities clearly, because the big firm or the big company that would have the obligation in relation to due diligence or other preventative measures could be located in a jurisdiction different from where the SME is located. So such kind of language could address the role of the companies undertaking due diligence or other preventative measures their role in supporting the SMEs within their value chains or within other business relationships they might hold, with a view to fulfilling those prevention and due diligence obligations without adding undue burdens on the SMEs. So these are three proposals for your consideration, and we hope this will be helpful. Thank you.

Good morning, colleagues. I will now share some thoughts on article 3.1. Since this working group was established in 2015, one of its central debates has been the subjective scope of the instrument, which actors and which activities it should address, and how a legal instrument can effectively address business activities in a globalized economy. To descend, several options have been proposed, referring to, as Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 does, to the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, attempting to define what a transnational corporation is, focusing on business activities, of a transnational character, also worded as transnational business activities. Other proposals have used the formula that cover all business activities of a transnational character and other business activities. Some of these options are not new. They have all been debated at the United Nations and in other international organizations for a while. Article 3.1 thus addresses the question of whether the scope of the LBI should include transnational corporations, especially considering historically the concerns around ensuring accountability for human rights abuses, particularly where complex corporate structures, cross-border operations and jurisdiction barriers make access to justice difficult, as stated in resolution 26/9. It is thus an accountability gap that prompted the draft of Article 3.1 in the first place. For example, the difficulties in attributing responsibility across corporate groups, accessing information and evidence, establishing jurisdiction, and obtaining effective remedies in cases where business activities extend across several states. A first question for states is whether it is necessary or helpful to rely on a concept that has proven hard to define. The definition of the transnational corporation was one of the points on which no agreement was reached in intergovernmental negotiations in the 70s and 80s. Nevertheless, In legal terms, a transnational corporation is generally understood as a group of companies operating in a coordinated way across jurisdictions under the general direction of a parent company. It is more accurately described as a transnational corporate group. Such groups are vertically integrated to varying degrees with particular entities responsible for particular functions. They work with suppliers and contractors in different jurisdictions under commercial contracts that make up their supply chains or value chains. It is this variety of legal entities across many jurisdictions, each with separate legal personality, what makes the concept hard to capture in law, at least if the group is treated as a single entity, which it is not. The development of business and human rights over the past two decades offers relevant experience. For example, on legislation, several jurisdictions have chosen to place duties on the parent companies of corporate groups regarding their subsidiaries, including those abroad, to take preventative measures, notably through human rights due diligence. depending on the functions of the entities within the group, these duties may extend beyond the ultimate parent company. Some of these laws also recognize, on a risk-based approach, that abuses in supply chains may need to be addressed by entities in the corporate group. On case law, courts in several jurisdictions have held that a parent company may in principle be liable under civil law, depending on how far it is involved in an overseas subsidiary and on its actual or constructive awareness of the risk of harm. Case law has also recognised possible civil liability in supply chains, for instance, where a dominant customer fails to use its leverage over a supplier. In other cases, judicial oversight has followed prosecutions for failures to oversee and implement human rights policies within supply chains. These experiences show that business activities, rather than the form or structure of the legal entity, are increasingly the basis for determining legal liability. International instruments on the responsibilities of business enterprises have generally avoided defining transnational or multinational enterprises. Several of them do recognize that the transnational character lies in the activities of a corporate group operating across borders. Examples are the commentary to UNGP 14, paragraph 6 of the ILO Tripartite Declaration, and paragraph 4 of the OECD Guidelines. Resolution 26/9 mandates the working group to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. Its footnote describes other business enterprises as those with a transnational character in their operational activities. The second part of the footnote excludes local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law. So states may wish to bear in mind and consider that many jurisdictions require every business enterprise, foreign ones included, to register under domestic law before operating. So states may wish to consider this to avoid loopholes that would let entities argue that they fall outside of the instrument. Wording such as "business activities of a transnational character" or "transnational business activities" would reflect the mandate's focus on operational activities. It would cover parent companies, entities within a corporate group, and supply chains for both prevention and access to remedy, including through transnational litigation. I will not repeat here the comments that I have made yesterday about global value chains, but they are of course part of this discussion. The formula, all business activities of a transnational character and other business activities, focuses on the transnational dimension, relying on the definitions in Article 1.4 and 1.5. It could cover the different forms of transnational business activity that Article 6, 8, 9, and 11 address, while leaving room to regulate other business activities that may harm human rights. Whatever states decide on the subjective scope, it will interact closely with the definitions in Article 1, particularly the concepts of business activities, business activities of a transnational character, and business relationships. Consequently, decisions on Article 3.1 should be reflected carefully there. Thank you, Chair. I now give the floor to my colleague, Richard Meeren.

Thank you, Chair. Good morning, Chair, and good morning, colleagues and friends. The purpose and scope of the instrument, as set out in articles 2 and 3, are articulated in the provisions of the treaty. and I've been asked by reference again to a hypothetical case example involving a business of a transnational nature to consider how the provisions, the various provisions of the treaty might apply to the case that I'm going to describe. So here's some background facts. We have a lead mine operating in a country in the global south. It has caused pollution for many, many years, and tens of thousands of local people have been poisoned. There's been little or no enforcement of local laws. The mine says that it's operating on the margins of profitability, and that community complaints are threatening the future stability of the mine and jobs. As a result of that, the community is afraid to take action locally and is subjected to intimidation when it complains. It cannot afford local lawyers, or lawyers at all. The other point to add to the mix is that the country in question has a three-year limitation period for bringing claims, otherwise they become time barred. Local public interest lawyers who have been assisting the the communities, realise that the mine is a subsidiary of a large transnational corporation that is incorporated in a tax haven. However, it has its central administration and assets in a state in the global north that has ratified the treaty. and passed domestic legislation in accordance with its obligations under the treaty. The local lords write to the company where it is headquartered and ask it to bring a halt to the lead emissions, to carry out a clean-up of the environment, to provide monitoring and treatment for young children and pregnant women, who are especially vulnerable to the effects of lead. The parent company, however, denies any responsibility. It says, "We're just an investor. We've got no involvement in or control over the mine." And the community and its local lawyers don't have any hard evidence to prove the contrary. and the parent company, in addition to this, says, "Well, you're all living in an area where lead naturally occurs, and that's most probably the cause of any problems that you are suffering from." So that's the scenario. Now, let's just think about what, under the provisions of the treaty, the community might be able to do about this in relation to the parent company. First, if we look at the provisions on jurisdiction, which are in article 9, we can see that article 9 that a legal person is considered domiciled in any territory or jurisdiction in which it has, and then it has four options, but one of them is central administration or management, and another is assets or operations. So, based on that provision, the courts of the country where the parent company has its assets or its central administration would have jurisdiction in a case. The state in question would also have a responsibility over a business that is within its jurisdiction. If we turn to the preventative section of the treaty, which is article 6, We can see that under those provisions, which the state in question has endorsed, the state is required to ensure that the company carries out human rights due diligence. In particular, if one looks at 6, measures to achieve the ends referred to in article 6 shall include legally enforceable requirements for business enterprises to undertake human rights due diligence, as well as such supporting or ancillary measures as may be needed to ensure that the business enterprises, while carrying out human rights due diligence, and then it lists a series of specific measures that would apply to the parent company. And in addition to that, it says in 6.5, each state party shall take necessary measures to ensure that business enterprises take appropriate steps to prevent human rights abuses by third parties where the enterprise controls, manages or supervises the third party, including through the imposition of a legal duty to prevent such abuse in appropriate cases. So applying that to the current scenario, what one might expect the state to ensure happens in relation to this parent company is that it investigates and evaluates exactly what's happening among the community where the mine is based, and that in the end, what it will do in order to mitigate the risk to the community, and it will require its subsidiary to clean up. It will implement a system for blood lead screening for children and women, and it will make sure that further operations of the mine do not infringe the rights of the local community. Now, turning to then questions of the communities themselves seeking justice for the harm that they have suffered. Well, that depends on them having access to justice in the courts of the parent company against the parent company, because as as explained in the facts, this is not something that's feasible in the host state. Well, the first issue is limitation, because I said in the facts that there was a three-year limitation period. And if one looks then at article 10 of the treaty, which deals with statute of limitations, and in particular article 10 because That provision deals with situations that do not constitute war crimes or the most serious human rights violations. What 10 requires is that the state party, which would be the state where the parent company is domiciled, will ensure that the limitation measures are not unduly restrictive in light of the context and circumstances, including the location where the relevant human rights abuse took place or where the relevant harm was sustained. In this instance, one would expect the three-year limitation to be disapplied and a more relaxed limitation provision to apply. The next issue that has been discussed frequently at these meetings, and the next hurdle that claimants would invariably encounter in cases where they are trying to bring a parent company to book in the home state, is forum non conveniens. That is the doctrine that many common law countries apply in which the courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case where it is felt that there is a more appropriate venue, namely the host state courts. So that's a very serious obstacle, and here then what we need to look at, we need to consider Article 42C read in conjunction with 9.3a. If we look at 4.2c, we see that victims should be guaranteed the right to fair, effective, prompt, non-discriminatory, appropriate and gender-sensitive access to justice. and that read in conjunction with 93a that the state party should take such measures as may be necessary That is in relation to the discontinuation of legal proceedings on the grounds that there is another more convenient or more appropriate forum with jurisdiction over the matter. That measure is designed to relax the application of the forum non conveniens rule in those states apply it very stringently. For instance, in North America, the rule is applied very stringently in relation to foreign claimants. Now, if we then turn to access to justice, access to remedy, this is article 7. There are some important measures here that will affect the ability of the claimants in this or the communities in this hypothetical case to get access to justice. As article 7 begins, the obligation on states is to progressively reduce legal and practical barriers to justice. and refer there in particular to 7, progressively reduce the legal and practical and other relevant obstacles that individually or in combination hinder the ability of a victim from accessing an effective remedy. And there are a series of important measures in articles 7 and 7. So if one looks at 7, That is critical to a case where the parent company says that it was nothing to do with it and the communities are unable to access information about the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary from public sources. Section 73B says that the policies that state parties should implement will ensure that victims have ready access to reliable sources of information, including by facilitating requests for disclosure of relevant information of business-related activities or relationships linked to human rights abuse. That is absolutely crucial from the the victim's perspective in cases against transnational parent companies. And then in 7.4D, to assist claimants further, there is a provision for the reversal of the burden of proof. So if the parent company fails to provide the information which would enable a claimant to evaluate the relationship, the burden is on the parent company to show that it was not in control, rather than the other way round. Article 7A allows for states to provide legal aid for cases. That is particularly crucial in cases involving complex, technical and medical evidence, as a case like this would be, would be very costly for claimants or even claimants' lawyers to afford on their own. 74F, ability to bring group actions. Now, that ability to bring class actions is also, I think, in article 4 under rights of victims. That is absolutely crucial in a case where, as in this scenario, you have thousands of claimants. They cannot possibly bring thousands of individual claims. That would be administratively impossible and hugely expensive. The availability of class actions or group actions is absolutely crucial. In this case, section 73D of the 1997 act requires the States to address the risk of reprisals to claimants. In this instance, where claimants are fearful of their safety if their opposition to the mine is publicised locally, having provisions for anonymity or very restricted divulging of the identity of claimants is hugely important. Now, moving on to the questions of liability, well, first of all, there's the question of the applicable law, because liability will be determined in accordance with the applicable law. In this situation, article 11 stipulates that the law of the domicile of the defendant could apply. Turning to the liability provisions, article 8 is important. The important point to make about that is that, in 8, states are required to to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish a comprehensive and adequate system of liability of legal and natural persons conducting business activities within their territory, jurisdiction or otherwise under their control for human rights abuses that may arise from their business activities or relationships, including those of a transnational character. So, I think that we have heard about cases in the UK in which the law has been developed to enable a parent company to be held to account legally, circumventing the corporate veil. That is not the case in other states, so the provision provides for that to happen. I had better leave it there. I hope that has given some indication of how the various provisions of the treaty could work together in a case that, although hypothetical, is not unusual.

I am grateful to the legal experts for those very useful ideas and thoughts. regarding article 3 and its three sub paragraphs as well as the hypothetical example where we could see the interaction of the various provisions of the LBI. So with that, as I stated at the start of the meeting, I'll give the floor now for statements, first of all, from States, going paragraph by paragraph in Article 3. So I invite States who wish to speak regarding the alternative options for Article 3.1. I give the floor to the GCC.

Regarding Article 3, we want to reiterate the importance of respecting the mandate in Resolution 26. 9 of the Human Rights Council, and to align the scope on the definitions contained in article 1. When it comes to 3.1, we think that the scope could cover local contexts, including enterprises that are not transnational, we propose taking into account option 2, given that other business enterprises mean transnational corporations such as contained in the footnote to resolution 26/9, we should exclude all other enterprises which is not covered by that. On rights, we should abide by the rights that are contained in agreements that are ratified by states without undermining their obligations under customary international law. We stress that that point should be linked to the definition of the adverse impact on human rights in paragraph 1.2. We should not impose on States treaty obligations that they have not approved. We trust that those proposals will be contained in the updated wording to ensure better protection for persons who are impacted. Thank you.

Thank you very much, the GCC. State of Qatar has the floor.

Thank you for giving me the floor. Thank you, Chair. Good morning, colleagues. For Qatar's side, our delegation considers Article 3.1 to be among the most significant provisions under the discussion, given its direct implication for the interpretation and implementation of the LBI as a whole. We note that the Chair-Rapporteur has presented two draft alternatives in this regard. We would appreciate clarification of the substantive legal difference between these options, particularly whether the second alternative is intended to narrow the scope of application or simply to identify more explicitly the business entities covered. We recall, as the GCC, the Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 specifically concerns transitional cooperation and other business enterprises. We therefore consider it important to examine carefully how the proposed scope relates to the mandate and to the transitional dimension of the activities that the LBI seeks to regulate. At the same time, we recognize the importance of preventing regularity gaps that could undermine effective human rights protection. Our delegation believes that the final formulation should clearly identify the activities and entities covered, while ensuring consistency with the provisions and prevention, liability, jurisdictions and international cooperation. We would therefore welcome a more detailed explanation of the legal consequences of each option before expressing preference for either formulation. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. to the State of Qatar. I give the floor to the EU.

Good morning.

Thank you for giving us the floor. Concerning Article 3.1, neither option appears to fully address our concerns regarding the personal scope. As we have said previously, Limiting the LBI to transnational corporations or business activities of transnational character would neither reflect the universal nature of human rights nor the approach of the United Nations Guiding Principles. Option two would be difficult to reconcile with our view, therefore, that the LBI should cover domestic as well as transnational business activities. Option 1 could offer a more suitable basis for further consideration, as its reference to all business activities leaves room for domestic activities to be covered. However, such broader scope would need to be reflected consistently throughout the instrument, whereas, on the contrary, currently several provisions continue to focus on transnational activities or enterprises. Thank you.

Thank you very much to the EU. I give the floor to the Philippines.

Excellency and good morning, colleagues. We thank the chair rapporteur for these two options, as well as to the legal experts for the very valuable clarifications on the relationship of this article with relevant articles of the provisions. of the LBI. We understand that this is an effort, the proposals you have presented is an effort to move the process forward. We note, however, that both options are a substantive expansion of the scope of the draft legally binding instrument beyond its original founding mandate. We recall that the Philippines voted in favor of HRC/26/99 in 2014, and it has been our consistent understanding that the LBI is intended to apply strictly to transnational corporations and other enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities. While the Philippines supports robust corporate accountability and recognizes the importance of responsible business conduct for all enterprises, Expanding the ALBI scope risks creating unmanageable administrative and legal burdens on domestic micro, small, and medium enterprises, which constitute over 99% of registered Philippine businesses. They are covered under our Magna Carta for Small Enterprises and MSME Development Act. Domestic businesses in the Philippines are regulated through domestic legislative, administrative, and judicial frameworks. Philippine statutory and regulatory mechanisms require business enterprises to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for human rights and environmental risks across their operations and value chains. For instance, we have a special constitutional remedy, such as the writ of kalikasan, allowing citizens and public interest groups to seek immediate judicial relief and injunctions against harmful environmental activity by a business entity and other actors. In closing, we note the positive intent of the proposals and, in conjunction with the proposed new provision at the end of article 6, 6.7, we understand that this is an effort to prevent legal loopholes that could undermine the purpose of the Inversion LBI, and we will take this into consideration in our domestic interagency discussions on this matter. Thank you.

Muchas gracias a Filipinas.

Thank you very much. Ice in, please.

Thank you very much, Chair. And also allow me to extend my thanks to the legal experts for providing the very valuable clarification, especially when it comes to reading the articles that we are discussing here today in conjunction with other important articles of this legally binding treaty. I think that perhaps we may be forgetting the overall context of this LBI. Having said that, On article 3.1, we will continue to reflect on the options that the chair has presented, but we also want to note that it is really important to choose an approach that avoids protection gaps and difficulties that are related to definitions that are introduced by a scope based on the legal structure of enterprises. So with respect to the two options the chair has presented, we suggest that the formulation would be simplified to avoid repetition and suggest the formulation among along the lines of all business activities, including in particular those of a transnational character, but would be open to review other other kinds of formulation as well. Thank you.

My thanks to Iceland, Saudi Arabia, and the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We also thank the legal experts for their explanations. Mr. Chair, The delegation of the Kingdom associates itself with the statement of the GCC. With regard to 3.1, the Kingdom recognizes the need to address the adverse human rights impacts emanating from business activities. We underscore, however, that the mandate of the Human Rights Council 6/9 should be observed, a mandate that refers to addressing all legal and organizational challenges connected to business activities of a transnational character. This requires that the LBI must be confined to the transnational corporations and other business activities of a transnational character. excluding the domestic enterprises. We also note that the first option, option 1, expands the scope explicitly to other business activities, while option 2 refers to other enterprises without adducing a definition, which can be understood to cover all business enterprises. expanding the scope to activities that are exclusively exercised within the national jurisdiction can expand the scope of application broadly. This can undermine the sovereign right of states to regulate its business activities within its jurisdiction as per its national legislations and relevant international obligations. We believe that option two is a better option, given the fact that it is predicated on the formulation of resolution 26/9. We propose that it should be complemented by the definition in the footnote of the resolution It can thus apply to all business activities of transnational corporations and other enterprises of a transnational character in its operational activities and that do not apply to local or domestic business enterprises. This does not create any gap, as the criterion here depends on the nature, on the transnational nature of the operational activity. We also propose to delete, and I quote, with due consideration to Article 3.1 of the new paragraph 6.7. We also reserve our position to align the operative articles, the other operative articles, including Articles 6.1 and 8.1 when negotiated. We reaffirm that the LBI should differentiate clearly between the business activities and the activities undertaken by country in its discharge of government powers. We will also tackle this part in our proposal of the new paragraph number 3.4. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much to Saudi Arabia. Japan, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning to the floor. Regarding Article 3.1, we would prefer option two presented in the Terraporter's proposal 20. This is because while option one focuses on the transnational character of business activities themselves, option two focuses on the entities conducting business activities, which is in line with the UNGPs that cover activities undertaken by business enterprises. However, Since option two is based on the definition of business activities in article 1.4, which we consider lacks clarity, we cannot support the current formulation of option two unless the definition in article 1.4 is appropriately refined. Also, we understand that the definition in option two derives from Human Rights Council resolution 26/9, but we believe that the definition of transnational corporations and other business enterprises excludes local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law, and therefore is not in line with the UNGPs, which require business enterprises to protect human rights, regardless of the size of those enterprises and the sectors in which they operate. However, with a view to respecting the objective of the aforementioned resolution, we suggest that option two be revised as follows. This LBI shall apply to all business activities of business enterprises, including transnational corporations. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Japan. Brazil, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the floor, and thank you also for the helpful input from the legal experts on proposal 20, Brazil reaffirms its stance that this LBI must cover all business activities. In our view, restricting the scope only to TNCs would create unacceptable protection gaps, allowing enterprises to evade international accountability through domestic registration or complex corporate restructuring. At the same time, Brazil stresses that a universal scope must never impose a disproportionate burden on smaller economic actors. It's a very important point for us. SMEs, family farming, cooperatives, and solidarity initiatives, important engines of employment, social inclusion, and local development, which is why we would also prefer to retain the proportionality provision on Article 3, but we will get to that on our following discussion. So our preference would be to retain the scope as it's currently reflected in the draft. However, given the need to advance the process, in particular on a point that's been on a deadlock for so long, and our commitment to constructive engagement, we could be flexible to accept option two, if we understand that other business activities means also not only TNCs. But we appreciate your efforts, Chair, in trying to bridge this gap, and encourage further efforts for us to find common ground on this point. Thank you.

Thank you, Brazil. The State of Palestine, Yousuf Raul.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We welcome on Article 3.1, we welcome that both options in your proposal put the transnational dimension at the center. We believe that the scope must target the actors that truly exercise control over and derive benefit from transnational operations. and accountability must not be avoided through corporate structuring. Scope and definitions must work together, so the scope should refer expressly to the definitions in Article 1. We therefore support a scope that would read as follows: "This legally binding instrument shall apply to natural and legal persons undertaking business activities of transnational character as defined in Article 1 of this Convention." Such a scope would be in line with the objectives of the LBI that focuses on international cooperation in relation to regulating business activities where multiple jurisdictions are involved, and in line with the framing of Resolution 26/9, which explicitly mandates the IGWG to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. In addition, this proposed language refers to the actors undertaking the activities. We note that the reference to natural and legal persons is already utilized in the text to focus the scope of certain articles like liability. Anchoring the scope in this way would prevent the fragmentation of liability and capture where actual decision-making power and control reside. Adopting such an approach would require rethinking the framing under certain operational sections, particularly that on prevention, including to clarify that in implementation, States cannot differentiate between business entities depending on whether they are considered domestic/nationals or foreign actors, and that the prevention obligation under the LBI would apply in relation to all business activities in line with existing obligations of states under international human rights law. In other words, focusing the LBI on transnational activities would not undermine in any way the existing obligation of prevention that states already have under international human rights law. I thank you.

Thank you very much to the State of Palestine. Cuba, you have the floor.

Thank you very much indeed, Chairperson. I'd like to begin my statement by thanking the legal experts for their guidance in this process and the clarity they've offered us on a very complex issue. dealt with by this working group. I also wanted to thank the Chair for his efforts to seek convergence with different options on this particular article. As he said, it's a very complex one for our part. We agree that Article 3.1 is a crucial article for the future instrument. Without a clear definition on this, it will be very difficult to move forward and to properly understand what we're committing to with the legally binding instrument. We think, therefore, that one possible way forward would be working on language that was already agreed upon by the Human Rights Council in Resolution 26/9, which created this working group. We agree with this position, with various delegations in the room. We know that language from that resolution isn't perfect, but it's the best language that's already been agreed upon. If we expand the scope of this document too much, we might end up adopting an instrument, yes, but a weak instrument with vague obligations that should be applicable to a bigger number of actors and a higher number of legislations. But if we have clearly limited scope, that would promote greater responsibility among transnational corporations. who have been historically associated with some of the worst human rights violations, the international community has not been able to legislate any document governing the activities of transnational businesses in the framework of international human rights law. These entities continue to evade their human rights obligations. With the purpose of putting an end to this phenomenon, the working group was created. Cuba remains committed to this purpose and therefore we keep our proposal on the table to have article 3.1 which stipulates that this instrument should be applied to transnational corporations and other business enterprises with the footnote that is in the resolution 26/9. Thank you very much.

Thank you Cuba. Costa Rica please.

Thank you, Chairperson. My delegation supports the current wording of Article 3.1. In terms of the options on the screen, we prefer option 1. It focuses the scope of the LBI on the nature of the business activities and not the character of the business itself as to whether it's transnational or national. We believe that it focuses and determines the text precisely, and that is the very nature of this exercise, clarification and negotiation. I take this opportunity to thank the legal experts for their extensive explanations. This approach is fundamental to ensure effective protection and to avoid protection gaps, as was flagged by the distinguished delegate from Iceland. The rights of victims and states' obligations should not depend on the corporate structure regardless of the nationality of the corporation responsible for the impact, but the business activity and its impact on human rights. Moreover, as was explained, business activities, modern business activities can happen through value chains, contractual relations, are very complex. Limiting instruments solely to certain categories of business could generate artificial distinctions that are comparable at different levels of protection therefore we believe that it should focus on the nature of the activity and its impact particularly when there is a transnational character not the legal label of the business developing those activities this approach would strengthen the effectiveness of the instrument avoid to protection gaps and ensure that similar situations that uh are given particular protection thank you

thank you Costa Rica The United Kingdom has the floor.

Thank you, Chair. On proposal 20, since we are intervening on points of principle, it is perhaps worth making clear that our basic position is that the instrument should apply to the business activities of all business enterprises, including those of a transnational character. and the drafting could simply say that. If the point of the instrument is to protect those whose human rights are impacted by business activity, the starting point should presumably be universal protection. That includes, but is not limited to, transnational corporations. We recognise the specific challenges that transnational corporations can present, and indeed, as our legal experts have noted, UK courts have allowed the corporate veil to be pierced in certain circumstances. Resolution 26/9 imposes some sort of limitation, but as many delegations have noted, the language is unclear. We do accept that the means through which a business enterprise discharges respect for human rights will be proportionate to, among other factors, its size, as the UN Guiding Principles do and as envisaged in draft Article 6.7. However, we reiterate that excluding whole categories of business clearly creates protection gaps and misses an opportunity to effectively address business-related human rights abuse. We are therefore inclined to agree with the EU that neither of the drafting options resolves the concerns that we have with the drafting. Like Brazil, we would compromise on the original drafting, and we could also consider Japan's drafting.

Thank you very much.

The United Kingdom. Uruguay, you have the floor.

A very good morning, and thank you very much, Chair, Rapporteur. We reiterate the importance of maintaining a broad scope which covers all business activities, including those of a transnational nature. At the same time, we believe that the particular emphasis on the transnational dimension shouldn't give rise to interpretations which would therefore exclude certain activities solely on the basis of the legal form, organisation or place of registration of the company. Thus, the wording should enable us to appropriately cover all forms that may arise of business activities of a transnational character, including those developed through business groups and trade relations that cross national borders. in this framework. We welcome the two options presented by the chair rapporteur, but we do understand that we need to continue working on the drafting with a view to better reflect the specific scope of the transnational character in the mandate without losing sight of the provisions or introducing criteria that may exacerbate protection gaps.

Thank you.

Thank you. To Uruguay. China, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

China has a very short comment regarding 3.1. We agree with what our colleague from Cuba said. We believe that the scope of the instrument must follow the mandate given out in resolution 26/9.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, China. Japan, you have the floor.

Thank you for giving me the second floor. Just briefly, Chair, we would like to say that we can also support the comments made by the delegate of the UK, which suggests that this instrument should apply to the business activities of all business enterprises. Thank you.

Thank you. Agathe Roux, South Africa.

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate the very useful guidance provided by the legal experts on the proposals under Article 3. South Africa considers that the scope of this instrument should remain anchored in Resolution 26/9. which mandates this working group to regulate in international human rights law the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. Chair, we therefore favor option two under article 3.1, read together with the resolution's footnote that other business enterprises have a transnational character in their operational activities. We would, however, welcome further refinement of option 2 to make more explicit its relationship to the footnote in resolution 26/9. And we recognize the concerns expressed by delegations favoring broader coverage, particularly the need to avoid gaps in protection and ensure that businesses cannot evade accountability through their corporate structures. These are concerns that South Africa shares. Our preference for a focused scope does not diminish the responsibility of all businesses to respect human rights or of states' existing obligations to protect against business-related abuses. Those whose activities are wholly domestic should remain subject to domestic regulation consistent with states' existing human rights obligations. Our efforts, Chair, in this working group reflects the particular contribution that this instrument can make in addressing prevention and accountability gaps arising from the business activities of transnational corporations. Chair, we believe that fidelity to the mandate and effective protection can be achieved together. The reference to transnational corporations and other business enterprises must be applied with regard to the substance of the operations. An incidental or remote international link should not bring a wholly domestic business within the LBI scope. We therefore consider that Articles 1, 2 and 3 should be read and developed together, providing sufficient clarity for States, enterprises, courts and affected persons while preventing corporate arrangements from being used to circumvent the instrument. Our objective, Chair, is a scope that is faithful to resolution 26/9, workable across different legal systems, and effective in addressing the protection gaps that prompted this process. I thank you, Chair.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you, South Africa. Pakistan, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Pakistan notes that neither of the options in the conference room paper aligns completely with the mandate entrusted by resolution 26/9, although we do note that option two is closer. Pakistan would favor a third formulation that tracks the mandate of the resolution establishing this working group and excludes purely domestic and local enterprises, the contribution of which to human rights abuses or adverse human rights impacts is covered by applicable domestic law and is therefore not subject to the gaps that this LBI is mandated to close. Nevertheless, we've also listened to the range of views expressed in the room. We also noted South Africa's suggestion just now. to look at possible ways of developing provisions in articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 together to see whether we can better achieve that closure. I also request your indulgence and that of colleagues in the room to go back to previous proposals that have been discussed in the room, with your permission. On article 2, the statement of purpose, we support the amendments making the transnational focus explicit. in subparagraphs B and C. While we do not have any specific objection to the enumeration of qualifiers to access to justice in subparagraph D, we do wonder if this is exactly strictly necessary for the purposes of this article. In the preceding set of articles under definitions, we would support deletion of draft article 1.10. On article 1.4, we note that the definition requires particular attention, because, as drafted, it could extend the scope indirectly of the draft legally binding instrument. We therefore request that the definition of business activities in article 1.4 be expressly stated to be read subject to article 3. So we would propose that article 1.4 open with the words subject to article three comma so that the limitation applies. And then articles 1.5, in article 1.5, we could support the three limb structure and the refinement made to subparagraph B. And in article 1.6, we note that we support the inclusion of financial institutions, investment funds, and transnational corporate groups. We note, however, that this definition can be a vector for expanding the scope of the LBI and would therefore necessitate, again, the qualifier that we requested in Article 1.4 to apply. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Pakistan. Do any other states wish to take the floor at this time? on the options under Article 3.1? That doesn't seem to be the case, so let's move now to representatives of civil society and other stakeholders. I give the floor to the International Federation for Human Rights.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. So I deliver this statement on behalf of FIDH. We support a broad personal scope for the LBI, which nevertheless places the focus on business activities of a transnational character and prioritizes these activities for state regulatory and enforcement action. While still requiring some work, this approach is already reflected in the draft LBI. Many of its key operative clauses apply in the context of transnational business activities or deal with challenges and gaps that arise specifically in this context, while other principles and provisions apply more broadly to all business activities. We believe that option one best reflects this approach. However, we would recommend reversing the proposed wording as follows. This legally binding instrument shall apply to all business activities with a particular focus on business activities of a transnational character. Finally, regarding the concerns for small and medium-sized domestic companies, these can be managed by States Parties through the flexibility provided by Article 3.2, now being proposed as 6.7. This introduces the principle of proportionality or differentiation, and it allows States Parties to tailor the due diligence obligations imposed on business enterprises based on considerations of size, among others. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to International Collective in Support of Fishworkers.

I speak on behalf of ICSF, a member of the Global Campaign. Scope has always been one of the most controversial aspects of this treaty. Nevertheless, resolution 26/9 is clear. The subjective scope, meaning who the treaty applies to, is transnational corporations and other businesses, enterprises of transnational character. The shift in the drafts to extend the scope to all business was made despite the objection of more than 60 countries in the previous sessions. Furthermore, during this very session, numerous states have once again strongly reaffirmed in their statements that the mandate of the resolution must be respected in Article 3.1. The Global Campaign has consistently defended the legitimacy of this resolution and the need to keep the scope on TNCs and other businesses and enterprises of transnational character. Several arguments have been raised to expand the scope to all business enterprises. We would like to address the main ones. Firstly, we strongly disagree about the claim that focusing on TNCs and other business enterprises of transnational character is discriminatory between businesses. Purely domestic companies are generally already well regulated by domestic systems. It is transnational corporations that obtain preferential treatment. They use the corporate structure and the fragmentation of production to evade obligation of preventions and rules of jurisdictions, and they gain competitive advantages doing so. This is precisely the gap that LBI is meant to fill. and it must therefore address these specificities through joint and several liability and specific prevention obligation among key other measures. It is telling that those business representatives among them who argue that focusing on transnational corporation is discriminatory are the very same ones who warn that this obligation will be too burdensome for SMEs. That is why purely domestic SMEs should not fall within the scope of this instrument. Regarding the concern that a focused scope could leave loopholes for TNCs to disguise themselves as domestic entities, the Global Campaign offers a concrete textual solution. Building on previous states' amendments and Palestine's proposal at the 2026 intersessional, our proposal links article 3.1 to the comprehensive definition of business activities of transnational character in article 1.4, thereby clearly establishing the objective scope of the treaty and closing any corporate loophole based on the formal structure or registration. Finally, our proposal aimed to remain faithful to the mandate and scope of resolution 26/9, while adding an objective criterion to qualify this transnational character. This ensures that businesses registered as domestic but operating within transnational value chains are not left outside of the scope of the LBI, ensuring that transnational corporations at the top of the chain is held accountable for them. Therefore, our text proposed for Article 3.1 reads as follows: This open bracket, legally binding instrument, close bracket, shall apply to transnational corporation and other business enterprises that undertake business activities of a transnational character. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to International Organization of Employers.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you as well to the legal experts for their explanation. I speak jointly on behalf of IOE and USCIB. We cannot support either option as drafted. Transnational activities are by definition already covered by reference to all business activities. Singling them out adds nothing but ambiguity as to the true scope of this instrument. As the legal experts themselves recalled, and as this working group has come to realize, a definition of transnational corporations has never been achieved, and business activities, rather than legal form, are increasingly what determines duties. The proposed wording would leave companies uncertain as to whether they fall within scope. Chair, the nature of a company is irrelevant to victims. What makes the difference on the ground is whether existing laws are effectively enforced for all companies alike. We have been hearing that the focus on transnational corporations is needed to close a so-called accountability gap. Any such gap, however, is the product of little enforcement of local law and corruption, not of the type of company involved. The case presented this morning started from precisely that situation. Yet under the current draft, the response would largely lie in proceedings before courts abroad with relaxed rules on jurisdiction. This only moves responsibility away from the host state, rather than strengthening its capacity to enforce its own laws where the harm has occurred. As we stressed under Article 2, A two-tier system will not address these root causes, and the persistent focus of this draft on transnational companies regrettably continues to overlook pillar one of the guiding principles. We therefore favour the clearest formulations this legally binding instrument shall apply to all business activities. Most of human rights deficits arise in the domestic economy, not in global supply chains. Lastly, the scope must respect the limits of each state's jurisdiction. Through the concept of value chains retained in Article 1.6, responsibility could extend to a wide range of entities located in states that may not have ratified this instrument. This raises clear concerns of legal certainty and sovereignty. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to International Trade Union Confederation.

I speak on behalf of the Global Labour Movement. In line with our comments on the Statement of Purpose, we believe that both options for Article 3.1 address the main focus of the LBI. Again, Chair, we commend this hybrid approach of balancing the focus on cross-border activities of business enterprises, while also applying its principal provisions to other business enterprises that do not operate across borders. Thank you, Chair.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I give the floor to Sidsi.

Thank you, Mr. Chair and rapporteur. I am speaking on behalf of the Scottish Independent Democrats and Citizens Association and its member organisations, Manas Unidas, CCFD-Terre Solidaire, Broderick Dellen and Trocaire. In article 3.1, we appreciate the chair's efforts to establish the scope by giving two options. However, we feel that neither reflects what the legal experts suggested during the intersessional consultation, which was focusing on the nature of business activities rather than the enterprise's legal form, as that can help to prevent regulatory gaps. while nevertheless prioritising those activities of a transnational character. In that context, we are unclear as to the meaning of other business activities in option 1 and recommend adding language that clarifies that matter, as has been suggested elsewhere. In addition, we reiterate the importance of reading the scope together with the definitions of business activities, transnational business activities and business relationships as discussed, as well as with the operative provisions of the LBA. These provisions need to work together to ensure comprehensive coverage of complex corporate structures, global value chains and cross-border impacts. Finally, Mr. Chair, we note with interest, but also puzzlement, the position of the European Union in favour of broad personal scope, which is in line with the UN guiding principles, but stands in marked contrast to the highly restrictive scope of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive as adopted in 2024, and which was further restricted by the first omnibus process last year. We are of the view that a broad scope with an explicit focus on transnational business activities could help to resolve these inconsistencies and close existing normative gaps that contribute to corporate impunity, and so encourage the EU and other states to support such an approach. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to ESCR-Net.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, rapporteur. I speak on behalf of EASRNet and represent the Asia Indigenous Peoples' Pact. Article 3.1 should focus scope on transnational cooperation and extend to all businesses, enterprises of a transnational character across value chains. This encompasses transnational operation and businesses relationship, including decision-making ownership, control, financing, technology, data flows, or other exercise of corporate power. The scope of the treaty must capture the modern manifestation of transnational business activities and corporate power. This is essential, not only for the traditional transnational corporation and enterprise, such as extractive companies, but also for digital platforms, AI companies, financial institutions, data infrastructures, parastatals, civilians company, charities, development agencies, and other tax exempt or non-profit organizations causing or contributing to cross-border violation of human rights through global value chains. Transnational corporations and other businesses enterprises have long violated the collective rights, rights to self-determination and the rights of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent. Communities are constantly affected by the extraction, agribusinesses and climate injustice, and this is in many cases addressed falsely as an issue of individual rights. On the other hand, accountability is severely restricted and major legal embedments exist domestically and particularly across borders to actively prevent communities from seeking remedy and injustice. It is a time to regulate transnational corporations and the scope should clearly be defined to make this possible. Thank you.

Thank you very much. That was the last speaker on my list. Grateful to all those who contributed to this discussion. We'll now move to consideration of Proposal 21 for article 3.2 with the suggestion of including it as a new provision at the end of article 6 as the new 6.7. I give the floor first of all to states who wish to intervene. I give the floor to Brazil.

Thank you, Chair. Regarding the placement of this provision, we prefer to maintain 3.2 within Article 3, the scope itself, rather than transferring it to Article 6, as we see proportionality as an overarching foundational principle for this treaty. And since Article 3 sets the parameters for the application of the instrument, we don't think it's just a detail pertaining to Article 6 due diligence procedures, but an interpretive principle that should inform the scope and implementation of the treaty as a whole. Also, placing Article 3.2 along 3.1, It's important because since we advocate for a universal scope covering all business activities, maintaining 3.2 within the same article would reassure states and market actors that universal coverage does not equate to a rigid one-size-fits-all regime. And conversely, relocating this rule exclusively to Article 6 risks restricting the application of proportionality strictly to Article 6 measures. We could, however, look favorably on language that suggests additional legal safeguards for small and medium enterprises, as the legal expert has indicated, particularly for those operating in developing nations. And so for these reasons, Mr. Chair, we would urge to retain Article 3.2 within Article 3, the scope. Thank.

You. Thank you very much, Brazil. I give the floor to the EU.

Thank you. As regards the proposal to relocate article 3.2 to article 6.7, we would like to flag that it is not entirely clear to us whether the revised wording would also allow for the exemption of companies of a certain size from the due diligence duties. This question is of importance given the different capabilities, resources and leverage of companies of different sizes and thus the proportionality of any obligations imposed on them. Related to this point is the question of how to ensure that business partners of InScope companies that do not themselves meet any required thresholds are protected against unnecessary and excessive indirect trickle-down effects, for instance, from information requests as part of human rights due diligence. Such safeguards or even support measures as provided for in the EU's CSDD directive are particularly important with respect to business partners that are SMEs. Thank you.

Thank you very much to the EU. I give the floor to Costa Rica.

Thank you, rapporteur. Chair, very briefly, just to support what Brazil said, basically what we said about the preference of maintaining Article 3.1 and fully agree with the reasons put forward by Brazil. Thank you.

Thank you, Costa Rica. Any other state wishing to contribute? Give the floor to Iceland.

On article 3.2, Iceland wants to emphasize that an inclusive scope has to go hand in hand with proportionality. And in that context, we would be supportive of the proposed article 6.7 and the tax guarantees on a non-discriminatory basis. On this note, we want to underline the importance of the instrument preserving the flexibility for states to design proportionate measures suited to their national circumstances. And when applying proportionality, we also want to encourage the chair to take into consideration that the text ensures that placing disproportionate indirect burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises that form part of the value chains of larger companies are avoided, as such enterprises are often required to carry out due diligence requests passed on to them by their business partners without having the resources to do so. Iceland underlines the importance of this because, as we said, we want the instrument to preserve the flexibility for states to design these proportionate measures so that it allows the consideration for small and medium-sized enterprises as well in that same context. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Iceland. State of Palestine has the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On article 3.2, we support moving the provision to article 6. We can support the views expressed by the legal experts, including adding further language to explicitly address concerns regarding implementation burdens on SMEs as they are defined by domestic law. removing the wording "notwithstanding Article 3.1" at the beginning of the paragraph, and finally adding wording that pertains to positive action that could be taken to support SMEs in relation to indirect implications that might arise, such as trickle-down effects from large enterprises in a value chain, and to address the role of the companies that are undertaking due diligence or other preventive measures in supporting the SMEs with a view to fulfil these obligations without adding undue burdens on the SMEs. I thank you.

Thank you very much, State of Palestine. Would any other State like to take the floor? If not, we'll then move to representatives from civil society and relevant stakeholders. I give the floor to International Trade Union Confederation.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of the global labour movement. Chair, we are comfortable with the redrafting of Article 3.2, which gives states the discretion to differentiate on a non-discriminatory basis how business enterprises discharge prevention obligation commensurate with their size, sector, operational context, and the severity of impacts on human rights. This differential treatment would only affect the modalities of implementation, not the obligation. Such an approach can be beneficial for the purpose of effectively regulating small and medium-sized enterprises and micro enterprises. I thank you, Chair.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. The International Organization of Employers has the floor.

I speak jointly on behalf of IOE and USAB. We welcome that the redrafting retains the possibility for states to differentiate the discharge of prevention obligations commensurate with the size, sector, and operational context of business enterprises and the severity of impacts, consistent with the UNGP 14 and essential for MSMEs. We also welcome the clarification that the reference to non-discrimination ensures that no differentiation is made on the basis of whether a company is domestic or foreign, ensuring fairness of treatment. The provision should add explicit language on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises to allow state parties to exclude them from legally binding due diligence obligations to avoid undue administrative burdens and support SMEs against trickle-down effects. In practice, SMEs are very often affected not by their own obligations, but by the requirement passed down to them by larger companies in their value chains. In line with UNGP 14, the differentiating factors should also include the ownership and the structure, as these two elements are included in UNGP 14 and do have an important impact on the scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. We also take note of the expert view that this provision is not meant to carve out state-owned enterprises, and we welcome that. Lastly, the provision retains the focus on prevention obligations, whereas the UN GP call for a process-oriented approach to addressing adverse impacts.

Thank you. Thank you very much. I give the floor to Center for Constitutional Rights.

Of the Center for Constitutional Rights and their client and partner, the Descendants Project in the United States, I am speaking in solidarity with frontline communities in Louisiana's river parishes, also known as Cancer Alley, where descendants of those enslaved on that land continue to pay the price of overindustrialization with their health and with the health of their children and grandchildren. With respect to the chair's proposal to move article 3.2 into article 6 as a proposed article 6.7, placing differentiated obligations within the prevention framework, we could be supportive of that. We would just add that frontline communities worldwide, such as those in Louisiana's river parishes, face cumulative impacts from the concentration of multiple facilities and business activities in one Therefore, assessing each business in isolation can understate the severity of harm experienced by a community subjected to overindustrialization. While different businesses may need different prevention measures, those measures must still effectively protect affected communities. A business's size alone does not determine the severity of its impacts, nor its contribution to cumulative harm. We therefore recommend clarifying that states must always consider the severity of actual or potential harm, including each business's contribution to cumulative impacts on affected communities when differentiating prevention obligations. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm speaking on behalf of CITSE and its member organizations, Manos Unidas, Misereor, CCFD-T solidaire, Broederlijk Delen, Truckers for Action, and CAFOD. We take note of the trust proposal allowing states to differentiate how business enterprises discharge prevention obligations according to factors such as size, sector, operational context, and the severity of impact. We understand the rationale for ensuring that prevention obligations can be implemented in a proportionate and non-discriminatory manner. In this sense, we welcome your proposal, as it has been already done by Palestine and other states, to move this obligation to Article 6.7. At the same time, any differentiation should not weaken the substantive obligations or create gaps in protection all along the value chain. The approach should therefore ensure that proportionality in implementation does not become a basis for exempting businesses from meaningful prevention responsibilities. We encourage states to ensure that differentiation remains consistent with the overall objective of effective prevention and accountability. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to Sethim.

Thank you, Chair.

My name is Sylvia Yanez, and I speak on behalf of UDAP, Friends of the Earth Ecuador, and CETIM, members of the Global Campaign. As you know, the case of Texaco/Chevron in Ecuador was one of the triggers for opening these negotiations to develop a binding treaty on transnational corporations and human rights. For decades, our communities have been suffering the impact of oil pollution caused by Chevron, but thus far we have not been able to obtain justice or remedy for those violations. We have managed to have the company found guilty in Ecuador, but later Chevron made use of the international architecture of impunity in particular, relying on bilateral investment agreements and associated private tribunals to evade that guilty verdict. We need an ambitious treaty that is focused on eliminating those legal gaps and dismantling the architecture of impunity that benefits transnational corporations. and it prevents us, the affected communities, from having access to justice. Therefore, as the global campaign has stated previously, the scope should focus exclusively on transnational corporations and other businesses that carry out business activities of a transnational nature. Moreover, the global campaign has systematically defended the inclusion of direct obligations for transnational corporations and other businesses of a transnational character in article 6. Those direct obligations, once clearly established, will take into account the capacity of businesses throughout the value chain, with the parent company assuming the greatest burden. Therefore, by adapting article 3 to respect the scope.

Of resolution 26/9 and establishing obligations specific to corporations in the other articles that recognize the.

Greater responsibility of parent companies and contractor companies, especially in article 6, then article 3.2 would be unnecessary.

The most burdensome obligations would be sufficiently specific to focus not just on SMEs but, above all, on.

Parent companies and contracting companies. who are those where power and control are concentrated and which, once more, act in complete impunity. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I thank all those who participated in the debate.

With that, we can move to consideration.

Of the proposal 22 article 3 3 where again we have two options I give the floor to States first who wish to intervene Costa Rica I give the foot Costa Rica

thank you chair We want to raise two points, one on international customary law and international environmental law. We think that it is important for the article to specifically recognise relevant customary law of international courts, including the International Court of Justice, as part of the legal framework that should guide its interpretation and implementation. Judicial decisions are legally recognised means to determine the content of the rules of international law, and when there is a binding ruling for the parties, the state concerned is legally bound by it. Article 38 of the ICJ statute recognises specifically judicial decisions as subsidiary sources of determining the rules of international law. Therefore, international customary law should not be viewed as a merely doctrinal or political consideration but rather as a legally recognised means of identifying, interpreting and determining the substance and scope of international obligations that are applicable, including those that derive from international human rights law. That reference is especially relevant when it comes to the ICJ's customary law. Its decisions in disputes are legally binding for the states parties in corresponding cases, and its customary law, including that which is developed in its advisory opinions, plays a fundamental function in determining and clarifying the content of the norms of international law. the decision constitutes an erga omnes precedent, does not undermine its importance in determining what our existing international norms are. As a result, we propose that the article makes specific reference to relevant advisory opinions and decisions of the ICJ and of other international courts and tribunals. since they contribute to determining and interpreting the substance and scope of State obligations pursuant to international law. Secondly, it is essential to include specifically international environmental law. A significant part of the adverse impacts on human rights that are caused by corporations' activities can take place specifically through environmental damage. I am grateful for the explanation that was given by the legal expert, which was very clear. That is particularly evident in cases such as mining and other extractive industries, where environmental impacts can be very closely linked to impacts on persons and communities. The UN working group on business and human rights, in its report on the extractive sector and a just transition, recommends carrying out due environmental diligence and human rights diligence, and it specifically tackles the issue of a clean, healthy, sustainable environment. There is not a separation between environmental protection and protection of human rights. The ICJ itself declared that enjoyment of a clean, healthy of the human right to a clean, healthy, sustainable environment is essential for the full enjoyment of a broad spectrum of human rights. Excluding international environmental law would therefore lead to an artificial separation between two legal spheres that, in practice, are profoundly and inextricably linked. Our proposal specifically therefore is that the article states in line with international law, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international customary law and international environmental law, taking duly into account the decisions and relevant advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice and other international courts and tribunals.

Thank you very much, Costa Rica.

Saudi Arabia, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chairman. We welcome the deletion of internationally recognized under Article 3 and the link established between the scope of rights covered and what is binding on States Parties. However, the Kingdom notes that the first option proposed expressly includes, alongside treaties, customary international law, general principles of law and domestic law. This is a wording that we have already commented on in the past. Option 2, with reference to international human rights law more broadly, also incorporates customary international law. Moreover, the expression of States parties in the plural could be interpreted as imposing on States obligations related to rights which are incumbent on other States parties without them being bound. This question is particularly important because Article 3.3 defines the rights that international corporations are bound to respect under 6.2 and the rights that victims benefit from under 4.1. Consequently, Saudi Arabia reiterates its position that the LPI should be limited to the rights enshrined in treaties to which the states concerned are party. On the basis of option one, we propose the following wording: "This instrument covers all human rights set forth in international human rights treaties to which the State party consented is a party, to the extent that they apply to it." No provision of this shall be interpreted as imposing on a State Party obligations relating to rights set forth in treaties to which it is not a party, or as expanding the obligations it has accepted under treaties to which it is a party. This paragraph shall not prejudice the obligations incumbent upon the State Party under customary international law, which shall neither be expanded nor modified by this instrument. This proposal defines the source and the limits of the obligations. The source lies in the treaties ratified by the states and the limits correspond to the scope which they have accepted, in which they've accepted their obligations in line with treaty law. The Kingdom does not deny customary, existing customary obligations, but would see it important that the instrument does not create obligations that states have not accepted. We reserve our position regarding 4.1 and 6.2b, which still refer to rights that are not internationally recognised. We also reaffirm our position not to include environmental issues in this instrument. Environmental matters should feature in other specialised international agreements. By way of conclusion, Chairperson, we would propose another paragraph 3.4. The Kingdom underlines the importance of the instrument containing an express guarantee preserving the particular nature of businesses and state goods. The title proposed would refer to governmental entities and would include a new provision regarding implementation of foreign judgments where the instrument currently contains no provision excluding acts accomplished by states in the exercise of their governmental authority. It does not expressly guarantee immunity accorded to states and to their goods and property in the framework of provisions related to jurisdictional competence, responsibility and implementation. It does not guarantee equality of arms and treatment between commercial enterprises, whatever their nature. We propose a new paragraph. This instrument shall not apply to activities carried out by the state or any entity acting on its behalf in the exercise of governmental authority. nor shall it prejudice the immunities enjoyed by states and their property under international law. Business enterprises shall be subject to the provisions of this instrument on an equal footing, regardless of whether they are publicly or privately owned.

Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia. Japan, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We prefer option 2 to option 1, presented in the Chair's reporters proposal 22, because option 2 covers the human rights recognized under the international human rights law binding on the state parties, which provide clear criteria and predictability and ensure legal certainty. In order to clarify this intent, we propose the following formulation. This LBI shall cover all human rights under international human rights treaties to which each state party is a party.

Thank you.

My thanks to Japan. The EU has the floor.

Thank you very much for giving us the floor. With respect to Article 3.3, dealing with the coverage of the LBI, neither of the two options appear to resolve fully the need for a clear common baseline. Under option one, reliance on treaties binding on each state and in its domestic law could perpetuate variable geometry. Option two, on the other hand, raises the question as to what will be the human rights binding on state parties under international human rights law. What rights would be covered by this formulation through customary international law and general principles of law? Would these sources provide a sufficiently complete and predictable baseline? In the EU, we have opted for a catalogue contained in the annex to the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. Such a catalogue could perhaps provide legal certainty, but agreeing on a common catalogue across prospective parties to the LBI could prove difficult. Therefore, one could consider perhaps an approach drawing on UNGP 12, by referring at a minimum to the International Bill of Human Rights and the principle concerning fundamental rights in the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work informed by core ILO conventions. With respect to comments that were made by Costa Rica to the human rights to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, I would like to stress and emphasize that the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive takes a holistic approach to the obligations and duties of due diligence and related liability, which therefore cover respect for human rights, labour rights and the protection of the environment. Thank you.

Thank you very much. To the EU, I give the UK the floor.

Thank you, chair. Just briefly on 3.2, as we have already stated, we recognise the importance of proportionality and we reserve our position on the drafting for now. In that regard, however, we also note the point from the Centre for Constitutional Rights that size alone does not determine severity of impact or contribution to cumulative harm. Turning to 3.3, like other delegations, we do welcome the deletion of the phrase "internationally recognized human rights," which lacks legal precision and the greater clarity of this drafting. However, we concur with the EU's concerns on both drafting options, so we think that the language could be further refined to make it clearer whether the relevant ratifications are those by the home or host state or something else more cross-cutting. As we know, ratifications of treaties are variable. We are open to drafting options here, though, but perhaps adapting option two to say binding on each state party as applicable could go some way to clarifying this. We could also consider the EU's and Japan's drafting proposals here. Thank you.

Thank you to the UK.

State of Palestine, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On 3.3, we prefer option one because it includes customary law, general principles, and domestic law. However, we emphasize that domestic law must be in line with or more protective than international human rights law. In addition, we propose to also expressly reference to declarations most relevant here on indigenous people, on peasants and other people working in rural areas, and on human rights defenders. The right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and the right of people to self-determination and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. I thank you.

Thank you very much. Cuba, you have the floor.

Thank you very much indeed, Chairman. Very briefly, just to voice the fact that Cuba prefers option 1. However, we can be flexible on this and be in the hands of the Chair to seek the option which it best enjoys consensus and helps move the negotiating process forward. Thank you.

Thank you, Cuba. Iceland, please.

Thank you, Chair. As we understand the material scope, it seeks to determine the rights states must take into account and the measures that they must think of and as a result, which rights business enterprises must consider when carrying out the due diligence. So in that context, we want to highlight a couple of considerations we hope will be had in mind when formulating the final version of this article. And first is legal certainty and predictability, which is important for states, business enterprises, but most importantly, victims. In that light, a text that provides a single common baseline anchored in international human rights law may be more inclined to provide such certainty. Secondly, regarding the nature of treaty obligations, it's important for the text to not reduce the scope to the lowest common denominator, and perhaps the reference binding under international human rights law, and option 2 would capture these considerations as it also covers customary international human rights law, which binds all states. So in light of the points mentioned above, we do think that option 2 or a formulation that captures the same intention offers the most balanced approach. In contrast, We feel that option one would result in a variable geometry as the material scope of the instrument would differ from one state party to another. And while we do understand that option one seeks to capture higher domestic protection, we respectfully point out that the non-regression clause in proposed article 16.7 would address that concern. And we point this consideration also out as it's relevant for global value chains, which sometimes span multiple jurisdictions. And a common baseline under international human rights law would avoid this, to our understanding. So having said that, we support option two, but remain open to alternative formulations that would achieve the same objective.

Thank you.

Muchas gracias, Saez.

Thank you very much, Iceland. Malaysia, please.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Um, regarding Article 3.3, Malaysia would appreciate clarification on whether the formulation, uh, under international human rights law in option two, is intended to limit the scope of the provisions to international human rights obligations or in the binding on the respective state parties, particularly under treaties to which they are parties or whether a broader scope is envisaged. This request for clarification is without prejudice to Malaysia's position on the proposed ILPI.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Muchas gracias, Malaysia.

Thank you. Brazil, please.

Chair, quickly, just to welcome, like others, the deletion of internationally recognized, and to mention that we could look favorably on Costa Rica's proposal to include international environmental law alongside international humanitarian law, customary international law, and international human rights law. I believe that's how it.

Was phrased. Thank you.

Thank you. Brazil, any other states wish to take the floor at this point? China, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. China will make a brief comment. China also believes that in order to ensure the substantive effect of international human rights protection, the legal certainty and predictability is very important. Judging from the situation now, China is rather in favor of keeping the current text. We are ready to further consider the option two proposed by Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Muchas gracias. Gina.

Thank you, China. South Africa, please.

Thank you, Chair. On article 3.3, South Africa favours a formulation that secures the highest level of human rights protection. We therefore assess these options by their capacity to provide effective protection and access to remedy, as well as legal certainty. At this stage, Chair, we continue to consider both options for the implications and would be open to receiving further drafting proposals. Thank you.

Thank you, South Africa. Uruguay, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, rapporteur. We take note of the two options that have been presented. We understand that both contain elements that may contribute to clarifying the material scope of the instrument. The initial one has merit because it distinctly expresses the different sources, customary international law, general principles of law, domestic law. We understand that that may contribute to avoiding a reading that is solely based on treaty body obligations by each state. The second, we understand, offers a more direct interpretation with international human rights law in line with the legal framework that this process is part of, and it is both more general and synthetic. However, neither of the two options taken in isolation is fully acceptable, so we need to incorporate all of the elements that we want to keep. We understand that we need to continue considering how to make the framework broad enough, clear enough, keep enough protection elements recognized by international law and domestic law and keep the reference to human rights binding on states parties taking into account the different legal commitments of states. Thank you.

Thank you, Uruguay. If there are no further requests for the floor from states, we can move to statements by civil society and other relevant actors. I give the floor to the IOE.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of IOE and USCIB. At the outset, Chair, we would like to recall the importance of ensuring that specific companies are not named in this forum, in line with due process and the courtesy expected in United Nations meetings. We kindly ask you to ensure that this is respected. Now, on proposal 22, we have important concerns with both options, as they both delete the reference to internationally recognized human rights. creating further legal uncertainty and opening the scope to rights recognized under domestic law but not at the international level. Option one, by referring to treaties, customary law, general principles, and the domestic law of each state party, is particularly worrying. As states diverge widely, even on the basic concept of discrimination, for example, this will create confusion and a variable geometry and extend states' obligation beyond the treaties to which they are party. Chair, this provision determines which rights businesses will have to consider in their due diligence under Article 6. Companies operating across several countries need a single, clear reference point, not one that changes with the treaties each state has ratified, as this will translate into different due diligence requirements from one jurisdiction to another and make it impossible to implement. Such a reference point already exists and is widely used by companies, the internationally recognized human rights referred to in UN GP 12. A clear and predictable material scope is what will allow this instrument to gain broad support. Internationally recognized human rights should therefore be clearly indicated in this provision in line with UN GP 12, providing a common baseline under international human rights law. To that regard, option two, referring to human rights binding on state parties under international human rights law, provides greater legal certainty, provided internationally recognized is returned. Lastly, we welcome the deletion of fundamental freedoms, a concept that lacks a common legal understanding across jurisdiction. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to Women in Europe for a Common Future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor. I am speaking on behalf of SITZ, the Society for Threatened Peoples Global Policy Forum Europe and Women Engage for a Common Future. We regret we cannot fully support the proposed redrafting of Article 3.3. While we welcome the addition of customary international law in option 1, other important references are still missing. However, a broad material scope is necessary to ensure the best and broadest protection of victims and affected communities. This should be reflected both in the preamble and also in this article. Consequently, we propose the deletion of the qualifier to which those states are parties. Instead, as mentioned before by Costa Rica, Brazil, and Palestine, and many CSO colleagues, including in the discussion of Article 1.3, the LBI needs an explicit reference to international environmental law, like the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. We also recommend explicitly referencing the core human rights conventions, the fundamental ILO conventions, plus ILO Convention 90 on harassment and violence, and ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples, as well as international humanitarian law. Thank you very much.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I speak on behalf of DCA Austria, EquiPAT International, and the Human Rights Clinic of UFMG and PUC-Parana. We appreciate the Chair's efforts on redrafting this article and proposing different options in clarifying the sources of international law covered by this instrument. We could support the adoption of option one since it broadens the scope of human rights comprehended in this LBBI by referring to customary international law and general principles of law. However, we believe there is still room to expand protection, which is why we fully support the suggestion made by the delegation of Costa Rica to include the consultative opinions made by international human rights courts and by International Court of Justice. We also support the suggestion made by Costa Rica, Brazil, and Palestine. The LBI needs to expressly mention international environmental law, also due to the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment by the Human Rights Council in its resolution number 48/30, and by General Assembly in its resolution number 60-- 76/300. This right is particularly significant in light of the well-documented adverse environmental impacts of business activities across various sectors. From a children's right perspective, the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is fundamental to the effective enjoyment of a broad range of other rights, taking into account that children are particularly vulnerable to adverse environmental impacts. I thank you.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. Distinguished participants, distinguished delegates, that brings us to the end of this morning's meeting. We will resume this afternoon at 3 o'clock and we will continue with the list of speakers of representatives of civil society and other relevant stakeholders. Thank you very much for your participation this morning. The meeting stands adjourned.