18th Nelson Mandela World Human Rights Moot Court Competition

The Thakakula Town Human Rights Court is now in session in the matter between Zwambuka and Lawman Yaka, the Honourable Judge Ivana Djelic presiding.

Good morning, distinguished guests. May I kindly request that you switch off your cell phones or you put them on silence as we commence the final oral round and awards ceremony of the 18th Nelson Mandela World Human Rights Moot Court Competition. The court is already in session. May I now just acknowledge the presence of His Excellency Ambassador Lahey, Ambassador— South African Ambassador. I'd like to also acknowledge Madam President of the Bench, Judge Jelic, honorable members of the bench, Professor Frans Viljoen, distinguished judges, representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. I would like to also introduce the bench that is before you. It is my distinct honor to introduce the eminent panel of of judges. Firstly, we have got Madame President Judge Jelic, who's going to be presiding today. She has presided over today's— she will preside over today's final oral round. Judge Jelic serves as a Vice President of the European Court of Human Rights and the President of one of its sections, She previously served as the Vice President of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva and is a member— is a former Associate Professor of the University of Montenegro. She is also an internationally recognized scholar for her expertise in international human rights law and minority rights. Madam President, we are honored to welcome you. We also have Judge Veronica Gómez joining the bench today. Judge Gómez serves on the court for, for the 2023-2028 term of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. She served She previously served as President of the Global Campus of Human Rights and currently serves as Director for Education at the Centro Internacional de Estudios Políticos in UNSAM in Argentina. She also held senior positions within the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Welcome, Judge Gómez. We also have Judge Dereitladi. We have a privilege to, to welcome the judge, who's a judge of the International Court of Justice. Judge Tladi is a former professor of international law at the University of Pretoria and former chair of the United Nations International Law Commission, where he also served as Special Rapporteur on use of cogwants. He has also served as a senior legal advisor for the Government of the Republic of South Africa in matters of international law and diplomacy. Welcome, Judge Dladi. Joining the bench is also Professor Nowak, Manfred Nowak, who is the Secretary-General of the Global Campus of Human Rights. Professor Nowak is a professor of international Human Rights at the University of Vienna and serves as the United Nations Independent Expert leading the global study on children deprived of liberty. He previously served as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and is internationally recognized as one of the world's leading human rights scholars. Welcome, Professor.

Thank you.

NORWEC. We are also delighted to welcome Professor Thompson-Chengeta, who is a professor of international law and AI technologies at Liverpool John Moores University. Professor Chengeta served on the United Nations Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and Global Commission on Responsible AI in military domain. For more than 15 years, he has authored the hypothetical cases of the Nelson Mandela Human Rights Moot Court Competition. Welcome, Professor Chingeta. We also warmly welcome Mr. Bikram Patra, the Human Rights Officer at the Office of the United Nations Human Human Rights Commission— United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. Mr. Batra has extensive experience in human rights investigations, legal analysis, monitoring, and policy development. Prior to joining the United Nations, he worked with Amnesty International. Welcome to you, Mr. Batra. On behalf of the organizers, I would like to thank the distinguished judges, for their continued commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and for honoring this competition with their presence. At this point in time, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to hand over to the Judge President to take her session forward. Thank you.

Thank you. Good morning to everyone. On behalf of the Final jury, I welcome the finalist teams, their coaches, my fellow members of the jury, and all distinguished guests. I congratulate both teams on reaching the final round of the 18th World Human Rights Moot Court Nelson Mandela, and we look forward to your submissions. I now declare the hearing of the final round open and the court is now in session. May I invite counsel for the applicant to introduce themselves, indicate the allocation of speaking time between co-counsels, and proceed with their oral submissions.

If it pleases this honorable court, I am first counsel for the applicant and my name is Prince Mafigu and I shall be taking up a total time of 22 minutes. And with me is my co-counsel Ruth Jokonya, who shall also be taking a total time of 18 minutes, and we shall then reserve before this honourable court 5 minutes for rebuttals.

Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Uh, I would like to invite the respondent, uh, to do the same. Thank you.

Good morning, Your Excellencies. My name is Ivan Kiriga, first agent for the respondent, and I shall be speaking for the first 25 minutes. My co-agent, Ms. Sagal Ahmed, will then address this court in the next 20 minutes. Thank you.

Thank you. So, um, counsel for the applicant, the floor is yours.

Please, this honorable court, I shall begin by making submissions on the preliminary issues, that is jurisdiction, admissibility, as well as proper submissions on the first claim. Your Excellencies, we submit Regarding claim number 1 of 2026 before this honorable court that concerns the widespread violations within the region of Dabula that are alleged regarding personal jurisdiction, Your Excellencies, we submit that before this honorable court, it possesses the requisite personal jurisdiction on both the parties. A clear reading of paragraph 47 of the facts make it abundantly clear that both state parties before this court at this present time have ratified the Takakula Down Charter on Human and People's Rights. Not only that, but they have deposited valid optional declarations that gives this honorable court the specific jurisdiction to hear this matter. Now, Your Excellencies, we acknowledge that on the 1st of September 2025, Yakar withdrew and renounced its particular optional declaration before this court. However, we submit that this does not vitiate the jurisdiction of this honorable court regarding this matter, and the legal basis for this argument is under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 56, Sub-article 2, which provides for at least a 12-month renunciation notice before a withdrawal by a state becomes valid. Now, Your Excellencies, we then consequently submit that the renunciation by the State of Yakar remains at least invalid until the 1st of September, 2026. Therefore, this court is properly seized with the requisite personal jurisdiction regarding this claim. Your Excellencies, further proceeding to make submissions regarding the requisite territorial jurisdiction on the same claim. Well, the applicant acknowledges that the violations occurred within the region of Dabula. Now, Your Excellencies, primarily jurisdiction is territorial, as clearly established by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Ilascu versus Moldova. Now, there are particular exceptions to this rule that then provides for the particular principle of jurisdiction being exercised by a court based on the principle of extraterritoriality. To this effect, we then proffer before this court the case of Ukraine versus Russia re Crimea, wherein it was highlighted that the only special and specific circumstances in which a court can exercise territorial jurisdiction where violations occurred outside of the parties before the court are namely, number one, where there is state agent authority and control. Your Excellencies, the other exception is where there is particular effective control over the particular violations. Now, Your Excellencies, we further submit that the respondent state, Yakar, exercised both of these 2 criteria in order for this court's jurisdiction to be properly triggered. Now the proof is as follows regarding state agent authority and control. Now the court in Auskeini versus the United Kingdom highlighted that the test for state agent control and authority exists where a state via its agents exercises exercises control and authority over individuals abroad, which is enough to trigger a jurisdictional link that can give rise to the court's jurisdiction. Now, a clear reading of paragraph 15 of the facts highlights that Yakari and field advisors were seen directing interrogations of individuals that were being tortured within the region of Dabula. Your Excellencies, not only that, paragraph 14 also then further highlights that during the operations of the Dabula Defense Forces, uh, the Yakarian satellites mapped precisely with these operations according to the satellite reconnaissance schedules.

Uh, Counsel Mafigu, uh, if I may just take you a little bit back. On the specific issues that you are relating to, perhaps we'll ask when you are dealing with specific claims. I just wanted to take you back to the authority of the Vienna Convention that you cited. In the facts, there is nowhere where it is indicated that, you know, the respondent has signed the Vienna Convention. So I wanted to know from you, on what basis can we actually be bound by the that convention? That's the first question. The second question regarding that is, do you have any case law in terms of withdrawal of states from a particular treaty in terms of jurisdiction? If you can refer us to that, please.

Most obliged, Your Excellency. While the facts do not point to either party signing as part of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, we submit that according to the preliminary objections judgment in the case of Nicaragua versus the United States of America, it was highlighted that in cases where there is a withdrawal, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties acts as the bedrock and the parent of all treaties which then reflects the customary international law provisions which are applicable whenever a state withdraws from a particular treaty. Your Excellencies, regarding the second question regarding the particular case law on withdrawal, we submit particularly the judgment in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of Yvke Bronstein versus Peru. It was highlighted that A state cannot attempt to use a withdrawal of the court's consent to the jurisdiction simply to tactically maneuver away from particular accountability for violations that crystallized during the time a declaration was active. Now, Your Excellencies, it is abundantly clear that Operation Purity occurred within the time of 2023 to 2024. That is pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the facts. Now, at this present time, the Court was still seized for— with the requisite jurisdiction, and consequently this Court cannot have this jurisdiction stripped away by such a bad faith attempt.

Counsel, do you mean to argue then that there is something, a different consideration when you're dealing with the interpretation of human rights treaties and withdrawals and reservations?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. Particularly, Your Excellencies, regarding the issue of withdrawals, we refer to this honorable court's particular judgment in the case of Umuhosa versus Rwanda, where particularly the issue that is looked at is what is provided for in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties under Article 26, that is pacta sunt servanda, whereby if a state then deposits a particular declaration which gives the Court jurisdiction, evasion of such would be violation of the actual good faith that is inherent in every human rights treaty. Now regarding reservations, Your Excellencies, the applicant does note that the ICJ in the case of border and transborder military activities on the territory of Cameroon and Nigeria highlighted that the 2, that is reservations and a treaty, are slightly different and in the following manner. And the court further emphasized that a declaration constitutes a sui generis particular act by a state And such a sui generis act by a state, while unilateral, it consists of a state's voluntary and sovereign exercise of its authority.

Counsel, if I may, does it matter what the treaty in question says? Is it the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that, that regulates the question of withdrawal? Or is it the content of the treaty itself?

Most indebted, Your Excellencies, we submit that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Takakula Down Charter on Human and People's Rights, these are not mutually exclusive treaties. However, they are inextricably linked, and the legal basis for such is the Charter generally provides the specific norms of application regarding human rights for the Takakula Down Union, that is consisting of the violations that are to do with the issues of torture and the protection of individuals from the deprivation of the right to life. Now, in order to operationalize the provisions and to protect the sanctity of all treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties acts as the sentry to that particular treaty. Your Excellencies, I shall proceed.

May I just ask you about attribution? What do you think, what do you think about how this Court should distinguish between jurisdiction established by the Charter, talking about Takakula down human rights and people's Charter and substantive attribution of internationally wrongful acts to the respondent state. What would be your opinion? What legal standard we should apply here?

Your Excellency, Judge President, we submit that Article 35 of the Takakula Down Charter provides for this honorable court's jurisdiction for the interpretation and application of all human rights treaties to which the parties are parties to. Now, Your Excellencies, regarding the issue of attribution, particularly regarding this initial claim of the atrocities committed within the region of Dabula, under the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Your Excellencies, under Article 8, it provides for attribution of a non-state actor's actions to a state where that particular state exercises direction or control of the particular actions. Now, if these are read together, it is clear and abundant that in order to establish a violation, there must be attribution of that particular wrongful act May I also—

sorry— come back to the withdrawal? The fact that the government of Yakar has actually responded also by launching an interstate complaint, does that have a legal effect on the withdrawal before?

Indicted, Your Excellency, uh, we acknowledge that on the 1st of February 2026 is when Yaka filed its counterclaim. However, we are of the opinion that this only further cements Yaka's bad faith because pursuant to paragraph 39 of the facts, it was through a rushed parliamentary decision when it decided to withdraw from the particular consent of this court after allegations had arisen from particular NGOs and other organizations regarding these atrocities. Now, it then filing such a claim before this honorable court after refusing the jurisdiction via a withdrawal further cements the breach of the bad faith— the good faith principle under international law.

May I ask you one last question on jurisdiction? So one of the issues that arises for me in this case is whether there is even, as a matter of law— I mean, clearly as a matter of fact there's no question that there's a dispute, but as a matter of law, is there even a dispute between the parties? So that's one of the requirements for a founding of jurisdiction, at least in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, which of course you have, you have alluded to.

Most obliged, most obliged, honorable judge. We submit that indeed a dispute exists between the parties, and the reasoning is as follows. Your Excellencies, pursuant to the reasoning of the ICJ in Myanmar versus Gambia, As also read with the Ogiech case, it defined what a people are, and a people constitutes not only nationals of a particular territorial state, but it also involves any other sub-states that have an ethnic and cultural or religious link to that territorial state. Now, relating this to the facts, Your Excellencies, paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 make it abundantly clear that the Kuru minority have a shared ancestry and cultural kinship with the people of Zambuka, as during the period of migration via the Dracula Sea, there was clearly a transference of indigenous peoples from Zambuka into the region of the Kuru Highlands. Consequently, the Kuru minority are a people of Zambuka. Therefore, as a matter of law, Zambuka is clearly at a legal standpoint where it can file an application regarding violations of its people.

Ah, so you've now moved on to standing. I was asking you a very specific question about disputes. You've moved on to standing, which is an interesting point. The question about a dispute though is whether or not the 2 parties have at least had an opportunity to discuss, to see Whether or not they can find an agreement before making an application before the court.

Most indebted, just as a correction, thank you very much. We note that under paragraphs 24 and 25 of the facts, there was a series of diplomatic cables between the parties followed by communications which are diplomatic once again But the parties realized that they failed in this regard. Therefore, the prerequisite of diplomatic negotiations outside of any tribunal was fulfilled before the application was brought before this court. Most indebted, I shall proceed to make submissions regarding the admissibility of the claims. Your Excellencies, we submit before this court that regarding admissibility in interstate applications pursuant to paragraph 47 of the facts, there is supposed to be the exhaustion of domestic remedies, and the exceptions which exist have been highlighted in Jawara versus The Gambia as follows: a domestic remedy ought to be pursued to the extent that it is effective, available, and efficient. Now, Your Excellencies, we further then submit that according to the case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, that is between Guinea and the State of the Democratic Republic of Congo, it was highlighted that whenever an applicant state is alleging fundamental breaches that are reflective of an administrative practice of violations, therefore domestic remedies can be waived. Pursuant to this reasoning, Your Excellencies, we submit that regarding this initial claim on the particular violations which have occurred within the region of Dabula, there is a systematic and administrative practice of violations. Now, Your Excellencies, the fact pattern—

Counsel, just maybe before I ask my question, to ask you, are you going to address any merits in your submissions?

Most, most, Your Excellency, I shall make submissions regarding the first claim.

In that, in that regard, I know we have asked you questions on procedural aspects. I will just ask you to answer perhaps this question and then move to the merits of the case. You, when you're talking about exhaustion of local remedies, in which country really? Because Dabula is not before the court today. So exhaustion of local remedies, can we as a court be able to comment on whether or not remedies were exhausted in a country that is not even before this court.

Your Excellencies, we proffer before this honorable court the Interhandle case, wherein the court highlighted that whenever there are violations in any territory, domestic remedies must be pursued by the specific individuals that were the victims of such violations. Now, a reading of the facts under paragraphs 36 and 38, there is the clear pursuance of these remedies within the state of Dabula. However, because of this cultural link between Jambuka and the Kuru minorities, then this matter can be admissible before this court.

May I ask you about interstate cases? before other international courts. Do you know any example where the exhaustion of domestic remedies is not a precondition for accepting an interstate application?

Honorable Judge President, we submit before this court the case of Ireland versus the United Kingdom, and the court highlighted the fact that where a state alleges a direct injury of its own state apparatus, then there is no particular domestic remedy to pursue. Now, in terms of the facts, there is the claim that has got to do with the sinking of the Madame VG, which was sunk on the region of the high seas, and the State of Yakar claims violations stemming from this, from the destruction of such apparatus. Now, that claim, clearly there is no domestic remedy to pursue because it is state apparatus that has suffered direct injury. Now, in the interest of time, I shall proceed to address the first claim. Your Excellencies, regarding the atrocities committed by the— regarding the particular atrocities that were committed in the region of Dabula, Your Excellencies, we submit before this honorable court that under Article 16 of the ASIWA, it was provided that a state is complicit in the commission of an internationally wrongful act if it assists or aids another state with knowledge of the circumstances. Now, Your Excellencies, before establishing this, there are violations of the rights that are provided for in the Convention Against Torture, to which both parties are parties to. particularly by the torturing of Reverend Tomaso Kwanza. Not only that, but the killing of 37 civilians and Muri Chavura also violates the right to life under the Charter. Now, in order to prove the particular assistance, the applicant points this honorable court to the particular facts. Paragraph 6 of the facts highlight the transportation of Yakarian military equipment using unmarked trucks into the region of Dabula. Not only that, Your Excellencies, it is also then abundantly clear that shortly thereafter, Your Excellencies, the applicant notes that its time has elapsed. Perhaps if I can get a minute to conclude the submission.

Could you just finalize your sentence? We have to be very strict about the time. Thank you.

Most indebted. This particular fact is then buttressed by the conversation between the 2 military commanders of the DDF and Yaka, where they were instructing each other to burn the root and the tree will wither. And this proves the knowledge of the circumstances and the intent to cause violations. Thank you.

Thank you. Please.

May it please this honorable court, I will be making submissions on the remaining claims before then tendering our prayer before this honorable court. In relation to claim number 2, Your Excellencies, the respondent state might try to argue that there was a violation of the right to life under Article 4 of the Charter as well as Article 6 of the ICCPR. However, Your Excellencies, the applicant submits that the state of Jambuka was in no way responsible the sinking of the Madame Vigie. The provisions of Article 8 of RCO make it abundantly clear that the only time where a state can be held responsible for the activities of an individual or a group of individuals is where it directed or controlled the particular activities. Consistent with this, Your Excellencies, is the effective control test, which was established by the ICJ in the case of Nicaragua v. USA and later on in the Bosnian genocide case Wherein, in paragraphs 397 to 405 of the judgment—

Counsel, may I stop you there? I can see the line of argument. The line of argument is making a very important assumption about the facts. So the assumption here is that the applicant State had nothing to do with, with the bringing down of the submarine. But that is contested on the facts. On the facts, there are some allegations that in fact the non-state actor here implicated did not have the capacity to engage in such, and so by implication that it was the applicant. How do you respond to that? Because that seems to be the critical point for me, at least.

Most indebted, Your Excellency. In response to that, we look at paragraphs 20 and 21 of the facts. wherein indeed it is stated that they did not have the capacity to carry out this attack that was on Madame Vigie. However, Your Excellency, as stated in the effective control test, for responsibility to then be attached, the state needs to direct the specific operation, in this case the sinking of Madame Vigie. And Your Excellencies, there is no evidence in the facts that shows that the state of Jambuka actually directed though it is alleged that the weapons were provided, which is disputed pursuant to paragraph 22 of the facts, wherein it was stated that the only reason why the KRF had access to these weapons is because of Yaka's failure to curb regional smuggling in the area.

So therefore, Your Excellency, we submit that because the State of Jambuka did not direct the specific operation, it cannot therefore be held responsible

So is it my understanding then that assuming the court were to find on the facts that we believe the allegation, that you would accept some responsibility? So if we were to determine on the facts that having looked at the facts and having listened to the allegations from the respondent, that we think in fact the applicant was actually involved, that you would then assume responsibility?

Yes.

Most indebted, Your Excellency. Looking at the provisions of our CIWA, it is clearly stated in Article 2 that a wrongful act is a prerequisite for responsibility. So if the Court were to find that the action itself is attributable to the State of Djibouti, we submit that it still would not constitute a violation of international humanitarian law. Your Excellencies, in the judgment of Nicaragua— my apologies, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, it was stated that in order to establish whether there was a violation of the right to life during a time of an armed conflict, we then resort to international humanitarian law, which is the interpretive lens in times of armed conflict. We submit, Your Excellencies, that pursuant to the facts, Madame Viji was a legitimate military objective. Which is defined in Article 52.

Counsel, I think it's a very important point that you're making. I just have one question, and I promise this is the last question that I'll ask you on this. So you have referred us to the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the famous quote about the relationship between IHL and international human rights law. Is it the case, do you accept, that the Court seems to have moved away from that particular relationship and now almost seems to treat international humanitarian law and international human rights law on an equal footing, even in terms of armed conflict? If I look, for example, at the advisory opinion of 2024 and of 2025 in relation to the situation in Palestine.

Most indebted, Your Excellency. We submit that because there was an armed conflict and international humanitarian law is the lex specialis, the court should find persuasion and look at the provisions of international humanitarian law to assess whether a violation of international human rights law occurred, even though it is up to the court and it is in the court's discretion.

May I come in for a moment, if I— so on that point, could you guide us to your argument on proportionality under international humanitarian law on this attack?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. I will refer this honorable court to the provisions of Article 51, Sub-article 5 of Additional Protocol I, as well as Rule 14 of the Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, where the principle of proportionality is discussed, stating that when carrying out attacks, it should be— the attack should not then result in collateral damage which is excessive in relation to the military advantage that is gained. Your Excellency, while it is accepted that the attack on Madame Vigie, pursuant to a reading of paragraph 20 of the facts, resulted in the deaths of 97 medical doctors, 33 nurses, we submit, Your Excellency, that also aboard the Madame Vigie were 30 specially trained Marines as well as hundreds of crates of armaments. Your Excellency is now applying this to the facts Your Excellencies, we note looking at the event that occurred before this, Your Excellencies, that in paragraph 7 there was a razing of entire villages, particularly the Turo, Ganza, and Ngaru, and all of this is attributable to the state of Yakar as argued by my co-counsel. We note that the Marines and the armaments were then meant to be used to continue with the atrocities that were occurring in the territory of Debula. That being said, we submit before this honorable court that the advantage that was gained far supersedes the damage that occurred, particularly the deaths of the civilians aboard the ship.

Excuse me. Also, on the sinking of the submarine, you seem to assume that international humanitarian law is applying. That means that you assume there was an armed conflict. Has there been at that time an armed conflict between Svanbuka and, and IACA? And when did that armed conflict start, and why was it during that time?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. I will begin by providing the definition of an armed conflict, which was defined by the International Criminal Court in the case of Prosecutor versus Ntaganda in 2019, particularly paragraphs 701 to 706 of the facts, wherein it stated, particularly first referring to a non-international armed conflict, it defines this as a conflict that goes on between governmental authorities and an organized armed group or between such groups themselves. It also then defined an international armed conflict as a conflict that occurs between 2 states. Now, Your Excellency is applying this to the facts. We note in paragraph 3 that there began a conflict between the KRF and the DDF, and this is also then cemented in paragraph 12 of the facts, which then shows that the KRF was an organized armed group, solidified by paragraph 19, meeting the organization requirement, where we note that the KRF made a statement claiming responsibility for the sinking of the Madame Vigie. Therefore, Your Excellencies, we submit that there was an there was an armed conflict between the KRF and the territory of Debula. But, Your Excellencies, we submit that this was then internationalized by the involvement of YAKAR, as it was providing the weapons and had control and assisted the DDF. Most indebted, Your Excellencies.

So, Counsel, just to clarify, since you're saying this is, is the context of armed conflict. Are you now saying that Jambuka, the state you are representing, also joined the armed conflict when they attacked the submarine?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. We submit that Jambuka was not a party to the armed conflict, as counsel still submits that it had no responsibility, and the action of the sinking of the Madame V Fiji is not attributable to the state of Jambuga, so it did not play a part in the armed conflicts.

Thank you for your clarifications. I would like to ask you about a genuine integrated normative framework established by a landmark case that your colleague quoted, Netherlands and Ukraine versus Russia. Were European Court of Human Rights departed from classical traditional interpretation of IHL as interpretative aid, but also introduced a transformative character and application of European Convention on Human Rights in terms of establishing state responsibility. So could you find a kind of parallel regarding the Charter obligations Obligations under Charter regarding state responsibility, or you insist on IHL in this respect?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. Counsel for the applicant insists on international humanitarian law. However, we submit to the discretion of this honorable court in relation to this matter. Yeah, most indebted, Your Excellency. I will proceed to address claim number 3. which is based on the Aurora Ceasefire Agreement. Once more, Your Excellencies, we submit that the State of Jambuka is in no way responsible for any human rights violations that arose from the Aurora Ceasefire Agreement. And we begin by proffering before this honorable court the provisions of Article 1 of the Charter, which places an obligation on states to respect and protect the rights that are provided for in the Charter. We now proffer before this honorable court the decision in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, wherein it was stated that the primary obligation to respect and protect rights that are provided for in the Charter lies with the state, a position that was also then cemented by the American Court of Human Rights in the case of Center of Human Rights versus Tanzania in 2025. Now, getting into more specific case law regarding this, Your Excellency, we begin by proffering the case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, decided by the Inter-American Court in 2012, wherein it was stated in paragraph 165 of the judgment that the state has an obligation to also respect the rights of the people to free, prior, and informed consultation. Your Excellency, we also proffer before this honorable court the case of Laka Hanhat v. Argentina, decided by the Inter-American Court in 2020, wherein paragraph 275 of the facts, it was stated that states must protect the relationship that Indigenous people have with their Indigenous land. It then went on to discuss and submit that this responsibility to ensure that the right to free, prior, and informed consultations cannot be delegated to private companies or third party, lest the private company that has interest in the particular rights in question. We therefore submit, Your Excellencies, that the right— the obligation rather to ensure that these rights were protected lies primarily with the State of Debula and not with the State of Jambuka. And that also, Your Excellency, due to the principle of non-intervention, the State of Jambuka could not then enter the territory of Debula to then regulate the mining activities that were being carried out.

Counsel, you've heard the saying, eat your cake and have it. It seems like you're doing that. You want to eat your cake and still have it. In respect of the, the armed conflict, it was clear that Jambuka was, was intervening. So in respect of that, you were willing to intervene, but now you're not willing to intervene?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. While first of all we submit that the State of Zimbabwe did not intervene, we also submit that it is also important to look at the context. While according to the court's discretion, if the court were to decide that Zimbabwe did intervene, it is important to note that the attack was carried out on the high seas and not in the—

So in this respect, my intervention here is in respect of You had said, you had made the argument that the applicant can't intervene in the territory of Dabula with respect to how Dabula treats its minorities. That's the essential argument that you had made. And I tried to compare this with earlier on when you did, in fact, or your state did, in fact, intervene to try to help the minorities. Why is it different this time?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. We submit that the difference is that the assistance Rambuka is providing to the minorities was by bringing the matter before this honorable court, and it did not enter the territory of Debula, um, in order to achieve this. But in this particular case, Your Excellency, we submit that it could not enter the territory of Debula pursuant to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of intervention to the domestic affairs of a state, 1981 if I'm not mistaken, when it was stated that states should not intervene with the internal or external affairs of a state for whatever reason. However—

But Counsel, you quoted very extensively the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Indigenous rights and on consultation, but why Do you think that a state should intervene with their presence on the ground in order to ensure that there is proper, a proper consultation process with an indigenous people? When we're talking about extractive activities and profit and agreements between states, et cetera, et cetera. Why do you equal that Let's say conditioning on a state relationship with its own indigenous population with, like, military intervention. Why do you equal those 2 situations?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. If I may begin by addressing the first half of your question. We submit that in relation to physical intervention, Your Excellency, and ensuring the right to free, prior, and informed consultations, Your Excellency, this is the most effective as physical intervention would ensure that the rights have indeed been fulfilled. And we submit that the territory of, or rather the state of Jambuka could not then intervene in this manner. If—

Yes, let me stop.

Does it matter that the rights in question are or create, raise obligations owed to all and such that therefore if they're obligations erga omnes, your State as well has an obligation to ensure that they're fulfilled?

Most indebted, Your Excellency. Indeed, pursuant to the East Timor case, these obligations are obligations erga omnes. But however, we submit that because the primary obligation lies with the State of Debula, which is not even a party to these proceedings, and also because of non-intervention, the State of Jambuka, while it had an obligation to ensure that these rights are respected, this was limited in as far as what could have been done by the State to ensure that these obligations are fulfilled. Most—

Thank you. Your time expired. Do you want to finish the sentence? Yes, please.

Most indebted, Your Excellency. We therefore submit that Srebrenica is not responsible, and in relation to the third claim— the fourth claim, rather— and the prayer, we rely on our written memorials filed of record.

Thank you. Thank you, Madam Counsel. Now the floor goes to respondent counsels, please. The floor is yours.

Madam President, Your Excellencies, good morning, and may it please this honorable court. My name is Ivan Kiriga, and together with my co-agent, Ms. Saga Ahmed, we rise on behalf of the respondent state of Lomunyaka. I will speak for the first 25 minutes On the preliminary issues of jurisdiction and admissibility, then address this court on Merits A concerning Yakar's responsibility for the human rights violations in Dabula and Merit D concerning the legality of the selective entry policy. My co-agent, Ms. Sagal Ahmed, will then address this court in 20 minutes on Merits B and C. Unless directed otherwise, we wish to proceed. Thank you.

Please.

Madam President, Your Excellencies, in war, truth is always the first casualty. Throughout their submissions, the applicants have sought to conflate and speculate. They conflate humanitarian assistance for operational control, and they speculate where the factual record remains deeply contested and highly fragmented. To that end, we pose a question before this honorable court: since when has international law made a decision on the basis of speculation rather than evidence? It is the respondent's submission that it has never done so. With all this in mind, allow me to proceed to my substantive submissions on the preliminary issues. Turning first to jurisdiction and admissibility, we are in agreement with the applicant's submissions that this court does indeed have the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter. However, before I move to, to address this honorable court on its admissibility, may I offer some clarity on its personal jurisdiction? Counsel for the respondent submitted that our withdrawal to paragraph 14 of the fact pattern was done on bad faith. However, Your Excellencies, may I direct this court's attention to paragraph 14, specifically the sentence beginning with on 1st September. On 1st September 2025, Yakar's Parliament, arguing that Yakar was being unfairly targeted by international institutions, in particular the Takakula down human rights system by a 2/3 majority formally withdrew from the jurisdiction of this court, declaring that the court had become politicized and inconsistent with the charter's original spirit. We submit, Your Excellencies, that our withdrawal was in pursuit of maintaining the spirit of the charter because we were being unfairly targeted throughout the human rights— throughout the war that was occasioning in Darbula.

So may I ask you a question just on that? I mean, it's a factual question. Were you targeted before this court or at that date? Just a point of clarification.

We were targeted throughout the diplomatic communications that existed between the 2 states. We are told, even pursuant to paragraph 39 of the fact pattern, that the applicant state Proceeded and places countermeasures as against the State of Zambouk, as against the respondent State, without even ensuring that Yaka was the one that was actually responsible for the human rights violations.

So you do realize the implication of my question, my earlier question, is then why withdraw from this Court if this Court has never done— this Court and the system has actually never done anything in relation to the respondent? Because it hasn't targeted you.

To clarify, Your Excellencies, paragraph 14 of the fact pattern states that we were being targeted by international institutions, particularly the Takakula Down Charter's human rights system. We therefore submit, Your Excellencies, that pursuant to paragraph 14, our withdrawal was conducted because the court had become politicized by efforts of of the applicant states and other states like it in the Takakula Union, and further, that it was moving in a manner that was inconsistent with the Charter's original spirit. We therefore submit, Your Excellencies, that our withdrawal was not done in bad faith. In addition to this—

Counsel, just one follow-up question on that, because it's really important, the argument you're making there. When you say the effects say that you were being targeted by the human rights system, was it by this court? Because the question still remains, why withdraw from this court if Sambuka is never— if your state has never been brought before this honorable court? Why withdraw from this court?

Your Excellency, this court is guided by the Charter, the Takakula Down Charter on Human Rights, and it is also developed by the Takakula Down Charter on Human Rights. If the spirit of the Charter is not being upheld by institutions established. And further, at paragraph 14, it is declared that also this honorable court, Your Excellencies, was acting in— was acting— was— we had become politicized and acting inconsistently with the Charter. And therefore, that becomes the basis of our withdrawal, and not on any point, at any point in time, done in bad faith.

In any event, Thank you, Council.

So how do we read Pacta su Nservanda? Because you're saying we're withdrawing— I'm trying to understand— because there is a problem with Pacta su Nservanda. But how do we read your withdrawal in terms of Pacta su Nservanda and the temporal application?

Your Excellency, I do note your concern, and with regards to the principle of good faith, it is our submission that our withdrawal was done with regards to good faith with the Charter establishing the Takakula Down Union, Your Excellency, in that the State of Yakar and its Parliament had noted that this honorable court had become politicized and was moving inconsistently with its obligations and the Charter's original spirit, which is the protection of human rights and not—

This court?

Yes, Your Excellency.

I thought you said that this court hadn't behaved that way.

Allow me to clarify, Your Excellency. At paragraph 14 of the fact pattern, it is stated that the Parliament of Dabula— of Yakar, sorry, by a two-thirds majority, withdrew from the jurisdiction of the Thakakula Down Human Rights Court, declaring that the court had become politicized and inconsistent with the Charter's original spirit.

Just again, maybe, Counsel, to allow you to move away from that point, you know, I think earlier you made a good submission to say a claim without evidence doesn't become truth because it's being claimed. So it's your Parliament which was claiming that you're being targeted, but is it a matter of fact? Can you relate where the court has done that? I think there's no evidence regarding that.

And maybe afterwards you can just move on to the next claim. I think we've heard you on this point and we're— we will consider it, but maybe you can answer that question and then just move on.

Your Excellency, whereas in the fact pattern we do concede that there is no evidence that we were being targeted by the court, it is our submission that Yaka has not acted considered inconsistent with the Charter's spirit, and therefore, Your Excellency, even in the withdrawal, it was done in accordance with good faith. Turning to admissibility, I note that firstly, counsel for the applicant directed this honorable court to paragraph 47. This is wrong, Your Excellencies, and the requisite standard on admissibility is enshrined at paragraph 48 of the fact pattern, and if I may guide this court's At paragraph 48 of the fact pattern, it is cited that the only relevant admissibility criteria within the Tucker cooldown in interstate matters such as this one is only the exhaustion of local remedies. To that end, Your Excellencies, we do not contest the applicant's submissions that this court has— that the matters before this honorable court are admissible specifically with Merit A, which they defended.

Thank you.

On merits C and D, Your Excellencies, local remedies were indeed exhausted as pursuant to paragraph 38 of the fact pattern, the NGO International Rights of Darbullians approached the Zwambuka Constitutional Court, which is the highest court in the land pursuant to paragraph 47. Additionally, at paragraph 39 of the fact pattern, affected Yakarians approached the Zwambuka Constitutional Court, and therefore we submit that with regards to both merits and local remedies were indeed exhausted. In contention before this honorable court, however, is the exhaustion of local remedies with regards to Merit B on the ceasefire agreement. Your Excellencies, may I begin with acknowledging that Merit B was indeed forwarded before this honorable court by the respondent state without the exhaustion of local remedies. However, it remains our submission that merit be is admissible before this honorable court. We place reliance on the case of Jawara v. The Gambia in 2001 by the African Commission, which established that local remedies are only to be exhausted where they are available, efficient, and sufficient. In the present case, Your Excellencies, the respondent state contests that local remedies in the applicant it were not available. Your Excellencies, local remedies are considered available where they can be pursued without an impediment. In the present case, we submit that Yaka and Swambuka being sovereign states, Your Excellencies, Yaka is impeded by the doctrine of equality of states from taking a matter before the court— the courts in Swambuka, and therefore, despite the lack of exhaustion of local remedies, Merit B remains admissible before this honorable court. Having concluded— having concluded on the preliminary matters before this honorable court, I now turn to—

I just have one question. It's a question I would have liked to ask the applicant, but I didn't. So you don't contest that the applicant has standing to raise the issue of the responsibility of the respondent for violations of the rights of the minorities in Ndabula?

In answering your question, may I direct this Court's attention to paragraph 48 of the fact pattern, specifically the line beginning with state parties to the Charter. Sorry, the sentence: State parties to the Charter may bring applications against other state parties alleging violations of the Charter. Interstate applications provided that all parties have accepted the court's jurisdiction. In the present case, on Merit A, the applicant has brought a claim alleging that by its participation in the war in this— in the state of Dabula, the respondent state has violated the right to life under Article 5— Article 4 of the Charter and the right to freedom from torture under Article 5. It therefore—

So just to be clear, In your view, once the court has jurisdiction, then the issue of standing is addressed?

No, Your Excellency. Standing works under— is under admissibility. So the court first establishes its jurisdiction, then moves to address its admissibility and standing of the applicant state. And in the—

Right, and the sentence that you've just referred to us is about Jurisdiction, it's not about standing or admissibility. That's really my question. So, so is your argument that once jurisdiction is established, it's not necessary to establish standing separately?

Excellency, we rely on paragraph 4, the first part of that sentence, which states that State Parties to the Charter may bring applications against other State Parties alleging violations of the Charter. In the present case, the applicant's submissions on Merit A, concerning Yaka's human rights violations are based on the violation of the right to life under Article 4 of the African Charter and the right to freedom from torture under Article 5, which pursuant to paragraph 46 is synonymous to the Takakula Down Charter.

Just to clarify, but do you imply then that if you have an interstate complaint, there is no need to let's say exhaust domestic remedies and comply with all of the other requirements that a claim through a court of human rights should satisfy before, not talking about jurisdiction, before there is admissibility for the claim? Because you were talking before about admissibility. The claimants were saying that there was no need to exhaust remedies because they were talking about a generalized human rights violation. But you're saying that actually they— some organizations approached a high court, and therefore there had been, let's say, exhaustion, although you were not clear about whether that was an adequate remedy.

Yes.

And whether it was actually effective. So can you clarify?

Excellencies, with regards to Merits B and Merits C and D, Your Excellencies, it is our submission that despite the fact that it is not the State of Yakarta that directly went before the highest court in the State of Zwambuka, Your Excellencies, local remedies have been exhausted. The African Commission in the 2017 case of African Commission on Human and People's Rights versus the State of Kenya, at paragraph 55, stated that the party before this court and the party that exhausted local remedies need not be the same, but all in all, that local remedies be exhausted. With regards to Merit B, we submit that the respondent state, being the custodian of the rights of the people who were, who were killed pursuant to the sinking of Madame Viji, is partly a victim, and therefore, Your Excellencies, by virtue of the doctrine of equality of states, states cannot approach the courts in the applicant state to exhaust local remedies. Proceeding, proceeding with my submissions and moving to Merit A, the question before the court is whether the State of Yaka can be held responsible for the human rights violations in Darbula. Under this merit, counsel for the applicant has submitted that there were human rights violations in the violation of the right to life, under Article 4 of the African Charter, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the fact pattern where 37 individuals were killed, and the violation of the right to freedom from torture under Article 5, pursuant to paragraph 15, due to the torture of Reverend Thomas Okonza. Your Excellencies, it is our submission that these human rights violations, whilst deeply regrettable, cannot be attributed to the State of Yaka by virtue of Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility. Article 16 of the Articles of State Responsibility provides that a state shall be held responsible for any assistance that it provides in the commission of an internationally wrongful act where 2 elements are met. First, that it is under a direct obligation not to commit these internationally wrongful acts, and second, that it gave knowledge, it gave assistance with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.

Mr.

Counsel, given the rights at issue, does the duty to prevent come in, which is much more positive, requiring much more positive conduct on the respondent, and much stronger than the right, so the obligation not to assist? Does this in any way affect your argument?

See, pursuant to CERAC with Nigeria, the duty to prevent does indeed come in, and we submit that that does not affect our state, as our state did not have knowledge that its assistance was going to be used to commit an internationally wrongful act.

And the test is not if you have knowledge, it's if in the circumstances you ought to have been aware that there was a possibility. And, and given the conflict and the news media about what was happening, surely you, you must have foreseen a risk, a real risk of some violations of human rights, and yet you continue to assist, no?

If I may direct this Court's attention to paragraph 10 of the fact pattern, it is clearly stated that Yaka insisted and continues to act lawfully to preserve regional stability. stability by supplying non-lethal aid such as rations, communication gear, and defensive drones. In the present case, Your Excellencies, all the offensive drones that were used in the other attacks mentioned by the applicant state pursuant to paragraph 6 and paragraph 11 of the fact pattern were not supplied by the State of Yaka, and therefore we submit that Yaka did not have any obligation to prevent, and this obligation lay with the State of Dabula as it is its officials who are committing these human rights violations.

May I ask you something? Maybe I misunderstood, but I have the impression that you claimed that there was no effective control. Do you think that there was no overall control at all from your side?

Maybe, Counsel, just so that you answer the questions together, because they are related on the question of effective control. On paragraph 15, this is specifically to do with the right to freedom from torture. It's clearly stated that there are eyewitnesses actually which say that it was Yakarian personnel who were directing the interrogations where someone is being tortured, which is, you know, direct control there. What would be your response to that?

Beginning with Madam President's question on overall control, while that might have been met by the provision of training and weapons, Your Excellencies, pursuant to the International Court of Justice's decision at paragraph 405 of the 2007 Bosnian genocide case, overall control is not the standard to be used in matters of state responsibility and is only to be used when assessing individual criminal responsibility. With regards to effective control and answering jointly Madam President's question and Professor, uh, Chingeta's question, with regards to effective control, pursuant to the International Court of Justice's case of Nicaragua versus the United States, at paragraph 115, effective control is demonstrated by either direct specific direction or enforcement of the acts in question. Direction in the present case requires that The State Party gives specific instructions for the alleged violations. In the present case, Your Excellencies, the evidence relied on by the applicant State at paragraph 15 of the fact pattern is cited as testimony from a former security contractor whose identity cannot be verified. And further, if I may direct this court's attention to paragraph 37 of the—

Counsel, when you say whose identity Cannot be verified? That's, that's not stated in the fact pattern. We don't, we don't have that, that their identity cannot be verified.

Allow me to direct this court's attention to paragraph 15 of the fact pattern, specifically the sentence beginning with Yaka dismissed. Yaka dismissed the reports as manufactured atrocity propaganda, adding that the alleged contractor had no verified verifiable identity. We therefore submit that reliance on this testimony, Your Excellency, from a person who can't even be brought before this honorable court cannot constitute and cannot be used to prove specific instruction by the State of Yakar. Additionally, at paragraph 37 of the fact pattern, where we had criminal prosecutions with regards to the right to torture specifically, whereas there were testimonies, Your Excellencies, The courts in Dabula held that without any further evidence in the form of signed orders, Your Excellencies, this could not be attributed to the State of Yakar. Proceeding with my submissions on Article 16, the threshold under Article 16 is established in the preparatory works, and we place reliance on the preparatory works by virtue of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention of Treaties, which states that when the text of the article is ambiguous, Then we can use the preparatory works to get the intent of the drafters. In the present case, the text of Article 16 is ambiguous on what the threshold of knowledge of the circumstances is, and therefore it is our submission that we should place reliance on the preparatory works. Your Excellencies, the preparatory works to RCWA, specifically the drafting committee's minutes of the 26th/81st meeting at paragraph 50,

One small question, it's a technical question.

So you're treating our COI as a treaty?

Your Excellency, it is soft law and it has been documented, and therefore we submit that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can apply in that at this specific moment we do not pass on to the reading of the text. The threshold of knowledge of the circumstances is not provided under the text of Article 16, and therefore, Your Excellencies, we move to the preparatory works to get the threshold.

The commentary, which is an integral part of the instrument adopted.

Your Excellency, the commentary in and of itself is also silent on the threshold. Under the preparatory works, specifically the conclusions of the meeting of the Drafting Committee's 2681st meeting, they conclude that the threshold under the threshold for knowledge is to be interpreted narrowly, Your Excellencies, and further adds that, and further adds that in the commentary this specifically will be discussed. The commentary at page 66, paragraph 4 states that the state will only be held accountable where it provided assistance with the knowledge of the intended use of its assistance. On the facts, this has not been demonstrated by the respondent, by the applicant state. They placed reliance on the leaked intercept at paragraph 8 of the fact pattern. However, Your Excellencies, at paragraph 8 of the fact pattern, it is stated that this leaked intercept has only been authenticated by Grok, an AI tool on X, Your Excellencies, and when it was provided to experts, they could only conclude that Yakarian accents were heard. We submit that accent alone is not enough to attribute any crime to any state, as any people from any other region can share accents and can speak in the language of another state. Further, Your Excellencies, under Article 16 of RCWA, assistance is not enough to prove attribution. And while the respondent state might have provided assistance, the applicants have not shown that the respondent state knew that its assistance was going to be used to commit human rights violations. Turning swiftly to merit D, Your Excellencies, the question before this honorable court is whether the visa policy is justified. Counsel for the applicants have not submitted on this merit, and therefore we place reliance on the statements by the Minister of the Estate at paragraph 40 that the visa policy is a lawful countermeasure. Countermeasures are guided by Article 49 of our CWA, and therefore—

You don't have much time left, and so I'm just going to ask you one question. So even if we forget countermeasures and everything, is there anything unlawful about that conduct? Is it not up to the state to determine its, its visa policies?

We do— could I kindly get Thank you. In answering Judge's question, Honorable Justice's question, it is true that states have the right to regulate entry and exit of aliens into its territory. However, this right is subject to Article 12 of the ICCPR, which provides that this must be governed by lawful processes, Your Excellencies, which have failed under RCWA, Your Excellency, as they have justified it as a lawful measure. And additionally, there must be notice and the aliens must be given a chance to contest their expulsion. In the present case, they were indeed given a chance and we do not contest that.

The time expired a couple of, you know, like I think 30 seconds ago. So just conclude your sentence and we finish. I took into consideration that we asked you a lot, so please conclude your sentence.

As I cede floor, Your Excellencies, where thresholds are not met, responsibility cannot arise. The applicants have not provided any thresholds before this honorable court, and therefore we submit that the respondent state cannot be held responsible for any violations. I cede floor to my co-agent, Ms. Agal Ahmed.

Thank you. Please, the floor is yours.

Madam President, Your Excellencies, may it please this honorable court, picking up from where my co-agent has left, my name is Sagal Ahmed, appearing as the second agent on behalf of the respondent state, Luang Muang Ya Kao. With the leave of this court, I shall be taking the next 20 minutes to dispense with Merit B, on the responsibility for the sinking of Madame Viji, and Meritsea on Zimbabwe's inconsistency with its human rights obligations under the Aurora ceasefire agreement. Your Excellencies, I posit a question before this court: does international law permit destruction, or does it demand restraint? The respondents submit that the law is unequivocal, that where verification is possible yet not undertaken, Where alternatives exist yet are ignored, and where lives could be spared but are not, the law is not applied, it is violated. With this, Your Excellencies, allow me to move to our substantive submissions, beginning with Merit B. It is the respondents' submission that Zomboka bears international responsibility for the sinking of Madame VG, and to this end, we shall be advancing our 2 arguments. That firstly, the attack on Madame Vijay was unlawful under international humanitarian law, and second, that that attack is in fact attributable to the applicant state. Turning first to the unlawfulness of the attack, it is our submission, Your Excellencies, that the attack on Madame Vijay was unlawful as the vessel itself constituted a dual-use object by definition under page 92 of the ICRC guide, Your Excellencies, wherein a dual-use object is one that has both simultaneous civilian and military functions.

Did the applicant state— know that it was dual-use? Is there anything in the facts to indicate that it knew that it was dual-use?

Your Excellency, it is our submission that whereas they may not have known, that in fact leads me to my point that in the cases of uncertainty, then that must be resolved in favor of protection. In this present scenario, it is our submission that the attack was unlawful as the principle of precaution was not adhered to. By dint of customary IHL Rule 15, as well as the 2000 Prosecutor v. Kupreskić decision, it was stated that the principle of precaution under international humanitarian law has attained the status of customary international law. And the reasoning of the tribunal, Your Excellency, was that no state had contested, even the ones that are part— even the ones that are not a party to the Additional Protocol. In contrast to these requirements, if I may guide this court's attention to paragraph 20 of the fact record, where it is stated that the applicant state chose the highest form of attack, torpedoing the Madame Viju, Your Excellency, leading to the death of the 97 doctors, 33 nurses, as well as the 30 specially trained commandos. Having established the unlawfulness of the attack, Your Excellency, it is our submission that we note the applicant has stated that the attack was proportionate. It is our submission—

Counsel, just for more clarity on the part of illegality that you are referring to, which I've heard that you have mentioned the principle of precaution. Can you articulate how the principle of precaution, IHL principle of precaution, is being violated in terms of the attack of the submarine? I'm not getting how you're linking there. Then if that's— is it only precaution also you are relying on as an IHL principle that was violated before you move on to question of proportionality?

Certainly, Excellency. It is a submission that the principle of precaution was violated as the agents for the applicants could have in fact chosen less lethal means as they had the capability as shown by paragraph 21 of the fact record where it is stated that the technology that was used in the tracking of Madam Vijay itself, Your Excellency, was capable of detecting and transmitting minute acoustic signatures even across continents. In this regard, It is a submission that they in fact had the capability to effect the principle of precaution. Moving then—

May I also ask in that context, do you think that the sinking of the submarine was a violation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or are you only applying international humanitarian law? And if so, do you contend that it was an international armed conflict at that time?

Your Excellency— sorry, Counsel, just the question which I wanted to follow up is that precaution, you take measures that are possible to take. So in this particular regard, I wanted to hear what are the alternative measures which they could have taken to actually destroy if it is a military target?

Responding to the first question, it is a submission that we're in fact contending that the attack was in violation of Article 6 of ICCPR as well as Article 4 of the African Charter, and we note that in this instance, Your Excellency, that your question in fact alludes to the difference between international humanitarian law as against international human rights law. In our present case, it is a submission that what is applicable is international humanitarian law. However, it is still a submission that international human rights law does not cease to take effect in instances of war, and therefore it is applicable and they're complementary to each other. And in that regard, it is a submission that that both are in fact applicable. Responding to the second question, Your Excellency, as to what feasible measures were present in the present case, it is a submission by relying on the San Remo Manual, Your Excellency, that the applicant state could have in fact issued blockades which would have achieved the— which would have achieved a— which would be a less lethal means, Your Excellency, as the attack happened on the high seas. It posed no imminent threat to the applicant state, and therefore there was no need to choose the highest form of attack on the Madame Viji. And therefore it is a submission that even then the principle of precaution was not adhered to. Addressing the—

So if you state that actually IHL is applicable here, then you submit that submarine was a legitimate military object. Where is the principle What is the principle of distinct here? And do you think that— how do you prove that a submarine is not a civilian object? For example, if it's used in humanitarian purposes or other purposes, could you elaborate on that, please?

Your Excellency, It is our submission that Madame Vigi was in fact not a military objective as it was a dual-use object. For an object to classify as a military objective, 2 criteria must be met under Article 52 of Additional Protocol I. That firstly, by its use, nature, location, or purpose, it must make an effective contribution to military action. And second, its complete or partial destruction offers a definite military advantage. In this present case, we contend the second criteria as it was not making an effective military contribution. If I may guide this court's attention to paragraph 23 of the fact record where Yaka states that the 30 commandos were accompanying the 97 doctors and 33 nurses for basic security in order to establish emergency clinics.

Yes.

And that was, Your Excellency, pursuant to the humanitarian mission to ensure that the citizens of Debula were to be protected.

And the crates of ammunition?

Your Excellency, while we note your concern regarding the crates of ammunition, it is our submission, Your Excellency, that in fact, even in the scenario where this Court finds that this was a military objective, the attack was still unlawful as the principle of precaution was not adhered to, as well as the principle of proportionality. It is our submission that in assessing the principle of proportionality, as rightfully noted by the second agent for the applicant, that this court should consider 2 factors. Firstly, the incidental civilian harm as against the military advantage present. In this present situation, Your Excellency, We submit that the—

So just one question on that point. Is that assessment taken before the attack or afterwards? So is it an ex post facto analysis that we say so many doctors died, so many nurses, so many civilians, or is the assessment taken before by the applicant in this case because you're soon going to argue attribution?

It is a submission that that assessment should be taken at the time of the attack and considering that—

And so my question then is, did the applicant, again assuming attribution, did they know that there were so many civilians and so many doctors and so many nurses?

Your Excellency, it is a submission, as the facts are unclear as to the time of the attack and the knowledge of the people on board, It is a submission that they should have verified considering they did have the capability to verify who was on board before making the attack. Moving then to the attribution of that attack, agents for the applicant have stated and relied on Article 8 on the articles of state responsibility. However, we seek to clarify something before this court. Agents for the applicant have stated that in fact the requisite standard and threshold under Article 8 is one of effective control. However, we submit to the contrary that that is in fact a misdirection before this court. We seek to rely on the ILC Commentary to Article 8 at paragraph 7, where it states that a state may assume responsibility under 3 limbs. Firstly, if it exercised direction, control, or instruction. It was stated in the text of Article 8 that these 3 are disjunctive. and it is sufficient to establish any one of them for responsibility to arise. While they have relied on control, it is a submission that we seek to ground responsibility under direction.

Paragraph—

page 69, paragraph 7 of the ILC Commentary states that the actual threshold required and standard for direction is one of actual direction of an operative kind. With that, if I may guide this court's attention to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the fact record, where it is evident that the Kuru Restoration Front, the KRF, could not possibly have possessed the requisite technology and capability to effect the attack.

You were earlier, or your co-counsel was earlier, talking about evidence, but could not have is not evidence.

Your Excellency, if I may guide this Court's attention to paragraph 20 of the fact record, where it is stated that this technology was of— was sophisticated and of restricted export. Further, this technology was within the exclusive control of Zambuka, and therefore, in this regard, It is our submission that they in fact directed the attack on Madame Viji. And to that end, we submit that Zimbabwe bears international responsibility for the sinking of Madame Viji in violation of its human rights.

So earlier on, in respect of the first claim, there was allegations made that some of the armaments that were used for some of the gross violations of human rights could only have or were the kinds of armaments that came from your state. And again, your co-counsel argued, but there's no evidence. This is not evidence because it could have been acquired by anybody. Is the same argument not available to the applicant? Again, the same evidentiary status argument.

While we note your concern, Your Excellency, We submit that this court can in fact then rely on circumstantial evidence to prove the fact that the applicants in fact directed the attack. And this is by dint of paragraph 132 of the Maripirian versus Colombia decision, where it stated that international human rights court do not bring states before it as defendants, but rather as custodians to protect the rights of the victims. In this present case. It is a submission therefore that this court can rely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the applicants directed the attack on Madam Vijay in violation of their human rights obligations. I now turn to address the third question, proving that Zambuka's— the Arada ceasefire agreement is inconsistent with Zambuka's human rights obligation. Your Excellency—

Sorry, Mr. Counsel, so you're arguing that there is an objective responsibility responsibility on the part of the states in this sort of scenarios?

Please clarify, Excellency.

You quoted a precedent when you said that states are custodians of the rights of individuals. Just to understand from which context you bring that precedent, are you trying to imply that we are in a scenario of objective responsibility on the part of the state?

Your Excellency, it is a submission that we seek to rely on that case to establish before this court that it can in fact rely on circumstantial evidence, as it is the obligation of the International Human Rights Court to ensure that they protect the rights of the victims. I now turn to address the third question proving that Zimbabwe's human rights obligations are inconsistent under the Aurora Ceasefire Agreement. Your Excellencies, it is our submission that these— that the Aurora Ceasefire Agreement is inconsistent as the right to self-determination of the Kuru indigenous people pursuant to paragraph 4 of the fact record has been violated. It is our submission, Excellency, by relying on the separate opinion of Judge Robinson and Judge Sebutinde in the case of Chagos Advisory Opinion of 2019, where he stated, and I quote, the inalienable right to self-determination is us Khojans. The corresponding obligation incumbent upon the administering power is an obligation erga omnes. The same was codified—

So if I may, I mean, that's a separate opinion. The Court has— the Court itself has later clarified that self-determination is indeed jus cogens, but it clarified that only the core part. What part would that, and how would that apply here? So in the 2024 advisory opinion on the policies and practices of Israel on the territory of Palestine?

Your Excellency, it is a submission that while we note that— while we note that assessment, and we do in fact side with that, it is a submission that the same was codified under the 2022 ILC draft conclusion on identification and legal consequences of peremptory norm, which included the right to self-determination as us Kojins. And the specific part was, as explained, to show that the requisite part of self-determination, Your Excellency, is the distinct social, cultural, economic characteristics, a special relation with ancestral territory. In this present regard, paragraph 4 of the fact record as well as paragraph 5 demonstrate that the Kuru people are an indigenous people that have territorial and ancestral connection with the Kuru Highlands. It is this— it is in this regard, Your Excellency, that flowing from the Sarayaku v. Ecuador decision, that in instances of right to self-determination, a binding obligation of free, prior, and informed consent We note then that the agents for the applicant aptly put that these obligations are territorial obligations. However, considering that this is a us cogens obligation, then it is a submission that they have an erga omnes obligation. And the court went ahead to state that in assessing free, prior, and informed consent, the court should also consider whether an environmental impact assessment was conducted. It is a submission, Your Excellency, that by relying on the Pulp Mills Uruguay decision, it was stated that it is mandatory for an environmental impact assessment to be conducted in the case where there's a proposed industrial activity that has an adverse impact on the climate and the environment.

And just a clarification, in these facts we know that no environmental impact assessment has been carried out. We do?

Your Excellency, it is a submission that there was no environmental impact assessment that was conducted pursuant to paragraph 33 and 34 of the fact record, where despite seeing that the rivers have clouded with runoff, ecosystems were being fractured, pastoral fields collapsed into pits, that no, no protective measures were put in place. Any claim by the applicant

Sorry, but can we separate—

can you separate the 2 concepts in the argument? Because if you're talking about self-determination, that means that an indigenous people has the right to establish that they want an extractive activity to be conducted if they can profit from it, which is separate from the effort of the international community establish damage to the environment and protection to the environment as an obligation. It's a process in which we're in. So can you please separate both?

Because—

or you intend to conflate both in one argument?

Just, Counsel, maybe to add to Judge Gomez's question, can you also clarify how the right to self-determination matter of fact, has been violated within the territory of Darbula. I'm asking this question because you are aware that the Charter of this Court is similar to that of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, so the question of self-determination is contained in Article 21, subsection 1. We're having to use your resources as a people should be balanced with the right to development, which is in Article 22. And that right to development, if you look on the facts, it actually says resulting out of this ceasefire agreement, there has actually been increased development in, in, in Dabula and the areas affected. How do you balance this for us to actually say there is a violation of self-determination here?

So your time expired, but because actually we made so many questions questions. I would allow you to answer one or two sentences if possible. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam President. It is our submission, Your Excellency, that in responding to the first question, we do not intend to conflate the rights— the right to self-determination of the Kuru people. In this present case, pursuant to paragraph 31 of the fact record, even the Kuru people themselves are protesting in grief, first in grief grief than in anger, and therefore in this regard even the Kuru people themselves who have this right are not, are not on board with this decision. Responding.

Thank you, thank you.

So now I would like to give the floor to applicants for rebuttal in duration of 5 minutes.

Most indebted judges. Your Excellencies, the respondent has tried to paint the wrong picture before this honorable court. regarding these claims. Firstly, Your Excellencies, regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction, the respondent has argued that this particular declaration that was withdrawn on the 1st of September 2025 is valid. However, this is a hypocritical argument as the State of Yakar claims to have withdrawn from the jurisdiction of this honorable court but then proceeds proceeded to file its counter-application. We surely do not understand how that holds legal weight, and it should only lead this honorable court to conclude that the respondent state is acting clearly in bad faith, in contrary with the provisions of the VCLT. Your Excellencies, we further submit, in contrast to the submissions made by the respondent state regarding the issue of interstate applications. Your Excellencies, we note that in line with this, there's a concern that was raised by Judge Veronica Gomez regarding how the mechanics of interstate applications and exhaustion of domestic remedies function under international law. Your Excellencies, we submit that the respondent state failed to clearly articulate what this means, and in this regard, we submit that in the case of Ahmadou Diallo Sadio, it was highlighted that where an applicant state— that is regarding interstate applications— where a state seeks to espouse or vindicate the rights of victims which are its nationals, then in that context those particular nationals and individuals must at least attempt to pursue domestic remedies within the particular state where the violations occurred. Now, Your Excellencies, we further proceed to make relevant submissions regarding the initial claim on the atrocities committed within the region of Dabula. Your Excellencies, the respondent has told this honorable court that it had no knowledge of the circumstances. However, as clearly highlighted by Judge Dhiretladi, it is apparent that according to the reports under paragraph 14 and paragraph 16 of the facts, it is a clear and lucid situation where these violations were known by each and every individual. Your Excellencies, more particularly, the respondent has also highlighted that there is no particular form of responsibility that is arising at its instance. Your Excellencies, we submit pursuant to the reasoning of Judge Diretladi in his declaration regarding the Nicaragua and Germany jurisprudence Prudence of 2024, where in paragraphs 1 and 13 he highlighted that where a state is aware of grave situations and ongoing allegations of gross violations, it is under a strict and continuing obligation of due diligence. Your Excellencies, to this effect, because of these widespread reports, the respondent state had an obligation to exercise due diligence even in the alleged supply of humanitarian aid, which we still vehemently dispute before this honorable court, it proceeded to supply these despite the volatile situation within the Darbula region, which is a consistent violation of due diligence under international law. Your Excellencies, lastly, regarding the issue of the crates of armaments, the respondent has also highlighted before this honorable court that the crates of armaments were in the particular submarine and this does not constitute any violation, and they referred to the San Remo Manual. Your Excellencies, we submit that under paragraph 67 of the San Remo Manual, it is highlighted that where a vessel is harboring particular weaponry in order to protect the individuals therein, such weaponry in terms of its threshold and amount should be at least adequate to protect the individuals within the particular machine. Your Excellencies, the facts make it abundantly clear, and this court can clearly see that there were merely 97 individuals and an additional 33, making them 130, and there were hundreds of crates of armaments. Your Excellencies, this is clearly not proportionate and is a consistent violation of that particular rule under international law. Your Excellencies, with this, the applicant rests its case.

Thank you. So, uh, now, uh, we would like to adjourn because we will deliberate. I would like to thank you for your excellent submissions and thank you for your patience. Now it's up to us to deliberate, and it's our work at stake. Thank you and see you very soon.

Thank you.

Hello, may I ask you to take your seats, please?

Thank you. So the Court has reached its decision, but before announcing the result, I would like to congratulate both teams on excellent final round. Your preparation, advocacy, professionalism have been exemplary, and it was a great pleasure pleasure being today with you. I would like to give the floor to my colleagues to share with you our comments, our impressions. So please, I would like to give the floor to Veronica Gomez on the right side.

Thank you. Just to start, congratulations to both teams. I think very, very well prepared. As I'm sure that many people that are in this room that managed to reach this stage of the competition also very, very well prepared. So congratulations on all the preparations for both teams. I think both teams are very gifted in terms of presenting their arguments, resisting the onslaught of questions from the bench and also referring to different types of case law from different regional systems. So thank you for that. And well, all the best for you. For us, it's always very encouraging to see how We have, you know, coming through the ranks many people with— that are particularly gifted for international litigation. So all the best for, for your careers, and congratulations for a job really well done.

Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you, Veronica. Now the floor goes to Judge Tladi.

Judge Gomes.

Well, thank you very much. I share everything that Judge Gomes has said. I was terribly impressed. I have been doing moots in some form or the other since 1994, in some form or the other, and this is the first time I think that I have seen 2 teams, and both teams did this, able to recite the facts facts without looking and telling us at which paragraph, able to recite judgments and telling us the pages and paragraph numbers of judgments. So that was really, really impressive. I know it's always very difficult to receive questions. It's much easier on this side. We don't even have to know the answers to the questions that we ask. You guys have to know the answers. And I know, again, because I've been on both sides of this bench, so it's really impressive what you've done. At the court at which I sit, you all would have done exceptionally because there, there are no questions. And the few times that there are questions, you can say, I'll respond tomorrow. So really, I'm— I've really been very impressed by, by your composure and your ability to withstand really very difficult questions, and I wish you everything of the best for the future.

Thank you. Now the floor goes to Professor Novak.

Yeah, I can only echo— I think I was extremely impressed by the knowledge of the facts, the knowledge of the law, the very, very quick reactions to partly very difficult questions, I should say, and And I was also kind of admiring— of course, you know that that is the rule of the game, but if I would be in your position and I get at the end 2 long questions, they are so long that the time is over and then you are not allowed to answer the questions because you have exhausted the time. I think I would have gone on speaking in your case, saying that's unfair. But I like the presentations. Unfortunately, because of so many questions, certain important issues on the merits have not really been addressed, but it was not your fault, it was our options, and I felt also that the rebuttal was excellent.

Thank you, Manfred. The floor goes to Professor Thompson.

Thank you, Judge. Let me also join the panelists in really congratulating both teams for really, really, really well-presented cases. I also must lead by by acknowledging your interest in human rights, especially in the era that we are currently living in. I hope and pray that you perhaps continue advocating in this particular field of human rights. 2 things that I would want to say, the first one being beyond— well, not starting first with the question of advocacy, but the question of research, which really, really was very impressive. Very clear for both teams that much research went into this. I would want to encourage you to say I think that that's sometimes one of the key best aspects of a lawyer, whether you're in private practice or at the international level, that sometimes people undermine the importance of research which you need to put in. I hope also that you continue, you know, being focused in that particular area. Then on the question of advocacy, Again, exceptional, exceptional presentations, and I think many in the room perhaps have been to courts of law where perhaps maybe people who are already qualified sometimes don't show that level of advocacy. So on that, on that, on that beat, really congratulations. 2 things that I want to add on the question of advocacy would simply say what I noticed for both teams. If you are claiming, if you are making claims, And also when you are defending, it may be a little bit perhaps helpful to differentiate the tone and approach when you're defending and when you are claiming, to show that, you know, for example, if you are defending that there is a human rights violation and when you are claiming there is, the tone there should be a little bit different, at least for me. Lastly, I would say that in terms of language, it's a point that I have to say excellent, excellent, excellent language that was being used. I would have to actually acknowledge the respondent, very respectful in every bit of your submissions. Applicant, without mentioning exactly which one, I think there was some time point where I think there's certain language I will be saying, uh, take it a little bit. For example, you wouldn't use language as hypocritical, uh, referring to, to submissions of co-counsel. Also on the respondent side, last comment, uh, perhaps letting go. There are certain points that don't hurt your case at all, so where you feel it's actually taking more time actually trying to articulate a point that actually doesn't add to your case, perhaps just letting it go. With that, congratulations, uh, to both teams, and it was a pleasure listening to you all.

Thank you.

Thank you. Uh, so Mr. Batra, please.

Thank you, Madam President. My fellow judges have already praised both teams, and I wholeheartedly agree with their views. Not much more for me to say on that point other than it was very competitive and extremely difficult to decide and mark on. But let me take this opportunity to also congratulate all the other participants of previous rounds who took part. I think many are in the room, and I think you may not have made it to the final, but congratulations Congratulations for making it to the final rounds, and I want to thank the organizers for the incredible competition that they organized. Now, I do also have the privilege of wearing my OHCHR hat, and we have been very fortunate to partner with this moot court competition from the early years, even before it moved to Geneva, as I understand. So let me take this opportunity then to congratulate you, the finalists, and all participants and organizers on behalf of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who could not be here today. Previous participants at the competition have gone on to make significant contributions to human rights. We've seen that from many of them, and that role is even more essential now in the times we live in with an ongoing assault on human rights, multilateralism, and the international order. OHCHR has now convened the Global Alliance on Human Rights, a multi-stakeholder, cross-regional mobilization to connect people and to, to fight exactly against what we are facing now. And I hope, and join my colleague in praying, that the finalists and all the others in this room will continue their advocacy for human rights and join us in this global alliance and this global initiative to push back against the attacks on human rights that we are seeing internationally. So with that, thank you very much, and pass you back to Madam President.

Thank you, thank you all. I would also like to express my sincere congratulations to both teams, but also to all participants of this exceptional world human rights moot court, unique of its nature. I'm always very happy, actually I'm very proud of you being here and doing all this work for the human rights cause. Better understanding, better dialogue is actually the way, the way forward. So I would like thank both of you for your outstanding, excellent presentations. We were very well aware when we came here that you know the case. But as Dira told, I was impressed that you even didn't consult notes when quoting paragraphs, and that was impeccable. Also, your presentations showed that you invested a lot of energy, time in order to get your competence and to sharpen your presentations. Where it became difficult is when we made questions. So at one moment I said to Dilek, I will not ask now, I will not ask anymore because I want to actually get them back to, to what they prepared. Don't My advice for future, don't try to persuade and lose time.

Move.

You say, you give your statement, you reply to the question, and then you move to another argument because, you know, organization of time in this working manner, we ask questions, then you reply directly. It's a cross-examination.

Thank you.

in a way. Yeah, in the European Court of Human Rights we don't have it. We, yes, judges make questions, but only after, after oral pleading of parties. When both parties finish, then we ask, and then we give half an hour usually for them to concentrate on replies, and then we leave 48 hours actually for written submissions, additional written submissions. So of course this is moot court. In every moot court we appreciate questions. So I was also impressed, like Manfred, with the rebuttal. I also liked how some of you, I think the lady from respondent side, replied question she was not very sure about, but then she replied. replied in a very, very good manner. Sometimes we ask questions just to check where you are. We don't ask questions for receiving yes or no, but— and that's also something that you should take into account. So for me, nuances are here. Both are— both, both of you, both teams were excellent and And all of you, all speakers, did a great, great job. So I congratulate you. And I also wish that you stay in this area, which is very vulnerable right now with all these politicians around us. So thank you. And I think that we will not announce announce any result now. It is— it will come later. So thank you so much.

Thank you so much, Madam President, and thank you to all members of the bench for your thoughtful reflections and valuable guidance to our finalists. It is a pleasure for me to now introduce to you His Excellency Ambassador Lahaye, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva to deliver the closing remarks. Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

Thank you. Thank you very much. Participants, judges, organizers, a few days ago we were welcoming you to Geneva for the Nelson Mandela World Human Rights Moot Court Competition. Today, after what I'm certain has been a rigorous week of researching, drafting, and arguing, you have reached the end of the competition. We congratulate you on the— on your participation and the winners for the achievement. Having sat here for today's final round, I fully concur with the comments from the judges. The exceptional level of arguments clearly shows the highest standards of participation. To all of you, you have already achieved something remarkable simply by being here. You successfully went through virtual rounds and the demanding process that brought you here to Geneva. As I noted on Monday at the opening, you have done so across languages, legal traditions, and time zones. With the support of your teams and institutions and your mentors. That achievement deserves immense recognition. Again, I want to repeat, your participation is not just about this competition. There is a larger purpose. Despite the gains we have made in setting norms for human behavior when it comes to rights and responsibilities, human rights are too often contested, dismissed, or politicized. This is especially so in the world we live in today. Your participation has allowed and given you the opportunity to engage on international human rights matters and international law more generally in a practical and constructive manner. Human rights law is only as strong as the people willing to study it, defend it, and apply it in practice. That is why this exercise is more than just a competition. Through your efforts, not just this week in Geneva but throughout the process, this competition has built a community of future practitioners who understand that justice must be argued for, not assumed, and that human rights are not just words on paper but must be actively pursued through justice. The vision of the Centre of Human Rights at the University of Pretoria and its partners has created a truly Global Forum for Legal Education, Human Rights Advocacy, and Intercultural Exchange. This must be commended and celebrated. To the organizers, we express our profound appreciation. The partnership that underpins this competition of a diverse range of collaborators who put this together, and I mention them all, the Centre for Human Rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Geneva Academy, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, the University of Geneva Faculty of Law, the Open Society Foundation, and Global Campus Africa. This model of constructive multilateral cooperation shows what can be achieved when institutions from different parts of the world work together with a shared purpose. It also represents an example of working across geographic and developmental divide that should be emulated by states and our citizens. To the judges, thank you for lending your expertise, your time, and your authority to this competition. Your presence lends weight to the proceedings and ensures that the students are able to gain from your experience and also encountered not only a contest but also a genuine test of discipline, seriousness, and integrity. To the coaches and faculty members, thank you for the countless hours of mentorship, encouragement, and intellectual guidance that brought your teams here today. Your contribution is often less visible but is indispensable. To the students, and you are the star attraction, once again, congratulations. You represent hope. You represent the future of human rights law. And whatever the outcome of the final round is, you have already shown that the next generation is ready to defend human dignity in a challenging world. South Africa is proud to be associated with this competition, which bears the name and honors the legacy of Nelson Mandela, whose 108th birthday we will be commemorating tomorrow. May your experience in Geneva and in this competition be an inspiration in whatever path your life journey takes. Let us not forget Madiba's life lessons of service, dignity, and solidarity. This competition illustrates the belief that young people, through knowledge and commitment, can help build a more just and humane world. I, for one, leave here inspired. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Your Excellency. We now proceed to the presentation of recognition awards. These awards recognize distinguished individuals whose dedication and long-standing contribution have helped shape and strengthen the Nelson Mandela World Human Rights Moot Court Competition over many years. May I respectfully invite the— His Excellency, as well as Judge Dhireh Tladi, to present the recognition of awards. Congratulations to all the recipients in advance. So the first award goes to Professor Manfred Nowak.

Thank you very much.

Thank you. Congratulations.

Congratulations.

The second award goes to Judge Veronica Gomez. The 3rd award goes to Professor Thompson Chingeta.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Congratulations.

The last award goes to Judge Ivana Celic. Congratulations to the recipients, and thank you so much for your invaluable service to this competition. Ladies and gentlemen, now we come to, to the moment of truth, the moment that you have been anticipating. May I invite Professor Frans Filion to come up to announce the official results?

Thank you very much, Dr. Sabelo. In the interest of time, I will try to be combining some remarks to thank a number of people together with the announcement of some results, but also to keep the suspense going. We will come to the final outcome of this day's events only at the end. So first of all, let me say thank you very much from the Center for Human Rights, my own side, to the triad that makes this Nelson Mandela Human Rights Moot Court Competition possible. At the top of the triad clearly are the students, the participants. You have committed not only these weeks but certainly more or less 6 months of your lives to this project. We trust that you found that you were shaped by this professionally, maybe also as human beings, but that you really also draw from this the privileged position you had to really in a sense also shape the legacy of the great and the mighty Madiba, Nelson Mandela. So thank you so much for the participants, for your contributions, and I'm sure it is a cliché to say, but I'm sure that we feel that you have benefited in many multiple ways all yourselves. Secondly, the faculty representatives, the coaches— we hesitate to use that word— the mentors, the sounding boards, those who are also the institutional links that ensure participation from universities over many years. We also know that resources are required to get the teams here. We really appreciate those institutional presences and continued loyalty to this competition. And the third of the triad certainly are the judges. The judges are during all the multiple facets of the competition and particularly also today. I think I can just also highlight our great appreciation over many years for those who have received the honorary mention and the plaques today. I think it just reinforces our appreciation and acknowledges your own great stature. I think all of you are in one way or another judges. Also, Professor Novak, as we would know, was in the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Judge of the European Court and Judge of the Inter-American Court, and then I'm sure Professor Thompson-Chengheta principally also. People often ask who is the drafter of these human rights hypotheticals, and we could say that it is the poet, the international law scholar, the imagination of Professor Chengheta that really has driven those hypothetical cases for a number of years now, so thank you very, very much to all of you. You are much, much appreciated, as are those in the other rounds of the competition. More towards the outcomes, the results. To revisit the phases of the competition, the first phase, as the students very well know, is that written arguments are submitted, and this year there was a record number of 122 universities that participated and submitted written heads of arguments. Now those are also assessed through a rigorous process and then from the 122 will emerge 50 and those 50 came from the global reach that the competition, you know, encompasses and it certainly also straddled the English, the Spanish and Francophone worlds. One of the main characteristics also of this competition, there were 15 teams from Asia, 14 from Africa, 8 from the West European and Other, 7 from Latin America, and 6 from East European that made it into the 50 teams that now advanced to the virtual rounds. As you know, those virtual rounds then took place subsequently. Let me, however, come to the first of our prizes, and that is the prize for those memorials. We have in the three language categories a prize for the best memorials. In the French category, it is the Université Catholique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest in Côte d'Ivoire that was the best team. But we believe that they are not present here, so that this will be sent to them by post. Then we have in the English speaking rounds. Maybe I'll I'll mention the top five. 5, just because there were so many teams. In the 5th place was the Royal University of Law and Economics in Cambodia. The 4th was Strathmore University in Kenya. The 3rd was University of Allahabad in India. The 2nd was Kenyatta University in Kenya, and the Winner of the Memorial Award then is an Indian university, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Unfortunately also not present here. So it brings us to the Spanish memorials, and the 3rd position for the best memorials in that initial phase goes to Universidad Austral in Argentina. The second position is the Autonomous University of Coahuila in Mexico. And the winning team for the memorials is Universidad Católica Boliviana San Pablo in Bolivia. And if that team is represented here today, Boliviana, the university, please, you can come and We ask that your plaque, the plaques be handed to you by Judge Gomez. Judge Gomez, we ask you to please hand these to the team, the winning team for the memorials in the initial rounds.

Thank you.

Congratulations.

Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. So, to you, sir, and it's a great occasion to celebrate your teams here. Then we moved to the next phase, which were in fact these virtual rounds. The teams participated 4 times virtually on a virtual platform. These were grueling rounds, and I think it's only correct that we also acknowledge the performance during those rounds. In our custom, we will mention the 10 highest teams just in terms of the scoring. You know that you were part of the 24 that advanced, but among the 24, we highlight just the 10 top teams from the various languages as they are. There are unfortunately no plaques, but honorable mention. In number 10 position, it was Hidayalathula National Law University in India. In number 9 position was Universidade Católica Boliviana São Paulo. Number 8 was Ukrainian Catholic University in Ukraine. Number 7, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Colombia. Number 6 was University of Allahabad in India. In the 5th position, Koç University in Turkey, Türkiye. 4 in these preliminary rounds was the Kenyatta University in Kenya. The 3rd position in those preliminary rounds, Universidad Austral in Argentina. The 2nd-ranked university in those virtual rounds, Oxford University, University of Oxford, United Kingdom. And the top university of those rounds, University of New South Wales in Australia. But where we do have plaques are for the individual orators in those rounds. So again, in the French rounds, the best orators in those virtual rounds were— was Alde de Sousa from Université Catholique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. but we believe that she is not here. But congratulations. To the Spanish best oralists, the award is in fact shared because up to 2 decimals these 2 people could not be separated in their scoring. And that is then— it goes to Ana Inés Gutiérrez from Universidad Austral and to Karen Sofia Rodriguez from Universidad Nacional de Colombia. If I could ask Professor Novak to please hand these to the best oralists in the Spanish rounds. I believe they are present, and they are welcome to come to receive their awards. For the Anglophone— yeah, the other one, we will keep it then. We'll make a plan with the other one. That person is not present. Thank you very much. And for the Anglophone rounds, perhaps we mention just the top 5 orators in the preliminary rounds. Number 5 was Ananya Mishra from University of Allahabad, India. Number 4 was Mushkan Goyal, University of Oxford. Number 3, Oyama Nzaidume, also from University of Oxford. Number 2 top odellist for the preliminary round, from the University of New South Wales, Brendan Milobara. And the winner for the best odellist during the preliminary rounds on a virtual basis was also from the University of New South Wales, Anthony Ma. If we could ask Professor Thompson-Chiangetha to just come to the front and hand the to applaud the winner. Thank you very much. And just to say that, so from the 50 teams that participated on the virtual rounds, 24 were selected to come to Geneva for the Geneva final rounds. Regrettably, 4 teams could not make it here due to visa issues, but ultimately we had the participation of these teams, and I can just say from that list, 17 countries were represented across the globe, and 2 countries, maybe just to mention them here, had more than one representative among that group, and those 2 countries were perhaps predictably from what you've heard before, Kenya and India. So we acknowledge those universities and their participation over time. So let me then just quickly say a few words in thanks before we do the grand finale announcement. From the Center for Human Rights side, just to thank the— all those involved in the Nelson Mandela Lecture, I think it was a great moment to discuss the issues of our time at that juncture. We appreciate everyone's presence. The Center does what it does only in partnership, and because it is able to partner with institutions, we very gladly do so. Our partner here is obviously the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, with the Council Branch in particular. I want to single out Mr. Pascal Siem, who is at the media section, the media officer, who has in so many ways assisted us as organizing team here. It certainly was him, as it were, our man in Geneva to make things happen on the ground. Thank you so much for the whole team and for you in particular. And also mentioning Mr. Bikram Batra, who graciously also joined us today here for these proceedings.

Thank you.

It behooves no argument that, you know, we may have lofty ideas, but those need to be concretized and supported materially, and we thank those who are able to support us materially, in particular the Permanent Mission of South Africa over many, many years, but also mentioning the European Union through the Global Campus of Human Rights represented here by the President and the Secretary-General, and also from the donors that the Center has, Open Society Foundations. Other partners were already mentioned by the Ambassador, our technical partners, the 2 academies, the academy at the Washington College of Law in the US, and the academy here, the Geneva Academy, and others who assisted us throughout these events. Certainly, it's always a team effort within the Center for Human Rights. There are many who had been contributing. We have the team back home, for example, the communications team, the assistant director Nkata Murungi, others such as Syed that I think many of you communicated with, Syed Ahmed, who is really the principal organizer, who is unable to be here because he's already looking at another moot court competition that the center is organizing, namely the Christopher Haines African Human Rights Moot Court. competition. But here present, we are very fortunate also that our assistant director, Dr. Sabelo Gomez, is here, who's led the team here. I have to mention the names of Kara, of Sam, Zelda, but particularly Carol. Carol has been here for many, many years. She's the kind of a— the, you know, the anchor around which the MoOD evolves over many years, together with Emily, who is also back home. Just mentioning everyone's names and appreciating everyone's great contributions. So I suppose that brings us to the moment of truth, as it were, the moment we've been waiting for. So just to clarify that the calculation is done as per usual in this competition, namely that the scores are added and the highest and the lowest scores are discarded and the winner is calculated through those mechanisms. I may just add that perhaps, you know, keeping the suspense going for one second longer, that we have a tradition also of handing out certificates to all participants. We are not dispensing with that, but we are moving into the electronic age, so you'll all receive your electronic versions of those certificates in due course for you to have this token of your presence and your participation here. So what I propose to do is to hand this result to the President of the Court to make the announcement, and then we have 2 teams who will come forward, I suppose, a winning team and a runner-up team, and I will ask that between her, the Judge President of the Court, Court and Professor and Judge Tladi, that then you hand your— these plaques to the runners-up, maybe Judge Tladi, and then to the winners, Judge Dziedzic. I might also now reveal, for those who are still in the dark, that the applicant team is in fact Midlands State University, which is based in Zimbabwe, and that the respondent team is Strathmore University based in Kenya. So with this, I'm going to hand over the results, and the announcement will be made by the President, and then she'll call forward the teams to receive their prizes.

So it is my honor to announce that the winning team is the applicant team. So in total, for transparency's sake, in total you won €89,000. 38 points. So that is your score. And the total for the runner-up team is 85. Respondent team, congratulations to you. So my colleague, my colleague Judge Dladi will hand over the certificate to respond on the team, the plugs, please.

Thank you.

Now I would like to invite applicant's team to, uh, to come, and I will hand over the plaques.

With pleasure.

Professor Filion, I think you have already given a vote of thanks on behalf of all of us. May I now invite everyone to, to the official photograph that will be taken, and then we'll have networking From our side, thank you so much once again for being part of this very important event. These proceedings are now adjourned.

Thank you.