General Assembly: Intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council - Informal meeting of the plenary, 80th session

Good afternoon, everybody. Let's— I call to order the 8th informal meeting of the Plenary on the question of equitable representation, on an increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Council.

Good afternoon, everybody.

That helps. We continue with the list of speakers remaining from our first meeting this morning, and I would like to start by giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste.

Co-chairs, distinguished delegates, Timor-Leste welcomes the formal presentation of the African Model for Security Council Reform. Today's submission marks a vital shift from political abstraction to actionable institutional design. In the African model, we recognize not only a call for justice, but a framework for a more legitimate and effective Council. While we align ourselves with the statement delivered by the L69 Group, we wish to highlight some points in our national capacity. First, correcting the historical injustice against Africa is a moral imperative. The Council's credibility is tied to its representativeness. It is untenable that a continent of 54 member states, and the region most frequently on the Council's agenda, remains excluded from permanent representation. This structural imbalance undermines the Council's authority. Correcting it is essential for the integrity of the entire system. Second, Timor-Leste subscribes to the principle of sovereign equality. All permanent members in the reformed Council must enjoy equal prerogatives and privileges. Anything less risks entrenching new inequalities. Furthermore, as a nation that has hosted UN peace operations, we strongly support the Model's call for institutionalized consultation with troop-contributing countries. Those who bear the human and logistical responsibilities of peacekeeping must be meaningfully included in mandate formulation and decision-making. Third, we underscored the necessity of a dedicated, non-permanent rotating seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions. While the African model addresses continental deficits, this initiative responds to an urgent representational gap. SIDS are on the frontline of climate-related security risks, from sea level rise to disaster-induced instability. Their systematic presence would allow the Council to better anticipate security challenges that transcend traditional geopolitical paradigms. Co-Chairs, the African Model provides the substantive foundation needed to move beyond procedural repetition. In line with the Pact for the Future, this moment calls for political courage and a commitment to renewal. Timor-Leste stands ready to engage with all Member States to transform these proposals into an equitable reality, one that aligns the Council's architecture with the moral and security imperatives of our time. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Timor-Leste for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ethiopia.

Distinguished co-chairs, my delegation would like to thank you for convening today's informal plenary of the intergovernmental negotiation. Ethiopia aligns itself with the statement delivered by Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group and fully subscribes to Africa's common position. Ethiopia commends the work of the African Union Committee of 10 Heads of States and Governments on Security Council reform for submitting a model On behalf of the African Group, this model is grounded in the long-standing position of the African Group that Security Council reform must, as a priority, redress the historical injustice against Africa by treating the continent as a special case. World leaders reaffirmed this recognition in the Pact for the Future. The model now submitted reflects this commitment. Equitable representation of Africa in the Security Council is essential to enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness, and impact of the UN, while also strengthening its legitimacy and inclusiveness. We underscore that expansion of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. Such enlargement would ensure fair representation of all regions, improve the Council's working method, and reinforce its relationship with the General Assembly. We reiterate our support to the Izzalwini Consensus, which calls for no fewer than 2 permanent seats for Africa with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right of veto should it continue to exist, as well as 5 non-permanent seats. The African Union should retain the responsibility to select its representatives for election by the General Assembly. Distinguished co-chairs. Africa must continue to be treated as a special case and a priority in the reform process, as recognized in the Pact for the Future. Any reform model must, as a matter of priority, include concrete measures to fully address Africa's unique exclusion from the current composition of the Security Council. The credibility of the United Nations depends on its ability to adapt to changing global realities to represent all regions equitably. Likewise, the credibility of Security Council reform will depend on the adoption of concrete steps to redress the historical injustice that has long disadvantaged the African continent. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ethiopia for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kenya.

Thank you for your continued stewardship of this important process. At the outset, the Republic of Kenya reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the common African position As enshrined in the Eschurin Consensus and the Syltet Declaration, we align fully with the statement delivered by Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group and the African model for the reform of the Security Council. Kenya reiterates its steadfast principles and unequivocal support for the African model. The Eschurin Consensus. And the Sylt Declaration are not mere aspirations, are not— nor are they opening pits for negotiation to be adjusted for convenience. They are the settled and the collective position of Africa, forged through consultation, sustained by consensus, and consistently reaffirmed over more than 2 decades within this Assembly and throughout the ISGN process. Africa has spoken with one voice. We have taken time to reflect on the responsibilities and obligations that come with permanent representation and enhanced non-permanent membership on the Council. The African model for a reformed Security Council represents our vision of how and where Africa will sit at the table. Co-facilitators, Kenya approaches this matter from a place of principle anchored in equity, inclusivity, and historical justice— values that lie at the heart of the UN Charter. As an African proverb reminds us, Until the lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter. The continued exclusion of Africa from permanent membership of the Security Council sustains an imbalance in global decision-making that no longer reflects contemporary realities. Today, I reiterate the clear and principled position articulated by Secretary-General President William Samoei Ruto, who has consistently affirmed that Africa's exclusion from permanent membership is unacceptable, unfair, and grossly unjust. Reforming the Security Council is not a concession to Africa. It is a necessary step for preserving the relevance, legitimacy, and moral authority of the UN in the 21st century. Co-facilitators, the African model remains clear and unambiguous. It calls for at least 2 permanent seats for Africa in the Security Council, 5 non-permanent seats for African member states, and full prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right of veto for as long as the veto remains part of the Council's architecture. Africa— Kenya reiterates that Africa's insistence on equal rights does not constitute support for the veto itself. Rather, it is a principled rejection of reforms that could create new inequalities and institutionalize second-class membership for Africa. Kenya therefore reaffirms its commitment to an inclusive transparent, and a text-based negotiation process conducted in good faith and guided by the General Assembly Decision 62/557 and its subsequent rollover decisions. We remain ready to engage constructively with all member states and groups in pursuit of genuine convergence across the 5 clusters of reforms. Co-facilitators, as the United Nations reflects on its future and its capacity to respond to increasingly complex global challenges, the issue before us is ultimately one of legitimacy. A Security Council designed for the realities of 1945 cannot fully respond to the demands of 2026 and beyond, nor can a council that does not reflect contemporary realities fully discharge the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Kenya seeks neither privilege nor exception. It seeks justice, equal participation, and fair responsibility sharing for Africa as well as the integrity of multilateralism itself. Half measures, interim formulas, temporary arrangements, and symbolic gestures cannot limit a structural injustice that has endured for generations. In conclusion, any effort to divide Africa's common position risks weakening the very foundation of this process. Until Africa secures full and permanent representation in the Security Council, in line with the Enschede Consensus and the Sylte Declaration, the reform of the Security Council will remain incomplete. I thank you. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Thailand.

Thank you. I'd like to start my statement by expressing our thanks to the co-chairs for organizing this meeting to discuss the African model, and we'd like to share the following 3 points. First of all, Thailand prioritizes the improvement of the Council's working methods as the most feasible avenue for meaningful progress. We support the model's proposal to enhance the Council's engagement with troop and police contributing countries in a regular and timely manner. We strongly support the Council's refraining from addressing issues that do not constitute a threat to international peace and security. This distinction is essential to restoring the credibility and effectiveness of the Council and, by extension, the United Nations. Second, Thailand strongly supports more timely and structured coordination with the General Assembly, as well as with other UN bodies such as ECOSOC and the Peacebuilding Commission, in line with their respective mandates. This is essential to ensuring a comprehensive approach firmly anchored in sustainable development to sustaining peace, including preventing relapse into conflict. Thailand believes that strengthened cooperation and partnerships among UN entities, as well as with regional organizations, represent actionable steps that can be taken without delay. Third, with regard to the Council's membership, Thailand supports greater representation for Africa alongside small and medium-sized developing countries. Any expansion of the Security Council must ensure fair and equitable geographical representation, cross-regional balance, and enhanced participation of developing countries while emphasizing A reformed Security Council that reflects plurality and multi-stakeholder approach. Co-chairs, in principle, Thailand supports the redress of the historical injustice against Africa as a priority and as special case, as reflected in the Pact for the Future. We would appreciate further clarification regarding the establishment of subsidiary organs of the Council that provide adequate and timely information to the wider UN membership? How might this transform the current practice where many subsidiary bodies such as sanctions committees often operate with limited public disclosure? I thank you very much for your kind attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Liberia.

Thank you. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, Liberia extends its appreciation to the co-chairs for their leadership in guiding the intergovernmental negotiations and for convening this important meeting. We express appreciation to the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone for Sierra Leone's coordination of the C10 and for the presentation of the comprehensive consolidated African model which corresponds to the Pact for the Future. Liberia expresses its full support for the C10 African Reform Model as a practical and unified framework for advancing the reform of the United Nations Security Council. Grounded firmly in the common African position, the model outlines key elements including the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership, equitable regional representation, An enlarged council that reflects current geopolitical realities, consideration of the veto, improved working methods, and a strengthened relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. In Liberia's view, this model represents a coherent and forward-looking approach to achieving fairness, accountability. and Africa's rightful place in global governance. Excellencies, the reform of the Security Council remains central to strengthening multilateralism and enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the United Nations. Africa's position in this regard is clear, consistent, and anchored in a unified continental consensus. That so long as the veto exists, it must be extended to all permanent members, including those representing Africa. This position reflects both a demand for equity and a principled commitment to a more democratic, representative, and accountable council. Liberia underscores that meaningful reform must respond to contemporary geopolitical realities. A Security Council that does not adequately reflect today's geopolitical landscape risks diminished legitimacy and effectiveness in carrying out its mandate. While African countries, including Liberia, serve as non-permanent members of the Council, Such participation, though valuable, cannot substitute for permanent inclusion. The absence of Africa in the permanent category remains a fundamental gap that must be addressed with urgency and resolve. Excellencies, finally, the reform of the Security Council presents an opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy and moral authority of the United Nations by correcting longstanding historical imbalances and injustices. We therefore call for renewed political will and genuine engagement to advance this process in an inclusive, transparent, and results-oriented manner. Liberia stands ready to continue contributing constructively to this process across all 5 clusters. I thank you.

I think the distinguished representative of Liberia for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic.

Thank you very much, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. We thank the co-chairs, Kuwait and the Netherlands, for convening this meeting on equitable representation at the Security Council and the increase in the number of its members and other issues related to the Council. We wish to recognize the work carried out by the co-facilitators during this session. Your leadership have fostered exchange on different and innovative formats and considerations that have hugely enriched the quality of our debates. The Dominican Republic reaffirms its support to efforts to advance negotiations towards a more inclusive, representative, and effective Council that reflects the diversity of the international community and that's able to address the great challenges of our time. In this context, we warmly welcome the presentation of the African model and we are encouraged by the shared belief that it is fundamental without delay to ensure more equitable geographic representation, especially for historically and systematically unrepresented and underrepresented regions like Asia, Asia-Pacific, Latin American and the Caribbean as a permanent category and non-permanent in the membership to the Council. In this spirit, we are encouraged by appeals made today by the L69 group and CARICOM for the C10 to include these considerations in the proposal for a rotating seat for small island developing states. Excellencies, the Dominican Republic firmly supports the appeal to explore synergies between the proposals presented by different groups committed to reform. We reiterate our belief that this intergovernmental process will only be able to advance in line with our expectations and with the urgency that the time requires if we set forth text-based negotiations with clearly defined milestones and timeframes. The African model recalls that there is clear collective will to undertake reforms that improve the working methods of the Council and that increase its efficacy and transparency. Similarly, sustained debates, leave no shadow of a doubt as to the shared desire to strengthen the balance and the harmony between the Security Council and the General Assembly in line with their respective mandates and competencies. These spaces of convergence must encourage us to ramp up efforts to achieve the necessary reforms. The Dominican Republic stands ready to work constructively to achieve tangible, timely, and meaningful results in this reform process. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic for her statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal— Federated States of Micronesia.

Thank you, co-chairs. I align Micronesia's statement with that delivered by the distinguished representative of Saint Lucia on behalf of the L69 group. Micronesia strongly supports the ongoing discussions on Security Council reform and warmly welcomes the AU Committee of 10 submission of the African model presented by Ambassador Michael Kanu of Sierra Leone, the C10 coordinator. Co-chairs, for 80 years since the founding of the United Nations, the arrangement from a bygone era may have been necessary at that time, but it no longer adequately represents the broader membership of the United Nations today. The world has changed significantly, and this evolution should be reflected in our representation. It is important that the voices of the majority are not overshadowed by the decisions of a few, and that the needs and perspectives of all members are taken into consideration. It is therefore essential that we continue our efforts to reform the Security Council so that it better reflects the realities of today's world and serves the interests of all member states. Micronesia reiterates its support for expanding Security Council membership in both categories to provide developing countries and underrepresented regions with a greater voice in decisions that affect their interests. As an L69 member, Micronesia supports L69 1969's blueprint of 27 seats needing 15 affirmative votes alongside Africa's minimum of 26. This harmony ensures meaningful growth, fair representation for the Global South— vital for vast ocean nations like ours— and a Council equipped to tackle the threats posed by climate change and sea level rise with credibility. As my delegation has said in the past statements, reform is not just a choice. It is necessary to make the council more legitimate and effective. Co-chairs, Micronesia fully supports the common African position as reflected in the African model for 2 permanent seats with all the rights and privileges of permanent membership. Like the African model, the L69's origins in A/61/ L69/Rev1 stem from a fundamental truth: the Security Council lacks legitimacy when regions suffering its decisions most, whether Africa's crisis or our drowning atolls from sea level rise, hold the least weight. For Micronesia's low-lying communities, this gap threatens not just equity but our physical existence. Micronesia fully supports giving SIDS A non-permanent seat whose voices are often not heard in the Security Council. As a SIDS, Micronesia therefore champions the L69's proposal rooted in CARICOM advocacy for a rotating non-permanent seat reserved for small island developing states. Far from rivaling Africa's demands, it fills a critical void addressing SIDS' acute exposure to climate-driven security risks that could submerge our homelands. We urge the C10 to explore integrating this forward-looking element. Co-chairs, in conclusion, I respectfully encourage the IGN to consider documenting each meeting in writing. Maintaining a single updated text would enhance transparency, clarify positions, and support more focused discussions. Such an approach would better equip the UN to address emerging challenges while ensuring that the Security Council reform remains central to our shared objectives. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Micronesia and I give the floor to the Maldives.

Thank you, Co-Chairs. The Maldives thanks the C10 for presenting the African model. It reflects Africa's longstanding and principled engagement on Security Council reform, including through the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. We believe the Security Council must be more representative of the wider membership, more accountable in the exercise of its authority, and more capable of acting in the interest of all member states. In that regard, we fully recognize the historical injustice faced by Africa. A council that continues to deny permanent representation to a continent of 54 member states cannot claim to be a council that is fit for purpose or representative. We therefore support equitable representation for Africa in an enlarged council, including in the permanent category. On the question of the veto, the Maldives remains clear: the veto should be abolished. It has too often paralyzed the council in the face of grave crises. If it is to continue, however, there should be no second-class permanent members. In that respect, we support the African model's position that any new permanent members must enjoy the same rights and responsibilities. As existing ones. We also welcome the model's emphasis on working methods and on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. Greater transparency, more regular engagement with member states, fuller access to documentation, more balanced penholdership, and more substantive reporting to the General Assembly would strengthen the legitimacy of the Council. At the same time, reform must not end with correcting one imbalance while leaving others untouched. For the Maldives, a credible reform must also provide institutional space for small island developing states. SIDS remain structurally underrepresented despite comprising a significant share of the UN membership, and we bring important perspectives on emerging threats to peace and security. We would therefore welcome further clarity on how the African model envisages broader cross-regional representation, including whether The emerging architecture could accommodate a dedicated rotating seat for SIDS as part of a more equitable overall package, and I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Maldives, and I give the floor to Paraguay.

Muchas gracias, señor cofacilitador.

Thank you very much, co-facilitator. Paraguay welcomes the organization of this meeting. That allows us to talk about the model presented by the distinguished delegation of Sierra Leone representing the African Union, who we commend for this coordination. Without a doubt, we recognize the particular situation of the African continent, as well as the value and contribution of groups like the Arab Group, the Small Island Developing States, underscoring that this does not mean that other group of countries don't have the same rights to be recognized, like is the case of landlocked developing states. That's why we believe that this is still an issue that requires more discussions to ensure that Articles 1.1 and 2.1 of the Charter are applied fully and that the reform enables the Security Council to be truly representative. We further agree that an increase to the number of the members is necessary and that this need is applicable particularly to the number of elected positions to the Security Council for 2 years and we can consult on that. Now, in terms of the vision of the African Union, there's no exception to the legal equality of states and if that's the case, the addition of new permanent members would not Uh, signifi— would not mean entrenching these differences. Co-facilitators: ensuring efficiency and efficacy for the Security Council must be an absolute priority, and that's why the matter of the veto and the working methods are comprehensive parts of this process. However, we understand that these should not be any reasons to block a reform. That the vast majority of the membership believes to be necessary. To conclude, we're grateful once again to the distinguished delegation of Sierra Leone for presenting this proposal and to the co-facilitators for convening this meeting. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Paraguay and I give the floor to Togo.

Merci, Monsieur le Co-président.

Thank you, Co-chair. The Togo delegation welcomes the presentation of the African model of the Security Council reform and welcomes the leadership displayed by Sierra Leone in coordinating the Committee of 10 of the African Union. This model, which is in addition to the formal proposals previously submitted by other groups of states, shows the full commitment of Africa to the current negotiations. It also shows its capacity to transform indignation into a demand and then a demand into a proposal. And further, it clarifies the African vision of a reformed council and does it in a structured way. On membership categories, here my delegation supports a broadening of the 2 categories currently existing with with giving Africa 2 permanent seats and 5 non-permanent seats. These measures meet the need to ensure a better representation of the continent within the Council and the need to redress the historic injustice the continent is a victim of because it's excluded from the category of permanent membership despite its demographic weight and its economic assets. It is guided by the spirit of justice and equity that the African position on the regional representation is determined. Only the distribution of seats ensuring a fair and equitable presence of various regions in general and of the African region in particular will give the Council a balanced configuration which would underpin the inclusive vision of dispute settlements. Furthermore, the broadening should base on looking for a balance between the need to improve the representative nature of the body, of the Council, and the need to enhance its effectiveness. Therefore, by supporting the African prospect of a Security Council broadened to no less than 26 members, We underscore the importance of making sure that this body is not transformed into an overly large body whose effectiveness thus could be brought into question. Furthermore, if the increase of the number of the members of the Council will contribute towards making it more representative, it will be through more democratic functioning that we will be able to strengthen its legitimacy and its effectiveness. Well, the current veto shows a rupture in equality amongst members of the Council. It strengthens the image of an oligarchic entity— that's being used to describe it— and shows that it's ineffective in providing lasting responses to crises. We fully align ourselves with the position of the African Union, which in principle is asking for the veto to be abolished. whose attribution to a few members confers an unjustified privilege and which is contrary to the demands of multilateralism. It is in this vein of us being attached to the principle of multilateralism that we support the need to also recognize to future new permanent members, including Africa representatives, the veto prerogative if the veto remains. This way, the Council and the decision-making within it will be made more democratic. Similarly, as we are saying sometimes, the capacity of conferring a veto is not a privilege but a responsibility. And Africa understands the importance of collective security mechanism, its importance for international peace and security. We were capable of fully shouldering this responsibility, responsibility which does not seem to appear sufficiently in the current workings of the Council. Furthermore, a lasting report can only be viewed if there is a strengthening of the transparency and accountability of the Council, and this essentially means that its capacity to strengthen its interactions with the General Assembly is enhanced. And that is why we align ourselves with the measures recommended by the African Group so as to improve cooperation between the Council and the Assembly whilst respecting their proper competencies. The Council will have a greater legitimacy for its action this way if it hears the diversity of the opinions of members of the GA and if it acts in such a way that preserves or even enhances the authority of the Assembly. Co-chairs, for about 20 years now, the issue of Security Council reform has been discussed within the intergovernmental negotiations, and negotiations continues without the perspective of finding a compromise on the horizon. Our debates seems to continue at an impasse because of the formalism that is a characteristic of this organization. In the recent years, negotiations essentially consisted of reiterating well-known positions without really moving forward towards a reform that we have very much wished for. So now the question is, who benefits from this status quo? We are aware of the urgent need to reform the Council. The delegation of Togo urges everyone to display constructive commitment and good faith that we need for the success of the process underway, which has to go through global consensus on the 5 clusters, taking into account the specific case of Africa. Therefore, we urge everyone to move more quickly towards discussion around a more consolidated model to make sure that the issue of the reform is no longer chimeric prospect fueled by endless debates based on theoretical confrontations of distant visions or visions close to each other. And finally, we welcome the fact that there are points of convergence between the African model and other models, but we are committed to continue dialogue with all other delegations still to make sure that we arrive at historic consensus consensus which will make the Security Council a body which is more representative, more inclusive, more transparent, more effective, more efficient, more democratic, and more accountable. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Togo for her statement, and I give the floor to Ecuador.

Gracias, copresidente.

Thank you, co-chairs. I also thank Ambassador Michael Kano for his eloquent presentation, the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone. Thank you. Addressing historic injustice and improving the effective representation of Africa at the UN Security Council was one of the flagship events of the Sierra Leonean presidency of the council that enabled in August 2024 us to delve into issues directly related to the agenda of this meeting. For my delegation, the fundamentals and principles have not changed. In terms of the substantive approach. That's why I will just make a few key points, underscore these 4 key facts. At the Security Council and in global governance bodies, there is a void that needs to be filled due to a lack of representation of Africa and other regions in these spaces. The 2063 Agenda, the Africa that we want, shows that the African continent is a key actor for strengthening the United Nations multilateralism as well as a driving force for global govern— global development. 3, Africa has contributed to providing effective responses to threats to international peace and security. This is particularly the case given the decisions that the African Union Peace and Security Council has taken and these linked to the position of the A3 at the UN Security Council. During the 2023 to 2024 period, as a member, an elected member of the Security Council, Ecuador was able to closely follow the principled position and actions of countries like Mozambique, Gabon, Ghana, Algeria, and Sierra Leone. The Pact for the Future establishes that Africa must be treated as a special case in negotiations for Security Council reform. So given these 4 facts that I just stated, And we could add many more to them. Ecuador is convinced that it's necessary to repair the historic injustice against Africa and to provide the continent with the ability to participate on an equal footing at a reformed Security Council. However, at the same time, there are questions that remain and that must also be responded to with actions.

Thank you.

So how has having permanent members at the Security Council really benefited international peace and security? And as a result, how is providing more vetoes going to contribute to achieving this goal of international peace and security? Now, answers to this are more relevant than ever because we— Um, are seeing that Security Council is not representative of the current reality for the reasons that we have discussed ad nauseam, and it must adapt to new and changing challenges such as pandemics, conflicts between non-state actors, international terrorism, and the, uh, crime of international, um, organized crime, among others. That's why, co-chairs, excellencies, colleagues, Ecuador believes that a reform of the Security Council will only be possible with a realistic approach, with an ethical model of democracy based on the principles of rotation and accountability in line with reality and the diversity of the contemporary world and that allows us to address and repay the historic debt to Africa and other regions of the world. My delegation welcomes the approach taken. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ecuador, and I give the floor to Nicaragua.

Co-chairs, we thank you for convening this important meeting for the presentation of the African model. We appreciate and welcome the presentation of the African model that Ambassador Michael Kanu, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone, on behalf of the C10, Voice of the African Union, um, of the— his presentation of the African model on these reforms. Thank you for that. We recognize the statement of Ambassador Manisa Rambally, Permanent Representative of Saint Lucia, on behalf of the L69, And we joined them expressing our support to the L69 and the support rather of the L69 to the African group. In this regard, as always, Nicaragua since 2007 have has affirmed and supported Security Council being expanded and saying that it must fully include the just and historic call of Africa. That has had this position laid down in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Certe Declaration and also their model presented today. We support that. As we have expressed, this support is growing each meeting we have, and now is time to serve justice for Africa, as they're calling for. That's why it's In these reforms, Africa must have 2 permanent seats and a total of 5 non-permanent seats. Co-coordinators, considering the principle of equitable geographic representation, there's a lack— a lacking in the current makeup of the Security Council that means that developing countries are underrepresented. Compared to Western countries at the Security Council. Given this reality, it's necessary for a new makeup of the Security Council. It needs to be expanded with a sense of justice and equity, expanding both categories, bearing in mind the aspirations of small and medium-sized countries, the African group, the Arab group, and the island states group. Nicaragua reaffirms its willingness to collaborate to achieve true reform in line with the realities of this new multipolar world where all of us have a voice for the good of humanity, where peace— for international peace and security. And we once again thank the African Group for its contributions to these negotiations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nicaragua, and I give the floor to The Gambia.

Thank you, co-facilitator. First, The Gambia thanks the co-chairs, Kuwait and Netherlands, for bringing us together to discuss the African model on the reform of the UN Security Council, a model that entails high-level engagements within the African Union member states and enjoys the broadest possible consensus and support within the wider AU membership. Co-chairs, the reform of the Security Council should increase the the representation and voice of developing countries, especially African countries. Africa has articulated a clear and compelling vision and model for reform, one that ensures equitable representation and meaningful participation of Africa in the Security Council. The Gambia applauds the Republic of Sierra Leone for its leadership of the Committee of 10 and calls for the address and redress of the historical injustice that has long plagued the continent, and most importantly, in the underrepresentation of Africa. Home to over 1.3 billion people and the 54 African countries, with significant contributions to peacekeeping and post-conflict resolution. After 8 decades, the imperative for reform is irrefutable and inevitable. We therefore fully support the position that Africa's situation must be treated as a special case. The Gambia recognizes that Africa's legitimate demands for greater representation in the United Nations Security Council are firmly advocated and reflected in both the Search Declaration and the Ezulwini Consensus. These foundational documents emphasize the pursuit of justice for Africa within the global governance framework. It is, it is inequitable for Africa to remain a topic of discussion and decision-making without possessing the necessary representation to influence outcomes that directly affect the continent. Meaningful participation and equitable representation are essential to address the historical injustices and to ensure Africa's voice and interests are properly reflected in the decisions of the United Nations. The reform of the Security Council, particularly for Africa and developing countries, legitimizes our position as a significant stakeholder in the overall U.N. reform processes. And while we welcome the growing support and momentum for the common African position on U.N. Security Council reform, particularly as articulated in Action 39, paragraph A of the Pact for the Future, which endorses the imperative to redress the historical injustice against Africa as a priority. The Gambia believes that we must find ways to launch text-based negotiations for meaningful dialogue while remaining faithful to our position of correcting Africa's exclusion, especially as the continent is without representation in the permanent category of the Security Council and also underrepresented in the non-permanent category. The Gambia therefore joins the African Group reinforcing the call for an enlargement of the Security Council, allocating at least 2 permanent seats with full rights and an expansion in the non-permanent category. This disposition will create the necessary atmosphere and conditions to articulate clear priorities and aptly reconnect the UN with the values that defined it 80 years ago. The Gambia supports the position that there should not be any distinction between the current and new members with respect to the applicability of the veto if it is to be retained, including for African states. We also reiterate the support of strengthening the role of the GA in line with its responsibility as stipulated in the UN Charter and its relationship with the Security Council. In alignment with the African Group, The Gambia asserts that engagement in text-based negotiations is only appropriate when there is proper prior consensus among all United Nations member states. Such consensus must encompass agreement on the 5 clusters that structure the reform discussions as well as an established framework that meaningfully addresses the historical injustices experienced by Africa. Furthermore, this framework should ensure expansion in both categories of the Security Council, thereby promoting greater equity and representation. We believe that a meaningful reform must also be anchored on real inclusive, transparent, and tangible process to improve global governance and the meaningful representation of the voices of all members of the United Nations. Finally, The Gambia advocates for building upon the current momentum achieved within these negotiations. It is essential to strengthen the areas of commonalities among member states by fostering unity around shared values and goals. This approach would facilitate progress and create a foundation for meaningful reform, ensuring that the United Nations better represents and serves the ideals for which it was established. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of The Gambia, and I give the floor to the last speaker on our list, Senegal.

Merci, Monsieur le Président.

Thank you, Co-Chair. Co-Chairs, Excellencies, colleagues, the delegation of Senegal would like to thank Sierra Leone. We thank him for having presented on behalf of the African group, this African model. By doing that, Sierra Leone was a spokesperson of a continent which is united in its determination, a continent which speaks with one voice to provide its reform of a different reform for a body which is a very different body. The African common position is not just any claim or demand. In addition to the imperative of democratic legitimacy, inclusive representation and collective effectiveness, it contains with it a need for historic justice. 80 years after it was created, 60 years after its last expansion, the Security Council continues symbolizing an unequal system within a continent which represents about one-third members, occupies a large part of the agenda, and contributes to peacekeeping keeping operations. Given that, there are certain forms of inclusion that have to cease to exist. We must redress this historic anomaly. And given this, the African model shows itself to be clear, consistent, and rooted in non-negotiable principles. It decides that this reform is not to deepen inequalities that we have to simply accept. This model supports uncompromisingly the broadening of the 2 categories and asks for 2 permanent seats for Africa. Also, our proposal to expand towards about 26 members is perfectly in line with the proposals we heard previously. It enshrines the principle of regional representation, greater regional representation. The model also is talking about additional non-permanent seats, which is a reaction to the need to have a more equitable presence for all underrepresented regions. Similarly, the issue of inter-regional representation is something that needs to be further considered. On the veto now, repetition here is necessary. We're asking for general abolition of the veto. This is the African position of principle. However, If the veto is maintained, the principle of equality requires that the veto be expanded to the new permanent members. On the working methods, my delegation would like to underscore that the proposals of the African Group express the consensus about the need to strengthen transparency, accountability, and the sharing of responsibilities within the Council, and a closer cooperation amongst various parties. This model has clear convergences with the proposals made by other groups of states, and this is something that numerous speakers underscored in their statements. The claims of Africa is something that is not just for our satisfaction. A council of 15 members stuck in the past cannot respond with precision to new geopolitical realities and the challenges of the 21st century. Century, namely climate change, terrorism, migration, cyber threats, pandemics. With this model, we have— Africa is sharing a vision, a vision of multilateral governance which is more inclusive, more democratic, within which the responses provided by the Council will be better aligned with the realities on the ground because they will bring forth the voices of those who are most concerned, a more transparent and effective Council in its working methods. A Council which works more closely with the General Assembly would be more legitimate because it will reflect the image of the people of the organization. Without reform, the Council will imperil crisis after crisis credibility, legitimacy, and ultimately authorities. Given the urgency that we ourselves recognized in this process and in the Pact for the Future, We remain committed to engage in this reform model and make concrete the discussions which have lasted for far too long. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Senegal. Colleagues, we have heard the last speaker for this module. I now give the floor back to the distinguished representative of Sierra Leone for conduct concluding remarks or to answer questions, as many have been put forth, that have been posed during the interventions by member states. The floor is yours, Ambassador.

Thank you, distinguished co-chair, and indeed joining colleagues to thank you, distinguished co-chairs, for really leading us in terms of the IG and to this important point in terms of structured dialogue on reform models. Colleagues, permit me firstly to express on behalf of the C10 member states and the African Group deep thanks for your very kind words directed not only to the coordinator, Sir Leon, but also to the C10 members, and permit me to even specifically mention the delegations— Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Kenya, Namibia, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia— for the important work that has gone into producing the reform model which we've discussed today. I, at the end of the presentation this morning, I said we will look forward to your thoughts and questions, and your questions have been quite easy. Colleagues, what I will do is to perhaps offer some general reflections, key takeaways, and then I will go to the questions. Some of them are already clustered, particular on specific issues that are involving, including the question of rotating seats and others, and so I would cluster that, not necessarily answer delegates by delegation. But first, I think one key takeaway point from our discussions today is the very fact that there's agreement that there's a lot of support still and continuing for the Common African Position, which is essentially the bedrock of the model which we've presented. In addition to expressing support for the Common African Position, We've also had those who have said that they do support Africa's aspiration for redressing the historical injustice and for equitable representation in the Security Council. That is very much welcome and appreciated. We have also heard that there's a lot of convergence in many areas, particularly in the reform model that we've presented and the reform model which has been presented by other groups and member states. I think we could also confidently say, because I think it also came out in most of the submissions, that we should move on to the next step of developing the consolidated model as agreed by our heads of state and government in the Pact of the Future. In terms of answering your question, perhaps some general framing. First, I think there have been questions that will require some level of detail that will get into deep negotiations. I know this is referred to as the intergovernmental negotiations, but some of the questions really would go towards negotiation-specific— on specific points, and noting how we do negotiate as an African group with adoption of the position at the highest political level at heads of state and government, particularly on issues that are evolving. The approach will be that we would always defer and go to heads of state and government whilst recognizing the evolution in some of the positions and also respecting those positions. But I wanted to just also indicate that there are a number of questions that have asked for a specific level of detail that are really deep points of negotiation. I also wanted to reflect on the role of the model, as it were, particularly if we are working towards the consolidated model, which is to really give an outline of what the reformed Security Council should look like, and that has informed particularly positions or points relating to the ideal size of the Council, including expansion in both categories and what an expanded permanent category would look like and a non-permanent category. For the African model, what I can say is that clearly the common African position is articulated in the Ezoueni Consensus and SEAD Declaration. The input to the 2015 framework document was a reaction to the request made by the co-chair— made by the chair of the intergovernmental negotiation then that addresses comprehensively the 5 clusters as we find in 62557, and the 3rd point on the Pact of the Future really were 2 non-exhaustive points on what it means to treat Africa as a priority. And a special case, and that is how it has been framed in our model in the sense that this is not exhaustive, but for now these are the 2 agreed points on what concretely it means to treat Africa as a priority, as a special case. So this is the outline, and so when we deal specifically on the issues, I hope that colleagues will have this broad framing in mind. So now let me get to the easy questions. for Small Island Developing States. Now, again, the first point to be made is that the common African position has been agreed at the head of state and head of government level. In addition to adopting specific numbers and seats, as you find in the model, 11 for permanent members and the rest for non-permanent members, including the 2 permanent members minimum for Africa, We believe that enough accommodation has been made for whatever formula the membership will eventually conclude on. What is important is the reflection of the principles, particularly when it comes to the issue of representation. There you will find, I think, enough Consolidation of the African view as to what it means when we say regional representation. It includes fair and equitable geographical representation that should lead to a fairer world based on universalism, equity, and regional balance within the UN system. Now, because the common African position is agreed at the heads of state and government level, specific pronouncement on evolving issues will require the heads of state and government to also pronounce on those evolving positions. I think it was said very eloquently by the Permanent Representative of Saint Lucia speaking on behalf of L69 in describing perhaps not pronouncing on a specific issue as a critical gap that has to be filled. Which will require continuing engagement in this process. It does not signify divergence, particularly as we fully welcome the support expressed by groups including and particularly L69, but rather this really reflects that the need that continuing engagement within the IGN process will lead to a situation where we'll find a solution that really corresponds with the principles which we've espoused on the question of representation and regional representation. And I think this also would apply to other concepts of cross-regional representation which will require specific pronouncement at that level. On the question of accountability and periodic review of permanent members, and I think this came from Thank you very much for the question from Italy on behalf of L69. I believe the Charter itself really incorporates some level of accountability, and throughout this IGN process, and even on Note 507 and the general practice in terms of the relationship between the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, we've built into the process specific accountability issues. Some of the accountability measures may not be foolproof at present, but they provide enough basis for the Security Council members to be accountable to the General Assembly, and this would really— the continuum would go from the way the Security Council report has been presented to the General Assembly to the way it's debated, the way the presidency of the Council will provide sufficient information to member states in the wrapping and wrap-up sessions, but critically I think we also have to look at how do we continue to improve the working methods of the Council to continue to ingrain transparency and accountability, and I believe on that cluster that's why the African model has been quite comprehensive in that area. In terms of the question of periodic review, again, these are all evolving issues. The model contains areas of agreement by the African member states, and where we've not agreed, and I think in the IGN process we've indicated that for these evolving issues, we would continue to listen and engage constructively. Overall, We want a very effective, democratic Security Council, and I believe with that objective in mind, suggestions and proposals that will go towards improving the democratic nature, efficiency of the Security Council are issues which we will look forward to engage on. There was a question on the impact of ratio in terms of elected— reduced members— reduced elected members and permanent members. I think the best way to answer this question really is to start on the principles that we have espoused. The one major concern has been to redress the historical injustice in the Security Council, and that requires expansion in both categories. I think we've said this over and over again, that there's no way we can redress the historical justice without an expansion in both categories. An expansion in both categories obviously will lead to additional permanent members, and we have to reconcile this with having an efficient total number composition that will allow the Security Council to function effectively. A balance will have to be reached, but I think here the critical point is ensuring that we address the principles Redressing historical injustice, representation, equitable geographical distribution. As the ratio itself is not a principal issue, but of course I do understand where this question is coming from, but on the balance of leaning towards the principle and the question of the ratio, I believe it would tilt towards ensuring that we we're able to be respectful to the principles and ensuring that the historical injustice is redressed. It does not in any way say that the issue of ratio is not important. It is important, but of course there is a hierarchy towards this, and historical injustice, I think, for us is the most important factor.

I—

I'll try as much as possible to go step by step in answering, of course mindful of your time. That was a question from Italy on behalf of UFC. We had questions from Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries. Again, grateful for the question. The question really was about fixed seats or rotating seats. I think this is similar to our response to the concept of cross-regional seats and cross-regional representation, which we've linked to regional— the idea of regional representation, and on the practical aspect of whether do we support specific seat allocations to the Arab Group and the Small Island Developing States. Firstly, the principle of ensuring that we have a universal, equitable, geographically balanced Council. And the idea of evolving positions in the IGN, which on the— based on our approach to the negotiation, we have to then get to the highest level for pronouncement on this. We are not there yet, but of course we do take note of the views that have been expressed. We also note that the starting basis for our position has been the provision of the Charter in terms of the 2 categories in the Charter, Article 23, and so whatever new position that has been suggested is something which we have to give full consideration to. The decision to expand seats to 26 would require change to the working methods. I think we were more detailed on the issue of working methods simply because we value the importance to ensure that we continue to have an effective Security Council. In the presentation, I also referred to another important initiative that was led by one C10 member during the tenure in the Security Council— that was Algeria— on documentation, which really demonstrated the extent of the prerogative of permanent members in the first place, and on the second aspect, how they work on on working methods is continuous. We've seen improvements in the process. We saw that already in the new addition to Note 507, and the fact that we have to continue to work on this should not derail efforts to achieve historical justice, to expand the Council in both categories, and to arrive at a total number of membership that really would be feasible but also lend credence to the positions which we have seen, particularly as submitted by various interest groups and member states in their reform model. And this is linked to the question of how can the enlargement avoid impasse, the impasse on subsidiary bodies. The issue on subsidiary bodies is unique because this is where it is not necessarily a question of the size itself. I think it's really a question of the political will of member states to resolve issues. Without even getting into any general position, I think we can resolve this issue of appointing chairs to subsidiary bodies from a very technical point of view. I think the Council, through its practice and working methods have resolved the issue of presidency and rotation of presidency in the Council. I do not see how we cannot also find technical solutions to the issue of appointing chairs to subsidiary bodies and allow what is in effect a form of veto exercise by all the members of the Council in dealing with the process of appointing appointing chairs of subsidiary bodies. And again, I don't think this can be or will be affected by an expansion in both categories because we do not see the direct linkage to the expansion in both categories and the lack of the membership to agree on the appointment of chair of subsidiary bodies. I think it points to a deeper political problem and crisis. I think I will link this to the question asked by Thailand because it will be easy to link the two in terms of— I think there was a question on subsidiary bodies again and the modality of providing information on the activities of subsidiary bodies to general membership. And perhaps to provide also a bit of a context that Most of the submissions on particularly this area is from the submission made in the 2015 framework document input, and between then and now, over a decade, a lot of improvements have been made in the working methods of the Security Council. One of these will be that at the end of the meeting of subsidiary bodies, particularly sanctions committee, they should normally put out a press statement. We've seen paralysis in this regard lately because even a press statement that is bureaucratic in nature that informs the membership of the meeting of the Security Council is becoming problematic. So again, this points to a deeper malaise and we can link it to the structural imbalance, but an avenue now exists for information to be provided to the general membership. The challenge has been in recent times that sometimes the members of the subsidiary body cannot even agree to a press statement because it is by consensus and everybody will submit in that regard. There could be, of course, further avenues to improve the information flow to the general membership, including ensuring that the press statement that agreed. The second part will be the whole issue of engagement with member states. We also see increasingly higher levels of participation by directly affected member states in the deliberations of the subsidiary bodies and sanctions committee. This continues to evolve in terms of the practice of the subsidiary bodies. and this could be ingrained particularly in Note 507. So this, I think, really is sort of an agreement from the African model perspective and for member states who do require additional and further information on issues which have been considered by the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council and should lend credence to what we have submitted as the African model. I think it also came from St. Lucia on behalf of L69, the modality in which AU can identify permanent members. I believe this is one area in which the Ezouini Consensus and Cede Declaration— Ezouini Consensus has been very clear from day one that the African Union will retain the, as it were, prerogative to select its permanent member and then will submit to the General Assembly for election. I think 3 quick points to be made here. We have enough practice to show that this is an expression of the principle of solidarity. The exception normally in elections would be that Africa will submit candidatures on a competitive basis. Repeatedly, the membership of the United Nations, including our non-permanent membership, have voted on a clean slate, and that is a practice that has also shown that the elected African members can effectively play their role in the Security Council without necessarily going against the solidarity principle and gaining the trust by having the majority, two-thirds majority member states supporting the Clean Slate African candidate. It is also respectful of the Charter provision on elections. We are saying we are doing this election and then we'll submit for election to the general membership. So the general membership still will retain its agency in the election. What Africa is doing is to select, and it is on the basis of objective criteria. But why is this important? It is important— this modality is important to maintain African unity, and I think this is known by many and all, that one of the greatest strengths of Africa is its unity. That is why we speak of, and many of you have spoken of and talked to the issue of regional representation in a sense that is unique to Africa. To maintain that unity, I think selection within the African Union context provides a good basis and still allows the membership of the United Nations to exercise the agency in the election of the permanent member, so still you We will retain that authority to elect, but Africa has asked and has demanded that it will do the selection because I think it provides a good basis to maintain the unity of the continent on this important issue. There was a question on— As I continue to— I think the first question that came from Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of CARICOM addressed the issue of the rotating seat for seats, and I think I've provided an answer for that, and I think the statement from St. Lucia I think is quite effective on this, on how we see it and how we continue to engage. There was a reference to the issue of Africa not being the only region that is not in the permanent category. I think when we do present that position, we do say the African continent. There's a difference between reference to the African continent and as a reference to the regional groups in the context of the United Nations and the international system. So there are big differences there, but I think the I think the principal point is this: mostly countries in what we refer to as the Global South, developing countries if I may, we should not be put in a position where we trade injustices and tragedies. Of course, we don't want to go back from the start of slavery to the partition of Africa to colonial domination and neocolonialism and all of the injustices which we can outline. Of course, we can say, well, we went through the same or went through aspects of this, but I don't think we should be placed and be put in a position where we put this on the table. I think we have to ensure that we're able to agree to redress the structural imbalance that exists And one of the agreements which really has been elevated to the highest level at the United Nations in the Pact of the Future is the agreement by all that we have to redress the historical injustice against Africa, and that acknowledgement, I think, is one we need to operationalize. It doesn't mean that we should not pay attention to the quests. And aspirations of representation by other groups, and that is what is reflected in our position on representation. I think it's very clear there, and when we look at the Pact on the Future in itself, it's self-explanatory when it comes to addressing the underrepresentation of other groups— Asia-Pacific group, Latin America and Caribbean, and so on. But it is clear that at least for now, what is agreed by heads of state and government is that there is a particular historical injustice that needs redressing, and I don't think we should be put in a position where we trade injustices because I think solidarity should be able to allow us to redress the injustice and also address the concerns of others. Again, there was another question from Spain on cross-regional group seats and Arab Group. I believe I've provided an answer to that. That was a very technical question from Austria on A59L67, as expected. I think what it shows from Ezoueni A59, L67, is the consistency of African position, because what you find in the African model is consistent. We are now— and of course that process of the submission of that L document and its withdrawal and the process of the IGN and how from time to time we've seen the broad support for the common African position representation in itself is telling without necessarily getting into the detail of— I'm sure the question really was going to go to the issue of distribution, which you do not find in the model. I think we see the model as the present position of the African Group, how we envisage the expanded Security Council should look like in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. Our heads of state This time around I've not gone— even in Ezoueni, I've not gone to the point where they've said that you give this amount of seats. What we have demanded is 2 seats for Africa in the permanent category, an additional non-permanent seat, 2 that will take it to 5. So we were clear on the distribution to Africa, and then we offer a vision of what the expanded Security Council should look like. But Thank you for asking that question because it reaffirms the consistency of the African position over time, which is important. We'll leave the modalities, as we say, to the heads of state and government in the evolution of the process, and that will include, of course, the issue of rotating seats or cross-regional seats and the idea of how do we continue to concretely operationalize the treatment of Africa as a special case. Thank you, Belgium, speaking on behalf of the Benelux countries, for the questions. The first one was on the selection process. I believe I've answered that already, and even the detail about whether Africa will submit one or two is a modality that we will leave for the African continent, as I've I've explained. I think it's very important for the United Nations membership to continue to embrace a united Africa, not only in this process but in the work that we do, than having an Africa that is not united, which poses even more challenges for the United Nations. How does the group— allocation of seats, again, I think I've answered generally. How do we see it in terms of the demand of the Common African position and how do we see an expanded Security Council. This is, of course, the prerogative of the process. What we've been clear on and what our heads of state have pronounced on is the total size, the expansion, and the seats being demanded by Africa. To do anything else would be to go beyond what the C10 is mandated for now at this point in time. Now, I believe the Permanent Representative of France in his intervention quoted what we said when we debated the issue of the question of the veto in the last IGN. We believe that the veto has to be used responsibly. That is really a very important point. It does not then mean that we should not really say so it can For now, we cannot get rid of historical injustice by not expanding the permanent category and giving Africa the veto. We see it in the structural imbalance. We see it in examples that have affected Africa directly on peace and security questions, even though when Africa had solutions on the table and how the African solutions were overridden largely because of not only the threat but the use of the veto. So without that, I don't think we can structurally deal with historical injustice. And then we have conversations about how can we use the veto responsibly, which I believe is something that should be of interest to all member states. And this includes the many initiatives which we've engaged in. Many of the initiatives have had African co-sponsors and voted in favor, including the veto initiative and other initiatives that have been submitted. The only point we've made is that those initiatives should be without prejudice to the overall reform of the Security Council because we do not support a piecemeal approach. But improving the work of the Council, the responsible use of the veto, are issues which African member states have routinely and continue to consistently support. We have a question from Pakistan on the total number of permanent seats, and then whether this is meant for regional groups and how would they be categorized. I think, and I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for the question, in many of the IGN processes we've had how Pakistan have expressed its appreciation and understanding of regional representation in the context of the African group and African continent and how this may be different to other regions. I don't think I'm qualified to speak for other regions, but what we do as C10 and what we do as an African group is reflected not only in our advocacy but even in the work of the A3+ now, and A3 and A3+ now in the Council, the accountability mechanism which we've built In the A3, in firstly receiving directives from the African Union Peace and Security Council—that's the continental mechanism in our in our peace and security architecture—and reflecting the views of situation countries in the African continent. And I think it is very it is demonstrative of the fact that when we refer to regional representation in the African context, in addition to the principles you find in the cluster. We've given meaning to this in the practice of the A3+, which has been referred to as one of the most important innovations in the Security Council. I see my coach. I hope I'm not taking too much time, so I—

No, no, no, take your time.

Thank you. Yes, I think the next question was really the also lack of representation from other regional groups including Asia Group, Arab Group, OIC, which must be treated the same. I think I've answered the question of not trading tragedies and where there are gaps to be filled, yes, but I think there's been a general acknowledgement particularly by our heads of state on the historical injustice against Africa, and we are grateful for that, and we do not take that for granted, and we do not hope to get into this conversation where we want to pit one injustice against the other, but our continuing appeal is that we operationalize this general acknowledgement that the historical injustice injustice against Africa must be addressed, and our views on equity also reflected in the model which we have submitted. There's a question from the Russian Federation on any preference for other regions besides Africa. I think I think I've answered that in the sense that whilst the model gives a comprehensive view of the reformed Security Council, again builds from the submission we made in 2015, we're very clear in the minimum allocation to Africa, the 2 permanent and 2 additional non-permanent, in total 5. That the expanded Security Council could go up to 26, and I think it provides enough opportunity for some of the other issues to be addressed. But what we have instructions on and what has been agreed at the continental level is the demand which Africa has put forward. And the process on selection I have explained the consideration. On penholdership, again, these are issues of practice which can continue to evolve and develop, indeed acknowledging the role played by the Russian Federation and other members of the Council in improving penholdership, and certainly this is one area which the A3+— the A3 and the A3+ have been quite active on as well, ensuring that we either co-pen or wholly pen on African issues. This is— the historical context lends credence to the fact that there's no permanent ownership, permanent membership from the African continent, so some of the arguments being put forward, in essence, institutional memory, is really some of the disadvantages and the challenges which we face, which we would not face if there is permanent African representation because there will be continuous institutional memory. But the A3+ is perhaps assisting to rectify, but this is a practice issue. It does not rectify and provide a complete remedy to this important issue.

Thank you.

I just want to make sure that I don't miss any questions. So Liechtenstein had questions on— so I think it was from also South Africa and Liechtenstein. When the African Reform Model was adopted in July 2025 by the C10 Heads of State and Government, of course, the layers towards How we agreed to our position on this issue of Security Council. The Assembly has given a mandate to the C10 to canvass, promote, and advance a common African position. The Assembly gave a mandate to the C10 to develop the reform model. The C10 developed this through its own mechanism and agreed in July 2025, and we've been going through the process for the endorsement of that model by the the African Union Assembly itself. Now, between the adoption by the C10, we had the new resolution on revitalization adopted by the General Assembly, so that is not listed, but I think the spirit of that bullet point is to show really the importance of the revitalization resolution because the existing resolutions were also cited in that regard, and that really speaks to the mandate of the General Assembly and the need to strengthen the General Assembly in its work, particularly on issues relating to international peace and security. There is alignment in that. It is more of a technical issue than not being responsive to the evolution of the question of revitalization Thank you. There was also a question for Blitzenstein on the practice of selection. As I said, I don't think this really contravenes the Charter provision on election. What it— I think we're doing a service to the United Nations General Membership by ensuring that we do not present to you really contentious and problematic cases. In fact, the requests mostly from member states have been to Africa to present endorsed candidates in most elections than providing competitive elections. So the selection process is really to address this, and I've given you the 3 important points which are fundamental in this regard. The veto is a privilege, it's a prerogative, it is important, it's an important instrument which must be used responsibly. I don't think we have disagreement with Liechtenstein on that view. We have our pragmatic principle position. It seems as if the reading of the membership now is not to abolish, and so if it's going to exist and continue to exist, it is only fair that it's extended to the new permanent members, and I think a lot of member states have expressed that view in the room today already. 79/327 I've answered. It was an issue of timing, but the principle is reflected, the spirit is reflected in the model. I've just answered Thailand. There was a question from All Leaves and Seeds. I think I've provided an answer to that and of course the questions that have been asked. And I think there was a question on the issue relating to the veto from Ecuador. I have also provided some reflections on that. and support to the Common African Position. Again, I end co-chairs because I think your leadership is important. This year, the membership is moving towards a consolidated model. As we continue the important conversation on this, we hope that we can make that meaningful progress. Thank you so much for your leadership in this process and for giving me this opportunity to present on behalf of the African Group. Thank you.

of the view forward within the IGN. Colleagues, we will enter into an interactive stage, so if you do have questions, and I'm sure some of you do, save them till then, and if you'll allow me just a couple of minutes until we make sure that the webcast is done. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr.