First Committee, 13th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Good morning, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. The 13th meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, in accordance with its programme of work, the committee shall finish its considerations of the cluster on nuclear weapons today. Before I open the floor, I would like to remind all delegations to respect the time limit for the statements during the thematic discussion. The first speaker on the list of speakers is the distinguished member of Parliament of India.

Thank you, Chair. India remains committed to nuclear disarmament that is universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable. This goal can be achieved by a step-by-step process underwritten by universal commitment to an agreed non-discriminatory multilateral framework. We outlined this approach in our 2006 working paper to the First Committee and again in 2007 at the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/1816, the relevance of this approach endures. As a responsible nuclear weapons state, India maintains a policy of credible minimum deterrence with a posture of no first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapons states.

We are prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.

I wish to underline that India's capabilities are shaped by a unique security environment and are not directed against any specific actor. India also remains committed to its voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

India believes that legally binding assurances.

To non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should alleviate their sense of insecurity and thereby strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This would contribute to reducing the nuclear danger. India acknowledges that the use of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control raises real questions. We espouse the principle that the decision to use nuclear weapons should be taken by humans. India traditionally tables two resolutions under this cluster. The resolution on reducing nuclear danger tabled by India since 1998 draws attention to the hair-trigger alert status of nuclear weapons and calls for de-alerting and de-targeting to reduce the risk of unintentional or accidental use. India has also introduced since 1992 a resolution on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such a universal, legally binding agreement would build the political will needed for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We look forward to the continued support and co-sponsorship.

Of Member States for both resolutions.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons does not create obligations for India. Our commitment to global nuclear disarmament nonetheless remains unchanged, as does our commitment to strengthening nonproliferation.

We also remain committed to promoting international efforts to prevent.

Terrorists and non-state actors from gaining access to nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished member of parliament of India. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Bulgaria aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Mr. Chair, Bulgaria reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the NPT and to its three mutually reinforcing pillars, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At a time of growing strategic instability, we call on all states to comply with their international obligations and exercise restraint in nuclear rhetoric. We support progressive, realistic, and verifiable nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. the entry into force of the CTBT, the commencement of negotiations on the Treaty Banning the Production of Missile Material for Nuclear Weapons, and renewed sustainable dialogue on arms control after the expiration of the New START Treaty. In the same manner, we also call for progress in the areas of nuclear disarmament verification, improving transparency and accountability, and continued efforts on nuclear risk reduction. As a NATO ally, Bulgaria reaffirms its support to the Alliance's nuclear deterrence policy as an essential element of our collective defense. NATO's deterrence posture serves to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression, and is fully consistent with our support for arms control, nonproliferation, and the long-term goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair. On Iran, Bulgaria's position is unequivocal. Iran's continued failure to meet its nuclear safeguards obligations, its refusal to cooperate fully and constructively with the IAEA, and its failure to provide the necessary information on nuclear materials and relevant nuclear activities are unacceptable. These actions undermine the confidence in the international non-proliferation regime and pose serious risks to regional and international security. Iran must immediately comply with its international obligations, provide the IAEA with access required to carry out its verification mandate, and resolve all outstanding issues through full transparency and verifiable action. A diplomatic solution requires genuine cooperation, not declarations or empty assurances. Equally important for the international security and for the prevention of nuclear incidents with potentially devastating consequences for the region and beyond is that Russia withdraws its military forces, equipment, and other personnel from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and return the plant to sovereign control of Ukraine. Meanwhile, we commend the IAEA for its indispensable work in monitoring nuclear safety and security of the Ukrainian nuclear facilities under exceptionally difficult circumstances. We once again reiterate our unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity with its internationally recognized borders.

I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Chair.

Nuclear disarmament has been a central goal of the international community since 1946. The final document of SSOD-1 sets a clear direction, general and complete disarmament as the ultimate objective, undiminished security for all at the lowest possible level of armaments, and the right of every state to security. Today, we are moving in the opposite direction. In February, the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement expired, leaving the two largest arsenals without any

agreed limits for the first time in over a half century.

Arsenals are being modernized and expanded.

Nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements are widening, and there is open talk of resuming nuclear testing. The salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines is rising, not falling.

Emerging technologies compound these risks.

AI, cyber, and space-based capabilities are blurring the line between conventional and nuclear domains and compressing decision time. Meanwhile, states with vast fissile material stockpiles continue to promote a cutoff treaty that would freeze existing asymmetries. The recent announcement of some nuclear weapon states to increase their warheads without resuming fissile material production vindicates our position.

It is existing stocks and not the future production alone that matter.

The nonproliferation regime is also undermined by discriminatory waivers and selective safeguards. Nowhere are these trends more dangerous than in South Asia. Our eastern neighbor continues to expand its unsafeguarded fissile material stockpiles

under special cooperation arrangements.

It has now deployed nuclear weapons and increased readiness of its delivery systems, despite a record of accidental launches. Chair, pending the goal of nuclear disarmament, a legally binding instrument assuring non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons remains the most urgent priority.

Pakistan has once again tabled its resolution on negative security assurances and looks forward to its adoption with the widest possible support.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Paraguay.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Once again, we wish to congratulate you on your election to steer our work. Chair, Paraguay wishes to be very clear indeed. The only use that we must have for nuclear energy is a peaceful one. Its use in situations of conflict is a threat to international peace. As such, we are of the view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty for nuclear weapons is the cornerstone of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy regimes. We believe that this instrument is complemented by and hones with the TPNW and the CTBT. It is also complemented by the declarations of nuclear weapons-free zones, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, the certainty that the NPT is vital for peace, means that we note with concern the fact that the meeting of the States Parties has already concluded without a final consensus document, in spite of efforts made by all parties. It's become clear that we stand at a complex, deeply worrying juncture that demands overriding efforts to ensure that nuclear weapons are never acceptable and to ensure that fear does not prevail over and above the law. At the same time, and in line with our vision for the world, we are of the view that the the NPT and the TPNW is not only a step forward in international law because it's rooted in the recognition of human suffering caused by nuclear weapons and their catastrophic consequences, the TPNW is also vital because it is a comprehensive, legally binding framework. We call upon states that are not party to the TPNW to become party to it, and we hope that the first REVCON next December will see us find useful, timely solutions to global problems. Moreover, we invite all states that are not party to the TPNW to express their interest in the review conference. We call upon members to strengthen peace and to ensure the safe, controlled elimination of nuclear weapons. Chair, we do defend the inalienable rights of all states to investigate, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We underscore that this development should be conducted through the implementation of programmes that are in line with international norms, bearing in mind the best practices cooperation, prevention of damage and due diligence must also be used, as well as environmental damage must be borne into mind. We point to the role played by the IAEA and the importance of their safeguard system, as well as the implementation of agreements entered into by Member States pursuant to the treaty. We conclude, Chair, recalling that Paraguay is party to all the primary international treaties in this domain, and as a member of the first densely populated area free of nuclear weapons, we remain staunchly committed to strengthening the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We will continue to champion transparent, verifiable and legally binding nuclear disarmament for all States. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Paraguay. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The full text of my statement will be available on the e-statements portal. Distinguished delegates, 35 years ago, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, where 456 nuclear tests were conducted for over four decades. Our decision to renounce the nuclear arsenal inherited at independence remains the foundation of our disarmament policy. At the same time, the task of overcoming the lasting consequences of nuclear testing gives that policy a human purpose. Kazakhstan reaffirms the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends on balanced implementation of all three pillars, including concrete progress under Article VI. Earlier this year, Kazakhstan was privileged to chair Main Committee II of the 2026 NPT Review Conference, promoting constructive dialogue and balanced consideration of State Parties' concerns. In March 2025, Kazakhstan also presides over the third meeting of state parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Our engagement under both treaties reflects our commitment to their shared complementarity objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. Together with Kyrgyzstan, we continue to work on victim assistance and environmental remediation under Article 6 and 7 of the TPNW. This year marks 30 years since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty opened for signature. We call upon all states to uphold and reaffirm their existing moratoria on nuclear testing and support treaties verification regime. The 20th anniversary of the signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty underlines the value of regional commitments. We refer to the joint Central Asia ministerial statement issued on the occasion of on the occasion and call for the complementation of ratification of its protocol as a reflection of the critical role that legally binding negative security assurances play in global peace and stability. We invite member states to support and co-sponsor the draft resolution on the Semipalatinsk Treaty. Mr. Chair, Kazakhstan continues to advocate for the resumption of the high-level dialogue among nuclear nuclear powers, and it's ready to assist in this undertaking. Kazakhstan will continue working across political differences to advance nuclear disarmament, as total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only reliable guarantee against their use. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lao PDR.

Mr. Chair, my delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN. Mr. Chair, we continue to witness that the existence of nuclear weapons remains one of the gravest threats to global peace, security and the very survival of humankind. Today, international efforts to advance peace, security, and sustainable development are overshadowed by the intolerable risk posed by nuclear weapons. The Lao VDR joins the majority of UN member states in calling for urgent and concrete action toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We request that despite our efforts, the 2026 NPT review could not reach consensus on the substantive outcome. We therefore call on all state parties to renew their commitment towards the full and effective implementation of the treaty in all its aspects. The Lao PDR reaffirmed its strong commitment to the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, We believe that the universalization of the TPNW is vital to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons and ensuring a world free from the threat of nuclear annihilation. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty continues to serve as a vital instrument and a strong international norm. that embodies our shared aspiration to ban all nuclear testing. We ask the remaining states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the treaty at the AOS opportunity to facilitate its entry into force. Mr. Chair, we believe that the establishment of regional nuclear weapons-free zones constitutes an essential step towards reducing and eventually eliminating the threats of nuclear weapons. The Lao PDR values the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development and expresses its appreciation to the IAEA for its continued assistance. Together with other ASEAN member states, we reaffirm our commitment to strengthening cooperation with the IAEA. In this regard, ASEAN continues to work closely to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Bangkok Treaty and its plan of action. In conclusion, the Lao PDR reaffirm its unwavering commitment to upholding its international obligation and to working constructively with all member states to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. thereby ensuring lasting peace, security, and.

I thank the distinguished representative of Lao PDR. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Chair, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports the statements delivered on behalf of the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, and we deliver this statement in our national capacity. The Kingdom accords extreme importance to the nuclear nonproliferation system regime, where the NPT is its cornerstone. And we stress that the full implementation of this agreement and achieving its universality is a means to establish a world free of nuclear weapons. And in this framework, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stresses the need to exert more effective international efforts to achieve the goals of the NPT. We call upon nuclear states to implement their obligations within Article VI of the treaty. We also stressed the need for complementarity between the NPT's three pillars and the need to apply them with equal attention, because the credibility of the NPT relies on the balance in implementing these three pillars. Here, we'd like to note that the United Nations has allocated the 26th of September of every year as a reminder of the need for the full elimination of nuclear weapons. We renew our affirmation that security and stability will not be achieved by owning these weapons. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia calls for not using nuclear weapons and are not threatening to use them. We stress the important role of the IAEA in verifying the peaceful nature of the nuclear weapons of member states, and we stress our continued support to the IAEA in its verification efforts. We welcome the technical cooperation and the capacity building that is offered to Member States. We stress the general right of Member States to the peaceful use of nuclear weapons and the need to provide nuclear technology for peaceful uses, Mr. Chair. We look forward for the, uh, this armament, uh, conference in Geneva to, uh, continue its work and to leave the impact that it has arrived at so that it can achieve its objectives. So we also hope, uh, that membership will be expanded and new members would be allowed into the conference. And here the Kingdom expresses its regret that the NPT Review Conference was unable to arrive at an outcome document for the third time in a row, which places the NPT before a real challenge that requires us to exert further efforts to maintain its credibility and the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. Creating a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is a responsibility that is a collective one and is upon the international the entire international community, therefore the states the sponsors of the 1995 and the 1995 state resolution. And we call for Israel to join the agreement, the NPT, and to allow its We believe that the fact that Israel has not joined the APT and placed its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguard agreement is the main obstacle to creating the zone. We will send the full text of our statement to the secretariat.

Thank you, representative of Saudi Arabia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mozambique.

Mr. Chair, nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to international peace, security, and human existence. We live in a challenging era marked by political-military instability, armed conflicts, growing mistrust, confrontation between states, and increasing role of non-state armed groups. These factors, combined with a weak international legal framework to control the unchecked arms race and an ever-growing use of artificial intelligence for military purposes, worsens the risk of a nuclear escalation. In this regard, we are all called upon to work together urgently and in good faith in efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone to ensure a safer and peaceful world. Mr. Chair, Mozambique reiterates its firm commitment to the effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Pelindaba Treaty. We also urge the international community to play a decisive role to prevent the collapse of existing international architecture through strengthening multilateralism, compliance with applicable international treaties, combating transnational threats, and ensuring coherence between the state intentions and concrete actions to each of our countries, bearing in mind that a war involving nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequence for all of humanity. In this context, we would like to highlight four aspects we consider important. First, the adoption of a balanced and responsible approach to the use of nuclear technology, including artificial intelligence, through respect for and compliance with the relevant international agreements and legislation, particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Second, the strengthening of international technical cooperation, promoting knowledge transfer and national capacity building, as well as fostering mutual trust. Third, prioritizing investment in nuclear programs for peaceful purposes with an emphasis on the energy transition, sustainable development, medicine, and public health. And fourth, the pursuit of nuclear disarmament through diplomatic dialogue, political will, and verifiable commitments, recognizing that This process is not merely a military issue, but a matter of human environment and economic survival. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mozambique. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Oman.

Peace and God's blessings be upon you, Mr. Chair. The Sultanate of Oman would like to express its support for the statements delivered by the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, who reaffirm our longstanding position calling for nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, considering this a paramount priority for international peace and security. My country, Oman, believes that the full and final elimination of these weapons in a transparent manner that is irreversible and internationally verifiable is the only guarantee against their use or the threat of their use. In this context, my country emphasizes the importance of strengthening the credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of disarmament and non-proliferation through the full and balanced implementation of its three pillars and the fulfillment of the commitments and undertakings agreed upon at the previous review conferences, particularly those related to nuclear disarmament. The Sultanate of Oman regrets that the Review Conference of 2026, and for the third consecutive time, was unable to reach a consensus final document, a situation that necessitates the renewed political will and the preservation of the credibility of the treaty and its review process. The Sultanate of Oman also reaffirms the inviolability of nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes, as well as the need to refrain from targeting or threatening to target them given the serious consequences this could have for nuclear safety and security and regional and international peace and security. The Saltzman Declaration, Mr. Chair, attaches special priority to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in the Middle East. We affirm that achieving this objective is a collective responsibility and an important contribution to enhancing regional and international peace and security. We further stress the continued importance of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the need to implement it. And here, the Sultanate of Oman is honored to chair the seventh session of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which is due to be held in November. Amman, as the chair of the conference, will seek to build on the achievements of previous sessions, and we will seek to benefit from the substantive discussions and the reports that have contributed to advancing this process. We will work with member states to strengthen dialogue and build confidence, and to continue our constructive progress towards achieving these objectives. The Sultanate of Oman calls upon all invited parties, without exception, to participate actively and constructively in the Subsidiary and to engage in its work in good faith to contribute to this process towards the establishment of the zone through a legally binding treaty that serves the security and stability of all the countries and peoples of the region. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Oman. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sudan.

Thank.

You, Mr. Chair. Sudan aligns itself with the statements delivered by the Non-Aligned Movement and the African and Arab groups. We wish to make the following remarks in our national capacity. The escalating international tensions and serious violations of the UN Charter and international law compel us to maintain the multilateral system. We must prevent a new arms race and uphold the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of a nuclear disarmament regime. The Sudan expresses its profound concern regarding the modernization of nuclear arsenals and the failure to fulfill disarmament obligations. It affirms that international peace and security cannot be achieved as long as such weapons remain in existence. We call for their elimination in a transparent, irreversible manner under international verification and in accordance with a specified timetable, while redirecting the resources allocated to them towards development. We further warn against the continued lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. We call upon nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations, particularly under Article VI of the Treaty and the relevant decisions of the Review Conferences. The Sudan emphasized that confidence-building and risk-reduction measures even though important, cannot constitute a substitute for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, for it remains the sole guarantee against their devastating consequences. We stress the need to negotiate on a comprehensive and legally binding international instrument on negative security assurances. We call upon nuclear weapons states to adopt the principle of no first use and review their policies on nuclear sharing and extended nuclear deterrence. It further calls for the cessation of nuclear cooperation with any state not party to the treaty and whose facilities are not subject to the comprehensive safeguards system of the IAEA. We affirm that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitute two complementary pillars of the NPT. They both contribute in strengthening the international legal framework for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Mr. Chair, the continued delay in the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution represents a serious setback to nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The Sudan reiterates that establishing a Middle East free of nuclear weapons is a collective international responsibility. In conclusion, we reaffirm the inherent and inalienable right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sudan. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mongolia.

Mr. Chair, Mongolia aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of NAM and States Parties and signatory states to the TPNW, who wish to offer the following remarks in our national capacity. At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions and growing reliance on nuclear deterrence, Mongolia remains convinced that international security must be pursued through diplomacy and mutual restraint and respect for international law. Rebuilding confidence and preserving existing disarmament commitments are important in present circumstances. While we regret that the 2026 NPT Review Conference concluded without consensus outcome, we commend Vietnam's constructive leadership in facilitating dialogue and bridging differences. Mongolia reiterates the importance of upholding existing commitments and advancing the full implementation of the treaty. Mr. Chair, Mongolia's approach to nuclear disarmament is rooted in its longstanding commitment to maintain its territory free of nuclear weapons. Since its declaration in 1992, Mongolia has pursued a consistent policy consolidating its nuclear-weapon-free status through national measures and international cooperation. Our experience illustrates how the states' individual security choices can contribute to wider disarmament and nonproliferation objectives. The General Assembly has played an important role in supporting the endeavor through its biennial resolution since 1998. At the current session, Mongolia has submitted its draft biannual resolution entitled Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear Weapons Status. The draft builds upon the established framework of previous resolutions while taking account of relevant developments. Its central purpose remains to reinforce international recognition and support for Mongolia's status and its continued implementation. We are grateful for the broad support And this initiative has received over the years and encourage all the delegation to call the delegations to call sponsored the draft and support its adoption by consensus. We are welcome their conclusion of qualified group of experts work on the comprehensive study of nuclear weapon free zones. Mongolia will continue to contribute to multilateral efforts to promote confidence and strengthen international commitments. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Tunisia.

Thank you, Chair. My country aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Arab Group, the African Group, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Each year, we commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Several statements are delivered on that occasion to highlight the gravity of these weapons, not only in terms of their use, but also of their stockpiling, development, and the threat of their use, as well as to stress the necessity of eliminating them. Until this objective sees the light, we will keep commemorating this International Day as a means of advocacy for a world free of nuclear weapons. As conflicts and crises continue to worsen in several regions of the world and narratives of nuclear threats are being normalized, there should be a growing conviction among states that eliminating nuclear weapons does not undermine international peace and security, but rather strengthen them. Mr. Chair, the increase of investment in nuclear weapons, estimated at nearly 120 billion US dollars last year, is not reassuring. It further jeopardizes our lives, increases nuclear catastrophes, and indicates a reluctance in eliminating this type of weapons. Since nuclear disarmament does not seem to be a priority for some states, it would be unfair to question the NPT for its third consecutive failure. We would have a better world if we redirect those amounts toward investing in comprehensive peace, financing the sustainable development goals, and humanitarian agencies, as well as eradicating poverty. In the aim of reducing nuclear risks, my country reiterates its support for the establishment without delay of the zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It calls on all states to join this realistic process, and which accomplishment depends on the shared political will. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, and in short, weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Tunisia. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Ghana.

Mr. Chair, Ghana aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement and offers the following remarks in its national capacity. Ghana's commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons is unequivocal. We remain deeply concerned about rising nuclear risk, growing tensions, threats of nuclear use, and the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals. Any use of nuclear weapons would have devastating humanitarian consequences. Their total elimination remains the only absolute guarantee against their use. Ghana reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends on the full and balanced implementation of all three pillars. We regret that the 2026 review conference was unable to reach consensus. We urge all state parties to strengthen implementation of the treaty and advance progress on Article 6 obligations. Mr. Chair, as a state party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Ghana views the treaty as an important contribution to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. We encourage all states that have not yet done so to join the treaty. Ghana calls for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and urges the remaining NS2 states to ratify it without delay. pending its entry into force, we call on all states to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing. Ghana reaffirms its commitment to the Treaty of Pelindaba and calls for full respect for Africa's nuclear weapon-free status. We also support efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ghana reaffirms the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in line with their international obligations. As we advance our peaceful nuclear program, we remain committed to working closely in cooperation with the IAEA and in the implementation of required safeguards. In conclusion, Ghana calls on all states to recommit to dialogue, build confidence, reduce risk, and take practical steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ghana. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Dominican Republic is grateful for the opportunity to take the floor at this thematic debate. We reaffirm our staunch commitment to the goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. In the current context, marked by growing international tensions and by the modernization of nuclear arsenals, it is vital to preserve and strengthen our multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. According to recent estimates by the Stockholm Institute, the global inventory of nuclear weapons now stands at around 12,000 warheads. This is a reality that lays bare the need to take tangible measures towards risk reduction and disarmament. We reaffirm our commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and more specifically to the full implementation of its Article VI. Nuclear disarmament must move forward in a gradual, irreversible, verifiable, transparent and non-discriminatory fashion. We regret the fact that the 11th Review Conference of the NPT, held this year, was unable to achieve a consensus-based outcome document. result should serve as an appeal to step up efforts to rebuild trust and strengthen dialogue between States Parties. Moreover, in our view, it is fundamental to preserve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Its entry into force remains an as yet unmet goal of the international community. We beseech States who have not yet done so to complete the process of signature and ratification. Chair, as a State Party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Dominican Republic also recognizes its contribution to strengthening international legislation against these weapons. We hope that the first treaty review conference will make it possible to foster progress in its implementation, particularly in terms of victims' assistance, international cooperation and environmental remediation. On the regional front, the Treaty of Tlatelolco turned Latin America and the Caribbean into the first densely populated area free of nuclear weapons. That demonstrated that regional cooperation and international law can effectively contribute to collective security. The Dominican Republic believes it is important to preserve the right of all States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards. To conclude, at times of deep geopolitical divisions, we must strengthen multilateralism. The total elimination of nuclear weapons remains a goal that is crucial to guarantee lasting international peace and security. The Dominican Republic will continue to work constructively towards the achievement of that goal. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon.

Mr. Chairman, nuclear weapons do not only threaten targets, they carry the possibility of destroying populations in several moments and entire cities and generations. And they harbor the threat of a particular nature, that of compromising the very future of humanity. And this is an issue which has a particular significance in light of the persistent difficulties being encountered by multilateralism, the outcome of the 11th. review conference of the NPT, which did not result in the adoption of a substantive document, underscores the need to preserve the credibility of the treaty through concrete and verifiable commitment. as a non-nuclear weapons state and a party to the NPT. We are also a party to the Pelendaba Treaty, and we ratified the CTBT as well. These commitments reflect our conviction that disarmament and non-proliferation, peaceful use are all inextricably linked. Our action needs to be focused on three priorities. The first priority is the promotion of nuclear risk reduction linked to accidents, miscalculation, or escalation related to difficulties in transparency. And these efforts need to contribute to the objectives of disarmament and to supplement them. Second, strengthening verification mechanisms, which are critical for the establishment of mutual trust as well as credibility of commitments, while at the same time fostering access of states, developing states, to scientific technical and institutional skills which are necessary. Third, preempting application of emerging technologies and anticipating this for strategic purposes. AI and cyber capabilities are transforming security environments and they can affect decision making processes. We encourage dialogue and international cooperation in order to prevent potential risk and to support collective efforts for achievement of stability disarmament. Risk reduction is a critical step, but in and of itself this cannot substitute for disarmament. It should contribute to the effective reduction of arsenals and subsequently complete elimination through a progressive and irreversible and verifiable process. Achievement of this goal requires a sustained commitment on the part of all Member States, notwithstanding difficulties for preservation of dialogue and ability to act collectively. Multilateralism draws strength from our ability to surmount disagreement and to overcome this. We believe in security rooted in law and cooperation and trust. As recalled in an African proverb, if you want honey, then don't destroy where the honey bees reside. And this is what should guide our action. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Gabon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My delegation associates itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Group of African States and the Non-Aligned Movement. This discussion is being held in a context which is particularly alarming and continues to deteriorate, including modernization of what arsenals and the restoration of nuclear related rhetoric. For us, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use, a threat of use. And towards that goal, the nonproliferation treaty remains the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime. The failures that have been countered by no means undermine the obligations under Article VI, and we call upon nuclear-weapon states to honor them as a state party to the CTBT. We have, for years, been hosting a certified seismic station in Masuku. And with this responsibility in mind, we recall our call for the maintenance of moratorium and the rapid entry into force of the treaty. And as a state party to the Treaty, we reaffirm our commitment to Africa's status as a nuclear weapons -- non-nuclear weapons -- a nuclear weapons-free zone. We call for universal negative security assurances, legally binding assurances, and support the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East. Any discussion on nuclear weapons needs to prioritize humanitarian considerations in the light of the incorporation of AI into military systems and decision related to the use of these weapons needs to remain under the full effective human oversight risk reduction cannot replace disarmament the land of Oklo natural nuclear reactors we wish to reaffirm the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear power in accordance with article 4 of NPT and we support the IAEA's support and we all applaud the IAEA support for African Development by recently signing the TPNW, we clearly have made a choice for a world free of nuclear weapons, and we call upon all states to follow suit. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Gabon. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of El Salvador.

Thank you, Chair. El Salvador is grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this important thematic debate on nuclear weapons. My country reaffirms the historic importance of the Tlatelolco Treaty that established the first nuclear weapons-free zone in a densely populated area. This We salute this and the role of OPANAL in the effective implementation of that treaty and its provisions. Our region has demonstrated that it is possible to build collective. security arrangements that are based on the absence of nuclear weapons. This year, the 11th review conference of the NPT concluded once again without achieving consensus on a substantive outcome document. This result is one more. It adds to the review conferences of 2015 and 2021 that those had similar results and should prompt us to ask questions about what we need to do to implement the commitments entered into under the Treaty, El Salvador will continue to recognize the NPT as a pivot of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is precisely for that reason that we're of the view that it is pivotal to preserve the balance across its three pillars. The NPT is not solely a non-proliferation tool or one for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is also an instrument of nuclear disarmament. We reiterate our appeal for the full compliance of obligations established in its Article 6. Chair, as a State Party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, we are preparing to actively participate in its first review conference that will be held between the 30th of November and the 4th of December this year. We're of the view that this first conference constitutes an opportunity to assess progress achieved since the treaty's entry into force. It's also an opportunity to strengthen its implementation and universalization. El Salvador reaffirms the fact that the TPNW complements the NPT and contributes to the implementation of nuclear disarmament goals. Chair, this year we also mark 30 years since the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Complete Test Ban Treaty. Over the last three decades, the CTBT has contributed to consolidating a solid international legal framework against nuclear testing. Finally, we cannot analyze the future of nuclear disarmament without considering the impact of expeditious scientific and technological progress, the growing integration of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and other emerging capacities into nuclear weapons related systems can reduce time available for decision making. It can introduce new vulnerabilities and increase calculation risks and errors. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of El Salvador. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Chair. The UK shares the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We are fully committed to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, to our obligations under Article VI, and to practical measures that strengthen international security and enable further progress on disarmament. The absence of a consensus outcome document at the NPT review conference does not diminish the value of our debate. Our discussions underlined shared commitment to the treaty and highlighted significant common ground, providing a valuable foundation for the coming review cycle. The UK remains committed to advancing nuclear disarmament in a step-by-step manner, with transparency, irreversibility and verifiability at its core. It is crucial that we continue to build the legal, political, technical and normative arrangements that will be required to sustain a disarmed world. The UK welcomes the establishment of the GSTE on nuclear disarmament verification, has led efforts to advance international understanding of irreversibility, and championed greater transparency and engagement with States Parties and civil society. Our national report supports understanding of and confidence in our policies. We are committed to dialogue among nuclear weapons states in areas such as nuclear doctrines and strategic risk reduction, including through the P5 process, which we chaired over the past year. The UK strongly supports the CTBT and its verification regime and calls for negotiations to begin on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. Progress on disarmament must be matched by progress across the wider non-proliferation regime. A strong, independent and impartial IAEA is central to ensuring that non-proliferation standards are upheld. The UK fully supports the IAEA and its safeguard system. We welcome the entry into force of CSAs by Guinea and Somalia this year, bringing us closer to universal safeguards implementation amongst NPT States Parties. Chair, the broader security environment makes our work more urgent. Russia's coercive nuclear signaling and pursuit of novel nuclear weapons, China's rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal without corresponding transparency, Iran's continued non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and the DPRK's ongoing violations of its international obligations undermine trust and make progress more challenging. These challenges reinforce that there is a greater need than ever for states to work together to create an environment conducive to disarmament. We must continue to focus on the steps that move us closer to our shared objective of a world without nuclear weapons, with undiminished security for all. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of the UK. Now I give the floor to the Distinguished Representative of Turkey.

Thank you, Chair. Turkey remains committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal, reducing nuclear risks, building confidence, and enhancing transparency remain critical. These efforts complement, rather than substitute, meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Even though an outcome document for the last NPT Review Conference was not agreed upon, despite intensive efforts, NPT's credibility and role in the global nonproliferation regime remains indispensable. Turkey remains fully committed to the implementation of the NPT across its three mutually reinforcing pillars. We support a systematic, step-by-step, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament process. Nuclear weapons states bear responsibility to advance their Article VI commitments through concrete reductions, confidence-building measures and greater transparency. We reaffirm the indispensable role of the IAEA in safeguards, nuclear safety and security, as well as in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We also continue to advocate for universalization of the NPT and Additional Protocol of its CSAE. Adherence to its instruments is indispensable for strengthening international confidence, enhancing verification and reinforcing the international nuclear non-proliferation architecture. Turkey considers NATO's nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements to be fully consistent with the NPT and to have contributed by reducing incentives for further proliferation to strategic stability while remaining fully compatible with our commitment to nuclear disarmament. As This year marks the 30th anniversary of the CTBT. Turkey regards the treaty as an important cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The rhetoric about the possible return to nuclear testing is concerning. Such tendencies risk eroding the progress made over the years and global norm against nuclear testing we have built together. We will continue to encourage all States, in particular the remaining Annex II States, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. It is crucial for all States to uphold and maintain moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions. This year, we also witnessed the termination of the New START Treaty without follow-on arrangement. Turkey encourages the continued and meaningful dialogue among nuclear weapons states with a view to promoting predictability and strategic stability. The challenges we face make nuclear disarmament more difficult, yet all the more urgent. Turkey stands ready to work constructively with all partners to strengthen the NPT and advance our common disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kiribati.

Thank you, Chair. Kiribati aligns itself with the statement delivered by South Africa on behalf of the States Parties to the TPNW and wishes to offer the following remarks in its national capacity. Chair, KITABEST remains deeply concerned by the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals, the growing reliance on nuclear deterrence, and the increasing risk of miscalculation and escalation. At a time when international trust is diminishing, the world needs greater restraint, transparency, and dialogue, not renewed nuclear competition. For Kiribati, nuclear weapons are a lived experience whose consequences continue to affect our people, our environment, and our development. Kiribati, therefore, calls for greater transparency, comprehensive scientific assessments, access to relevant historical and radiological information, and meaningful international cooperation to address the continuing impacts of nuclear testing. Affected communities must not be forgotten. Their needs for victim assistance, environmental remediation and appropriate redress must remain integral to our collective disarmament efforts. Chair, Kiribati reaffirms its strong support for the TPNW and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We call upon all states that have not yet done so to join these instruments and strengthen the international norm against nuclear weapons and nuclear testing. Disarmament and non-proliferation must be pursued through mutually reinforcing efforts. We encourage states to preserve existing commitments, reduce nuclear risk, improve transparency, and pursue practical confidence-building measures that advance verifiable disarmament. Nuclear-weapon-free zones remain essential regional contributions to global non-proliferation and disarmament. KITIBEST attaches great importance to the South Nuclear-Free Zone and the Treaty of Rarotonga, which reinforce our region's commitment to peace and security. Chair, CDIBES believes that the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons is a shared responsibility. Our Pacific experience teaches us that the decisions of today can leave consequences for generations yet unborn. Let us ensure that future generations inherit a world defined not by the threat of nuclear destruction, but by peace, justice, and collective responsibility. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kiribati. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine.

Mr. Chair, Ukraine Alliance itself was the statement delivered by the EU and would like to add a few additional remarks in its national capacity. For decades, sustained international efforts brought tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear arsenals were reduced from their Cold War peaks, while international arms control and nonproliferation frameworks were developed and strengthened. Today, much of the hard-won progress in nuclear disarmament has been eroded. Nuclear arsenals are being modernized and expanded, nuclear threats are becoming increasingly explicit, while nuclear weapons are assuming a more prominent role in military doctrines. Three consecutive NPT review conferences have failed to reach consensus on a substantive outcome document. The international arms control architecture has suffered serious setbacks, including the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the expiration of New START, against the backdrop of Russia's persistent violations of its obligations under both treaties. Furthermore, Russia has withdrawn its ratification of the CTBT. It must be stated unequivocally that these developments reflect Russia's deliberate efforts to undermine the international security and arms control architecture. Mr. Chair, Ukraine made a historic contribution by voluntarily relinquishing the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. In return, Ukraine received security assurances from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation. which committed to respect our independence, sovereignty, and existing borders, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against our country. Tragically, all those commitments were not honored. Russia not only violated all of its international commitments and launched an unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. Over the past year, we have also heard repeated and explicit threats to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Russia is demonstrating to the world that a nuclear weapons state can threaten a non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear annihilation while waging a war of aggression against it. What message does this send to countries that have chosen not to acquire nuclear weapons? What does it mean for the credibility of international security commitments? Nuclear threats must never become an acceptable instrument of state policy. The international community must send an unequivocal message to Moscow. Such threats are unacceptable and must cease immediately. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, restoring confidence in the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime requires ending Russia's aggression, achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace for Ukraine, and providing our country with credible, effective, and legally binding security guarantees. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kuwait.

In the name of.

God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Kuwait, Mr. Chairman, reaffirms that the storage, development, and the use of nuclear weapons undermines international peace and security. Elimination of these weapons is the only way to guarantee against their use. One cannot continue to threaten to use these weapons. and accelerate the arms race. That is unacceptable. My country reiterates our commitment to the NPT and the balanced implementation of the three pillars thereof. We deplore the fact that the NPT Review Conference of 2026 did not result in an outcome document that was consensus-based. And for this reason, we wish to stress the fact that the absence of consensus does not undermine obligations, and we have an obligation to undertake concrete commitments to guarantee the complete elimination of these weapons according to an established timeline. We call for guarantees to be provided in terms of countering the use of these weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, and for the assurances to be provided against the threat of use as well of such weapons. My country has also taken note of the security -- the Board of Governors, the resolution of the IAEA, as well as the report of the Director General of the IAEA. We call upon Iran to act in accordance with its obligations and to provide information and to guarantee inspectors access from the IAEA insofar as trust in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programs requires that they honor their obligations in full. We are in favor of a diplomatic solution that preserves peace and security in our region. Mr. Chairman, the State of Kuwait reiterates our call for the international community to adopt meaningful measures to prompt Israel, the occupying power, to join, accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and to submit all of its facilities and nuclear activities to the IAEA Generalized Safeguards Arrangement. And this is necessary in order to provide for peace and stability, as well as to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. We stress the importance of the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone and a zone free of other WMDs in the Middle East, as well as the implementation of the resolution dating 1995. As part of our chairmanship duties of the Board of Governors for the 2026 to 2027 period, we have undertaken the necessary efforts in order to see to the implementation of the obligations in full. To conclude, states have an obligation to fulfill their commitments in order to provide for a nuclear-weapons-free world. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kuwait. Now I give the floor to distinguished permanent observer of policy.

At a time of profound instability, nuclear arsenals are being modernized and expanded. Nuclear rhetoric is becoming more pronounced, and deterrence continues to occupy a central place in security doctrines. Rather than strengthening international security, these trends exacerbate instability and perpetuate a situation in which peace hangs on the threat of catastrophic destruction. The continued existence of nuclear weapons remains one of the gravest threats to humanity. As Pope Leo XIV observes in Magnifica Humanitas, there is a widespread yet erroneous belief that nuclear deterrence is an indispensable prerequisite for security. A security architecture that relies on the credible threat of nuclear weapons use leaves humanity in a permanent state of vulnerability. The catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons transcend borders and generations, revealing the profound contradiction of seeking security through the threat of their use. Furthermore, integrating artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies into nuclear systems introduces additional risks, including shaping the conditions under which decisions of the gravest consequence are made. Effective, self-aware, and responsible human control and judgment must therefore always be maintained. Mr. Chair, the only lasting response to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons is their total elimination. While measures to reduce nuclear risks are necessary, they cannot substitute for disarmament. In this spirit, the Holy See calls upon all nuclear-armed states to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, pursuing concrete and verifiable progress towards nuclear disarmament in good faith. At the same time, the Holy See affirms its strong support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which significantly contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Based on the recognition of the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons, the TPNW provides a tangible commitment to their total elimination. As states parties prepare for the first review conference of the TPNW, the Holy See calls for renewed efforts towards its effective implementation and universalization and encourages all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify or accede to the treaty. The Holy See likewise renews its call for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and for the preservation of existing moratoria on nuclear testing. Mr. Chair, the deterioration of international security environment cannot justify deeper reliance on nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it makes it pursuit of their limitation all the more urgent. As Pope Pius XIV recently recalled, peace is not a balance of power, but through dialogue and justice. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Holy See. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Mr. Chair, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, The risk of use of nuclear weapons is at its highest in decades. We are alarmed by this evolution and by the lack of an urgent and focused collective response from the international community. This is the reason why the International Committee of the Red Cross has decided to speak on the cluster on nuclear weapons of the First Committee for the very first time. While nuclear disarmament is a collective duty, a particular responsibility lies with States possessing nuclear weapons and States associated with nuclear weapons. Instead, that what we see today is accelerated modernization of arsenals, increasing prominence of nuclear weapon in security policies, doctrinal shift lowering the threshold of use, expanded nuclear sharing, and extended deterrence arrangement, and to change national legislation in non-nuclear weapon states to allow stationing or transit of nuclear weapons. For the ICRC, the only effective response to this dangerous trend is to put the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons back at the heart of all debates and decisions related to nuclear weapons. In this regard, the ICRC welcomed the establishment by the UNGA of the Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War and the decision of the World Health Assembly to update the WHO reports on health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons. We urge States to vote in favour of this resolution dealing with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. And it is for this reason also that the ICRC, along with the rest of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, actively support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The failure, again, of the NPT Review Conference to adopt a consensus outcome document only emphasizes the need for states to persist with even a greater determination in their nuclear disarmament efforts. In this regard, the first review conference of the TPNW this December provides the international community an important opportunity to work toward nuclear disarmament this year, despite the difficult circumstances. We urge all states to participate in the review conference and support the implementation and universalization of the treaty. As the President of the ICRC recalled, complete nuclear disarmament remains a moral and legal imperative to prevent

I thank the distinguished representative of International Committee of the Red Cross. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Nigeria aligns itself with the statement delivered by NAM and that of the African Group, and we have the following remark in our national capacity. Nigeria remains deeply concerned by the continued existence and modernization of nuclear arsenals, heightening geopolitical tension and the growing risk of nuclear confrontation. We reaffirm that the total, irreversible, and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use. The failure of the 11th Review Conference of the NPT held in May 2026 to achieve a consensus outcome for the third consecutive time is deeply regrettable. The persistent impasse underscore the urgent need for renewed political will, particularly among nuclear weapons states, to fulfill their obligation under Article VI of the treaty and ensure balanced implementation of the three mutually reinforcing pillars. Nigeria remains strong support for the TPNW as a vital complement to the NPT, and we look forward to the first review conference scheduled for 30th November to 4th December 2020 under the presidency of South Africa. Nigeria equally call for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the commencement of negotiation of full-scale material cut treaty, and concrete time ban measure toward nuclear disarmament. We further emphasize that nuclear risk reduction measures, while important, are not a substitute for disarmament. In this regard, we underscore the imperative of maintaining meaningful human control and judgment over nuclear weapon systems, particularly in the face of emerging risks associated with artificial intelligence. As a party to the Treaty of Pelindaba, Nigeria reaffirmed the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zone and support the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. We equally upheld the inalienable right of states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and recognize the central role of the IAEA in advancing nuclear science and technology for sustainable development. Mr. Chair, Nigeria reiterates that catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons demand urgent collective action. We call upon all states, particularly nuclear weapons states, to demonstrate genuine commitment to their disarmament obligation and work toward a world free of nuclear weapons in the interest of present and future generations. And thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria. We have just heard the last speaker on the cluster of nuclear weapons. Total 104 delegations made the statements this year, compared to 106 statement last year. Distinguished delegates, the committee will now take up the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction. As decided at its organized meeting, The committee will hear a statement in the right of reply at the end of the meeting. We have a long list of speakers for the cluster, so I appeal for the full cooperation of all delegations in respecting the time limit to enable the committee to avoid falling behind the schedule. With this, the first speaker on the list for this cluster is the distinguished representative of Indonesia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The full statement of this statement will be submitted to the Secretariat. Mr. Chair, I'm honored to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Non-fulfillment of the commitments and obligations assumed under the relevant international illegal binding instrument, especially on weapons of mass destruction, continues to pose threats to global peace and security. NAAM takes note of the complete destruction of all declared chemical weapon stockpiles and commends the work of the OPCW in this regard. The NAAM State Parties to the CWC express their appreciation for the recent positive developments regarding the Syrian chemical weapons file. We also welcome the broad recognition by the delegations of the Executive Council at its 110th session of the constructive cooperation and engagement demonstrated by the Syrian Arab Republic, including the provision of all necessary facilitation, such as granting unrestricted access to information and suspected sites to enable the destruction of the remnants of the chemical programme of the Assad era. Non-State Parties to the CWC reiterate their call on developed countries to promote international cooperation for the benefit of State Parties through the transfer of technology, material, and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field, and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. Non-State Parties to the CWC attach high importance to the OPCW and emphasize the importance of consensus in the decision-making process on matters of substance. Mr. Chair, Non-State Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention recognize that the lack of a verification system continues to pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the Convention. They continue to call for the resumption of multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory, legally binding protocol dealing with all articles of the convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner to sustainably strengthen the convention, including through verification measures. They welcome the 9th BWC Review Conference's establishment of the working group on the strengthening of the convention, including its mandate on compliance and verification. They reiterated their commitment to work towards establishing a mechanism to facilitate and support international cooperation and assistance under Article 10. In the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004, NAM underlines the need to ensure that any action by the Security Council do not undermine the UN Charter, existing multilateral treaties on WMD, and the role of the General Assembly. NAMM cautions against the continuing practice of the Security Council to utilize its authority to define legislative requirements for member states. The issue of acquisition of WMD by non-state actors should be addressed in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner by the GA. Namuri affirms the need to prevent the emergence of new types of WMD, as those weapons require a comprehensive ban, and therefore support the necessity of monitoring the situation and pursuing international action as required. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Lao PDR, Speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation, ASEAN.

Mr. Chair, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of ASEAN. ASEAN aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of NAM. The full statement will be made available on e-statements. Mr. Chair, recognizing the threat and dangers of the existence and use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, ASEAN continue to call for universal adherence to applicable international legal instruments prohibiting these weapons. ASEAN reaffirms its unequivocal commitment to upholding the international norms against the existence and use, and reiterates its support for the UN Secretary General's agenda for disarmament, including its emphasis on ensuring respect for norms against chemical and biological weapons, which concerns the interests of all humanity. ASEAN remains fully committed to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or BWC, recognizing the necessity of multilateral negotiations and noting the absence of a verification mechanism, which continues to challenge the convention's effectiveness. We express our continued support for the BWC working group on strengthening the convention. We also place great importance on enhancing international cooperation, assistance, and exchanges in toxins, biological agents, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes. ASEAN likewise reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention that has verifiably eliminated undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles under strict international supervision. We recognize the importance of strengthening efforts to address current and emerging global challenges related to chemical security and chemical disarmament. ASEAN strongly believes that the international community should strengthen international cooperation and assistance in chemical safety and security, including through enhanced engagement with industry players as well as with the network of ASEAN chemical, biological, and radiological, or CBR, defense experts. ASEAN also comments and reaffirms its full support to the OPCW to carry out its mandated work in complementarity with the work of the United Nations. We urge the few remaining states not yet party to the convention to accede without delay to achieve its universality. We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons or toxic chemicals as a biological weapon, and radiological weapons, anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances. Mr. Chair, at the regional level, cooperation among the ASEAN CBRN network continues to deepen. Since its launch in 2019, the network has grown from a network of 35 to 58 nominated experts across all three CBR domain in 2025. Supported by its dedicated secure web portal, the network facilitates information sharing, technical workshops and tabletop exercises on harmonized sampling and analysis, interpretation of mass spectra and investigation of CBR incidents. This effort significantly enhanced regional preparedness, cooperation and coordination in response to CBR threats. In conclusion, let me reiterate ASEAN's firm commitment to the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and stress the importance of enhanced international support for state parties in need of assistance to build national capacity for the implementation of treaties related to weapons of mass destruction. in accordance with national and international law and the UN Charter. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Lao PDR, speaking on behalf of ASEAN. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation, speaking on behalf of a group of countries.

Mr. Chairman, we, the Algerian Republic, the Arab Republic of Algeria, Burkina Faso, the State of Eritrea, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kyrgyz Republic, the People's Republic of China, the multinational state of Bolivia, Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Burundi, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Mali, the Republic of Niger, the Republic of Nicaragua, the of Tajikistan, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the Russian Federation, the Central African Republic, reaffirm our dedication to protecting humanity from chemical and biological warfare. We recognize the common interest of all humankind in completely excluding the possibility of the use of chemical, bacteriological, biological, and toxin weapons. Convinced that such use would run counter to the conscience of and be repugnant to the conscience of humankind, we are determined to condemn any use of toxic chemicals, biological agents, or toxins as weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time, and to hold accountable those responsible for any such use. We underscore that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling of Bacteriological, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpilling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, and the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of War and Asphyxiating, Poisonous, and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the Geneva Protocol, are essential for international peace and security. We reaffirm that under all circumstances, the use Development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological, biological, toxin, and chemical weapons are prohibited under Article I of the BWC and Article I of the CWC. We urge all States Parties to the BWC and CWC as a priority to comply with all of their obligations pursuant to these conventions and to abide by the understanding agreed upon by the review conferences of the States Parties to the conventions. We note efforts by the UN Secretary-General and Secretariat, as well as national initiatives, to provide relevant training to experts that could support the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. At the same time, we recognize that there have been developments in the field of science and technology related to the UNSGM and that the situation relating to the CWC, BWC, and Geneva Protocol regimes, including new challenges and threats such as chemical and biological terrorism, have changed since the establishment of the UNSGM in 1987 and the endorsement of its technical guidelines and procedures in 1990. Therefore, we are convinced that there is need to intensify efforts of the international community with support from the UN Secretary to strengthen the expert and technical capabilities of the UNSGM Particular attention should be paid to the UNSGM guidelines and procedures document A/44/561, which have not been updated with the exception of the technical appendices. Few of their points were revised in 2007 since the endorsement by the UN General Assembly resolution A/45/57C dated 14 November 2007. or December 1990, we reiterate that according to section G of the above-mentioned guidelines and procedures, the UN Secretary-General should periodically review, with the assistance of his appointed expert consultants, bearing in mind modifications proposed by member states, the technical guidelines and procedures contained in Annex 1 to the 1989 report of the Secretary-General, and to revise them as necessary for submission to the General Assembly. The microphone has been cut off.

I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation speaking on behalf of a group of countries. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of France, speaking on behalf of a G7 global partnership.

Mr.

Chairman, France this year holds the chairmanship of the G7 Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this capacity, I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the 31 members of the Partnership. Since its creation in 2002 at Canada's initiative, the G7 Global Partnership has established itself as a tool in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN. and threats. It played a central role in the efforts that led to the dismantling of the former Soviet Union's programs in the 2000s, the Libyan programs between 2004 and 2016, and the destruction of the chemical weapons declared by the Assad regime between 2013 and 2015. These major initiatives demonstrate the G7 global partnership's contribution to international security. Today, the G7 partnership plays an unrivaled role as a platform for international cooperation. It enables the implementation of concrete projects, bringing together member states, partner countries, specialized international organizations such as IAEA and the OPCW, and project leaders such as Interpol, UNODA, the European Union, and many others. The G7 global partnership is renewing its activities to adapt to the international context. On one front, it continues to address persistent challenges such as combating biological threats in Africa. On another, the partnership has launched new initiatives to respond to current crises. Three examples. Firstly, the Ukraine CBRN Information Sharing Initiative. This coordinates assistance in response to these threats in Ukraine. Secondly, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Impact Initiative. This aims to anticipate and counter threats linked to emerging technologies. Thirdly, an initiative to combat disinformation on weapons of mass destruction. This because disinformation undermines trust and consequently the standards of our non-proliferation architecture and its norms. The total value of projects funded by G7 Global Partnership since its inception stands at $25 billion. Our efforts go unabated. In 2025, 344 projects representing over $3 billion were implemented in 158 countries. Two-thirds of this funding benefits emerging or developing countries. International cooperation is an essential element in the fight against proliferation. The members of the G7 Global Partnership consequently reaffirmed their desire to see the establishment of an adequately funded mechanism for international cooperation and assistance under the auspices of the Biological Weapons Convention. Such a mechanism is currently lacking in the biological field. Without cooperation, there can be no collective security. It is for this reason that the countries of the G7 Global Partnership are deeply committed to this joint action. We invite all states that share this same goal to contribute to our efforts. Chair, I thank you.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative to the conference on disarmament of France, speaking on behalf of the G7 Global Partnership. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the European Union, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member states. North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino align themselves with this statement. The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery remains a grave and real threat. The EU remains firmly committed to preventing the proliferation or use of chemical and biological weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances. Our priority is to uphold, strengthen and fully implement the Biological and Chemical Conventions and ensure accountability for any violations. Chair, the EU remains seriously concerned by Russia's established record of breaches of the CWC, including the use of Novichok nerve agent against Alexei Navalny. Based on analysis of samples, the governments of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom have confirmed that he was poisoned and that this poisoning was highly likely the cause of his death. We are appalled by Russia's refusal to engage in good faith and address the legitimate international concerns under the Convention. Impunity for the use of chemical weapons must not and will not be tolerated. We strongly condemn Russia's widespread use of riot control agents as a method of warfare and toxic chemical agents against Ukrainian soldiers, with over 14,000 cases reported. Russia must provide credible responses to the legitimate concerns raised under the Convention and fully comply with all its obligations. The EU welcomes the continued cooperation of the Syrian authorities with the OPCW and the progress made in addressing the chemical weapons dossier inherited from the former regime and underlined by the reports of the OPCW Director-General. We encourage Syria to continue fulfilling all its obligations under the CWC in cooperation with OPCW and with the support of international partners. Chair, the EU continues to actively engage in the BWC Working Group on strengthening the BWC with an aim to ensure its successful conclusion by December. We underline the importance of a balanced and meaningful outcome that strengthens all relevant aspects of the Convention, while making the BWC fit for the challenges presented by scientific advances and technologies. We also support creating an OEWG to develop a verification regime for the Convention. Sustainability of any future mechanism is a key factor for states, in particular developing countries, to benefit from their establishment. We condemn the deliberate use of disinformation, including false allegations concerning biological weapons programs, which undermines trust, politicizes technical discussions, and obstructs international cooperation to address genuine biological threats. The EU also reiterates its strong and long-standing support for the UN SG mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, the only existing independent international instrument for investigating alleged use of biological weapons. The EU reaffirms the importance of the resolution 1540 and also continues to support the HCOC as an important transparency and confidence-building measure. as well as effective multilateral export control to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The full version of this statement will be available online. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union. Speaking on behalf of the EU and its member states, now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, Italy fully aligns itself with the statement just delivered by the European Union. I will make some additional remarks in my national capacity. The rapid development of emerging technologies and artificial intelligence in particular is profoundly transforming the landscape of weapons of mass destruction. While offering enormous opportunities for peaceful development, these technologies can also lower barriers to sensitive knowledge and materials and create new pathways for the development, proliferation, and potential use of weapons of mass destruction, including by non-state actors and terrorist networks. Against this evolving background, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention remain indispensable pillars of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Their universalization and full and effective implementation are more important than ever. Chair, unlike the CWC, the BWC is not supported by a fully fledged international organization. This makes the process launched by the Ninth Review Conference in 2022 to strengthen the Convention particularly important. After four years of substantive discussions, we now have a real opportunity to translate this work into concrete results, including through the establishment of an international cooperation and assistance mechanism and a science and technology review mechanism. This would strengthen the Convention's institutional framework and its capacity to respond to a rapidly changing scientific and technological environment. Italy will continue to fully support the Chair and all States Parties in the final phase of this process. We hope that when the Working Group meets again in December, political will and flexibility will allow us to reach consensus and deliver tangible results. Italy remains equally committed to the CWC and the OPCW. We condemn any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, and under any circumstances. Italy welcomes the constructive cooperation between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the new Syrian authorities in addressing the chemical weapons dossier inherited from the Assad regime. The consensus decision by the OPCW Executive Council last July to reinstate Syria's rights and privileges reflects the progress achieved through this renewed cooperation. At the same time, we remain deeply concerned about violation of the CWC in connection with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has confirmed the presence of the riot control agent CS in samples collected on the battlefield in Ukraine. We also reiterate our support for the Hague Code of Conduct as well as for the UN Secretary-General mechanism.

I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement. Next, I call on the distinguished representative of Egypt. You have the floor.

Chairperson,

I wish to highlight the following remarks. Egypt categorically rejects the use of chemical, biological, and other toxin weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances. We recognize also the emerging chemical and biological risks and the importance of stepping up existing efforts to anticipate, prevent, and respond in a timely and effective manner. Similar to chemical and biological weapons, which are prohibited under respective conventions, nuclear weapons, being the most consequential of weapons of mass destruction, must be prohibited and totally and irreversibly eliminated under effective international control. To ensure political and moral consistency and lack of double standards, when some member states call on other nations to accede to the other conventions of chemical and biological weapons, they also need to extend their attention to achieving the universality of the NPT, on calling upon its non-state parties, including in the Middle East, to join the Treaty as a matter of urgency. Mr. Chairperson, Egypt signed and ratified the NPT in good faith and implemented all its respective obligations under the Treaty, including adherence to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of the IAEA. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was made possible on the basis of the package, which included 1995 resolution on establishing the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, which remains unimplemented till now. Egypt calls for an immediate action to rectify the state of strategic imbalance in the Middle East. Egypt further rejects and condemns any use or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. In this regard, Egypt has consistently supported the implementation of international resolutions especially Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent acquisition by or diversion to non-state actors, including terrorist groups. Finally, and while not being a state party, we continue to follow with interest the discussions in the context of BWC's working group to strengthen the convention. We reiterate that efforts to respond to the use of chemical and biological weapons must not result in any undue restrictions. including through arbitrary and selective export control regimes, to the inherent right of countries to benefit from the application of peaceful uses, international cooperation, and technology transfer. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement. Next, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The global norm against biological and chemical weapons must be preserved. Any use of such weapons by any actor and under any circumstances is unacceptable and contrary to international law. Russia's use of toxic chemicals as a method of warfare in Ukraine is deeply concerning, as are its unfounded allegations concerning biological weapons programs. Such violations and efforts to undermine the conventions must have consequences. Norway fully supports the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat. Independent investigations, technical assistance and attribution mechanisms are indispensable to confidence in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the rules-based international order. Norway further welcomes the reinstatement of the rights and privileges of Syria under the CWC. At the same time, we remain concerned by allegations of chemical weapons use in Sudan and call for Sudan's full cooperation with the OPCW. Chair, as we approach the 2027 review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, strengthening the convention must remain a priority. At the working group's final session in December, Norway expects consensus on an ambitious and balanced package, including effective mechanisms for science and technology review and international cooperation and assistance, stronger implementation support, and an open-ended process on concrete compliance and verification measures. The outcome should provide a credible basis for decisions at the review conference. We must also preserve, strengthen, and adequately resource the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism as an independent and impartial instrument for investigating alleged uses of chemical and biological weapons. The international community needs credible, independent investigative tools, and the efforts to weaken them should be rejected. The Secretary General has full authority to review and update the mechanisms procedures if needed. We therefore see no need for a member state driven initiative to revise these procedures. Advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence offer major benefits that may also increase biological risks and proliferation challenges. Peaceful innovation must be accompanied by effective safeguards, responsible governance and international cooperation. Non-proliferation and peaceful cooperation are mutually reinforcing. Effective export controls prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction while facilitating legitimate scientific exchange and peaceful uses of technology. Chair, Norway will continue working with partners from all regions to strengthen both conventions and the norms protecting us from biological and chemical weapons. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Azerbaijan. You have the floor.

The conventions prohibiting biological and chemical weapons constitute a vital component of the

global arms control framework, reflecting a collective commitment to opposing the most abhorrent forms of warfare. Advanced in the biological and chemical sciences, coupled with developments in AI and synthetic biology, are creating a novel risk that are emerging faster than government frameworks can address them. Preventing misuse while ensuring equitable access, particularly for developing countries, required cooperation, especially in advancing scientific progress. The Zabolons'ville established petrochemical industry enables us to contribute actively to international frame cooperation on the peaceful application of chemical technology. We recognize the organization for prohibition of chemical weapons as a vital platform for advancing this cooperation and support an expanded role for the technical secretariat in capacity building. Azerbaijan has consistently engaged with the OPCW by hosting respective conferences, making a voluntary contribution to the OPC Trust Fund for training, and supporting training initiatives at the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology. We remain firmly committed to advancing the goal of complete chemical and biological disarmament. under the CWC and BWC, respectively, and actively support efforts to universalize this convention. The destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles declared by States Parties was a historic milestone. Nevertheless, we must ensure that the OPCW remains equipped to address rapid advancement in chemical science and technology.

Mr. Chair, by fully restoring sovereignty over its territories from foreign occupation, Azerbaijan strengthened border control, thereby

reducing the risk of illicit trafficking in components of weapons of mass destruction, an effort aligned with the Convention's objectives. To conclude, Mr. Chair, we remain committed to tackling current and emerging challenges in this field through closer international cooperation and by ensuring that scientific and technological advances contribute to the security and well-being of peoples. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Azerbaijan for his statement. Next, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Armenia. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, Armenia remains committed to the full and effective implementation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention, BWC. The government of Armenia has continuously worked to enhance its national capacities in the area of biological safety and security. We recognize that rapid advances in biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies present both opportunities and challenges. In this context, we support strengthening the BWC's implementation mechanisms and promoting greater cooperation among states parties, scientific community, and relevant international organizations. Armenia highly values its partnership with the OPCW and remains committed to contributing constructively to the organization's work. Our commitment was further demonstrated this year through Armenia's voluntary contribution to OPCW activities. including support for the joint OPCW-BWC Implementation Support Unit workshop on policy and diplomacy for scientists and activities related to the OPCW's work in Syria. Armenia considers such cooperation especially valuable for strengthening national expertise, promoting responsible scientific practices, and ensuring that advances in chemistry and biotechnology are directed toward peaceful purposes. Mr. Chair, We consider the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation as an important confidence building and transparency instrument contributing to international peace and security. As a subscribing state, Armenia remains committed to the objectives and principles of the code and has consistently fulfilled its commitments, including through the timely submission of annual declarations. Armenia believes that greater Universalization and effective implementation of the code can contribute to the increased transparency, confidence building, and responsible behavior in the area of ballistic missiles activities. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Armenia. Next, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka. You have the floor.

Yeah, my delegation aligns itself with the statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, and I would like to add the following remarks in our national capacity. The international security environment remains deeply concerning, with conflicts and heightened tensions continuing to affect international peace and security. Against this backdrop, Sri Lanka believes that our aspiration to see a world free of all weapons of mass destruction is more urgent than ever. My delegation attaches great importance to strengthening the international, legal and institutional framework governing these weapons. Mr. Chair, Sri Lanka stands for the full, effective, universal and non-discriminatory implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We welcome the continued work of the OPCW towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons Sri Lanka supports the efforts of the OPCW to strengthen chemical safety and security and to develop best practices in this area. We regret that the last two Review Conferences of the OPCW ended without consensus outcomes. We urge States Parties to find their way back to common ground and to continue to implement the Convention fully and without discrimination. Mr. Chair, My delegation views the Biological Weapons Convention as one of the important instruments of the international disarmament framework. Sri Lanka supports the negotiation of a legally binding verification regime that applies equally to all States Parties. Sri Lanka submits its annual confidence-building measures and views them as an important contribution to transparency. Our national inventory of dangerous pathogens, developed with the help of international partners. We also attach major importance to the peaceful uses of the life sciences. In keeping with Article 10 of the Convention, we encourage wider international cooperation and assistance so that developing countries can build the capacities needed to benefit from those advances. Mr. Chair, Security Council resolution 1540 remains an important part of international efforts to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. As preparations advance for the 2027 comprehensive review, the process should be transparent and take into account the differing circumstances and implementation capacities of developing countries. The complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction requires our steadfast cooperation. We owe that effort to present and future generations. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nepal. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Nepal Alliance itself, with this statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Amidst escalating geopolitical tensions and protracted armed conflicts, the threats posed by chemical, biological, and radiological weapons remain a serious concern for international peace and security.

Despite established

international norms, challenges persist regarding compliance, verification, misuse of emerging technologies, and the potential acquisition of such weapons by non-state actors. These challenges underscore the urgency for renewed political commitment, sustained international cooperation, and effective implementation of disarmament obligations. Mr. Chair, as a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, Nepal remains firmly committed to their universalization, full and effective implementation. Nepal neither possesses nor develops, manufactures, imports or exports weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, and has no intention of doing so. We unequivocally oppose the use of chemical and biological weapons under any circumstances. The verified destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles under the CWC represents a landmark achievement in multilateral disarmament. It, safeguarding this achievement, demands sustained vigilance, credible verification, effective compliance and accountability. Nepal recognized the important role of the OPCW in resolving outstanding chemical weapons-related issues through cooperation and verification. We equally emphasize facilitating access to chemical materials, equipment and technologies for exclusively peaceful purposes, particularly in developing countries. Mr. Chair, the BWC remains indispensable to preventing the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. We support efforts to strengthen the convention and welcome the work of the working group on strengthening the convention in this regard. Pending the establishment of a verification mechanism, Nepal calls for meaningful multilateral negotiations to adopt a legally binding protocol dealing with all articles of the convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Technical assistance, capacity building, and scientific cooperation for peaceful purposes remain essential for developing countries, particularly LDCs and LLDCs. Nepal supports sustained multilateral efforts to address the threat posed by radiological weapons and strengthen the security of radioactive materials. In closing, Mr. Chair, preventing the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction is both a legal obligation and a shared responsibility to protect humanity from their devastating consequences. Our commitment must be reflected not only in the strength of international norms, but also in our resolve to uphold them. Nepal remains steadfast in its commitment to advancing disarmament and strengthening international cooperation towards a world free from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nepal for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr Chairman. The resolution 1540 of the Security Council remains the cornerstone to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We underscore that this resolution complements export control regimes, and we call for the strengthening of the resolution, as well as for its effective implementation at a national level. Argentina has actively participated in regional workshops on this issue and has updated its national export control framework and the framework for proliferation financing. We once again underscore the work done by the Security Against Proliferation Initiative. The last meeting thereof was held in Buenos Aires. Argentina reaffirms its ironclad commitment to the Convention on Chemical Weapons, CWC, and the Convention on Biological Weapons, the BTWC. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical or biological weapons by any actor, anywhere, and under any circumstance. Turning now to the Convention on Chemical Weapons, we support the work of the OPCW. At a national level, the National Authority for the CWC, ANCAC, has co-organized advanced courses in responses to chemical emergencies, this across Latin America and the Caribbean. We've also organized regional exercises on chemical terrorism in the reporting period. In the biological domain, we reiterate the importance of the Convention as the first treaty which prohibits a complete category of weapons of mass destruction. We support the strengthening of the Convention, as well as its universalization and its effective implementation. This includes scientific and cooperation for peaceful purposes. As the first country of Latin America to host a maximum biological containment laboratory that is biosafety level 4, we reaffirm the importance of the peaceful uses of this technology. Chair, current challenges including the convergence of emerging technologies, the risk of terrorism and geopolitical tensions. demand strengthened international cooperation. Argentina will continue to contribute to these efforts with a constructive spirit. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for his statement. Next, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of India. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair. The use of chemical weapons can never be justified. India supports the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of CWC. We reiterate the importance of impartial, objective investigation of any alleged use to establish facts and reach evidence-based conclusions with full respect for the delicate balance of authority and responsibility embedded within the Convention. We support proposals for adapting the CWC verification regime to make it for the future, taking into account S&T developments, including emergence of new chemicals and growing posed by non-state actors. Chair, in December 2025, India hosted an international conference in New Delhi to mark the 50th anniversary of the BWC. focused on the standing biosecurity for the global south. Over 80 countries from the global south took part. The conference highlighted that critical gaps in the health infrastructure across the global south are not only developmental, but shared global security risk. It also demonstrated India's capacity in biosecurity and public health and underline the role of global South must play in shaping the convention next 50 years. In the ongoing BWC working group, India has stressed the need to enhance compliance, establish a structured review of the relevant science and technology developments, and more importantly, promote international cooperation and assistance. We also underline that convention financial health must be enforced and it must be on a stable, predictable footing. Chair, terrorism remains a major challenge to international security. India is deeply concerned about the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists and non-state actors. Since 2002, India has tabled a resolution titled Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction. We encourage all Member States to remain vigilant about the transfer of dual-use and sensitive technology, particularly to those with a record of proliferation or linked to terrorism. I thank you, sir.

I thank the distinguished Member of Parliament of India for his statement. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative for Disarmament Treaty Phase, China. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Upholding the vision of building a community with a shared future of mankind, China will promote the comprehensive, balanced, and effective implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The BWC is the cornerstone of the global biosafety and biosecurity system. It is essential for the working group on strengthening the convention to agree on a final report by consensus and submit it to the 10th review conference, which would be of great significance for the global biosafety and biosecurity and the future development of the convention. China supports the working group to continue in-depth discussions, bridge differences, and develop as soon as possible a package of arrangements, including compliance and verification, international cooperation and assistance, and scientific and technological development et cetera, with a view to strengthening the convention comprehensively and ensuring the equal participation and benefits for all states parties. Mr. Chair, China advocates resolving chemical weapons related hotspot issues through dialogue and consultation. We support the OPCW executive, the Technical Secretariat carry out work strictly in accordance with the authorization of the CWC to prevent OPCW from further politicizing and leading to division and confrontation among the States Parties. The chemical weapons abandoned by Japan, JACWs, have become the greatest real obstacle to the realization of a world free of chemical weapons. The destruction of JACWs must be a top priority for the implementation of the CWC. In September this year, a delegation of the OPCW Executive Council and the newly appointed Director General visited the JACWs disposal facilities in Huijun Harbin and Dunhua in China and witnessed on site the real dangers of these weapons and the urgency of their destruction. It is hoped that the OPCW would devote more resources to the destruction of JCWs and that the international community will continue to monitor the destruction of the JCWs. This year marks the 81st anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people's war of resistance against the Japanese aggression and the world anti-fascist war and the 80th anniversary of the But the JCW's still pose threats to the Chinese people and the environment. The destruction plan adopted by the OPCW has suffered four extensions of deadlines. This is entirely due to insufficient attention and inadequate input from Japan, which lead to a serious delay. China once again urges Japan to face up to its historic responsibility and resolve the scourge of the JSW at an early date. My full text of this statement will be made online. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. I now give the floor to the permanent representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Thank you, Chair. In addition to the statement delivered by the EU, I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Chair, Excellencies and Distinguished Delegates, Preventing the proliferation or use of chemical and biological weapons is our shared responsibility. As the host state of the OPCW, the Kingdom of the Netherlands actively supports the prohibition of the possession and use of chemical weapons as laid down in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Chair, We are seriously concerned by Russia's widespread use of chemical weapons. These actions form a clear pattern and include the use of riot control agents against Ukrainian soldiers and the use of the choking agent chloropicrin on the frontlines in Ukraine. In addition, there is Russia's repeated use of highly toxic nerve agents in poisoning of individuals. In a joint statement in February this year, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom conclusively confirmed the presence of a lethal neurotoxin in the body of Mr. Alexei Navalny at the time of his death in 2024 while held in a Russian prison. All of these incidents are serious breaches of the CWC. Until now, Russia has not provided a credible response. Instead, it resorts to a campaign of denial, distortion and disinformation. On the other hand, we are pleased to see that the situation regarding the chemical weapons programme in Syria under the Assad regime has improved remarkably, thanks to the close cooperation between Syria and the OPCW. We commend these efforts, which have recently led to the first verified destruction of chemical weapons since 2014. We encourage the Syrian authorities to continue on this path towards full compliance with the Convention. Chair, the Nelans emphasizes the importance of attribution. Holding perpetrators of chemical weapons use accountable and delivering justice to victims is our priority. We cannot allow impunity to undermine the global norm enshrined in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Chair, the Biological Weapons Convention has been of utmost importance in preventing the spread of bioweapons for more than 50 years. To ensure it remains fit for purpose, we are committed to the efforts of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention. The Netherlands will continue its efforts as friend of the Chair to take forward the topic of compliance and verification. I thank you for giving me the floor.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, Malaysia associates itself with the statements delivered on behalf of NAM and ASEAN.

True security remains unattainable, whilst any category of weapons of mass destruction continues to threaten humanity. Malaysia therefore reaffirms that the complete elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons represents the only absolute guarantee against their use. Malaysia reaffirms its steadfast commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention. As an active OPCW Executive Council member for the 2024-2026 term.

And through the work of our national authority, we uphold robust national implementation while maintaining.

Strict oversight over compliance and security. In cooperation with the OPCW, Malaysia co-hosted a pilot Article VI verification course in Kuala Lumpur in April 2026, bringing together 33 participants from 11 Asian State Parties to strengthen national implementation, industrial compliance and inspection preparedness. We reiterate our unwavering support for the OPCW in carrying out its mandate with independence, impartiality and professionalism. Those who violate the global norm against chemical weapons must be held accountable.

On Syria, Malaysia welcomes the progress achieved through continued cooperation between the Syrian authorities.

And the OPCW Technical Secretariat, including the verified destruction of chemical munitions in August 2026. We encourage sustained cooperation towards addressing all outstanding issues and ensuring the complete and verified elimination of any remaining chemical weapons and related materials. Mr. Chair, on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Malaysia reiterates the importance of strengthening the Convention, including through the development of an effective verification mechanism. Building on deliberations from the Working Group's ninth session in Geneva in August 2026, we encourage State Parties to.

Continue constructive discussions towards strengthening compliance, transparency, and confidence in the implementation of the Convention.

Malaysia also underscores the importance of strengthening national implementation measures in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention.

In line with.

Article 10, Malaysia reaffirms the importance of international cooperation and assistance in the peaceful uses of biological science and technology.

Including through capacity building and the exchange of knowledge and expertise. Such cooperation should be promoted in a manner consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Convention.

In conclusion, Malaysia reaffirms its commitment to a world free of weapons of mass destruction.

We must act with urgency and resolve, uphold multilateralism, and ensure the pursuit of lasting peace and security prevails over the threat of catastrophe.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland. You have the floor.

Chair, Ireland aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, and we remain steadfastly committed in our support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and their effective operationalization. Chair, Russia's continuing and systematic use of riot control agents as a method of warfare against Ukraine and their lack of engagement with the legitimate concerns of states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention corrodes the norm that it established and is utterly unacceptable. The poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent in 2020 and the finding that he was further poisoned by epibatidine while in Russian custody, likely leading to his death, are also instructive. This pattern of use highlights a total lack of regard for the convention and makes Russia wholly unfit for membership of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Chair, the OPCW oversaw the destruction of category three chemical weapons in Syria in August 2026, representing a critical juncture after years of obfuscation under the Assad regime. Ireland commends the OPCW's impartial expertise and work conducted under challenging circumstances. as well as the sustained cooperation between the technical secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic. We welcome the OPCW Executive Council's decision in July 2026 to reinstate the rights and privileges of Syria under the Convention and, as always, stress the need to ensure that all chemicals prohibited by the Convention are verifiably and irreversibly destroyed. Chair, the Biological Weapons Convention entered into force 51 years ago. It is essential that more progress be made to develop the structures of the Convention to make it fit to address the threats of today. Through the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention, States can enable the BWC to respond to challenges posed by scientific and technological advancements. Ireland firmly supports the operationalization of mechanisms on science and technology reviews and international cooperation and assistance. Enhanced compliance and verification also remain paramount. Ireland urges the successful completion of the group's work by the end of this year. Ireland also reiterates its support for the UN Secretary-General's mechanism on UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Chair, multilateral export control regimes play a critical role in preventing the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. These regimes offer guidance to states, enhance transparency, and promote best practices in reducing WMD proliferation risks. This is all the more important at a time of rapid technological development. They do so without impeding economic development or posing obstacles to legitimate trade. Ireland firmly rejects narratives that seek to delegitimize these crucial non-proliferation efforts. Chair, Ireland urges the handful of States not parties to the CWC and BWC to ratify or accede to them without delay. We also call on all States to uphold their international obligations and commitments under the conventions and to work constructively to strengthen them for the benefit of all humanity. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, the full text of my statement will be distributed electronically. The BWC is one of the pillars of international security, which has prohibited a whole category of WMDs. The Russian Federation, as a depository state of the BWC, fully and comprehensively complies with the provisions thereof. At the same time, certain countries continue to pursue military and biological activity which runs accounted to the convention. There have been no responses to the questions put forward by the Russian Federation in connection with the implementation and violation of the BWC, the military -- the political program in Ukraine with support from the U.S. This is particularly striking and reflects the need to develop a universal, legally binding, non-discriminatory protocol to the convention with effective verification mechanism for its implementation, as well as stringent compliance by states parties with obligations under the convention at the national level. We intend to continue to undertake steps strengthen the BWC, including through the specific working group. Russia's initiatives include the establishment of mobile medical biological units, the establishment of a scientific and technological and consultative committee, fine-tuning confidence-building measures, establishing an investigative mechanism into alleged instances of violations, as it is needed to strengthen the Secretary-General's mechanism to investigate instances of possible use of chemical, biological weapons. And the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, in 2023, submitted to the Secretary General, Mr. Guterres, a call to organize a review of the principles and procedures of this mechanism. And this call was a voice, the same call was voiced in the joint statement today from the group of states, and we expect that the Secretary General will act accordingly. The Russian Federation is undertaking efforts to comprehensively strengthen the CWC. A key challenge for this treaty is the exceedingly politicized nature of its operations, organization of the prohibition of chemical weapons with Western countries have transformed into a cudgel of political pressure for the achievement of their geopolitical agendas. Imposition in violation of the provisions of the attribution has resulted in significant divide. This is something which they're trying to make universal in nature, and the West is stepping up efforts to discredit inconvenient states through baseless allegations. Real violations are being completely disregarded, and this is fraught with resulting erosion of the chemical nonproliferation regime. The Russian Federation, as a conscientious participant in the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons shall continue to undertake all possible measures in order to prevent politicization of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by Western states, and will continue to cooperate with all States Parties to the CWC in order to restore at the OPCW the spirit of consensus. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. Next, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Philippines. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The Philippines aligns itself with the statements delivered by ASEAN and NAM. The Philippines reaffirms its commitment to upholding and strengthening global governance against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation. In this regard, we reiterate our full support for the universalization and full and effective implementation of the BWC and CWC, as well as the work of the OPCW. No ambition or context can justify the use of weapons that destroy indiscriminately, causing humane suffering and widespread destruction, and produce irreparable environmental harm. Weapons of mass destruction pose an existential threat to humanity, and the danger is further amplified once they are acquired by non-state actors or terrorists. At the national level, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, We continue to enhance and reinforce our legal and regulatory frameworks. The Philippines established Strategic Trade Management Office, which implements the country's relevant nonproliferation obligations, including maintaining robust strategic trade controls. We have also issued our CBRN National Action Plan, which focuses on building and strengthening national capacities to mitigate and counter CBRN risks. We enacted their Chemical Weapons Prohibition Act last year, which criminalizes the use, financing, and cross-border transfer of scheduled toxic chemicals and precursors. In our region, the Philippines continues to bridge norm building with capacity building. As host to the CBRN Center of Excellence in Southeast Asia in Manila, We actively collaborate with regional and international partners to mitigate emerging CBRN risks and strengthening regional capacities, including by hosting a CBRN summit in Manila in 2024. We look forward to the upcoming conference of the States Parties to the CWC in November, the meeting of States Parties to the BWC in December, and the 10th BWC Review Conference next year, which provide an opportunity to review the implementation of these instruments and advance international cooperation. We likewise welcome the ongoing work of the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC. Finally, Chair, we champion the right of states to the peaceful uses of biotechnology and chemistry in support of sustainable development. In this regard, we reiterate the urgent need to establish effective mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance, as well as the institutionalization of the assessment of scientific and technological developments under the BWC. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines. Next, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa. You have the floor.

South Africa aligns with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. We underline the importance of achieving the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and we call upon states that are not yet party to the convention to sign and ratify it and to join the OPCW. South Africa continues to support the OPCW as the only technically competent international authority in the field of chemical weapons. We urge all States Parties to redouble their efforts towards cultivating a culture of consensus in the work of the Organization and restore an environment of cooperation and mutual agreement. We encourage the OPCW Secretariat to work closely with the States Parties and continue providing appropriate, tailor-made assistance and technical support to enhance their national capacities in carrying out the national implementation measures. The full implementation of Article 11 in order to strengthen and accelerate the economic and technological development of States Parties remains essential. South Africa underlines the importance of the Africa Programme remaining a component of international cooperation and assistance program and welcomes the ongoing consultations concerning the conceptualization of the eighth phase of the Africa program and looks forward to its launch. We reiterate the importance of having the OPCW designated laboratories in all regions and appreciate efforts of the technical secretariat to assist the laboratories in obtaining their designation. Chairperson, the biological convention remains key to the maintenance of international peace and security by preventing the threat posed by biological weapons. South Africa regrets that the ninth BWC review conference did not agree on a substantive outcome. However, we welcome the decision by the conference to establish a working group open to all states parties to develop specific measures, including possible legally binding measures that could include recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the convention. We believe that the voluntary guidelines are important to assist with the implementation of the convention through practical operationalization efforts. South Africa attaches great importance to the Secretary General's mechanism to establish the facts regarding alleged chemical or biological weapon incidents and to report results. We consider the legal situation of the mechanism to be and unambiguous. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for her statement. Now, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, The heightening of geopolitical tensions combined with strategic competition and rapid scientific advantages are placing the global disarmament and arms control architecture to the test. Switzerland reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention. These instruments are critical pillars of disarmament and nonproliferation, which we must both preserve and strengthen. Turning to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Switzerland welcomes the measures undertaken by the Syrian authorities to strengthen their cooperation with OPCW, which have facilitated significant progress in the verified destruction of chemical aerial bombs originating from the former Syrian government's chemical weapons program. We encourage continued cooperation and the resolution of all outstanding issues, and welcome the Executive Council's decision to restore Syria's rights and privileges under the Convention. We affirm the importance of investigating credible allegations of chemical weapons use, establishing the facts, that those responsible are held to account in accordance with international standards. Turning to the Biological Weapons Convention, we welcome progress made to date by the Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention. We encourage States Parties to address all outstanding issues before the conclusion of its work and subsequently to translate its outcomes into concrete measures at the 2027 Review Conference. We attribute particular importance to establishing a mechanism to systematically review scientific and technological developments and their implications for the Convention, as well as to strengthen international cooperation and assistance. We will continue to actively contribute to these discussions. Turning to the Biological Weapons Convention, does not have a verification mechanism. Switzerland deems it essential to advance work towards establishing a dedicated verification mechanism in order to ensure compliance with the obligations under the convention. We hope that states parties will be able to agree on such a mandate. Rapid scientific and technological advances, particularly the convergence of chemistry and biology, require increased vigilance. in order to ensure that scientific progress is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Switzerland stands ready to contribute its scientific and technical expertise towards this goal. Mr. Chairman, upholding the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons requires beyond more than robust norms. This requires sustained political will as well as respect for and strengthening of existing institutions and mechanisms. We will continue to work constructively with all states on these essential pillars of disarmament and nonproliferation. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for her statement. next I call on the distinguished representative of Mexico. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My country reaffirms its categorical repudiation of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical and biological weapons. Their prohibition constitutes a fundamental issue in international law. Their prohibition must be preserved without exceptions. No circumstances can justify the use of these weapons, nor the impunity of those who do resort to them. In terms of biological weapons, Mexico recognizes the progress achieved over the more than five decades since the entry into force of the BTWC. However, the strengthening of this convention is a task that must continue, particularly in view of The breakneck speed of scientific and technological progress, the absence of a comprehensive compliance and verification mechanism remains one of our primary challenges. Consequently, Mexico actively participated in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC, including as a friend of the chair. We did that in order to drive forward discussions on this issue. The 10th Review Conference must constitute a turning point. Mexico Advocates for the establishment of an open-ended working group with a clear mandate to develop concrete compliance and verification measures, including possibly legally binding measures. Chair, in terms of chemical weapons, Mexico condemns in the strongest possible terms their use under any circumstance and by any actor. We express concern at the reports from the OPCW regarding the presence of anti-riot agents in Ukrainian war zones. These reports must have full clarity brought to them through objective, independent and technically rigorous investigations in accordance with the Convention mechanisms. Regarding Syria, we recognize recent progress in cooperation with OPCW. We encourage Syrian authorities to continue bringing full transparency to its former chemical program in its entirety, including as yet incomplete verification and destruction activities. In Mexico's view, it is vital to preserve the independence, impartiality, and technical nature of the OPCW, avoiding political polarization from hampering its mandate. Moreover, we here warn that AI and other emerging technologies present new opportunities. However, they do also present risks of proliferation and misuse. These require multilateral attention. The prohibition of these weapons cannot be limited to simple declarative commitments. The prohibition must ultimately translate into effective mechanisms for prevention, compliance, and verification. Thank you.

The distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement. now call on the distinguished representative of Portugal. You have the floor.

Chair, Portugal aligns with the EU statement and wishes to make a few remarks in its national capacity. We reaffirm our commitment to the universalization and full implementation of the BTWC and the CWC. Chair, Portugal wishes to highlight three points. First, On the biological side, we remain committed to the work of the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC. We will continue to actively contribute to achieving a successful outcome in December 2026. The establishment of an international cooperation and assistance mechanism would represent an important step towards strengthening the implementation of Article 10. Equally important is the establishment of a science and technology advisory mechanism capable of providing states parties with scientific and technological advice on developments relevant to the convention, including their implications for compliance and possible verification measures. Second, on the chemical side, Portugal reiterates its strong support for the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat, whose credible and impartial work remains essential to the effective implementation of the CWC. Portugal also welcomes the renewed cooperation between the OPCW and the Syrian authorities, as well as the positive results achieved. Third. Stronger cooperation in these domains and a more systematic integration of disarmament activities in development partnership is needed. In the biological domain, please let me highlight the Simboloso initiative, focused on strengthening biosecurity and biosafety in the countries of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries. In the chemical domain, Portugal actively supported a memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the community of Portuguese-speaking countries, which aims at the full implementation of the Convention in the Lusophone space. Furthermore, Portugal actively contributes with national expertise to regional workshops on the implementation of the BTWC and to training courses under the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism. Chair, we firmly believe that to strengthen national capacities, mutual trust and collective preparedness are essential to building a safer, more resilient and more secure world for all. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for his statement. Next, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of New Zealand. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. New Zealand is unwavering in opposing the development, possession, and use of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. These indiscriminate and inhumane means and methods of warfare have no place in the modern world. The comprehensive legal prohibitions on biological and chemical weapons are hard-won but towering achievements. Despite the CWC's overall success, we are faced with mounting indications of new use of chemical weapons. We are gravely concerned by reports of Russia's use of riot control agents and other chemical substances in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Three technical assistance visits by the OPCW Technical Secretariat have confirmed the presence of riot control agents as a method of warfare, which the Convention strictly prohibits. We have also seen deeply troubling allegations of the systematic use of more toxic substances such as chloropicrin. We welcome the Secretariat providing training and equipment to Ukraine, which will build its capacity to respond to potential chemical weapons attacks, including in evidence handling and preservation. This is critical to informing national investigations and contributing towards broader attribution of these attacks in due course. We are increasingly persuaded that the use of chemical weapons against Ukraine is part of an escalating pattern, which has involved poisonings of Yulia and Sergei Skripal, and the deaths of Dawn Sturgess and Alexei Navalny. We condemn Russia's actions in the strongest terms, and call on Russia to cease its use of chemical weapons, comply fully with its obligations, and cooperate transparently with the OPCW. Chair, New Zealand commends the Syrian interim authorities on their decision to work with the international community to eliminate remaining chemical weapons in Syria once and for all. We note the cooperation of the interim authorities with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to ensure full and verified destruction of all chemical weapons and related infrastructure, and urge them to continue doing so. New Zealand welcomed the continuing work in the context of the BWC to strengthen it in the face of rapid scientific and technological advances. We need to ensure that the Convention is fully equipped to meet the challenges of the next 50 years. New Zealand will continue to advocate for the universalization and strengthening of the CWC and BWC. We remain committed to achieving a world free from weapons of mass destruction.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for her statement. I shall now call on delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I will begin by first giving the floor to delegations who are unable to exercise their right of reply or their right to a second intervention last Friday due to time constraints. I now call on the representative of the DPRK for the second intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The DPRK delegation is going to exercise right of reply to clarify our position. The root cause of instability of the Korean Peninsula lies in hostile military activities of the United States and its following state, like ROK. The military exercises which are being carried out without any space gap through the whole year in front of the doorstep of the nuclear weapon state escalate military situation of the region to the extreme level. Recent global geopolitical crisis and complicated international events remind us the very clear fact. All military maneuvers of the field warfare troops to be conducted by the enemy states assume no distinction between the defense and attack, training and actual warfare. In addition, the ROK is not frantically engaging in military provocations against the DPRK at its southern border. The hostile states should never try to test our patience. will and capability. We seriously warn the ROK against the reckless acts of aggravating the situation by constantly threatening the border security of the DPRK and the safety of our service personnel. Explicitly speaking, we do not say empty words about the protection of our sovereignty. As a responsible nuclear weapons state, the DPRK will fulfill its responsible obligations for the sake of national security, regional stability, and global peace. Thank you.

I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation for the second intervention.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before exercising our right to reply, we wish to take the floor as a point of order. We wish to put forward a clarifying question about how we will organize this right to reply. Do we understand correctly that first we will exhaust opportunities for right to reply which have remained from Friday and subsequently in accordance with the decision 34/401, we will have a right of reply segment in connection with the conclusion of cluster one of the thematic debate on nuclear disarmament. And subsequently, there will be a separate segment for exercising right of reply and concluding the first meeting on cluster two. other forms of weapons of mass destruction. Because in subsection F of decision 34/401, right of reply, this section explicitly states in paragraph 9 that the number of statements in exercising right of reply for each delegation on one agenda item, and we stress under one agenda item, are limited to two statements during the course of one meeting. Our delegation needs to, we demand that there be full compliance with this decision. We request that you provide the explanation in connection with 34/401. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. We will first hear, to your response, we will first hear rights of reply from Friday. Regarding rights of reply for the day, each delegation is entitled to two statements, first and then a second intervention. For more clarity, I recognize the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your clarification. However, the decision 34/401 regarding right of reply refers not to the end of the day, but rather refers to specific agenda items. And when it comes to the end of the day, this pertains to every individual agenda item. Today, during today's, this present meeting, we considered two agenda items. And for each of those two agenda items, In accordance with paragraph 9 of Decision 34/401, every delegation in exercising right of reply should be granted the floor to make two statements during the course of this one meeting for each of those two agenda items. That is a decision of the General Assembly. We did not revise that. Therefore, it remains fully in force. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, we would like to request that opportunity be given to each delegation that wishes to do so in accordance with this decision 34/401 to to be granted the opportunity to speak twice for each of the agenda items, namely for cluster one, nuclear weapons, and cluster two, other forms of WMDs. Furthermore, in accordance with established practice, this precise decision is what we have always adhered to here, and this includes last year, the year before last, and the year before that one. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I will now give the floor to the secretariat for further clarification. You have the floor.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, perhaps I should mention that each main committee decides how it will conduct its work. And at its organizational meeting, the first committee decided how it will proceed. The length of statements, you know that, you already know that it took a while for the committee to decide on its program of work. My understanding is that a non-paper was circulated to all delegations a few weeks ago in terms of how the committee will conduct its work. And in that non-paper and in a decision taken at its organizational meeting, I quote the exact decision taken. Statements in the exercise of the right of reply should not exceed four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second. These statements shall continue to be heard at the end of each meeting or at the end of the day if two meetings are scheduled for that given day. For the thematic discussions, statements in the right of reply will be exercised at the end of each day." End of quote. The delegation of the Russian Federation has correctly pointed out the practice of past years. However, as I also mentioned, it's you, committee members, who decide how you'd like to conduct your session for a specific year. And you did that at the organizational meeting. And I just read the decision that you have taken. With specific reference to the query on the item, the GA decision, and this is reflected in the rules of procedure. It is true that it says that the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two per item. But that rule also says that the first intervention should be limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention should be limited to five minutes. So it's for you as the committee to decide the length of statements. It's for you to decide whether you would hear rights of reply after the clusters, or if you would hear the right of reply at the end of the meeting or at the end of the day. And I've just read the decision that you took at the organizational meeting on how to manage the rights of reply. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the secretariat for the clarification. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are grateful to the Secretariat for the explanation that was provided. And first of all, we should like to state that the decision that was taken by the Committee during the organizational meeting by no means runs counter to the decision 34/401. It merely supplements it as a limitation on the duration of statements under right of reply. And at the same time, the decision, namely decision 34/401, remains in force where it's explicitly set out in paragraph 8 and 9 as right of reply needs to be exercised and applied during the meeting. For this reason, a decision taken during the organizational meeting supplements decision 34/401, especially in light of the fact that the decision that we took during the organizational meeting mentioned nothing about agenda items. Furthermore, the decision that we took during the organizational meeting is fully in accordance with similar decisions during previous years, which also were part of 34/401 and complemented that. And in accordance with that practice that had been implemented in previous years where such decisions of the organizational session were supplemented by decision 34/401, the right to reply always was granted at the end of each thematic cluster. Insofar as this constitutes a separate agenda item, for this reason, we believe that we need to fully comply with those decisions that were taken both at the organizational meeting and before at the General Assembly of the United Nations. And consequently, to comply with the practice that had been embraced in previous years, namely for the right to over apply to be provided twice for each agenda item and specifically for each of the thematic clusters which we are discussing. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, chair. My main concern is that we have been operating in this committee rather effectively and efficiently under the stewardship of you and your colleagues on the bureau. We are getting into a rather circular debate here, which I think detracts from the debates that we want to have on substance. I will give you an example of why this could be a difficult debate. In the same decision that the Russian delegation is mentioning, decision 31/401, paragraph 22 says that chairmen of main committees should fully exercise their authority under rule 106 of the rules of procedure and, in particular, propose more frequently the limitation of the time to be allowed to speakers or of the number of times each representative may speak on any given item. I think I would urge the Russian delegation to trust in the Bureau and our chair people the effective running of this committee, which has been running effectively in the view of my delegation for the last two weeks and I hope will continue to do so for the coming two weeks. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. Now I call on the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for the second intervention. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman. Once again, we are compelled to exercise, to have a point of order in order to clarify procedures of granting rights of reply. And this is because our delegation does not deem it possible to revise preceding practice and decisions of the General Assembly, especially in light of the fact that there have been no additional decisions to revise these decisions under right of reply, no such decisions have been taken. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, we would like to request that clarification be provided and for the decisions taken by the General Assembly to be adhered to and for the decisions taken during the organizational meeting of the First Committee to also be complied with. And we reiterate the question, do we understand correctly that we will be granted under right of reply granted two opportunities to deliver statements in connection with conclusion of cluster one, nuclear weapons, and cluster two, two opportunities to speak in connection with the conclusion of a first meeting under cluster two, other forms of WMDs. We believe that the Bureau cannot revise such decisions in light of the fact that they were taken by member states And I refer to decision 34/401. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. Regarding the right of reply for the day, each delegation is entitled to two statements, first intervention plus second intervention for the entire meeting. I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation for the second intervention. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, once again, we have been compelled to take the floor on a point of order insofar as the explanations that have been provided by yourself on counter to decision 34/401, specifically paragraph 9 of this decision. And the Bureau does not have the right to change the content of these decisions. These are this decision, decision 34/401 with the in addition to the decision that was taken during the organizational meeting are fully enforced. One does not strike out the other. Therefore, we would like to request that decision 34/401 be complied with, paragraph nine of this decision to be complied with, and for opportunities to be given to all interested delegations to speak twice during exercise of right of reply under each agenda item. In accordance with established practice, in accordance with those decisions of the General Assembly that were taken and adopted previously. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are counting on your assistance in upholding our right.

Once again, I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. In light of the time, limitation I conclude that the Bureau will consult and revert back to you in respect to the right of reply we will hear from the Russian Federation followed by the Netherlands followed by the Republic of Korea and Iran at our next and Japan. They will be heard as the first speakers to exercise their right of reply at our next meeting. The Committee will convene tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. in this conference room to continue the thematic discussion under the cluster of other weapons of mass destruction. The meeting is adjourned.