First Committee, 7th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 81st session

Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues. The seventh meeting of the Determined and International Security Committee of the 81st sessions of the General Assembly is called to order. Distinguished delegates, the committee will continue this afternoon. with its general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items allocated to it. We will now turn to our list of speakers for today. And I urge all delegations taking the floor to kindly keep in mind the suggested time limit for the statements. With this, I would like to give the floor to the Distinguished Permanent Representative of El Salvador.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Allow me to first extend my congratulations to you for having been elected to chair the work of the First Committee for this session. You and the other members of the Bureau can count on the support of the Salvadoran delegation in order to successfully conclude our work. Chair, our full statement will be available on the e-delegates platform. Allow me to also point something out. In 2025, world military expenditure broke a record, almost $3 trillion. This is the 11th consecutive year of growth. This contrasts with the growing needs for resources when it comes to peace, development, and international cooperation. For El Salvador, security cannot be only understood in merely military terms. It requires investing in prevention, development, solid institutions, and well-being for our populations, Chair. Complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament continues to be a pending matter. My country regrets that the 11th Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons once again wrapped up without reaching consensus in terms of substantive results. But I would like to be clear that the lack of results in consecutive cycles of review should lead us to redouble our efforts and not to diminish our expectations. We reaffirm the importance of finding a balance between the three pillars of the Treaty, and the right that all States have to development, research and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and on the basis of applicable safeguards. As a State Party of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, we consider that the first review conference is an opportunity to move towards its universalization and keep at the heart of our deliberations the devastating humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons. We reiterate our support to the Treaty for the complete ban of nuclear testing, and we call upon States whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force to adopt necessary measures without greater delay. We also reaffirm the value of nuclear weapons-free zones. This is inspired on the historic experience of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Caribbean. Chair, we welcome the holding of the ninth biennial meeting on the Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was held in June of this year. This allowed us to review challenges when it comes to the implementation of the plan of action and the international tracing instrument. We, on the other hand, reiterate are concerned over the challenges that the Convention on the provision of landmines and rollbacks in universalization efforts. These weapons continue causing death injury and suffering long after conflicts are over. And this disproportionately affects civilian populations and has social and economic consequences that can last for generations. As a member of the Committee on Assistance to the Victims of the Convention, El Salvador promotes a rights-based focus that ensures services and inclusive policies. And our country held the regional dialogue on assistance to victims bringing together states, survivors organizations and people living with disabilities as well as specialists from our region. Chair, advances in science and technology demand that this committee pay greater attention to implications for international peace and security, AI, quantum technologies, Autonomous systems and other emerging capabilities offer important opportunities for development, there is no doubt about that, but their integration in military applications and weapon systems also creates legal, humanitarian, ethical, and security risks that we should address collectively. El Salvador considers that it is indispensable to preserve the judgment, agency, and control of human beings over decisions related to the use of force. paying attention to the ethical, moral and humanitarian implications of these issues. Chair. 2026. In this year, we have begun a new stage in multilateral diplomacy on ICT safety With the launch of the Global Mechanism on progress on ICTs in the context of international security, after the organizational session in March, the Mechanism held its first substantive plenary in July and will continue to work with the first meetings of its dedicated thematic groups, which will be held in December. For El Salvador, it is an honor and an important responsibility to exercise the presidency of the first biennium 2026-2027 of the aforementioned mechanism. My country's commitment is contributing to consolidate a standing, inclusive, and results-oriented process that preserves the consensus that we have that promotes the application of the framework for responsible behavior and that responds to the needs of all member states, especially when it comes to capacity building for developing countries. This responsibility also reflects our conviction, Chair, that small countries and developing countries can also substantively contribute to seeking consensus and to strengthening multilateralism. We hope that other delegations will continue to support us in setting the stage for this important mechanism. Many of you have worked on it for several years already. Finally, Chair, we reaffirm the importance of full, equal, significant and effective participation for women, as well as greater participation of youth in disarmament and international security processes. We also recognize the contributions coming from civil society, academia, the technical community and think tanks. Their knowledge and experience enrich our deliberations. There is no doubt about that. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of El Salvador. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey.

Mr. Chair, allow me to congratulate you on your election. I assure you of my delegation's full support. Ongoing conflicts, rising geopolitical tensions have further strengthened an already fragile international environment. Effective multilateralism is more important than ever. Turkey remains firmly committed to the international law and UN charter and supports a more responsive and effective UN. The war in Ukraine continues to have profound implications for international peace and security. As illegal and illegitimate attacks on civilian vessels causing loss of life in the Black Sea continue, reaching a deal that ensures the safety of navigation in the region is becoming increasingly urgent. We reiterate our strong support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence, and reaffirm our commitment to bringing an end to the war through dialogue and diplomacy. We also continue to support IAEA's efforts to advance nuclear safety and security at all Ukrainian nuclear power plants, particularly at Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl site. The situation in Gaza and the broader Middle East remains a source of grave concern. Turkey reiterates the imperative of full respect for international law and international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, and unhindered humanitarian assistance. A lasting peace can only be achieved through a just, lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the relevant UN resolutions and in accordance with the international law and on the basis of two-state solution. Mr. Chair, support for global arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation efforts is one of the principal pillars of Turkish foreign policy. We remain committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal, reducing nuclear risk, building confidence, and enhancing transparency remain critical. These efforts complement rather than substitute meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the essential foundation for pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Even though an outcome document of the 11th NPT RevCon was not agreed upon despite intensive efforts, NPT's credibility and role in the global nonproliferation regime remains indispensable. Turkey has always worked constructively for success of the RevCon, both at national level and also through cross-regional groups as NPTI. Turkey remains fully committed to the implementation of NPT across its three mutually reinforcing pillars, including concrete progress under Article VI towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We highly value its close cooperation with IAEA across all areas within the agency's mandate and reaffirm its strong support for its indispensable role in safeguards, nuclear safety and security, as well as in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As this year marks the 30th anniversary of CTBT, Turkey regards the treaty as another important cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We will continue to encourage all States, in particular the remaining Annex II States whose ratifications are required for the entry into force of the treaty, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. This year, we also witnessed the termination of the New START Treaty without a follow-on arrangement. We encourage continued and meaningful dialogue among nuclear-weapon States, with a view to promoting predictability and strategic stability. Recent developments in the Middle East have further underscored the importance of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as agreed in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed in the 2010 Action Plan. Turkey calls for intensifying international efforts in close engagement with regional partners to implement this long-standing commitment without further delay. Turkey has closely monitored developments regarding Iran's nuclear facilities in all its aspects. The IAEA should discharge its safeguards responsibilities under the NPT Safeguards Agreement at the declared nuclear facilities and verify the status of these facilities and associated nuclear material. In this framework, we once again underline the nuclear facilities should never be target of military operations and their safety and security should not be compromised. A lasting and credible solution with regards to Iran's nuclear program should juxtapose both Iran's legitimate right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the NPT and, at the same time, effective and unhindered IAEA verification to respond to the proliferation concerns. We will continue to encourage all relevant parties accordingly. We will also remain seriously concerned by the continued development of the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the DPRK, which have expanded since last year. We call for the resumption of meaningful dialogue and negotiations towards the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Turkey welcomes the adoption by consensus of the resolution to close Syria's nuclear file at the September session of IAEA Board of Governance, which has been on the board's agenda for 15 years. We believe that Syria's commitment to its obligations under the NPT and CSA with the Agency, as well as its increased cooperation with the Agency, will further contribute to regional security. We also welcome the reinstatement of Syria's rights and privileges at the OPCW and renewed cooperation between Syrian authorities and the Organisation, as well as Syria's accession to the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. Turkey attaches high priority to strengthening international cooperation in the field conventional weapons and promoting greater responsibility and transparency in international arms transfer. We remain firmly committed to the fight against terrorism and to strengthening international cooperation in this field. We urge all relevant stakeholders to take concrete and effective measures to prevent the diversion of arms, ammunition, and related materials to terrorist organizations and other unauthorized recipients. Turkey maintains a policy of zero tolerance towards proliferation in all its forms. We also attach great importance to preventing proliferation of WMD, as well as their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-state actors, which is a great threat to the international peace and stability. The rapid evolution of the expansion of military applications, emerging technologies, particularly AI, and laws are increasingly gaining strategic importance. Maintaining meaningful human control together with accountability, transparency and international legal responsibility of states remains a core priority for Turkey. We welcome adoption by consensus of the final report of GGA, which contains a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures. CCW, with its technical expertise, remains the appropriate forum for continuing our collective work on laws in the next mandate cycle. Turkey remains ready to contribute in our shared effort towards a safer, more secure, and more stable international environment. Full text of our statement is available on the website. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Yemen.

Sayed Rais.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to take this opportunity, first and foremost, to congratulate you upon your election to the helm of the First Committee. We wish to assure you of our cooperation and our full support as we seek to achieve success in our work. We align ourselves with the statements delivered by Libya on behalf of the Arab Group. We wish to reiterate our commitment to the purposes and the principles of disarmament, international security, as well as nuclear nonproliferation. These weapons pose a threat to international and regional safety and security. We support all initiatives which are geared towards limiting proliferation of these weapons, chief among which is the establishment of a nuclear weapons and WMD-free zone in the Middle East. This session coincides with the 30th anniversary of the extension of the NPT, an open-ended extension which reflects the importance of the treaties being sustained and for sustained efforts to be undertaken for implementation thereof. We deeply regret the failure of the 11th Review Conference of the NPT and the inability to arrive at a final document for the third consecutive time after the failures of 2015 and 2022. We call for strengthening the spirit of multilateralism for a world free of nuclear weapons in order to protect succeeding generations. We wish to underscore the importance of the role played by the agreements to create a nuclear weapons-free zones. In this context, we reiterated that strengthening stability in the Near East and preventing an arms race requires that all states in the region, including Israel, that they accede to the NPT. and to place all of their nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards agreement, as well as for there to be participation and meetings of United Nations Conference for the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East. In this context, we welcome the conduct of six sessions of the UN Conference on the Establishment of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones and free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs, and we welcome resolutions which emanated From said conferences, we are keen to participate, to see all states participate under the chairmanship of the Sultanate of Oman next November. I now turn to SALW. We wish to reiterate the importance of a full and complete implementation of the United Nations Action Plan, specifically in combating the scourge of these weapons, preventing these weapons from falling into the hands of armed militias and armed terrorists and terrorist groups. Turning to cybersecurity, we emphasize the importance of supporting international cooperation in order to to enhance the security of the CPT to strengthen state security in the face of attempts at destabilization as well as support to undertaken to least developed countries to address the issues and in this regard last September we signed the United Nations convention to fight against cyber crime turning to the situation in Yemen. And this is an important example when it comes to addressing the AI and the presence of weapons, armed conflict, and regional and international security. The endless flow of sophisticated Iranian weapons falling to the hands of Houthi terrorist groups specifically ballistic missiles, drones, and marine objects, not only have prolonged the conflict, but they have also contributed to extend the resulting spillover into neighboring states and neighboring maritime pathways, the security of these maritime pathways is not just a question of Yemen or regional issue, but this is of international importance. There is a need to prohibit the delivery or the use of weapons with military capabilities and threatening maritime navigation or blackmailing the international community. In a grave development, the Houthi militias have been using cruise missiles with thermal systems, and these systems have been following air corridors that have been used by civilian aircraft, which may target -- any aircraft may be targeted without distinction as to civilian or military aircraft. These issues have not been limited to the delivery of weapons. So to the Houthis, we are also talking about the development of on-ground operations, training initiatives for armed elements, the establishment of workshops, bringing a weapons assembly workshops, as well as the the management of extremely sophisticated trafficking networks with the use of capabilities, the Revolutionary Guards who are working directly in areas under Houthi control. We call upon the international community to undertake measures to prevent the transfer of these weapons and to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as to ensure accountability for perpetrators, specifically for Iran. We wish to reaffirm the fact that the Yemeni establishing its capabilities over its soil is necessary for lasting peace. Authentic peace can only be achieved, cannot be achieved when an armed group continues to dispute a state's exclusive right to take decisions related to war and peace, or the use of, when it uses weapons or missiles as it seeks to threaten neighboring civilian efforts of the Yemen to Republic in addressing state issues and sovereignty is not merely a national consideration. Naturally, this is linked to security of the region, maritime safety and security, and the freedom of navigation. And this is also related to the prohibition, the need to prevent these terrorist groups from destabilizing the region. We wish to reiterate our intention to cooperate with you in a constructive manner. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Yemen. And now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Portugal. Sorry, distinguished permanent representative of Peru.

Mr. Chair. Peru joins the main elements of the statement delivered by Uruguay on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Mr. Chair, We are meeting in a scenario that is characterized by persistent conflicts, geopolitical tensions and growing mistrust. In the face of this, we must strengthen multilateral disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation mechanisms, I would like to refer to four priority issues for Peru. The elimination of nuclear weapons, challenges for regional security, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the challenges posed by technological progress. First, the total elimination of nuclear weapons continues to be a priority for Peru. Their use would have humanitarian and environmental consequences that would be catastrophic. As we move toward their elimination, we should reduce the risks of use, promote transparency, and strengthen negative security assurances. The 11th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty concluded this year without consensus on a substantive result. This does not take away from the relevance of the treaty or its obligations. On the contrary, it means preserving existing commitments to move forward in their commitments, including Article VI, and keeping pathways for dialogue open. In Latin America and the Caribbean, we understand the value of regional commitments. The Tlatelolco Treaty established the first nuclear-weapons-free zone in the first nuclear weapons-free zone in a highly populated region. Faithful to that tradition, Peru reiterates its support to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to a world free from these weapons, in a way that is irreversible, verifiable and transparent. The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons feeds organized transnational crime, one of the main threats for Peru's security. Facing this requires strengthening national controls, preventing the diversion of weapons or munitions, as well as deepening international cooperation. And in these efforts, The UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, UNLURAC, which is headquartered in Lima, plays a key role. It was created in 1986 and it provides technical assistance, legal support, advisory, and a space for regional dialogue. Every year, Peru hosts, on behalf of GRULAC, a resolution that recognizes its contribution to regional peace and security, and its work is upheld through voluntary and substantive contributions from countries such as Canada, Germany, the United States, Panama, and of course, Peru. We therefore staunchly support ONLURAC and the continuity of its operations in Lima, and we call upon the international community to increase its political and financial support in order to ensure the sustainability of its work. Third, Mr. Chair, Peru reaffirms the in NPT to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the basis of their international obligations. Nuclear sciences and technologies offer opportunities for development when it comes to health, agriculture, food security, and the management of water resources. We should ensure that its benefits are accessible for all, especially for developing countries. Fourth, Technological progress require collective responses and a people centered kind of governance. Artificial intelligence offers major opportunities. However, its development and uses should be underpinned by accountability, supervision and transparency. The launch this year of the Global Mechanism on progress on ICTs in the context of international security offers a standing forum for dialogue. And in this vein, Peru will support an inclusive process that beefs up the implementation of international law, norms for responsible behavior, CBMs, and capacity building. regarding autonomous weapon systems, we should ensure that they are compatible with IHL. Peru supports the establishment of legally binding international norms and the preservation of human control over the use of force. Finally, Chair, disarmament cannot continue to be a promise deferred. Let us recall the legacy of former Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who recalls Latin America and the Caribbean's contributions to peace and multilateralism. And inspired by that tradition, Peru reaffirms its commitment, increasingly more firm, to disarmament, nonproliferation, and strengthening the United Nations in order to benefit peace and to safeguard humanity. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Peru. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Portugal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Portugal aligns with the EU statement, but would like to add a few remarks in our national capacity. Allow me to start by congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election. I'm happy to see you presiding this committee. The committee is in good hands, and I wish you all the best and all the luck in this. You can count with a constructive posture from Portugal during the session. Portugal would like to underline three points. The first is our collective diagnosis of the disarmament and nonproliferation landscape must be balanced. It is easy to be the fittest, and pessimistic when trust between countries seems to be eroding and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric seems to be on the rise. Only a few months ago, we were unfortunately unable to agree on an outcome during the NPT Review Conference. But there are also good news that we often forget about. On the diplomatic front this year, there have been at least three important agreements. Here in New York, during BMS-9, we agreed on an outcome on small arms and light weapons. In Laos, we agreed on an outcome on cluster munitions. And in Geneva, we agreed on an outcome on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Furthermore, from the beginning of this year, we also reached an important milestone. This is the longest period without a nuclear test explosion in many years. To be clear, we acknowledge that the challenges to the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture are real, serious, and complex, but the international community should not minimize the positive developments which may inspire us to work harder and cooperate more. Second, international security is best sustained by international law and multilateral diplomacy rather than the law of force. Every country, large or small, benefits from the rules-based order. Every country, large or small, is less safe when fragmentation becomes the norm. So when challenges emerge, when obligations related to disarmament and nonproliferation are not respected, the law is our best safeguard. This is why Portugal has consistently called for the entry into force of the CTBT and the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Mr. Chair, the increasing challenges posed by artificial intelligence and the progress made in Geneva by the Group of Governmental Experts should also impel the international community to consider the adoption of a treaty on lethal autonomous weapons systems. And where binding treaties or voluntary norms are already in place, implementation, verification, and monitoring are key. This is why we remain deeply attached to the independent and impartial work carried out by international agencies, such as IAEA or the CTBTO. Third, the disarmament machinery must be forward-looking, modern, and fit for purpose. Our discussions cannot shy away from the impact that new and emerging technologies are already having on the military domain. Whether we talk about uncrewed systems like armed drones, about genetic engineering or synthetic biology, about 3D printing of small weapons or ammunitions, about electromagnetic devices for warfare, or the protection of undersea cables, it is undeniable that the threat landscape is changing. And while multilateral negotiations must remain intergovernmental, we must adapt our institutions to obtain greater input and expertise from the private sector and academia, for example, in the global mechanism on cybersecurity. Greater rationalization efforts and synergies between the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament, and the Disarmament Commission are essential in making the system function more efficiently. Mr. Chair, to conclude, Portugal hopes that in this committee session, we overcome polarization and recommit to a collective security system based on international law and multilateral diplomacy. In our view, this is the only way to ensuring that the arms control agenda remains relevant and effective, with the ultimate goal of making our countries safer. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Portugal. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Malta.

I thank you, Mr. President. Malta aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. President, we meet at a time when the disarmament and arms control architecture is under considerable strain. Malta believes that the First Committee must remain a forum for practical action to reduce the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction and to advance peace and security. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only effective guarantee against their use or threat of use. The continued existence and modernization of nuclear arsenals and increasingly dangerous nuclear rhetoric are deeply concerning. The expiration of New START has further weakened an already fragile arms control environment. Malta calls for renewed efforts towards meaningful, verifiable and irreversible reductions in nuclear arsenals and arms control arrangements to fill this gap. We remain committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the implementation of its three pillars. The lack of consensus at the 2026 NPT Review Conference must not become an excuse for inaction, but must strengthen our determination to preserve the integrity of the NPT and advance its objectives. As a State Party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Malta encourages States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. The forthcoming review conference in New York will provide an opportunity to strengthen implementation and reaffirm our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. In this context, Malta is proud to serve as the gender focal point for the TPNW. Over the past year, through engagement with states and civil society, Malta has worked to advance the guidelines on age and gender sensitive victim assistance. President Malta further reaffirms its strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and calls for its universalization and entry into force. We must preserve the norm against nuclear testing and strengthen its verification architecture. Emerging technologies are transforming the security environment. Malta stresses that meaningful human control must remain at the centre of decisions involving the use of force. We support efforts to strengthen the international framework governing conventional weapons and address emerging security challenges, including in cyberspace and outer space. Mr. Chair, in concluding, disarmament is ultimately about human security. We will continue working constructively to strengthen multilateralism, uphold international law, and advance a safer world for present and future generations. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Malta. And now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Vanuatu.

Mr. Chair. Allow me at the outset to congratulate you on your election as chair of the first committee. Wanna to extend its full support and cooperation to you and to the members of the Bureau as you undertake this important responsibility. We meet at a time of profound uncertainty in the international security environment. Armed conflicts continue to cause immense human suffering. while geopolitical tensions, strategic competition, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons continue to challenge the international peace and security. The erosion of trust among states is particularly concerning at a time when the international community needs stronger cooperation. We are witnessing increasing polarization and fragmentation. For small states, this is deeply troubling. Our security depends not on military strength, but on the strength of international law, multilateral institutions, and the collective commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes. For Vanuatu, therefore, disarmament and arms control are not abstract concepts. They are essential components of a rules-based international order in which all states, large and small, can enjoy security on an equal basis. For NATO remains concerned about the challenges facing the global disarmament machinery. The continuing inability of the international community to make meaningful progress in some areas of disarmament demonstrates that the machinery required renewed political commitment. The Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and other relevant mechanisms remain indispensable. Their effectiveness, however, depends upon political will, genuine dialogue and a willingness to move beyond entrenched positions. We should not allow institutional deadlock to become the permanent condition of international disarmament. For not to believe that the United Nations must remain at the center of global efforts to reduce the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and the emerging military technologies, we must strengthen confidence-building measures, transparency, accountability, and dialogue, while ensuring that the forces and security concerns of smaller and vulnerable states are not marginalized. Mr. Chair. We must pursue a world free of nuclear weapons. As a Pacific nation that knows the devastating humanitarian legacy of nuclear testing in our ocean, Vanuatu reaffirms that there can be no sustainable peace while nuclear weapons exist. We are proud to be a state party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established the South Pacific as a nuclear-free zone. We call on all States to comply with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to support the universality of the TPNW. Any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to international humanitarian law and to the UN Charter. We must address emerging asymmetric threats. Vanuatu is deeply concerned by the rapid development of autonomous weapons systems without meaningful human control. We support sustained multilateral dialogue to establish clear international norms and rules governing the development. deployment and use of autonomous weapons systems, including meaningful and human control over decisions to use lethal force. We are equally concerned by the increase of small arms and light weapons, which fuels insecurity in the region, and by the weaponization of new domains, including cyberspace and outer space. International law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, must apply fully in these domains. Mr. Chair, for seats such as Vanuatu, the international security agenda cannot be separated from the broader vulnerabilities that confront our societies. Our security is affected not only by conventional military threats, but also by climate change, sea level rise, natural disaster, transnational crime, maritime insecurity, and emerging technologies. These challenges can compound one another and place disproportionate burdens on countries with limited resources. The Pacific has long sought to maintain its region as an ocean of peace. We therefore have a profound interest in preventing the proliferation and illicit movement of weapons and in strengthening a culture of peaceful dispute settlement and cooperation. Vanuatu believes that a truly comprehensive understanding of international security must place human security, sustainable development, and protection of vulnerable states at its center. We call upon the international community to ensure that the disarmament agenda universal, inclusive, and responsive to the realities of all states. Let us, therefore, renew our commitment to multilateralism, international law, and the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In an increasingly uncertain world, our greatest strength is not the weapons we possess, but our collective ability to prevent conflict, build trust, and preserve peace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Vanuatu. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Brazil.

Mr. Chair, allow me to congratulate you and the Bureau on your election. You can count on Brazil's cooperation throughout this session. We meet amid deteriorating international security. Arms control agreements are eroding, military expenditures are expanding, and technological advances are creating new risks. Brazil believes that the collective security must be grounded in international law and the UN Charter, with cooperation prevailing over strategic competition. The nuclear domain illustrates these challenges. The expiration of the New START removed the last legally binding limits on the strategic arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers. Arsenal modernization, nuclear sharing, and extended deterrence arrangements further entrench nuclear weapons in security doctrines. Nuclear umbrellas offer no sustainable path to peace. The catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear war make elimination imperative. The failure of the 11th NPT Review Conference represents another serious setback. The indefinite extension of the treaty never legitimized indefinite nuclear possession. Commitments adopted in 1995, 2000, and 2010 remain valid, particularly under Article VI. NPT's credibility requires balanced implementation in its three pillars. Nuclear weapons states must undertake concrete, transparent, and verifiable disarmament measures. Risk reduction cannot substitute for disarmament. Brazil supports effective IAEA safeguards and the inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination. We oppose the use of force to enforce nonproliferation obligations and condemn armed attacks against nuclear facilities, which are contrary to international law. Brazil remains committed to strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones. As a party of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we support closer cooperation among zones. Brazil shared the group of qualified experts responsible for the comprehensive state study contained in document A/81/293. Together with Mexico, we will submit a draft resolution on this study and invite all delegations to support it. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, including through our presidency of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention, to enhance its effectiveness, implementation, and institutional framework. Brazil, therefore, urges all BWC States Parties to demonstrate the political will and flexibility necessary to achieve a successful outcome in December. Mr. Chair, On conventional disarmament, Brazil supports the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Global Framework on Ammunition, and cooperation against illicit trafficking and diversion. Humanitarian mine action, victim assistance, and civilian protection remain priorities. Emerging technologies demand urgent attention. Brazil welcomes the consensus report on the GGE on lethal autonomous weapons systems as a basis for negotiation, a legally binding instrument establishing prohibitions and restrictions, as jointly advocated by Secretary General and ICRC President. Human control must remain central to decisions involving force, including nuclear command and control. We expect the seventh review conference of the Convention on Certain Convention Weapons to adopt a mandate for negotiations of a protocol on loss based on GGE report. Brazil is equally concerned about an arms race in outer space. Its peaceful and sustainable use must be preserved for all, consistent with the Outer Space Treaty. The development and deployment of weapons in this global common threatens international security. Mr. Chair, global military expenditure approached $2.3 trillion in 2025, marking the 11th consecutive annual increases. While recognizing the legitimate security needs, Brazil stressed the contrast between expanding military budgets and unmet needs in poverty and education, sustainable development, and climate action. Disarmament and development must reinforce each other. Our collective security cannot rest on endless weapons accumulation in another tragic march of folly. Brazil will continue advocating inclusive, multilateral negotiations, international law, concrete disarmament, and reform of the UN disarmament machinery. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Brazil. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Panama.

Thank you very much Mr. chair Panama would like to congratulate you for assuming the chairmanship of this committee and we would like to greet members of the Bureau and ensure you that you have our delegation's full cooperation we joined the statements delivered by Indonesia and Uruguay on behalf of the non-aligned movement and see like respectively this committee begins its work in a moment that sees growing conflicts with a rise in military expenditure and a decrease in trust among states. It is paradoxical that while somehow we find resources to sustain growing military expenditure, there are difficulties to respond to the most pressing humanitarian needs and even fund the United Nations with the necessary resources to implement its mandates. It will be difficult to move toward disarmament if dialogue is seen as a concession and the accumulation of weaponry is seen as a security assurance. Events this year when it comes to nuclear files showcase the fragility of the international scenario. The 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation concluded without finding consensus for the final document. And the end of New START put The end of New START concluded the last bilateral treaty that established legally binding limits to nuclear arsenals between the US and the Russian Federation. This demands strengthening the international disarmament and nonproliferation architecture. The lack of consensus does not take away from the validity of international obligations, nor does it justify a delay in compliance. Panama recalls its support for the NPT and the balanced application of its three pillars, as well as its commitment to the TPNW. We would also like to underline the importance of the total nuclear test ban treaty entering into force and Concerns related to proliferation should be addressed through strict compliance of international obligations, application of verification mechanisms, and good faith negotiations. The use of force cannot substitute diplomacy, nor can it offer by itself lasting solutions. As a state party of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Panama highlights the contribution of nuclear weapons-free zones to international peace and security. This treaty will soon turn 60 years old and it constitutes one of the most important achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean when it comes to nuclear disarmament. It was the fruit of political will, dialogue and cooperation among states in the region. When it comes to non-proliferation, Panama believes that strengthening national capacities is especially important, as well as cooperation to prevent these WMDs from getting into the hands of non-state actors. And with that purpose, in July, we held a regional workshop on export controls that was jointly organized with Germany in order to strengthen the implementation of Resolution 1540 of the Security Council. Mr. Chair, allow me to refer to conventional weapons now. The illicit trafficking and diversion of conventional weapons threaten our societies directly. In Latin America and the Caribbean, these weapons and their munitions feed violence, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational organized crime, which has a high cost in terms of human lives every single year. An important quantity of the weapons that end up in the hands of criminal organizations come from and benefit providers that are outside of our region. This reality demands shared responsibility among producing states, exporters, and those that are affected by this through controls, traceability, strengthening national capacities, and greater cooperation to prevent the diversion towards illicit markets. To these challenges, we may add the risks posed by new technologies, including artificial intelligence in the military domain. Autonomous weapons systems pose serious questions about human intervention when it comes to decisions that can have irreversible consequences for the lives of people. Panama considers that no kind of technological progress should undermine compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, nor should it dilute human responsibility over decisions related to the use of force. Panama considers that it is critical to preserve effective human control, especially when it comes to target selection and attacks against certain targets. In that sense, we take note of gains made this year in the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts on Autonomous Weapon Systems, and we encourage the continuation of its work to move towards understandings that allow us to respond to the challenges posed by these technologies. Even when there are serious differences, there is broad recognition of the need to reduce risks for international security and continue moving forward when it comes to disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. For this, we must recover the capacity to listen to each other, not just hear each other, listen to each other, to negotiate despite our differences, and above all, to keep our agreements. First Committee should continue to be a space to move in that direction. Panama will continue supporting the work of this Committee with the determination of contributing to finding convergences that on the basis of international law and respect for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter will allow us to move towards a world that is safer and more peaceful. The full version of my statement has been uploaded to eDelegates. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Panama. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cote d'Ivoire.

Mr.

Chairman, my delegation would like to extend to you our warmest congratulations upon your election to the chairmanship of this committee, and we wish to assure you of our full cooperation in the conduct of our work. We align ourselves with the statements delivered by the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. In our national capacity, we wish to deliver the following remarks. Mr. Chairman, our work is being conducted at a time when the world is being buffeted by major uncertainty in terms of security-related issues. Before our very eyes, conflicts are overlapping and being prolonged, military expenditures are skyrocketing. Weapons arsenals are being modernized, and at the same time, collective mechanisms that had been built with assiduous efforts undertaken in order to curb an arms race are perilously starting to collapse. Force appears to be the most immediate means of addressing disputes and surmounting differences. at a time when our security has never been as interdependent as it presently stands. For this reason, we wish to reaffirm our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. The absence, for the third consecutive time, of a consensus-based outcome document following the NPT Review Conference and the expiration of the New START Treaty, which was the intent without any intended successor instrument, are alarming developments which serve as a reminder of the need to revert back to the path of dialogue and collective responsibility. We call for strengthening the NPT with its three pillars. We reiterate our support for the TPNW, and we remain profoundly committed to the and Daba Treaty, which reflects the historical will of the African continent not to possess nuclear weapons and also is a symbol of our contribution to collective security. We wish to reiterate our belief that 30 years after the opening for signature of the CTBT, its entry into force is more necessary now than ever before. This treaty has contributed to the establishment of a potent norm against nuclear tests and has facilitated the building of an international verification system whose value is largely recognized. We also have contributed to this verification architecture. We call for building upon these gains. and for the work that was done together in 1996 to be carried through. As we face insecurity and armed conflict in many regions, Africa is facing the perils of illicit circulation of SALW, terrorism, Armed violence, as well as transnational organized crime in Western Africa, in particular, these phenomena are overlapping, generating vicious cycles. They are crossing borders and undermining our efforts towards achievement of peace. They are diverting the resources which our nations need in order to finance education, healthcare, and development. Therefore, we call for the meaningful implementation of the United Nations Program of Action on SALW, as well as implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and the Global Framework for Conventional Weapons and Munitions Management. We are also profoundly committed to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which is a critical component of our regional security architecture, and we welcome greater cooperation between ECOWAS and the United Nations in this area. And in this respect, we welcome the recent strengthening of the partnership between ECOWAS, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNODA, and the regional United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament, UNREC, which should facilitate the building of national capabilities and regional capabilities for disarmament as well as arms control and nonproliferation of SALW. Mr. Chairman, technological innovations each day demonstrate prodigious capabilities of the human mind and the abilities to push the limits thereof, and they also test our collective ability to manage technological progress in a responsible and clear-sighted way for my country, artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons systems, cyberspace, and outer space should not become new arenas for military competition without any rules. We believe that technological innovations should benefit humanity and should -- is something which needs to be part of human accountability and oversight and respect. We support preventing an arms race in outer space, as well as the crafting of a meaningful, normative framework on lethal autonomous weapons systems, guaranteeing respect for international law and appropriate human oversight. Mr. Chairman, my country has been buffeted by a grave political military protracted crisis and we are keenly aware of the consequences of weapons we are also aware of the fact that there is a need to recognize the value of peace and this painful experience prompts us to reaffirm our conviction that disarmament is a prerequisite for Collective Security for rebuilding trust rebuilding dialogue surmounting our divisions and transforming security into a collective good for the benefit of people we are wedded to our tradition of dialogue, our commitment to multilateralism, and our focus on embracing peace, and we shall continue to contribute to collective efforts. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Equatorial Guinea. Now I give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Thailand.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me congratulate you and the members of the Bureau on your election. I would like to assure you of Thailand's full support. Thailand aligns itself with the ASEAN statement. Allow me to add a few points in our national capacity. A full version of this statement will be available on the website. We share a common goal, a safer and secure world for all. Much progress has been made, but we are now seeing retreat. In 2025, the UN documented one civilian death every 14 minutes in armed conflicts, nearly double the figure in 2022. So we must redouble our efforts and rebuild the trust on which progress depends. Mr. Chair, Thailand remains firmly committed to the NPT. It is deeply regrettable that the Review Conference failed to reach an outcome for the third consecutive time. Moving beyond this impasse requires political will and balanced implementation of our three pillars, not least disarmament, where progress has lagged furthest behind. Consistent with the NPT's Article VI obligation, the TPNW complements the broader disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Thailand looks forward to the first review conference of the TPNW under the presidency of South Africa. As informal co-facilitator with Ireland on complementarity, we will work to ensure that the TPNW and other instruments reinforce one another so that legal commitments translate into concrete action. As depositary of the treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone or the Bangkok Treaty, Thailand reaffirms its commitment to securing legally binding negative security assurances under the treaty's protocol. We urge the nuclear weapon states to sign and ratify the protocol without reservations. Thailand welcomes the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear weapon free zones on which a Thai expert served. We encourage states to take its recommendations forward, including by strengthening cooperation among existing zones and supporting the establishment of new ones. We call for sustained dialogue among states possessing nuclear weapons, including on a successor framework to the New START Treaty. Transparency and risk reduction measures must go hand in hand with disarmament efforts to build confidence and reduce nuclear risk. In this 30th anniversary year of the CTBT, Thailand calls on all states to maintain moratoria on nuclear explosive testing and sustain the effective functioning of the treaty's verification regime. We urge the remaining and next two states to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay. Thailand reiterates its firm position against the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances, and supports the work of the OPCW. Ahead of the 2027 BWC Review Conference, Thailand, as a friend of the Chair, supports an international cooperation and assistance mechanism, a science and technology advisory mechanism, and a pragmatic approach to compliance and verification. Mr. Chair, guided by international humanitarian law, Thailand maintains its long-standing commitment to humanitarian disarmament. The use of any weapon must, in all circumstances, strictly adhere to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. As a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Thailand has cleared over 99.5% of its mine contaminated areas and shares its expertise as a member of the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance. Yet the continued use of anti-personal mines, coupled with instances of non-compliance, suspension, and withdrawals by state parties, weakens a norm that has saved countless lives. Thailand calls on all states to uphold the convention's principles and join us in building a mine-free world. As a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty, Thailand continues to engage constructively and support the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Global Framework for Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management. While AI can be a force for good, its integration in two decisions on the use of force versus fundamental questions of human accountability. One principle must remain clear. Decisions of life and death must stay under human control and comply with international law, including international humanitarian law. Thailand supports the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under the CCW and welcomes the outcome of the third summit in Spain. The same principle applies to nuclear weapons. The integration of AI into nuclear command, control and communications increases the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to commit to keeping decisions on nuclear use under human control. Thailand promotes responsible state behavior in cyberspace and has integrated relevant norms into national law, including the Cybersecurity Act. We will engage constructively in the global mechanism on ICTs in the context of international security, where capacity building and international cooperation are essential to closing digital divides and ensuring equitable access to technologies. On outer space, Thailand supports the Open and Networked on perils and looks forward to a consensus outcome that strengthens transparency and confidence-building measures in synergy with corpus and the ITU. Mr. Chair, Thailand will continue to work with all delegations to strengthen the disarmament architecture so that this committee delivers for the people whose security depends on it. I thank you so much for your kind attention.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Thailand. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to congratulate you upon your election to the chairmanship of this committee. We wish to assure you of our full support, and we also wish to convey to the Secretariat our profound appreciation for their commitment to the benefit of our work. Mr. Chairman, let us imagine a weapon system that is capable of identifying a target, engaging said target without human intervention at the decisive juncture. Who will then be responsible for the decision of using force? This is a question which no longer belongs to the realm of science fiction, and it is part of a fundamental challenge. When technological power evolves, our means of governing this also needs to evolve. Cameroon. This hinges on three inextricably linked needs: security, anticipation, and equity. Mr. Chairman, drones, artificial intelligence, Cyber capabilities and autonomous functions are transforming our security environment. These technologies are generating new opportunities, but they are also generating risks to international peace and security. We have a collective responsibility, which is to do everything possible to ensure that multilateralism preempts these transformations rather than subsequently managing the consequences post-crisis. We are also contributing to designing solutions and we are contributing to crafting international norms rather than merely undergoing these such changes. And in this regard, we wish to reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument, as well as the Central African Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. These new technologies for manufacturing prompt us to strengthen tracing, marking, registration, and international cooperation. And in parallel, nuclear weapons are still an existential threat to humanity, and we wish to reaffirm our commitment to nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is the cornerstone of the multilateral architecture. Chairman, the question of lethal autonomous weapons systems particularly encapsulates these challenges. The use of these systems need to be subject to international law, applicable international law, specifically international humanitarian law, and the principles of distinction, of proportionality, and precaution need to be stringently complied with regardless of the degree of autonomy of the systems being used. We support the pursuit of a substantive multilateral dialogue through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in order to address humanitarian security-related concerns which are raised as a result of the use of these technologies. Decisions relate to the use of force. need to remain subject to appropriate human judgment, meaningful oversight, and a clearly established and identifiable chain of command. An algorithmical system should never become a chain of responsibility. The autonomy of a system cannot erase the obligation of those who design it or use it or deploy it. The same needs apply to cyberspace. We support the United Nations efforts which are geared towards promoting responsible state conduct, strengthening confidence-building measures, and building international cooperation. Cybersecurity needs to be part of a shared responsibility together with capacity building for all states. Mr. Chairman, these challenges prompt us to consider three key needs. First of all, responsibility. Technological progress should neither dilute human responsibility nor road, international obligations. Subsequently, anticipation. We need to identify emerging risks, and we need to craft collective responses before they become crises. And next, turning to equity, developing states, specifically African states, need to have scientific, technical, and institutional capabilities and know-how in order to understand these technologies, to assess risks, and to meaningfully participate in the drafting of rules rules which govern them. Capacity building is an international security-related need and a development-related need on equal footing, and we will continue to constructively contribute to multilateral dialogue on military emerging technologies to preventing proliferation and to African-related development. Mr. Chairman, at the start of my our remarks, we posed a question, who is responsible when a machine intervenes in decisions related to the use of lethal force? The response from our state, our nation, is clear. Technology can strengthen human capabilities, but never must it cause a human responsibility to be lessened. African wisdom recalls that we are those who possess the future, which does not belong exclusively to us. Therefore, we have a duty to convey to future generations, to hand down a world where technological progress is guided by wisdom, responsibility, and peace. Real progress is not only measured by what humanity becomes capable of achieving, but the wisdom with which they choose to proceed. Governing power today, in addressing, doing so today, means protecting future generations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon. Now I give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Syrian Arab Republic.

Mr. Chair, please allow me to congratulate you on your election as chair of the First Committee. I also congratulate your bureau members. We stand ready to cooperate with you to make a success of this session. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Arab Group. Mr. Chair, the First Committee, with its central role for the maintenance of international peace and security and disarmament, is a key platform where the Syrian miracle manifests itself. In record time, the new Syria turned a heavy legacy of challenges and threats into genuine opportunities for cooperation and partnership. For decades, the defunct regime has failed to uphold its international obligations, but the new Syria cooperated with the international community, marking a turning point not only for Syria, but for its security and for regional and international stability. This opened up new prospects for enhanced security in the Middle East. This is of paramount importance at this complex regional juncture. As part of Syria's compliance with its obligations under the NPT, in early September, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted by consensus a resolution ending consideration of Syria's nuclear noncompliance. In so doing, it turned the page on a dark chapter of the legacy of the defunct regime. We thank Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco for co-sponsoring and submitting the draft resolution. We also thank all countries that endorsed this resolution. This resolution reflects an international recognition of our full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA. It also culminates our intense national efforts we have led jointly with our international partners. Upholding obligations must be coupled with the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as enshrined in the NPT. Today, we are not only turning the page on decade-long attempts to instrumentalize this legacy as a bargaining chip, We are rather opening up new prospects to develop and acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. We call on the international community to support our recovery. After years of war, our success and stability will reflect positively on the region and the world. Mr. Chair, in another milestone, in September, We kicked off the destruction of chemical materials found in Syria with support from our international partners. This is the first such operation since the country's liberation. This proves that the chemical file, which for years posed a threat to Syrians and the world, can become a model for diplomacy. and can reflect what international cooperation can achieve. We welcome the new Director General who is now in Syria today. You have all witnessed our full and transparent cooperation in this file and also in delivering justice for victims of chemical weapons. We have initiated the process to hold those the perpetrators accountable. We also joined the International Partnership Against Chemical Weapons Impunity. Mr. Chair, our unprecedented cooperation cannot be reduced to implementation measures. Our cooperation marks a political transformation and conveys a message to the world after years of war and destruction. This projects our image as a responsible state that has regained its rightful place thanks to its cooperation and compliance. This message takes on greater significance now, at a time when the multilateral system faces immense challenges. Our approach is thus a practical contribution to restore trust in international cooperation. Our actions protect the international order and international multilateral cooperation. We thank the international community that stood by us. At the same time, this political support must be translated into practical and effective measures to address threats to our security and to regional security. Mr. Chair, Syria cannot achieve this objective amid attempts to undermine its stability. the repeated Israeli attacks on Syrian territory have hindered, if not suspended, cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the IAEA. Teams and sites were jeopardized, too. This does not only undermine our security, but also undermines regional security. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, Our transformation goes beyond a mere change of government. Our transformation embodies an inflection point in our relationship with the international community at large. As proof, we have embraced cooperation and partnership instead of confrontation and polarization. With this, we did not only open a new page in our history, but we have become a pillar of stability in a conflict-affected region. Supporting this transformation and countering attempts to destabilize Syria is not a Syrian responsibility. This is a collective global responsibility and interest. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Syrian Arab Republic. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Liberia.

Liberia congratulates you and the other members of the Bureau on your election. Liberia aligns with the statements delivered on behalf of the African group and the non-aligned movement. I now offer the following remarks in our national capacity. The stability of the international security environment is becoming increasingly critical and unpredictable. Nuclear risks are rising. Arms control arrangements are under strain, as illicit weapons continue to fuel conflict, while confidence in multilateral institutions is being tested. The General Assembly remains the one chamber where the security concerns of the least militarily capable states carry the same weight as those of the most heavily armed. This commitment must therefore build bridges across regions and translate shared concerns into practical restraint and measurable action. Liberia speaks as a non-nuclear weapons state. A country shaped by conflict and recovery. An elected member of the Security Council for the 2026-2027 term. Our national experience teaches that the Council members, that the Council chamber is often the last stop in crisis. Prevention must begin earlier in national institutions, at borders and within communities. Mr. Chair. Liberia notes with concern that the Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concluded without an agreed substantive outcome. This further failure to reach consensus should strengthen our determination to preserve the integrity of the NPT and restore confidence in its review process. The treaty's credibility depends on balanced implementation across all three pillars. Nuclear weapons states bear a particularly high responsibility to reduce nuclear risks, improve transparency, and pursue sustained, measurable progress under Article VI. All states parties must also fulfill their nonproliferation obligations while access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy is preserved. Liberia supports a transparent, structured, and non-discriminatory process for reviewing the implementation across all three pillars. It should promote accountability and regular reporting, while complementing existing mandates. Liberia affirms the humanitarian imperative underpinning the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We also renew our call for full adherence to the protocols of the Treaty of Pelendaba for stronger implementation of the treaty by African states. Human judgment and accountability must remain central to decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence, may support but must not replace humanitarianism. Liberia encourages dialogue on practical safeguards to reduce miscalculations, unintended escalation, and unauthorized uses. Mr. Chair, for Liberia, the illicit circulation of small arms is not an abstract question. Our history shows how unaccountable weapons can prolong conflict, empower criminal networks, weaken institutions, and obstruct development. Liberia welcomes the outcome of the ninth biannual meeting of states on the Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We support continued technical work addressing polymer frame, modular, three-dimensional printed, and privately manufactured firearms. while pressing new challenges for marking, record keeping, and tracing. At home, Liberia is translating international commitments into national systems through civilian arms registration and marking exercises mandated by Executive Order 141, a commitment A commitment negotiated in New York gets meaning only when it can be implemented in Monrovia, at Liberia's borders, and within its communities. We call for full implementation of the Program of Action and its international tracing instrument, effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, and greater assistance for marking, tracing, stockpile management, and border control for Liberia, regional, Disarmament begins in the Mano River Basin. Weapons diverted across one border can destabilize communities in several countries. Liberia will therefore continue supporting cooperation within the Mano River Union And echo was through information sharing, coordinated border management, and stronger national institutions. Regional initiatives, nuclear weapon-free zones, and community-based peacebuilding form a connected architecture of prevention. That architecture is stronger when women and young people are part of decision-making and implementation. Finally, Mr. Chair, Liberia is concerned when procedural differences prevent disarmament institutions from performing their mandates. The Disarmament Commission's inability to agree on a substantive agenda demonstrates the need for renewed dialogue, focused agenda, transparent facilitation, and stronger continuity between sessions. Consensus gives disarmament outcome legitimacy. It should ease convergence rather than produce permanent postponement. As an African state, a post-conflict society, and an elected member of the Security Council, Liberia stands ready to listen, bridge differences, and advance practical results. And I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Liberia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the State of Palestine.

Thank you, Mr. President. Allow me to congratulate you and the Bureau on your election and assure you of my delegation's full support. Mr. Chair, the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons remains an existential imperative. Their use under any circumstances is incompatible with international humanitarian law and the diktats of humanity. Yet, instead of disarmament, we witness the modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals and increasing reliance on nuclear deterrence. An arms race is always dangerous. A nuclear arms race is potentially, probably, inevitably, cataclysmic. Reliance on nuclear weapons is ultimately a doctrine of collective suicide. Mr. Chair, we regret the failure of three consecutive NPT review conferences in adopting a substantive consensus outcome at a time when collective action is more needed than ever. This reflects a deeper crisis in the multilateral disarmament regime and in the international law-based multilateral order. Mr. President, the NPT can only remain a cornerstone of international peace and security if we remain true to its three interconnected pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT carved out a temporary and limited exception, inseparably linked to the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. Its indefinite extension was never an indefinite authorization to possess them. Interpreting it otherwise would transform the NPT from a cornerstone of international peace and security into a threat to them and a justification for a reality incompatible with international law. The entire IHL edifice is built on the principle of distinction, including to protect civilian populations. That is why all weapons of mass destruction, because of their very nature, are prohibited. What international law prohibits for chemical and biological weapons cannot be tolerated for nuclear weapons, the most indiscriminate and inhumane of all. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is essential as it reminds us that the rule governing weapons of mass destruction is prohibition. It complements in this regard the NPT with its dual objective of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. We look forward to its first review conference. We uphold this principle of prohibition, alongside friends and foes alike, because on this question, we side with humanity. We have sat beside survivors of nuclear attacks and testing and pledged not to relent until this threat disappears from the face of the Earth. We intend to honor that pledge. Mr. Chair, establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is integral to the commitments underpinning the NPT's indefinite extension. as reflected in the 1995 resolution and 2010 action plan. These commitments must be implemented, not abandoned nor further delayed. Israel cannot remain outside the NPT, maintain nuclear ambiguity, refuse to join the CTBT, and use this as the basis for its claim for exceptional entitlement to nuclear weapons. Nor can it boycott the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone and then challenge its legitimacy because of its own self-inflicted absence. The process is and remains open to all. We remind the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution of their responsibilities and call on them to contribute positively to this process. Mr. President. Our commitment to disarmament extends beyond weapons of mass destruction, including to protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Palestine was among the first states to endorse the political declaration in this regard. We did so before the horrific war on our people and assault on our people in Gaza with massive bombardments that led to the destruction of over 90 percent and damage to over 90% of homes in the Gaza Strip, with 74,000 Palestinians at least killed in these bombardments. We are also committed to the prevention of illicit arms transfers. We reiterate our call for a comprehensive arms embargo against Israel. consistent with international law, including the Arms Trade Treaty and the ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion on the illegality of the Israeli occupation and its follow-up General Assembly resolution. We also call for the disarmament of armed Israeli settlers, in line with Security Council Resolution 904. The Palestinian people enduring indiscriminate bombardment, attacks targeting civilians, including children, and grave violations of international humanitarian law must receive immediate and effective international protection. Mr. Chair, military applications of artificial intelligence raise profound humanitarian concerns. Human responsibility was never be surrendered to algorithms. Palestinians have witnessed how AI-generated target lists and automated killing machines facilitate systematic violence against those IHL was designed to protect. Cyberspace and outer space, common spaces of humanity, must remain peaceful domains, not be weaponized and become new arenas for arms races. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, the choice is between a future governed by international law and one held hostage to annihilation. Will we render nuclear weapons extinct? Or will nuclear weapons render us extinct? For the sake of people and planet, there can only be one answer. And I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the State of Palestine for his statement. I now give the floor to the permanent representative of Montenegro. Excellency, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair, Montenegro aligns itself with the U.S. statement. 20 years after joining the UN, Montenegro firmly believes the respect for international law, the rule of law, and multilateralism anchored in the UN Charter is the only sustainable path towards lasting peace and security. Over the past two decades, Montenegro has contributed to strengthening global architecture of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as well as international export control regimes. As a NATO and a future EU member, Montenegro will continue to pursue policies that promote good neighborly relations, regional cooperation, and stable security environment. Today, we are confronted with numerous conflicts around the world, accompanied by violations of international law, including international humanitarian law. It is deeply concerning that we are once again convening against the backdrop of an increasingly deteriorating international security environment, with ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. As Russia's aggression against Ukraine enters its fifth year, Montenegro strongly condemns its actions, which have resulted in immense human suffering with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. is a flagrant violation of fundamental principles of international law that has far-reaching repercussions to European and global security. Montenegro will continue to support efforts to adjust and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. We remain deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Montenegro is firmly committed to a just and sustainable peace based on a two-state solution. The comprehensive peace plan for Gaza and UN Security Council Resolution 2803 must be implemented in line with international law. The freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and respect for the international maritime law is a cornerstone of global security and prosperity, which benefits all states. Montenegro supports diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a lasting solution in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter and relevant Security Council resolutions. Mr. Chair, as a State Party to the NPT, CWC, BWC, the ATT, and the CCW, Montenegro consistently advocates for universal adherence, effective implementation, and further strengthening of these instruments. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the full implementation of the NPT, which remains the bedrock of global nuclear nonproliferation regime and an essential foundation for pursuing nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI. We regret that State Parties were unable to reach consensus on a substantive final document at the 2026 MPT review conference. As we mark the 30th anniversary of the CTBT, we underline its crucial importance to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We will continue to support the objectives and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the vital work of the OPCW. We are also fully committed to the Biological Weapons Convention and its effective implementation. Montenegro is actively strengthening CBRN resilience, guided by a CBRN roadmap 2023-28 in close cooperation with the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative. We are enhancing legislative alignment, strengthening national capacities, and improving interagency coordination in preparedness and response. Dear colleagues, Montenegro continues to fulfill its obligations in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation through active participation in relevant international and regional mechanisms. We encourage and support continued dialogue on international regulation and the establishment of rules when it comes to lethal autonomous weapon systems. The use of AI in military applications should remain under human supervision. Additionally, we remain committed to the full and effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its protocols, which seeks to strike a balance between legitimate defense requirements and preventing human suffering. Mr. Chair, Montenegro is pursuing a comprehensive and strategic approach to small arms and light weapons control and reduction in line with the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and our regional commitments in the Western Balkans outlined in the UNDP/CSAC Regional Roadmap 2030. We are developing a new strategy and action plan for combating the illicit possession, misuse, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, ammunitions, and explosives 2026-2030. It aims to further strengthen our national arms control system by developing risk-based policies, enhancing criminal intelligence capabilities, improving information exchange, and establishing more effective preventive mechanisms. One of the most successful reform initiatives in this field has been the modern program through which Montenegro successfully addressed 96% of its surplus conventional weapons and ammunition. This year also marks the 30th anniversary of the signing of the legally binding agreement on sub-regional arms control known as the Florence Agreement. Under it, a total of 529 missions have been conducted and more than 10,000 pieces of armaments has been destroyed. Even in the current complex conditions and deteriorating security situation in Europe, this agreement has demonstrated remarkable resilience owing to the solid foundations it was built on. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, Montenegro strongly believes that international peace and security depend on sustained progress in disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. We will remain committed to cooperation with all allies and partners in advancing our vision of a safer and a more secure world. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Montenegro. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Namibia. You have the floor.

Uh thank you chair. Namibia lines itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the African group. Mister chair, global peace and security under severe strain. The work of this committee is therefore more urgent than ever. Disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation remain indispensable pillars of international peace and security, and they are central to our foreign policy and to our collective aspirations for a safer world. More than five decades after the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the world continues to live under the imminent threat and shadow of nuclear weapons. The failure of nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations under Article VI, as well as the lack of reliable security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states, undermines the credibility of the treaty and threatens global stability. The NPT is not a mechanism to indefinitely preserve nuclear privileges. It is a legally binding commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons. Namibia, therefore, calls for genuine political will, concrete and irreversible steps toward disarmament, and a recommitment to the full implementation of Article VI, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions. Africa has long demonstrated leadership in this regard. Through the Pelindaba Treaty, our continent has declared itself a nuclear weapon-free zone, reaffirming our conviction that nuclear weapons have no place in Africa's future. My delegation welcomes a growing support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW. This treaty strengthens the global disarmament architecture by placing the humanitarian imperative at the center of nuclear disarmament efforts. We encourage all States to engage constructively with this instrument, including during its upcoming first review conference. We also call for the urgent entry into force of the CTBT. Namibia is honored to host the third CTBT integrated field exercise. that started on the 10th of this month and will continue until the 20th of November in Namibia. This will be the first time such an exercise is conducted on African soil, marking a historic milestone for our continent and further building trust for the global multilateral verification regime. It further demonstrates Namibia's strong commitment to disarmament and nonproliferation, not least because Namibia is the third largest uranium producer in the world. Chair Namibia stresses the urgent need for stronger international cooperation to curb illicit trafficking, enhanced transparency in arms transfers and verification. The diversion of weapons to non-state actors and terrorists remains one of the most destabilizing threats to peace and security on our continent. and addressing it must be a priority for this committee. The absence of legally binding norms governing all military activities in outer space poses grave risks to international peace and security. Outer space must remain a domain for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. Namibia therefore calls for the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space, the prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space, and the strengthening of transparency and confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of miscalculation. Autonomous weapons systems, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence present both opportunities and risks. Namibia believes that technological advancement must not outpace our international norms. We support efforts to ensure meaningful human control over autonomous weapons systems, to strengthen cyber resilience in developing countries, and to protect critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity. Bridging the digital divide is essential to ensuring that all states can participate equitably in global governance and benefit from technological progress. Namibia underscores that disarmament and non-proliferation must be balanced with the inalienable right of states to access nuclear and chemical technologies for peaceful purposes. This right is vital for development, energy security, agriculture, health, and climate resilience. We reject discriminatory restrictions that impede developing countries' access to technology. International cooperation must be guided by equity, transparency, and non-discrimination. The credibility of the multilateral disarmament machinery depends on the rejection of unilateral actions and on the consistent and principled engagement of all member states, especially those with special responsibilities. The challenges before us are immense, but they are not insurmountable if we act with urgency, responsibility and the unity of purpose. Namibia is committed to engage constructively and to contribute to a safer, more just and more secure world as we continue our deliberations in this Committee. A longer version of our statement has been sent to eStatements. Thank you so much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Namibia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation congratulates you and the Bureau on your election. I assure you of Singapore's full support and cooperation. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Philippines on behalf of ASEAN. Allow me to make the following four points in our national capacity. First, Singapore reaffirms our unwavering commitment to the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with the NPT as its cornerstone. At a time when the NPT regime is under severe strain, States Parties must undertake concrete actions to implement the Treaty equally across its three pillars and uphold its credibility and integrity. We are deeply concerned that three consecutive NPT Review Conferences, including the most recent RevCon, have failed to adopt substantive outcomes. Ultimately, the NPT is only as meaningful and effective as the actions that States Parties take to implement it. We urge all States Parties to work constructively toward a tangible and more positive outcome in the next review cycle. As we mark the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT this year, the fact that the treaty has still not entered into force remains a matter of serious concern. Singapore welcomes Tonga's ratification of the CTBT in July and reiterates our call on all states that have yet to do so, particularly the remaining Annex II states, to ratify the CTBT without further delay. Singapore is a committed state party to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and we support the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones as a practical and concrete step towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. We encourage individual nuclear-weapon States that are willing to sign and ratify the Protocol to the START Treaty without reservations and provide written, formal assurance of this commitment to go ahead with the signing. Singapore remains committed to engaging all nuclear-weapon States and to intensify efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty. Mr Chair, Singapore recognises the indispensable role of the IAEA in ensuring the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards implementation globally. We will continue to work with the IAEA to share expertise and strengthen capabilities on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including through its Technical Cooperation Programme and the Singapore-IAEA Third Country Training Programme. ASEAN is also strengthening cooperation with the IAEA, including through the proposed ASEAN-IAEA Strategic Partnership on Nuclear Energy, Safety and Governance. Second, cyberspace. Singapore remains committed to an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful and interoperable cyberspace, one underpinned by international law, the UN Charter and rules, norms and principles for responsible state behaviour. We should focus our efforts in translating collective commitments into practical action, strengthen resilience, and equip states with the capacity to address evolving ICT threats. Singapore will continue to build on the UN's work through our hosting of the annual Singapore International Cyber Week, which is taking place this week, and by partnering with UNODA to offer the UN-Singapore Cyber Fellowship Programme. The successful conclusion of the OEWG and the establishment of the GMAC marked important milestones in international cybersecurity cooperation. It demonstrates that consensus remains possible even amid geopolitical tensions. Singapore was honoured to have chaired the OEWG. We look forward to working with all member states through the GMAC to advance a responsible state behaviour, deepen confidence building and cooperation, and strengthen capacity building. Third, outer space. Given the increasing reliance on space technologies and applications for essential services, outer space must be preserved as a peaceful global commons. States have a collective responsibility to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space is safe, sustainable and beneficial for all. Singapore reiterates the centrality of international law in reducing the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation in outer space. We welcome the substantive discussions during the third session of the OEWG on PIROS in all its aspects in July, and look forward to working with all delegations towards further meaningful progress. Fourth, AI. Singapore views AI as a critical emerging technology with significant potential. While we recognise the benefits of the rapid development and use of AI in the military domain, we are also cognisant of its attendant risks. We must build convergence on approaches to the responsible use and governance of AI, including appropriate guardrails, through inclusive and multi-stakeholder discussions. We welcome the informal exchanges on artificial intelligence in the military domain in Geneva in June, and look forward to further productive discussions following the draft resolution led by the Netherlands and the ROK, of which we are a core group member. We hope that these discussions will complement existing platforms, such as the Responsible AI in the Military Domain process. We welcome the significant results of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems in achieving consensus on a substantive final report in September, paving the way for further work on laws. Mr. Chair, to conclude, Singapore looks forward to working constructively with you and all member states to achieve a successful session. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Burundi. Excellency, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We wish to take this opportunity today in an international context which is punctuated by growing strategic instability, persistent conflict, heightened geopolitical tensions, and rapid military technology being developed. And these technologies are undermining existing disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation mechanisms. And amid this environment, the first committee has an obligation to remain a space for dialogue and seeking ways to address these challenges. And this should not prevent us from identifying areas where cooperation still is possible and necessary. For Burundi, international security cannot be achieved through accumulation of military capabilities alone. This also needs to be rooted in trust, international dialogue, and the political will for conflicts to be prevented and avoidance of risks of confrontation. In this regard, we wish to highlight four observations which represent important priorities for our state. First and foremost, disarmament and -- nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation must remain at the heart of our collective efforts. We remain profoundly committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian, environmental, and economic consequences of the uses of these weapons would be catastrophic, be this intentional or accidental. We call upon nuclear weapons states to undertake a verifiable eradication of these arsenals and to address risks through transparency, strategic communications, and prevention of calculation errors. And these efforts need to be undertaken in a complementary way. The NPT is the linchpin of this architecture, that they need to preserve the integrity thereof, to strengthen implementation thereof. We reiterate our support for the entry into force of the CTBT, and we call upon states concerned to undertake the necessary measures to that end. Second, the rapid developments of military technologies require a collective vigilance on our part to autonomous weapons systems, cyber technologies, and new space-related technologies offer significant opportunities, but they also generate new risks to international peace and security. Burundi believes that technological progress must not undermine the primacy of international law. The use of force must always be subject to the obligations under international law, specifically international humanitarian law, there needs to be a particular focus on systems, weapon systems that can select or engage with targets with growing autonomy degrees. And we call for pursuit of efforts which are geared towards preventing an arms race in outer space, the promotion of responsible norms and conduct in outer space. Third, Mastery of conventional weapons remains a key priority, specifically for those regions facing the direct consequences of conflict. The proliferation, illicit trafficking, small arms and light weapons fuels violence, crime, and instability, and results in greater conflict. We support strengthening international mechanisms to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, and we call for greater accountability in arms transfers. The fight against anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war also needs to remain at the heart of our efforts. Fourth, Disarmament needs to be envisaged closely together with sustainable development and conflict prevention for developing states. Resources dedicated to security also need to be considered in the light of urgent needs faced by our people. Peace and development are not two distinct agendas. They are mutually reinforcing inclusive development, investments in human capital, and the generation of opportunities for young people are also important means for conflict prevention and for peacebuilding. Mr. Chairman, Burundi also attributes particular importance to regional and subregional peace and security mechanisms. Security realities differ from region to region, and measures need to undertake into account a regional context while at the same time remaining anchored in the principles of the UN Charter and international law. We attribute particular importance to nuclear weapons-free zones. Africa has made a clear choice through the Pelendaba Treaty, that of a continent free of nuclear weapons. And this is an important contribution from Africa to global efforts towards disarmament and nonproliferation, and it warrants being sustained and built upon. We also underscore the importance of multilateralism and United Nations mechanisms. amid the current strategic insecurity, we need to strengthen existing mechanisms rather than allowing them to be eroded. We need to preserve spaces for dialogue to mitigate risks of confrontation. Mr. Chairman, we cannot prevent any crisis that may break out, all crises that may break out, but we can build up our collective ability to prevent them, to mitigate the consequences thereof, and to prevent their escalation. Our goal needs to be clear that of risk reduction, reduction of risk of a war, preventing the spread of dangerous weapons, mastering military related technologies, and creating conditions so that resources that are dedicated for confrontation, for them to be dedicated to development, to the wellbeing of our people in this world. marked by uncertainty, these are necessary for security and multilateralism remains the best tool at our disposal to preserve peace, to strengthen trust, and to build a safer, more secure future for present and future generations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Burundi for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Maldives. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. We recognize why military spending is rising. Wars, attacks, and regional tensions create genuine fears. Yet, when one state's response triggers another's, military competition can deepen the insecurity it is meant to answer. For small states, the risks are especially acute. Our security depends on restraint, international law, and rules that apply to all. A State may increase its arsenal in the name of security, but security is not measured by the number of weapons it holds. It is measured by whether people are protected, conflict is prevented, and every State, including the smallest, retains the freedom to shape its own future. The Maldives therefore sees three priorities for this Committee. First, Nuclear disarmament must return to implementation. The 2026 NPT Review Conference ended without an agreed outcome for the third time in a row. The New START Treaty has expired, and a sovereign future cannot rest on the threat of nuclear annihilation. Risk reduction cannot replace disarmament, but it can help prevent a crisis from becoming catastrophe while disarmament advances. We therefore encourage all nuclear-armed states to return to strategic dialogue, notify one another of major exercises and launches, and agree on procedures to clarify incidents that may be misread. All states must also refrain from threatening or using nuclear weapons. States that have not done so should ratify the CTBT and join the TPNW. The upcoming first review conference of the TPNW is an opportunity to turn commitments into action. Disarmament must also advance alongside nonproliferation and peaceful uses. Since joining the IAEA in 2025, the Maldives has begun seeking cooperation in cancer care and radiation safety. Second, we need stronger safeguards against the diversion of conventional weapons. Small arms and light weapons fuel violence and organized crime. States should verify end-user certificates, record transfers in national systems, and investigate unexplained losses. The UN Programme of Action and the Arms Trade Treaty offer tools for this work, but many small states need technical assistance to use them. This is where the Office for Disarmament Affairs can work together with interested states on implementation, including on fulfilling reporting obligations, providing customs training, or ensuring stockpile security. Third, every state must have a voice in shaping the rules for military technologies that influence its security. Artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons are already changing warfare. Machines must not decide on who lives or dies. A sovereign future requires these decisions to remain subject to human judgment and accountability. Autonomous weapons whose use cannot comply with international law must be banned, and other weapons must be regulated to ensure meaningful human control. In outer space, we should prevent an arms race and agree on practical measures to avoid dangerous incidents. In cyberspace, states should protect hospitals, water systems, power grids, and other critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity. Chair, these choices are especially consequential for small states. Limited military power does not diminish our sovereign equality or our right to security or our voice in shaping the rules that govern international security. Let us ensure that every state, however small, can shape its own security and future. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Maldives for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. At the outset, Malaysia congratulates you and the members of the Bureau on your election. We have Malaysia's full support. Malaysia associates itself with the statements delivered on behalf of NAM and ASEAN. international security landscape continues to be marked by deepening geopolitical divisions, protracted conflicts, and growing mistrust among states. The suffering of civilians, particularly the continued plight of the Palestinian people in Gaza, serves as a stark reminder of the human cost of conflict and the urgent need to uphold the UN Charter and international law. Against this backdrop, the erosion of long-standing arms control arrangements and the pursuit of military superiority risk further undermining international peace and security. In this regard, disarmament must remain a collective responsibility rather than being subordinated to narrow strategic interests. It is therefore incumbent upon member states to translate long-standing commitments into meaningful and concrete action. Mr. Chair, the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains an overriding priority for Malaysia. We are deeply concerned by the continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, compounded by the persistence of nuclear sharing arrangements and extended nuclear deterrence doctrines. The pursuit of security through continued reliance on nuclear weapons perpetuates risks that transcend national borders. The expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026 without a successor agreement represents a significant setback to efforts to maintain verifiable limits on strategic nuclear arsenals. We call upon the States concerned to pursue dialogue and negotiations towards a successor arrangement providing effective, verifiable, and legally binding limits on nuclear arsenals. The outcome of the 11th NPT Refcon earlier this year is equally disconcerting. The failure to achieve consensus on a substantive outcome for the third consecutive Refcons underscores the persistent divisions among state parties and the widening gap between commitments and implementation. Nevertheless, the absence of consensus must not become a justification for inaction, nor diminish the treaty's centrality to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Malaysia reiterates the imperative of implementing all three pillars of the NPT in a full, balanced and effective manner, with particular emphasis on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments by the nuclear weapons states, supported by greater transparency and accountability. Mr. Chair, in stark contrast to these setbacks, Malaysia welcomes the continued progress towards the universalization of the TPNW. Malaysia firmly believes that the TPNW reinforces and complements the NPT by advancing the humanitarian, moral and security imperatives of a world free from nuclear weapons. As we approach its first REVCON, Malaysia looks forward to a substantive and forward-looking conference that consolidates the progress achieved and strengthens international cooperation towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Equally important is the preservation of other components of the nuclear disarmament architecture. Malaysia renews its call upon remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay or preconditions to facilitate its long overdue entry into force. At the same time, Malaysia reaffirms its steadfast commitment to nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the START Treaty, as vital building blocks towards a world free of nuclear weapons and an important contribution to regional and international peace and security. We remain committed to continuously engaging all nuclear weapons states, including those with reservations, and to intensifying the efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the START Treaty. Our commitment to disarmament extends beyond nuclear weapons. Malaysia unequivocally condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. Malaysia reiterates its firm commitment to the CWC and to the work of the OPCW. We will also continue to advance the objectives of the BWC by strengthening national implementation measures in accordance with Article IV and supporting the constructive discussions under the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention, particularly on effective verification. Mr. Chair, technological developments present both opportunities and increasingly complex challenges for international security. Malaysia underscores the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring its peaceful use for the benefit of all humanity. We support the ongoing OEWG on PAROS and encourage substantive, inclusive and coherent discussions. Malaysia further looks forward to the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration on Space Cooperation at the 49th ASEAN Summit. In the field of ICT, Malaysia welcomes the commencement of work under the permanent global mechanism. We attach importance to ensuring that this mechanism remains inclusive, action-oriented and responsive to the needs of developing countries, particularly in advancing work across its five pillars. Malaysia also recognises the urgency of continued multilateral deliberations on emerging technologies in the military domain, particularly laws and AI. Human responsibility and control over the use of force, together with full compliance with international law, including IHL, must remain central to these discussions. Mr. Chair, the challenges before us are formidable, but they should strengthen rather than weaken our collective resolve. At a time when military competition increasingly overshadows cooperation, we must resist the normalization of perpetual insecurity and the erosion of established disarmament commitments. The effectiveness of the multilateral disarmament machinery ultimately depends upon the political will of member states to engage constructively, bridge differences, and uphold their shared responsibilities. Nigeria remains committed to working with all delegations towards practical and meaningful progress in disarmament and international security, guided by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the enduring aspiration of a peaceful, secure and nuclear-weapon-free world. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Congo. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, the Republic of the Congo would like to join the statement delivered on behalf of the African Group. Allow me to, on behalf of my delegation, warmly congratulate you for your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee and to assure you of our total cooperation in the discharge of your mandate in an international context characterized by persistent conflicts, worsening geopolitical tensions, the modernization of military arsenals, and the rapid progress of new technologies, disarmament is, more than ever before, an imperative for international peace and security. The Republic of the Congo reaffirms its attachment to multilateralism, to the Charter of the United Nations, and to the peaceful solution of disputes. Mr. Chair, the Republic of the Congo is deeply attached to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. As a state party of the NPT, as well as the CTBT and the TPNW, which was ratified in 2022, my country considers that collective security cannot rest upon nuclear deterrence or the threat of mutually assured destruction. We call for the preservation and the strengthening of the international disarmament architecture, as well as the full of existing commitments and for efforts to continue in order to totally, irreversibly, and verifiably eliminate nuclear weapons. Congo also reaffirms its attachment to the international regimes to ban chemical and biological weapons, and we call for their universalization as well as their full implementation. Mr. Chair, for Africa, the challenge of disarmament is also closely linked to the fight against the illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons. these weapons continue to feed conflicts, terrorism, violent extremism, cross-border crime, as well as insecurity in several regions of the continent. As a State Party of the Kinshasa Convention, our country supports national and regional mechanisms to reinforce weapons control, including marking and tracing, ensuring the security of stocks, and border controls and information exchange among States. We reaffirm our support to the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons as well as the Arms Trade Treaty. The fight against the illicit trafficking of weapons is not just a security issue; it is an essential condition for sustainable development and for protecting civilian populations. Confidence-building measures and regional cooperation are also indispensable tools to prevent conflicts. The Republic of the Congo is convinced that dialogue, transparency, information exchange, and early warning mechanisms are effective ways of preventing tensions and strengthening regional stability. Therefore, we support strengthening African and subregional mechanisms when it comes to prevention, management, and the peaceful solution of disputes. Mr. Chair, emerging challenges related to outer space as well as cyberspace and artificial intelligence also call for more attention on behalf of the international community. Congo supports efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space continue to be purely peaceful and benefit all humanity, and especially developing countries. Spatial technologies are for Africa a critical tool to underpin sustainable development, environmental surveillance, disaster prevention and the fight against illicit trafficking. Moreover, cyber threats and the military applications of AI are major challenges for international security. We support multilateral efforts to promote a cyberspace that is open, stable, safe, and grounded in respect for international law. We also consider that the use of AI in the military domain should continue to be under significant human control and be fully respectful of the UN Charter, international law, and IHL. Capacity building for developing countries in this area is a priority in order to avoid the emergence of a new digital or security divide. Mr. Chair, the issues under review in this committee are very diverse, but they have a single goal: to prevent conflicts and to strengthen collective security. Whether we are speaking about nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, light weapons, outer space, cyberspace, or AI, no sustainable response will be found in a siloed fashion. For the Republic of the Congo, the way forward depends on four fundamental principles-- disarmament, prevention, respecting international law, and multilateral cooperation. at the international level, as well as the African and subregional level. My country will continue to support all initiatives to build a world that is safer, more peaceful, and more prosperous for present and future generations. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Congo for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Georgia. Excellency, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, allow me to congratulate His Excellency Ambassador Badur and the members of the Bureau on the election, and we assure you Georgia's full support and cooperation throughout the work of the First Committee. Georgia remains firmly committed to peace, international security, respect to international law, and effective multilateral cooperation. At a time when the international security environment is facing profound challenges, strengthening collective efforts to preserve peace and prevent further erosion of the rules-based international order is more important than ever. Dear colleagues. The security environment in Europe and beyond countries to be, beyond continues to be undermined by the aggressive policies of the Russia Federation, including its occupation of Georgia's territories and its ongoing war in Ukraine. The continued erosion of the international arms control and disarmament architecture is a matter of grave concern. What is at stake is not merely the weakening of individual instruments, but the gradual undermining of the rules, commitments, and verification mechanisms that have underpinned international security for decades. The selective implementation, deliberate circumvention, or total disregard of international obligations undermines trust, diminishes predictability and increases the risk of proliferation and conflicts. We cannot allow the erosion of established arms control and non-proliferation norms to become the new normal. In this regard, Georgia attaches particular importance to the full implementation of the existing international instruments. Verification, transparency, and compliance are essential pillars of this architecture. States cannot selectively interpret, suspend, or disregard their international obligations without undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the entire system. In this context, Georgia joins the United States as a co-sponsor of the resolution entitled Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments. We believe that strengthening compliance and accountability is essential to preserving the credibility of the international security architecture and ensuring that existing commitments remain meaningful and effective. Dear colleagues, international security is closely interconnected with the security of the Black Sea region. Russia's war against Ukraine has fundamentally transformed the Black Sea security landscape. Conventional military threats increasingly intersect with hybrid warfare, cyber attacks, disinformation, attacks against critical infrastructure, and the use of emerging technologies. Russia's continued military presence in Georgia's occupied territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali regions, together with their ongoing militarization, contributes to broader instability. Reports on the development of additional Russian military infrastructure, including a permanent naval facility in Ochamchire, are particularly concerning and have implications extending beyond Georgia. The illegal occupation also creates so-called gray zones in which international security and nonproliferation mechanisms cannot be effectively implemented. Georgia has previously detected cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials through the occupied territories. The continued denial of international access and the absence of effective verification mechanisms heighten these risks and remain a concern not only for Georgia but also for the wider region and the international community. We once again call on Russia to fully implement the EU-mediated 2008 ceasefire agreement and withdraw its forces from the territory of Georgia. Distinguished colleagues, the evolving security environment also demonstrates that modern security cannot be understood solely in military terms. Cyber attacks, disinformation, information manipulation, unmanned systems, and other emerging technologies are increasingly being integrated into coercive and hybrid strategies. The resilience of critical infrastructure, energy and transport corridors, ports, and communication and digital networks is therefore becoming an essential component of international security. As a strategically located Black Sea country and an important link between Europe and Asia, Georgia attaches great importance to strengthening regional resilience and cooperation. We support enhanced international cooperation in maritime security, the protection of critical infrastructure, information sharing, and preparedness for emerging and hybrid threats. Mr. Chair, the challenges before us are increasingly interconnected, armed conflicts, the erosion of arms control arrangements, risks to nuclear safety and security, proliferation concerns, and emerging technologies can have consequences for… far beyond the regions in which they originate. These challenges require coordinated, credible, and practical action by the international community. Georgia will continue to support disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, uphold the principles of international law, and contribute to the work of multilateral institutions. We believe that international rules must be applied consistently and that their credibility depends on compliance, accountability, verification, and genuine international cooperation. At the same time, emerging technologies must be developed and used in the ways that contribute to international peace and security, rather than create new sources of instability. Georgia remains ready to contribute constructively to these efforts within the First Committee. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Georgia for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Luxembourg. Excellency, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I wish to assure you of my delegation's full support. During the work of the First Committee, we align ourselves with the statement of the European Union, and we wish to deliver the following remarks in our national capacity. Disarmament and non-proliferation of conventional weapons and WMDs and WMD delivery vehicles areas of action which remain priorities for Luxembourg in terms of conflict prevention. We are profoundly concerned by the deterioration of the international security environment. With each year, this committee has to operate in increasingly more dangerous and complicated world. We are bearing witness to a devastating toll. 252 million people need humanitarian assistance, 204 million victims endure the devastating consequences of more than 60 active armed conflicts. And we are in the midst of the most violent period since the inception of the United Nations. We need to end impunity and ensure accountability for perpetrators of violations of international law, including IHL. In this context, we are committed fully to the Charter, the international rules-based order, and international multilateralism. The international community cannot allow the Charter of the United Nations to be trampled upon, including by the permanent members of the Security Council, the body which has been entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We firmly condemn the unjustified, illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has been conducted on a large scale by the Russian Federation for more than four years. Once again, we beseech Russia to end this war and to at last must respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. We also denounce the numerous armed conflicts which continue to fester throughout the world. These persistent violations of international law, including the Charter of the UN, fly in the face of the spirit and the goals of the United Nations. We regret the disappointing outcome of the 11th NPT Review Conference. The absence of consensus is liable to fuel the impression of there being irreconcilable positions, which are further reinforced by the outcome of the 70th General Conference of the IAEA. The NPT remains a cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime. In that vein, we supported the referral of the nuclear Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council in light of the persistent failure of Iran to comply with international nonproliferation obligations. We continue to support all diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons. We urge the United States, Russia, and China, the three primary nuclear powers, to negotiate a trilateral agreement establishing a new framework for the reduction of nuclear weapons. We urge the DPRK to immediately abandon its nuclear weapons programs and ballistic missiles programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible way. We remain profoundly concerned by the precarious state of nuclear facilities in Ukraine, specifically the Zaporizhzhia plant, and we emphatically condemn the illegal occupation thereof by the Russian Federation. As we commemorate the 30th anniversary thereof, we also reaffirm the importance of the CTBT. We wish to see its entry into force as soon as possible, and we wish to see the conclusion of negotiations for a treaty preventing the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Mr. Chairman, although we do have a great deal of progress that lies ahead for the achievement of international stability and security, it is evident that progress in the right direction is visible. Unlike Iran, the recent example of Syria shows that extended, transparent cooperation with the IAEA, compliance with the safeguards regime have contributed to strengthening the trust of the international community and have generated positive results, we applaud the recent positive developments under the OPCW and the fact that Syria has joined the International Partnership Against Impunity for Chemical Weapons Use. We encourage Syria to continue along these lines, and we will support them in this. Turning to international security, present-day developments are closely entwined with technological progress, specifically in the realm of AI and the significant challenges that AI might pose, specifically the use of autonomous weapons and the risks that this poses for civilians and civil society. This year, the GGE on lethal autonomous weapon systems reached a historical consensus Fulfilling the mandate that was entrusted to them, the seventh review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons will be an opportunity to move to substantive negotiations, and we stand ready to make headway to that end. We are strongly committed to the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. An effective architecture for nonproliferation disarmament, lastly, hinges on export controls, related export controls. And these guarantee practical and meaningful implementation of commitments undertaken by states and ensures that sensitive technologies and goods cannot be diverted for malicious purposes. And we remain committed to the various multilateral regimes in this regard and the relevant instruments, including the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol. As an active member of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace, and Security, we are continuing to fulfill our commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda under Resolution 1325. We denouncing the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and girls and recognizing the need for meaningful participation of women in peace processes. In order to make headway in this agenda, all states need to adopt tangible measures. And at the national level, we are continuing to implement the agenda through our National Women, Peace, and Security Action Plan for the 2025 to 2030 period. We emphasize the key importance of compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law under all circumstances. And we also support participation and engagement of civil society. The microphone has been cut off.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Luxembourg for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Spain. Excellency, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Spain would like to congratulate the Chair and the members of the Bureau for their nomination, and we join the statement delivered by the EU. Chair, we are meeting in a moment of extraordinary uncertainty. Conflicts are multiplying, trust among states is eroding, and we are seeing strategic competition and rearmament dynamics that could weaken cooperation mechanisms built over decades. consensus reached with a lot of effort are questioned and too often we see zero-sum logics prevail that undermine the multilateral system and the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture at the moment when we need it the most. We cannot forget that investing in non-proliferation and disarmament means investing in our own collective security. And that is why the work of the First Committee and of all the disarmament machinery is more necessary than ever today. It is one of the few spaces where there are still transparency mechanisms and CBMs that are capable of preventing an escalation, reducing risks, and that favor understanding among states. At the same time, the universalization and full compliance with the nonproliferation disarmament treaties is something that is more critical than ever. Recent progress in Syria, thanks to the collaboration from its authorities and the technical, independent, and professional work of the OPCW and the IAEA, show that multilateral institutions work. So let's stay away from defeatist rhetoric. The response to deficiencies in the nonproliferation and disarmament architecture do not mean that we have to weaken it, they mean that we have to strengthen it, make it more effective and adapted to the realities of the 21st century. The deliberations in the review conference for the NPT held this year in New York showcased commitment of state parties of the treaty and the need to improve its implementation in order to progress on nuclear disarmament and compliance with the obligations of nuclear weapons states on the basis of Article VI. We should continue to build upon that consensus in the next review cycle for this Treaty. Mr. Chair, Russia's unilateral, unprovoked, and unjustified aggression against Ukraine continues to be a grave violation of the UN Charter, and it continues to have serious implications for our international security architecture. This conflict has exposed the risks of Russia's irresponsible, repeated nuclear rhetoric and its attacks against civilian nuclear infrastructure, such as Zaporizhzhia. This shows that nuclear security is already a major issue for collective security. Reports from the technical secretariat of the OPCW reveal that in Ukrainian territory, riot control agents and chloropicrin were used. These are completely banned as a method of warfare according to the convention. Spain condemns these actions and we reiterate our firm support to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. the Middle East Spain continues to be deeply concerned due to the deterioration of the security situation we reiterate our commitment to a diplomatic solution for the Iranian nuclear file in close cooperation with the IAEA Spain encourages the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully comply with its safeguards agreement and to renew full cooperation with the IAEA in order to re-establish trust with the international community. The accumulation of weaponry associated to these and other conflicts, as well as non-compliance with IHL, have devastating consequences for the civilian population. Their protection should continue to be at the heart of our efforts. The media visibility of these crises should not distract us from the seriousness of North Korea's actions in the framework of their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Total, definitive and irreversible denuclearization is an urgent and priority goal. Chair, emerging technologies offer enormous opportunities as well as risks for human progress. AI is a clear example of this challenge. This is why Spain will continue to be committed with all efforts to promote its responsible governance in the military domain. Spain would like to warmly welcome the consensus recently reached in the Group of Government Experts for Lethal Autonomous Weapons under the excellent leadership of Ambassador Robert Lindenbach. The adoption of the final report provides a solid basis to continue moving towards an instrument that is based on three fundamental principles: the maintenance of human control, full respect for international law, and specifically international humanitarian law, and the existence of effective mechanisms for accountability and responsibility. We support the work of the open-ended working group on preventing an arms race in outer space and their dialogue on norms for responsible behavior and elements for a possible international treaty with the goal of ensuring the peaceful use of this space. We also support the work of the working group on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Spain will also continue to champion the importance of the international export control regimes. These are critical to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the illegal diversion of conventional weapons, at the same time that they facilitate legitimate and responsible trade. We reaffirm our support to the Disarmament Conference. It is time to revitalize it, go beyond the paralysis, and reinforce its capacity to respond to contemporary challenges through the negotiation of universal instruments. For this, the principle of inclusivity of the Conference is absolutely essential. Chair, a full version of this statement will be published on the relevant platform for this Committee. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative to the Conference of on disarmament of Spain for her statement. I shall now call on delegations who have requested the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to four and a half minutes for the first intervention and two and a half minutes for the second intervention. I call on the representative of Germany for the first intervention. You have the floor.

Very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we have taken note of a rather comprehensive reply to our general statement by Iran yesterday. We shall endeavor to be somewhat more concise. However, we feel compelled to respond to the few points that were raised regarding issues concerning First Committee. Germany is and has always been in full compliance with the NPT, all articles contained therein, and IAEA safeguards. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have been and continue to be fully consistent with the NPT. They were put in place well before the NPT entered into force in 1970 and were well known to all signatories. Neither the IAEA nor the Security Council have ever indicated any noncompliance by Germany with any of the articles of the NPT. It is therefore somewhat bewildering to be accused of non-compliance with the NPT by a state whose own track record speaks a very different language. Numerous IAEA reports have pointed out Iran's disregard for its NPT safeguards obligations. On two occasions in 2005 and again in 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors officially confirmed Iran's non-compliance. Just a few weeks ago, given Iran's unwillingness to live up to its obligations, the Board of Governors decided to report Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. We remain convinced that compliance is not merely an obligation, but a choice that strengthens the credibility of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Our track record with IAEA safeguards has been and continues to be impeccable. We can only encourage Iran to rediscover the merits of that approach and invite Iran to join once again those countries that have made this choice. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Germany. I now call on a distinguished representative of Poland for the first intervention. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairperson. I take the floor to address the claim made by the delegate of the DPRK yesterday that Russia's aggressive behavior in Europe can be justified by the alleged violations of its security interests through NATO enlargement. This assertion is false and has been also a key element of the Russian disinformation campaign and needs to be debunked. Therefore, I would like to make three points today. First, NATO did not enlarge by itself. Sovereign states freely and democratically choose to join the alliance, exercising the right to determine their own security arrangements. Second, Poland joined NATO to safeguard its freedom, security, and democratic values. We did not wish to remain in a gray zone of security or return to the Russian sphere of influence. What Moscow seeks today by invading Ukraine is precisely the reestablishment of such spheres in Europe. As for the latest round of NATO enlargement, Russia has no one to blame by itself. Its war of aggression launched in 2022 was the trigger which encouraged additional two states to seek the NATO membership. Third, NATO is a defensive alliance. It seeks neither confrontation nor territorial expansion. NATO's strategic documents make it clear that the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used are extremely remote. Since the end of the Cold War, allies have reduced the number of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by around 90%. Russia has chosen a different path, which stands in a stark contrast with NATO. It has increased its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons, maintained a disproportionately large arsenal of such weapons, repeatedly resorted to nuclear threats and significantly lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use in its declaratory policy. All of this makes credible NATO deterrence necessary. NATO's nuclear policy, including nuclear burden sharing, is a safeguard against intimidation and an important contributor to the overall stability and security, including nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Poland. I now call on the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman. The Russian Federation repudiates the groundless and utterly unsubstantiated accusations in connection with the conduct of the special military operation in Ukraine. Our country fully complies with the obligations under international humanitarian law, as specifically from the very start of the conflict, the Russian Armed Forces have been operating in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the protocols thereto, as well as in accordance with the Convention on Inhumane Weapons. They are strictly complying with the national instructions on IHL, which were crafted in a manner that takes into account the content of the above-mentioned international treaties. The goal of the Russian military forces and their targets continue to be focused purely on military facilities and military infrastructure used for military purposes, contrary to attempts by opponents in Kyiv and European countries to allege otherwise. Unfortunately, the same cannot be stated about the Kyiv regime, whose main aim is to inflict maximum damage on civilian, civilian infrastructure. In Russia, since late June, for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, they have been routinely striking Russian deliberately striking Russian civilian infrastructure, oil refineries, oil bases, port terminals, energy, industrial infrastructure, marketplaces, civilian service data centers, airfields, and maritime vessels. Since the start of this year, Kyiv strikes on various regions in Russia have caused more than 8,000 casualties, including 425 children, at least since last week alone. 552 civilians perished, including five children. Another 206 people were wounded. Civilian vessels are being targeted, including those transporting products for global markets, including food, oil, oil products. And in 2026, 214 such incidents were reported. 20 and this 228 since the start of such incidents, since the start of the special military operations operation, 20 crew members died. And to compare figures, in 2025, 12 vessels were struck, whereas in 2023 and 2024, only one vessel, and during those years, one vessel was struck. Despite the statistics, not a single European country even considers reprimanding their in Kyiv. And this has become a norm for Western countries, with double standards being used. Their statements heard at the First Committee are hypocritical attempts to justify their failures and shortsightedness. The real reason for the difficult situation with IHL in Ukraine the UAF's practice of deploying heavy military infrastructure in residential areas, the use of civilians as human shields, and civilian infrastructure being used for military aims. Ukrainian units are deploying air defense systems and munitions and arms storage sites, military-industrial complex, as well as drone production components and other military infrastructure, which are legitimate targets for the Russian armed forces. These are being deployed within residential areas, thereby posing a threat to the lives of ordinary Ukrainians. And this is a breach of Article 58 of Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which stipulates to the extent that it is possible to avoid the placement of military facilities in densely populated areas. To conclude, we wish to call upon the international community to refrain from baseless allegations and for the facts that we have shared with you to be duly taken into account. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I now call on the distinguished representative of Israel. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, my delegation has requested the floor to react to the statement by the Palestinian representative earlier today. Mr. Chair, Israel has been engaged for three years in a war against terrorist groups that populate the Middle East and undermine its stability. This is a word that was imposed on us after the abhorrent terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel on October 7th, 2024, 2023, sorry. It is nothing less than tragic, tragic that the Palestinian representative did not mention even in one word the tragedy this attack inflicted not only against my people, the people of Israel, but also against members of so many other communities that were murdered that day and the casualties of the war in Gaza that came as a result of this attack chair Israel has the right and indeed the obligation to protect and defend its citizens the IDF the IDF operations in Gaza are and were posed to bring the dismantling of Hamas governing and military capabilities in order to assure that Hamas will never pose a threat to Israel and its people. This is a name that every country, every country will have if it was in Israel's use. We emphasize, as always, that Israel operates its military operations in accordance with international law including the laws of armed conflict, and it will always do. Chair, despite the war and the suffering, Hamas is still unwilling to give up its arms and maintains tens of thousands of military operatives in Gaza, systematically concealing its military assets within the civilian environment. This is intended to create a severe a condition in which civilians are human shields for Hamas operatives. Chair, colleagues, we wish one day the Palestinian representatives will denounce the terrorist organization of Hamas for cowardly hijacking international humanitarian law for the protection of its own operatives in the account of the population in Gaza. Terrorist groups worldwide from Hamas in Gaza and well beyond must be held accountable. This is the duty of the international community. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Israel. I now call on the distinguished representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, thank you for the floor. My delegation expresses its deep regret that a state who doesn't even know the member state's official name took the floor in this committee. And my delegation reminds Spain to properly call the official name of my country as listed in the UN system, that is, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Mr. Chair. My delegation categorically and totally reject the stereotyped and absurd allegations of the delegations from Turkey, Luxembourg, Spain, who groundlessly blame the DPRK's sovereign rights and defensive measures. As we have mentioned on many occasions, the DPRK's position of nuclear weapons is a sovereign entitlement and right to defend itself from the nuclear threat of the US, which lasted for several decades. The DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons is clearly stipulated in its constitution, and if one tries to deny or change the constitutional position of my country as a nuclear-weapon state, preaching denuclearization to us, it will be regarded as the most serious infringement upon its sovereignty. The DPRK's nuclear deterrent is the absolute might and irresistible force designed from A to Z to safeguard the sovereignty, security, and peace against aggression and threat from outside. The DPRK will firmly defend the dignity and sovereignty of the nation, its people, and constitution from all sort of attempt from the hostile forces. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I had not intended to take the mic, but I feel compelled to do so in response to the statement from the Russian delegation. Chair, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues to inflict immense suffering on civilians. More than four years after the start of the full-scale invasion, evidence assembled by the OSCE, successive OSCE Moscow Mechanism expert missions, the United Nations and other independent bodies continues to paint a deeply disturbing picture. This reporting documents the Russian Federation's persistent violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The OSCE has recorded accounts of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture and ill-treatment, conflict-related sexual violence, and the fabricated prosecution of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war. It has also documented systematic restrictions on fundamental rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, alongside the humanitarian consequences of Russia's attacks on populated areas and civilian infrastructure. Successive OSCE Moscow Mechanism expert missions have reinforced these findings. Experts have documented Russia's unlawful transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children, efforts to alter their identity, and programmes of militarisation and indoctrination. They have also reported widespread torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well as allegations of executions, sexual violence and the denial of protections that are required under international law. Today, that suffering continues. Russia has intensified its attacks on Ukrainian cities to unprecedented levels. In the first eight months of this year, civilian casualties rose by 55 per cent compared with the same period last year. As winter approaches, Russia has openly signalled its intention to intensify large-scale strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Millions of civilians once again face attacks that threaten to deprive them of electricity, heating and essential services. The United Kingdom remains committed to accountability. We will continue to work with Ukraine to support efforts to document violations and preserve evidence, including of the more than 260,000 recorded alleged war crimes. We will also continue to pursue justice through international and domestic mechanisms, including the ICC, the special tribunal for the crime of aggression and the register of damage. The background context for this growing humanitarian suffering is clear. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness for peace, but Russia has instead chosen to intensify its attacks. The United Kingdom calls again for Russia to agree to a full and unconditional ceasefire, to enter in good faith into serious negotiations and to commit to a just and lasting peace, ending the dire humanitarian consequences of its illegal war against Ukraine. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. I now give the floor to the Islamic Republic of Iran. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. While we categorically reject baseless allegations made by certain Western countries against Iran's peaceful program, nuclear program, I would like to underscore the following. to Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, and certain other Western countries that level baseless allegations against Iran's peaceful nuclear program while refusing to condemn the illegal attacks against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities, I have a clear message. Before pointing fingers at Iran, address your own violations of Article I and II of the NPT arising from your reliance on NATO's nuclear deterrence arrangements. Your selective invocation of international law, blatant hypocrisy, and double standards expose the hollowness of your accusations. Those who apply international law selectively have no credibility to lecture others on compliance. You cannot invoke international law against others while shielding yourselves and your allies from its obligations. I further warn these countries not to assume that the baseless allegations they make in this and other chambers carry no consequences. Such allegations have been used to manufacture a pretext for and lend political justification to the illegal US-Israeli attacks against Iran, which have killed more than 4,000 innocent people, including 168 schoolgirls in the Meenab. Those who propagate such allegations cannot wash their hands of the consequences when their rhetoric helped legitimize aggression. Let me be clear. Those who knowingly spread false accusations that help pave the way for acts of aggression bear political and moral responsibility for their role in creating the conditions that enable such crimes. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation for a second intervention. You have the floor.

Mr. Chairman. The Russian Federation repudiates the latest share of unsubstantiated and baseless insinuations against us in connection with the conduct of the special military operation in Ukraine. We believe that the explanations that were provided regarding the full compliance with international IHL obligations are comprehensive in nature. In connection with yesterday's baseless statements from the Republic of Korea regarding cooperation between Russia and the We wish to recall the fact that the UN Security Council did not limit the right of the DPRK under Article 51 of the Charter. We are also surprised at the regular attempts by Seoul to pin responsibility on Russia for the protracted years-long targeted escalatory actions, which are are the root cause of the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula. During the 30th session of the General Assembly and Resolution 33/90B, the First Committee on the Korean Peninsula issue already set out concrete steps to provide for guarantees for a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. This includes the withdrawal of all foreign troops present in the Republic of Korea, as well as the replacement of the agreement with a peace treaty, insofar as none of the above mentioned is part of the long-term plans of Washington and Seoul. Expecting any comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula in the foreseeable future is hardly possible. Instead of implementation of the above measures, the Republic of Korea decided to introduce peace and stability, so-called, by brandishing the U.S. nuclear truncheon towards the DRK. And then, for the first time in a long time, nuclear weapon, the deployment to 1976 to the present day, there have been joint exercises with the U.S. on carpet bombing scenarios of cities in the DPRK. On the basis of this longstanding aggressive policy, Seoul together with Washington and Tokyo are de facto establishing military alliances targeting states in the region. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available for this meeting. We will meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. sharp in this conference room. We shall continue with the general debate on all disarmament and related international security items, and I appeal to all delegations to be punctual to enable us to proceed with our work in a timely manner. The meeting is adjourned.