Non-proliferation - Security Council, 10224th meeting

Good morning to you all. The 10,224th meeting of the Security Council is called to order. The provisional agenda for this meeting is non-proliferation. The representative of the Russian Federation has requested the floor. I give him the floor.

Mr. President, once again in the space of a few days, we have been forced to observe attempts by some members of the Security Council and its President to grossly abuse procedure and conduct a meeting on the selfsame non-existent agenda item. Once again, we'd like to remind you of the stark facts. Security Council Resolution 2231 expired on the 18th of October 2025. On that day, the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. and the item non-proliferation was removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. Such wording was clearly stipulated in paragraph 8 of OP of this resolution. The mechanism reinstating the pre-2015 Security Council resolution on Iran provided for in resolution 2231 was not triggered for a whole number of reasons. about which we and other delegations repeatedly talked. Given this, there is no legal or procedural basis for conducting today's Council meeting on the defunct agenda item non-proliferation. We categorically reject attempts by some members of the Council thus to create the illusion of legitimacy through their assertions about some kind of apparent existing snapback. We would call for the adoption of the agenda to be put to a procedural vote. I thank you.

I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for the statement. Would any other member of the Council like to take the floor? The United States? China. China first.

Thank you, President. China supports the remark made by the Russian Federation. China has reiterated for many times that Resolution 2231 has expired on October 18, 2025, and the Security Council has ended its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. In disregard of this fact, the United States proposed and promoted the relevant draft resolution. China has expressed our opposition for many times. The current situation in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear issue is in a deadlock. The Security Council should play a constructive role in promoting dialogue and easing the situation, rather than serving as the platform for individual members to engage in political confrontation and pressurization. China calls on countries to earnestly implement Resolution 2231 and relevant measures related to the expiry date of that resolution to maintain the authority and multilateral democracy credibility and create necessary conditions for political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. The President should also accommodate concern of all parties and to play a constructive role for enhancing these. unity and the cooperation of the Security Council avoid intensification of division. Thank you.

I thank the representative of China, and I give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. President. We strongly reject the assertions made by some members of this Council, and we fully support moving forward with this meeting. Several members of this body want to prevent this discussion to protect Iran. a country that continues to openly defy many of its most basic UN obligations. This committee was tasked by this body to constrain and monitor a nuclear program that Iran sought to operate out of the view of the international community. We will discuss the essential extension of this panel's mandate today. Just one year ago, this council voted decisively to permit the snapback of sanctions and the reestablishment of the 1737 committee. This committee is legitimate. It has a sanctions list, a proposed slate of members for the panel, and it has decided a number of sanctions exemptions. I urge everyone to join us to adopt the agenda and allow the council to proceed with the vote. Thank you.

I thank the representative of the United States for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Mr. President. As we heard in last week's Council meeting, Iran's nuclear program presents a threat to international security and to the global nonproliferation regime. With experts appointed, the panel of experts would play a critical role in supporting the implementation of UN sanctions by identifying, exposing, and countering the progress of Iran's nuclear and missile programs and other forms of non-compliance. UN Security Council Resolution 1929 sets out a clear mandate for this panel of experts. We thank the US for their work as penholder, and we urge Council members to proceed with today's meeting to adopt this important mandate and to defend a key pillar of UN sanctions architecture. The United Kingdom will vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda.

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Colombia.

Thank you, Mr. President. Colombia would like to make it clear here with regard to the legal problems.

A problem as to whether the committee and the panel is legal from the international perspective. Colombia wants to remind members of the Council of the decision of the International Criminal Justice Court of Kosovo 2010 on the good faith principle. Though the principle is situated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 that applies obviously to treaty law, the court has said in this and in a nuclear test decision of 1974 that the good faith principle also applies for any legal instrument that is issued by international bodies in the sense and context that provides to any legal provision the legal force that it requires to have legal effects. This principle of obligatio is iuris vinculum. We do need to understand that once the Council voted for the previous resolution a year ago, It provides the legitimacy to the instrument and the fact that the snapback mechanism didn't reach its goal does not render on the good faith principle the instrument that consecrate and the instrument that establish it inexistent. We force upon and ask everyone to consider the fact that Not allowing the vote of this panel of experts equals to say that we do not follow the principle of good faith in the commitments and also in the interpretation of the international rules, considering especially the regime sanctions of the Security Council. And though it seems to be a matter of only applicable to the issue of Iran, we are here setting a precedent to any other similar legal issue that is taking the force away from the Security Council regime. As such, the decision is not just conjunctural. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of Colombia for those comments, and I will now make a statement in my capacity as representative of France. The Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme, including resolution 1929, were restored on 27 September 2025. I'd like to recall the note sent on 28 September 2025 by the Secretary-General, taking note of the reinstitution of these resolutions. Paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 provides for the implementation of an initial mandate of one year. of a panel of experts to assist the 1737 Sanctions Committee. The restoration of resolution 1929 reinitiated this mandate. It is therefore necessary for this Council to consider a draft resolution considering the renewal of the panel. Therefore, we will vote in favour of this agenda item. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. Given the request made and the comments shared by members of the Security Council, I propose to put the provisional agenda to the vote. I will now put it to a vote. May those in favour of the adoption of the draft agenda on non-proliferation please raise their hand. Those against? Abstentions? The result of the voting is as follows. 11 votes in favour, 2 votes against, 2 abstentions. The agenda is adopted. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item 2 of the agenda. Members of the Council have before them a draft resolution, published in document S/2026/740, submitted by the United States of America. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. Will those in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/2026/740 please raise their hand? Those against? Abstentions? The result of the voting is as follows: 11 votes in favour, 2 votes against, Two abstentions. The draft resolution is not adopted owing to the negative vote of two permanent members of the Security Council. I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the vote. I give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, we are not surprised by the actions of several Council members in vetoing the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts. That's because this panel would have shined the light on the UNSCR-prohibited bilateral defensive cooperation between Iran and its partners. Given this veto, it is clear that this is part of a broader effort to prevent appointments or renew mandates of expert panels to stifle reporting that implicates their own activities in support of rogue regimes in defiance of their UNSCR obligations. Panels have learned the hard way that calling out members of this body for sanctions violations or evasion can have serious and sometimes tragic consequences. This includes delays or refusals to approve individual experts for Yemen and the Central African Republic panels. In more extreme cases, entire expert panels have been eliminated, including those for Mali and DPRK. Mali's sanctions regime itself was terminated. Without an independent panel of experts, this council loses its principal source of impartial, evidence-based reporting on sanctions violations, creating a monitoring gap that only benefits the Iranian regime and those who profit from evading those measures. In view of this latest act of obstructionism, the United States will not cease efforts within this committee to establish a panel of experts that befits the mandate of this committee, as well as name a committee chair and produce and post an updated sanctions list. The United States looks forward to working with member states on continuing the important work of this committee. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of the United States for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you to the US for their work on this important mandate. For over 20 years, the international community has sought to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. The United Kingdom has consistently championed a diplomatic solution. Regrettably, Iran has too often chosen escalation over cooperation, creating the circumstances that continue to demand the Council's attention today, expanding her nuclear programme in ways that lack any credible civilian justification, failing to cooperate with the IAEA and denying access to IAEA inspectors. meaning that the IAEA has been unable to verify the current size, composition or whereabouts of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile. This Council established the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee in 2006 because of these grave concerns, and established a panel of experts in 2010 to help the Committee monitor the relevant provisions and to provide expert and independent advice to ensure that sanctions were effective and appropriate. Russia and China voted for both these resolutions. Twenty years later, we are again seeing Iran refusing to comply with the basic legal requirements of legitimate civil nuclear activity. The United Kingdom regrets that Russia and China have chosen to exercise their veto today, choosing to shield Iran and to undermine this Council's work to ensure that she doesn't acquire a nuclear weapon. Sadly, we see similar actions beyond Iran. In March 2024, Russia's veto of the 1718 panel of experts ended 14 years of monitoring expertise on the DPRK's sanctions evasion. Russia's facilitated Iran and DPRK's evasions of sanctions and received Iranian-designed Shahed drones and the DPRK's ballistic missiles to fuel her brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. However, while Russia and China vetoes today reduce the council's understanding of how the sanctions are being implemented, they do not change the fundamentals. Sanctions against Iranian proliferation remain fully in force, binding on each and every UN member state. The United Kingdom stands ready to work with all partners towards a negotiated settlement to uphold and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and to ensure that Iran never acquires or develops a nuclear weapon. Thank you.

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Greece.

Mr. President, we thank the United States for their efforts in this mandate. Greece voted in favour of the resolution before us. Our vote reflects, first and foremost, the need to ensure that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 can effectively discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by this Council. For this, it must have the necessary institutional and technical tools at its disposal. Central among these is a functioning panel of experts established pursuant to resolution 1929. Without it, the Committee's capacity to perform its mandate and the Council's ability to oversee the implementation of its own decisions are diminished. More broadly, the effectiveness and credibility of Security Council sanctions regimes depend on ensuring that the Council's subsidiary bodies have the tools necessary to fulfill their mandates. Security Council decisions must be implemented by all Member States. We therefore reiterate that the remaining operational arrangements of the Committee, including the appointment of a Chair, must be completed without further delay. that at the same time, Mr. President, implementation and oversight mechanisms are neither an alternative to diplomacy nor an end in themselves. They are only part of a broader effort aimed at achieving a diplomatic resolution of the Iran nuclear issue. Greece reiterates that a comprehensive, verifiable and durable diplomatic solution remains the only sustainable path to addressing proliferation concerns and restoring regional stability. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Greece for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Colombia.

Thank you, President.

Let's begin by disaggregating the legal issues so we understand what we are saying here. First of all, Article 25 of the Charter provides the decisions of the Security Council a binding effect, either we have it or not. Second of all, we are talking about a panel of experts under international law and international treaty law and international constitutional law, therefore, United Nations law. This body is a subsidiary organ. No subsidiary organ in practice or in jurisprudence is considered to be the upholding condition to apply the instrument that created. That instrument is a resolution of the Security Council. Whatever happened with the subsidiary body in this mission, once it's activated, does not determine the validity or the legality of the instrument that created. In other words, the resolution, the regime sanctions never cease to exist. It was all the time there. It can be suspended. And there are many other issues in history since the United Nations was created when the regime's sanctions have been suspended. And it is the practice of the Security Council to periodically review whether or not reestablish the sanctions. But the legality of the instrument was never at issue, and it should not be by virtue of a political interpretation of international law, which has, again, institutional implications for all of us and the body in which we sit today.

As such, recognizing the validity of these decisions on is not exhausted through formal recognition, it is also worth preserving the instruments that the Security Council established to oversee the activities relating to uranium enrichment in Iran. It is specifically on this point where Colombia expresses its greatest concern. After almost a decade of suspension, the Committee needs this technical, independent information at a critical time, at which a regional conflict is escalating to the international level. the practices of evasion and also recommendations with regard to new trends relating to relevant actors are all relevant here. We regret the fact that this mandate has not been able to be renewed. This deprives the regime of one of the mandates established by the Council and once again to obtain information that facilitates not only the taking of decisions but also, specifically, a diplomatic path for the conflict that has already escalated to unsustainable levels. Our decision is not only legal in nature, it is also political, but it will likely have consequences beyond our time on the Council. Colombia, therefore, believes it's essential to preserve these instruments so that the Council itself can comply with and follow its own decisions, which, according to the letter of the law, is not being called into question, and which clearly exists in all provisions of the legal instrument that we have before us. Thank you, President.

I thank the representative of Colombia for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain.

Thank you, Mr. President. The Kingdom of Bahrain regrets that the draft resolution was not adopted. We have actually voted for the draft resolution. It would have allowed the extension of the mandate of the panel of experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 of 2010. It would have empowered it to undertake its work and support the Commission established pursuant to Resolution 1737. However, the failure to adopt the draft resolution does not change the facts that must remain seized by this Council. It must implement its resolutions and measures for most the continued concerns over the Iranian nuclear program and the need to ensure full compliance to relevant international obligations. There is a need to establish an independent technical mechanism that would support the committee to monitor the implementation of different measures and assess non-compliance, including different nuclear activities, procurement networks, transfer of material, equipment, and relevant technology. This is of greater importance in light of the regional repercussions of Iranian activities. The Kingdom of Bahrain and the countries of the region have been, um, continuously attacked. These attacks targeted our territories, infrastructure, and civilian objects. These were condemned by the Council in its resolution 2817. There is also continued danger due to the activities of different groups and proxies to Iran. Disrupting such a technical tool will only avoid the Council from considering this thing. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain for that statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Latvia.

Thank you, President. Latvia voted in favour of the resolution submitted by the United States, and we regret that a positive outcome was not reached. The selective interpretation of international law and Council decisions by some members has caused the work of all of the Council's subsidiary organs to come to a standstill. Such politicization of the Council's past decisions undermines the ability of this Council to fully implement its mandate to uphold international peace and security. In this case, opposition to the resolution serves to shield Iran, a state that has been appropriately sanctioned for its longstanding and systematic failure to uphold its international non-proliferation obligations. Despite efforts by some members to rewrite history and ignore binding Council resolutions, the sanctions against Iran remain in force. All UN member states are obliged to respect and implement them. Today's draft is a technical resolution aimed at extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1737 Sanctions Committee, in line with established practice and in full accordance with the procedures of this Council. Mr. President, panels of experts are vital instruments for the comprehensive implementation and oversight of Council-mandated sanctions. They are particularly important for addressing efforts to circumvent sanctions, as well as for identifying any necessary changes and updates. The 1737 Sanctions Committee is currently operating without a panel of experts due to politicization rather than sound legal arguments. Today's outcome is part of a deliberate pattern of weakening the UN sanctions architecture for the benefit of one member state, similar to Russia's veto on the mandate renewal of the panel of experts of the 1718 Sanctions Committee concerning the DPRK, another partner in its illegal aggression against Ukraine. In conclusion, allow me to reiterate that Latvia will continue to uphold the global non-proliferation regime and binding decisions of this Council to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Latvia for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Denmark.

Thank you, Mr. President. Denmark voted in favour of this resolution to extend the panels of experts supporting the 1737 Sanctions Committee. The role of the Panel has become all the more essential in light of Iran's refusal to live up to its safeguard obligations and to cooperate with the IAEA. We deeply regret that the resolution has been rejected. What should have been a simple, technical rollover was prevented by the unwillingness of a few Council members to acknowledge that the snapback mechanism was activated in full accordance with Security Council Resolution 2231. This resolution, it is worth recalling, was adopted unanimously by the very same countries that are now preventing its implementation. Mr. President, the Panel is meant to assist this Committee in carrying out a crucial role in sanctions implementation by providing independent and impartial information, putting all differences from geopolitical tensions aside. Denmark has remained actively and constructively engaged in the work of the 1737 Committee and its Panel of Experts. We call on all Council members to fulfill their responsibilities and ensure the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Mr. President, Iran has developed a nuclear program that lacks any credible civilian justification, including enriching uranium up to 60 percent. Just last week, The IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran to this very Council over its safeguards non-compliance. Iran must never develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon. The responsibility before this Council is clear: to act with resolve, speak with one voice, and safeguard the foundational principles of global non-proliferation, upon which our collective security rests. I thank you.

I thank the.

Representative of Denmark for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, President. I have taken the floor to explain Pakistan's abstention on the draft resolution just acted upon by the Council. Pakistan remains concerned that the consideration of Iran nuclear issue, including by the Security Council, has become further complicated. over a period of time. We have clearly come a long way from the spirit of cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes that characterized the adoption of resolution 2231 more than a decade ago. Ongoing tensions and hostilities in the region and strikes on nuclear facilities as well as continued differences among permanent members on key aspects of this file have added to the challenge in addressing the issue through dialogue and diplomacy. Last September, the council had two opportunities before it to either continue the termination of sanctions as envisaged under JCPOA or to bring into effect a six month technical extension. in the mandate of resolution 2231 to provide more time and space for diplomatic efforts to proceed amicably. Regrettably, a non-consensual path was chosen with far-reaching consequences that have since continued to reverberate in this Chamber and beyond. We had stressed at that time that a non-confrontational and cooperative approach would have better facilitated the quest for a lasting, peaceful solution while preserving consensus within the Council. The President of Pakistan continues to believe that diplomacy and dialogue remain the guiding principle for resolution of outstanding issues concerning Iran nuclear program. Pakistan has consistently advocated the primacy of diplomatic engagement and the imperative of avoiding confrontation and conflict. We reiterate our position that the Iran nuclear issue should be addressed through peaceful means and in accordance with the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the parties concerned. We also lend our support to the critical role of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the technical body entrusted with implementing the respective safeguards agreements. The IAEA should ensure this important work as per its mandate, independently and without political interference. There is an urgent need to renew and continue diplomatic engagement to seriously and faithfully address outstanding issues in a cooperative manner, in accordance with the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the parties concerned. We must prioritize this approach and never give up on a peaceful negotiated settlement. On its part, Pakistan continues with its efforts to promote peace and stability in the region, building upon the solid foundation provided by the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. We call on all parties to implement the commitments agreed in the Islamabad MOU, return to the negotiating table, and allow diplomacy to deliver for the sake of regional and international peace and security. I thank you.

I thank the representative of Pakistan for the statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Panama.

Thank you, Mr. President. Our vote in favour of the resolution today is in line with the firmly held belief of the Republic of Panama in favour of multilateralism, respect for international law and of the institutional and architectural architecture that underpins the measures imposed by the Security Council. Sanctions committees represent fundamental instruments for the effective implementation of the decisions adopted by the Security Council. Against this backdrop, the panels of experts play a crucial role, particularly in collecting, verifying and carrying out a technical independent analysis of information. Their work provides Member States with objective information that contributes to the adoption of well-founded, consistent decisions in line with the mandates adopted by this Council. For this reason, the Republic of Panama regrets the fact that the differences of opinion between some members have not allowed us to reach the necessary consensus for the renewal of this important panel of experts. This situation transcends the merely procedural. The lack of this mechanism is hampering the committee's ability to fully undertake the responsibilities entrusted to it, and it lays a worrisome precedent, as well as denying the committee the relevant tools to ensure the effective functioning of the Security Council and UN sanctions regime. President, one year ago, this Council decided to reapply the corresponding sanctions in accordance with the snapback mechanism through which the set of resolutions re-entered into force. Consequently, we believe that The validity of the 1737 Sanctions Committee was restored as a body entrusted to oversee the measures taken by this Council, and the Republic of Panama is obliged to recognize its mandate and the binding nature of such measures. regrets the fact that the Committee will be forced to continue to exercise its mandate without the support of a panel of experts that is fully operational. We therefore urge Member States to preserve the ability of mechanisms established by this Council to fulfill their mandates and prevent political differences compromising the effective functioning of this and other subsidiary bodies. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Panama for the statement and I give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. President, we today have heard about how international law works and how members of the Security Council think. Let's listen to our version now. The Russian Federation voted against the US authored draft resolution of the Security Council on extending the mandate of the panel of experts of the illegitimate 1737 committee. The position of our country regarding the ponderings of our Western countries on the apparent successful triggering in 2025 of the so-called snapback mechanism is crystal clear to all. In For those who are particularly forgetful, I'd like to remind you that UK, France and Germany did not have the right nor the justification to use this instrument. The reasons for this have repeated, we've repeatedly explained our reasons and other colleagues have gone into this in great detail. And anybody who so desires can look at our previous statements and also the joint letters by Russia, China and Iran on this. Thus, the reactivation of the UN Security Council resolution regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran in full force until 2015, including 1737 and 1929, that reactivation did not occur. No attempts to challenge this fact or the false and biased actions of the UN Secretariat's leadership that the Security Council did not mandate are able to change this objective reality. Given this, the draft resolution just under consideration by the Security Council was deeply flawed and did not have any legal basis. It proposed extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of 1733. However, the Panel and the Committee suspended their activities when the Council adopted 2231 and it expired in October 2025, and that has made this irreversible. Right from the beginning, it was clear that the US-authored document a priori was not acceptable. We, along with our Chinese partners, consistently conveyed that to our American colleagues and other members of the Council. We strongly urged the authors to refrain from promoting such a draft. It was clear that the only thing that such a stubborn imposition of such products could lead to would be an increased growth in tensions within the Security Council, both on political and procedural grounds. Nonetheless, Washington decided to opt for confrontation and put the draft to a vote. Such actions are of no surprise, since they are along the lines of the overall logic of escalatory steps taken by Western countries on the Iranian nuclear program file. This was prompted not by concerns for the global nonproliferation regime. If that were to have been the case, the US would not have withdrawn unilaterally from the JCPOA and would not have conducted, along with Israel, numerous strikes on Iranian peaceful nuclear infrastructure that were under IAEA safeguards. And countries loyal to Washington would not have supported these actions. The destructive path of our Western colleagues determined purely by their economic interests in exerting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran alone. To these ends, they've been harnessing all possible international fora, including the UN Security Council. The efforts include not only creating the illusion that the Security Council's anti-Iran resolutions have been instated, but also direct attempts to impose non-existent restrictions on member states. A clear example of such an absurd situation is What was disseminated a few days ago in the Security Council by some of its members, including the US, and American colleagues have openly admitted this at the Vienna forum, so the dissemination of the so-called objections regarding the visit to Austria of the Vice President of Iran, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad Islami, who was going to Vienna to participate in meetings of the IAEA General Conference. The Austrian authorities deemed this as an excuse to revoke Mohammad Eslami's visa that had already been issued, thus violating its obligations as the host country for the Agency. In this context, we mustn't forget that just a week ago in this Chamber, a whole number of Security Council members, including the US, actively called on Tehran to expand its cooperation with the IAEA Secretariat. The sincerity of such calls by the American side speak for themselves. Washington, along with Western Jerusalem, by starting its aggressive actions, has undermined the verification work of the IAEA in Iran. Then the US has contradicted itself by attempting illegally to pressure other states in order to prevent cooperation between Tehran and the agency secretariat. In addition, Washington has stubbornly refused to provide convincing guarantees on the non-resumption of strikes on the Iranian nuclear energy infrastructure, and it continues to threaten with escalatory measures. Mr. President, the Russian Federation categorically condemns this dangerous path. Thus, we reject the abuse of the procedure of the Security Council for political interests. Our country continues to counter any attempts to legitimize the assertions of the so-called existing snapback. We would call upon the UN Secretary-General and his subordinates to correct their mistakes. We strongly urge Western colleagues to stop their very dangerous actions on the Iran front. which threaten further complication of settling of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. The only way to resolve disagreements and to alleviate concerns inter alia pertaining to the Iranian nuclear program is through political and diplomatic efforts, the basis of which should be the consideration of the interests of all sides and the legitimate Right, so, Tiran, the Security Council bears particular responsibility for creating good conditions for such work. We trust that all colleagues will demonstrate common sense and will stop hampering this objective. I thank you.

I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for the statement. I give the floor to the representative of China.

President. Currently, hostilities in the Middle East continue unabated, while the political process on the Iranian nuclear issue remains deadlocked. The more turbulent the situation, the more important it is for the Security Council to demonstrate leadership and act in a responsible manner that avoids double standards, political manipulation, pressure, and confrontation. China voted against the draft resolution guided by the need to uphold justice and fairness, safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East, and proceed from the overall interests of seeking a political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. I wish to further elaborate on China's position as follows. First, we must uphold objectivity and impartiality and safeguard the Council's authority. The U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and its policy of maximum pressure against Iran, as well as its two rounds of military action against Iran during the negotiation process, including military attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities under the safeguards and monitoring of the IAEA, are at the root of the current crisis. The E3 failed to fulfill their obligations under the JCPOA and did not exhaust options for dispute resolution before initiating the so-called snapback. Such action is legally and procedurally flawed. Council Resolution 2231 expired and terminated on 18th October 2025, and the Council has ceased its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. Ignoring these facts and seeking to push through the reimposition of sanctions against Iran in the Council, or introducing a draft resolution that is clearly contentious, will only undermine the unity and credibility of the Council and impede diplomatic efforts. China firmly opposes such actions. Second, we must work to end hostilities and promote peace and de-escalation. Hostilities in the Middle East have repeatedly flared up, with the U.S. and Iran engaging in frequent attacks against each other. This has caused serious harm and losses to the people of Iran and other countries, while the spillover effects continue to expand, undermining the common interests of the international community. The pressing priority for the international community, including the Council, is to urge the parties concerned to remain calm and exercise restraint, cease the use of force or the threat of force, and de-escalate tensions. We should actively create the necessary conditions for the parties concerned to restore and implement the ceasefire, return to negotiations, and reach a peaceful agreement, thereby safeguarding peace and stability in the Middle East and beyond. Third, We must take a long-term view and uphold the overall direction of a political settlement of the issue. Military means, sanctions and pressure will not help resolve the issue. They will only exacerbate tensions and escalate the situation, which serves the interests of no party. Equal dialogue and negotiations are the only viable path forward. All parties should fully respect Iran's legitimate right as a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A long-term agreement should be reached through diplomatic efforts with the IAEA providing strict safeguards to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Any council action should help facilitate negotiations among the parties on the equal footing, enable them to find the greatest common ground while accommodating each other's legitimate concerns and reach a solution that meets the expectations of the international community. President, as a participant in the JCPOA and a permanent member of the Council, China has always been upholding justice, promoting peace, and facilitating talks. We do not seek geopolitical self-interest or engage in political confrontation. We have played a constructive role in promoting de-escalation in the Middle East and advancing a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. China will continue to work with all parties to advance a political settlement of the issue, uphold the global nonproliferation regime, and promote peace and stability in the Middle East through unremitting efforts. Thank you, President.

I thank the representative of China for the statement. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of France.

The draft text that was submitted to the Council today had a simple aim: to renew the mandate of the independent panel of experts tasked with assisting the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran and monitoring the implementation of resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme. France voted in favour of this text because it supports the full implementation of these resolutions. They were re-established a year ago in line with the procedures stipulated in resolution 2231 because of the grave repeated violations by Iran of its commitments under the JCPOA. This decision was taken not just like that, but after months of sterile negotiations between the E3 and Iran in Geneva, in particular, that demonstrated Iran's obstinate refusal to cooperate. We deplore the fact that The veto of two members has hampered the renewal of the mandate of this panel. We also deplore the fact that the very same members of the Council a few days ago blocked the recruitment of experts proposed by the Secretariat for this panel. This veto deprives the 1737 Committee and the Council of an indispensable tool to ensure the implementation of their decisions. It deprives the whole of the international community deprive them of a reliable, impartial source of information on a key issue of international peace and security. And just like the veto that was opposed two years ago regarding the renewal of the panel on North Korea, this veto harms the international nonproliferation regime that is one of the foundations of our collective security. The role of this panel of experts is particularly important because of the violations by Iran of its international obligations and, in particular, the Council's resolutions. These violations pose a serious threat to international peace and security. The status of the Iranian nuclear programme remains a major subject of concern while Iran continues to block all resumption of cooperation with the IAEA. To this end, we take note of the recent decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to refer to this Council the question of the non-respect by Iran of its safeguards agreement under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran's ballistic programme continues also to threaten regional stability, as we are reminded by the indiscriminate strikes conducted over recent months against the Gulf States. We would recall that 1929 prohibits Iran from conducting activities linked, ballistic missile activities rather, that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. France will continue to strive for the full implementation of the Council's resolutions on Iran, including by studying means to document violations, the implementation of international sanctions remain a crucial instrument to encourage Iran to come back to respecting its non-proliferation obligations and to engage in negotiations in good faith regarding a scaffold for its nuclear program. France remains committed to the quest for a diplomatic solution. It is ready to contribute to efforts to find a lasting, verifiable agreement guaranteeing that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.

I resume my function as President of the Council. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The meeting is adjourned.